The

PUBLIC SAFETY
PROGRAM
VI ETNAM
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
U S AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SAIGON, VIETNAM
1966
T HE PUBL I C SAFETY PROGRAM
UNI TED STATES AGENCY
For
I NTERNATI ONAL DEVEL OPMENT
Saigon, Vi etnam
CHARL ES A MANN
DI RECTOR, USAI D/VI ETNAM
ROBERT C L OWE
ASSI STANT DI RECTOR FOR PUBL I C SAFETY
Saigon
1 Apri l 1966
F OREWORD
The purpose of thi s pamphlet is to provide a brief narrati ve
description of the objectives, acti nti es and accomplishments of the
Office of Public Safety of the United States Agency for I nternational
Development (USAID) Mission i n Vietnam, as they were at the beginning
of cal endar year 1966
The pamphlet is intended pri mari l y for the use of United States
civilian or mi l i tary advi sors i n Vietnam whose effectiveness may be
enhanced by a general knowledge of the work of the National Pol i ce and
other law enforcement agencies and of the rol e of the Office of Public
Safety in supporting and developing those agencies I t is al so available
as a ready reference for members of the working press and others with
a seri ous i nterest i n Vietnam I t is not intended as a program justifi-
cation nor is it a manual for Public Safety Advisors
It is hoped that the information provided here will be useful and
that it will promote a spi ri t of cooperation and mutual helpfulness
The task of civil policing and l aw enforcement, parti cul arl y
under the present difficult ci rcumstances, is so overwhelming that the
National Pol i ce and the Office of Public Safety need, and ask, the sym-
pathetic understanding and wholehearted support of everyone in Vietnam
1 April 1966
Robert C Lowe, Assistant Di rector
USAID Mission in Vietnam
Robert C Lowe
Assistant Director for Public Safety
- 3 -
Philip D Batson
Deputy Assistant Di rector for Public Safety
Maynard N Shirven - Chief, Finance and Logistics Division
- 4 -
Charl es E O'Bri en - Chief, Operatlons Division
El mer E Adkins, Jr
Chief, Admlnlstratlon and Support Division
(Transferred from Vietnam, April 1966 )
NATIONAL
COMMISSIONER DAILY STATUS COMMISSIONER CAREER COMMISSIONER PRINCIPAL
REDACTOR DAILY STATUS
REDACTOR PRINCIPAL
INTRODUCTION
The civll police of the Republic of Vietnam are organized ona
national basis, i e , there are no local police forces such as are found
i n the United States, except for some village constables who are largely
untrained and operate at a very low level
The police organization is known as the Directorate General of
National Police, or, for the sake of simplicity, as the National Police
I t is headed by a Director General under whom are a Deputy Director
seven A s si st ant Directors for, respectively, Admini st ration, Personnel
and Training, Intelligence, Operations, Resources Control, Field Force,
and Scientific Police 1/
-
There are six National Police Regional Directorates, designated
and located as follows
North Central Lowlands Hue
South Central Lowlands Nha Trang
Central Highlands Ban Me Thuot
Eastern Bien Hoa
Upper Mekong My Tho
Lower Mekong Can Tho
I / The Directorate General of National Police was established on
J une 27, 1962, with the signing of a decree by the President of the
Republic of Vietnam Pri or to that date there were many separate
police agencies operating throughout the country, without essential
coordination and without the unity of effort that is particularly necessary
to meet the widespread threat to national security posed by the Viet
Cong and thei r foreign allies and supporters
-
- 7 -
The boundaries of the Regions are shown i n the map on page 9
In addition, there is the Saigon Municipal Pol i ce Di rectorate (SMPD),
which reports directly to National Pol i ce Headquarters in Saigon The
SMPD includes i n i ts jurisdiction the neighboring province of Gia Dinh
A l l the other provinces and autonomous ci ti es are grouped into one or
another of the si x Regions Each of the Regions and the Saigon Municipal
Pol i ce Di rectorate has an appointed Regional or Municipal Chief of Pol i ce
I n each Provi nce and Autonomous City there is a Provi nci al
Chief of Pol i ce or, as the case may be, a MunicipalChief of Pol i ce
Provi nces are divided into di stri cts, each of which has a Chief of Pol i ce
The administrative chain of command of the National Pol i ce is
from Headquarters to Region to Provi nce to District Thi s encompasses
such matters as police policy and doctrine, personnel administration,
including recrui tment, pay, promotion and transfer, training, technical
standards, budgets and finance, equipment and supply, and like functions
Administration is highly centralized, there being comparatively l i ttl e
delegation of authority to the field I n thi s respect there is great si mi l ari ty
to the French system of administration and therefore considerable
divergence from the Ameri can system
I n practi ce the operational chainof command is the same as the
administrative chain, although as a matter of Government regulation
each Provi nce and District ChiefJ < is responsible for l aw enforcement
in hi s own area These regulations date from the Diem regi me and have
never been revi sed Of necessity there is greater delegation of authority
i n operational than i n administrative matters
'k Note The Provi nce Chief and the District Chief are not to be confused
with the Provi nce Chief of Pol i ce and the District Chief of Pol i ce
When the l atter are meant in thi s pamphlet, thei r full ti tl es
are used
- 8 -
USOM/ PSD
IAP PROVIMCE
I NAME
I QUANGTPI
3 QUAWGNAM
4 QUANGTIW
5 QUANGNGA
6 6lNH 81NH
8 YHANHHOI
0 BINHTHUAI
I KONTUM
2 PLEIKU
5 PHUBON
1 DARLAC
i QUANGDM
; TUYENDlIi
' LAM DONG
I PHUOC LOW,
1 BINH LONG
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L THUATHIEI
7 P ~ Y E N
9 NINHTH~II
81NH DUONi
PHUOCTHANH
LONG KHANH
8lNH TUY
PHUOC TUY
BIEN HOA
GIA DlNH
LONG AN
KlEN TUONG
KlEN PHONG
I DINHTUONG
? KlEN HOA
1 VlNH BlNH
I VlNHLON6
i ANGIANG
i KlENGlANG
PHONGDINH
I CHUOlVGTHltW
' EA XUYEN
AN XUYEN
CON SON
REGIONAL POLICE AREAS
1
I
MAP PROVINCE
MAME REGl Ol
35 AN GIANG
40 AN XUYEN
39 8A XUYEN
26 SEN HOA
REGION
LOWLANDS
LOWLANDJ
SOUTH
HIGHLANDS
EASTERN
REGION
'PER MEKoY
REGION
WEL MEW1
REGION
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2
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KONTUM
LAM DONG
LONG AN
LONG KHANH
NlNH THUAN
PHONG DlNH
PHU 6ON
PHWC LONG
HUOC THANH
PHUOC TUY
PHU YEN
PLEIKU
PUAWG DUC
lUANG NAM
?UANGNGAI
?UANG TIN
WANG TRI
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PI
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17t h PARALLEL
- 9 -
The Province Chief is al so the mi l i tary (Sector) commander i n
the Province and as such reports to the Corps Commander Pol i ce
operations are routinely coordinated with mi l i tary operations through
thi s channel
The Province Chiefs report through civil channels to the Ministry
of I nterior, in which the Directorate General of National Police is located
organizationally (An organization chart of the Ministry of I nteri or is
on page 11 The organization of the National Police is shown on page
12
From a force level of 22, 000 in mid-1964 the National Pol i ce
had reached 52,000 by the end of 1965 and a further i ncrease of 20,000
is planned for 1966, with a target strength of 72, 000 by the end of 1966
A s would be expected, thi s l arge and rapid expansion has brought in its
wake a host of problems, with which the police and the Office of Public
Safety are struggling jointly This pamphlet outlines our joint efforts
The Assistant Director of USAIDfor Public Safety is the principal
advisor of the Director General, National Police, or, in bureaucrati c
parlance, they are counterparts Similarly, each of the USAID Regional
Police Advisors has as hi s counterpart the appropriate Regional Director
of the National Police and each USAID Provincial Police Advisor has
as hi s counterpart the Provincial Chief of Pol i ce Nearly all other
public safety advi sors al so have counterparts within the National Pol i ce
hi erarchy or in one of the other organizations supported under the public
safety program, namely, the Combined Telecommunications Directorate
of the Ministry of I nterior, the Directorate General, Pri son Rehabili-
tation (Ministry of I nteri or) and the Customs Directorate General
(Ministry of Finance)
A s of J anuary 1966 the Office of Public Safety was authorized to
have 160 professional advisors, of whom approximately 100 were on
board Additionally six Bri ti sh and one Australian police advi sors are
on loan to the Office of Public Safety to assi st i n project implementation
- 10 -
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
I
COMMISSIONER FOR INTERIOR
I
CHIEF OF CABWI T
1
CHARGE OF YlSsloN PRIVATE SECRETA CABINET ATTACHE
I
I I I
6 INSPECTORS
DlRECTORArE DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
GEN OF NAT OF OF TELECOM OF CIVIL
POLICE REHABILITATION MUNlCATlONS DEFENSE
C OR K
SPONDENCE
SECTION
OFFICE OF rnf COYYISSIOMER
I I
CHIEF OF CABINET
CABINET
DIRECTOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR
A MI N AFFAIRS
I
I I I 1
I
SERVICE D
CONTROL
I
BUDGET 8
SECRETARY ATTACHES LEGISLATI DMfflISTRAT PERSONNEL
PERSONNEL
BUREAU OF BUREAU OF
LOCAL GENERAL
ADNIN ADMlN
I
I
RESEARCH a
ENTRANCE
BUREAU
PRESS PERSONNEL
RESEARCH REWISTION AMMUNITION
BUREAU SECURITY
SECTION
ALI ENS
MEASURES
4 - 1 MINORITIES
COOAOINATION
USAl D/PAD Dec 16 1965
I PRIMEMINISTER 1
WAR & REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT GROUP
Autonomous Cities
- Hue
- Da Nang
- CamRanh
- Da Lat
- Vung Tau
I
F
N
i
(+) (Also Pol i ce representation in
some Villages & Hamlets)
NHA TRANG BIEN HOA
I I
PROVINCI&L
8 Preci ncts +
Gia Dinh Police
( 8 Districts) 8 Preci ncts
I I I I
I Prov Pol 6 Prov Pol 5 Prov Pol 9 Prov Pol 8 Prov Pol 8 Prov Pol
HQ s HQs HQs
I I I I
I I I
i
I
District Di stnct District District District District
Police Police Police Police Police Police
Results of V C terrorist bombings in Saigon
- 13 -
V C terrori st bombings such as these are
investigated by National Police
- 14 -
OBJ ECTIVES OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM
Gene r a1
I n ordinary circumstance the principal functions of the civil police
forces of a state are to maintain l aw and order, toprotect the l i ves and
property of persons within i ts borders, to detect and suppress such
illegal activities as subversion and incipient insurgency, and to perform
various regulatory functions, ranging from traffic control to the control
of the movement of persons and goods across or within i ts borders and
the protection of the currency TheNational Police of Vietnam have al l
these functions, and in addition they must currentl y support and assi st
the mi l i tary and parami l i tary forces i n suppressing the Viet Cong in-
surgency, which deri ves much of i ts mi l i tary strength and support form
outside the borders of South Vietnam
To oppose, seek out and destroy the mi l i tary forces of the Viet
Cong is the function of the mi l i tary forces of Vietnam and i ts al l i es
