Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of
the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent
1
and the main sponsor
2
of the proposed Article on
Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".
3
Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.
4
For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)
5
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC
for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers
of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,
6
a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system
intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that
before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in
an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said
order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,
7
Section 4 of Article VII,
8
and Section 8 of
Article X
9
of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"
10
embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number
of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an
Order
11
(a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including
the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation
at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).
12
Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground
that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five
days.
13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil
action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on
local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative
to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his
privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers
only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits
constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government
department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition,
the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least
P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit.
14
Besides, there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and
(b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
15
on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED
TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC
IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.
1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND
RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE
COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT
THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES
AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP.
412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment
16
which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a
"knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the
movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a
few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can
give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment
17
for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly
affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentionsinitiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that
system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the
Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code.
The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to
Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed
on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for
hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism,
Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition
in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
18
it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties.
19
Arevision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are
based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as
a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but
not as a premium for good performance.
20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the people's initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before
whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering
the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity
of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is
without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former
does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention.
21
He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He
likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said
petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to
assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of
the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional
convention.
22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the
Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the
aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and
the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations
and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor,
was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the
time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested
intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that
the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the
deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI,
and IBP.
23
The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.
24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take
cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior
court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v.
Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme
Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.
25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.
26
The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin
and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda.
27
Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for
hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant
petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not
supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise
be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.
28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS,
UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,
29
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments
and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332).
30
That section reads as
follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution.
31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative
which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru
initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.
32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the
provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the
budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it
best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of
this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative
power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how this is to be carried out is it
possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather
than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to
constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in
the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties
in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is
source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in
the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in
the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations.
33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution;
thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
34

xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b)
in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama,
Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE
OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained
in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.
36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement
the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another body
to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would be
subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the people,
may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the
Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the
initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of
three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import being
that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary
legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot
agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require
another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I
might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions.
39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in
favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986.
41
Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view
thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.
42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to
"therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress
43
shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
44
This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private
respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This
is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII
then reading:
The Congress
45
shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The
"rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out."
46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the
House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,
47
which dealt with the initiative and referendum
mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,
48
which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as
with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
Senate Bill No. 17
49
solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by
the Senate
50
and by the House of Representatives.
51
This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a
statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in
part."
52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must
submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top
of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle
is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is
"national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act,
which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative
with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced,
54
since the provision therein
applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.
55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of
signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be within the
period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.
56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word
"Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d)
reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the
approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating
blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.
57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC
"to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
59
The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
61
A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The
Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed
validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to
prescribe the form of the petition;
63
(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in
each legislative district;
64
(3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;
65
and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the
said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is
an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh
and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against
private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and
CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion
Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec.
Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair
Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the
Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups
1
and
individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)
2
and Section 7
3
of Republic Act No. 6735
or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)
4
and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department)
5
and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."
6
These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition,
the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
7

The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections
8
declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31
August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not
be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite
the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the
system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors
10
uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors
11
hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino
Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the
minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
12
(4) the nature
of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the
case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no
need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to
propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
13
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the
people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also
"envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is thatthe entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent
or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact
of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed
14
the concept of people's initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate
an initiative clause. In almost all States
15
which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is
signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be
to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the
petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.
17
(Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,
18
the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of
the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the
initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x
x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in
many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative.
In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x
as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden
of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet
20
after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum
on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached
21
to the opposition in intervention
filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We
reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Verified
Signatures:

Legislative District: Barangay:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN
ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend
the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Precinct
Number
Name
Last Name, First Name,
M.I.
Address Birthdate
MM/DD/YY
Signature Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)
_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)
__________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments
before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system
of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together
with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked
if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier
in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as
well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the
mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines"
22
has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE
THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support
the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition
of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987
Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL
AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila.
23
(Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission
24
arevastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition
filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the
Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only
Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group
caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3
of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during
the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed
to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this
Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication
that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative
filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h.
Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with
the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made
after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the
signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the
petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that
what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that
cites a proposed changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed
change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the
people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino
Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the
draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated
claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six
months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could
not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of
100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated
the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."
25
This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes
beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed
the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent
distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets
could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the
petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as
attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this
admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to
so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in
the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing.
They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:


1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide
to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office;
27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.
28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely
requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase
"election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for
the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of
the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because
the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to,
or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis
supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being
a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This
puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,
29
the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything,
we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is
voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate
fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of
the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only
one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,
30
the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence,
stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated.
There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a
greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other
(more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative
before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45
days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament
has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do
not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such
further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such
an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory
Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the
regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their
term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will
remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the
House of Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would
be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by
the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an
issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot behidden from the people under a general
or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if
the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a
constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2
of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this
afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered
by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon
petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending
the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments
to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
x x x x
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the
sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting
it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include
the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
31
(Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. J ordan,
32
the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting
or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus
clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be
effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:
33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on
the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and
submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it
is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:
34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself,
and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated
as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power
to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or
amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the
clear command of the Constitution that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.
35
(Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed
a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as
to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."
36
The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
37
Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."
38
A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that
"jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."
39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino
Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution.
40
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure
of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve
specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or
that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus,
for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
41
(Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,
42
an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several
other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as
follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many
other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in
existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not
only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would
even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
x x x x
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature
at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would
result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the
government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.
43
(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the
count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
44
There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the
structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino
Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an
initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it
speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the
people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in
general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter
because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group
wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group
trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
45
Any theory
espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success.
In Lowe v. Keisling,
46
the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII,
section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect
proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the
initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter
of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and
radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot
measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section
2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x
x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article
XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution,
but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x
x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably
located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers
among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years
47
is an amendment
and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not
a revision.
48
Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution
may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article
II
50
of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is
best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On
the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake
only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by
stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate
constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of
a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
"Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to
the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian
models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of
the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal
of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.
51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change
the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty.
Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely
attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even
comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.
52
For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize
the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political
group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new
dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution
does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast
53
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite
held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific
modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to
be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the
agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will"
in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the
bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively
gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is
to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.








Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J .:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at
which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years
"shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and
by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention
resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor
General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC
filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are
indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the
Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition
was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel,
resist petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that with the principal
parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors
from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul
S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and
Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and
dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding
motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties,
the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that
they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the
said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent
portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of
two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the
House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of
election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which
began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution
No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended
Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds for
the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates
waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above)
resolution." The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may
we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use
of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of said ballots and election
forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be distributed at the same
time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then transmitted them to the
Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of
October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto
attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate Antonio
Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the
delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon
are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the
President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts
performed in connection with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved
by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators
and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out
the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the
other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix
the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the
authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting
such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to
decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and
that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the
Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a
justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein
the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its
jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would
misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting
as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution,
which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any
lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one declined to
pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the
Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil.
818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Taada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on
Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under
its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging
to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for
the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the
number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised
were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the
repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) to make, and, hence,
to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators
and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they
are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority
from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec.
2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is
essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with
the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral
argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the
existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention which
drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing
government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely
without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of
1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was
called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution
which provides:
ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the
existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may
propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention,
its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in
everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in
its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by
any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the
press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the
taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the
Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between private
individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing
Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it,
according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that
somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to
confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is
naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked
by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited,
has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and
balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are
authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression
on the authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding
years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein
petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution
of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the
resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government
established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall
have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted
the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which
have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the
absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of
1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of
the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict?
And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may in
the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must
we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission
as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of
authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between
any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the
Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been
convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an
assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of
the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this not
because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention
and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the
power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have
joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on
its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage
under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is
called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-
olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to
prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with
his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection
with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether
or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and
resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not
set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the existing
Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other
amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of
the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means
the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to
vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally
permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the
fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and
purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself
was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the
youth in particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the
existing social and governmental institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the
underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony,
as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have
justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the
people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of
what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the
plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the
imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other
departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the
Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof.
Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful
change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional
Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling
provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not
without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is
warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the
complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave
divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises.
The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely
passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of the
utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in the
manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and
to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter.
Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no
alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate
departments of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress
pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal
operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all
subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is
subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the
process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the
most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and
which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable
aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A
constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and
prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate
without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent
conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily
mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last
for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated
against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with
them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such
limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they
may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the
Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to
whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and
as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the
view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the
lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and
as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh,
We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis
of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by
the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is
the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose
We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or
a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that
Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,"
thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is
as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only
because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on
the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and
national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can
have any part which is out of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the
people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an
integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for
themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an
amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment
in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is
evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of
the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it
impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the
reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot
nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can
he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be
minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who
can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the
country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical
ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of
which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide
the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other
parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly
started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of
Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the
rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole
purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by
the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in
Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass
judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people
under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being
complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and
separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of
the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the
ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are
only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other
amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,
Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said
organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.




















