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DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.

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Co-ord|nated d|vers|ty: revo|ut|onary suggest|ons for LU compet|t|on |aw (and for LU |aw too)
Dr Chr|stopher 1own|ey
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uolteJ lo ulvetslty (tbe us motto)
Abstract: 1he overwhelmlng vlew ls LhaL Lhe Lu compeLlLlon rules should be applled
unlformly. 8y placlng Lhe compeLlLlon rules ln a wlder Lu conLexL, speclflcally ArLlcle 101 1lLu (anLl-
compeLlLlve arrangemenLs), Lhls paper argues LhaL Lhe naLlonal compeLlLlon auLhorlLles (nCAs)
should be able Lo dlverge ln Lhelr appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101. 1hls beLLer respecLs Lhe Lu legal order's
subsLanLlve and procedural dlverslLy. lL also helps learnlng. 1here are llmlLs, however. 1he paper
Lhen suggesLs co-ordlnaLlng Lhls dlverslLy ln neLworks where Lhe nCAs and Lhe Commlsslon can
share pollcy soluLlons and ldeas (Lhe LCn). 1hls neLwork can be repllcaLed Lo help ln oLher areas of
Lu law. 1ake Lhe neLwork of naLlonal and Lu bodles LhaL dlscuss proposed Lechnlcal regulaLlons'
compaLlblllLy wlLh ArLlcles 34 and 36 1lLu under ulrecLlve 98/34, as amended. 1he paper explores
how lnslghLs from Lhe LCn can lmprove pollcy learnlng ln Lhls free movemenL neLwork Loo.
keywords: ArLlcles 34, 36 and 101 1lLu, compeLlLlon, free movemenL, unlformlLy, dlverslLy, neLwork

1. Introduct|on
Luropean economles sLagnaLe and our peoples are scared, dlvlded, and lncreaslngly dlssaLlsfled wlLh
aLLempLs Lo placaLe Lhem.
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We populaLe an ever more complex space. '1he lncreased heLerogenelLy,
pollLlcal, economlc and culLural.lnevlLably brlngs an lncrease ln Lhe heLerogenelLy wlLhln Lhe
funcLlonlng of.[Lhe Lu's] lnsLlLuLlons and pollcles.'
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As a resulL, Lhe Lu 1reaLles are rlddled wlLh
consLlLuLlonal confllcLs. Llke all mulLl-level sysLems, we need Lo know whaL powers reslde where.
ower ebbs and flows beLween Lhe Lu and Lhe Member SLaLes. 8ellef ln Lhe markeL and deslre for
more sLaLe lnLervenLlon changes over Llme Loo. Sewn Lhrough lL all ls a Lenslon beLween dlverslLy
and unlformlLy. 1hls applles Lo subsLanLlve confllcLs (markeL lnLegraLlon and Lhe envlronmenL, for
example), as well as how Lo regulaLe such confllcLs (sLaLe measures or prlvaLe acLlon).
SecLlon 2 of Lhls paper hlghllghLs flve ma[or challenges ln Lhe Lu's regulaLory game. 1hey are
compeLlLlon v. co-operaLlon, Lhe lmporLance of publlc pollcy, approprlaLe mechanlsms for achlevlng
regulaLory alms, Lu/ Member SLaLe power dlsLrlbuLlon, and uncerLalnLy. 1hese flve challenges affecL
Lhe Lu and Lhe Member SLaLes' ablllLy Lo agree Lhe approprlaLe Lype and level of lnLervenLlon.