I n thei r supporting role, the police must gather intelligence on Viet
Cong clandestine operations and movements, must maintain public order
in urban areas and i n rural areas that have been pacified by the military,
including the control of smal l i rregul ar forces which may remai n behind
or may reinfiltrate, and must control the movement of men and materi al
into and out of Vi et Cong hands
The National Police as presently constituted are not capable of
fulfilling thei r responsibilities in toto They are understrength and,
owing to the rapid expansion since 1964, they are f or the mostpart
inadequately trai ned Frequent changes in command associated with
the seri es of coups have had an adverse effect on management and ad-
ministration I nadequacies in police jurisdiction at ti mes render the
police ineffective Specifically, it is believed that the Viet Cong recei ve
a l arge part of thei r equipment and supplies, including arms and ammu-
nition, through illegal traffic within Government - controlled areas,
especially the Saigon Area It is known that Viet Cong personnel some-
ti mes infiltrate Government areas dressed i n ARVN uniform and thus
- 15 -
acquire at l east parti al immunity for thei r illicit operations These are
deficiencies that must be remedied in order to make police more effective
A maj or objective of theoffi ce of Public Safety is to develop the
National Pol i ce into a modern professional l aw enforcement organization
capable of maintaining l aw and order and of constituting an effective
first line of defense against subversion, insurgency and guerri l l a activi-
ti es The National Pol i ce will be trained and equipped to a level where
they can cope with guerri l l a operations short of those by organized
units employing mi l i tary discipline and tacti cs and essentially mi l i tary-
type weapons and where they can hold areas cl eared by the rl ilitary, thus
enabling the l ater to concentrate on offensive action against the mi l i tary
main force units of the Viet Cong Concurrently, the capability of the
National Pol i ce will be strengthened so that they can control civil di s-
turbances with a minimum of violence and cope with common cri me in
a manner befitting a modern state These targets are closely i nter-
related, i e , the efficient performance of normal police functions tends
to prevent cri mes associated with insurgency
The current pri ori ty objective of the police, as of the enti re
Government of Vietnam, is to crush the Viet Cong insurgency To thi s
end, intensive efforts are being devoted to improvement of police in-
telligence and to such special functions as resources control and counter-
terrori st operations and to the development of the Pol i ce Field Forces--
essentially a constabulary type of police organization- -while at the same
ti me stepping up training and high-level managerial advice to the police
Specific Ob j ec tive s
--- Support the
expansion of the National Pol i ce to 72, 000 men by the
end of 1966 by providing essenti al equipment and supplies not other -
wise available and al so by providing budgetary support to tne extent that
the accel erated expansion is beyond the current financial capability of
the Government of Vietnam
- 16 -
Lows J Poudre - Senlor Advlsor, Loglstrcs and
Tran Van Son, Loglstlcs Technlclan
, Mf L I H P ~
J ames F Gorman, J ack M Forcey - Research and
Reportmg Offlcers and Nguyen Ngoc Cam,
Adminlstratlve Asslstant to Assl stant &rector
--- Strengthen the operational capability of the Provi nci al and Di stri ct
police organization , parti cul arl y with respect to counter-insurgency
operations
--- Assi st the National Pol i ce to establish and trai n a tacti cal police
fi el d force consisting of smal l , highly mobile, lightly armed units
capable of
a Controlling a low level of armed insurgency and banditry,
wherever i t occurs,
b Protecti ng resources control operations against guerri l l a
action,
c Supporting other Government agencies i n the "holding" phase
of the pacification program and rooting out VC i nfrastructure in Govern-
ment -controlled terri tory,
d I nterdicting VC l i nes of communication into and out of
pacified areas,
e Collecting intelligence by watching trai l s and waterways
and by reconnaissance patrol s,
f Reinforcing police posts which come under attack
--- Assi st the National Pol i ce to regulate the movement of sel ected
resources, both human and materi al , i n order to restri ct support of
the Viet Cong or deprive them of it altogether and to i nterrupt and destroy
VC non-military communications More specifically, the objective is
to intercept and detain known or suspected members of the VC and other
persons who may be engaged i n transporting intelligence or supplies to
the VC, to interdict materiel going out of Government controlled terri tory
which would be of value to the VC, including food, medical supplies and
petroleum products, and to sei ze contraband materi al s, e g , explosives,
entering or being transported within Government-controlled terri tory
--- I mprove the police records and identification system, which is
basi c to all police work
- 18 -
--- Enhance the capability of the Saigon Municipal Pol i ce Di rectorate
to perform effectively, normal metropolitan police functions, including
traffi c control, and improve the effectiveness of counter -insurgency
measures
--- Assi st the National Pol i ce to provide adequate recrui t and refresher
training to all members of the National Pol i ce and to provide advanced
training for selected personnel
--- Assi st the National Pol i ce to select, equip and fully trai n police
personnel in civil disturbance control, so that the police wi l l have the
capability of coping with ri ots and other civil disturbances i n accordance
with modern humane methods and with a minimum l evel of force
--- Enable the Combined Telecommunications Directorate to establish,
operate and maintain nation- wide integrated telecommunication facilities,
systems and servi ces for the National Pol i ce and other civil securi ty
agencies i n di rect support of the counterinsurgency effort, civil security,
rural construction and the preservati on of law and order
--- Support the Customs Service by providing equipment and supplies
essenti al for its modernization (Administrative and procedural reforms
are the responsibility of the Assi stant Di rector for Special Proj ects )
--- A ssi st the Di rectorate General of Pri son Rehabilitation to establish
an adequate system of pri soner confinement and re-education
PUBLIC SAFETY ACTIVITIES
Support of Expansion of the National Pol i ce
To support a police force of the si ze needed i n present ci rcum-
stances is beyond the present limited economic and financial capabilities
of the Government of Vietnam Accordingly, in view of our mutuality
of i nterest, the USAID has undertaken to supplement Vietnamese re-
sources with American,
The
assi stance provlded is financial, material and technical
as part of the economic aid program
- 19 -
I
N
0
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
I ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 1
I I 1 I
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
H COUNTER INSURGENCY
DEPUTY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATION and
SUPPORT DIVISION
FINANCE and LOGISTICS
OPERATIONS DIVISION Dl Vl Sl ON
CHIEF
POLlCE FIELD FORCE
I I
t
SENIOR ADVISOR
OPERATIONS
SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SENIOR ADVISOR
RESOURCES
CONTROL
SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR
EDUCATION and RECORDS and
TRAINING IDENTIFICATION
SENIOR ADVISOR
r l OPERATIONS
FIELD
1
t
SENIOR ADVISOR
LOGISTICS
SENIOR ADVISOR
INTELLIGENCE
SENIOR ADVISOR
RESEARCH and
REPORTI NG
SENI OR ADVISOR
I PROGRAM and
EVALUATION
SENI OR ADVISOR
CONSTRUCTION
SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR
CIVIL POLICE
I I I
DISTU RBANCES
- 1 1 I
Weapons Maintenance Admsors Samuel P Beverlin and J oseph
A Sobotta at thei r office i n N P Headquarters, Saigon
Advisor Sobotta teaching N P
weapons maintenance men
the operating of the gun bluing machines at N P
Headquarters
- 21 -
Logistics Advisor Lowell E Diamond checking U S A I D
commodities to be deLvered to N P
r
Logistics Advisor Walter E Swarthout supervising loading
of concertina wi re for delivery to National Pol i ce
- 22 -
The provision of di rect budgetary assi stance on a significant
scale is an innovation i n 1966, made necessary by the l arge i ncrease
i n the police strength at ati me of severe budgetary stringency, the l atter
brought about by a government policy of budgetary austeri ty as a counter-
inflationary measure Direct financial grants and rel ease of counterpart
funds ranging from ten to thi rty or thirty-five per cent of the overal l
police budget may be made i n 1966 To the extent they are made, they
will beused to pay the costs of the 20,000-man expansion and to provide
funds for repai r and rehabilitation of essenti al faci l i ti es and a minimum
of necessary new construction
It is al so necessary to equip the police in order that they may
operate effectively The principal i tems of equipment furnished on a
force-wide basi s are smal l arms and vehicles The basi c police weapon
is the 38 cal i bre revolver, one of which is furnished f or every man i n
the force (except f or Fi el d Force personnel) I n addition, forty per
cent of the men are furnished carbines, twenty per cent submachine
guns, ten per cent 12 gauge shotguns and two per cent BAR'S Except
for the revolvers, these weapons are normal l y kept i n the police ar-
mori es and are i ssued daily as requi red Some other weapons are pro-
vided f or speci al purposes, and the Fi el d Forces have thei r own table
of weapons
Ammunition is furnished on the basi s of a tabl e of standard al-
USAI D has lowances, which wi l l be modified as experience is gained
provided a reloading plant for 38 cal i bre wadcutter (training) cartri dges
Thi s will resul t i n considerable savings i n ammunition costs, i n fact,
no more wadcutter ammunition is being procured
Vehicles are furnished on a basi s of three per 100 police, with
some exceptions made for the Field Forces and certai n other special
units The vehicles furnished are 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps) and 1 1/2-ton
trucks, in the rati o of three to one One thi rd of the j eeps and all the
1 1/2-tontrucks havefour-wheel dri ve I n addition, 148 five-ton trucks
have be en f urni sh e d
- 23 -
The vehicle fl eet 1s rapidly being standardized, in order to faci l -
i tate maintenance and repai r and to minimize spare parts inventories
Arrangements have been made to obtain spare parts from a U S depot in
J apan on instantaneous requisitions (Milstrip), thus effecting maximum
economy both in inventories and in ti me lost by deadlining
Recently (FY -66) USAID has agreedto assi st by furnishing i tems
of individual clothing and equipment Substantial quantities of uniforms
have been and will be supplied, as wel l as boots and certai n other in-