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J .:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the
plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the
Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor
General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase
the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall
have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from
each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of
respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Association hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA
were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be
deferred until after a substantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission on Elections,
1
which was expected to decide it any
time, and whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on
the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review
bycertiorari of the resolution of the Commission on Elections
2
dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on
November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a
class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer
denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would
appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the
merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit
and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito.
3
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was
allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in
the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in
operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of
rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
4
this Court speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a
respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true
that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
5
this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or
not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for
ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes
vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,
6
Avelino vs. Cuenco,
7
Taada vs. Cuenco,
8
and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.
9
In the first, we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the
latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the
election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House of
Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each
province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of
which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress.
10
It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours
11
to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power.
12
Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, notas members of Congress, but
as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same function,
13
for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid
nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,
14
the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional,
15
despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito,
16
the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part
of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that
purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary.
And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at
best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both that is to say,
propose amendment and call a convention at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be aspecial election, not a general election,
in which officers of the national and local governments such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be
held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and
implications of said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the
several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until
such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the
National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the
Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress
and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually
pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,
17
purporting to make said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the
ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.
18

Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the
Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de
facto officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify,
however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de
facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law.
The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by
law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved
or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of
the expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made
necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.
19
The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the
Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in
1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by
establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution
regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections
scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly
indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that
the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question,
therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the
Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963,
Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and
were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal
provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such
conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats
in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the
view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to
this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in
consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in
1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress with a House of Representatives
composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections remained in force, we can not
see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make
a reapportionment within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,
20
the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main
function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal
or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of
title thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and
Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of
persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the
officer in question is concerned.
21
Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from
them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold,before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands,
even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments.
22
One can imagine this great
inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.
23
It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings.
Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.
24
And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an
indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is
concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein
are not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent withTayko vs. Capistrano.
25
In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before
Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that
the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted
that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge
Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence
of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions
herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the
disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances and none has brought to our attention supporting the
conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the
law warrants it.
26

It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for
ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in
general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R.
B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H.
No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other.
In other words, they were notpassed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to
approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional
session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said
convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this
argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose
thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein,
without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part
of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three
previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval
independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed
amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general elections,
particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite
simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term
"election" used, without qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when we consider: (1)
that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of
the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election.
Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They
opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the
attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent,
impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let
alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The
question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much
as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading
into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be
a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional as ably set forth in the
opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had
practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and
in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling
place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal
native languages, for free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for
amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform
the people of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution
down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto,
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office building and in each polling place not later than the
twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination of the
election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling
place available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as
may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least
fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building
and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein continually
until after the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at
each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior
to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building
and in every polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At
least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be
kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to
the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building
and in every polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified
electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted
therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution
except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand,
said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the
same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for
amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their
opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its
constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or
omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for
ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case,
constitute the minority upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the
substance of said proposals, which is under R. B. H. No. 1 the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from
120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3 the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if
elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We who constitute the minority believe that
Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B.
H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a
careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may
enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and
the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional
Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV
of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they
should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect
the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not theauthority of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth
in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own
sphere. The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls
within the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act
No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No
product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe,
however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the
petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of jurisdiction.





























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS
REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said
Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226
dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before
and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression
and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and
necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent
punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision, as follows:
Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities. Except to the extent that the same may not be
applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code ('Sections
261, 262, 263 and Article' XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be aplicable to the plebiscite
governed by this Resolution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in
fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
On November 28, 1989, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections from enforcing and implementing
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167. We also required the respondent to comment on the petition.
On January 9, 1990, respondent Commission on Elections, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election
or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or
against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime. This is provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881:
Section 90. Comelec Space. Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province
or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in
said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space
shall be allocated, free of charge equally and impartially within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
Section 92. Comelec Time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the
questioned Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167.
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for
the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Similarly, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) likewise provides:
Prohibited forms of election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: ...
(b) for any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media
to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, or personality who is
a candidate for any elective office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis ours)
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information
to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is acandidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd
par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the
prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was
assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the
electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case
does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in
favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his
views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time,
the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the
forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented
in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they
are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The
restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000
1
(the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
2
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
3
In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in
Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.
4
The President further stated that to heighten police
visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.
5
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
6
Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
7

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
x x x
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in
Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active
and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to
handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of
crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a
sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb
criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security,
although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and
holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is
to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint
NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be organized to provide the mechanism,
structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.
xxx.
8

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall,
Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
9

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF
SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT
(LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS
OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
10

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP
questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,
11
dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the
petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that
petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political
question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of
the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the
Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
13
The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
14
The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
15

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of
the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to
improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.
What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the
questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically
rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this
Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement
of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.
16
In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
17
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
18
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are
under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the
Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-
Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated
provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual
basis for said troop [Marine] deployment."
19

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny
since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court
gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond
the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the
armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare.
20
For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt
of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos
v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter,The American Presidency]. The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
xxx
21

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political
question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.
22
It pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are
"political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or
measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco
23
puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an
issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,
24
"[p]rominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question."
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that "(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
25
Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that
the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being
one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.
26
Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.
27
When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
28

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
29
Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may
look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
30
A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy.
31

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon
to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In
the performance of this Courts duty of "purposeful hesitation"
32
before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
x x x
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced
in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
x x x
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
33
That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call
is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out
such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can
impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We
are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of
calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: "The President may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: "The
President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for handling
imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the
Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.
34

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide
latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the
evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as
highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the
present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the
calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by
an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth
the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can
show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that,
"[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila..."
35
We do not doubt the veracity of
the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in
the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the
exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3, Article II
36
of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, whi ch sufficiently provides the metes
and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.
37
Under
the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.
38
It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines.
39
It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers.
40
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
41

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has
been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually
participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no
"insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals
that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both
the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:
1. Elections;
42

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
43

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
44

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
45

5. Development of the culture and the arts;
46

6. Conservation of natural resources;
47

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
48

8. Enforcement of customs laws;
49

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
50

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
51

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;
52

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
53

13. Sanitary inspections;
54

14. Conduct of census work;
55

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
56

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
57

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
58

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and, yet, never before questioned.
59
What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted,
60
and whose
Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed
under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act
61
of the US, the use
of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or
the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
62

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US courts
63
apply the following standards, to
wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel
subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
64
George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433
(1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. Seelikewise
HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152,
1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?
x x x
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the
Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those
claiming relief.1wphi1 A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law
enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court
agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A
65
does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do
not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,
66
8(k)
67
and 9(a)
68
of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or
condemn. In No. 9(d)
69
of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply
no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)
70
of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The
conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.
71

