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Meryl altman: Hegel's infuence on Simone de Beauvoir's work is also wider. She says she studied Hegel as a noncombatant in Paris during the German occupation. Altman: her reading of Hegel has mainly been discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic.
Meryl altman: Hegel's infuence on Simone de Beauvoir's work is also wider. She says she studied Hegel as a noncombatant in Paris during the German occupation. Altman: her reading of Hegel has mainly been discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic.
Meryl altman: Hegel's infuence on Simone de Beauvoir's work is also wider. She says she studied Hegel as a noncombatant in Paris during the German occupation. Altman: her reading of Hegel has mainly been discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic.
Beauvoir, Hegel, War MERYL ALTMAN The importance of Hegel to the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, both to her early philosophical texts and to The Second Sex, is usually discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic and a Kojveinfuenced reading, which some see her as sharing with Sartre, others persuasively describe as divergent from and corrective to Sartres. Altman shows that Hegels infuence on Beauvoirs work is also wider, both in terms of what she takes on board and what she works through and rejects, and that her read- ing of Hegel is crucially infected by two additional circumstances that Sartre did not entirely share: the experience of her frst serious study of Hegel as a noncombatant in Paris during the German occupation and her earlier direct exposure to an eccentric, idealist reading of Hegel as developed by the group Philosophies in connection with surrealism and the artistic avant-garde. Altman also explores the afterlife of Hegels infuence on Beauvoir on second-wave feminism in the United States and Europe, and suggests continuing relevance to feminist theory today. Montrer les infuences et liens philosophiques nest important mes yeux que si cela ajoute la comprehension dune pense. Eva Gthlin There is no absolute beginning in thought. Michle Le Doeuff People make their own Hegel. But they do not make him just as they like. The importance of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, both to her early philosophical texts and to The Second Sex, has been quite well recognized. However, her interpretation of Hegels thought has Meryl Altman 67 mainly been discussed in terms of the master-slave dialectic and described as infuenced by Alexandre Kojves famous 1930s lectures at the cole Pratique des Hautes tudes. For a long time, her reading was seen (and dismissed) as indistinguishable from Jean-Paul Sartres; more recently, Eva Lundgren-Gthlin (1996) and Nancy Bauer (2001) have persuasively shown how she diverges from or even corrects Sartres views. My own work with Beauvoirs texts, including her early diaries and fragments, has shown me that Hegels infuence on her work is also wider, both in terms of what she takes on board and what she works through and rejects. Beauvoirs reading of Hegel is crucially infected by two circumstances Sartre did not fully share: her experience of serious, independent study of Hegels texts in Paris under the German occupation, and earlier encounters during her student days with eccentric, idealist, and literary readings of Hegel, exemplifed by the Philosophies group and by surrealists such as Louis Aragon. This article sets out some of this wider context, not to be obsessed with the minutiae of Beauvoirs intellectual autobiography, but with the ultimate goal of understanding what is puzzling about Hegels appearances in The Second Sex and then in later feminist texts that are infuenced by Beauvoir. Despite recent work by Kimberly Hutchings (1998), Patricia Jagentowicz Mills (2003), and others, it must be admitted that the appropriateness of Hegel to a feminist undertaking, in Beauvoirs day or in ours, is not the frst thing about his writing that one notices. So, the frst question is, Why Hegel? and then the second question is, Which Hegel? Beauvoir studies is currently experiencing something of a renaissance, and I must acknowledge Margaret Simons (1999), Toril Moi (1994,2000), Karen Vintges (1996), Sonia Kruks (2005), and Michle Le Doeuff (1991), as well as Bauer (2001) and Lundgren-Gthlin (1996), among those who have made my work possible. 1 Part of the collective project over the last few decades has been simply to establish how much Beauvoir had accomplished before she met Sartre, and how fully she had her own independent and truly philosophi- cal projects apart from his. (Perhaps this point may not really be necessary to make anymore within a feminist context, although I note that mainstream philosophical narratives, for example, standard surveys of the infuence of Hegel on French philosophy, still havent taken much account of her existence.) Wanting to ensure that Beauvoir would be taken seriously, we have sometimes argued vehemently that she was a real philosopher, almost as though we were making her tenure case in a U.S. universityand this has been made harder because she herself sometimes said that she wasnt one. Dare I say, however, that not to be a philosopher is perhaps not the worst state of affairs conceivable? Also, there are many different styles of doing philosophy. I thought of taking as my epigraph, The present writer is by no means a philosopher, which is actually a quotation from Sren Kierkegaard (Sara Heinmaa says this is Kierkegaards satiric response to Hegels systematic 68 Hypatia thought [2003, 9]). 2 What emerges from the study of Beauvoirs early infuences is how heterogeneous her philosophical background was with respect to genre and style. The separation between the philosophical and the unphilosophical, between the philosophical and the literary perhaps, isnt quite there. This has implications for her mature work: in my view, perhaps the greatest contribution of The Second Sex to what came to be called womens studies was an interdisci- plinary method that accepts and weighs all sorts of evidence and levels out all modes of authority, including the philosophical voice alongside literature, social science, history, and (not least) the personal testimony of lived experience. But I quote Kierkegaard also defensively here; my own training was in literary studies, and my interest in Hegel is secondary to my commitment to Beauvoir. As a result, I approach Hegel from the outside, taking what might be called a genealogical approach, and remaining agnostic about which read- ing of Hegel might be a correct one. Also, I am not concerned with whether Hegel himself was right, but with whether, and how, he has been useful: not with what he means but with what he does, if you will (how to do things with Hegel). Finally, I dont at all mean to offer a deterministic account, as though the thought of one person causes the thought of another, or as though the infuence of sources had to be mutually exclusive. Part of my argument here is simply that a broad-based, contextualized approach to the history of political ideas is worth the effort. How to Have Theory under an Occupation In July 1940, Beauvoir returned to Parisshed fed the city as the Germans were arriving, part of a mass exodus, but then decided to come back in case Sartre might return or send some word. At this point, as she tells us in her memoirs, she does not know whether he is alive or dead. July 6. I went to the Bibliothque Nationale. I took a card and I began to read some Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Spirit. At the moment I understand almost nothing [quasi rien]. Ive decided to work through Hegel every day from 2 to 5 oclock. Its the most soothing [apaisant] thing one can fnd. (1960, 523) 3 July 7. Rode my bicycle across Paris with Lise. I passed a parade of armored cars, full of Germans dressed in black, their large berets waving in the wind; it was somewhat beautiful, and sinister. At the Nationale I read Hegel, which I still have a lot of trouble understanding. I found and copied out a passage which will do marvelously as the epigraph to my novel. (1960, 524) 4 The passage in questionEvery consciousness pursues the death of the other 5 does indeed stand at the opening of LInvite (1943) and we can take Meryl Altman 69 it as her version of the idea Sartre (to whom she passed it on) would phrase more famously as hell is other people (1945). There is something piquant in thinking that Hegel had written the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1977) under conditions of practical and psychological duress while his city was besieged by the French, and she was reading it under the equivalent and yet opposite condition. Beyond anecdote, context can help us understand that