Sie sind auf Seite 1von 185

ABU DHABI MARINE OPERATING COMPANY

Das Island Division


Das Engineering Team

US COLUMNS HEAT EXCHANGER-CHANNEL HEAD DIVIDING
PLATE
Work Request #: DIAD/WR/12/030




NON-LINEAR ANALYSIS OF HEAT EXCHANGER -
CHANNEL HEAD

DOC. NO.: 20/1552/DET/2014/0XXX


0 26/02/2014 For Review JVB DETL EPM(DAS)
Rev. Date Description Prepared
By
Reviewed By Approved By


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 2 of 39
TABLE OF CONTENTS


1.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................3
2.0 REFERENCE ....................................................................................................................................3
2.1 LIST OF APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS .................................................................................3
2.2 DRAWINGS ....................................................................................................................................4
2.3 DESIGN DATA ................................................................................................................................5
2.4 HISTORY OF FAILURES ....................................................................................................................7
2.5 SITE VISIT .......................................................................................................................................8
3.0 ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 12
4.0 FITNESS FOR SERVICE PROCEDURE ............................................................................................... 14
5.0 DISCUSSION ON THE ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................... 19
6.0 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 26
7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS: .................................................................................................................. 27
8.0 APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................ 31
8.1 ORIGINAL WORK REQUEST AND CORRESPONDENCES ................................................................... 31
8.2 INSPECTION REPORT .................................................................................................................... 32
8.3 DAMAGE MECHANISM AS PER API571 .......................................................................................... 33
8.4 LEVEL -1 ASSESSMENT .................................................................................................................. 34
8.5 METALLURGY ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 35
8.6 FEA FOR THE DESIGN BASE CASE .................................................................................................. 36
8.7 NON-LENEAR ANALYSIS RESULTS (10MM PASS PARTITION PLATE) ................................................ 37
8.8 PROPOSED SOLUTION (TO MITIGATE HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS THE PASS PARTION
PLATE) ................................................................................................................................................... 38
8.9 DRAWINGS .................................................................................................................................. 39




Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 3 of 39
1.0 INTRODUCTION

The heat exchanger of stripping column 200 at Umm-Shaif plant was under major
Overhaul. Upon the opening of the heat exchanger, the Pass partition plate of the
channel head was found broken in two places and fallen down on the bottom of the
channel. The inspection team suspected the pass partition plate had a fatigue
failure. Similar problems were found in column 100 and 400 heat exchanger and the
plates were replaced with 10mm ASTM A516 Gr.70.
It was observed that the water hammering was high in the steam side.
The objective of this study is to carry out a root cause analysis for the breaking of
the heat exchanger channel pass partition plate at Umm-Shaif plant and put forth
recommendations/solutions.
2.0 REFERENCE

2.1 List of Applicable Codes and Standards

International Standards
API 571: Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the
Refining Industry
API579: Fitness-for-Service Second Edition
ASME FFS-1

ASME Sec VIII Div.1 Pressure Vessels
BSI 1501 Steel for pressure purpose
ASTM A516 Standard Specification for Pressure Vessel Plates,
Carbon Steel, for Moderate- and Lower-Temperature
Service

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 4 of 39
AVIFF Guidelines for the avoidance of vibration induced
fatigue failure in process pipework
ADMA OPCO Standards
CP-117 Code Of Practice For Evaluation, Repair, and Rerate
Of Heat Exchangers
PRO-154 Procedure For Failure Analysis For Exchangers
2.2 Drawings

Plant Specification
AD41-4.3/8.7-R-0013

P&ID
AD-04.3-D-2980
AD-04.3-D-2981
AD-04.3-D-2982

PFD
ED7-90-D-3252

GADs
FAD-4-M-7210
FAD-4-M-7211
FAD-35-M-15714
FAD-4-M-8262

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 5 of 39
FAD-4-M-8264
FAD-4-M-8265
FAD-35-M-15715
Misc
AD41-36-R-0076
AD-4.3-M-15719
2.3 Design Data

The heat exchangers were built between 1972 and 1980s to ASME Section
VIII Div.1 and TEMA C (refer name plate detail drawing FAD-4-M-8264).
Channel Head:
Channel type Front End Stationary Head Type, Removable cover (TEMA
Type A)
The exchanger channel side is fillet welded with flat metal plate which divides
(pass partition plate) the head into separate compartments for the tube side
fluid and to provide the desired flow path. The original thickness of the plate
was 12.7/13mm. The material for the pass partition plate was not clearly
identified in the drawings; however, in the analysis BS 1501-151-Gr28A
(1964) was used. The nearest equivalent as per latest BS 1501 is 151 grade
430. The equivalent grade as per TEMA 2007(ninth edition) in ASME is SA-
515-65
Sour Charge heater details from ED7-90-D-3252 are as follows:
TEMA Size & Type : 26-144/AEU(HORIZ)
Effective Surface per Unit = 810ft
2

Design(rated) Heat duty = 29.585 x 10
6
BTU/Hr
An allowable stress used in the original design calculation is 15700psi
(108MPa) at 204DegC (refer Drawing FAD-4.3-M-15719).

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 6 of 39
The thickness of the pass partition plate was checked in accordance with
TEMA and enclosed is the calculation in Appendix.
Therefore,
Maximum allowable stress = 15,700lbf/in2 = 108Mpa
As per BS1501 :Part1 :1980
Yield Strength = 192Mpa @ 250Deg C,
215Mpa @ 200Deg C
222Mpa @ <150DegC
Mass density of steel as per BS4360 = 7850kg/m3


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 7 of 39

2.4 History of Failures

The following are the history of failures of the pass partition plate on each heat exchangers
for the US stripping columns:
Sl.n
o
Description Commissioni
ng
Failures of Pass partition plate Action during
Investigations
Remarks
1 Heat
exchanger for
US Column
401
(43100344)
Jan 1982 March 2008,
corroded pass
partition plate
replaced
Feb 2013,
Rupture/
broken.
Replaced with
10 mm
thickness plate
with 13 mm
drain hole
Decided to replace
the 10mm plate
with 13 mm hole to
13 mm plate
without hole on
trial basis as per
PMR, but PMR not
approve, partition
plate should be
replaced specified
13mm thickness
plate
Two times
replaced.
Started failure
occur in year
2008
2 Heat
exchanger for
US Column
101
(43100341)
Jan 1981 Dec 2011,
Rupture/
broken pass
partition plate
replaced
April 2013,
Rupture/ broken
pass partition
plate
April 2013,
replaced with 13
mm thickness plate
with 13 mm drain
hole
two time
replaced
3 Heat
exchanger for
US Column
201
(43100342)
Oct 1981 May 2012,
Rupture/broken
pass partition
plate replaced
March 2013,
Rupture/ broken
pass partition
plate
March 2013,
replaced with 13
mm thickness plate
with 13 mm drain
hole
two time
replaced
4 Heat
exchanger for
US Column
301
(43100343)
March 1982 Feb 2008,
Rupture/broken
pass partition
plate replaced
March 2011,
rupture/broken
March 2013,
replaced with 13
mm thickness plate
with 13 mm drain
hole
Three times
replaced.
Started failure
occur in year
2008

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 8 of 39
2.5 Site visit

Umm Shaif Process Plant

36" Main Oil Line coming from offshore Umm Shaif Super Complex(USSC)
arrives at Das to Umm Shaif plant, (see Figure below). The US plant at Das
comprises of:
a) 7 HP Separators, 2nd stage, 250 psig operating pressure.
b) 7 LP Separators, 3rd stage, 40 psig operating pressure.
c) 2 Spheroids, 4th stage, Atmospheric pressure.
d) 3 Parallel trains of dehydrators and desalters have now been de-
mothballed and commissioned.
e) 4 Cold stripping towers.
Umm Shaif crude is sweetened via one of four cold stripping units, each with
a nominal capacity of 120,000 BPD. The following description refers to the
operation of just one of these units.
A common 30 sour crude oil header delivers crude via the charge pumps to
the stripping area. The crude is divided into four by parallel 12 inlet lines,
which feed the four cold stripping units.
Crude is preheated, using steam as the heating medium, in the sour crude
charge heater to approximately 43C. A flow control valve FV-702, in the inlet
line to the stripping tower also acts as shutdown valve SDV- 702. The
preheated crude flows down through the stripping tower against a counter-
current flow of sweet gas from the gas sweetening unit. Sweet gas enters the
tower below the bottom tray.
The sweet gas, as it passes through the descending oil lowers the partial
pressure of the oil thereby removing H2S and some light hydrocarbons from
the crude. The spent sweet gas passes through a demister pad, before
leaving the tower and entering the 60 atmospheric gas manifold.
The stabilized and stripped crude flows from the bottom of each stripping unit
via a seal loop into the vent drum where further gas separation occurs.
Gas evolved in the vent drum is vented to join the spent sweet gas leaving
the stripping tower, before joining the 60 atmospheric gas manifold.
The sweetened crude from each stripping unit combines in the 24 crude
product header and is pumped to the finished crude STOREX area.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 9 of 39



It is to be noted is that ETPP D&D train heat exchanger are not used and are to be
demolished.
There are four trains of strippers in the Umm Saif i.e. three Running and one stand-
by/maintenance/Dual(ZK/US service).


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 10 of 39
Design Parameters
The original design of the heat exchanger was reviewed and the following
observations were made (refer ED7-90-D-3252):
Flow for individual cold stripping units Nominal Design Operation for summer and
winter = 120,000BPSD
The Design minimum temperature of the crude = 50DegF(10Deg C)
The Design maximum temperature of the crude =83.6DegF(28.6Deg C)
Design Maximum Crude flow rate = 150,000BPSD
Design Maximum Steam weight flow rate = 33,590lb/hr.
Design Winter steam flow rate = 26,872lb/hr
Design summer steam flow rate = 6,940lb/hr
Design Differential Pressure across the Pass partition plate was not found in the
records.
Also, to be noted is that D&D train heat exchanger are not used and are to be demolished.
The crude oil was intended to be routed to the D&D plant; however, this plant was never
operated.
Present Operations
During the site visit the following production profile were noted in the Umm Shaif
plant:
- Old production profile prior to 1992 : 180-200,000MBD
- New Production profile(2012): 250-300,000MBD
- Per train Capacity: 120,000MBD
- Mani/Maximum differential Pressure: 11-18Psig(given at site).
(Across the Pass Partition Plate)
- Nominal Differential pressure: 13Psig(Email Confirmation

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 11 of 39
(Across the Pass Partition Plate) dated 3
rd
Feb 2013)
The Data for USP H/Exchanger steam inlet pressure D/Stream the TCVs:
Stripper Inlet
Pressure
Cond. Outlet Pressure Remarks
Col.100 28 PSIG 17 PSIG {common header to
Utilities}
Existing production = 280/50MBD
Col.200 29 PSIG 17 PSIG {common header to
Utilities}
Existing production = 280/50MBD
Col.300 36 PSIG 17 PSIG {common header to
Utilities}
Existing production = 280/50MBD
Col.400 35 PSIG 17 PSIG {common header to
Utilities}
Now ZK crude service, Existing ZK
production = 365/0 MBD

The inlet steam pressure depends on the oil production, and the pressure of the
common steam condensate header for all of the Das plants. The common steam
header pressure varies from 12 to 17PSIG.
More over these Data also vary upon ambient temperature which is considerably
different in summer & winter. Accordingly, the steam load is varied to maintain the
crude oil temperature.
Below table shows existing operating temperature
Stripper Existing
Oil Flow
to Strip.
MBD
Inlet TEMP Inlet
TEMP
D/Stream
TCV
Strippers
Oil Outlet
Temp.
Remarks
Col.100 95 14.3 Deg C 44 DegC 37 Deg C Temporary Auto control
Col.200 67 30.2 Deg C 44 Deg C 36 Deg C On cascade control {Operational

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 12 of 39
requirement}.
Col.300 95 14.4 Deg C 44 Deg C 36 Deg C Temporary Auto control
Col.400 At the time of taking the reading this
stripper was used for ZK crude service.
There is only one pressure transmitter in the inlet steam header of each heat
exchanger. The steam passes through each exchanger in parallel trains. However,
the differential pressure measurement is not monitored continuously.
During the site visit the broken plate were visually inspected along with the channel
head. Anomalies are reported in the inspection report.(Refer inspection report in
appendix of the findings)
A random instantaneous flow measurement was taken(26 Feb 2014 at 11:45am) at
the steam inlet of the heat exchanger and compared to the design values
FT-741 28,410Lb/hr (High as winter design case is 26,872lb/hr)
FT-791 28,710Lb/hr (High as winter design case is 26,872 lb/hr)
FT-841 38,604Lb/hr (Very high as design max is 33,590lb/hr)
As the D&D trains heat exchangers are not used, the capacity of the heat exchanger
for the increased flow is to be analyzed. There is no record/report which provides
concurrence to the present operating parameters.
3.0 Assumptions

a. It was assumed that there was no thickness loss/variation - as inspection reports
did not reveal any such defect.
b. The original design data and calculation were not available. A finite element
model of the design case (without any flaw/base case) was generated to look at
the maximum stress at the relevant part and compare with the flaw assessment.
The construction code ASME Section VIII Div.1 year 1977and TEMA C year