ollcy-makers sLruggle wlLh Lhese flve challenges. We are used Lo Lhls ln many key areas of Lu law,
such as free movemenL of goods and employmenL law. ln facL, Lhe paper uses Lhe free movemenL
provlslons Lo lllusLraLe how many of Lhe challenges llsLed above are accommodaLed. 1he soluLlons
are ofLen conLesLed. 1here ls much dlscusslon abouL how Lhe Lu can and should respond Lo Lhese
challenges. ollack, Wallace and ?oung hlghllghL Lhree Lrends ln Lu pollcy-maklng:

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klng's College London. 1hanks Lo Marle-Llse van veensLra, for her research asslsLance, and Lo nlna 8oeger,
8oger 8rownsword, Anna Cerbrandy, enny Creen, Allson !ones, 8alner Llndberg, lmelda Maher, Clorglo
MonLl, Ckeoghene Cdudu, lederlco CrLlno, !an CsLer, Cozde uenlz Sanrah, Mlchael Schllllg, Peba Shaheln,
Cona 5Lefan, Marlana 1avares, Alex 1urk, Pans vedder, 1[arda van der vl[ver, 8lchard Whlsh, WouLer Wlls,
Lorenzo Zucca and Lhe parLlclpanLs aL CareLh uavles' CorporaLe Soclal 8esponslblllLy and roducLlon SLandards
AmsLerdam 2013 workshop for Lhelr commenLs. lor my famlly: Peba, !allla and Samlha.
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lor example, ew8esearchCenLer, 1be New 5lck Moo of otope. tbe otopeoo uoloo, 13 May 2013.
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de 8urca and ScoLL, 'lnLroducLlon' ln de 8urca and ScoLL (eds), coostltotloool cbooqe lo tbe u. ftom
oolfotmlty to flexlblllty? (ParL 2000), 2.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
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.experlmenLaLlon wlLh and adopLlon of new modes of pollcy-maklng, ofLen ln con[uncLlon
wlLh more esLabllshed modes., renegoLlaLlon of Lhe role of Member SLaLes.ln Lhe pollcy
process, and eroslon of LradlLlonal boundarles beLween lnLernal and exLernal pollcles."
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1hls paper's slgnlflcance lles ln lLs analysls of who should generaLe Lu compeLlLlon law's subsLanLlve
pollcy, ln Lhe llghL of Lhe wlder Lu conLexL and regulaLory Lheory. lL focuses on experlmenLaLlon wlLh
new modes of pollcy-maklng, and renegoLlaLlng Member SLaLes' roles, vls-a-vls Lhe Commlsslon. lor
example, ln Lu compeLlLlon law Lhere are dlsagreemenLs on alms (goals) and meLhods (how Lo
achleve Lhe goals). Should Lhe Commlsslon sLlfle Lhem as damaglng (ofLen naLlonal) fragmenLaLlon,
unllaLerally lmposlng lLs own regulaLory vlslon, or, celebraLe Lhese useful experlmenLs ln areas of
doubL, pressure valves ln case of dlfference? 1hls paper brlngs Lhese lssues Lo Lhe fore. 8esolvlng
Lhls lssue ls parLlcularly lmporLanL glven Lhe quanLlLy of ArLlcle 101 cases brughL by Lhe nCAs.
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uue Lo dlfferlng vlews wlLhln Lhe Lu and lndlvldual Member SLaLes on how besL Lo deal wlLh our flve
challenges, SecLlon 3 asks wheLher Member SLaLes have any freedom Lo adopL dlverse poslLlons,
speclflcally ln Lhelr appllcaLlon of Lhe Lu's free movemenL of goods case law, ArLlcles 34 and 36. lL
examlnes Lhls core compeLence and noLes LhaL some Member SLaLe dlverslLy ls permlsslble Lhere.
1hen Lhe paper examlnes ArLlcle 101, anLl-compeLlLlve arrangemenLs. 1he domlnanL vlew ln Lhe Lu
ls LhaL Member SLaLes' courLs and nCAs should closely follow one, Lhe Commlsslon's, appllcaLlon of
ArLlcle 101.
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?eL, Lwo hlghly repuLable [urlsdlcLlons (Lhe uSA and Cermany) encourage, wlLhln llmlLs,
dlsagreemenLs on Lhelr own compeLlLlon laws' alms, and on Lhe meLhods Lo achleve Lhem.