death was more than just a metaphor, for both of them. On July 11, she receives a penciled note from Sartre: hes in a prison camp, but at least hes alive. The gray and green uniforms, the Nazi fag fying over the Senate, had become familiar. I taught my classes at Duruy, and I read Hegel at the Nationale which now opened in the morn- ing as well. Hegel calmed me down a little. Just as when I was twenty years old, my heart bleeding over my cousin Jacques, I read Homer in order to put all of humanity in between me and my particular suffering, I tried to melt the moment I was going through into the course of the world. Around me, embalmed in thousands of volumes, the past was sleeping, and the present seemed to me like a past yet to come. I myself did not exist [Moi, je mabolisais]. However, these reveries in no way encouraged me to consent to fascism. If one were an optimist, one might consider it the necessary antithesis of bourgeois liberalism, thus a stage toward the synthesis we were hoping for: socialism. But in order to hope to one day sublate fascism, one had to begin by refusing it. No philosophy could have persuaded me to accept it, it contradicted all the values upon which Id built my life and every day brought me new reasons to detest it. How nauseated I felt reading in Le Matin and La Victoire these virtuous apologias for Germany, these scolding sermons our conquerors heaped upon us. Since the end of July, placards had appeared in certain shop windows: Jews Not Allowed. (1960, 526) 6 Life goes on; the school year begins, and she is asked at work to sign a statement attesting that she is not a Jew (and does sign itwhat else could she do?). She listens with rage to the discourses of Henri-Philippe Ptain and others who claim to be patriots saving France, and who blame the defeat on the excesses of the Popular Front, on Andr Gide, and so on, preaching a return to agriculture and to what we would now call family values. There was no reason to think Germany would be defeated; London was being bombed to pieces, the United States had not yet entered the war. But, she says, she makes a kind of wager: if the world continued to fall apart, thered be very little point in writing, but in case the world should ever come to its senses, she decides to keep writing 70 Hypatia anyhow. Every morning she goes to the Caf Dme and works on her novel; every afternoon she returns to the library. I continued to read Hegel, whom I was beginning to understand. In the details, the richness of his thought overwhelmed me: but the system overall made me dizzy. [Lensemble du systme me don- nait le vertige.] Yes, it was tempting to cancel oneself out in favor of the Universal, to consider ones own life from the perspective of the End of History, with the detachment which the point of view of death also implies: then how ridiculous would seem this tiny moment in the course of the world, this one individual, me! Why should I concern myself with what happened to me, what surrounded me, right here right now? But the smallest movement of my heart disproved these speculations. Hope, anger, waiting, anguish affirmed themselves against all sublations; the escape into the universal, in fact, was only an episode in my personal adventure. I went back to Kierkegaard and started to read him passionately; the truth he was affirming defed doubt as victori- ously as the Cartesian proof; the System, history, couldnt do any more than the Evil Demon. 7 The more I went along, the more I separated from Hegel, without ceasing to admire him. Now I knew that I was linked to my contemporaries, to the marrow of my bones; I discovered the other side of the coin of this dependence, my responsibil- ity. . . . In occupied France, one consents to oppression merely by breathing. . . . But this situation that was imposed on me, my remorse had taught me that I had contributed to creating it (1960, 537). 8 Interestingly, quite a few people were reading or rereading Hegel about this time. Theodor Adorno was. And Walter Benjamin had been perhaps reread- ing, certainly rewriting him, in the theses On the Concept of History (1940), just about the last piece of writing Benjamin completed. Its strange to realize that if Beauvoir had tried to read Hegel in the Bibliothque Nationale even a few months earlier, she might not have been able to get the book because Benjamin might have had it checked out: though hed been urged to fee by his ex-wife and his friends, and had even been interned in a camp for two months the previous year, it was not until June 1940 that he fnally began the months of wandering and the quest for papers that would culminate in his suicide on September 27. Barbara Johnson says that faced by the prospect of German invasion, Benjamin renewed his library card (Johnson 2003, 155; see also Brodersen 1996); and in some ways that is the same gesture as Beauvoirs decision to study Hegel, which is not (as I have discovered) a stroll in the park, Meryl Altman 71 or a short-term project. Je crois en un aprs (I believe in after) (1960, 518). So as long as were talking about history, and various things that can mean, I would want us to be working toward an intellectual history that would take into account the actualit of two people who might have been studying in that room at the same time, but not together, and the situatedness (in a broader sense) that meant only one of them survived. Thus far Ive been citing Beauvoirs memoir, La force de lge (1960), which was actually written during the Algerian crisis, at a time when Beauvoir and Sartre were calling into question what it meant to them to be French, to be in fact traveling the world as prominent cultural exports of the French govern- ment, which was meanwhile pursuing repressive and repugnant policies in their name. So, a colleague suggested to me, perhaps Beauvoir was retrospectively reading those issues into her memories of the Occupation. 9 But if we look at the two major philosophical essays Beauvoir produced in the early 1940s, Pyrrhus et Cinas (1944) and The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), we fnd them very much marked by this problem about history and using Hegel to work through it. For example, in The Ethics of Ambiguity she condemns what she calls the aesthetic attitude, which she illustrates as follows: Let us try to take the point of view of History, people told themselves, when they learned that the Germans had taken Paris (1944,10910). 10 The conclusion to that essay invokes, and then departs from, Hegel very directly. 11 The Ethics of Ambiguity both reports and enacts the same move I found in the memoirs. An optimistic view of His- tory with a capital H is corrected by a concrete experience of life at a particular historical moment, with a particular positionwhat wed now call a social location, what she would call a situation,that one has not entirely chosen but for which one is responsible. Its worth dwelling on this shift because it is the major shift, or development, within their thinking that both she and Sartre ever made, an extremely enabling one on which her whole ability to be a feminist thinker joining concrete personal experience with political will depends. 12 Another Young Hegelian in France In fact, however, Beauvoirs initial engagement with Hegel was closer to the intellectual generation formed by the First World War, and had remarkably little to do with questions of solidarity, responsibility, or political life. Most com- mentators suggest that Hegel had not really been on Beauvoirs screen before the 1940s. This is the impression Nancy Bauer gives in her book, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism (2001). And Lundgren-Gthlin (1996) reads Beauvoirs Hegel entirely through Kojves, even though Beauvoir apparently did not attend his famous lectures of the 1930s. We do know, however, that she read Jean Wahls book, Le Malheur de la Conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel, when it appeared in 1929. 13 In fact, the frst memoir passage I quoted above 72 Hypatia (dated July 6) originally read in her journal, I worked through Hegel for two hours with the Wahl [book] on Le Malheur de la Conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel. At the moment I understand almost nothing. (1990, 339). 14 Its easy to see how Wahls book might not have helped much: he does not exactly provide a commentary. Rather, he reads selectively, and his reading stresses Christian redemption and reconciliation with the Absolute through suffering, as tragic, romantic, religious experiencea narrative one might more readily associate with Kierkegaard. I fnd this especially hard to understand since Wahl himself was a Jew: by the time Beauvoir was attempting to use him as an approach to Hegel, he had already been excluded from the Sorbonne, would be interned at Drancy. But as I said at the beginning, people make their own Hegel. 