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CHREA vs.

CHR
G.R. No. 155336

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special
provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source
of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the
then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region
Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-
Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a
Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-
Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?

HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and
its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-
National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR
Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
and Position Classification System in the Government and
For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law,
provides that it is the DBM that shall establish
and administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the
long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to administer is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to
direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of;
and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the
government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buag,
this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the
requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized
and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole
power and discretion to administer the compensation and
position classification system of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of
the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and
benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the
coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation
and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the
PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any
PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its
personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM
can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the
latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs
function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the
Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as
closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No.
6758. )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential
yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought
prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of
positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of
the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title
XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget
and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget,
preparation, execution and control of the National Budget,
preparation and maintenance of accounting systems
essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more
economy and efficiency in the management of government
operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding
that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM
to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions
as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting
approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now
claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought
from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken
premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional
commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain
terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall
be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is
silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with
the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is
abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of
Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other
than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require
from time to time.
22
In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v.
Drilon,
23
it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC,
the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep.
Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did
not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to
which the special provision to formulate and implement
organizational structures apply, but merely states its
coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices
enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of
fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the
members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within
the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent,
however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary
rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.
26

NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no
locus standi considering that there exists no official written
record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona
fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the
records to show that its president has the authority to sue the
CHR.
On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as
a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which
consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions
benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the
Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and
file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed,
the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of
its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those in
the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring
the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the
merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by
this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that
an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as
to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process.
2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the
Salary Standardization Law of providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the
case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme
proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general
provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which
the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification
scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or
changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided
by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM
discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the
CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve positions of
Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions
of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the
context from support to substantive without actual
change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute
is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA,
we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.













































Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to
GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a
managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but
which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article
XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In
self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of
such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection
of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication
that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that
a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further
the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the
past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon
a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments,
and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved
into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence
in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it
has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting
of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially
on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has
to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified
Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel
Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from
selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and
to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per
shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.














































KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA

GR No. 113375, May 5, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the
authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO decided to
establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the
PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system,
the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company and
one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,
became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its
individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors
in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which
was intended to be the medium through which the technical
and management services required for the project would be
offered and delivered to PCSO.
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request
for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line
lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC
submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the
Office of the President announced that it had given the
respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the countrys on-
line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing
contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993
for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to
President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of
the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and
ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office
of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona that only a court
injunction can stop Malacaang, and the imminent
implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994,
KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January
1994 this petition.
Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation
composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns,
and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators
Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative
Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of
the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers
and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and
Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as
members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents,
meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to
maintain the instant suit, citing the Courts resolution in
Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.
is legal and valid.
HELD:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the
country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects
of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in
the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents
tried to take advantage of.
The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably
clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by
way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can
it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the
contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is
merely an independent contractor should not be decided on
the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the
intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the
PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between
them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical,
operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery
system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the
franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore,
what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which
negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to
be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in
the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.
We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease
violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is,
therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion
renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues
raised by the petitioners.














SANIDAD VS COMELEC

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement,
the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of
his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued
another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous
PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite
of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter
alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to
he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas
clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in
nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose
amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true
in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition
(Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art.
XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly
to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue
of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,
within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2
(2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement,
or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme
Court has the last word in the construction not only of
treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution,
is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to
present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.






































































LAMP VS SECRETARY OF DBM

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action
for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the
General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a
group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission
of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above
provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and
congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not
empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select
and identify programs and projects to be funded out of
PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of
separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter,
spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further,
the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain
to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid
of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible
and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on
the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils
of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the
exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2)
whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members
of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the
implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this
is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in
the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues
impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of
issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF
deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the
assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional,
the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity
accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the
nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a
clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No
convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there
were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress,
who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.
Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,
the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection
of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful
enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the
President to recommend projects and programs which may
be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the
Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are
consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the
President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to
exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in
establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is
no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries
between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary
process remain intact.
_______________
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.








































DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of
the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No.
6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A.
No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its
deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative
is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous
silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared
void.

RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation.
R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which
are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through
its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under
R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known
that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign
to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should
not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996,
the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
wasted its time, energy, and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I
likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas
has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and
MENDOZA concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for
clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not
prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to
campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which,
consequentially, is made permanent under
the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition
and must not be so understood as having intended or
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
constitutional mandate on people initiative.

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice
Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A.
No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA
concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin
Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly
proposed by the people through initiative, there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an
initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures
in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the
Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no
public funds may be spent and no government resources
may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily,
the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majoritys two other rulings.



















SALONGA VS PANO

FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the
months of August, September and October of 1980. On
September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-
born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost
killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a
result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the
YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by
police and military authorities were several pictures taken
sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former
Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a
Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were
among those whose likenesses appeared in the group
pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a
result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought
by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center
(V. Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and
detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all
direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly
afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and
Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal
possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs
once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which
resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping
at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused
injuries to a number of persons. The President's anniversary
television radio press conference was broadcast. The
younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented
during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out
with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga
had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive
care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where
he was held incommunicado for some time. More bombs
were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro
Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the
General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980.
Minutes after the President had finished delivering his
speech before the International Conference of the American
Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International
Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded. Within the next
24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were
issued against persons, including Salonga, who were
apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of
bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to
the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center
where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic
ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest.
The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which
however did not specify the charge or charges against him.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the
lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner
Salonga.