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril
our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces.
Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his
authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the
calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have
been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the
joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not
when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal
courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in
the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it
was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each
of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each
of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for
the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report
to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to
law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules
1
approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following
tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment.
Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof or by a verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings
Deemed Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such
official are deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against such
official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated at the time of the filing of
such verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within the period of one
(1) year.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
Impeachment Proceedings. Within a
period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same official. (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
2
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
4
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
5
of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
6
The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
7
and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
8
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
9
but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
10
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
11
was filed with the Secretary General of the House
12
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"
14
posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had
been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House
of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which
are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted
the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment
trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the
cases of Chavez v. PCGG
15
and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
16
prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an
order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment
complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from
taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen,
taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class
suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran
17
which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with
the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the
time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the
Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives
does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of
Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings
arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,
18
prayed for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,
petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the
Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be
formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,
19
and as reflected above,
to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28,
2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court
directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae.
20
In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their
behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of
special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally
mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela)
21
and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment
cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."
22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is
concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles
of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in
a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261.
On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R.
Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it
should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue
of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
J udicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment
complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission
23
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as
they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
24
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts
25
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which
is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."
26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison
27
that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.
28
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.
29
And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,
30
the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
31
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
32
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement
of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control between them."
33
To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of
intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation."
34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of
its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
x x x
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in
a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because
the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass
upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request
an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x
x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
35
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-
settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
36
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.
37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
38
in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
39
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
40
where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
41
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,
42
this Court, through Chief
Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.
43
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
44
this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
45
(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.
46
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings
from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases
48
(1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.
49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.
50
Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.
51
Respondents likewise
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers
upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,
52
"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."
53
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower
courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power
to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation,
54
our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
55
provides for
several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution
did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr,
57
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez
58
and Alejandrino v. Quezon,
59
cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond
the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,
60
this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,
61
in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,
62
this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.
In Coseteng v. Mitra,
63
it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,
64
it held that
the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v.
Cuenco,
65
it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,
66
it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system
of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."
67
Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for J udicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
68
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained
and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest
70
and transcendental importance,
71
and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.
72
Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts
will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure
73
while
the latter has constitutional underpinnings.
74
In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato
75
to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is
the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can
maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper
role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
x x x
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"
76
(Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were
supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by
this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show,
not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.
77
In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
78
the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
79
Before he can invoke
the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
81
This Court opts to grant standing to most of
the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.
82
Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.
83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,
84
especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will
affect their vital interests,
85
the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
86
It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned
87
to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,
88
for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the class, is, under theres judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.
89
Where it
clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court,
G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No.
160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of
a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
90
Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein
are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.
91
Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence
of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does
not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.
92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since,
save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been
interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking
their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional
issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with
Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the
Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed.
For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,
93
to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege
that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that
there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
94
(Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in
public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,
95
this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."
96
Only then may the courts pass on
the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance
with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried
out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga
opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway.
He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the
same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution
97
and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer
their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact
that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted
Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
J usticiability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,
98
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in
the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
99
(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of
cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its
power of judicial review.
100
In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
101
Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana
v. Executive Secretary
102
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question
doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application
on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions
or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers
without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a
number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have
no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission
who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any
story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under
mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our
very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In
17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The
draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a
plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on
which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its
approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve
of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes
cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring
that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government was
that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
x x x
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that
all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places
of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the
only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
x x x
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a
political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a
husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such
are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There
are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme
Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of
that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the
judiciary.
103
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also
in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial
power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.
104
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction
over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,
105
this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
106
x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
107
through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."
108
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,
109
speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
110
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification
of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr
111
attempts to
provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
112
(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each
in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement
of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any
discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is
a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.
113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of
public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no
better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of
both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.
114
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in
the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,
115
this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.
116
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
117
where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
118
[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."
119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution
120
calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.
121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's
ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee,
122
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not be compelled to testify against one's self.
123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy
the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are
alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement
which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro
and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"
124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be
76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a
resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of
the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
J udicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try
and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."
125
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not
legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."
126
Otherwise, this Court
would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound
to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
127
In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty
which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because
no other office has the authority to do so.
128
On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."
129
After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of
their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest
or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."
130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.
131
In that
case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of
an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,
132
it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of
its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the
one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his
or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.
133
(Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,
134
this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA
135
as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can
be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead
to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest
in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.
137
Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court
to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional
crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional
duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon
the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-
validation, follows."
138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary
139
where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to
sustain respondent's claims,"
140
the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner
and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, towit:
141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do
not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in
that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not
possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of
this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the
Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant
petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any
doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and
that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is
the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of
the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee.
Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that
initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there
have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner
Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on
the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only
have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the
Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the
resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee
on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of
the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with
me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete
the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings"and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the
phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section
will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really
starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a
matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only
in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.
143
(Italics
in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.
144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained
that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an
action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
x x x
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object
in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from
the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that
the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several
steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of
the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold
it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is
the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House
is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line
on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
146
Thus the line was deleted
and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation,
this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is
ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and
not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the
term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of
Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino
147
wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the
Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention
to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.
148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the
1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its
rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report
to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then
it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,
149
this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of
what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,
150
Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,
151
declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,
152
quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
153
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It
is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia,
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even
more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the
principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of
power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of
this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the
House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods
the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their
own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for
judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining
Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
154

x x x
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this
enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded
from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.
155

x x x
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly,
the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.
156

x x x
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x
x x x
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what itmust do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us
to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy,
orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving
the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
157
(Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the
Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US
158
as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the
issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with
their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate
any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and
argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the
subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-
interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the
Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its
exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face
thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem
head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy,
is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge
by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of
this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting
legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment
according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as
tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when
one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential
to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above
the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important
that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.




















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner
Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can
enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can
no longer be reopened.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest that the two, in joining the
dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law. They cite the following statement in
the opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners' standing
and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any
subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the membership of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and
Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the
maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two new appointees, regardless
of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of
necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second
lotto case." And petitioners ask, "why should it be so?"
Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip where none exists, may be
more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which they can impute to some members of the Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain rather than to justify the majority's decision to overrule the ruling in the
previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be
barred by stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some ulterior motives on the part of the new majority in
reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of the Court at the time they
dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees
with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it
was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
made a " formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement that would be in
conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line,
hi-tech lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of the features which made the first contract
objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which
was received on May 6, 1994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with the authority of PCSO under its
charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its
Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" but only a manifestation that the parties were not filing a motion for reconsideration. Even if the parties
made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of
standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case
was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of
the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was erroneousand no legal doctrine stood in the way
of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of change in the membership of a court. In 1957, this
Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in 2174 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the date of the election. On the
other hand, the dissenters argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed office.
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated under oath in her certificate of
candidacy that she was eligible for that position although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumed office. The question was
whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court ruled she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice,
Benison, who dissented in the first case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that while the statement that the accused
was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority in the Feliciano case," the accused could not be held liable for falsification, because
the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of the election or whether it was
sufficient that they attained it at the beginning of the term of office] has not been discussed anew, despite the presence of new
members; we simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the retirement of two members (Recess and Flex, JJ.) who
had taken part in the decision in the first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David, JJ.) and the fact that the vote in the
first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its ruling in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it
gave the accused the benefit of the doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she
assumed office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were noted without anyone much less would-be
psychoanalysts finding in the statement of the Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a result of change in membership was
accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision. This was the lesson of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall.
457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks) legal tender for the payment of debts, public
or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting debts, was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869).
The Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3,
the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices
Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and
infirm member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote
was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts invalid.
On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancy caused by the
resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases,
as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving
members of the former majority. There were allegations that the new Justices were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender
Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn
case by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one
of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds."
1