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 13 of 39
1978 as per the name plate details were used for the calculation of the base
case. The year of manufacture was Nov 1980.
c. For the purpose of this calculation, it is assumed that the Heat Exchangers have
a suitable monitoring / inspection program and that the Exchangers will be
operated in future under its present operating conditions. Also noted, is the fact
that, the Exchangers have been operated safely for more than 31years and these
are recent occurrences i.e. it is assumed that no pervious failure exists as no
similar records were found.
d. The applicability and limitation of the fitness for service assessment is as per API
579.
e. The original design data was taken from the FAD-35-M-30847 / 30848 / 30849.
It is to be noted that the original material for the Pass partition plate is not mentioned
in the drawings/manufacturing records and is assumed as BS 1501-151-28A. This was
considered in all the calculations.
f. As per the site visit report the weld procedure followed was requested and the
weld procedure was check with the manufacturing records FAD-35-M-30847 /
30848 / 30849. The welding procedure used does not exist in the records for he
pass partition plate.
g. As the temperature variation in the channel head (only 2 pass) are very minor
during operation and the channel head is free to expand, the effect of
temperature was not considered. Only during cold start up the thermal variations
are experienced. This effect is known to all and it is assumed that proper
procedures are practiced during start up and shutdowns. If this effect has to be
investigated, it will be based on site teams advice.
h. The result of vacuum case for channel is not included in this report as no
concerns have been reported. It is assumed that a proper procedure is followed
during shutdown and no rapid cooling is envisaged.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 14 of 39
i. It is assumed that a detailed metallurgical study report was done by the site team
and all defects related to metallurgical aspect were covered and no anomalies
are reported.
4.0 Fitness for service Procedure

The following Procedure was followed:
STEP 1 Flaw and Damage Mechanism Identification:
The damage mechanism (as per API 571) was analysed and enclosed is the
discussion in Appendix.
The following case scenarios were considered for further evaluations: (serial number
maintained as per Appendix on Damage mechanisms as per API 571)

SLNO

DAMAGE MECHANISM

DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE
MECHANISM

REMARKS

12 Thermal Fatigue

Thermal fatigue is the result of cyclic
stresses caused by variations in
temperature. Damage is in the form of
cracking that may occur anywhere in a
metallic component where relative
movement or differential expansion is
constrained, particularly under repeated
thermal cycling.
The startup and shutdown of
equipment increases the
susceptibility to thermal fatigue. The
number of start-up and shutdown
cycles needs to be controlled. The
magnitude of temperature swing
needs to be controlled.
This damage mechanism is a
credible case, however, this can
easily be controlled by procedures of
slow start up and shutdowns.
18 Caustic Cracking

Caustic embrittlement is a form of stress
corrosion cracking characterized by
surface-initiated cracks that occur in
piping and equipment exposed to caustic,
primarily adjacent to non-PWHTd welds.
Affected Materials-Carbon steel, low alloy
steels and 300 Series SS are susceptible.
Caustic stress corrosion cracking typically
propagates parallel to the weld in
adjacent base metal but can also occur in
the weld deposit or heat-affected zones.
PWHT is recommended to be
carried out on the channel head. A
heat treatment at 1150F (621C) is
considered as an effective stress
relieving heat treatment for carbon
steel
To rule this out, analysis of steam
and metallographic examination
needs to be carried out.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 15 of 39
22 Amine Cracking

Amine cracking is a common term applied
to the cracking of steels under the
combined action of tensile stress and
corrosion in aqueous alkanolamine
systems used to remove/absorb H2S
and/or CO2 and their mixtures from
various gas and liquid hydrocarbon
streams. Amine cracking is a form of
alkaline stress corrosion cracking. It is
most often found at or adjacent to non-
PWHTd carbon steel weldments or in
highly cold worked parts.
A metallurgical analysis report on
the plate needs to be carried out to
rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be
ruled out on the basis that similar
materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
PWHT of the Channel head is
recommended.
23 Chloride Stress Corrosion
Cracking

Surface initiated cracks caused by
environmental cracking of 300 Series SS
and some nickel base alloys under the
combined action of tensile stress,
temperature and an aqueous chloride
environment. The presence of dissolved
oxygen increases propensity for cracking
A metallurgical analysis report on
the plate needs to be carried out to
rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be
ruled out on the basis that similar
materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
24 Carburization

Carbon is absorbed into a material at
elevated temperature while in contact
with a carbonaceous material or
carburizing environment. Three
conditions must be satisfied:
1) Exposure to a carburizing environment
or carbonaceous material -
(hydrocarbons, coke,
gases rich in CO, CO2, methane, ethane)
and low oxygen potential (minimal O2 or
steam)..
2) Temperature high enough to allow
diffusion of carbon into the metal [typically
above 1100F
(593C)].
3) Susceptible material
A metallurgical analysis report on
the plate needs to be carried out to
rule it out.
This is steam service and maximum
temperature is only 204Deg C.
This damage mechanism can be
ruled out on the basis that similar
materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
31 Brittle Fracture

Brittle fracture is the sudden rapid
fracture under stress (residual or applied)
where the material exhibits little or no
evidence of ductility or plastic
deformation.
Affected Materials:
Carbon steels and low alloy steels are of
prime concern, particularly older steels.
400 Series SS are also
The hydrotest case needs to be
carefully analyzed and would require
a FEA analysis looking at the stress
on the components. This damage
mechanism is a credible and will
need to be further analyzed.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 16 of 39
susceptible.
39 Dissimilar Metal Weld
(DMW) Cracking

Cracking of dissimilar metal welds occurs
in the ferritic carbon steel or low alloy
steel) side of a weld between an
austenitic (300 Series SS or Nickel base
alloy) and a erritic material operating at
high. Cracking can result from creep
damage, from fatigue cracking, from
sulfide stress cracking or hydrogen
disbonding
This is a credible case and will be
studied further.
40 Hydrogen Stress Cracking
in HF

Hydrogen Stress Cracking is a form
of environmental cracking that can
initiate on the surface of high strength
low alloy steels and carbon steels
with highly localized zones of high
hardness in the weld metal and HAZ
as a result of exposure to aqueous
HF acid environments.
A metallurgical analysis report on
the plate needs to be carried out to
rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be
ruled out on the basis that similar
materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
43 Corrosion Fatigue A form of fatigue cracking in which cracks
develop under the combined effects of
cyclic loading and corrosion. Cracking
often initiates at a stress concentration
such as a pit in the surface. Cracking can
initiate at multiple sites.
Contrary to a pure mechanical fatigue,
there is no fatigue limit load in corrosion-
assisted fatigue.
Corrosion promotes failure at a lower
stress and number of cycles than the
materials normal endurance limit in the
absence of corrosion and often results in
propagation of multiple parallel cracks.
Crack initiation sites include
concentrators such as pits, notches,
surface defects, changes in section or
fillet welds.
This is a credible case as multiple
site cracks are observed and will be
studied further. However, only minor
corrosion was observed during the
site visit and reported in the
inspection reports.
48 Ammonia Stress Corrosion
Cracking

Aqueous streams containing ammonia
may cause Stress Corrosion Cracking
(SCC) in some copper alloys. Carbon
steel is susceptible to SCC in anhydrous
ammonia. Anhydrous ammonia with
<0.2% water may cause cracking in
carbon steel.
PWHT eliminates susceptibility of
most common steels. To rule this
out, analysis of steam and
metallographic examination needs to
be carried out.
56 Vibration-Induced Fatigue

A form of mechanical fatigue in which
cracks are produced as the result of
dynamic loading due to vibration, water
hammer, or unstable fluid flow.
The plate is rigidly supported all
around. There is report of
vibration/water hammer, or unstable
fluid flow from site. This damage
mechanism is likely. However, if this

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 17 of 39
is to be ruled out completely, then a
complete vibration study of the
system needs to be carried out. In
the interim period a DP across the
heat exchanger is recommended.


STEP 2 Applicability and Limitations of the FFS Assessment Procedures:
The widely used API 579 fitness for service procedure was used for the evaluation of
the crack on the heat exchanger plate. As the heat exchanger partition plate is not
covered in the standards, a modified approach was used inline with the principle of
the FFS study.
As no original design information was available, a base model was made and all
parameter were check to the name plate codes ASME VIII and TEMA.
STEP 3 Data Requirements:
The available data required for a FFS assessment depend on the flaw type was
identified. Data requirements included: original equipment design data, information
pertaining to maintenance and operations, and material properties.
The available original design information on the heat exchanger was gathered.
However, only some dimensional drawings were available in the ADMA document
system along with name plate details. No design data or calculations were available.
Therefore a based case finite element model to look at the conformance to ASME
Section VIII Div.1 and TEMA C was required. The relevant drawings are referenced
in section 2.2. The design data as per the P&ID and vendor drawings referenced
was used for the calculation.
The WPS was reviewed with the original manufacturer. However, there was no
record of the procedure used for the pass partition plate. The fillet weld design used
at site was not found in the records.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 18 of 39
The material of construction was not available on the General arrangement
drawings.
STEP 4 Assessment Techniques and Acceptance Criteria:
As the damage was crack in the pass partition plate, assessment techniques and
acceptance criteria are not provided in API 579.
As multiple damages are present for the various thickness of the pass partition plate
used, the individual model of the damage was made and analysis was carried out
separately.
This was then compared to the base model. It was found that the pass partition plate
was initially design to withstand a differential pressure of only 12psig.
STEP 5 Remaining Life Evaluation:
An estimate of the remaining life or analysis for lowering of MAWP was not required.
Therefore, this was not carried out.
STEP 6 Remediation:
Based on the damage mechanism, the possible cause of crack failures was
established. It was due to high stress on the pass partition plate due to high
differential pressure leading to brittle fracture and/or vibration induced fatigue failure.
The recommendations for the above are given in section 7.0
STEP 7 In-Service Monitoring:
As, the heat exchanger was under major overhaul and it was clearly established that
the flaw will be repaired (if found unacceptable) before put the heat exchanger is
back to service - there is no requirement of in-service monitoring of the flaw.
However, as highlighted in section 7.0 regular inspection of the heat exchanger are
recommended along with lowering of the steam load.
STEP 8 Documentation:

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 19 of 39
This report aims to document the record of all information and decisions made in
each of the previous steps and to qualify the heat exchanger for continued
operation.
5.0 Discussion on the assessment

There are three level of assessment as per API579 and below is brief of the
assessment carried out:
5.1 Level 1 Assessment:
The assessment procedures included in this level are intended to provide
conservative screening criteria that can be utilized with a minimum amount of
inspection or component information.
The steam sample revealed no anomalies as per the passports for the heat
exchangers and the boilers. Therefore, the following modes of failure were
rules out:
The following design code were used to check the minimum thickness of the
pass partition plate
1. ASME Section VIII Div.1 and
2. TEMA C
Refer Appendix 8.2 for details, of the calculations.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 20 of 39

For Shell & Tube heat exchangers employed in refineries & petrochemical
complexes, the applicability of API 660 (ISO 16812) in addition to TEMA has
becoming mandatory by most end users and consultants. API 660 lays down
most requirements based on practical considerations & past experience. At
the same time, incorporating such requirements does have an impact on cost
and efforts during fabrication of S&T Heat exchangers. The table below
compares critical requirements of API 660 with relative TEMA requirements
for the channel head only. It does not include API 660 Supplementary
Requirements and Recommended Practices.

Sl
no
Subject API 660 Requirement API 660 Requirement Remarks
1. Pass Partition
Plate Weld
(9.2)
Pass-partition plates for
forged or welded channels
and floating heads shall be
welded full length, either
from both sides or with full-
No specific guideline is
given in TEMA for full
penetration weld
requirement for pass
API 660
recommendation is
applicable and shall
be considered. It is
recommended to

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 21 of 39
penetration welds, except
for special designs approved
by the purchaser. If welded
from both sides, the first 50
mm (2 in) from the gasket
face shall be full-penetration
welds.
partition plate. carry out full
penetration welding of
the full length.
2. PWHT
requirement of
Channel(9.6.4)
CS and LAS Channels with
6 or more pass
Nozzle to channel ID ratio
> 0.5.
No specific guideline is
given in TEMA.
In our case the heat
exchanger is 2 pass
and therefore not
applicable.
Nozzle to channel ID
ratio=220mm /660mm
=0.33. Therefore, not
applicable

The following damage mechanisms as per API 571 were reviewed and the findings are as
follows: (serial number maintained as per Appendix on Damage mechanisms as per API 571)

SLNO

DAMAGE MECHANISM

FINDINGS
12 Thermal Fatigue

From the site visits there were no findings of abnormal start up and
shutdowns. However, considered for further analysis.
18 Caustic Cracking

Steam analysis was carried out recently on the boiler and reviles no
concerns. Therefore, this ruled out. However, PWHT is recommended.
22 Amine Cracking

Steam analysis was carried out recently on the boiler and reviles no
concerns. Therefore, this ruled out. However, PWHT is recommended.
23 Chloride Stress Corrosion
Cracking

Steam analysis was carried out recently on the boiler and reviles no
concerns. Therefore, this ruled out. However, PWHT is recommended.
24 Carburization

This was ruled out. However, PWHT is recommended.
31 Brittle Fracture

Further analysis is required to rule this out.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 22 of 39
39 Dissimilar Metal Weld
(DMW) Cracking

This was ruled out after review of the weld records, metallurgy report and
the site visits.
40 Hydrogen Stress Cracking
in HF

This was ruled out after review of the steam analysis, weld records,
metallurgy report and the site visits.
43 Corrosion Fatigue No major corrosion/errosion was reported in the inspection findings,
metallurgy report. This was ruled out.