dividual i tems It is planned to equip a police clothing factory (pri mari l y
with cutting and power sewing machines), thus effecting economies in
supply of clothing A shoe factory is al so under consideration
In order to improve the securi ty of police installations, l arge
amounts of sandbags, barbed wi re and concertina wi re have been furni sh-
ed In addition, cement and roofing materi al s are being supplied to
meet urgent requi rements Provi si on of these l atter is a form of budge-
tary support which makes possible vari ous high pri ori ty proj ects that
otherwise could not be undertaken by the police because of fi scal l i mi -
tations
Because of securi ty conditions i n the countryside, it has been
impossible to effect the normal distribution of equipment and supplies
by rai l and road Accordingly USAID has provided air transportati on
on a regul ar basi s for police materi al and occasionally for personnel
A i r servi ce requi rements are under study with a view to a long-range
s olut i on
Technical advice has been and is being furnished on a continuing
basi s on a wide range of administrative and manageri al probl ems These
include such fundamental matters as the organization of the National
Police, the rul es and procedures of the police, force levels, l ogi sti cs
systems, and, f or the future, personnel administration
I n 1965 a joint study of the organization of the headquarters of
the National Pol i ce was conducted over a period of several months and
- 24 -
recommendations f or reorganization were submitted to the Director
General Similarly, a joint study of the regulations and procedures of
the police was initiated and the draft of the fi rst of three projected
volumes of a manual of procedures and standing orders, including control
of expenditures, was submitted to the Director General Thi s study is
scheduled for completion by J anuary 1967 and should lead to the pro-
mulgation of a complete code of procedures and standing orders forthe
police No such code exi sts at the present ti me and the lack is grievously
felt A new police decree, establishlng the National Pol i ce and providing
f or its discipline, has been drafted and is awaiting promulgation A
codification of the l aws is al so urgently required, but this arduous
task has not yet been undertaken
A consolidated Logistics Service was created in National Pol i ce
Headquarters in 1965 and USAID undertook to give it technical support
Thi s involves technical advice in logistics planning, supply and di stri -
bution techniques, stock records systems, warehousing, maintenance
systems for vehicles, boats and weapons, and the establishment and
operation of maintenance shops A very cl ose working relationship,
based on mutual dependence, has developed between the police Logistics
Service and the Logistics Unit of the Office of Public Safety, with thei r
combined efforts resulting in increasingly effective supply and main-
t enance operations
Support of Pol i ce Fi el d Operations
I n a sense, of course, all non-headquarters operations are field
operations, and in that sense ninety per cent of the National Police
operations are i n the field Here, however, we are talking about the
operations of Regional, Provlncial and mstri ct police headquarters
These are supported by USAID with technical advice and equipment and
supplies, and indirectly, through the budget, with funds
It is planned to station a Public Safety Advisor in each Resonal ,
Provincial and autonomous city police headquarters A s of Apri l 1966,
there was an advisor i n each of the si x resonal headquarters and there
- 25 -
Thi rd Preci nct N P personnel being bri efed on pl ans for
a night Fami l y Census operation at Preci nct Headquarters
I
I!
d
Vincent E Young, Advisor to Saigon Municipal Pol i ce
cl erk on proper index procedures f or police records
Thi rd Preci nct, offering advice to Thi rd Preci nct Chief and
r
Saigon Municipal Police on a night-time
Fami l y Census checking operation
A gambling den raided by Saigon Municipal Police
were 31 Advisors distributed among the 43 provinces and autonomous
cities, exclusive of Saigon Obviously most of these Advisors wer e
servi ng more than one headquarters, another 17 were required for
complete staffing, and these were arrl vi ng at a good rate as recrui ted
and trained
The various field headquarters are lacking i n transportation
and are seri ousl y deficient in up - to - date office equipment, such
as typewri ters and duplicating machines Some of these deficiencies
wi l l be made up i n 1966 and i t is planned to continue thi s kind of support
in future years A s a matter of principle we consider that field offices
should beat l east as well equipped, in relation to need, as the National
He adqu a r t e r s
The physical facilities - office buildings, police stations and
official quarters - have not expanded significantly with the i ncrease i n
the numbers of policemen, with the resul t that they are now, by and
l arge, grossl y inadequate, with a resulting deleterious effect on ef -
ficiency and moral e While there is a shortage of resources, both
fi scal and physical, we propose to do what we can to amel i orate the
situation An urgent need is a long-range plan of construction,
with pri ori ti es cl earl y identified We shall work jointly with the police
to develop thi s
Sumort of Pol i ce Field Forces
C oncer>t
The war has produced several attempts at area pacification I n
each of these a consistent pattern has emerged of inability to provide
permanent local securi ty within which civil development may take place
The reason for thi s weakness l i es in a gap between the rol es and
mi ssi ons of the Armed Forces, including the Resonal and Popular
Forces, and the ordi nary National Police The gap is not apparent, of
course, while the Army (ARVN) is present and is conducting cl eari ng
operations, However, when the ARVN has completed its cl eari ng
- 28 -
operation and is redeployed elsewhere, mi l i tary responsibilities devolve
upon the Resonal Forces and the Popular Forces It then becomes
necessary, in the view of most Province Chiefs and Di stri ct Chiefs
under whose control these forces lie, to employ them l argel y for the
protection of the provincial and di stri ct capitals
The resul t is that the villages and haml ets scheduled for the
final stages of "hold" operations and the soci al developments associated
with pacification are left without continuous protection against the re-
emerging village guerri l l as These smal l groups of VC thugs then
terrori se the hamlet dwellers, undisturbed
Eradication of the village guerri l l as, elimination of the VC i nfra-
structure, and resources control are the essenti al and interlocking
components of "hold" operations which can only be finally effective when
conducted at vlllage /haml et level
The existence of thi s gap in rol es and mi ssi ons was appreciated,
and the Mission Council supported a GVN decision to f i l l i t with an ap-
propri ate component of the National Police Thi s was confirmedby de-
cree i n J anuary 1965
The decision to use police had a two-fold origin Fi rst, in ex-
amining solutions to si mi l ar probl ems elsewhere, the pattern set by the
Pol i ce Field Force i n Malaya, working as the arm of Special Branch
I ntelligence, was found to be closely rel ated to that of the older US-
sponsored Philippine Constabulary Both handled thi s type of problem
with conspicuous success and thereby established relevant precedents
Second, a need was cl earl y evident for a post-hostilities organization
capable of smoothly taking over a diminishing tacti cal situation from
the military, further reducing it, and handling i t on to the uniformed
police Such an organization would need both a tacti cal capability (mi nor)
and a police capability, including powers of arrest and search
- 29 -
The identification of thi s need resulted in the creation of the
Police Field Force (PFF), a grouping of minor tactical components,
strong enough to dominate a village/hamlet complex against the village
guerri l l a groups, within range to support the local representati ves of
the uniformed police, and in the direct police line of command to ensure
the rapidity of response that only personal responsibility can i nspi re
The PFF is a lightly-armed, ground-mobile force administrative-
l y organized by companies, performing i ts function of maintaining a
presence of government strength by platoons, each platoon responsible
for the hamlets of one village area selected by the District Chief i n
coordination with the District Pol i ce Chief, filling the village/hamlet
gap and complementary to the District Chief's RF / PF forces and hi s
rural construction team
Deployment
The di agram on page 31 represents a "slice" of a pacifi-
cation program which, for convenience, may be assumed to be one
province
I llustrated is a typical situation in which the peri pheral area is
VC controlled and access by GVN can be effected only by a mi l i tary
operation, which would be conducted by ARVN Such an operation might
be short, with an aim of disturbing the VC to prevent thei r buildup -
tactical, logistic or political This type of operation would be described
as interdiction
The next i nner ring is the designated area for ARVN pacification
operations, aimed at eliminating VC main force and regional force units,
and so depriving the VC i nfra-structure of the support they need to
develop their activities This type of operation would be described as
destruction
Finally, there is the pacified area, where control is exerci sed
Thi s is a development by the National Police i nthe normal ci ml sense
situation
- 30 -
w
I
rn
z
e:
w
E
E
P4
- 31 -
The l i mi ts of these areas cannot be clearly defined The rear
of the ARVN area wi l l be sufficiently cl ear of major VC concentrations
for PFF to begin their operations, and the forward edge of the pacified
area wi l l still contain sections which are l ess than completely secure
It is this zone, broadly astri de the boundary between military tactical
action and civil police action, that is the PFF area of operation, and
the rate at which PFF can move forward governs the rate of the whole
pacification program There can be no short cut
A s PFF move forward they are followed up by regular National
Police and by the civil program of regional development
The diagram on page 33 shows a typical PFF province
all oc at i on
I t wi l l be observed that this province consists of five districts,
of which
One is thoroughly pacified and under normal NP security
One is VC controlled
Three have recently been cleared, or partly cleared, and are
designated PFF "task di stri cts ' I , with one company each
Looking more closely at one district, which has seven villages,
we see
One is secure, with normal NP arrangements
Two are VC controlled
Four have recently been cleared and are designated as "task
villages", with one platoon each
It wi l l be noted that no provision is made for PFF deployment
in the vicinity of the provincial capital Their work is in the field
It wi l l be further noted that a PFF reserve platoon is located at