We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest, applicable to private
litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional
policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for
striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's
organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, 16), grants them standing
to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:
Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and thepromotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Id., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only
provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently
with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the
PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegalper se. . . . It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which
they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The
Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the
democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the
judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art.
VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the
political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the provisions on independent
people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the speech points the way to
the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than to the courts, as the appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners'
views.
2
Indeed, the provisions on independent people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and
referendum as a means whereby the people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For the fact is that petitioners'
opposition to the contract in question is nothing more than an opposition to the government policy on lotteries.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount public
interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional
issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110
Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47
SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630
[1994])Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21
SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be settled
early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965);
Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA
659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995
(Mendoza,J., concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners
allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC
(see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial
review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is
vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis added)
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to question government contracts regardless of
whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit seeking the
annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case was dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court
on the grounds of res judicata and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by the government with a foreign
corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed, but even if it was, petitioner's standing could
be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank, which was one of the defendants in the case.
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were allowed to sue to question
the validity of a contract entered into by the city government for the purchase of road construction equipment because their contention was that the
contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an
appropriation made by law.
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that of Gonzales
v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of the Philippines were not
public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the President of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by
them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain
of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition questioning another form of lottery conducted by the PCSO
on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a "citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children," had no direct and personal interest in the
lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute complained of." In the case at bar, petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they should be accorded
standing to bring this suit.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of timber licenses was
sustained in that case because the Court considered Art. II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts. That provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such categorization.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral. This is not,
however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not stopped there and dismissed their case. For in the view
we take, whether a party has a cause of action and, therefore, is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional question must turn
on whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason the Court has not ducked the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:
1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office,
shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services
and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be
determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related investments, programs,
projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for
the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing
ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private
sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)"
in paragraph (B) of 1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law of this case because the parties are the same and the case involves the same
issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory provision.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one. Petitioners also say that inquiry into the same
question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment,"
however, is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially different claims.
This is generally accepted in American law from which our Rules of Court was adopted. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210
(1979); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, 28; P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2 [3rd Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that this exception is
inapplicable in this jurisdiction.
Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are substantially different from those involved in the prior case
between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first case.
Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any other party" qualifies not only 1 (B) but also 1 (A), because the exception clause ("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph
[A]") "operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the
text of Section 1(A)."
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that
been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under paragraph (B), the PCSO is prohibited from
"engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs, projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities not only "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party but also "by itself." Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts
these activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit.
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph
(B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments, programs, projects and
activities for the purpose of raising funds for health programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such investments by the PCSO should "not
compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority."
Justice Davide, then an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill they were discussing concerned
the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. The following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the
subject of the discussion:
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the amendment is not to leave the determination of
whether it is adequate or not to anybody. And my amendment is to add after "adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a mater of fact, it will strengthen the authority to invest in
these areas, provided that the determination of whether the private sector's activity is already adequate must be determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority.
Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. 6, 1979,
p. 1007)
Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is
prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." This seems to be the only possible interpretation
of 1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. That there is today no other entity engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does
not detract from the validity of this interpretation.
III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been
removed in the new contract. For instance, 5 of the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the PCSO must employ "its own competent
and qualified personnel." Petitioners claim, however, that the "contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite
the testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery
system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of technology.
Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not by what some officials of the
PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that 5 reflects the true intention of the parties. Thus, Art.
1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulations shall control." The intention of the parties must be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts." (Art. 1371; Atlantic
Gulf Co. v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. On the other hand, the claim of third
parties, like petitioners, that the clause on upgrading of equipment would enable the parties after a while to change the contract and enter into something
else in violation of the law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity of the contract.
IV. It is contended that 1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment to the
government or to any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale. Consequently, a lease of equipment,
like the ELA, must be submitted to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on two premises: (1) that 1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to
any contract whereby the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are
distinct from each other so that when an exception in 1 speaks of "supplies," it cannot be construed to mean "equipment."
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in paragraph (a), which provides that a contract for the furnishing
of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is construed to include "equipment," however, the lease of
heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity will have to be submitted to public bidding before it can be entered into by the
government.
In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to expropriation, paying compensation afterward. This is just
like purchasing the equipment through negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by public bidding, not to mention the fact that
the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the government can very well negotiate with private owners.
Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, 1 covers both contracts of sale and lease agreements and
(2) that the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus, under paragraph (b) of 1, public bidding is not required
"whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service."
Following petitioners' theory, there should be a public bidding before the government can enter into a contract for the lease of bulldozers and dredging
equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by lahar because, first, lease contracts are covered by the general rule and, second, the
exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only "supplies" but not equipment.
To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies under procurement have
been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant
or nonconforming to specifications." Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a contract for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if
there are no bids because, first, lease contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding and, second, the exception to public bidding in
paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting 1 as applicable to any contract for the furnishing of supplies, materials and
equipment and of considering the words "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Our ruling that 1 of E.O. No. 301 does not
cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is supported by the text of 1, which is entitled "Guidelines for Negotiated
Contracts" and by the fact that the only provisions of E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, 6 and 7, concern the lease of buildings by or to the government.
Thus the text of 1 reads:
1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive order or other issuances to the contrary
notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its
branches, agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following
situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of, or danger
to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed
without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have subdealers
selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous
terms to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exhorbitant or non-
conforming to specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated purchase is most
advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head concerned; and
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of reviewing negotiated contracts of purchase for the
furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as well as lease contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298, promulgated on August 12, 1940,
required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head concerned and the approval of the President of the Philippines before
contracts for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment could be made on a negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this
by providing as follows:
2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. In line with the principles of decentralization and accountability, negotiated contracts
for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials or equipment may be entered into by the department or agency head or the
governing board of the government-owned or controlled corporation concerned, without need of prior approval by higher authorities,
subject to availability of funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the audit
jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the Secretary and two other Undersecretaries.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned buildings or spaces for their use, or
to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, shall have authority to determine the reasonableness of the
terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof, and to enter into such lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher
authorities, subject to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the DPWH
and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized representative in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment, and it was merely to change the system of
administrative review of emergency purchases, as theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was issued on July 26, 1987. Part B of this
Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and therefore does not govern the lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does
not require public bidding for entering into it.
Our holding that E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to P.D. No. 526, promulgated on August 2, 1974, which
is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of supplies." By specifying "procurement of
supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases" when made under certain circumstances, P.D. No. 526, 12 indicates quite clearly that it
applies only to contracts of purchase and sale. This provision reads:
12. Procurement without public bidding. Procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of public bidding in the
following modes:
(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) Emergency purchases;
(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and
(5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.
Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including
everything except real estate, which may be needed in the transaction of public business, or in the pursuit of
any undertaking, project, or activity, whether of the nature of equipment, furniture, stationery, materials for
construction, or personal property of any sort, including non-personal or contractual services such as the repair
and maintenance of equipment and furniture, as well as trucking, hauling, janitorial, security, and related or
analogous services.
Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, 1 and of P.D. No. 526, 1 and 12, make it clear that only contracts for the purchase and sale of supplies,
materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule concerning public biddings.
Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts of purchase and sale because of "multifarious
credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously these credit and tax constraints
can have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of sale over lease of equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in
common use is not a reason for implying that the rule on public bidding applies not only to government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the
fact also is that the government leases equipment, such as copying machines, personal computers and the like, without going through public bidding.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built houses, provided health
care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to
country. They have provided the dynamic human link between cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand not
only how much international migration impacts development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect.
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
Global Forum on Migration and Development
Brussels, July 10, 2007
1

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
2
to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by
unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs'
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the December 8, 2004 Decision
3
and April 1, 2005 Resolution
4
of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject clause unconstitutional.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
5

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.
6

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
7
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
8

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May
26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23)
days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint
9
against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total
amount of US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
May 27/31, 1998 (5
days) incl. Leave
pay
US$ 413.90
June 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
July 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
August 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Sept. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Oct. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Nov. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Dec. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
Jan. 01/31, 1999 2,590.00
Feb. 01/28, 1999 2,590.00
Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19
days) incl. leave
pay
1,640.00
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25,382.23
Amount adjusted to
chief mate's salary

(March 19/31, 1998
to April 1/30, 1998)
+
1,060.50
10

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL CLAIM US$ 26,442.73
11

as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and
severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainants salary for three (3) months of the unexpired
portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.1avvphi1
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00),
12
representing the complainants claim
for a salary differential. In addition, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at
the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, the complainants (petitioner's) claim for attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the total amount awarded to the aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
13
(Emphasis supplied)
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months only -- rather
than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject clause. However, the
LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime
pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month."
14

Respondents appealed
15
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.
Petitioner also appealed
16
to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
17
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of
their contracts.
18

In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally, in
Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00

3. 10% Attorneys fees 424.50
TOTAL US$4,669.50
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
19

The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for
vacation leave pay."
20

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause.
21
The NLRC denied the
motion.
22

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
23
with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.
24
After initially dismissing the
petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
25

His Motion for Reconsideration
26
having been denied by the CA,
27
petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving
similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three
(3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is
submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore
determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which
unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from
petitioners award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.
28

On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary
award for his medical treatment and medication.
29
Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution
of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the constitutional question be resolved.
30

Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential
of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by
reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of
three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is
entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.
31

The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their
overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package.
32
It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it
treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case
of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate
treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups;
33
and that it defeats Section 18,
34
Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.
35

Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of
illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected OFWs.
36

Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is
not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their
obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in
deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
37
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the
provision makes foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign employers are
liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum
salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages they have to give their employees they have illegally
dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the
illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be
more than three (3) months.
38

Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to
under his fixed-period employment contract.
39

The Arguments of Respondents
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by
petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.
40

The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)
41
points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
42

Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary
benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local
workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire
jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission
43
and
Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,
44
OFWs are contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local
workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not
available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money
claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the
Constitution.
45

Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement
agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement
agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions."
46

The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these
conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;
47
(2) that the
constitutional question is raised by a proper party
48
and at the earliest opportunity;
49
and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the
case,
50
otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.
51

Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the
CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as provided under the subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity
entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before acompetent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that
competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
52
Records disclose that the
issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration
with said labor tribunal,
53
and reiterated in his Petition forCertiorari before the CA.
54
Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is
not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-
judicial function its function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be
applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself;
55
thus, its foremost function is to administer and
enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the
power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause.
56
Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the
CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at the very core
of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?
The answer is in the negative.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive
57
is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation,
58
and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected;
59
however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.
60
Thus, the non-
impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties.
Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be
employed.
61
Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior
and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
62

Does the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18,
63
Article II and Section 3,
64
Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of
their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
65

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of
the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.
66

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis
scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;
67
b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification
is at least substantially related to serving that interest;
68
and c) strict judicial scrutiny
69
in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right
70
or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class
71
is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is
upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.
72

Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications
73
based on race
74
or gender
75
but not when the classification
is drawn along income categories.
76

It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
77
the
constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for
maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of other GFIs had been
exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the
Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in this
case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy, to wit:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in
American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a
people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and
such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be
construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct
and different from others.
x x x x
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest
against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development,"
further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the
Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches
but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
x x x x
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to
Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
x x x x
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank
- possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of
job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment . This is in accord with the policy of
the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of
life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
(Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts ofone year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more
As pointed out by petitioner,
78
it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
79
(Second Division, 1999) that the
Court laid down the following rules on the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e.,
whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident
from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three months."To follow petitioners thinking
that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some
words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care
should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in
the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
80
(Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months
and 6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and
Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations Commission(Second Division, October 1998),
81
which involved an OFW who was
awarded a two-year employment contract,but was dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and
awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to
SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid
his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.
82

Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division, December 1998),
83
which involved an OFW
(therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract, which was deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving
for one year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the following cases:
Case Title Contract
Period
Period of
Service
Unexpired Period Period Applied in the
Computation of the
Monetary Award
Skippers v.
Maguad
84

6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
Bahia Shipping v.
Reynaldo Chua
85

9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
Centennial
Transmarine v. dela
Cruz l
86

9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Talidano v. Falcon
87
12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Univan v. CA
88
12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Oriental v. CA
89
12 months more than 2
months
10 months 3 months
PCL v. NLRC
90
12 months more than 2
months
more or less 9 months 3 months
Olarte v. Nayona
91
12 months 21 days 11 months and 9 days 3 months
JSS v.Ferrer
92
12 months 16 days 11 months and 24
days
3 months
Pentagon v.
Adelantar
93

12 months 9 months and 7
days
2 months and 23 days 2 months and 23 days
Phil. Employ v.
Paramio, et al.
94

12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired portion
Flourish Maritime v.
Almanzor
95

2 years 26 days 23 months and 4 days 6 months or 3 months for
each year of contract
Athenna Manpower
v. Villanos
96

1 year, 10
months and 28
days
1 month 1 year, 9 months and
28 days
6 months or 3 months for
each year of contract
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract.
The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month
contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for
about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs
involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were
awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary
rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both
commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause,
OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only
US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14
months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on J uly 14,
1995,
97
illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:
Case Title Contract Period Period of
Service
Unexpired
Period
Period Applied in the
Computation of the
Monetary Award
ATCI v. CA, et al.
98
2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
Phil. Integrated v.
NLRC
99

2 years 7 days 23 months and 23
days
23 months and 23 days
JGB v. NLC
100
2 years 9 months 15 months 15 months
Agoy v. NLRC
101
2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
EDI v. NLRC, et
al.
102

2 years 5 months 19 months 19 months
Barros v. NLRC, et
al.
103

12 months 4 months 8 months 8 months
Philippine
Transmarine v.
Carilla
104

12 months 6 months and 22
days
5 months and 18
days
5 months and 18 days
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries
multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs
based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and
subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof,
whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than One Year
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court now has misgivings on the accuracy of
the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases
"every year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time.
105
Corollarily, that "every year" is
but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be
no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever
would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause
"for three (3) months forevery year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original contract period as held
in Marsaman,
106
but the length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the
contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who
are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those
who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited
to their salaries for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who
each have a 24-month contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th
month. Considering that there is at least 12 months remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the
latter's monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the
contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired term of the contract. On the other
hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be
entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis--vis Local Workers
With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This
uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.
107

The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299 of the Code of Commerce (1888),
108
to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks and employees should have been made of a fixed period, none of the
contracting parties, without the consent of the other, may withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the termination of the period agreed upon.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and damage suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained in the following
articles.
In Reyes v. The Compaia Maritima,
109
the Court applied the foregoing provision to determine the liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge
of its managers prior to the expiration of their fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the shipping company liable for the salaries of its managers
for the remainder of their fixed-term employment.
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code of Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged
until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused
to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie,
110
in
which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,
111
Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889,
to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without
sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan
112
read the disjunctive "or" in Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local
workers who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel
de France Company.
113
And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on
Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On
the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay
114
held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence,
that when an employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind in the same community, for the purpose of
reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an
effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and that other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an employee
is wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment his prima facie damage is the amount which he would be entitled to had he continued in such
employment until the termination of the period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98
Mich., 43.)
115
(Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3,
Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.
116
Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code
of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged.
However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,
117
the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying
Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment
contract was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect.
118

More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally
terminated, such as in First Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople,
119
involving seafarers who were illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and
Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
120
an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration of her fixed-period
employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same ruling
in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission,
121
which involved a foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who
was illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job -- the Court awarded him salaries corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of his
contract. In Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
122
a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola was
awarded his salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,
123
an OFW whose 12-month contract was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled to his salaries for
the remaining 10 months of his contract.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-
term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict
judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.
124
It is akin
to the paramount interest of the state
125
for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or
maintaining medical standards,
126
or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
127

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting
the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest of
local placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay."
128

The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is
not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their
obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in
deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement
agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane
conditions.
129
(Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of its perception of the state interest sought to be served by the
subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which
the law originated;
130
but the speech makes no reference to the underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of
the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any and all claims under this Section shall be joint and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money claims exclusive of damages under this Section shall not be less than fifty
percent (50%) of such money claims: Provided, That any installment payments, if applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or voluntary settlement
shall not be more than two (2) months. Any compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null and void.
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided under this Section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the
following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld
until the said official complies therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such official may have incurred under other
existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the computation of money claims.
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted and eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042. The Court examined the rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral Conference Committee (Conference Committee)
Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs (Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However, the Court finds no
discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action
that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private
businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are
mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes
administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine
agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of
their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection.1avvphi1
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective
that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3,
131
Article XIII of the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing,
132
there are some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII being one,
133
particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
134
has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are
automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to
guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security
of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor
against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment-a utopian notion,
doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed
rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent
legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable rightto stave off the dismissal of an
employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions
on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.
135
(Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be
declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad
a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the
status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to
being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it
was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the
challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection -- such as the
working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the
significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause.
Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him
of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.
136

The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in
case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is
nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is
an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1,
137
Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
On the Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any
work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary
award, unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods. As the Court held in Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,
138

However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission,
to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman
could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees
the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual
service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.


























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 131124 March 29, 1999
OSMUNDO G. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PURISIMA, J .:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1997, which set
aside the Amended Decision dated December 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 94-3078, and dismissed the petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against the respondents.
The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the present are as follows:
On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by the then President Fidel V.
Ramos. He was assigned in Manila, from November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994, and in Makati, from March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994.
On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules
and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance, to wit:
A. Issuance of Letters of Authority (LA's) to investigate taxpayers despite the ban on investigations as ordered
in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 31-93. In numerous cases, revenue officers whose names appeared in the
LA's as investigating officers were unaware that such LA's were issued to them. He issued LA's to favored
revenue examiners such as his Secretary, Natividad Feliciano;
B. Termination of tax cases without the submission of the required investigation reports, thus exempting the
same from examination and review;
C. Terminated cases with reports were submitted directly to and approved by respondent Umali without being
reviewed by the Assistant Division, thus eliminating the check and balance mechanism designed to guard
against abuses or errors;
D. Unlawful issuance of LA's to taxpayers who were thereafter convinced to avail of the BIR's compromise and
abatement program under RMO's 45093 and 54-93, for which the taxpayers were made, for a monetary
consideration, to pay smaller amounts in lieu of being investigated;
E. Despite the devolution of the authority to issue LA's from Regional Directors to the Revenue District Officers
under RMO 26-94, dated April 14, 1994, respondent Umali continued to issue antedated LA's in absolute
defiance of the aforesaid issuance, using old LA's requisitioned by him when still Regional Director of San Pablo
Region. In one instance, he issued a termination letter bearing the San Pablo Region letterhead even when he
was already Makati Regional Director; and
F. In his attempt to cover up his tracks and to muddle the real issue of his violations of the ban in the issuance
of LA's and basic revenue rules and regulations, respondent enlisted the support of other regional directors for
the purposes of questioning particularly the devolution/centralization of the functions of the Bureau.
1