48 Ammonia Stress Corrosion
Cracking

This was ruled out after review of the steam analysis, weld records,
metallurgy report and the site visits. However, PWHT is recommended.
56 Vibration-Induced Fatigue

This was credible and will be studied further.

The review of the operation of the heat exchanger reveled the following:
a. There was no record for the design limits for the differential pressure.
b. The steam flow was maintained higher than the design maximum
c. The heat exchanger was used to heat the crude from 10 deg C to 44 Deg
C, while the design intent was to heat till 28 deg C.
Due to this, a high differential pressure was observed across the pass
partition plate.
The calculation showed that the minimum thickness required was 13mm plate
for meeting the required differential pressure of 18psig across the plate. Also,
the welding used was not as per the recommendations made by the codes.
Therefore a further assessment was carried out.
5.2 Level-2 assessment:
For the pass partition plate, a level 2 assessment criteria does not exist and
the existing design calculation were also missing from ADMA documentation.
Therefore, a level 3 assessment was carried out.
5.3 Level-3 assessment:

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 23 of 39

Initially, as the design calculations of the heat exchanger were not available,
the base case model (model without any distortion) was created, using the
design parameters.
Limit-Load Analysis Method (refer B1.2.3 of API579) was used in determining
the maximum pressure required to reach the minimum yield stress i.e. to
determine the load required to reach the plastic deformation. The base case
established that a differential pressure of 18psig (0.1241Mpa) was required to
be applied uniformly on the pass partition plate at 204degC.
Along with linear analysis, a non-linear analysis and even Riks non-linear
method was used when convergence was not achieved.
The equivalent stress equal to the von Mises equivalent stress was used.
Allowable Equivalent Stress
To determine the acceptability of a component, the computed equivalent
stresses shall not exceed specified allowable values.
It is to be noted that the allowable stress for this analysis at 204 deg C for the
steel was 15,700lbf/in2 or 108Mpa.
The assessment procedure as per API579 was followed.
The following cases were analyzed:
10mm plate without hole:
1. Hydrotest case at 263psig(1.8133MPa) at 37 deg C
2. Normal Operating case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 35psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=18Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg C
3. Operating case with following parameter

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 24 of 39
a. Internal Pressure = 35psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=30Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg
4. Design case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 175psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=12Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg
5. Failure/Max Design case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 175psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=18Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg
13mm plate without hole:
6. Hydrotest case at 263psig(1.8133MPa) at 37 deg C
7. Normal Operating case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 35psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=18Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg C
8. Operating case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 35psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=30Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg
9. Design case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 175psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=12Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 25 of 39
10. Failure/Max Design case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 175psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=18Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg
13mm plate with 13mm hole:
11. Hydrotest case at 263psig(1.8133MPa) at 37 deg C
12. Normal Operating case with following parameter
a. Internal Pressure = 35psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=18Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg C
13. Design case with following parameter(Base Case)
a. Internal Pressure = 175psig
b. Differential pressure across the Pass partition=12Psig
c. Temperature = 204Deg
From the above analysis it was concluded that if the present scenario of
operation is continued, the failure of pass partition plate is possible.
Therefore, stiffeners on the plate are required. After analyzing more than 33
possible design improvement/cases, the most optimum is presented which
required the least amount of modifications.
For example the following cases were analyzed:
1. Change in Pass plate thickness to 15mm
2. Change in channel head wall thickness to 12.5mm
3. Change in both channel head to 12.5mm and pass partition plate
thickness to 15mm
4. Various type and profile of stiffeners on 13mm plate, 15mm plate

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 26 of 39
This is presented as the proposed solution in the appendix.
6.0 Conclusions

From the finite element analysis carried out on the pass partition plate the
stresses were found to be high. The following are the findings of the stress
analysis:
1. The design of the pass partition plate was to handle a differential pressure
of only 12psig.
2. The four corners of the pass partition plate are found to be heavily
stressed when the differential pressures across the pass partition plate
exceed 12psig.
3. A proper weld WPS needs to be developed for the pass partition plate.
Design of the weld shall consider full penetration weld along the full length
of the pass partition plate.
4. The result of the stress analysis is enclosed in the appendix in three
section
a. Base case (13mm pass partition plate)
b. 10mm pass partition plate
c. Proposed Solution (to mitigate high differential pressure)
5. The hole in the pass partition plate did not contribute to any additional
stress and can be retained. However, it is suggest to move it from the
center to low stress region (see 13mm proposed solution case results)
offset from the center.
6. A vibration study has to be carried out on the entire steam header with
specialist contractor. As the high differential pressures are maintained and
reports of vibration exist, it is believed that the initial failure of the 13mm

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 27 of 39
plates were due to vibration induced fatigue. However, the 10mm plate
failure is believed to be due to the fact that the design thickness of the
plate not maintained resulting in high stress causing brittle facture.
7. It should be noted that the differential pressure across the heat exchanger
are high and has to be brought down to below 12psig. There is always a
trade-off between the pressure-drop in the channel with the thermal rating.
With recommendation to lower the pressure drop, maintaining the
temperature of the crude would be difficult. If the pressure cannot be
maintained below 12psig, stiffeners are recommended to be installed with
full penetration welds of the pass partition plate as soon as possible.
8. Operating parameters are exceeding the design parameters and these
have to be controlled.
9. D&D train heat exchanger are not used and are to be demolished. The
D&D heat exchangers were supposed to have operated in serial with the
US column heat exchangers, lowering the steam load on these
exchangers.
Root Cause: of the 10mm plate failure is due to high differential pressure
causing a Brittle fracture. Also, the improper welding have compounded/
attributed to the failure.
Root Cause: of the 13mm plate failure is due to high differential pressure
causing a Brittle fracture and /or vibration induced fatigue failure.
7.0 Recommendations:

The following recommendations are made based on the study:
a) For new exchangers, the pressure differential used to calculate the pass-
partition plate thickness shall be in accordance with TEMA (8th edition), RCB-
9.132, shall be the allowable tube-side pressure drop of the entire exchanger

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 28 of 39
unit. Also, the estimate differential pressure across the new heat exchanger/s
shall be provided by the vendor and the differential pressure across the pass
partition plate design shall withstand the estimated differential pressure or
30psig minimum (whichever is greater). In future all new heat exchanger pass
partition plate shall be design to withstand a differential pressure of 30Psig as
a minimum in ADMA OPCO. A review of ADMA OPCO standard is requested.
b) The operating parameter is to be maintained well within the design limits of
the system. It is observed that steam inlet flow measurements are maintained
high during winter.
c) Differential pressure gauge shall be installed across the heat exchanger with
alarm setting and trip setting for all the heat exchangers, even in new built.
d) The differential pressure across the heat exchanger has to be brought down.
This can be brought down by
i. Common spare stripper to be made online always
(If this does not reduce the differential pressure then)
ii. Replacement of heat exchanger / Additional train to be considered to
carter to the recent Production increases.
e) In some Das facilities, the heat exchangers in crude service are TEMA R
and in some place TEMA C. This should be standardized in ADMA OPCO. It
is recommended to develop a standard in ADMA OPCO for heat exchangers.
Note: The general descriptions of the three major TEMA classes are:
TEMA C - General Service
TEMA B - Chemical Service
TEMA R - Refinery Service
**TEMA R is the most restrictive and TEMA C is the least stringent.
f) At the time of writing this report, the pass partition plates are replaced with
13mm plate as per original manufacturer material & design recommendations.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 29 of 39
In the next major overhaul the pass partition plate and the weld shall be
checked with MPI for crack or any discontinuity. PWHT is also recommended
even if no anomalies are found.
g) If any anomalies are found the pass partition plate shall be replaced with
13mm plate, as per the original design. However, with the drain hole offset
from the centre to a lower stress region.
i. For the welding of the pass partition plate it is recommended to have
full length penetration weld V-type. A proper design of the weld is
suggested and to be adopted in ADMA OPCO as a standard.
ii. The stiffener as per enclosed design is recommended to be welded to
allow for any pressure surge of up to 30psig.
iii. Welding shall be carried out as per the Approved ADMA OPCO
procedure.
iv. PWHT is recommended to be carried out after welding of the pass
partition plate. Obtain hardness reading at weld vicinity to ensure
effective treatment.
v. After hydrotest the pass partition plate shall be examined and
inspected with report issued.
vi. MPI shall be carried out on the pass partition weld upon completion of
the repair.
vii. Hydrotest for the shell side and tube side to carried out after the
completion of the repair and NDT.
h) A complete review of the steam trap efficiency for the entire steam headers
shall be carried out by a specialist contractor. The steam traps functional test
to be carried out to ensure no steam condensate on the steam line upstream
and downstream of the Heat exchanger.
i) Vibration study is suggested to be carried out for the steam headers.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 30 of 39
j) Steam analysis is to be carried out on a regular basis and reports to be
available.
k) Number of cycles of start-up and shutdown are to be reduced or minimized.
Ideally the units should be in operation always until the next major overhaul.
Proper procedure should be in place to the start-up and shutdown with logs
maintained to avoid Thermal fatigue failure.

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 31 of 39

8.0 APPENDICES
8.1 Original Work request and correspondences


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 32 of 39
APPENDICES
8.2 Inspection report


1 of 3
Endorsed by VPI
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term.
Perform shellside internal pitting inspection to confirm depth and pitting corrosion rate. This is required before Dec-2018.
Strip insulation and perform 100% visual external inspection followed by UT thickness readings of any suspected damaged areas. This
is required before Dec-2018.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8479E+6
87.1457
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8524E+6
87.2823
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
Fluid Phase
C17-C25
Liquid
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.586 Temp (C) 29/42 Fluid Name
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3.2
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
7.1173
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
4.8
2.41
19
NA
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Jan-1980
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100341
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
2
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C101-SS

2 of 3
Inspection History Summary
July-06 - Isolated areas of light wastage and pitting were reported along the
bottom less than 1mm deep on shell internal surface.
Mar-08 - The heat exchanger was taken out of service due to a water leak from
the area between the channel head & the tube sheet. Inspection revealed a
small groove on both the channel head face & the tube sheet. Repairs were
carried out with Belzona compound followed by a hydrotest.
Dec-11 - A crack was noted along the partition plate weld, and the partition
plate was replaced. Repair coating was applied on internal surfaces at affected
(pitted )areas at the shell and dished end.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-101/F-101).
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
The major threat to the carbon steel shell is pitting of the shell bottom due to underdeposit corrosion from crude BS&W collecting in shells of
these crude preheat exchangers. A corrosion pitting rate for the Umm Shaif plant shells is estimated at 0.12 mm/yr.
CUI damage is also a threat, the calculated rate is 0.22 mm/yr.
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0.1987 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility NA Type NA
13.1
17.77
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.12
NA
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
LOCAL
01-Dec-2011
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the shell is fit for continued service subject to
pitting monitoring of shell.
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100341
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
2
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C101-SS

1 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100341
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
2
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C101-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Jan-1980
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
0.5
2.41
19
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
3.5585
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3.2
NA
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.965 Temp (C) 220/85 Fluid Name
Fluid Phase
STEAM
Two Phase
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1
X
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1
X
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
0.153
4.2056E+4
6434.5039
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
0.0602
4.2056E+4
2530.3474
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term: By Dec 2018, perform visual internal tubeside inspection followed by UT measurements as necessary for corrosion at
condensate liquid level and outlet nozzle. Perform crack inspection at pass partition plate to channel cylinder welds.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM Endorsed by VPI

2 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100341
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
2
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C101-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the channel is fit for continued service.
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
GENERAL
01-Dec-2011
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
13
50.00
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.05
NA
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility HIGH Type OTHER
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
There is a minor threat to the channel due to steam condensate corrosion. There have been little corrosion problems reported for the steam
side. A corrosion rate of 0.05 mm/yr is estimated for steam condensate corrosion.

In 2011, the channel pass partition plate weld to shell was cracked and a new head was installed. This should be considered an on-going threat
until the root cause is established.
Inspection History Summary
July-06 - Isolated areas of light wastage and pitting were reported along the
bottom less than 1mm deep on shell internal surface.
Mar-08 - The heat exchanger was taken out of service due to a water leak from
the area between the channel head & the tube sheet. Inspection revealed a
small groove on both the channel head face & the tube sheet. Repairs were
carried out with Belzona compound followed by a hydrotest .
Dec-11 - A crack was noted along the partition plate weld, and the partition
plate was replaced. Repair coating was applied on internal surfaces at affected
(pitted )areas at the shell and dished end.
This is an insulated horizontal U tube heat exchanger of all welded carbon
steel construction, mounted on two integral steel saddle supports bolted to
steel support structures approx. 2.0m high.
Dimensions - Vessel 4838 mm long x 660mm i/d x 13mm thick.
Design Pressure - 360 psig @ 66C. Test Pressure - 525 psig. Design Code -
ASME VIII Div.1.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-101/F-101).
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.