district headquarters and that i t is NOT a tactical reserve but an admi-
nistrative reserve to ensure that the field platoons are at ful l operational
strength
- 32 -
D E P L O Y M E N T P A T T E R N S - I1
NP
w
I
P R O V I N C E
PFF PFF PFF vc
COMPANY COMPANY
NP PFF PFF PFF PFF @ vc vc
PL ATOON
Villages
PL ATOON PL ATOON PL ATOON
PROVI NCE PFF COMPONENT 3 companies each of 3 - 5 platoons
Finally, although operational directives come from the District
Chief, through the District Chief of Police, to the Company Commander,
the line of administrative control is through the PFF representati ves
on the staff of the Provincial Chief of Police and Regional Chief of Pol i ce
Pacific at ion Role
The PFF is a part of the provincial pacification team and functions
under the overall direction of the Provi nce Chief, through the Province
Chief of Pol i ce and the unit commander, to give expressi on to the Pro-
vince Chief's pacification plan
The fi rst stage in the pacification program is intelligence pro-
curement, planning, and preparatory psychological warfare The PFF
must be actively associated with the plan from thi s first stage
The next stage is the tactical action of ARVN, with VNAF support,
to cl ear the selected area of VC main force and provincial force units
Thi s is followed by the securing of the cl eared area by RF/ PF
During thi s phase, the PFF is deployed to the villages se- elements
lected f or i ts operations
With securi ty augmented by the RF / PF presence, the PFF
--- Conducts day and night tactical patrols, normally in platoon
strength,
- - - I nitiates and maintains civic action procedures, ei ther alone
or in conjunction with the appropriate civilian organization,
--- Supports the National Pol i ce i n thei r resources control
measures
When the situation is secured to a degree that the PFF can operate
alone, the RF / PF move off to support further ARVN operations - but not
before I t is fatal to redeploy the RF / PF on a rigid ti me table Thei r
onward movement can only be decided in the context of the local develop-
ment of the securi ty operation That this may delay further planned
deployments of ARVN is appreciated, but must be accepted
- 34 -
Command Structure
Command of the PFF is exerci sed by the Commander, PFF, who
has the status of a Director at the Headquarters of the National Pol i ce
For thi s purpose, the Commander, PFF, has the Headquarters, PFF,
at which are represented all branches of staff and servi ces
While every member of the PFF is a fully-trained policeman
who, at the direction of the Director General, may at any ti me revert
to a civil police function, he is al so a fully trai ned sol di er, operating
within a field tacti cal context Because the operations of the PFF are
tactical, its administration, logistic support and discipline are designed
to support tactical operations and, although within the overal l police
administrative framework, are distinct
The Commander, PFF, is represented at the headquarters of
Regions and Provi nces by PFF offi cers attached to the offices of the
Regional Chief of Pol i ce and Provi nci al Chief of Pol i ce respecti vel y
The duty of these offi cers is to ensure continuous and adequate logistic
and administrative support from Headquarters, PFF, to keep the' Com-
mander, PFF, continuously informed on all aspects of the status of hi s
companies, and to ensure a proper working relationship between PFF
company commanders and the Provi nce District administration In
parti cul ar, they must ensure that the PFF field el ements are used only
f or the purpose for which they have been provided, i e , mobile fi el d
operations at village level They will not provide personal securi ty for
Provi nce or District Chiefs, thei r equipment will not be diverted to non-
PFF el ements nor may they be used as scouts for ARVN or RF / PF
tacti cal operations
A s the PFF operates on a separate disciplinary code, designed
to meet tactical conditions, the system of inquiry and punishment wi l l
resi de within the PFF, cases beyond the competency of the company
commander being referred to the representati ve of the Commander, PFF,
at Provi nce or Region as necessary
- 35 -
I t is the prerogative of the Provi nce Chief to decide in which
di stri cts of hi s province the PFF companies wi l l be deployed Thi s he
wi l l do as part of hi s pacification plan From ti me to time, as the
situation develops, one way or another, he may decide that
1) The local securi ty has so deteriorated that the PFF can no
longer operate according to concept, and wi l l be withdrawn,
or
The local securi ty has so improved that PFF operations are
no longer necessary, and securi ty wi l l pass to the regul ar
police
2)
I t is the task of the Provincial Chief of Police to ensure that,
within the selected "task districts", the police administrative and in-
telligence machinery and the arrangements for cooperation with all other
government agencies (parti cul arl y the armed forces) are such that the
PFF companies can effectively operate
I t is the task of the PFF representati ve at Provincial Headquarters
to ensure that the PFF companies allotted to a di stri ct are at all ti mes
and in all respects operationally effective
The Di stri ct Chief wi l l decide in which villages of hi s di stri ct
the PFF platoons wi l l be deployed Thereafter, as the situation develops,
he may re-deploy them (bearing in mind that, once re-deployed, they
wi l l not regain maximum operational effectiveness for three months)
The District Chief of Pol i ce wi l l use all the District police re-
sources to express hi s policy Of these, the PFF company is only one,
though probably the l argest He wi l l give tasks (by designating areas)
to the PFF Company Commander, who wi l l deploy hi s platoons to villages
to handle these tasks He wi l l not tel l the PFF Company Commander
how to do hi s job
The PFF Platoon Commander wi l l work i n cl ose association with
the Village Chief of the village to which hi s platoon is assigned
How-
ever, the Village Chief has no authority over the Platoon and the Platoon
- 36 -
Commander has no authority over the Village Chief
the PFF is collaboration with the village and hamlet authorities
The essence of
Training Centers
A Pol i ce Field Force Unit Training Center has been constructed
at Trai Mat i n the mountains near Dalat, Tuyen Duc Provi nce A s of
1 March 1966, five companies had graduated fromthi s center and six
companies were undergoing training, which consi sts of twelve weeks
of intensive field work Following a decision of the Di rector General,
National Police, to give basi c police training f or all recrui t policemen
destined f or the Field Force at Dalat, construction of a basi c training
center adjacent to the unit training center was begun Thi s new center
wi l l have a capacity of 1000 trai nees
Though not fully equipped, the operations of the limited number
of companies deployed by 1 March 1966 have tended to confi rmthe
soundness of the Pol i ce Fi el d Force concept
Strength
A s of March 1, 1966 the Field Force was authorized a strength
of 8500 men, to be organized into 47 companies I t seemed probable
that thi s authorization would be i ncreased eventually
USAID Support
The USAID is providing technical assi stance and extensive budge-
tary and commodity support to the Fi el d Force, i n the belief that i t can
and will make a maj or contribution toward pacification of the country
A total of fifteen Public Safety Advisors is planned, although only eight
were on board i n March 1966 A special Assistant f or Counterinsurgency,
located i n the USAID Office of Public Safety, coordinates Field Force
plans and operations with rel ated activities The USAID has provided
the arms and ammunition and most of the equipment of the Fi el d Forces,
including some rati ons and clothing
- 37 -
Police Field Force trainees at Dalat camp on the pistol
range and hand grenade throwing range
- 38 -
Support of the Resources Control Program
The Resources Control Program is based on the premi se that
the Viet Cong, like any other sizable guerri l l a force, is dependent on
the support of the local populace for i ts continued existence (Confer
Mao Tse Tung's analogy of the guerri l l a as a fish who swims in the
ocean of the population ) If popular support is not forthcoming, then
the guerri l l a force cannot maintain itself i n the field, much less move
effectively on the offensive Thi s premi se is considered valid in spite
of the fact that the Viet Cong are receiving reinforcements and logistic
support from outside the boundaries of South Vietnam It is essential
therefore to break contact between the Viet Cong and the general popu-
lation, to the maximum extent possible, thus depriving the Viet Cong
of supplies, intelligence and other support (The principles of resources
control, as well as an account of the Malayan experience, are set forth
i n a 200-page pamphlet The Pol i ce and Resources Control in Counter-
I nsusgencyby E H Adkins, Jr , publishedby the USAI D/Vietnamin 1965 )
The fi rst U S - supported efforts in this direction date back to
1961 and 1962, when a Public Safety Advisor visited Malaya and studied
the successful Resources Control Program employed there Subsequently
42 i nstructors were trained in the techniques of resources control and
these i n turn trained some 300 policemen However, the effort was al-
lowed to lapse, owing to opposition within the GVN at the ti me
Thi s opposition was finally overcome and in September 1964 an
operation christened Hop Tac (Cooperation) was mounted in Saigon and
seven surrounding provinces (Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, Hau
Nghia, Long An, Phuoc Tuy, Phuoc Thanh) Thi s area, with 3, 600,000
people and eighty percent of Vietnam's industrial capacity, was the
principal source of non-agricultural supplies f or the Viet Cong The
theory was that the Army (ARVN) would cl ear the area progressi vel y
of armed opposition and that the National Pol i ce would immediately
move into the pacified areas, hold them, and establish resources control
there, as well as in the already secure areas
- 39 -
To thi s end, police strength i n the area was i ncreased by 3445
over a two-month period (from 9447) Additional vehicles were assigned
and a few assault craft were borrowed from the Army The original
42 i nstructors were given refresher training and 58 new i nstructors
were trai ned
The GVN assigned responsibility f or resources control to the
National Pol i ce and a bureau was established for thi s purpose within
National Headquarters Thi s bureau al so assumed staff responsibility
for the Family Census and I dentity Card program (vide i nfra)
The HopTac program did not attain maximum resul ts as rapid-
l y as had been hoped, pri mari l y because the ARVN was not able to cl ear
areas on schedule On the other hand, i t is considered that the Resources
Control Program i n the pacified areas has fully met expectations In-
telligence reports indicate that the Viet Cong have been hurt