15 Beauvoir seems to have begun making hers even before Wahls book appeared, however. True, Hegel didnt loom large on the curriculum for the agr- gation (the highly competitive examination French students take to qualify for teaching careers). She notes in her memoirs, At the Sorbonne, my professors systematically ignored Hegel and Marx; in his large tome about the progress of consciousness in the West, Brunschvicg gave barely three pages to Marx, who he put in parallel with a highly obscure reactionary thinker (Beauvoir 1958, 318). 16 Beauvoirs general opinion of Lon Brunschvicg, the doyen of Sorbonne philosophy at the time, who directed her thesis on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, was from the very beginning quite low. M. Brunschvicg may be a man of merit but for me = O (2006, 213). 17 Brunschvicgs contempt for Hegel is confrmed by Alexandre Koyr, who quotes his description of Hegels philosophy as an escape hatch [chappatoire], a means for contemporary philosophy to evade or postpone contact with true knowledge of the real . . . anachronistic even before it was born (1931, 150). 18 A story Henri Lefebvre told to Bud Burkhard around 1932 provides further confrmation. The typical frustration came when Lon Brunschvicg turned down yet another thesis topic, this time on Hegel: You know (Lefebvre recalled Brunschvicg saying) Hegel had the mental age of a seven-year-old. He thinks of a concept like a cow thinks of green: because she browses indiscriminately among grasses, leaves, hay, she has a concept of green (quoted in Burkhard 2000, 138). 19 Disdain for Hegel was not new in French academic life. In the letters of Alain-Fournier and Jacques Rivire, which Beau- voir read and reread during the late 1920s, Rivire complains (before the First World War) that he would have liked to write a thesis on Hegels aesthetics but knew his professors would never accept it. And yet, as a rebellious idea, the project was available, then and later. While Hegel was not on the syllabus, Beauvoir would have encountered him in a surprising number of other places, and especially in an intellectual culture that circulated around, and in opposition to, the Sorbonne. 20 One could speak of the official and the unofficial curriculum of the 1920s, and while Hegel certainly Meryl Altman 73 wasnt part of the formerLefebvre goes so far as to say Hegel was proscrit (banned)he was very much a part of the latter, and it was the latter that Beauvoir found especially compelling. As she wrote in her diary in November 1926: Philosophy would be thrilling, if only there were no tests to study for, and I could really dive into it! (2006, 179). 21 Those diaries also show an important, though short-lived, intellectual friendship with a student named Barbier, who appears to be the same friend called Nodier in the Mmoires dune jeune flle range (1958). Barbier was part of a group called Philosophies, Marxists, but with a mystical slant, who published a journal called LEsprit; Beauvoir seems to have been drawn toward their approach in 1927 (long before her acquaintance with Sartre), in part because she found Barbier attractive, and she took it seriously enough to have wondered about her own intellectual future, NRF or lEsprit? (2006, 263). 22
Elsewhere she notes, A real pleasure, to chat for ffteen minutes with the director of lEsprit. All at once I imagine everything knowing him might bring (2006, 308) and December 2. Read lEsprit. There are two strangely beautiful articles by someone called Morhange (2006, 198). 23 But who were the Philosophies, and what was LEsprit? Apart from the now-forgotten poet Pierre Morhange, this group of young men included Norbert Guterman, Paul Nizan, Georges Politzer and, most interesting to me, Henri Lefebvre. Their frst review was called Philosophies; the second, LEsprit, came out in 1926 and 1927. The same group (joined by Georges Friedmann) later founded the La Revue Marxiste. Described as the frst group to present a coherent Marxist-Leninism in France, their mature work took a similar approach to the Frankfurt school. La Revue Marxiste was the frst to translate Marxs economic and philosophical manuscripts, before falling apart in a fairly dramatic wayin the words of Michel Trebitsch, it was immediately crushed in grotesque circumstances by the brutal intervention of the Party (1991, xxii). 24 What they were doing in the 1920s, however, was attempting to fnd, or to found, a new mythology, a new absolute, a new mysticism, as a response to the problems of postwar inquitude. In this context, the frst issue of LEsprit published Hegels section on the unhappy consciousness, translated and pref- aced by Jean Wahl: it seems possible that this was the frst writing by Hegel Beauvoir actually read. 25 Morhanges writing is vague poetic yearning mush, and Lefebvres own meandering contributions about le moi are not much better. 26 In retrospect, this is more than a little embarrassing for Lefebvre, who would go on to be known for work as a demystifer in such works as The Critique of Everyday Life (1947/1991), which is currently enjoying something of a renaissance. The Brief Notes at the beginning of the Critique of Everyday Life are about as complete a repudiation of the mystical Hegel of the Philosophies as might be conceived 74 Hypatia ofLefebvre saves a special virulence for surrealists and other practitioners of magic realism. And Burkhard notes that by the frst sketches for La Conscience Mystife, in the 1930s, Lefebvre and Guterman were working out a critique of Lefebvres earlier position. La mystifcation: Notes pour une critique de la vie quotidienne (1933) 27 notes that bourgeois culture appeals to an abstract esprit, which offered unreachable Absolutes and a diversity of entertaining evasions in place of reality, and thereby maintained order. The true roots of the unhappy consciousness . . . lay in the projection of human desires and consciousness into an impossible search for comfort in an unrealizable Absolute (Burkhard 2000, 14344). 28 Now, this is more or less the same trajectory that will be taken by Simone de Beauvoir, away from what she calls le got de labsolu (a taste for the absolute), through and away from the inquitude of the postwar period. 29 In the course of her early essays and novels, she moves toward what might also in her case be called a critique of everyday life, which I see in The Second Sexs analysis of the Myth of Woman as it enters normative cultural practice through literature, religion, the education of girls, and other ideological-material formations. (The Second Sex is directly critical of surrealists.) Im tempted also to compare this to the other French classic of demystifcation, Roland Barthess Mythologies (1957). 30 But Beauvoir will never have anything positive to say about Lefebvre and Guterman for the quite sensible reason that they were vicious political enemies to Sartre after the war; and Barthes does not have much good to say about Beauvoir or Sartre, perhaps for similar reasons. At some moments, how- ever, the similarities may be more striking than the differences, and perhaps we are at such a moment now. 31 If we go back to the 1920s, we fnd that Beauvoirs notebook contains some other interesting, though puzzling, references to Hegel. For example, in a time of depression she copies into her notebook some lachrymose verses by Jules LaForgue, of which it is hard to make much, except that they correspond to the ups and downs of her relationship with her cousin Jacques and her struggles to put together a sort of self. Nothing more! Marble Venus! Pointless corrosives / Mad brain of Hegel! sweet consoling refrains! / Churchtowers set in order (2006, 128). 32 Hegel here seems to be standing in for a myth of human col- lective progress, for a delusion of absolute sense and order, a brief stay against the feeling that one is merely a speck in the random, pointless universe of adolescent yearnings. Beauvoir also copied a more interesting citation from Louis Aragon: All metaphysics is in the frst person singular. So is all poetry. The second person is still the frst (2006, 227). 33 Ive traced this quotation to the conclusion of Aragons early poetic effort, Le Paysan de Paris (1926/1990), a sort-of-novel that is not really enormously readable today, but was a major inspiration for Benjamins work on the Paris Arcades. Meryl Altman 75 The explicit project of Le Paysan de Paris is to create a modern mythology, including new myths of modernity, based on valuing quotidian, as well as nonrational and contralogical, aspects of human life. Aragons opening is very much on the side of philosophy, but not at all the classroom sort. It begins (at least) as an opposition to Hegel, and the conclusion is a pretty thorough critique of Hegels logic, but I think it also parallels the search for a new mystical totality undertaken under the sign of Hegel by the Philosophies group. 