1 of 3
Endorsed by VPI
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term.
Perform shellside internal pitting inspection to confirm depth and pitting corrosion rate. This is required before May-2019.
Strip insulation and perform 100% visual external inspection followed by UT thickness readings of any suspected damaged areas. This
is required before May-2019.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8479E+6
87.1458
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8527E+6
87.2923
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
Fluid Phase
C17-C25
Liquid
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.586 Temp (C) 29/42 Fluid Name
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3.2
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
6.995
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
4.8
2.41
13
NA
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Jan-1980
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100342
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
2
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C201-SS

2 of 3
Inspection History Summary
July-06 - Isolated areas of light wastage and pitting along the bottom less than
1mm deep on shell internal surface.
Mar-08 - Heat exchanger taken out of service due to water leak from the area
between the channel head & the tube sheet. Inspection revealed small groove
on both the channel head face & the tube sheet. Repairs were carried out by
Belzona compound followed by a hydrotest.
Dec-11 - Crack noted along the partition plate weld, partition plate was
replaced. Repair coating applied on internal surface at affected (pitted) areas at
shell and dished end.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-201/F-201).
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
The major threat to the carbon steel shell is pitting of the shell bottom due to underdeposit corrosion from crude BS&W collecting in shells of
these crude preheat exchangers. A corrosion pitting rate for the Umm Shaif plant shells is estimated at 0.12 mm/yr.
CUI damage is also a threat, the calculated rate is 0.22 mm/yr.
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0.1987 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility NA Type NA
13
18.26
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.12
NA
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
LOCAL
01-May-2012
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the shell is fit for continued service subject to
pitting monitoring of shell.
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100342
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
2
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C201-SS

1 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100342
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C201-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-May-2012
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
0.55
2.41
10
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
3.4667
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3.2
NA
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.965 Temp (C) 220/85 Fluid Name
Fluid Phase
STEAM
Two Phase
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1
X
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1
X
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
0.153
4.4192E+4
6761.3133
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
0.0499
4.4192E+4
2204.5408
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term: By June 2017, perform visual internal tubeside inspection followed by UT measurements as necessary for corrosion at
condensate liquid level and outlet nozzle. Perform crack inspection at pass partition plate to channel cylinder welds.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM Endorsed by VPI

2 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100342
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C201-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the channel is fit for continued service.
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
GENERAL
01-May-2012
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
NA
50.00
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.05
NA
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility HIGH Type OTHER
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
There is a minor threat to the channel due to steam condensate corrosion. There have been little corrosion problems reported for the steam
side. A corrosion rate of 0.05 mm/yr is estimated for steam condensate corrosion.

In 2011, the channel pass partition plate weld to shell was cracked and a new head was installed. This should be considered an on-going threat
until the root cause is established.
Inspection History Summary
July-06 - Isolated areas of light wastage and pitting along the bottom less than
1mm deep on shell internal surface.
Mar-08 - Heat exchanger taken out of service due to water leak from the area
between the channel head & the tube sheet. Inspection revealed small groove
on both the channel head face & the tube sheet. Repairs were carried out by
Belzona compound followed by a hydrotest .
Dec-11 - Crack noted along the partition plate weld, partition plate was
replaced. Repair coating applied on internal surface at affected (pitted )areas at
shell and dished end.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-201/F-201).
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.

1 of 3
Endorsed by VPI
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term.
Perform shellside internal pitting inspection to confirm depth and pitting corrosion rate. This is required before Mar-2018.
Strip insulation and perform 100% visual external inspection followed by UT thickness readings of any suspected damaged area and
required before Mar-2018.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8479E+6
87.1457
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8524E+6
87.2823
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
Fluid Phase
C17-C25
Liquid
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.586 Temp (C) 29/42 Fluid Name
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3.2
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
7.1173
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
4.8
2.41
19
NA
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Oct-1993
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100343
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C301-SS

2 of 3
Inspection History Summary
The shell of this crude charge heater was opened due to high vibration and
noise in the unit. The partition plate of the channel was found to have cracked
in HAZ of weld joint, probably due to process hammering. It was replaced with
a new one. MPI was conducted after welding and found acceptable.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-301/F-301).
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
The major threat to the carbon steel shell is pitting of the shell bottom due to underdeposit corrosion from crude BS&W collecting in shells of
these crude preheat exchangers. A corrosion pitting rate for the Umm Shaif plant shells is estimated at 0.12 mm/yr.
CUI damage is also a threat, the calculated rate is 0.20 mm/yr.
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0.1987 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility NA Type NA
19.8
35.05
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.12
NA
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
LOCAL
01-Mar-2011
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the shell is fit for continued service subject to
pitting monitoring of shell.
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100343
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C301-SS

1 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100343
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C301-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Oct-1993
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
0.5
2.41
19
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
3.5585
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3.2
NA
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.965 Temp (C) 220/85 Fluid Name
Fluid Phase
STEAM
Two Phase
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1
X
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1
X
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
0.153
4.2056E+4
6434.5039
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
0.0602
4.2056E+4
2530.3474
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term: By Mar-2018, perform visual internal tubeside inspection followed by UT measurements as necessary for corrosion at
condensate liquid level and outlet nozzle. Perform crack inspection at pass partition plate to channel cylinder welds.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM Endorsed by VPI

2 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100343
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C301-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the channel is fit for continued service.
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
GENERAL
01-Mar-2011
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
13
50.00
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.05
NA
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility HIGH Type OTHER
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
There is a minor threat to the channel due to steam condensate corrosion. There have been little corrosion problems reported for the steam
side. A corrosion rate of 0.05 mm/yr is estimated for steam condensate corrosion.

In 2011, the channel pass partition plate weld to shell was cracked and a new head was installed. This should be considered an on-going threat
until the root cause is established.
Inspection History Summary
In March 2011, the shell of this crude charge heater was opened due to high
vibration and noise in the unit. The partition plate of the channel was found to
have cracked in HAZ of weld joint, probably due to process hammering. A
crack in this weld also occurred in 2008. The plate was replaced with a new
one. MPI was conducted after welding and found acceptable
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-301/F-301).
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.
1 of 2

Endorsed by VPI
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term.
Perform shellside internal pitting inspection to confirm depth and pitting corrosion rate. This is required before Feb-2019.
Strip insulation and perform 100% visual external inspection followed by UT thickness readings of any suspected damaged areas
before Feb-2019.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8479E+6
87.1457
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
2.8524E+6
87.2823
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
X
4
3
2
1
A B C D E
5
Fluid Phase
C17-C25
Liquid
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.586 Temp (C) 29/42 Fluid Name
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
7.1173
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
4.8
2.41
19
NA
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Nov-1980
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100344
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C401-SS
2 of 2

Inspection History Summary
The internal shell surface was found in good condition except isolated pitting in
the range of 0.2 to 1.5 mm depth at the 4.0 to 8.0 oclock position. Belzona
compound was previously applied on three pitted locations, and it was found
intact. The Crude oil heater is considered suitable for continued service on 48
months endorsement.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-401/F-401). The stripped crude then transported to Crude Oil Storage Tanks 13,14,17,18,19,20&21.
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
The major threat to the carbon steel shell is pitting of the shell bottom due to underdeposit corrosion from crude BS&W collecting in shells of
these crude preheat exchangers. A corrosion pitting rate for the Umm Shaif plant shells is estimated at 0.12 mm/yr.
CUI damage is also a threat, the calculated rate is 0.22 mm/yr.
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0.1987 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility NA Type NA
13
17.63
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.12
NA
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
LOCAL
01-Feb-2012
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Shell Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the shell is fit for continued service subject to
pitting monitoring of shell.
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100344
(Shellside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C401-SS

1 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100344
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C401-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Mechanical Information
Exchanger Type Shell & Tube Component Start Date 02-Nov-1980
Diameter (mm)
Design Code
Base Material
Clad Material
660
S8-DIV1
SA516 - 70
NA
Length (m)
Design Press. (MPag)
Base Thickness (mm)
Clad Thickness (mm)
0.5
2.41
19
NA
PWHT
Design Temp. (C)
Joint Efficiency
T-min (mm)
NO
66
0.850
3.5585
Insulation
Liner Type
Corr. Allow. (mm)
Weight (kg)
CALCIUM SILICATE
NA
3
NA
Process Information
Op Pressure (MPag) 0.965 Temp (C) 220/85 Fluid Name
Fluid Phase
STEAM
Two Phase
Risk Results
Long Term Predicted Risk Risk After Mitigation
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1 X
A B C D E
5
4
3
2
1 X
Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure
1 POF <= 0.0001 A COF <= 10000
2 0.0001 < POF <= 0.001 B 10000 < COF <= 100000
3 0.001 < POF <= 0.01 C 100000 < COF <= 1000000
4 0.01 < POF <= 0.1 D 1000000 < COF <= 10000000
5 POF > 0.1 E COF > 10000000
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
4.2056E+4
1.2869
POF(Failures/yr)
COF($)
Risk($/yr)
3.06E-5
4.2056E+4
1.2869
Risk Mitigation
Recommendations
Short Term:
None.
Long Term:
Perform visual internal tubeside inspection followed by UT measurements, as necessary, for corrosion at condensate liquid level and
outlet nozzle before Feb-2019.
Prepared by E2G Reviewed by E2G Approved by SISL Approved by TIM Endorsed by VPI