Pl ans have been completed for extending the program to the
Mekong Delta (It should be noted that the system of checkpoints is i n
use throughout the country now, what is involved next is an intensification
of the effort, utilizing more trai ned men andgreater materi al resources )
The Delta contains most of the 6, 000, 000 acres under ri ce cultivation
in South Vietnam and produces enough ri ce to feed the whole country
and provide a surpl us which normally constitutes Vi etnam's principal
export The terrai n of the country, cri sscrossed by ri vers and streams
interlocked by i rri gati on ditches and rich in food provides an ideal si te
for guerri l l a activities Success in resources control here presents
numerous and great difficulties, i f attained, i t wi l l render the Viet Cong
position in the whole Delta precari ous
The problem of restri cti ng, depriving and denying personnel,
logistical and communications support to the enemy guerri l l as is attacked
by interrupting the movement of men and materi el in three ways
a The establishment of static (fixed) checkpoints along pri mary
and secondary arteri es of travel , both land and mari ne
- 40 -
b I mplementation of mobile or surpri se checkpoints to catch
individuals tryi ng to by-pass a stati c control point i n a vehicle, and
utilization of patrol s to cover the foot paths and trails by which tons of
material maybe transported on the shoul ders of volunteer or indentured
coolies
c Establishment of sound rural i nternal securi ty along with
appropri ate control s i n villages and stategic haml ets to obstruct the
tremendous seepage of supplies and information from these population
centers to the enemy
One of the fi rst things to be done i n controlling human resources
is to identify the people The first Vietnamese national program for
identification of the population was introduced i n 1938 The identification
document was a si mpl e piece of paper on which the requi red identification
data were pri nted Thi s was found to be an unsuitable document, but did
serve the useful purpose of making an initial identification of the country's
people
I n 1957 legislation was passed requi ri ng al l persons over the age
of 18 to obtain and carry an identification card Everyone was to be
fi ngerpri nted when a card was i ssued to him, with two fingerprint i m-
pressi ons becoming part of the ID card and a full set of pri nts being
sent to the files of the Central I dentification Bureau of the National Pol i ce
Headquarters i n Saigon Lack of durability of these cards, made by a
si mpl e laminating process, together with forgeri es by the Viet Cong,
l ed to the development of the I D card now used Cards are now made
with safety paper, covered with laminated plastic, which is embossed
on one side, a distinctive kind of pl asti c is used and the pl asti c is budded
to the paper card i nsi de the pl asti c
I n the ci ti es, people were asked by the Government to come to
processi ng stati ons to complete the paper work necessary to implement
the I D Card Program I n the rural areas the Government went to the
people, i n the form of mobile processi ng teams, which could servi ce one
village or small area at a ti me
- 41 -
The program was sponsored by the then Public Safety Division
USAID furnished al l the cameras, lights and rel ated equipment neces-
sary to prepare the cards Eachpersonto whom a card was i ssued was
charged 10 pi asters, just enough to cover the cost of photographic paper,
chemicals, blank forms and sal ari es of the people who did the processi ng
The Viet Cong reactedviolently to thi s ID Card Program and did
thei r best to nullify i t They ambushed mobile regi stry teams, threw
grenades at regi strati on centers, and conducted an anti -regi strati on
propaganda campaign Armed police frustrated these efforts, however
The I D Card Program was decl ared completed on J une 30, 1963,
by which ti me cards had been i ssued to approximately 7, 000, 000 of the
approximately 8, 000, 000 population over 18 years of age The remaining
1, 000,000 people could not be reached since they were under control of
the Viet Cong At the present ti me about 25, 000 persons reaching the
age of 18 are processed each month
I D cards, of course, become out of date People change in ap-
pearance, i nname (through marri age) andotherwi se and the cards them-
sel ves deteri orate It therefore becomes rrecessary to rei ssue the cards
on some systemati c basi s Thi s problem is currentl y under study and
i t is hoped to begin a program of rei ssuance sometime in 1966 One
possibility is to rei ssue al l cards when a certai n specified period, such
as five years, has elapsed since the date of original i ssue Another
possibility is to rei ssue all cards in certai n geographical areas, such
as a city or province In any case the rei ssuance presents many ad-
mi ni strati ve problems which have not yet been solved Furthermore,
the cards themsel ves are of l i ttl e value for police purposes, and may
even hamper the police, i f they are not based in the fi rst instance on
proper identification of the subject Thi s problem is closely rel ated
to the problem of unclassified and unfiled fingerprint cards(see page48 )
Until these twi nprobl ems can be solved, Vietnam cannot be sai d to have
an adequate system of personal identification
- 42 -
The Fami l y Census consi sts of an inventory of the population by
housing unit The regi strati on form is a booklet in which are recorded
pertinent data concerning each legal resident of a parti cul ar dwelling
unit These data include the name and curri cul um vitae of each resident,
al l significant resources of the residents, such as outbuildings, tools
and domestic animals, and the political affiliations or tendencies of
each resident, if known A group photograph (highly prized by most
families) is al so included Two copies of each booklet are made, of
which one is held by the family and one by the authorities Each head
of household is reponsible for reporting changes, such as bi rths and
deaths and changes of address
These documents obviously contain information of value for many
purposes,including population census and vital stati sti cs, although it is
doubtful i f they are fully exploited From the standpoint of the police,
especially in resources control, they are invaluable Armed with the
appropri ate booklets, the Pol i ce can cordon off an area and check every
dwelling place within Using this technique, parti cul arl y during the
curfew hours, they detect and apprehend illegal residents, draft dodgers,
deserters, and wanted cri mi nal s or suspects Not infrequently VC
i nfi l trators or suspects are discovered i n this manner Follow-up in-
vestigations then reveal further information and may lift a corner of
the veil over the VC i nfrastructure There is no doubt that such police
checks, conducted regularly, tend to keep the VC off balance, i nterrupt
VC intelligence and psychological warfare operations and i nterfere with
supply, sabotage and terrori st activities The Police, especially in
Saigon, are pursuing this program mgorously
For a stati sti cal summary of some of the resul ts obtained to
date, see the tabl es on pages 44 -47
USAID has cooperated fully with the National Police in the es-
tablishment of a sound Resources Control Program It has provided high-
level technical assi stance and al so significant amounts of equipment and
- 43 -
NATI ONWI DE RESUL TS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM
From 1 J anuary to 30 December 1965
WEAPONS
M O N T H I
Total 677 units
- -
NATI ONWI DE RESULTS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM
From 1 J anuary to 10 December 1965
FOODSTUFFS
I
- Total 2, 852, 680 units
NATI ONWI DE RESUL TS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM
From 1 J anuary to 30 December 1965
MEDI CI NES
I
rp
Q)
I
Total 96, 839 units
NATI ONWI DE RESULTS OF THE RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM
From 1 J anuary to 30 December 1965
EQUI PMENT
mM o n t h I
400,000
I
330,589
I I I
250, 000
200,000 3
150,000
100,000 ,~
I
50,000
,25.325
Total 1, 041, 438 uni ts
supplies In 1966 it is planned to initiate procurement of some 76 forty-
foot ri ver patrol craft for use in the Delta and al so to provide l i mi ted
budgetary support
Records and I dentification
A s indicated above, good records are fundamental to al l police
work However, the records of the National Pol i ce, invaluable though
they are, l eave much to be desi red The system of personal and incident
dossi ers is outmoded, as i t overuses scarce filing space, i ntermi ngl es
police records with records of other agencies and is not conducive to
the excerpting of cri me stati sti cs for administrative use Records are
not reti red and/ or destroyed when they have outlived thei r useful ness
and duplicate records are maintained, with consequent additional strai n
on l i mi ted personnel and storage faci l i ti es There are some 7,500, 000
unclassified civilian fingerprint cards, some of which are filed alpha-
betically, but many of which are simply stored i n bags and are thus
completely unusable
The National Pol i ce, with the assi stance of USAI D, are working
hard to remedy these deficiencies Standard procedures are being
developedfor the checking and filing of fi ngerpri nts of arrested persons
Training in fingerprint classification is being extended, and files are
being decentralized to provincial and regional l evel s A standard system
of police records is being developed which should make the records l ess
bulky and more usable than in the existing non-system Hopefully a l arge
volume of obsolete records will be reti red and destroyed, ei ther with
or without being mi crofi l med (Only a smal l portion need to be pre-
served f or posteri ty 1
USAI D is i n process of furnishing additional filing cabinets, which
are urgently requi red, and l i mi ted quantities of other equipment and
supplies I t is al so furnishing technical advice and guidance, which,
as is not infrequent, is more important than equipment
- 48 -
Identity cards which all Vietnamese 18 years of age,
and over, must carry on thei r persons at all ti mes
- 49 -
USAI D is al so providing technical assi stance and commodity
support for the police laboratory, which is organizationally associated
with the Records Bureau
Sumort of Saigon Municipal Pol i ce
The Saigon Municipal Pol i ce are an integral part of the National
Police, but by virtue of thei r numeri cal strength and thei r strategi c
location i n the capital city, they exerci se a greater degree of autonomy
than the forces of the provinces or the other autonomous ci ti es
The Saigon Pol i ce suffer from much the same weaknesses as
the rest of the National Police, to wit, poor administration and manage-
ment, ari si ng out of lack of trai ned and experienced admi ni strators,
inadequately trained personnel, a basically inadequate personnel system,
an inadequate budget further complicated by unduly rigid rul es for budget
administration, and shortages of equipment and materi al of all kinds,