HELD:
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of
intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of
Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres
where even the awesome powers of Government may not
enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The
Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has
the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In
dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who
questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive
and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the
provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition
became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless
rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624)
whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could
validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to
the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the
Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the
preservation and development of Filipino culture for national
identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile
(59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26
petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his
petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of
murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The
fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent
the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever
printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence
miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against
Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan
to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any
subversive organization. The respondents have taken the
initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court
reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate
the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence
against Salonga found in the records.


















































TANADA VS ANGARA

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the
constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate
of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to)
give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the
national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our
Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization and from integrating into a global economy that
is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the Presidents
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our
country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the
Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same
time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments,
goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent
national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing
country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as
in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national
treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and
reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the
best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to
compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper
against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional
principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to
protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true
that such principles while serving as judicial and
legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes
of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said
treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent
and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion
or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may
even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to
the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No.
97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so
would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own
judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was
a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise
was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected
policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation
should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization
and economic globalization is a matter that our people
should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the
WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should
this be the political desire of a member.













SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of
Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back
to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August
1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were
lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of
the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)
SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec.
18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit
a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation
of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power
of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears
that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to
the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus
standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-
Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners
here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or
that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil
Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of
the Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any
person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or
not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.






















































DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP
No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
[calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and
[power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5
implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP
and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1)
it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is
a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal
arrest and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that
the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did
not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is
constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into
three important provisions, thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon
me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided
by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion
was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4,
Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without
legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases,
PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial
Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.


Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the
President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This
is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power
is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.


Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents
authority to declare a state of national emergency and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article
VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during
the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone
can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President
has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.


As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides
a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement
PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have
not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.









































FORTUN VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

I. THE FACTS

On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed
led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned
down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In
response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on
November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency
in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP
1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for
identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On
December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in
joint session to review the validity of the Presidents
action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before
Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

II. THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render
the issues moot and academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on
the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
rendered the issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of
the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in
entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the
acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The
issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue
of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959
is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could
fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate
the same. xxx.

xxx xxx x
xx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but
in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not
have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper
suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first
a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before
the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened,
could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these
cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to
review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a
supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the
operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or
decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be
enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had
been reported. Those who were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed,
no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is
that the President intended by her action to address an
uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated
province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and
swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply
armed government presence.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension
never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without
touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.


































BAYAN VS ERMITA

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right
as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No.
880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human
rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows
that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition
and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on
February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the
petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising
factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of
September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the
Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise
by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution
provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection.
For this rights represent the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power,
which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public
places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit
of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the
expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section
15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30)
days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of
advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise
the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public
parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet
complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated
pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and
VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from
using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of
maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all
other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 is SUSTAINED





















































ROQUE VS COMELEC

Facts

On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending
the first automated election law, RA 8436.
[2]
Section 5 of RA
8436, as amended by RA 9369, which amendment took
effect on 10 February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:
Use an automated election system or systems in the same
election in different provinces, whether paper-based or a
direct recording automated election system as it may deem
appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting
of votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of
results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the regular
national and local election, which shall be held
immediately after effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be
used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two
provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be
chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding regular
national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented
nationwide. (Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC did not use any automated election system
in the 14 May 2007 elections, the national and local elections
held after RA 9369 took effect.
On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM
and Smartmatic (Provider), on the other, signed the Contract
for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast
nationwide in the 10 May 2010 elections. For
P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for use in the 10
May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related
equipment) and hired ancillary services of the Provider.

On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed
this petition
[4]
to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its
implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms of the
Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its
subcontractors.
[5]
Petitioners sought the Contract's
invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in
Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial
use of an automated election system before deploying it
nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's
invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1) the optical scanners
leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum
systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended and (2)
the Provider not only failed to submit relevant documents
during the bidding but also failed to show "community of
interest" among its constituent corporations as required
in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC(Infotech).

Issue


Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion
when it entered to contract with Smartmatic TIM Corporation
and assailing to an automated election.

Ruling

Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the
enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners
invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award
to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and
conditions of the corresponding automation contract in
question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And
surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for
having a foreign company as partner.

The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a
distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative
to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with
restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an
organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be
afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in
devising means and initiatives that would enable it to
accomplish the great objective for which it was created--to
promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is
as it should be for, too often, COMELEC has to make
decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen
events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court
has steered away from interfering with the COMELECs
exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its
office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion on comelecs part, as
here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective
hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that
body.

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public
problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the
matter of the administration of the laws relative to the
conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive
zeal take away from the comelec the initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due
regard to the independent character of the Commission x x x
requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that
body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but
firmly in appropriate cases.

.This independent constitutional commission, it is true,
possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable
latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however,
towards successful 2010 automation elections would
certainly be rough and bumpy. The comelec is laboring
under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help
of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men
and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist
comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the
integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would
like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

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