2 of 3
HEAT EXCHANGER PASSPORT
43100344
(Tubeside Pressure Boundary)
Revision #
Analysis Date
Location Tag
3
01-Dec-2012
04.3-HSR4-C401-TS
Location/Unit Das Island/Umm Al Shaif Description Sour Crude Heat Exchanger - Tube Side
Risk Mitigation
Material Review
Comments
All carbon steel construction shell and tube crude preheat exchanger. Heats wet crude on the shellside with superheated steam on the tubeside
prior to sending to H2S stripping. tower. A thorough review of the materials and process shows the channel is fit for continued service.
Thinning
Type
Last Insp. Date
GENERAL
01-Feb-2012
Thickness (mm)
Remaining Life(yrs)
13
50.00
BM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
CM Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
0.05
NA
External Ext. Corr. Rate (mm/yr) 0 Ext. Cracking NA
Cracking Susceptibility NA Type NA
HTHA Susceptibility NONE
Threats
There is a minor threat to the channel due to steam condensate corrosion. There have been little corrosion problems reported for the steam
side. A corrosion rate of 0.05 mm/yr is estimated for steam condensate corrosion.
Inspection History Summary
The internal shell surface was found in good condition except isolated pitting in
the range of 0.2 to 1.5 mm depth at the 4.0 to 8.0 oclock position. Belzona
compound was previously applied on three pitted locations, and it was found
intact. The Crude oil heater is considered suitable for continued service on 48
months endorsement.
Equipment Sketch
Process Summary
This exchanger is used to exchange heat between superheater steam and crude oil, which purpose is to heat up the crude oil entering the cold stripping tower / vent
drum to strip H2S from the system before transporting the crude to crude oil storage tanks. The Sour Crude Oil pumped from Umm Shaif Charge Pumps (J184, J185,
J186, J187) and distributed using a common distribution header is then preheated by Superheated Steam from Steam Header before entering the Cold Stripping
Tower / Vent Drum (HSR4-E-401/F-401). The stripped crude then transported to Crude Oil Storage Tanks 13,14,17,18,19,20&21.
Commissioned in 1981, monitoring the service efficiency and fouling resistance are recommended as it affects the heat transfer capacity over time.
0 08 - 09 Issued for Implementation
Rev. Date Description / Text Affected
Manual For Welding Procedure Specification(in-House Use)
ADMA-OPCO MNL-02
PAGE
21
SF / General / 002 Rev.0 sheet 1 of 1
QW 482 WELDING PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION (WPS)
(See QW- 200.1, Section IX, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code)
Company Name ADMA-OPCO By: Mustafa A. Jarebi
Welding Procedure Specification No. ADMA-OPCO-3 Rev. 0 Date Supporting PQR No. ADMA-OPCO-1-1
Revision No. 0 Date /
Welding Process (es) SMAW Type(s) Manual
(Automatic, Manual, Machine, or Semi-Auto)
JOINTS (QW-402) DETAILS
Joint Design Groove or (Refer to the attached weld joint
configurations)
Backing (Yes) With (No) No
Backing Material (Type) /
(Refer to both backing and retainers)
Metal Nonfusing Metal
Nonmetallic Other
Sketches, Production Drawings, Weld Symbols or Written Description
Should show the general arrangement of the parts to be welded. Where
Applicable, the root spacing and the details of weld groove may be
Specified.
(At the option of the Mfgr., sketches may be attached to illustrate joint design, weld
layers and bead sequence, e.g. for notch toughness procedures, for multiple process
Procedures, etc.)
* BASE METALS (QW-403)
P-No. 1 Group No. 1 or 2 to P-No. 1 Group No. 1 or 2
OR
Specification type and grade ASTM A 106 Gr. B or Equivalent (i.e. A 105) (Sweet or Sour)
To Specification type and grade Same
OR
Chem. Analysis and Mech. Prop.
to Chem. Analysis and Mech. Prop.
Thickness Range:
Base Metal: Groove 5 mm to 16 mm Filet ALL
Other
* FILLER METALS (QW-404) SMAW
Spec. No. (SFA) 5.1
AWS No. (Class) E 7018-1
F-No. 4
A-No. 1
Size of Filler Metals 2.5, 3.25, 4.0 mm
Weld Metal
Thickness Range:
Groove Up to 16mm max.
Fillet ALL
Electrode Flux (Class)
Consumable Insert
Other
* Each base metal- filler metal combination should be recorded individually.
0 08 - 09 Issued for Implementation
Rev. Date Description / Text Affected
Manual For Welding Procedure Specification(in-House Use)
ADMA-OPCO MNL-02
PAGE
22
SF / General / 002 Rev.0 sheet 1 of 1
QW 482 (Back)
WPS No. ADMA-OPCO-3 Rev. 0
POSITIONS (QW 405) POSTWELD HEAT TREATMENT (QW 407)
Position(s) of Groove ALL Temperature Range N/A
Welding Progression: Up Uphill Down Time Range
Position(s) of Fillet All
PREHEAT (QW 406) GAS (QW 408)
Preheat Temp. Min 30
0
C Percent Composition
Inter-pass Temp. Max. 250
0
C Gas(es) Mixture Flow Rate
Preheat Maintenance / Shielding N/A N/A N/A
Trailing N/A
Backing N/A
(Continuous of special heating, where applicable, should be
recorded)
ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS (QW 409)
Current AC or DC DC Polarity EP (SMAW)
Amps (Range) As Shown Below Volts (Range) As Shown Below
(Amps and volts range should be recorded for each electrode size,
Position, and thickness, etc. This information may be listed in a
Tabular form similar to that shown below. )
Tungsten Electrode Size and Type N/A
(Pure Tungsten, 2% Thoriated, etc.)
Mode of Metal Transfer for GMAW N/A
(Spray arc, short circuiting arc, etc.)
Electrode Wire feed speed range
TECHNIQUE (QW 410)
String or Weave Bead String bead (Root), Weave Bead (Fill & Cap)
Orifice or Gas Cup Size N/A
Initial and Inter-pass Cleaning (Brushing, Grinding, etc.) Grinding and brushing using C.S Material
Method of Back Gouging N/A
Oscillation N/A
Contact Tube to Work Distance N/A
Multiple or Single Pass (per side) Multiple
Multiple or Single Electrodes Single
Travel Speed (Range) See Below
Peening N/A
Other N/A
Filler Metal Current
Weld Layer(s) Process
Class Dia.
Type
Polar
Amp Range
(A)
Volt
Range
(V)
Travel Speed
Range
Other (eg.
Remarks,
Comments, Hot
Wire Addition,
Technique, Torch
Angle etc.)
Root SMAW E 7018-1 2.5 mm +ve 95 -110 22-24
Fill and Cap SMAW E 7018-1 3.25, 4.0 mm +ve 100-140 22-24
70-80mm/min
0 08 - 09 Issued for Implementation
Rev. Date Description / Text Affected
Manual For Welding Procedure Specification(in-House Use)
ADMA-OPCO MNL-02
PAGE
23
SF / General / 002 Rev.0 sheet 1 of 1
3.3 to 6
t
0 to 2.3 mm
5t
t
45
0
(G) Double-
bevel-groove
T-joint
(H) Lap joint
t
t
45
0
to
60
0
t
1.5 to 3.0
0 to 2.3 mm
0 to 2.3 mm
(D) Fillet corner joint
(E) Single-bevel-groove
corner joint
(F) Square-groove
T-joint, single weld
60
0
60
0
(typ)
1.5 + 0.5 mm
0 to 2.3
t
t
t
1.5 to 3.0 1.5 to 2.3
(A) Square- 1.5 to 3.0 1.0 to 1.5
groove
butt joint
(B) Single V-groove
butt joint
Double V-groove
butt joint
1
Jose Bijoy (ADMA DID)
From: Das Mechanical Maint. Section Leader (ADMA DAS)
Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2013 9:12 AM
To: Jose Bijoy (ADMA DID)
Cc: Rabindra K. Singh DETL (ADMA DID); Das Maintenance TL (ADMA DAS); Das Mech. Engineer P&V (Bala/Rashid) (ADMA DAS); Das Process
Operations TL (ADMA DAS); Das Facility Integrity SL (ADMA DAS); Das Integrity Svs. Eng. (A1) (ADMA DAS); Gamal Saeed Bazara (ADMA
DID)
Subject: FW: Channel head for the US column-300 Heat exchanger - 43100343 - Worl Request DIAD/WR/12/030
Attachments: Work Request DIAD/WR/12/030: Repeated Failure of Umm Shaif Heat Exchangers Channel Pass Partition Plate
Mr. Bijoy,

Please note that failure was observed on US Column 300 Exchanger Channel Partition Plate also when we opened the Channel cover on 22/03/2013 to check
the condition.
Appreciate if you can expedite the deliverables of the work request raised in June-2012 regarding this type of failure.

Regards,
Sunil Kumar

From: Das Integrity Svs. Eng. (A1) (ADMA DAS)
Sent: 23 March 2013 8:58 AM
To: Das Mech. Supervisor P&V Crew #2 (Andre/ Kassim) (ADMA DAS)
Cc: Das Facility Integrity SL (ADMA DAS); Das Mechanical Maint. Section Leader (ADMA DAS); Das Process SL (ADMA DAS); Das Process Supervisors (ADMA DAS); Das
Process Operations TL (ADMA DAS); Ali Saleh Khorooh FITL (ADMA ID); Junior Das Integrity Svc. Eng. (AlHammadi) (ADMA-DAS); Das Mech. Engineer P&V (Bala/Rashid)
(ADMA DAS)
Subject: Channel head for the US column-300 Heat exchanger - 43100343

Gents,

Visual inspection was carried out on Channel head for the US column-300 Heat exchanger after removing from service. It was observed that the pass
partition plate was found rupture, the crack propagate from the HAZ area of the pass partition plate on both side and on the center of the pass partition plate.
The thickness of the existing pass partition plate is noted to be 10.0mm.

Recommendation

2
1) The rupture pass partition plate shall be replaced with 13mm plate, as per the original design.
2) After removing the cracked pass partition plate the area on the channel shall be checked with MPI for crack or any discontinuity.
3) It is recommended to have full penetration weld at least 50mm on both side from gasket area and then continuous fillet weld as per the original
construction drawing.
4) Welding shall be carried out as per the Approved ADMA OPCO procedure.
5) MPI shall be carried out on the pass partition weld upon completion of the repair
6) Hydrotest for the shell side and tube side to carried out after the completion of the repair and NDT.
7) The steam traps functional test to be carried out to ensure no steam condensate on the steam line upstream of the HE.

Since the failure of the pass partition plate have been occurred on the same heat exchanger during Feb 2008 and Mar 2011, it is required to expedite the
engineering review /root cause analysis(refer the attached mail) for all the US Sour crude heat exchangers which are having the pass partition plate rupture
history.


Regards,

Ashraf kassim
Das Integrity Service Engineer-A1
68036
16911


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 33 of 39
APPENDICES
8.3 Damage Mechanism as per API571
From API 571 Table 5-4 Key to Damage Mechanisms

Damage Mechanism



SLNO

DAMAGE MECHANISM

DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE MECHANISM

REMARKS

1 Sulfidation Corrosion of carbon steel and other alloys resulting from
their reaction with sulfur compounds in high temperature
environments. The presence of hydrogen accelerates
corrosion. This mechanisms is also known as sulfidic
corrosion.
As this is steam service, this damage mechanism
can be ruled out.
2 Wet H2S
Damage(Blistering/HIC/SOHIC/SSC)
This result in blistering and/or cracking of carbon
steel and low alloy steels in wet H2S environments
As this is steam service, this damage mechanism
can be ruled out.
3 Creep / Stress Rupture At high temperatures, metal components can slowly and
continuously deform under load below the
yield stress. This time dependent deformation of
stressed components is known as creep. Also,
deformation leads to damage that may eventually lead to
a rupture.
As the threshold temperature of carbon steel is
353Deg C, this damage mechanism can be ruled out.
4 High temp H2/H2S Corrosion The presence of hydrogen in H2S-containing
hydrocarbon streams increases the severity of high
temperature sulfide corrosion at temperatures
above about 500F (260C). This form of
sulfidation
usually results in a uniform loss in thickness
associated with hot circuits in hydroprocessing
units.
This damage mechanism is crack and not corrosion
therefore this can be ruled out.
5 Polythionic Acid Cracking

A form of stress corrosion cracking normally occurring
during shutdowns, startups or during operation when air
and moisture are present. Cracking is due to sulfur acids
forming from sulfide scale, air and moisture acting on
sensitized austenitic stainless steels. Usually adjacent to
welds or high stress areas. Cracking may propagate
rapidly through the wall thickness of piping and
components in a matter of minutes or hours. Affected
Materials- 300 Series SS, Alloy 600/600H and Alloy
800/800H.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
6 Naphthenic Acid Corrosion

A form of high temperature corrosion that occurs
primarily in crude and vacuum units, and
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
downstream units that process certain fractions or
cuts that contain naphthenic acids.
7 Ammonium Bisulfide Corrosion

Aggressive corrosion occurring in hydroprocessing
reactor effluent streams and in units handling
alkaline sour water. Several major failures have
occurred in hydroprocessing reactor effluent
systems due to localized
corrosion.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
8 Ammonium Chloride Corrosion

General or localized corrosion, often pitting,
normally occurring under ammonium chloride or
amine salt
deposits, often in the absence of a free water
phase
This damage mechanism is crack and not corrosion
therefore this can be ruled out.
9 HCl Corrosion

Hydrochloric acid (aqueous HCl) causes both
general and localized corrosion and is very
aggressive to most common materials of
construction across a wide range of
concentrations. Damage in refineries is most often
associated with dew point corrosion in which
vapors containing
water and hydrogen chloride condense from the
overhead stream of a distillation, fractionation or
stripping tower. The first water droplets that
condense can be highly acidic (low pH) and
promote
high corrosion rates.
This damage mechanism is crack and not corrosion
therefore this can be ruled out.
10 High Temperature Hydrogen Attack

High temperature hydrogen attack results from exposure
to hydrogen at elevated temperatures and pressures.
The hydrogen reacts with carbides in steel to form
methane (CH4) which cannot diffuse through the steel.
The loss of carbide causes an overall loss in strength.
A metallurgical report on the plate and steam
analysis needs to be carried out. However, as this is
steam service and this steam is supplied throughout
the plant. There is no reported failures in other
plants. This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
11 Oxidation

Oxygen reacts with carbon steel and other alloys at high
temperature converting the metal to oxide
scale. It is most often present as oxygen is in the
surrounding air (approximately 20%) used for
combustion in fired heaters and boilers. Oxidation of
carbon steel begins to become significant above about
1000F (538C). Rates of metal loss increase with
increasing temperature.
A metallurgical report on the plate and steam
analysis needs to be carried out. However, as this is
steam service and this steam is supplied throughout
the plant. There is no reported failures in other
plants. This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
12 Thermal Fatigue

Thermal fatigue is the result of cyclic stresses caused by
variations in temperature. Damage is in the form of
On our case the startup and shutdown of equipment
increase the susceptibility to thermal fatigue. The
cracking that may occur anywhere in a metallic
component where relative movement or differential
expansion is constrained, particularly under repeated
thermal cycling.
number of start up and shutdown cycles needs to be
controlled. Also the magnitude of temperature swing
needs to be controlled also. This damage
mechanism is a credible case however, can easily
controlled by procedures for slow start up and
shutdowns.
13 Sour Water Corrosion (acidic)

Corrosion of steel due to acidic sour water containing
H2S at a pH between 4.5 and 7.0. Carbon dioxide (CO2)
may also be present. Sour waters containing significant
amounts of ammonia, chlorides or cyanides may
significantly affect pH but are outside the scope of this
section
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
14 Refractory Degradation

Both thermal insulating and erosion resistant refractories
are susceptible to various forms of mechanical damage
(cracking, spalling and erosion) as well as corrosion due
to oxidation, sulfidation and other high temperature
mechanisms.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
15 Graphitization

Graphitization is a change in the microstructure of certain
carbon steels and 0.5Mo steels after longterm operation
in the 800F to 1100F (427C to 593C) range that may
cause a loss in strength, ductility, and/or creep
resistance.
At elevated temperatures, the carbide phases in these
steels are unstable and may decompose into graphite
nodules. This decomposition is known as graphitization.
The design temperature are much lower and
therefore this damage mechanism is ruled out
16 Temper Embrittlement

Temper embrittlement is the reduction in toughness due
to a metallurgical change that can occur in some low
alloy steels as a result of long term exposure in the
temperature range of about 650F to 1070F (343C to
577C). This change causes an upward shift in the
ductile-to-brittle transition temperature as measured by
Charpy impact testing. Although the loss of toughness is
not evident at operating temperature, equipment that is
temper embrittled may be susceptible to brittle fracture
during start-up and
shutdown.
The design temperature are much lower and
therefore this damage mechanism is ruled out
17 Decarburization

A condition where steel loses strength due the removal
of carbon and carbides leaving only an iron matrix.
Decarburization occurs during exposure to high
temperatures, during heat treatment, from exposure to
fires, or from high temperature service in a gaseous
environment.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out due to the
temperatures (204deg C only)and similar materials
are existing in other plant in similar service
18 Caustic Cracking