ranging from patrol vehicles and office equipment to gasoline for cars
and motorcycles For example, the daily allowance of gasoline per
vehicle is ten l i tres - enough to run a jeep about thi rty mi l es in Saigon
- as compared with a daily minimum of 100 mi l es per vehicle i n an
Ameri can municipal jurisdiction Preci nct administration is weak and
needs greater attention
I n recent years the Saigon Pol i ce have been subjected tonumerous
changes i n the upper echelons, associated with changes at the National
Police Headquarters, with consequent disruptive effects Further
political changes would no doubt be reflected In the Municipal Police al so
Nevertheless some progress has been made and more is i n
prospect
The Saigon Pol i ce have played an important and increasingly
effective rol e i n the Resources Control Program Checkpoint operations
and the associated training have shown good resul ts in terms of Viet
Cong arrested and contraband sei zed The Fami l y Census Program
- 50 -
within Saigon is proving effective i n the detection of illegal resi dents
and thus has made i t more difficult f or VC cadres to infiltrate and live
within the city Continuing sweeps have netted numerous draft dodgers,
mi l i tary deserters and wanted cri mi nal s, as well as illegal resi dents
andknown or suspectedVC While these programs were at first resi sted
by some Saigon Pol i ce admi ni strators, the input of men and materi el
has gradually paid off and the programs are now generally supported
A system of "Roll Call" trai ni ng has been instituted consisting
of twenty-minute lectures on police procedures and practl cal police
probl ems which are Bven to personnel of each shift immediately
before they go on duty Thi s device, which was originated i n the United
States, where i t is now widely used, has al so proved to be a valuable
element ir the Saigon Pol i ce training program - so much so, in fact,
that i t has been adoptedby the National Pol i ce Headquarters and is being
instituted i n the vari ous provinces
USAID proposes to take the following actions in 1966 in support
of the Saigon Pol i ce
--- To develop and maintain cl ose counterpart relationships between
precinct commanders and thei r Public Safety Advlsors, thereby assi st -
ing the preci nct commanders to make rapid and sound decisions and
judgments in everyday preci nct management and operations A USAID
Public Safety Advisor has been assigned to each preci nct
--- To coordinate plans with American mi l i tary el ements for the el i mi -
nation or reduction of stati c police guard posts at American mi l i tary
facilities, thereby freeing a minimum esti mated 25 percent of the total
force for the performance of regul ar police duties
- - - To establish a system of mobile radi o patrol s in support of the
fixed post system now generally employed, thus providing improved police
protection and effecting substantial savings i n manpower The Mission
has al ready furnished enough radio-equipped vehicles to permi t the
assignment of approximately 40 continuous patrol s
- 51 -
--- To-obtain National Pol i ce Di rectorate General sanction of a tri al
work schedule calling for a basi c work day of eight hours and providing
for 16 hours offduty for each policeman between regul ar tours of duty
Thi s contrasts with the present system of four hours on and eight hours
off throughout the seven-day work week
--- To develop and establish, i n a pilot precinct, a coordinated system
of operational record-keeping forms and procedures for thei r use
--- To obtain Saigon Municipal Pol i ce Di rectorate and National Pol i ce
Di rectorate General support of traffi c law enforcement Advisory
assi stance to the traffic unit is being provided, as well as minimum
traffic control equipment, such as traffic lights
--- To provide advisory assi stance to the Harbor Pol i ce in harbor
police management and operations
--- To provide commodities (boats, spare parts, tools and supplies)
as necessary for Harbor Police operations, upon conclusion of an agree-
ment between the Mission and mari ne securi ty agencies (Harbor Police,
Resources Control Bureau, and Customs Service) providing for combined
support and maintenance faci l i ti es at Saigon and el sewhere as appropri ate
--- To obtain a consolidated ai rport securi ty organization (perhaps
under the VN A i r Force or the National Pol i ce) i n place of the several
autonomous and, to some extent, duplicating commands which now exist,
and to strengthen the Saigon Pol i ce rol e at the ai rport, as it may be
defined, through advisory servi ces, participant training and minimum
commodity support
--- To assi st the Saigon Municipal Pol i ce Di rectorate i n the establish-
ment of improved management and administrative procedures within
the Di rectorate Special emphasi s wi l l be given to personnel adminls-
tration establishment of a pilot precinct, and improved budget pre-
paration and follow-up
The National Pol i ce Training Program
The typical police recrui t is a young man with a sixth-grade
He knows education who may or may not have had mi l i tary training
- 52 -
- -
virtually nothing about law or law enforcement, has never driven an
automobile or a truck, is ignorant of mechanics, and, unl ess he has
served in the army, has nexer fi red a weapon However, he is lit-
erate, and this in itself is of great advantage I n practice, he has proven
to be reasonably intelligent and adaptable and compares wel l with police
recrui ts in other developing countries His first and basi c need is training
At the beginning of 1966, thebasi c (recrui t) training course was
si x weeks, of which one was devoted to resources control Thi s was
obviously inadequate and was so acknowledged by the responsible autho-
ri ti es, but the urgent need to get policemen on the job, combined with
a dearth of training facilites, made a longer course impracticable
I n J anuary 1966, however, the basi c course was lengthened to twelve
weeks, a maj or step i n the right direction The curri cul um of the twelve
week course is shown on page 56
The National Police now plan to have three basi c training schools,
at Vung Tau (Rach Dua), Da Nang and Dalat Rach Dua will be expanded
to a capacity of 2, 000 recrui ts at any one time, as compared with i ts
present 1,000 and Da Nang and Dalat developed to a capacity of 1, 000
each The output of the Dalat basi c training center is destined f or the
Pol i ce Fi el d Force Trai ni ng school sites presentl y i n use at Tam Hiep
and L e Van Duyet (in the Saigon area)will be rel eased to the Army as
soon as al ternate faci l i ti es are ready f or occupancy
An advanced training school is under construction at Thu Duc,
near Saigon, and there are plans f or the eventual creation of a police
college at Dalat, ei ther along the l i nes of the Royal Malaysian Pol i ce
College near Kuala Lumpur or of the Thai Pol i ce College near Bangkok
These plans wi l l probably have to wait until the present budgetary
stringency is eased, but thei r realization is an essenti al part of the
training program
Refresher training and retraining are al so essenti al to a complete
training program, and this is doubly true i n Vietnam where the initial
basi c training was inadequate pri or to 1966 There are plans, not yet
- 53 -
1
Training Advisor Brooks D Anderson illustrating hand-to-
hand combat tacti cs to N P i nstructor and trai nees
Anderson died on duty in Saigon in May 1966
Training Advisor Thomas P I sbell illustrating use of the
f i rearms i nstructor "sawed off" 12 guage shotgun to N P
- 54 -
I
Equipment furnished under the Public Safety program in use at
repai r shop of Combined Telecommunications Directorate
Training Advisor Dudley J Britton demonstrating use of
Training I nstructors 38 cal i ber revolver to N P
- 55 -
CURRICULUM NATIONAL POLICE
BASIC TRAINING PROGRAM
528 hours 12 weeks
A - GENERAL POLICE SERVICE
1 - General Administration
2- Police Administration
3- J udicial Police
4- Resources Control
5- I D Cards, Records, Scientific Police
6- Civil Disturbance Control
7- Traffic Police
B- SPECIAL BRANCH POLICE
C - MISCELLANEOUS
132
116
Total 52 8
24
1 - Note-taking
2- Use of Telephone & Mobile Radio
3- Fire Prevention & Protection
4- Fi rst Aid
5- Defensive Tacti cs & Disarming Techniques,
6- Circumstances of Using Weapons
7- Evacuation, Al arms & Curfews
Police Baton
D- PSYWAR & PUBLIC RELATIONS
1- Police Attitude
E- DIRECTOR'S TIME, SANITATION
F- MILITARY TRAINING
1- Military Basic
2 - Weapons, Fi rearms
12
40
24
40
10
24
12
24
2
4
4
10
20
4
4
16
10
20
G- EXAMINATIONS (3 days)
- 56 -
worked out i n complete detail, for retraining for all police personnel
now serving Weapons refresher training is currentl y being given to
as many police as can be accommodated at the rather limited firing
ranges available to the police in the Regions and Provi nces
USAID has encouraged the development of an adequate training
program and has supported it with men, money and materiel, that is,
with technical advlce, budgetary support, and equipment and supplies
Among the last named, training aids, books, film, and other essential
commodities have been and wi l l continue to be furnished Thi rteen USAI D
Trai ni ng Advisors are planned
Civil Disturbance Control
Good police administration requi res that i n ti mes of emergency
there be a capability for dealing with unruly demonstrations, ri ots,
and natural di sasters Enlightened practi ce al so requi res that timely
measures be taken to prevent the development of civil disturbances and,
when they do occur, that they be dealt with i n accordance with the
For thi s reason i t is essential that a
properl y trained and equipped civll police organization be available and
that mi l i tary units be employed for thi s purpose only as a l ast resort
principle of minimum force"
1 1
During the Diem regime, civlldisturbance control was the work
of the Combat Police, who were deployed throughout Viet Nam in all
the maj or towns, the number i n any one town varylng according to the
si ze of the town and the securi ty hazards of the surrounding area
Shortly after the assassination of Diem, the Combat Police, whose ex-
cesses had caused them to be popularly detested, were disbanded
However, the requirement f or specially trai ned police continued
to exist, especially in Saigon, and in December 1964, following extensive
di sorders, a special unit was created and training was initiated In
J anuary 1965, i t was decided to create two battalions, to be known as
Order Police These two battalions, the 222 and the 816 how have
approximately 1000 men each Both are located in Saigon, the 222
- 57 -
directly under the Director General of National Police and the 816 under
the Director, Saigon Municipal Police The 222 Battalion is currently
used to bolster night security in the outlying precincts, while the 816 is
pri mari l y a reserve force Both are in readiness when called upon to
perform thei r pri mary function Creation of a third battalion sometime
in the future is under consideration.