34 Like the work of the Philosophies group, Aragons is an attempted solution to the postwar problem of loss of faith. It is not religious as suchAragon is very clear that people who believe in God are simply being lazy. Rather, it attempts to substitute a different absolute, an absolute that he perversely locates in the concrete, the particular, the ephemeral, the everyday. He also locates it in women, or rather in Woman. So, in the middle of the section called Passage de lOpra, we fnd: The living individual, says Hegel, poses himself in his frst evolu- tion as subject and as notion, and in this second evolution he assimilates to himself the object, and thereby gives himself a real determination. And he is in himself Kind, substantial uni- versality. The relationship of one subject with another subject of the same kind constitutes the particularization of kind, and judgment expresses the relationship of kind to the individuals thus determined. That is sexual difference. (70) 35 The reaction of the narrator to this Hegelian proposition is to test it by going for a walk, during which he fnds that many diverse women out for a walk submit themselves to the Hegelian judgment. 36 In other words he encounters women who offer him a variety of sexual experiences, more and less feeting, including prostitution, which Le Paysan de Paris energetically defends. 37 Afterlife The same point from Hegel comes up in The Second Sex, in the chapter on les donnes de la biologie. 38 Beauvoirs reaction there is rather different, as you might expect. Most philosophers, she says, have not had too much to say about sexual difference: the myth in Platos Symposium explains love, not sexual dif- ference (which it presupposes); Thomas Aquinas says women are occasional beings, which is just a masculine perspective on the accidental character of sexuality. Hegel, however, would have been unfaithful to his rationalist delirium [son dlire rationaliste] if had had not tried to found it [sexual difference] logically. According to him, sexuality 76 Hypatia represents the mediation by means of which the subject attains itself concretely as kind. Kind [genre] produces itself in him as an effect against this disproportion in his individual reality, as a desire to fnd again in another individual of his species the feeling of himself in uniting himself to it, of completing himself and thus enveloping kind in his nature and bringing it to existence. This is sexual intercourse [laccouplement]. And a little further on: the process consists in this, to know what they are in themselves, that is to say one single kind, one single and same subjective life, they posit it as such. And Hegel then declares that for the process of coming together to occur, there must frst be differentiation of two sexes. But his demonstration is not convincing: one feels too much in it the parti pris of locat- ing the three moments of the syllogism in every operation. The sublation [dpassement] of the individual towards the species, by which individual and species accomplish themselves in their truth, could come about without a third term in the simple rela- tion of the parent to the child: reproduction could be asexual. Or else the relation of the one to the other could be the relation of two likenesses [semblables], with differentiation residing in the singularity of a single type, as happens in hermaphroditic species. Hegels description pulls out a very important meaning of sexuality; but his error is always to turn a meaning into a reason [son erreur est toujours de faire de signifcation raison]. It is in exercising sexual activity that men defne the sexes and their relations, just as they create the meaning and the value of all the functions that they fulfll; but it is not necessarily implied in the nature of the human being. (1949, 39) 39 Then she moves on to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Later, she suggests that sexual difference is not all that crucial: one cant imagine people who dont die and are still people, but people could reproduce partheno- genetically and still be human. Beauvoirs (perhaps coincidental) rewriting of Aragon parallels a key move in her introduction to The Second Sex: One must understand the implications of the verb to be: bad faith consists in giving it a substantive value when it should have the dynamic Hegelian meaning: to be is to have become, to have been made the way one manifests oneself. (Beauvoir 1949, 25) 40 Meryl Altman 77 One of Beauvoirs characteristic moves was to turn a prescriptive or neces- sary account into a descriptive, historically contingent one (Hutchings 2003, 72). Sometimes, as in my frst example, she makes an antifoundationalist appropriation of Hegel (against his own grain, perhaps); sometimes, as in my second example, she put that appropriated Hegel to use in an antideterminist reading of something else. She needs Hegel to account for oppression and also to hold out the possibility that things really can change, that is does not imply ought. We need to bear in mind the basic methodological point that slipping from a meaning to a reason, like slipping from a fact to a right, is in her view a mistake. Not noticing this has led otherwise intelligent people to some fairly spectacular misreadings of The Second Sex. Aragons conclusion returns to Hegel, and also uses Hegel against himself, in attempting to synthesize philosophy and eroticism. 41 Synthesizing philosophy and eroticism is something Beauvoir will also try to do: as Ive argued elsewhere, the radical core of The Second Sex is an argument about the centrality and authenticity of womens sexual pleasure and desire, although this is accom- plished mainly by a sort of via negativa (or perhaps a way of despair), through the minute investigation of female unpleasure, discomfort, pain, and frigidity (Altman 2002). Perhaps the main thing she got from Aragon was the tendency to apply Hegel to sex in a very concrete way; the sense that such juxtapositions were not incongruous; or perhaps the sense that such incongruous juxtapositions might be intellectually productive. At least, I hope Ive shown that Hegel was part of the ordinary language of the avant-garde, so that it was in a sense normal for Beauvoir to turn to Hegel, even in thinking through problems where what Hegel actually had to say was quite problematic. But there are also some things about Aragon that will not be assimilable to a feminist appropriation. For him, the concrete is the sexual, or at least sexualized, experience of Woman (by a man). Beauvoir works through this in her sections about Mythes, where she is liquidating her own intellectual past through literary criticism and critique of many of her own earliest literary infuences (surrealists, but also Paul Claudel). Much of the literary criticism in The Second Sex (and there is a great deal of it) is of this demystifying or anti-myth type. 42 A huge amount remains to be said about Hegels presence in, and infuence on, The Second Sex. Here are a few general remarks that might guide futher. First, Beauvoirs knowledge of Hegel was comprehensive, including Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Right, as well as Phenomenology of the Spirit, and (unlike many of her contemporaries) she did not confne herself to following out a single thread or theme in his work but tried instead to come to terms with his texts in their entire, strange complexity, without ever becoming a prisoner of his system; 78 Hypatia Second, her reading of Hegel was her own (and reading her only through Kojve, or only alongside Sartre, is insufficient); Third, her reading is itself dialectic, in very local ways, which means that any summary will be falsifable and problematic; Fourth, she needs to be located in a broader context, including cre- ative writing, and the split between philosophers and poets must be set aside; 43 Fifth, her use of Hegel is not accidental or decorative. Hegel mattered to her, and through her, to the next generation of feminists and scholars. To take up this last point: Beauvoirs demystifying appropriation of Hegel had an enormously signifcant, but not unproblematic, legacy for 1970s feminisms. 44