Caustic embrittlement is a form of stress corrosion
cracking characterized by surface-initiated cracks that
PWHT is recommended to be carried out on the
channel head. A heat treatment at 1150F (621C) is
occur in piping and equipment exposed to caustic,
primarily adjacent to non-PWHTd welds. Affected
Materials-Carbon steel, low alloy steels and 300 Series
SS are susceptible. Caustic stress corrosion cracking
typically propagates parallel to the weld in adjacent base
metal but can also occur in the weld deposit or heat-
affected zones.
considered an effective stress relieving heat
treatment for carbon steel
To rule this out, analysis of steam and metallographic
examination needs to be carried out.
19 Caustic Corrosion

Localized corrosion due to the concentration of caustic or
alkaline salts that usually occurs under
evaporative or high heat transfer conditions. However,
general corrosion can also occur depending on alkali or
caustic solution strength.
As this is steam service and this steam is supplied
throughout the plant. There is no reported failures in
other plants. This damage mechanism can be ruled
out.
20 Erosion / Erosion-Corrosion

Erosion is the accelerated mechanical removal of
surface material as a result of relative movement
between, or impact from solids, liquids, vapor or any
combination thereof. Erosion-corrosion is a description
for the damage that occurs when corrosion contributes to
erosion by removing protective films or scales, or by
exposing the metal surface to further corrosion under the
combined action of erosion and corrosion.
Slight erosion related damage was observed on the
plate. However, the thinning was very minor and was
not attributed to the crack on the plate. Therefore this
damage mechanism is ruled out
21 Carbonate SCC


Carbonate stress corrosion cracking (often referred to as
carbonate cracking) is the term applied to surface
breaking cracks that occur adjacent to carbon steel
welds under the combined action of tensile stress in
systems containing a free water phase with carbonate,
where some amount of H2S is also present. It is a form
of Alkaline Stress Corrosion Cracking (ACSCC).
A metallurgical analysis report on the plate needs to
be carried out to rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out on the
basis that similar materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
22 Amine Cracking

Amine cracking is a common term applied to the
cracking of steels under the combined action of tensile
stress and corrosion in aqueous alkanolamine systems
used to remove/absorb H2S and/or CO2 and their
mixtures from various gas and liquid hydrocarbon
streams. Amine cracking is a form of alkaline stress
corrosion cracking. It is most often found at or adjacent
to non-PWHTd carbon steel weldments or in highly cold
worked parts.
A metallurgical analysis report on the plate needs to
be carried out to rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out on the
basis that similar materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
PWHT of the Channel head is recommended.
23 Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking

Surface initiated cracks caused by environmental
cracking of 300 Series SS and some nickel base alloys
under the combined action of tensile stress, temperature
and an aqueous chloride environment. The presence of
dissolved oxygen increases propensity for cracking
A metallurgical analysis report on the plate needs to
be carried out to rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out on the
basis that similar materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
24 Carburization

Carbon is absorbed into a material at elevated
temperature while in contact with a carbonaceous
material or carburizing environment. Three conditions
A metallurgical analysis report on the plate needs to
be carried out to rule it out.
This is steam service and maximum temperature is
must be satisfied:
1) Exposure to a carburizing environment or
carbonaceous material - (hydrocarbons, coke,
gases rich in CO, CO2, methane, ethane) and low
oxygen potential (minimal O2 or steam)..
2) Temperature high enough to allow diffusion of carbon
into the metal [typically above 1100F
(593C)].
3) Susceptible material
only 204Deg C.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out on the
basis that similar materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
25 Hydrogen Embrittlement

A loss in ductility of high strength steels due to the
penetration of atomic hydrogen can lead to brittle
cracking. Hydrogen Embrittlement (HE) can occur during
manufacturing, welding, or from services that can charge
hydrogen into the steel in an aqueous, corrosive, or a
gaseous environment
This is not a credible, this damage mechanism is
ruled out.
26 Steam Blanketing

The operation of steam generating equipment is a
balance between the heat flow from the combustion of
the fuel and the generation of steam within the waterwall
or generating tube. The flow of heat energy through the
wall of the tube results in the formation of discrete steam
bubbles (nucleate boiling) on the ID surface. The moving
fluid sweeps the bubbles away. When the heat flow
balance is disturbed, individual bubbles join to form a
steam blanket, a condition known as Departure From
Nucleate Boiling (DNB). Once a steam blanket forms,
tube rupture can occur rapidly, as a result of short term
overheating, usually within a few minutes.
This is not a credible case, this damage mechanism
is ruled out.
27 Thermal Shock

A form of thermal fatigue cracking thermal shock can
occur when high and non-uniform thermal stresses
develop over a relatively short time in a piece of
equipment due to differential expansion or contraction. If
the thermal expansion/contraction is restrained, stresses
above the yield strength of the material can result.
Thermal shock usually occurs when a colder liquid
contacts a warmer metal surface.
There is no evidence of a large thermal shock and
therefore, this damage mechanism is ruled out.
28 Cavitation

Cavitation is a form of erosion caused by the formation
and instantaneous collapse of innumerable tiny vapor
bubbles. Inadequate NPSH in pumps can result in
cavitation
This is not a credible case, this damage mechanism
is ruled out.
29 Graphitic Corrosion (see Dealloying)

a) Cast irons are comprised of graphite particles
embedded in an iron matrix. Graphitic corrosion is a
form of dealloying in which the iron matrix is corroded,
leaving corrosion products and porous
graphite.
This is not a credible case, this damage mechanism
is ruled out.
b) Attack results in a porous structure with a loss of
strength, ductility and density. It usually occurs
under low pH and stagnant conditions, especially in
contact with soils or waters high in sulfates.
30 Short term Overheating Stress
Rupture

Permanent deformation occurring at relatively low stress
levels as a result of localized overheating. This usually
results in bulging and eventually failure by stress rupture.
As no heat is exists and no bulging is observed - this
is not a credible case, this damage mechanism is
ruled out.
31 Brittle Fracture

Brittle fracture is the sudden rapid fracture under stress
(residual or applied) where the material exhibits little or
no evidence of ductility or plastic deformation.
Affected Materials:
Carbon steels and low alloy steels are of prime concern,
particularly older steels. 400 Series SS are also
susceptible.
The hydrotest case needs to be carefully analyzed
and would require a FEA analysis looking at the
stress on the components. This damage mechanism
is a credible and will need to be further analyzed.
32 Sigma Phase/ Chi Embrittlement

Formation of a metallurgical phase known as sigma
phase can result in a loss of fracture toughness in some
stainless steels as a result of high temperature exposure.
Affected Materials
a) 300 Series SS wrought metals, weld metal, and
astings. Cast 300 Series SS including the HK and HP
alloys are especially susceptible to sigma formation
because of their high (10% to 40%) ferritecontent.
b) The 400 Series SS and other ferritic and martensitic
SS with 17% Cr or more are also susceptible (e.g.,
Types 430 and 440).
c) Duplex stainless steels.
The material is carbon steel and this damage
mechanism can be ruled out.
33 885oF (475oC) Embrittlement

885F (475C) embrittlement is a loss in toughness due
to a metallurgical change that can occur in alloys
containing a ferrite phase, as a result of exposure in the
temperature range 600F to1000F (316C to 540C).
The design temperature are much lower and
therefore this damage mechanism is ruled out
34 Softening (Spheroidization)

Spheroidization is a change in the microstructure of
steels after exposure in the 850F to 1400F (440C to
760C) range, where the carbide phases in carbon steels
are unstable and may agglomerate from their normal
plate-like form to a spheroidal form, or from small, finely
dispersed carbides in low alloy steels like 1Cr-0.5Mo to
large agglomerated carbides. Spheroidization may cause
a loss in strength and/or creep resistance.
The design temperature are much lower and
therefore this damage mechanism is ruled out
35 Reheat Cracking Cracking of a metal due to stress relaxation during Post
Weld Heat Treatment (PWHT) or in service at elevated
temperatures above 750F (399C). It is most often
observed in heavy wall sections.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
36 Sulfuric Acid Corrosion Sulfuric acid promotes general and localized
corrosion of carbon steel and other alloys. Carbon
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
steel heat affected zones may experience severe
corrosion.
37 Hydrofluoric Acid Corrosion

Corrosion by HF acid can result in high rates of
general or localized corrosion and may be
accompanied by hydrogen cracking, blistering
and/or HIC/SOHIC
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
38 Flue Gas Dew Point Corrosion

Sulfur and chlorine species in fuel will form sulfur
dioxide, sulfur trioxide and hydrogen chloride within the
combustion products. At low enough temperatures,
these gases and the water vapor in the flue gas will
condense to form sulfurous acid, sulfuric acid and
hydrochloric acid which can lead to severe corrosion.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
39 Dissimilar Metal Weld (DMW)
Cracking

Cracking of dissimilar metal welds occurs in the ferritic
carbon steel or low alloy steel) side of a weld between an
austenitic (300 Series SS or Nickel base alloy) and a
erritic material operating at high. Cracking can result
from creep damage, from fatigue cracking, from sulfide
stress cracking or hydrogen disbonding
This is a credible case and will be studied further.
40 Hydrogen Stress Cracking in HF

Hydrogen Stress Cracking is a form of
environmental cracking that can initiate on the
surface of high strength low alloy steels and carbon
steels with highly localized zones of high hardness
in the weld metal and HAZ as a result of exposure
to aqueous HF acid environments.
A metallurgical analysis report on the plate needs to
be carried out to rule it out.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out on the
basis that similar materials are existing in other plant
in similar service.
41 Dealloying (Dezincification/
Denickelification)

Dealloying is a selective corrosion mechanism in which
one or more constituents of an alloy are
preferentially attacked leaving a lower density
(dealloyed) often porous structure. Component failure
may occur suddenly and unexpectedly because
mechanical properties of the
dealloyed material are significantly degraded. This affect
primarily copper alloys (brass, bronze, tin) as well as
Alloy 400 and cast iron.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
42 CO2 Corrosion

Carbon dioxide (CO2) corrosion results when CO2
dissolves in water to form carbonic acid (H2CO3). The
acid may lower the pH and sufficient quantities may
promote general corrosion and/or pitting corrosion of
carbon steel.
As this is steam service and this steam is supplied
throughout the plant. There is no reported failures in
other plants. This damage mechanism can be ruled
out.
43 Corrosion Fatigue A form of fatigue cracking in which cracks develop under
the combined effects of cyclic loading and
corrosion. Cracking often initiates at a stress
concentration such as a pit in the surface. Cracking can
initiate at multiple sites.
This is a credible case as multiple site cracks are
observed and will be studied further. However, only
minor corrosion was observed in the site visit.
Contrary to a pure mechanical fatigue, there is no fatigue
limit load in corrosion-assisted fatigue.
Corrosion promotes failure at a lower stress and number
of cycles than the materials normal
endurance limit in the absence of corrosion and often
results in propagation of multiple parallel
cracks. Crack initiation sites include concentrators such
as pits, notches, surface defects, changes in section or
fillet welds.

44 Fuel Ash Corrosion

Fuel ash corrosion is accelerated high temperature
wastage of materials that occurs when contaminants in
the fuel form deposits and melt on the metal surfaces of
fired heaters, boilers and gas turbines. Corrosion
typically occurs with fuel oil or coal that is contaminated
with a combination of sulfur, sodium, potassium and/or
vanadium. The resulting molten salts (slags) dissolve the
surface oxide and enhance the transport of oxygen to the
surface to re-form the iron oxide at the expense of the
tube wall or component.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
45 Amine Corrosion

Amine corrosion refers to the general and/or
localized corrosion that occurs principally on
carbon
steel in amine treating processes. Corrosion is not
caused by the amine itself, but results from
dissolved acid gases (CO2 and H2S), amine
degradation products, Heat Stable Amine Salts
(HSAS) and other contaminants.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
46 Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI)

Corrosion of piping, pressure vessels and structural
components resulting from water trapped under
insulation or fireproofing.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
47 Atmospheric Corrosion

A form of corrosion that occurs from moisture associated
with atmospheric conditions. Marine
environments and moist polluted industrial environments
with airborne contaminants are most severe. Dry
rural environments cause very little corrosion.
This damage mechanism can be ruled out.
48 Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking

Aqueous streams containing ammonia may cause Stress
Corrosion Cracking (SCC) in some copper
alloys. Carbon steel is susceptible to SCC in anhydrous
ammonia. Anhydrous ammonia with <0.2% water may
cause cracking in carbon steel.
PWHT eliminates susceptibility of most common
steels. To rule this out, analysis of steam and
metallographic examination needs to be carried out.
49 Cooling Water Corrosion

General or localized corrosion of carbon steels and other
metals caused by dissolved salts, gases,
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
organic compounds or microbiological activity.
50 Boiler Water / Condensate
Corrosion

General corrosion and pitting in the boiler system and
condensate return piping.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
51 Microbiologically Induced Corrosion
(MIC)

A form of corrosion caused by living organisms such as
bacteria, algae or fungi. It is often associated with the
presence of tubercles or slimy organic substances.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
52 Liquid Metal Embrittlement

Liquid Metal Embrittlement (LME) is a form of
cracking that results when certain molten metals
come in contact with specific alloys. Cracking can
be very sudden and brittle in nature.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
53 Galvanic Corrosion