During FY 1966 it is planned to institute a rotational system of
training within the Saigon Municipal Police so that as a long term pro-
ject all the police within the capital city wi l l be trained in civil di s-
turbance control This training wi l l produce an adequate number of
specially selected men, who after a course in the techniques of in-
struction, wi l l provide a cadre of i nstructors These i nstructors wi l l
be used for civil disturbance cclntrol training in the various Regional
Director ate s throughout Vietnam
During F Y 1967 it is proposed to initiate training in civil di s-
turbance control in each of the six Regional Directorates The training
course willlast for four months and wi l l be repeated three times year-
l y at each of the six Regional training centers, namely Can Tho, My
Tho, Bien Hoa, Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang and Hue
A s along-termproject, trained menfrom the Regional Director-
ates wi l l be used as i nstructors for civil disturbance control training at
the provincial and district levels
Each District Police Chief within the Regional Directorate wi l l
be required to nominate a minimum number of men from within hi s
command to attend the training course This wi l l ensure that the com-
pany wi l l always have some men familiar with the topography of any of
the Directorate in which they may be required to operate
Men who during training prove to be of outstanding ability and
display qualities of leadership wi l l be recommended for consideration
for a course at the Command School A promotion incentive wi l l thus
be created
- 59 -
Technical advice in civil distnrbance control is currentl y
provided by a Bri ti sh Police Advisor attached to the USAID Office of
Public Safety The USAID has provided substantial commodity support
including vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and plans to continue
support of this essenti al activity, as wel l asto promotethe doctrines of
prevention and minimum force
Support of Other National Police Activities
Harbor Police
The Harbor Police, which is a section of the Saigon Municipal
Police (q v ) patrol s the waters of the Saigon River from below the
mouth of the Kinh Te Canal to the GVN Navy pi ers up ri ver from the
commerci al docks A ri ver patrol operates 24 hours a day every day
to protect ships entering and leaving the harbor against the operations
of pi rates and to discourage smugglers The land patrol is responsible
for the securi ty of the harbor from the l andsi de They are responsible
for safety of ship's cargo untilit is placed in warehouses A l l vehicles
and persons entering and leaving the harbor are checked by Harbor
Police, who al so notify masters of ships of local conditions and needed
securi ty precautions Cri mes committed aboard ships in the harbor
are investigated by Harbor Police personnel, who also check departing
ships f or stowaways and i ssue passes for merchant seamen and shi p's
pas s eng e r s
The Public Safety Advisor working with the Harbor Police assi sts
i n all problems of administration and operation rel ated to that organi-
zation Vessels and other equipment have been provided by
A i rport Police
the USAID
The Airport Police is al so a section of the Saigon
Police It has the responsibility for examining passports,
Munic ip a1
especially
for proper visas, checking manifests, checking incoming and outgoing
passengers prohibited from entering or leaving the country for political
- 60 -
%-
I
I
>
Reginald S Davis - Senior Advisor, Telecommunications
(left) and P S Communications Advisor Robert A Craft
receiving GVN awards of meri t for thei r work from the
Director General of National Pol i ce
Harbor Pol i ce Advisor Otto H Ludwig,
Jr with Pol i ce Patrol Craft
- 61 -
Telecommunlcatlons equipment furnished by U S A I D
as part of Public Safety program
Saigon Office of Public Safety teletype operators
or other reasons, investigating and issuing passes to persons having
business in the airport (Tan Son Nhut) at Saigon, providing guard posts
at entrances and strategic areas at the airport and surrounding areas,
and conducting undercover investigations by plain clothes police per-
sonnel in the ai rport area
A Public Safety Advisor is assigned to participate in activities
designed to improve securi tyat the Tan Son Nhut Airport and suggest
methods for improvement in efficiency and utilization of securi ty
personnel and equipment
Special Police Branch
The Chief, Special Police Branch, on 15 April 1964, issued the
following "statement of mission" which is still valid "Special Police
Branch is in charge of intelligence, responsible for collection of in-
formation necessary for the eradication of any threat to internal security
which may hurt the Republic's national security ' I This branch maintains
hourly and daily liaison with all other GVN intelligence agencies, both
military and civllian, as wel l as with Saigon Municipal Police Head-
quarters The Special Branch has units working i n all National Police
regional and provincial headquarters, i n most districts, and in many
villages and hamlets throughout the country
The Public Safety Advlsor working with this branch suggests the
use of acceptable police techniques to be employed in pursing the Brancn
mission, recommends improvements needed for performance of modern
operations, and suggests interrogation techniques, particularly f or Viet
Cong suspects and political pri soners who threaten internal security
He also conducts local and national level instruction and is currently
employed in devising a pattern of integrated activlty for the Special
Branch and the Police Field Forces He is al so concerned in the building,
staffing, and admimstrative establishment of a nationwide network of
provincial interrogation centers to be manned by the Special Branch
- 63 -
I nternal Af f ai rs Division
Thi s division of the National Pol i ce Headquarters was created
during March 1964 to investigate all compl ai nts recei ved against
members of the police and to make recommendati ons concerning di s-
ci pl i nary action to the Di rector General I t is responsi bl e di rectl y to
the Di rector General alone A l l personnel of thi s division are stationed
at the headquarters The casel oad outside of Saigon is handled by road
tri ps
When evidence of a cri me is obtained, reports are furni shed to
the J udi ci al Pol i ce f or thei r disposition
The Advi sor assi gned to work with thi s Division has the responsi -
bility to confer with and advl se the Chief and Assi stant Chi efs of the
Division on pol i ci es and procedures in the adrninistratlon of the office
He al so assi sts i n the evaluation of complaints recei ved, makes recom-
mendations as to contemplated investigations, and assi sts i n supervi si on
of i mportant cases The Advi sor also l ectures i n speci al trai ni ng cl asses
for personnel of the division
J udi ci al Pol i ce Servi ce
~~
Thi s branch of the National Pol i ce conducts open (non-covert)
investigations as assi gned by the vari ous courts, deal s with economic
and financial offenses, i nvesti gates smuggling and black market offenses,
conducts investigations of persons indebted to the government and
members of f ormer regi mes, makes open investigations upon recei pt
of complaints, i nvesti gates narcoti c cases and illegal purchases of
medicinals, control s purchase of chemi cal s and i tems having mi l i tary
value, i nvesti gates and makes arrests of professi onal cri mi nal s, conducts
investigations upon request of other police agenci es and governmental
bodies throughout the country on i mportant cases, makes undercover
investigations on undeveloped cases
- 64 -
The advisor assigned to this Servlce examines procedures and
techniques and suggests efficient and effective operational methods
I mmigration Service
The I mmigration Service, a branch of the J udicial Police, is
responsible for control of foreigners entering into, residing in, and
leaving Vietnam Visas are issued by this service, after approval has
been granted by the Minister Forei gners who apply for Vietnamese
citizenship are investigated by the I mmigration Service Passenger
and commodity control at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport is al so vested
i n this servi ce
The Advisor working with the I mmigration Service examines
procedures and techniques of the Servlce with the purpose of making all
operations more efficient and effective
A dminist r ative Police
The Administrative Police Service consists of the Administrative
Investigation Bureau, the Passport Bureau, the Research and Control
Bureau and the Secretariat of the Service Thei r work consists of making
background checks of civil servants, contractors, business men, teachers
and cab dri vers They investigate certain types of sensitive employment,
investigate and i ssue permi ts to carry weapons and operate radio
stations, reBster and change reglstrations of vehicles, make investi-
gations before issuance of passports to Vietnamese nationals
and investigate and process all political and criminal pri soners to be
released One USAID Public Safety Advisor maintains liaison with che
Service, but to date USAID support has been minimal
Support of Combined Telecommunications Directorate
The Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) is re-
sponsible for the establishment and operation of an integrated system
of country-wide telecommunications - radio, telegraph, teletype, tele-
phone - f or all Government Agencies directly engaged in providing civil
- 65 -
securi ty These include, but are not limited to, the Directorate General
of National Police, the Ministry of I nterior, the Customs Service, the
Rehabilitation Servlce, and the Railway Security Service Thi s ar-
rangement was designed to eliminate duplication of manpower and equip-
ment, and without doubt i t is eminently successful in achieving thi s
objective
The system as planned, and now virtually completed, is shown
pictorially on page 67, I t wi l l be noted that it follows established
government channels in proceeding from the National Capital in Saigon
to the Regions and thence on to Provinces, Districts, Villages and
Hamlets Communication is by radio teletype from Saigon to the Regions,
by radio telegraph from Regions to Provi nces and from Provi nces to
Districts, and by radio-phone from Di stri cts to Villages There is a
land-line teletype system within Saigon inter-connecting the Pri me
Mi ni ster's Office, the Ministry of I nterior, the Directorate General of
National Police, the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and USAID with the CTD
c ommunic at ions center
The system extending from Saigon through Regions and Pro-
vinces to Di stri cts is known as the Administrative Network and is owned
and operated by the CTD It wi l l handle messages for any government
agency, but police traffic takes precedence over other traffic
The CTD has a Base Communications Center at Saigon and a
Base Depot and Technical Training Center near Thu Duc, in the Saigon
area There are six Regional Headquarters, corresponding to the
National Police Regions, with radio rel ay facilities and technical and
logistic capabilities to support communications activities in each Region
The CTD staff numbers approximately 2600
Since the beginning of 1965 the USAID has gradually been pro-
viding radio-phone equipment to enable the Director General of National
Police to communicate with the Regional Police Directors, the Regional
Di rectors with the Provincial Police Chiefs and these in turn with Dis-
tri ct Police Chiefs To date radios have been installed in Regional,
- 66 -
I
Qs
4
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U s OM / PS 0 CO M B I NED S ECUR I TY TE LECOM M U N I CAT I0 N 01 RECTORATE
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S Y S T E M
6 R E G I O N S
RADIO TELEORAPH
1 Y S T E M
4 3 PROVI NCES
238 DI STRI CTS
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2500 VILLAGES
7000 HAMLETS
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OTHER C I V I L
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR- SECURITY AGENCIES
n mo n
* 1 6 1 0 N CI VI C S I C U I I I V
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HUE BANYETHUOT CAN THO MY THO DI EM H O A NHA TRANG
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PROVI NCE
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Provincial and District Police offices Thi s is basically a VHF- FM
radio system In the Highlands and South Lowland Resons an HF-SSB
radio-phone system has been installed between Regional Headquarters
and Provi nces because the distances are too great for VHF-FM servi ce
Earl y rn 1966 the first FM- 1 and FM-5 radios were received and wi l l
be i ssued to Provincial and District Police, including police and Re-
sources Control checkpoints Eventually there wi l l be about 5000 of
these radios in al l phases of the Police organization, including Field
Forces (See page 69 for illustrations of these radi os )
A maj or effort of CTD, supported by USAI D, has been the de-
velopment, establishment and support of the Village-Hamlet Radio
System Thi s is a system of about 12, 000 two-way radio-phone units
that were designed and procured to USAID specifications for specific
requirements in Vietnam The fi rst village radios were installed earl y
in 1962 and final installation was made in J une 1965 I t has been pro-
posed to procure additional radi os in FY -67 torepl ace those lost to VC
action and to provide equipment for newly activated or recaptured areas
and for pacification teams
The USAID, through i ts Office of Public Safety, has provided
technical assi stance and equipment i n support of the CTD In addition
to five Americanpublic safety communications technicians on the USAID
staff, there are approximately 25 American technicians provided under
a contract (currentl y the Philco Corporation)and 50 Filipino technicians
employed under another contract (currentl y Landis Brothers) Virtually
all of the telecommunications equipment of the CTD and the other civil
security agencies, with a value of many million dollars, has been sup-
plied by USAID Expansion, upgrading and support of these systems
is continuing
The USAID has al so provided direct communications support to
the Saigon Municipal Police Department Since 1958 this Department's
telecommunications capability has been expanded to provide a central
- 68 -
FM 1 (above) and FM 5 radios furnished through USAI D
Combined Telecommunications Directorate
- 69 -
communications center, a dispatching radi o station, about 120 radio-
equipped mobile patrol vehicles, 50 fixed-radiophone-equipped securi ty
posts, a call-box telephone system of 40 call-boxes and more than 150
hand-held radi os f or patrol use
The Customs Service has been provided with ship - to - shore
radi os and equipment for border posts Radios have al so been furnished
the Rehabilitation (prison) Service, the Railway Security Service, and
the Port Authority for pilot operations at Saigon and Danang CTDpro-
vides the engineering, technical and logistic facilities to support these
organic t elec omrnunic ations systems
The CTD has alsoprovided servi ce to USAID by handling 10,000
USAID messages to and between the USAID Offices i n Saigon, the four
Regions and the 43 Provi nces in 1965 I n addition to the message traffic,
CTD personnel assi st the USAID field operations by providing telephone
facilities and ground-air radi os and teletype servi ce from the CTD
Regions to USAID Regional Offices
The USAID program for the immediate future includes the fol-
lowing
1 Completion and continued support of the command and in-
telligence radiophone system for the National Pol i ce and the i ssue of
radi os to Pol i ce Fi el d Forces and rural posts and patrol s
2 Continued support of the Saigon Police, Customs Service,
Rehabilitation Service and other civil securi ty agencies
3 Provi si on of technical and commodity support to CTD to
enable that Di rectorate to furnish support to i ts "users"
Support of the Customs Service
Customs recei pts constitute approximately forty per cent of the
regul ar GVN budget revenues I n the opinion of the Finance Minister,
with which the seni or USAID Customs Advisor concurs, up-grading of
- 70 -
- - - I_.