It is central, for instance, to Sherry Ortners groundbreaking article, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture? (1972), one of the most infuential pieces of the new feminist anthropology. 45 It was also an important infuence on the feminist critique of science, for example on Sandra Harding, who brings up the master-slave struggle in a founding moment for feminist epistemologythe slave has to know more about the master than the master knows about the slave (1986, 26). 46 The most Hegelian text of 1970s radical feminism is Shulamith Firestones The Dialectic of Sex (1971), which even includes several diagrams purporting to capture the essence of World History. 47 And then we might think about the way of despair, or doubt: in Jean Hyppo- lites formulation, what consciousness takes to be truth is revealed to be illusory, consciousness must abandon its frst belief and move on to another (1979, 12). Could we see the crucial second-wave feminist practice of consciousness- raising implied in that idea of the unhappy consciousness, refecting upon itself in ways that lead to collective recognition and then to collective action? Of course, the practice had other points of origin, for example the Maoist practice of speaking bitterness, but the term itself is suggestive. There are also suggestive parallels with a very interesting Italian radical feminist text of the 1970s, Carla Lonzis Sputiamo su Hegel. 48 The title means lets spit on Hegel or we spit on Hegel, and the message is hardly ambigu- ous. For instance, The master-slave dialectic is a settling of scores between groups of men: it does not point a way toward the liberation of woman, the great Oppressed of patriarchal culture (1974, 17). 49 And yet, why spit on him rather than simply turning away? I see Lonzi as performing an appropriation similar to Beauvoirs in attacking both the male Left in Italy and its deeper philosophical roots, through a point-by-point refu- tation of the boldest sort. Lonzi doesnt mention Beauvoir, but I hear echoes of Beauvoirs point when Lonzi says, for example, Womans condition, which is the result of her oppression, is viewed by Hegel as its cause (1974, 25). 50
And Lonzi, like Beauvoir, talks a great deal about womens sexual pleasure and unpleasure as the root of their oppression. Meryl Altman 79 Against all odds, feminisms engagement with Hegels views of sexuality appears to persist, perhaps most recognizably in the work of Judith Butler (1999, 2000). Couldnt we do without him by now? Probably. But knowledges are situated, and political knowledges perhaps doubly so; continued engagement with Hegel may point to also continued, though not always acknowledged, engagement with Beauvoir, which in my view is all to the good. The best reason to continue to engage with Hegel may be that feminism needs some dynamic account of the shape of change, both internal and external, and how these connect; the best reason to continue to spit, that feminism has to be, frst and foremost, a ruthless work of demystifcation. Finally, to gesture (at least) back toward my title: the need for and the dif- ficulty of demystifcation will be precisely and particularly evident in the special case of military propaganda. It would be stretching a point to see Beauvoirs engagement with Hegel as caused, or even exhaustively explained, by the double European experience of the lies of war in the frst half of the twentieth century. One may say, though, that the need for a form of cultural demystifcation that can if necessary stand outside the academy and apart from the state has never been more obvious than it is right now. Notes A preliminary version of this paper was delivered at the Australasian Society for Conti- nental Philosophy annual conference 2005, The Politics of Being, School of Philoso- phy at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, June 1517, 2005. Many thanks to all who commented there, particularly Robert Bernasconi, Simon Lundgren, and Marguerite La Caze; to my colleagues Andrea Sununu and Neal Abraham for help with languages and text; and to Keith Nightenhelser for indispensable assistance at all stages of this project. For Anglo-Americans, another important step is the ambitious translation 1. project of which the frst volume has now appeared (Simons 2004). The quotation is from Kierkegaard 1983. Heinmaa sees Kierkegaard as leading 2. Beauvoir to reject systematic philosophy in favor of the phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty. See Heinmaa 2003, 611. 1940 6 juillet. Jai t la Nationale. Jai pris une carte et jai commenc lire du 3. Hegel, la Phnomenologie de lEsprit. Pour linstant, je comprends quasi rien. Jai dcid de travailler Hegel tous les jours de 2 heures 5 heures. Cest ce quon peut trouver de plus apaisant. The passage published in her Journal de guerre (1990, 339) is virtually identical, adding only that she is using Jean Wahls book alongside Hegels. 7 Juillet. Promenade bicyclette, dans Paris, avec Lise. Jai crois un dfl dautos 4. blindes, charges dAllemands vtus de noir dont les grands brets fottaient au vent; ctait assez beau et sinistre. A la Nationale, jai lu Hegel que jai encore bien du mal comprendre. Jai trouv un passage que jai copi et qui servirait merveilleusement depigraphe mon roman. 80 Hypatia Chaque conscience poursuit la mort de lautre. 5. De nouveau mon journal sarrte. Je navais plus rien noter. Les uniformes verts 6. et gris, la croix gamme fottant sur le Senat mtaient devenus familiers. Je faisais mes cours Duruy et je lisais Hegel la Nationale qui, present, ouvrait ds le matin. Hegel me calmait un peu. De mme qu vingt ans, le coeur saignant cause de mon cousin Jacques, javais lu Homre pour mettre toute lhumanit entre moi et ma douleur par- ticulire, jessayais de fondre dans le cours du monde le moment que jtais en train de traverser. Autour de moi, embaum dans des milliers de volumes, le pass sommeillait et le prsent mapparaissait comme un pass venir. Moi, je mabolisais. Daucune manire, cependent, ces rveries ne mincitrent consentir au fascisme; on pouvait, si on tait optimiste, le considrer comme la ncessaire antithse du liberalisme bourgeois, donc une tape vers la synthse laquelle nous aspirions: le socialisme; mais pour esprer un jour le dpasser, il fallait commencer par le rfuser. Aucune philosophie naurait pu me convaincre de laccepter, il contredisait toutes les valeurs sur lesquelles stait btie ma vie. Et chaque jour mapportait de fraches raisons pour le dtester. Quelle nause, le matin, lorsque je lisais dans le Matin, dans la Victoire ces vertueuses apologies de lAlle- magne, ces sermons grondeurs dont nos vainqueurs nous accablaient! Ds la fn de juillet, des pancartes apparurent la vitrine de certains magasins: Interdit aux juifs. Another passage in the Journal de guerre (362) that is not picked up in the memoir reads: 21 janvier [1941] Hegel ou Heidegger? Pourquoi si la conscience peut se transcender mon destin individuel aurait-il tant de prix? Je narrive pas decider. Tantt il me semble que le point de vue universel Hegel-Marx te tout sens la vie. Tantt que peut-tre lindividualit comme tel na pas de sens, que cest un leurre de vouloir en donner un. Ide de salut personnelmais pourquoi cette ide (Kierkegaard, Jacques, Kafka, etc.) aurait-elle un sens? u est le vrai? u est le leurre? Avons-nous seulement un besoin de penser que cela a un sens? Mais comment luniversel en aurait-il si lindi- vidu nen a pas? (January 21. Hegel or Heidegger? If consciousness can transcend itself, why should my individual fate have such value? I cant manage to decide. Sometimes it seems to me that the Hegel-Marx universal point of view takes all the meaning out of life; sometimes I think maybe individuality as such has no meaning, that its a trick to try and give it one. Idea of personal salvationbut why should this idea [Kierkegaard, Jacques, Kafka, etc.] have meaning? Which is the truth? Which is the trick? Is it just that we need to think it has meaning? But how could the universal have any meaning if the individual doesnt?) See Heinmaa (2003, 611) for a discussion of Kierkegaards mockery of Hegels 7. system in the Concluding Unscientifc Postscript (1846/1960). Je continuai lire Hegel que je commenais mieux comprendre; dans le dtail, 8. sa richesse mblouissait; lensemble du systme me donnait la vertige. Oui, il tait tentant de sabolir au proft de luniversel, de considrer sa propre vie dans la perspec- tive de la fn de lHistoire, avec le dtachement quimplique aussi le point de vue de la mort: alors, comme cela paraissait drisoire cet infme moment du cours du monde, un individu, moi! Pourquoi me soucier de ce qui marrivait, de ce qui mentourait, juste ici, maintenant? Mais le moindre mouvement de mon coeur dmentait ces spculations: lespoir, la colre, lattente, langoisse saffrmaient contre tous les dpassements; la fuite dans luniversel ntait en fait quun pisode de mon aventure personnelle. Je revenais Meryl Altman 81 Kierkegaard que je mtais mis lire avec passion; la vrit quil revendicait dfait la doute aussi victorieusement que lvidence cartsienne; le Systme, lHistoire ne pouvaient pas plus que le Malin Gnie faire chec la certitude vcue: Je suis, jexiste, en ce moment, cet endroit, moi. Plus