A form of corrosion that can occur at the junction of
dissimilar metals when they are joined together in a
suitable electrolyte, such as a moist or aqueous
environment, or soils containing moisture.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
54 Mechanical Fatigue

Fatigue cracking is a mechanical form of degradation
that occurs when a component is exposed to cyclical
stresses for an extended period, often resulting in
sudden, unexpected failure. These stresses can arise
from either mechanical loading or thermal cycling and
are typically well
below the yield strength of the material.
The only mechanical loading /thermal cycles loading
are during start up and shutdown was reported.
These are relative low and therefore this damage
mechanism was ruled out.
55 Nitriding

A hard, brittle surface layer will develop on some
alloys due to exposure to high temperature process
streams containing high levels of nitrogen
compounds such ammonia or cyanides, particularly
under reducing conditions
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
56 Vibration-Induced Fatigue

A form of mechanical fatigue in which cracks are
produced as the result of dynamic loading due to
vibration, water hammer, or unstable fluid flow.
The plate is rigidly supported all around. There is
report of vibration/water hammer, or unstable fluid
flow from site. This damage mechanism is likely.
However, if this is to be ruled out completely, then a
complete vibration study of the system needs to be
carried out. In the interim period a DP across the
heat exchanger is recommended.
57 Titanium Hydriding

Hydriding of titanium is a metallurgical phenomenon in
which hydrogen diffuses into the titanium and reacts to
form an embrittling hydride phase. This can result in a
complete loss of ductility with no noticeable sign of
corrosion or loss in thickness
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
58 Soil Corrosion

The deterioration of metals exposed to soils is referred to
as soil corrosion
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
59 Metal Dusting

Metal dusting is form of carburization resulting in
accelerated localized pitting which occurs in carburizing
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case as the damage is cracks and service is
gases and/or process streams containing carbon and
hydrogen. Pits usually form on the surface and
may contain soot or graphite dust.
steam which does not have carbon or hydrogen.
60 Strain Aging

Strain aging is a form of damage found mostly in older
vintage carbon steels and C-0.5 Mo low alloy
steels under the combined effects of deformation and
aging at an intermediate temperature. This results
in an increase in hardness and strength with a reduction
in ductility and toughness
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case
61 Sulfate Stress Corrosion Cracking

Surface initiated cracks caused by environmental
cracking of copper alloys in sulfate solutions over
many years. Most commonly found in heat
exchanger tubes, primarily in cooling water
services
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case.
62 Phosphoric Acid Corrosion

Phosphoric acid is most often used as a catalyst in
polymerization units. It can cause both pitting corrosion
and localized corrosion of carbon steels depending on
water content.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case.
63 Phenol (carbolic acid) Corrosion

Corrosion of carbon steel can occur in plants using
phenol as a solvent to remove aromatic compounds from
lubricating oil feedstocks.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case.
64 Ethanol Stress Corrosion Cracking

Surface-initiated cracks caused by environmental
cracking of carbon steel under the combined action
of tensile stress and a fuel grade ethanol (FGE,
ASTM D 4806) or FGE / gasoline blend
environment.
Dissolved oxygen and the presence of variable
stresses such as cyclic stress or component
flexing,
increase the propensity for cracking.
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case.
65 Oxygen-Enhanced Ignition and
Combustion

Many metals are flammable in oxygen and enriched air
(>25% oxygen) services even at low pressures,
whereas they are non-flammable in air. The spontaneous
ignition or combustion of metallic and nonmetallic
components can result in fires and explosions in certain
oxygen-enriched gaseous environments if not properly
designed, operated and maintained. Once ignited,
metals and non-metals burn more vigorously with higher
oxygen purity, pressure and temperature
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case.
66 Organic Acid Corrosion Of
Distillation Tower Overhead
Systems

Organic compounds present in some crude oils
decompose in the crude furnace to form low molecular
weight organic acids which condense in distillation tower
overhead systems. They may also result from additives
This type of damage mechanism can be ruled out in
this case.
used in upstream operations or desalting. These
naturally occurring acids may contribute significantly to
aqueous corrosion depending on the type and quantity of
acids, and the presence of other contaminants.


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 34 of 39
APPENDICES
8.4 Level -1 assessment

Check the Thickness of Pass Partition Plate as per TEMA Ninth Edition -2007 and
ASME Sec VIII
The fillet weld size as per latest TEMA is 3/4t = 9.75mm on both sides. Looking at the
manufacturers drawings, the fillet weld size was found to be 6 CFW-continuous fillet weld.

Also, the ADMA OPCO Inspection Division recommendation of API-660 of full penetration
weld 50mm/2inch if welded on both sides is endorsed.

Also, enclosed is the Process Industry Practices (PIP) standard reference


PWHT also is to be reviewed due to the proximity of the two welds.
A review of the fillet weld design is required. A closer examination of the recommendation
of Process Industry Practices, API660 and TEMA is required. Enclosed is the hand
calculations done.

8.4
8.4
8.4
8.4

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 35 of 39
APPENDICES
8.5 Metallurgy assessment


ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report




















2013
Failure of US Heat Exchangers
Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
Prepared By Tarek A. Hassan (DFISL)
Das Integrity Svs. Eng. (A1)
Page 1 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................... 3
2.0 DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................... 3
3.0 BRIEF HISTORY ................................................................................................................................... 4
4.0 INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER ..................................................................................................... 5
5.0 TOR FOR TASK FORCE ...................................................................................................................... 5
6.0 TF KICKOFF MEETING ........................................................................................................................ 5
7.0 INSPECTION ......................................................................................................................................... 6
8.0 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................... 8
9.0 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 9
10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 10
11.0 LESSONS LEARNT ................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
12.0 APPENDIX .................................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.






























Page 2 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It was reported that repetitive ruptures occurred on channel head pass partition plate of
Heat exchanger for US columns.
After the reported failure of Crude Oil Charge heaters for US column 400, visual
inspection revealed that the ruptured partition plate (broken into pieces) was resulted
of crack propagation on the weld toe on both side of welding at inlet steam side.

There was no evidence of ductility or plastic deformation (brittle), this rupture have
occurred due to fatigue/cyclic over stress (possible steam hammering effect at inlet side
due to suspected steam condensate trapped on steam flow due to insufficient steam
traps performance)

During the course of repairs after the reported failures, partition plates were replaced
by inadequate material with low thickness plate (10mm) and incorrect size of drain hole
(22mm) against the original plate thickness of 13 mm with 13 mm drain hole as per
manufacture construction drawing.

The existing 10.0 mm thickness pass partition plate is not in compliance with TEMA
requirement of 12.0 mm minimum thickness plate if it is constructed from carbon steel
material for Channel head with the size of 660 mm diameter. (TEMA - Tube Exchangers
Manufacturing Association). The 22 mm diameter drain hole on pass partition plate
possibly caused vibration & induces stress on the plate due to Nozzle effect (significant
steam pressure difference between inlet and outlet)

Modification/changes from original design thickness were implemented without
following the ADMA OPCOs PMR procedure.

2.0 DESCRIPTION
A cylindrical carbon steel pressure vessel with one dished end and one flanged end (U-
tube type), externally insulated and horizontally mounted on two steel saddles located
on two concrete plinths.
Manufacturer - Robert Jenkins & Co. Ltd., Rotherham, England.
Design Pressure - 175 psig (tube side) , Test pressure : 263 psi
Design Pressure - 350 psig (shell-side), Test pressure : 525 psi
Fluid Service - Steam (tube side/channel head), Crude oil (shell side)
Dimensions - Vessel 4838mm long x 660mm i/d x 13mm thick.
Commissioned - 20/01/82






Page 3 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report
3.0 BRIEF HISTORY
We experienced the reoccurrence of frequent failures on pass partition plate of the heat
exchangers channel heads since 2008,

US heat exchangers have been operational since 1981 (32years). The following are the
history of failures of pass partition plate on each heat exchanger for US columns.

A Task Force was formed under the sponsorship of MDO to investigate the repetitive
failure of channel head pass partition plate and to develop Rout Cause Analysis Report.

The objectives of the investigation are to examine and identify root causes for this
failure and make appropriate recommendations to prevent reoccurrence.

Several meetings were conducted on Das Island to align the task force members on the
objectives and deliverables.

Sl.no Description Commissioning Failures of Pass partition plate Action during
Investigations
Remarks
1 Heat exchanger
for US Column
401 (43100344)
Jan 1982 March 2008,
corroded pass
partition plate
replaced
Feb 2013,
Rupture/ broken.
Replaced with 10
mm thickness
plate with 13 mm
drain hole
Decided to replace
the 10mm plate
with 13 mm hole to
13 mm plate withoit
hole on trial basis as
per PMR, but PMR
not approve,
partition plate
should be replaced
specified 13mm
thickness plate
Two times
replaced. Started
failure occur in
year 2008
2 Heat exchanger
for US Column
101 (43100341)
Jan 1981 Dec 2011, Rupture/
broken pass
partition plate
replaced
April 2013,
Rupture/ broken
pass partition
plate
April 2013, replaced
with 13 mm
thickness plate with
13 mm drain hole
two time
replaced
3 Heat exchanger
for US Column
201 (43100342)
Oct 1981 May 2012,
Rupture/broken
pass partition plate
replaced
March 2013,
Rupture/ broken
pass partition
plate
March 2013,
replaced with 13
mm thickness plate
with 13 mm drain
hole
two time
replaced
4 Heat exchanger
for US Column
301 (43100343)
March 1982 Feb 2008,
Rupture/broken
pass partition plate
replaced
March 2011,
rupture/broken
March 2013,
replaced with 13
mm thickness plate
with 13 mm drain
hole
Three times
replaced. Started
failure occur in
year 2008





Page 4 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report

4.0 INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER

INVESTIGATION TEAM
Tarek A. Hassan / Mohamed Al Ansari Taskforce T/L ID
Aref A. Ahmed / Soud DPOTL DIAU
Moustafa Dawoud /Dheya Al Afeefi DMTL DIAU
Abdallah Alhouig

DMMSL DIAU
Al i Al Hosani / Lione HSESL HSED

5.0 TOR FOR TASK FORCE
5.1 Review the design drawings, inspection report, Process parameters, Functional
checking of instrument upstream and down steam, advice the adequacy of the
present procedures, methodologies and advise areas of improvement.
5.2 Identify any acts of omissions/substandard practices that could lead to
unfavorite consequences.
5.3 To carry out gap analysis and identify gaps.
5.4 To identify the root causes of the incident.
5.5 To recommend the remedial measures.
5.6 To develop lesson learnt.
6.0 TF KICKOFF MEETING
The Task force members conducted a kickoff meeting on February 23
rd
, 2013 to address
the failure process, to be familiar with the TF objectives and to agree on the way
forward.
The Task force members visited the site to inspect the ruptured pass partition plates, to
discuss the failure with DED, inspection, operation and maintenance, to address the
outcome and propose root causes along with the recommendations.


Page 5 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report

7.0 INSPECTION
Preliminary inspection revealed that the rupture could have occurred on pass partition
plated due to low thickness plate used and inadequate drain hole size against the
original manufacture construction drawings as indicated in the attached initial file
note.
Initial Inspection.docx

7.1 FINDINGS:
The pass partition plate was found ruptured (broken into two pieces). It appears that
the crack propagated from the weld toe of pass partition plate on both side of
welding at inlet steam side.
There was no evidence of ductility or plastic deformation (brittle) at the breaking
surfaces.
22 mm diameter drain hole was noticed on pass partition plate.
Erosion-corrosion was evident over the surface of the partition plate, cover plate
and drain hole.
The thickness of the existing pass partition plate was found to be 10.0mm
The followings were identified as the main contributing factors lead to failures:

The first factor is the steam/condensate hammering effect on pass partition plate
due to increase in steam flow due to increase in Oil production since 2008. We need
to ensure the condensate removal (Knock out) prior to interring the HE.

The second factor contributing to the problem was low thickness plate 10 mm with
22 mm holes used against the original design thickness of 13.0 mm with 13 mm
holes as per original construction drawings.

NOTE:
The original Pass partition plate was installed in accordance with BS 1501-151-28A in
year 1980, Original thickness: 13mm, 6 mm continuous fillet weld on both sides as
per drawing. However, the new replacement plate material is ASTM SA 516 grade 70
and thickness 13.0 mm. (Assumed the grade is A 516 Gr 70 as per Maximo Cat.
ID:99563).




Page 6 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report











Pass partition plate
Cover plate with groove
Channel head
Crack on pass partition
propagate on toe of weld
Page 7 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report


7.2 REVIEW OF HISTORICAL FILE, ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS AND TEMA
STANDARD:
All relevant original construction drawings are reviewed and confirm the following:-
The original construction drawing revealed that the thickness of pass partition is 13
mm with 13 mm diameter condensate drain hole.

As per TEMA, the minimum required thickness of pass partition plate is 12.0 mm if it is
carbon steel material for diameter 660 mm Channel head.