On August 2, 1994, upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President Ramos authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive
suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC),
for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. In its Order, dated August 9, 1994, the PCAGC directed him to send in his answer, copies of his
Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the
PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required Answer.
On August 25, 1994, petitioner appeared with his lawyer. Atty. Bienvenido Santiago before the PCAGC. Counsel for the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue submitted a Progress Report, dated August 24, 1994, on the audit conducted on the petitioner. As prayed for, petitioner and his lawyer were
granted five (5) days to file a supplemental answer.
The hearing was reset to August 30, 1994, during which the parties were given a chance to ask clarificatory questions. Petitioner and his counsel did not
ask any question on the genuineness and authenticity of the documents attached as annexes to the Complaint. Thereafter, the parties agreed to submit
the case for resolution upon the presentation of their respective memoranda.
Petitioner filed his Memorandum on September 6, 1994 while the BIR sent in its Memorandum on the following day.
After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the
twelve (12) charges against petitioner, to wit:
1. On the First Charge Respondent issued 176 Letters of Authority in gross disobedience to and in violation
of RMOs 31-93 and 27-94.
xxx xxx xxx
3. On the Third Charge There is sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of falsification of official documents
as defined in Art. 171, par. 2 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, against the respondent for the issuance of 9
LA's and who did not investigate the tax cases, each LA being a separate offense.
xxx xxx xxx
7. On the Seventh Charge There is sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of falsification of official
documents against respondent for antedating the four LA's cited in the charge, each LA constituting a separate
offense, under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
8. On the Ninth (sic) Charge There is sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of falsification of an
official document under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code against the respondent in the tax case of
Richfield International Corp., Inc. for indicating a false date on the letter of termination he issued to the
company. There is, however, insufficient evidence against respondent in the other tax case of Jayson Auto
Supply Co.
9. On the Ninth Charge There is sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of falsification of official documents
in each of the two cases cited in his charge, under the provisions of Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
the dates of Termination Letters were false.
10. On the Tenth Charge Respondent, by his own admission, violated RMO 36-87 requiring turn over of all
properties and forms to his successor upon transfer as head of office, and RMO 27-94 requiring the surrender
of all unused old forms of Letters of Authority. The Commission noted the defiant attitude of respondent, as
expressed in his admission, towards valid and legal orders of the BIR, and his propensity to defy and ignore
such orders and regulations.
2

xxx xxx xxx
On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner
from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
On October 24, 1994, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his dismissal but the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration on
November 28, 1994.
On December 1, 1994, petitioner brought a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3079 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, alleging, among others:
I. That the petitioner was suspended and dismissed from the service in violation of his constitutional right to due
process of law; and
II. That the constitutional right of the petitioner to security of tenure was violated by the respondents.
The case was raffled off to Branch 133 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati, which issued on December 2, 1994, a Temporary Restraining Order,
enjoining the respondents and/or their representatives from enforcing Administrative Order No. 152, and directing the parties to observe the status
quo until further orders from the said Court.
On December 23, 1994, the said Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. On January 10, 1995, the petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration,
this time, theorizing that the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the
investigation against him.
Respondents submitted their Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration. Then, the petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Inoturan on the
ground that the latter was formerly a Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General and could not be expected to decide the case with utmost impartiality.
The case was then re-raffled to Hon. Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr. who, on December 13, 1995, handed down an Amended Decision, granting the petition and
practically reversing the original Decision.
Not satisfied with the Amended Decision of Judge Guadiz, Jr., the respondents appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals.
On April 8, 1997, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals
3
promulgated its decision, reversing the Amended Decision of the trial court of origin, and
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-3079. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied on October 28, 1997.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the petition under scrutiny.
In the interim that the administrative and civil cases against the petitioner were pending, the criminal aspect of such cases was referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for investigation.
On July 25, 1995, after conducting the investigation, Ombudsman Investigators Merba Waga and Arnulfo Pelagio issued a Resolution finding a probable
cause and recommending the institution in the courts of proper jurisdiction criminal cases for Falsification of Public Documents (13 counts) and Open
Disobedience (2 counts) against the petitioner.
However, acting upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration Special Prosecution Officer II Lemuel M. De Guzman set aside the said Resolution of July
25, 1995, and in lieu thereof, dismissed the charges against petitioner, in the Order dated November 5, 1996, which was approved by Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto. Accordingly, all the Informations against the petitioner previously sent to the Office of the City Prosecutor, were recalled.
On August 10, 1998, Commissioner Beethoven L. Rualo of the Bureau of Internal Revenue sent a letter to the Solicitor General informing the latter that
"the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case against Atty. Osmundo Umali" on the basis of the comment and
recommendation submitted by the Legal Department of the BIR.
4

Petitioner raised the issues:
1. WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152 VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE;
2. WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 152;
3. WHETHER THE PCAGC IS A VALIDLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND WHETHER
PETITIONER CAN RAISE THE ISSUE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY BELATEDLY IN ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION; AND
5. WHETHER IN THE LIGHT OF THE OMBUDSMAN RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST
PETITIONER, THERE IS STILL BASIS FOR PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL WITH FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS
AS RULED IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152.
Petitioner contends that as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue he belongs to the Career Executive Service. Although a Presidential
appointee under the direct authority of the President to discipline, he is a career executive service officer (CESO) with tenurial protection, who can only
be removed for cause. In support of this theory, petitioner cited the case of Larin vs. Executive Secretary
5
where the Court held:
. . . petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he
comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the settled principle that the "power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint" conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. . . . This power of removal,
however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. . . .
Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that
career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said
law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove
him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of
tenurial protection, thus, may only removed for cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987,
6
loss of
confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his
right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized.
After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues. To be sure, petitioner was not
denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged
violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his
protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis.
Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of
Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary
support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His
failure to do so is fatal.
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
How about the fourth issue, whether in view of the Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against petitioner, there still remains a basis
for the latter's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits, as directed in Administrative Order No. 152?
It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal
case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal
charges before the Ombudsman.
In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the issues posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding
and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in
the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and
unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the
position taken by the Solicitor General,
7
that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events
that cannot be overlooked.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby
GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, Administrative Order No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.




















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108399 July 31, 1997
RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION
SUPERVISORS composed of Atty. RUBEN M. RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA RUSTIA,
in her capacity as Director of the Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO, Budget Officer EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of the
City Government of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN NOEL T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ,
LOURDES ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS, MA. ALBERTINA RICAFORT, and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE WILFREDO D.
REYES, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Metro Manila, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 36),
1
nullifying an order of
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on
December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first elections for the
SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, seven (7) members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section
532(a) provides that the first elections for the SK shall be held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took effect on January 1, 1992.
The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27, 1992, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution
No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992 The guidelines placed the SK elections under
the direct control and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC.
2
After two postponements, the elections were finally
scheduled on December 4, 1992.
Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363 youngsters, aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them
filing certificates of candidacies. The City Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.
On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-resolution "exemption" the City of Manila from
holding elections for the SK on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first under the newly-enacted
Local Government Code. The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila and a member of City
Council of Manila, which called attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang
Kabataan) had previously been held on May 26, 1990. In its resolution, the DILG stated:
[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang
Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and
January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to coincide with
the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.
On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and Local Government had no
power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution in question denied them the equal
protection of the laws.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman, Bernardo P. Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering
petitioners "to desist from implementing the order of the respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until further orders of the Court." On the
same day, he ordered petitioners "to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement Resolution No. 2499 dated August 27, 1992 of the
Commission on Elections providing for the holding of a general election of the Sangguniang Kabataan on December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every
barangay throughout the country."
The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the new judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a
decision, holding that (1) the DILG had no power to "exempt" the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX,
C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall" is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect determined that there had been no previous elections
for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the "exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILG's records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held between January 1,
1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held on December 4, 1992.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was
exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides that:
All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sangguniang shall be deemed vacant until such time that
the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That,
elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992
shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the
said period shall be extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. (emphasis added)
They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG has authority to determine whether the City of Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d) so as to
be exempt from holding the elections on December 4, 1992.
The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996
3
rendered this case moot and academic. There are two
questions raised in this case. The first is whether the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can "exempt" a local government unit from holding
elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide that "the Department of Interior and Local
Government shall have direct control and supervision over the election of sangguniang kabataan with the technical assistance by the Commission on
Elections."
We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the
validity of the acts of those elected in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the trial
court and these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
4
For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control
and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such
elections.
In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission to cease
and desist from granting a shipper what the ICC perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage charges. The cease and desist
order was for a period of about two years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to November 15), but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been
able to hand down its decision by the time the cease and desist order expired. The case was decided only on February 20, 1911, more than two years
after the order had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had thereby become moot and the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this
contention, the Court held:
The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at
bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and
at one time the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission without a chance of redress.
5

In Roe v. Wade,
6
petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had
a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at least within the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when she was no longer
pregnant. But the U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. It was explained: "[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact the
litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If
that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification
for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"
7

We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to
determine whether under 532(d) of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK. As already stated,
petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that this is a power which Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the
Constitution vests in the COMELEC. Respondents further argue that, by mandating that elections for the SK be held on December 4, 1992 "in every
barangay," the COMELEC in effect determined that there had been no elections for the KB previously held in the City of Manila.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG.
Contrary to respondents' contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power
to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Elections for SK
officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials
do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,
8
it was contended that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different
from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which
explicitly provides that "it shall govern all elections of public officers", and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the
COMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for in Section 2(1),
Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of
the 1987 Administrative Code.
9

Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contest involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws
in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six
sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers
referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial
courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional
Trial Courts.
xxx xxx xxx
In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the
Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay officials. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not
make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang
barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and
who are duly registered voters of the barangay.
10