jallai, plussans cesser de ladmirerje me sparai de Hegel. Je savais prsent que, jusque dans la moelle de mes os, jtais lie mes contemporains; je dcou- vris lenvers de cette dpendance: ma responsabilit. . . . Dans cette France occupe, il sufft de respirer pour consentir loppression. . . . Mais cette situation qui mtait impose, mes remords mavait dcouvert que javais contribu la crer. Kruks (2005) observes that until the Algerian crisis Beauvoir spoke about the 9. privileged as though she herself were not among them, but that subsequently she was able to acknowledge and then use this privilege in politically progressive and effective ways. It may also be relevant to note that before seriously taking up the study of Hegel, Beauvoir had already read Marxshe had worked her way through Das Kapital (1857) and says retrospectively that there was a great deal she didnt really grasp in this frst encounter (though she had had the impression of deciphering it easily); but she recalls being blown away by the labor theory of surplus value, as much as by her frst encounter with Descartes cogito. Essayons de prendre le point de vue de lhistoire, se disait-on en apprenant 10. lentre des Allemands Paris. Ds quon considre abstraitement et thoriquement un systme, on se situe en 11. effet sur le plan de luniversel, donc de linfni. Cest pourquoi la lecture du systme hg- lien est si consolante: je me souviens davoir prouv un grand apaisement lire Hegel dans le cadre impersonnel de la Bibliothque Nationale, en aot 1940. Mais ds que je me retrouvai dans la rue, dans ma vie, hors du systme, sous un vrai ciel, le systme ne me servait plus de rien: ctait, sous couleur de linfni, les consolations de la mort quil mavait offertes; et je souhaitais encore vivre au milieu des hommes vivants (As soon as one considers a system arbitrarily and theoretically, one situates oneself on the plane of the universal, thus the plane of the infnite. Thats why reading the Hegelian system is so consoling: I remember having felt very much soothed reading Hegel in the impersonal setting of the Bibliothque Nationale, in August 1940. But once I found myself outside in the street, in my life, outside the system, under a real sky, the system was no more use to me. The consolations he had offered me, painted with the colors of the infnite, were the consolations of death, and I wanted to go on living, among living men). The passage continues: Lexistentialisme ne propose aucune evasion. . . . Et en fait tout homme qui a eu de vraies amours, de vraies rvoltes, de vrais dsirs, de vraies volonts, sait bien quil na besoin daucune garantie trangre pour tre sur de ses buts; leur certitude vient de son propre lan (Existentialism [in implied contrast] proposes no escape. . . . And in fact, every man who has had real loves, real rebellions, real desires, real acts of will, knows very well that he needs no external guarantee to be sure of his goals; their certainty comes from his own rush forward). Ive given a fuller account of Hegels presence in Beauvoirs early philosophical 12. essays, and also in The Second Sex, in Feminists Reading Beauvoir Reading Hegel, paper delivered at the conference on Hegelian Politics of Gender: Spirit, Nature, Law, December 1213, 2003, University of Jyvskyl, Finland. 82 Hypatia Parmi les ouvrages non romanesques qui comptrent pour nous pendant ces deux 13. ans, je ne vois que Ma vie de Trotsky, une nouvelle traduction dEmpedocle dHolderlin, et Le Malheur de la conscience de Jean Wahl qui nous donna quelques aperus dHegel (1960, 59). (Aside from novels, the only works I remember which counted for us during those two years [19291930] were Trotskys My Life, a new translation of Holderlins Empedocles, and Jean Wahls The Unhappy Consciousness, which gave us some glimpses of Hegel.) Jai travaill 2 h 14. . Hegel avec le Wahl sur la conscience malheureuse et la phnomenologie de lesprit, pour linstant je ne comprends quasi rien. Baugh (2003) foregrounds the formative importance of Wahls Hegel, rather than 15. Kojves, to such thinkers as Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida, and Sartre, and very helpfully explains Wahls reading as a reaction against earlier attempts to co-opt Hegel for an empiricist philosophy of science. I am indebted to Simon Lumsden for steering me toward this lucid and indispensable book. But Baugh minimizes, to the point of obscur- ing, the religiously specifc dimension of Wahls own focus on redemption. Sometimes it does seem possible to view this metaphorically, or at least ecumenically, as when Wahl explains Hegels method in his Prface (1929, 9): lorigine de cette doctrine qui se prsente comme un enchanement de concepts, il y a une sorte dintuition mystique et de chaleur affective. (At the origin of this doctrine, which presents itself as a development of concepts, there lies a sort of mystical intuition and warmth of feeling.) But see such passages as On voit alors comme il est injuste de dire que Hegel a manqu le sense du pch. On pourrait le croire en lisant certaines affrmations dog- matiques sur la rationalit de lunivers; mais si on suit les chemins par lesquels passe Hegel pour arriver ces affrmations, on se rend compte quau centre de sa philosophie est lide de conscience malheureuse, lide du pch. . . . Le pch est rachet par la mort dun Dieu (Wahl 1929, 99). (Thus we see how unfair it is to claim that Hegel lacked a sense of sin. One might believe this from reading certain dogmatic affr- mations about the rationality of the universe; but if we follow the roads by which Hegel travels to arrive at these affrmations, we realize that at the center of his philosophy is the idea of the unhappy consciousness, the idea of sin. . . . Sin is redeemed by the death of a God.) This feels closer to Claudel, or to the Thomism of Beauvoirs teachers at the Cours Dsir (the very Catholic girls school she attended while her competitors were preparing for the ENS at elite lyces), than to the genealogy Baugh (2003) traces as far as Derrida and Gilles Deleuze. Attempts to reconcile Hegelianism with orthodox Christianity persisted; for instance, Heckman (1974) notes that the offcial Hegel congresses of the 1940s were controlled by the Jesuits. There is more to chew on here than I can possibly bite off. A la Sorbonne, mes professeurs ignoraient systmatiquement Hegel et Marx; 16. dans son gros livre sur le progrs de la conscience en Occident, cest peine si Bruns- chvicg avait consacr trois pages Marx, quil mettait en parallle avec un penseur ractionnaire des plus obscures. See Simons (1999, 198). Simons, who is working on Meryl Altman 83 Beauvoirs very early infuences (especially Bergson) has located the textbook Beauvoir used at the Cours Dsir. Simons found Hegel in that text, obviously in a very reduced and simplifed form. There is also the possible indirect infuence of Alain (mile Chartier, [1868 1951]), whose presentation of Hegel in a section of Ides (1939) Michael Kelly described as sniping (1981, 45). M. Brunschvicg est peut-tre un homme de valeur mais pour moi = 0. I was 17. fortunate to consult Beauvoirs early diaries in a manuscript transcription, thanks to the generous help of Peg Simons. An English translation is now available (Beauvoir 2006), so I have cited that edition. Un moyen pour la philosophie contemporaine dluder ou dajourner le contact 18. avec lintelligence veritable du reel . . . anachronique avant mme de natre. Koyr attributed the relative poverty of French work on Hegel to a variety of causes, including the dominance of la pense mathmatique, World War I prejudice against all things German, and the unavailability of accurate French translations. See also Lefebvre (1973, 372): Brunschvicg ne parlait de rien dactuel, de rien 19. de vivant . . . rien ne rpondait aux questions que se posait un jeune homme, aprs la guerre, dans leffondrement des valeurs et des ides reues (Brunschvicg never spoke of anything current, anything living . . . he had no answers to the questions a young man was asking himself, after the war, as values and received ideas were crumbling around him). Baugh (2003) provides a fuller and more sympathetic explanation of Brunschvicgs distaste for Hegel. Again, Lefebvre (1973, 373): Les salles de cours de la Sorbonne, o enseignait 20. Brunschvicg, offraient aux jeunes philosophes des oasis de calme rudit, intellectua- lit sereine, que je ne pouvais mempcher de trouverspontanmentdouillette et stagnante. Autour de la Sorbonne, dans les directions les plus diffrentes, ctait une immense fermentation, une immense renaissance; du moins on le croyait. Tout scrou- lait, tout allait recommencer (The classrooms of the Sorbonne, where Brunschvicg taught, offered young philosophers an oasis of erudite calm, serene intellectuality, which I couldnt help fnding suddenly stagnant and