7.3 SITE VERIFICATION:
The steam/condensate traps provided at down stream Heat Exchanger was brought to
workshop and functional test was carried by maintenance and it was found to be
satisfactory.
Condensate pumps are provided at the D/S of the heat exchangers and considered as
a backup for condensate traps.
The functions of all steam/condensate traps provided at upstream Heat Exchangers
were verified and it was found to be satisfactory, as per the energy conservation task
force most of the traps were replaced, and some of them yet to be replaced.
PCV for steam at upstream Heat exchanger functional tests were carried out and
found to be satisfactory

7.4 PLANT MODIFICATION REQUEST:
A PMR was raised to replace the existing 10 mm pass partition plate of Heat Exchanger
for column 400 with 13mm thick plate without hole on trial basis to verify the drain
hole as a contributing factor for failure. DED reject the PMR and recommend to
replace the ruptured plate with 13mm plate thickness and 13mm condensate drain
hole. Also they recommend applying a post weld heat treatment to relieve residual
stresses.
8.0 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Inspection report and file note revealed that the following;
The correct size plate 13.0 mm was not used due to non-availability of adequate
material at that time of 1
st
failure and replacement of pass partition plate .
They did not provide correct size drain hole 13mm due to not verifying the original
construction drawings.
Not followed the Companys PMR procedure when there is design
changes/modification taking place.
However, the 1
st
failure could be the steam hammering effect due to the increase in
steam flow in 2008 in addition to the age of the equipment nearly 28 years.
Page 8 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report


8.1 REVIEW OF ISSTL MEMOs FOR ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
8.1.1 Initial report from ISSTL for repetitive failure of pass partition plate revealed that
the observed values may be attributable to fatigue vibration acting on the reduced
plate thickness of the pass partition plate which has exacerbated by the increasing
of the steam flow rate causing hammering on the partition plate.

8.1.2 The ruptured pass partition plates were sent for lab analysis through ID in Abu
Dhabi and report received from ISSTL revealed that the cause of failure is due to the
pre-existing plate manufacturing defects (i.e. voids, laminations and inclusions).

Its also noted that the tensile strength of the plate material does not meet the
requirements of the specified grade ASTM A 516 Gr. 70.
9.0 CONCLUSIONS
The repetitive failure have occurred on the channel head pass partition plate of US Heat
exchanges are mainly due to the followings:-

9.1 Due to the unavailability of design 13mm thickness plate, low thickness 10 mm plate
was used with 22 mm drain holes against the original design thickness of 13 mm with
13 mm drain hole as per original construction drawing when 1
st
failure occurred.
9.2 The use of unspecified material with pre-existing manufacturing defects (i.e. voids,
laminations and inclusions).
9.3 The fracture has simultaneously at multiple sites along the length on tube side where
cyclic stress condition due to steam pressure can be expected and has propagated
through the thickness connecting the voids, finally rupturing the plate in ductile
manner.
9.4 Modification/change from original design thickness was implemented without
following the ADMA OPCOs PMR procedure.










Page 9 of 10

ADMA-OPCO
Repetitive rupture of Channel head pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger
Das Island Investigation Report
10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
To minimize any further incident of failure, the following recommendations are made:

10.1 Pass partition plate of US Heat Exchanger 401 needs to be replaced with the specified
material acc. to ASTM SA 516 Gr. 70, 13mm plate thickness and 13mm condensate
drain hole (currently is 10mm thickness)
10.2 Use original specified material (BS 1401-151 Gr 28A) or equivalent
10.3 Use 13.0 mm thickness plate with 13 mm condensate drain hole as per original
construction drawings.
10.4 Welding of new partition plate shall be by complete fillet weld from both sides. Carry
out full penetration at 50 mm from the gasket face (double V joints) as per API 660.
10.5 Apply a post weld heat treatment to relieve residual stresses and to obtain hardness
reading at weld vicinity to ensure effective treatment.
11.0 LESSONS LEARNT
11.1 Maintenance and Inspection to ensure that any repair/replacement is carried out as per
original construction drawings and relevant international code and standards.

11.2 Maintenance to ensure that sufficient material are made available for repair/replacement
with relevant test certificate to avoid using unidentified material on urgent basis.

11.3 Any Modification/changes shall be carried out through PMR.

12.0 APPENDIX

Construction Drawings for Heat Exchanger and Welding Procedure


US Heat Exchangers
1.pdf
US Heat Exchangers
2.pdf
US Heat Exchangers
3.pdf
US Heat Exchangers
4.pdf
US Heat Exchangers
5.pdf
US Heat Exchangers
6.pdf


Page 10 of 10


Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 36 of 39
APPENDICES
8.6 FEA for the design base case

a) With drain Hole

b) Without drain Hole
Page 1 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Stress Analysis Results
13mm Plate With a 13mm Drain hole

A stress analysis was carried out on the 13mm pass partition plate with a 13mm dia hole at the center of the plate. The following cases were
analyzed:
1. Hydro test case at hydrotest pressure of 263psig
2. Operating Cases 35psig operating pressure with 18psig differential pressure across the plate
3. Max design Case 175psig Design Pressure with 12psig differential pressure across the plate
CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Hydrotest case

The channel head was
subjected to hydrotest
pressure of 263psig. Pass
partition plate had no
differential pressure across
the plate.
A linear static analysis was carried
out.

The maximum stress in the channel
head were found to be 107.2Mpa
and was found to be within the
allowable limits(120Mpa).

Max Stress=107.2Mpa < allowable
Stress 120Mpa at 37 deg C

Therefore Acceptable.
None.
Page 2 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
13mm pass partition plate with 13mm
drain hole
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 3 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report










Hydrotest Case
13mm pass partition plate with 13mm
drain hole
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 4 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report



CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Operating Cases 35psig operating pressure
with 18psig differential
pressure across the plate
A linear static analysis was carried
out.

The maximum Stress of 160.3Mpa
was found at the four corners of the
plate.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=160.3Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Therefore Not Acceptable.

A lower differential pressure was to be
maintained.

The welding the corners to be full
penetration.

PWHT shall be carried out to relieve stress
at the joints.
Page 5 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate with 13mm hole
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 6 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
13mm plate thick Dividing plate with 13mm hole
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 7 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate with 13mm hole
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 8 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report










Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate with 13mm hole
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 9 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Design Base Case 175psig Design Pressure with
12psig differential pressure
across the plate
A nonlinear static analysis was
carried out to achieve the
convergence.

The maximum stress was found to
be 117.6Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=117.6Mpa just above
the allowable Stress 108Mpa.

Due to this, this case is considered
as the Base case.

Therefore Acceptable.



Same as above

The differential pressure shall be
maintained Below the design value of
12psig in all cases.

A DP is required to be installed across the
heat exchanger and monitored the
differential pressure.

Further it is suggested to install alarm and
trip setting of 12psig.
Page 10 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 11 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 12 of 12
10mm Plate With a 13mm Hole - Stress Analyses Report










Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 1 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Stress Analysis Results
13mm Plate Without drain hole

A stress analysis was carried out on the 13mm plate pas partition plate. The following cases were analyzed:
1. Hydro test case at hydrotest pressure of 263psig
2. Operating Cases 35psig operating pressure with 18psig differential pressure across the plate
3. Operating case 35Psig operating Pressure with 30psig differential pressure across the plate
4. Max design Case 175psig Design Pressure with 12/18/24/30psig differential pressure across the plate
CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Hydrotest case

The channel head was
subjected to hydrotest
pressure of 263psig. Pass
partition plate had no
differential pressure across
the plate.
A linear static analysis was carried
out.

The maximum stress in the channel
head were found to be 110.7Mpa
and was found to be within the
allowable limits(120Mpa).

Max Stress=110.7Mpa < allowable
Stress 120Mpa at 37 deg C

Therefore Acceptable.
None.

Page 2 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 3 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 4 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 5 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report









Hydrotest Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 6 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report



CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Operating Cases 35psig operating pressure
with 18psig differential
pressure across the plate
A linear static analysis was carried
out.

The maximum Stress of 138.1Mpa
was found at the four corners of the
plate.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=138.1Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Therefore Not Acceptable.

A lower differential pressure was to be
maintained.

The welding the corners to be full
penetration.

PWHT shall be carried out to relieve stress
at the joints.
Page 7 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 8 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 9 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 10 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report









Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 11 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report


CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Operating case 35Psig operating Pressure
with 30psig differential
pressure across the plate
A nonlinear static analysis was
carried out to achieve the
convergence.

The maximum stress was found to
be 226.3Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=226.3Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Therefore Not Acceptable.



Same as above
Page 12 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 13 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 14 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 15 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 16 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report









Operating Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 17 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Design Base Case 175psig Design Pressure with
12psig differential pressure
across the plate
A nonlinear static analysis was
carried out to achieve the
convergence.

The maximum stress was found to
be 111Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=111Mpa just above the
allowable Stress 108Mpa.

Due to this, this case is considered
as the Base case.

Therefore Acceptable.



Same as above

The differential pressure shall be
maintained Below the design value of
12psig in all cases.

A DP is required to be installed across the
heat exchanger and monitored the
differential pressure.

Further it is suggested to install alarm and
trip setting of 12psig.
Page 18 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 19 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 20 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 21 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 22 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 23 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report










Base Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 24 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Max design Case 175psig Design Pressure with
30psig differential pressure
across the plate
A nonlinear static analysis was
carried out to achieve the
convergence.

The maximum stress was found to
be 244Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=244Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Therefore Not Acceptable.



Same as above
Page 25 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 26 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 27 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 28 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report




Design Case
13mm plate thick Dividing plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 37 of 39
APPENDICES
8.7 Non-lenear Analysis Results (10mm pass partition Plate)

Page 1 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Stress Analysis Results
10mm Plate Without drain hole

A stress analysis was carried out on the 10mm plate pas partition plate. The following cases were analyzed:
1. Hydro test case at hydrotest pressure of 263psig
2. Operating Cases 35psig operating pressure with 18psig differential pressure across the plate
3. Operating case 35Psig operating Pressure with 30psig differential pressure across the plate
4. Design Case 175psig Design Pressure with 12 psig differential pressure across the plate
5. Max design Case 175psig Design Pressure with 18psig differential pressure across the plate
CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Hydrotest case

The channel head was
subjected to hydrotest
pressure of 263psig. Pass
partition plate had no
differential pressure across
the plate.
The maximum stress in the channel
head were found to be 90.1Mpa and
was found to be within the allowable
limits(108Mpa).

Max Stress=90.1Mpa < allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Therefore Acceptable.
None.
Page 2 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 3 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 4 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 5 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Hydrotest Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 6 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report










Hydrotest Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 7 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report











Hydrotest Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=263psig
Page 8 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report


CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Operating Cases 35psig operating pressure
with 18psig differential
pressure across the plate
A non-linear analysis was carried out
as the convergence was not
achieved during linear analysis.

The maximum Stress of 196.1Mpa
was found at the four corners of the
plate.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=196.1Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Mini Specified Yield = 211Mpa
@204Deg C

Therefore Not Acceptable.

To increase the thickness of the plate to
13mm minimum.

The welding the corners to be full
penetration.

PWHT shall be carried out to relieve stress
at the joints.
Page 9 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 10 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 11 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 12 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report









Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 13 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report










Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 14 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Operating case 35Psig operating Pressure
with 30psig differential
pressure across the plate
A nonlinear analysis was carried out
using the Riks method to achieve the
convergence due to plastic
deformation.

The maximum stress was found to
be 327Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=327Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Mini Specified Yield = 211Mpa @
204 Deg C

The stress has exceeded the yield
strength. Therefore failure of the
plate is expected.

Therefore Not Acceptable.



Same as above

Proper measures are to be in place to
ensure that the deferential pressure across
the pass partition plate is not exceeded.
The Differential pressure gauge to be
installed across the Heat exchanger with
alarm settings.
Page 15 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 16 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 17 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report









Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 18 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report









Operating Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=35psig
Differential pressure across the plate =30psig
Page 19 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Design Base Case 175psig Design Pressure with
12psig differential pressure
across the plate
A nonlinear analysis was carried out
to achieve the convergence as
plastic deformation.

The maximum stress was found to
be 139.7Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=139.7Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Therefore Not Acceptable.



Same as above
Page 20 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 21 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 22 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 23 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report










Design Case
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =12psig
Page 24 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

CASE DESCRIPTION OUTCOME RECOMMENDATION
Max design Case 175psig Design Pressure with
18psig differential pressure
across the plate
A nonlinear analysis was carried out
to achieve the convergence as
plastic deformation.

The maximum stress was found to
be 204.2Mpa.

At 204Deg C the metal allowable
stress is 108Mpa.

Max Stress=204.2Mpa > allowable
Stress 108Mpa.

Mini Specified Yield = 211Mpa @
204 Deg C

The stresses are very close to the
yield strength. Therefore plastic
deformation of the plate is
expected.


Therefore Not Acceptable.



Same as above
Page 25 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 26 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 27 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report

Design Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig
Page 28 of 28
10mm Plate Without Hole Stress Analyses Report



Design Cases
10mm plate
Internal Pressure=175psig
Differential pressure across the plate =18psig

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 38 of 39
APPENDICES

8.8 Proposed Solution (to mitigate high differential pressure Across
the pass partion Plate)
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis (Boundary Condition)
Support
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis (Load)
Design Pressure = 175psig
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis (Load)
Differential Pressure = 30psig
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis
Proposed Solution Stress Analysis

Das Island Division
Das Engineering Team
Stress Analysis Report-US channel head Page 39 of 39
APPENDICES
8.9 Drawings