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative policy evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684
(April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the "Secretary of Local Government
and Community Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this
Decree." Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421 of the President of the Philippines, in calling for the general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July
13-14, 1985, tasked the then Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and the Commission on Elections to assist the
Kabataang Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in a Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino
directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue the necessary rules and regulations for effecting the representation of the Kabataang Barangay,
among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local government units.
The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means inconsequential. DILG supervision was to be exercised within the
framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to perform was the
enforcement of the rules.
Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the barangays which, because they had conducted kabataang
barangay elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4, 1992. That these
barangays were precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the DILG to supervise the conduct of the
elections. Since 532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials whose term of office was extended beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the
conduct of elections in that year must necessarily be deemed to include the authority to determine which kabataang barangay would not be included in
the 1992 elections.
The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had
been held in a given kabataang barangay. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4, 1992 since by virtue
of 532(d) the term of office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was "extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those
elected under [the Local Government Code of 1991]." In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government was to act merely as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.
11
There was no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. That this is constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases.
12

Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void because (a) they were called at the instance of then Mayor
Gemiliano C. Lopez who did not have authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.
The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated
April 25, 1990 stated:
WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, has been practically dormant since
the advent of the present national administration;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertaking of the government to ensure the participation of all
sectors of our population in the task of nation building;
WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November 1985 yet, which is over their three years term of
office;
WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for under the law;
xxx xxx xxx
The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30, 1990, KB City Federation elections were
conducted.
It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of
the new Local Government Code that the exception clause of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee which
drafted the Code show the following:
13

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!
HON. LINA: . . .
Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in lieu thereof, insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of
the Code. The rationale. . . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?
HON. LINA: It will read as follows: "Provided however, that the Local Government Units which have conducted elections for the Kabataang
Barangay as provided for, in Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, up to the effectivity. . . ."
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word "within," ha, up to. . . .
HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, "within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of
this Code."
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?
HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh, na ginawa, eh.There are five thousand
barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of forty thousand, imaging that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB
Constitution and By-Laws, and they're sitting already, now if we do not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila ng question.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.
Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done
which otherwise would be invalid under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such laws are recognized in this
jurisdiction.
14

Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from the requirement to hold elections for SK officers on
December 4, 1992 would deny the youth voters in those barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondent claim that only in barangays in the City
of Manila, which then numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 there had
already been SK elections held, when, according to petitioners' own evidence, during that period, SK elections had actually been conducted in 5,000
barangays.
Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely showing that there were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB
elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were permitted to hold elections on
December 4, 1992. For one thing, according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9), 568 barangays in the Province of Bulacan did not
have SK elections on December 4, 1992 either, because they already had elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even
assuming that only barangays in Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on December 4, 1992 while the rest of the 5,000 barangays were
allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this fact does not give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays ground for
complaint because what the other barangays did was contrary to law. There is no discrimination here.
In People v. Vera
15
this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal application of its benefits by making its applicability depend
on the decision of provincial governments to appropriate or not to appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers, with the result that those not
disposed to allow the benefits of probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for the salaries of probation officers. The
difference between that case and the one at bar lies in the fact that what youth voters in the other barangays might have been allowed was not a right
which was denied to youth voters in Manila. If those barangays were not entitled to have SK elections on December 4, 1992 but nevertheless were
allowed to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in Manila should similarly have been allowed to conduct elections on December 4, 1992
because the fact was that they already had their own, just two years before on May 26, 1990. Respondents' equal protection argument violates the
dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case filed against petitioner by private respondents
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996
LUIS MALALUAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EVANGELISTA, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:p
Novel is the situation created by the decision of the Commission on Elections which declared the winner in an election contest and awarded damages,
consisting of attorney's fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, unearned salary and other emoluments for the period, from March, 1994 to April, 1995,
en masse denominated as actual damages, notwithstanding the fact that the electoral controversy had become moot and academic on account of the
expiration of the term of office of the Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato.
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction,
seeking the review of the decision en banc
1
of the Commission of Elections (COMELEC) denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision
2
of its
First Division,
3
which reversed the decision
4
of the Regional Trial Court
5
in the election case
6
involving the herein parties. While the Regional Trial
Court had found petitioner Luis Malaluan to be the winner of the elections for the position of Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the
COMELEC, on the contrary, found private respondent Joseph Evangelista to be the rightful winner in said elections.
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato,
in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against petitioner's 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a
winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181
precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of
154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluan's protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC.
Just a day thereafter that is, on February 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an
order, dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of
Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for long, though. In the
herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluan's continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the First Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private respondent to be the
duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision.
Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence.
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has
become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality
7
because expiration of the term of office
contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic.
8

When the appeal from a decision in an election case has already become moot, the case being an election protest involving the office of mayor the term
of which had expired, the appeal is dismissible on that ground, unless the rendering of a decision on the merits would be of practical value.
9
This rule we
established in the case of Yorac vs.Magalona
10
which we dismissed because it had been mooted by the expiration of the term of office of the Municipal
Mayor of Saravia, Negros Occidental. This was the object of contention between the parties therein. The recent case of Atienza vs.Commission on
Elections,
11
however, squarely presented the situation that is the exception to that rule.
Comparing the scenarios in those two cases, we explained:
Second, petitioner's citation of Yorac vs. Magalona as authority for his main proposition is grossly inappropriate and misses the point
in issue. The sole question in that case centered on an election protest involving the mayoralty post in Saravia, Negros Occidental in
the general elections of 1955, which was rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term of office in December, 1959. It
did not involve a monetary award for damages and other expenses incurred as a result of the election protest. In response to the
petitioner's contention that the issues presented before the court were novel and important and that the appeal should not be
dismissed, the Court held citing the same provision of the Rules of Court upon which petitioner staunchly places reliance that
a decision on the merits in the case would have no practical value at all, and forthwith dismissed the case for being moot. That is not
the case here. In contradistinction to Yorac, a decision on the merits in the case at bench would clearly have the practical value of
either sustaining the monetary award for damages or relieving the private respondent from having to pay the amount thus
awarded.
12

Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no
longer exists. However, the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorney's fees, actual
expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en masse denominated as actual damages,
default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of
his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on
the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.
What looms large as the issue in this case is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of
private respondent.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that "actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in
accordance with law."
13
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that "in all election contests the Court may adjudicate damages and attorney's fees as it
may deem just and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has included such claims in his pleadings."
14
This appears to require only that
the judicial award of damages be just and that the same be borne out by the pleadings and evidence The overriding requirement for a valid and proper
award of damages, it must be remembered, is that the same is in accordance with law, specifically, the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to
damages.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that "except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages." The Civil Code further
prescribes the proper setting for allowance of actual or compensatory damages in the following provisions:
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that
are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obliger shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Considering that actual or compensatory damages are appropriate only in breaches of obligations in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts and on the
occasion of crimes and quasi-delicts where the defendant may be held liable for all damages the proximate cause of which is the act or omission
complained of, the monetary claim of a party in an election case must necessarily be hinged on either a contract or a quasi-contract or a tortious act or
omission or a crime, in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory damages.
15
In the absence of any or all of these, "the claimant must be able
to point out a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party"
16
. For instance, the claimant
may cite any of the following provisions of the Civil Code under the chapter on human relations, which provisions create obligations not by contract,
crime or negligence, but directly by law:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. . . .
1
7
Claimed as part of the damages to which private respondent is allegedly entitled to, is P169,456.00 constituting salary and other emoluments from
March, 1994 to April, 1995 that would have accrued to him had there not been an execution of the trial court's decision pending appeal therefrom in the
COMELEC.
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who has been
proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office, is
entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position.
18
We ratiocinated in the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan that:
This is as it should be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events. This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the
person who rendered the service unless the contrary is provided. There is no averment in the complaint that he is linked with any
irregularity vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection
with positions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the
persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein
the contrary rule has been upheld.
19

In his concurring opinion in the same case, however, Justice Padilla equally stressed that, while the general rule is that the ousted elective
official is not obliged to reimburse the emoluments of office that he had received before his ouster, he would be liable for damages in case he
would be found responsible for any unlawful or tortious acts in relation to his proclamation. We quote the pertinent portion of that opinion for
emphasis:
Nevertheless, if the defendant, directly or indirectly, had committed unlawful or tortious acts which led to and resulted in his
proclamation as senator-elect, when in truth and in fact he was not so elected, he would be answerable for damages. In that event
the salary, fees and emoluments received by or paid to him during his illegal incumbency would be a proper item of recoverable
damage.
20

The criterion for a justifiable award of election protest expenses and salaries and emoluments, thus, remains to be the existence of a pertinent
breach of obligations arising from contracts or quasi-contracts, tortious acts, crimes or a specific legal provision authorizing the money claim in
the context of election cases. Absent any of these, we could not even begin to contemplate liability for damages in election cases, except
insofar as attorney's fees are concerned, since the Civil Code enumerates the specific instances when the same may be awarded by the
court.
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
21