namby-pamby. All around the Sorbonne, on all different sides, there was a tremendous ferment, a tremendous rebirth; or at least we thought so. Everything was falling apart, everything was about to start over). And: De cette priode date un fait assez important: la philosophie (vivante, pour autant quelle vive) commenait se chercher et se faire en grande partie hors de lUniversit. Cette scission ne devait entrainer ses consquences que dix vingt ans plus tard (A pretty important fact dates from that time: living philosophy [insofar as philosophy can live] began to be pursued to a great extent outside the University. The consequences of this split would not be felt for ten or twenty years) (376). La philo serait passionante sil ny avait pas dexamens prparer et quon pt 21. sy livrer fond! NRF is the 22. Nouvelle Revue Francaise, the prestigious and urbane literary and critical journal founded by Andr Gide and friends in 1909. What Beauvoir means particularly here may be seen in the diarys critical comment about her errant cousin Jacques, penned after she had dedicated herself seriously to her philosophy: Oh! cette frivolit, ce manque de srieux; comme il est NRF avec ses histoires de bar, de bridge, 84 Hypatia dargent! (Oh the frivolousness, the lack of serious commitment; hes so NRF with his stories about going to the bar, playing bridge, spending money!) Un vrai plaisir pour un quart dheure de bavardage avec le directeur de lEsprit. 23. Tout de suite jimagine tout ce quil pourrait mapporter. . . . 2 decembre. Lu lEsprit. Il y a dun certain Morhange deux articles trangement beaux. See also Beauvoir 1958, 326. See Trebitsch (1987a, 1987b) and also especially Burkhard (2000), whose 24. indispensable book is devoted to tracing the history of the group. Wahls brief translators note to the selection published in 25. LEsprit (1926, 195) reads: Ces pages contiennent une description du ddoublement de la conscience et de son effort vers lunit tels quon le voit dans la religion. Ainsi, le christianisme, dont lapparition a t prpare par le scepticisme dune part, en tant que conscience de la dualit humaine, par le judaisme de lautre, en tant que conscience contradictoire de la dualit absolue de lhomme et de Dieu et de leur unit immdiate, est le sentiment auquel lme parvient dans son malheur, de limmuable en tant que particulier et du particulier en tant que limmuable. A lopposition de la gnerale et du particulier (judaisme) succde grace lui la religion du Dieu incarne (These pages contain a description of the doubling of consciousness and its effort towards unity, such as is seen in religion. Thus Christianity, whose appearance was prepared for, on the one hand by the Skeptics, in the form of consciousness of human duality, on the other hand by the Jews, in the form of contradictory consciousness of the absolute duality of man and God and of their immediate unity, is the feeling which the soul attains in its unhappiness, of the immutable in the form of the particular and the particular in the form of the immutable. From the opposition of general to particular [Judaism], and by means of it, follows the religion of God incarnate). To my ears, very little distinguishes this from simple Christian triumphalism, of the sort Beauvoir had heard quite enough of at the Cours Dsir. The continued political power of the Catholic faction within French academic and literary life, the seriousness with which questions of faith were taken, the central signifcance of loss of faith in intellectual autobiography, and the continued psychological pressure to reconvert, con- fess, take communion, and so on to which Beauvoir and her fellow students and fellow writers continued to be subjected throughout their lives, deserves greater attention than it usually receives from secular-minded scholars. But to balance this religious solemnity, the editors of lEsprit added to Wahls note the following even briefer preface: Nous ne publions pas cet important fragment de Hegel pour manifester une coordination avec ce philosophe, mais pour le reconnaitre, puis cer- tainement, le repousser [signed N.D.L.R.] (We publish this important fragment of Hegel, not to display our solidarity with this philosopher, but to recognize him, then, certainly, to push him away). (1926, 195) This both is, and isnt, a joke, I think. The book series associated with Philosophies published Wahls (1926) work on 26. Platos Parmenides, as well as the works of William Blake (1926), another builder of mystical systems. Meryl Altman 85 Mystifcation: notes for a critique of everyday life. 27. Baugh (2003, 59) points out that the title, 28. La conscience mystife, is a direct riposte to La conscience malheureuse: unhappiness now seen as a result of alienation. Lefebvre has also been recognized for his direct infuence on Guy DeBord, the Situationists, and the protests of 1968. Whether that legacy was truly a demystifcation of French culture or simply created new mythologies through a romanticization of youth (or both) is an open question. In the specifc case of her interest in the Philosophies group, Enlightenment 29. common sense kicked in very quickly. In a fragment of Beauvoirs writing given to me by Peg Simons, who holds the manuscript privately, Beauvoir wrote a highly ambitious to-do list on July 19, 1927, for the following school year. This list includes the phrase, Essentiellement: relire lEsprit et tudier le mysticisme (Essentially: reread lEsprit and study mysticism) (76) at the head of a long list of philosophers she intends to get to the bottom of; but a mere ten days later, she has seen a diffculty, at least of method. Je ne vois rien, rien; non seulement pas une rponse mais aucune manire sortable de poser la question. Le scepticisme, lindifference sont impossibles, une religion est impossible pour linstantle mysticisme est tentant; mais comment connatrai-je la valeur dune pense qui ne laisse pas place la pense? sur quoi mappuyer pour le rejeter ou laccepter? (I see nothing, nothing; not only no answer, but no presentable way to ask the question. Skep- ticism, indifference are impossible; a religion is impossible for the momentmysticism is tempting; but how would I be able to evaluate a way of thinking that leaves no place for thinking? what could I lean on to reject it or accept it?) (85). The general taste, or perhaps one should say nostalgia, for an Absolute lasted much longer. Derrida, too, has been at pains in a 1986 interview to distance himself from U.S. 30. interpretations of his thought as a mysticism. Unfortunately or fortunately, as you like it, I am not mystical and there is nothing mystical in my work. In fact my work is a deconstruction of values which found mysticism, i.e. of presence, view, of the absence of a marque, of the unspeakable. I originally viewed the translation at http://www.lake. de/sonst/homepages/s2442/reb.html#eng, but the page has since been taken down. For another translation of this interview, see The PreText Conversations held a Re/In/View with Victor Vitanza, beginning September 1997. The Guest Moderator is/was Steven Mailloux, UC-Irvine. File 6 (http://www.pre-text.com/ptlist/vitanza6.html, accessed April 15, 2007). On this blog site, the reader is referred to the original transcription, which was published in Rtzer 1986, 6787, quotation on 74. See Baugh, especially Derrida and Sartre: Filiation/ Parricide (2003), 14044); 31. see Fox 2003 and recent work by Foucault biographer Eribon (1999). Oh! la vie est trop triste, incurablement triste! 32. O Bien-Aim! Il nest plus temps, mon coeur se crve Et trop pour ten vouloir, mais jai tant sanglot, Vois-tu, que seul mest doux le spleen des nuits dt, Des nuits longues o tout est frais comme un grand rve. . . . Astres! je ne veux pas mourir! Jai du gnie! . . . Et plus rien! Venus de marbre! eaux fortes vaines! 86 Hypatia Cerveau fou de Hegel! doux refrains consolants! Clochers brodes jour et consumes dlans, Livres o lhomme mit dinutiles victoires! Tout ce qu la fureur de tes fls enfant, Tout ce qui fait ta fange et ta splendeur si brve, O Terre, est maintenant comme un rve, un grand rve. Va dors, cest bien fni, dors pour lternit. See Rubio 2003. The question of mystifcation or mythifcation comes up also 33. with reference to the Arcades project: briefy, Benjamin saw his work as demystifying Aragons, Adorno worried (not without reason) that Benjamins account wasnt suf- fciently free of its own phantasmagoria. To complicate matters further, Le Paysan de Paris itself wavers (or, if you like, unfolds a dialectic) between building myths and tearing them down. See Limat-Letellier 2003. Toute mtaphysique est la premire personne du singulier. Toute posie aussi. 