Telecommunication equipment furnished under
U S A I D Public Safety program
- 71 -
the quality of the inspectional servi ces would resul t i n a significant in-
crease in collections The USAID Customs Advisors have devoted as
much ti me as feasible to assisting GVN customs personnel with the clear-
ing of ships and cargoes in the port area, but much remai ns to be done
in management and control, documentation, apprai sal and financial
procedures It is possible that a Participating Agency Service Agreement
(PASA) with the U S Customs Bureau may offer the best long-range
solution
Customs enforcement and investigations are the responsibility
of the Customs Fraud Repression Service Owing in l arge part to lack
of confidence i n the personnel formerl y assigned to thi s unit, it has
received very l i ttl e support from the USAID However, it is now con-
si dered that some limited support may be worthwhile and it is proposed
to furnish certai n equipment and supplies which wi l l extend i ts capability
in the investigation of cri mi nal offenses against the customs l aws
Other than for two participants who were accepted f or thi rd
country training some three years ago, USAID has not supported any
Customs training Local training i n weapons, parti cul arl y for the boat
fl eet personnel and for those assigned to Cambodian Border outposts,
was initiated i n 1965 There has been no formal training within the
Customs Service itself si nce the Vietnamese took over from the French
A program has been drawn up whereby the younger officers who have
entered the servlce i n the past five years may recei ve basi c training
Any significant program of up-grading customs procedures
necessi tates a corresponding build-up of thei r fi scal faci l i ti es The
buildings and collection offices in the maj or ports of Saigon and Danang
have long outlived thei r usefulness and replacement is badly needed
There is a need for dock and pi er facilities, storage warehouses, etc ,
for the port areas and al so for the customs stations along the Mekong
and Bassac ri vers Under the present procedure thi s necessi tates pi aster
expenditures which cannot be expected with any degree of optimism f rom
- 72 -
the present meager resources of the Vietnamese government Although
approximately 25 million pi asters have been requested i n the budget
for construction of requi red facilities, none have been forthcoming
The weapons with which the Customs Service was equipped were
the l eftovers of the French colonial regi me When several customs
outposts were overrun by the Viet Cong i n succession i n earl y 1964,
owing pri mari l y to inadequacies in thei r protective facilities, i t was
cl ear that improvements were i n order During F Y 1965 some 500
weapons, ranging from 38 cal i bre revol vers to 60mm mortars, were
furnished by USAID and were distributed to various outposts and boat
fleet units An equivalent number of obsolete and antiquated weapons
of various types were collected and turned over for destruction by the
Army
Adequate stores of ammunition for both training and operations
have been procured by USAID and delivered to the Customs Service
Thi s is a continuing requirement
A start has been made i n up-grading the vehicle fleet of the
Customs Service by supplylng 12 j eeps and two five-ton trucks and
orderi ng five more vehicles for F Y 1966 The Customs rolling stock
is in poor condition countrywide owing to the lack of proper maintenance
facilities, parti cul arl y in the areas outside of Saigon I n Saigon itself
the situation is not bad and wi l l continue to improve, particularly since
the USAID has equipped a very good maintenance and repai r shop with
the tools and equipment necessary to perform satisfactory maintenance
No up-grading of the rolling stock is contemplated for the country areas,
nor does it appear feasible, since the officers in those areas are ex-
tremel y hesitant about accepting j eeps because of the securi ty situation
They feel they can travel safely in thei r respective areas only when
are not identified as government officers In order to achieve this
status they travel in civilian clothes without identification and in Euro-
pean made vehicles such as Peugeot and Citroen
- 73 -
No additional units have been acquired for the boat fleet si nce
the Customs Servi ce became a separate entity However, in order to
enable the Service to carry out its responsibilities, it was apparent that
a build-up of the boat fleet would be necessary Accordingly, additional
craft were ordered i n F Y 1965 and F Y 1966 (a total of 50), mostly 30
and 40-foot U S Coast Guardutility craft These wi l l be put i n servi ce
in the Mekong-Bassac ri ver complex and i n the deep seaports of the
South China Sea
The facility f or vehicle repai rs, in Saigon has been up-graded to
a quite sati sfactory state Thi s maintenance unit is al so engaged in
maintenance and repai r of the vari ous boat fleet units Additional equip-
ment has been secured and more has been ordered sufficient to bring
thi sup to a high l evel of operating capability For the future there are
under way steps to set up an additional maintenance facility at Vinh Long
i n the Delta area to take careof the requi rements of the Customs boat
fleet units operating on the ri vers and al so simultaneously to servi ce
the National Pol i ce water-borne units which wi l l be used i n resources
control
The Customs Service operates a l aboratory f or anal ysi s of the
components of imported commodities so that proper classification and
evaluation of these commodities may be made The l aboratory is used
f or the secondary purpose of such cri mi nal identification work as the
Customs acti vi ti es necessi tate The laboratory, while effective, is pos-
sessed of a considerable amount of obsolete equipment A survey of
its needs was conducted bya Public Safety Laboratory Technician and an
order has been placed for approximately $5, 000 worth of new equipment
which wi l l significantly up-grade its capability and make it much more
useful for routine customs and police bal l i sti cs and identification work
During the past two years, as part of the Public Safety program,
a countrywide radi o net has been established tying i n all customs posts
- 74 -
Translator and typing pools of Saigon Office of Public Safety
- 75 -
and mari ti me units with the headquarters station in Saigon
operating satisfactorily
The net is
For the future, it is planned to i ncrease the patrol fleet from
29 to 70 vessel s, while scrapping 27 obsolete vessel s, to expand the
training program, and to reorganize the servi ce in such manner as to
strengthen i nternal management and control
Technical assi stance to the Customs Service has been provided
bythree Public Safety Advi sors In 1966 a decision was reached to pro-
vide additional technical assi stance of an operational nature through
the USAID Assistant Director for Special Proj ects, who now has the
operational responsibility for technical assi stance to the Customs
Service OPS wi l l continue to manage the necessary supporting
commodity acquisitions
Sumort of Pri son Rehabilitation
Following the overthrow of the Diem resme, the number of
pri soners was reducedfrom about 30, 000 to about 16,000, but is now
back to 25,000, owing to more GVN and U S mi l i tary activity Several
new and more modern pri sons are under construction to repl ace some
of the more primitive institutions in use at present Pri soners are
being segregated by types of cri mes and severi ty Approximately
$20r3, 000 worth of US commodities have been received, including sewing
machines, office equipment, carpentry tools, vehicles, proj ectors,
public address systems, and handcuffs
A real i sti c i n-servi ce training school has been established for
j ai l er and rehabilitation cadre Thirty-five femal e j ai l ers are under-
going nurse training Vocational schools have been started in several
of the centers in carpentry, tailoring, u eaving, typing, and other subjects
Two participants have received seven months training at Southern
I llinois University, and two have attended the UN school in J apan on
cri me, delinquency, and correcti on Four more participants wi l l be
sent to Southern I llinois University in 1366 The policies of the Di-
rectorate have changed from the punitive type to the correcti onal type
- 76 -
A pri mary classification system is being introduced and the enti re pri -
soner record system has been revamped
New Centers or Correction I nstitutions wi l l be more modern in
design than those now i n use Few of the present Centers have proper
facilities for housing pri soners Most kitchens are dirty and in di srepai r
Bathing and toilet facilities are inadequate and primitive Sewers are
almost non-existent, and those present are inadequate and usually not
functioning Most of the training buildings are "jerry-built" out of scrap
materi al and thatch, with a few "conference rooms" available in some
centers for mass reeducation
Two new centers are under construction and two more are on
the drawing board These new centers and others planned, together
with the renovation of some of the older ones now in use, wi l l cost ap-
proximately VN$ZOO million over a period of years Thi s amount wi l l
al so include housing for personnel employea by the Directorate
A training program for both jailers and rehabilitation cadre has
been i n operation since April 1964 About 100 of the 1, 100 employees
have already successfully completed the 3G-day course Additional per-
sonnel have been authorized and wi l l be recrui ted and trained during
F Y 1966 Present plans call for the recruitment of a l east 50 additional
new employees during each of the next five years Previously, em-
ployment requirement s, both physical and mental, were extremely, low
A s wage l evel s have been quite low, f ew educated indimduals were at-
tracted to the servi ce The standards have now been rai sed f or both
jailers and cadre, and thi s wi l l contribute toward a better pri soner re-
education program New personnel meeting the higher standards are
eligible for commensuraxely higher wages The present cadre and jailer
i n-servl ce training school wi l l continue until all have been retrai ned
Pre-servi ce schooling is planned for all new recrui ts An advanced in-
servl ce training school for the more experienced j ai l ers and cadre is
in the planning stage
- 77 -
I nstructors have beenhired for vocational training for a number
of the centers and equipment for thei r shops is either in country or on
order These training schools for pri soners wi l l start with basic tools
and equipment, and as more i nstructors are provided, they wi l l become
more sophisticated and modern power equipment wi l l be introduced
Academic subjects are taught in most centers to a limited degree, but
present plans call for this program to be expanded to cover more grades,
up to and including the equivalent of American high school
I n F Y 1966 and FY 1967 procurement actions wi l l be continued
on a limited scale in support of rehabilitation efforts and improvement
of the physical facilities Training wi l l continue for Rehabilitation Cen-
ter personnel in various aspects of prisoner rehabilitation and prison
admini s t rat ion
The USAID has one Pri son Advisor and plans to add one more
- 78 -
Pri son Rehabilitation activities i n vari ous pri son centers
- 79 -
I
PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISORS
WHO DIED WHILE
SERVING IN VIETNAM
I
P
x
a
Jack Ryan
Chief of Office
1964- 1965
83
J ohnF McCabe
Deputy Chief
1960-1962
Wyman W Vernon
Deputy Chief
1959-1 960
f
84
Brooks Anderson
1962-1966
Carl Al exander
1964-1966
Edward H Forney
Bri g Gen USMC (Ret
1960-1965 /
Jack Wel l s
1965
85
Dolph B Owens
1960