Given the aforecited laws, and jurisprudence on the matter at issue, let us now look into the basis of respondent COMELEC for awarding actual
damages to private respondent in the form of reimbursement for attorney's fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and salary and other emoluments
that should have accrued to him from March, 1994 to April, 1995 had the RTC not issued an order for execution pending appeal.
The First Division of the COMELEC ruled on private respondent's claim for actual or compensatory damages in this wise:
. . . under the present legal setting, it is more difficult than in the past to secure an award of actual or compensatory damages either
against the protestant or the protestee because of the requirerments of the law.
In the instant case, however, We are disposed to conclude that the election protest filed by the protestant is clearly unfounded. As
borne out by the results of the appreciation of ballots conducted by this Commission, apparently the protest was filed in bad faith
without sufficient cause or has been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the protestee-appellant for which he incurred expenses.
The erroneous ruling of the Court which invalidated ballots which were clearly valid added more injury to the protestee-appellant.
This would have been bearable since he was able to perfect his appeal to this Commission. The final blow, however, came when
the Court ordered the execution of judgment pending appeal which, from all indications, did not comply with the requirements of
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. There was no good and special reason at all to justify the execution of judgment pending
appeal because the protestee's winning margin was 149 votes while that of the protestant after the Court declared him a winner
was only a margin of 154 votes. Clearly, the order of execution of judgment pending appeal was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
For these reasons, protestee-appellant seeks to recover the following:
1. Actual damages representing attorney's fees for the new counsel who handled the Appeal and the Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals . . . P372,500.00
2. Actual expenses for xerox copying of Appellants Brief and the annexes (14 copies at P1.50 . . . P11,235.00
3. Actual expenses for xerox copying of ballots . . . P3,919.20
4. Actual damages for loss of salary and other emoluments since March 1994 as per attached Certification issued by the Municipal
Account of Kidapawan . . . P96,832.00 (up to October 1994 only)
Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation can be recovered (as actual damages) in the
case of clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding. And, while the case of Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Carlos Tan (91 Phil. 724)
disallowed recovery of salaries and allowances (as damages) from elected officials who were later ousted, under the theory that
persons elected has (sic) a right to compensation during their incumbency, the instant case is different. The protestee-appellant was
the one elected. He was ousted not by final judgment bur by an order of execution pending appeal which was groundless and
issued with grave abuse of discretion. Protestant-appellee occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper and, not having
been elected to the office, but merely installed through a baseless court order, he certainly had no right to the salaries and
emoluments of the office.
Actual damages in the form of reimbursement for attorney's fees (P372,500.00), actual expenses for xerox copies (P15,154.00),
unearned salary and other emoluments from March 1994 to April 1995 or 14 months at P12,104.00 a month (P169,456.00), totalled
P557,110.00. To (sic) this amount, however, P300,000.00 representing that portion of attorney's fees denominated as success fee'
must be deducted this being premised on a contingent event the happening of which was uncertain from the beginning. Moral
damages and exemplary damages claimed are, of course, disallowed not falling within the purview of Section 259 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
It goes without saying that if the protestant-appellee fails to pay the actual damages of P257,110.00, the amount will be assessed,
levied and collected from the bond of P500,000.00 which he put up before the Court as
a condition for the issuance of the order of execution of judgment pending appeal.
22

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision on March 29, 1995. The COMELEC en banc, however, did not find any new matter
substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reconsideration of said decision and accordingly affirmed in toto the
said decision. Hence, this petition raises, among others, the issue now solely remaining and in need of final adjudication in view of the mootness of the
other issues anent petitioner's right to the contested office the term for which has already expired.
We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasi-contract; or tortious act nor
crime that may make him liable for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been "able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a
money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party."
23

We find respondent COMELEC's reasoning in awarding the damages in question to be fatally flawed. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by
the petitioner to be clearly unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming,
ex gratia argumentis, that this is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of
petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the trial court. In other words,
the actuations of the trial court, after the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not, in the absence of clear proof,
make the suit "clearly unfounded" for which the complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and attorney's fees are
concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by respondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having been a clearly
unfounded one under the aforementioned circumstances.
Respondent COMELEC also found the order granting execution of judgment pending appeal to be defective because of alleged non-compliance with the
requirement that there be a good and special reason
24
to justify execution pending appeal. We, however, find that the trial court acted judiciously in the
exercise of its prerogatives under the law in issuing the order granting execution pending appeal. First, it should be noted that the applicability of the
provisions of the Rules of Court, relating to execution pending appeal, has ceased to be debatable after we definitively ruled in Garcia vs.de Jesus
25
that
"Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon good reasons stated in a special
order, may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided by them."
26
It is not disputed that petitioner filed a bond in the
amount of P500,000.00 as required under the Rules of Court.
It is also now a settled rule that "as much recognition should be given to the value of the decision of a judicial body as a basis for the right to assume
office as that given by law to the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers."
2
7
. . . Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume office, subject to future
contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed . . . the board of canvassers is composed of
persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more apt to yield
extraneous considerations . . . the board must act summarily, practically raising (sic) against time, while, on the other hand, the
judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart
from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering judgment . . . .
28

Without evaluating the merits of the trial court's actual appreciation of the ballots contested in the election protest, we note on the face of its
decision that the trial court relied on the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) handwriting experts which findings private
respondent did not even bother to rebut. We thus see no reason to disregard the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
on the part of the trial court judge. Capping this combination of circumstances which impel the grant of immediate execution is the undeniable
urgency involved in the political situation in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. The appeal before the COMELEC would
undoubtedly cause the political vacuum in said municipality to persist, and so the trial court reasonably perceived execution pending appeal to
be warranted and justified. Anyway, the bond posted by petitioner could cover any damages suffered by any aggrieved party. It is true that
mere posting of a bond is not enough reason to justify execution pending appeal, but the nexus of circumstances aforechronicled considered
together and in relation to one another, is the dominant consideration for the execution pending appeal.
29

Finally, we deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking legal sanction. Respondent COMELEC ruled that inapplicable
in the instant case is the ruling in Rodriguez vs. Tan
30
because while in that case the official ousted was the one proclaimed by the COMELEC, in the
instant case, petitioner was proclaimed winner only by the trial court and assumed office by virtue of an order granting execution pending appeal. Again,
respondent COMELEC sweepingly concluded, in justifying the award of damages, that since petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by
the trial court and assumed the functions of the office on the strength merely of an order granting execution pending appeal, the petitioner occupied the
position in an illegal manner as a usurper.
We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right,
31
the petitioner
exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto.
32
It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared
petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the
risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation
made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidate's right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned.
We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a "de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining
thereto"
33
and is thus "legally entitled to the emoluments of the office."
34

To recapitulate, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory damages in
accordance with law. The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if any damage had been suffered by
private respondent due to the execution of judgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is,
damage without injury, or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for
which the law provides no remedy.
35

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. While we uphold the COMELEC decision dated May 5, 1995 that private respondent Joseph
Evangelista is the winner in the election for mayor of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, that portion of the decision is deemed moot and
academic because the term of office for mayor has long expired. That portion of the decision awarding actual damages to private respondent Joseph
Evangelista is hereby declared null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140835 August 14, 2000
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as
Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic
Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as
Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails
the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such, and
to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the
Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays
for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.
On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The
rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner
then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision.
I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order
No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order "to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same."
1
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law.
2
Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he
is totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.
3

It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We agree.
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.
4
Under
E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999.
5
However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive
Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz
SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission
shall submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise
spent the funds allotted to it.
6
Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the
Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks
this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such.
7
Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists.
It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.
8
At this point, any ruling
regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as
the PCCR is concerned.
The question in standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
9
In
assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
10
A citizen acquires standing only if he can
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
11
In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,
12
we denied standing to
petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation, stating that,
in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a
form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held,
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his
rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he
has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest
they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required
to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case since, according to petitioner, the President
has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has
sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that
he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to
enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution.
13
, Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
14
This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP)
and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as the "Omnibus Election Code") requiring radio and
television stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign period.
15
The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not
have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of Congress.
16

Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by
the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,
17
the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential
decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the Court explaining that
...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes.
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as
taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds.
In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as
taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
leaves to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.
18
And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
19
the
Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the
construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a
law.
Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,
20
the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent
Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the public market
entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such
taxpayers suit since "[o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no
public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building."
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is "appropriated" for its
operational expenses "to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President." The relevant provision states -
Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be
sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be
released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. "In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of
the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used
in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. "
21
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit.
22
In the case at bar,
there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity
as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement."
23
In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.
24
Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants
The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70)
positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and
twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.
25
Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these
positions.
26

Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he
has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly,
petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. Unlike
the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive
order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to "create" the positions of presidential advisers, consultants and
assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner merely annexed a copy of the
Philippine Government Directory (Annex "C") listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition.
However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient
nature of the allegations in the Petition.
III. Right to Information
Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex "D") dated October
4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients
of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.
27

The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Under both the 1973
28
and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling
in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
29
wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public right and "when a [m]andamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right." However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such
limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees," which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are
obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents
for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.
30

Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano
31
that "[t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution
is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times." The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters of public
concern", a term which "embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public."
32
1wphi1
Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer
petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of
public property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the
inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.
33

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
SO ORDERED.