34. La seconde personne, cest encore la premire. Lindividu vivant, dit Hegel, se pose dans sa premire evolution comme sujet et 35. comme notion, et dans ce second il sassimile lobjet, et par l il se donne une dtermi- nation relle. Et il est en soi le genre, luniversalit substantielle. Le rapport dun sujet avec un autre sujet du mme genre constitute la particularisation du genre, et la jugement exprime le rapport du genre aux individus ainsi dtermins. Cest l la difference des sexes. According to Rubio (2003), this comes from Hegels Logic, which Aragon read in Veras 1859 French translation. Tants de promeneuses diverses se soumettent au jugement Hgelien. 36. Dans le passage tant de promeneuses diverses se soumettent au jugement hg- 37. lien, dge et de beaut variables, tant de promeneuses dans ces galeries, leurs complices, se contentent uniquement dtre femmes, que lhomme encore indcis et solitaire avec son ide de lamour, lhomme qui ne croit pas encore la pluralit des femmes, lenfant qui cherche une image de labsolu pour ses nuits, na rien faire dans ces parages (In the passage so many women, of varying age and beauty, out for a walk, submit to Hegelian judgement, so many women out for a walk in these corridors which are their accomplices, happy just because they are womenso many that the man, still indecisive and lonely with his idea of love, the man who does not yet believe that women are many [and not One], the child who seeks an image of the absolute to comfort his nights, has nothing to do in this neighborhood). Parshley translates this as the data of biology, but the biological givens is 38. another possible meaning. Hegel cependant et t infdle son dlire rationaliste sil net tent de la 39. fonder logiquement. La sexualit represente selon lui la mdiation travers laquelle le sujet satteint concrtement comme genre. Le genre se produit en lui comme un effet contre cette disproportion de sa ralite individuelle, comme un dsir de retrouver dans un autre individu de son espce le sentiment de lui-mme en sunissant lui, de se complter et senvelopper par l le genre dans sa nature et de lamener lexistence. Cest laccouplement [Philosophie de la Nature, 3e partie, 369]. Et un peu plus loin: Le processus consiste en ceci, savoir: ce quils sont en soi, cest dire un seul genre, une seule et mme vie subjective, ils le posent comme tel. Et Hegel declare ensuite que, pour Meryl Altman 87 que le processus de rapprochement seffectue, il faut dabord quil y ait diffrentiation des deux sexes. Mais sa dmonstration nest pas convaincante: on y sent trop le parti pris de retrouver en toute opration les trois moments du syllogisme. Le dpassement de lindividu vers lespce, par lequel individu et espce saccomplissent dans leur verit, pourrait seffectuer sans troisime terme dans le simple rapport du gnerateur lenfant: la reproduction pourrait tre asexue. Ou encore le rapport de lun lautre pourrait tre le rapport de deux semblables, la diffrentiation rsidant dans la singularit dun mme type, comme il arrive dans les espces hermaphrodites. La description de Hegel dgage un trs important signifcation de la sexualit; mais son erreur est toujours de faire de signifcation raison. Cest en exerant lactivit sexuelle que les hommes dfnissent les sexes et leur relations comme ils crent le sens et la valeur de toutes les fonctions quils accomplissent: mais elle nest pas ncessairement implique dans la nature de ltre human (Beauvoir 1949, 1: 3839). Cest sur la porte du mot tre quil faudrait sentendre; la mauvaise foi consiste 40. lui donner une valeur substantielle alors quelle a le sens dynamique hglien; tre cest tre devenue, cest avoir t fait tel quon se manifeste. As Rubio (2003) puts it, Le parcours amoureux mime parfaitement le dvelop- 41. pement dialectique de la connaissance propre la philosophie hglienne (the course of love perfectly imitates the dialectical way knowledge develops in Hegels philosophy). The legacy for second-wave academic U.S. feminist literary criticism, fltered 42. at frst through Kate Millett (1970) and Betty Friedan (1963), deserves to be better acknowledged and further discussed. Thinking outside disciplinary boundaries would also be helpful in coming to 43. terms with Bataille, Benjamin, and others. Heckmans (1974) failure to include Beauvoir in his mapping of the intellectual 44. terrain of French versions of Hegel is regrettable, and also leaves out a major interna- tional infuence that Hegel actually (through her) had. Unfortunately, the same must be said of Baugh (2003), who does not even include Beauvoirs reading of Hegel in his chapter on Sartre, where it would be quite relevant. The debate between Sherry Ortners view and Gayle Rubins The Traffc in 45. Women (1975), so foundational to feminist anthropology in the 1970s and since, can be seen as a debate between two versions of Beauvoir, where each anthropologist draws on different sections of her chapter on Mythes. The view is suffciently problematic that I am of two minds about claiming 46. it as a legacy of Beauvoirs. See Bauer (2001, 267): [Karen] Vintges and I agree that the standard reading of Beauvoirs relation to Hegel, on which she just maps relations between men and women onto the master/slave dialectic is untenable. . . . Vintges fur- ther observes, quite astutely, that the feminist standpoint theory that developed in the wake of The Second Sex has been driven in many of its incarnations by exactly the sort of clichd Hegelian picture that she and I fail to fnd in Beauvoirs work. A slightly different way to approach this: standpoint theory is either a terrible idea, or a very good one, depending on whether the standpoint is understood in a static way (as identity), or a dynamic way (as situation). A limiting case of the former might be the nineteenth-century understanding of women as more moral than men, which has unfortunate avatars even today in the womens ways of knowing school of feminist 88 Hypatia epistemology and in some approaches to the question of women and war. For a related critique, see Le Doeuff 1998. See also Ehrenreich 2004. Beauvoir herself, Id argue, is closer to the more dynamic view, which understands the ways in which situations are complex, relative, and can change as a function of historical realities and also through acts of conscious choice and will. So, for example, a woman may be epistemologically advantaged with respect to her husband but episte- mologically disadvantaged with respect to the woman who cleans her house; or a woman scientist may be epistemologically one step ahead of those who run her university or biotech corporation, but one step behind the human subjects who are the objects of her scientifc work. She will still, and always, have choices to make about how to live this situation, in complicity with power relations as she fnds them, or in resistance to them. It is always possible to open ones eyes, or to close them, to what is going on in ones life and work. Were not so far, now, from Donna Haraways concept of situated knowledges, which might help us appreciate the inputs of existentialism to that strand of feminist work. Epistemological and ethical advantages are not pre-given, nor are they entirely made. They must be actively worked for, worked toward, and reworked as conditions change (this last point a particularly salient one for second-wave feminists in the twenty- frst century). Another trap can arise from thinking too rigidly about masters and slaves: considering oneself to be the slave, when one is actually the master (or neither, or in between) is a form of bad faith in itself, especially when coupled with the idea that the victim is epistemologically privileged. See Brown 1995. And fnallyas I think Beau- voir sawepistemological privilege need not imply ethical privilege, and may not lead to ethical behavior: all sorts of accommodation, complicity, and bad faith remain equally possible. See especially chap. 9. Like many of her generation, Firestone owes more to 47. Beauvoir than she signals directly. Two translations of Lonzis text into English are available. For an abridged cross- 48. cultural translation by Giovanna Bellesia and Elaine Maclachlan see Mills 1998; for a differently abridged translation by Victoria Newman see Bono and Kemp 1991. I have consulted both, and tinkered. Lonzis manifesto, comparable in wit and tone to Robin Morgans (1970), deserves to be much better known outside Italy, and would be well served by a full translation that acknowledged its original activist context. La dialletica servo-padrone una regolazione di conti tra colletivi di uomini: essa 49. non prevede la liberazione della donna, il grande oppresso della civilt patriarcale. Quelle condizione femminile che il frutto delloppressione indicata da Hegel 50. come il movente delloppressione stessa. Meryl Altman 89 References Altman, Meryl. 2002. La femme frigide dans Le deuxime sexe. 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