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Wallace, ollack and ?oung (eds), lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe otopeoo uoloo (SlxLh edn, Cu 2010) 482.
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[refer to wouter paper, page 7 and following]
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1hls ls expllclL ln arllamenL, kesolotloo oo tbe commlssloo wblte lopet oo moJetolsotloo of tbe toles
lmplemeotloq Attlcles 85 ooJ 86 of tbe c 1teoty (cOM(1999) 101 & c5-0105/1999 & 1999/2108(cO5)) (1999),
para 6, Lhe Cplnlon of AdvocaLe-Ceneral Mazk, Case C-373/09 ltezes utzJo Ocbtooy kookoteocjl l
koosomeotw v 1ele2 lolsko sp. zoo, oow Netlo 5A w wotszowle, 3 May 2011, nyr, para 14, Luls CrLlz 8lanco &
Alfonso Lamadrld de ablo, u competltloo low ofotcemeot. elemeots fot o Jlscossloo oo effectlveoess ooJ
oolfotmlty, (2011) lordham 38Lh Conference on lnLernaLlonal AnLlLrusL Law and ollcy, DkAI1, 46-7, Cenglz,
'MulLl-level Covernance ln CompeLlLlon ollcy: Lhe Luropean CompeLlLlon neLwork' Luropean Law 8evlew,
!ones and Sufrln, u competltloo low. text, coses ooJ motetlols (lourLh edn, Cu 2010), ScoLL, '1he LvoluLlon
of CompeLlLlon Law and ollcy ln Lhe unlLed klngdom' LSL Law, SocleLy and Lconomy Worklng apers
<hLLp://www.lse.ac.uk/collecLlons/law/wps/WS2009-09_ScoLL.pdf> , 3, uougan, Notloool kemeJles 8efote
tbe coott of Iostlce. lssoes of botmoolsotloo ooJ Jlffeteotlotloo (ParL 2004), 120, Lowe, '1he 8ole of Lhe
Commlsslon ln Lhe ModernlsaLlon of LC CompeLlLlon Law' (ModernlsaLlon of LC CompeLlLlon Law:
uncerLalnLles and opporLunlLles), LenaerLs, 'ModernlsaLlon of Lhe AppllcaLlon and LnforcemenL of Luropean
CompeLlLlon Law: an lnLroducLory overvlew' ln SLuyck and Cllllams (eds), MoJetolsotloo of otopeoo
competltloo low (lnLersenLla 2002), 36-7, 1esauro, '1he 8elaLlonshlp 8eLween naLlonal CompeLlLlon
AuLhorlLles and 1helr 8especLlve CovernmenLs ln Lhe ConLexL of Lhe ModernlsaLlon lnlLlaLlve' ln Lhlermann
and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 273, Cerber,
'Modernlslng Luropean CompeLlLlon Law: a developmenLal perspecLlve' 22 Luropean CompeLlLlon Law 8evlew,
123-6, klngsLon, 'A 'new ulvlslon of 8esponsablllLles' ln Lhe roposed 8egulaLlon Lo Modernlse Lhe 8ules
lmplemenLlng ArLlcles 81 and 82 LC? A Warnlng Call'lbld, Wlmann, 'uecenLrallsed LnforcemenL of LC
CompeLlLlon Law and Lhe new ollcy on CarLels' 23 !ournal of World CompeLlLlon, 147-8, Schaub,
'ModernlzaLlon of LC CompeLlLlon Law: reform of 8egulaLlon no. 17' 23 lordham lnLernaLlonal Law !ournal,
734, 764, and Whlsh, 'naLlonal CourLs and Lhe WhlLe aper: a commenLary' ln Lhlermann (ed), 1be
MoJetolsotloo of otopeoo competltloo low. tbe oext teo yeots (CLLS Cccaslonal aper no 4 1999), 77. CLhers
assume LhaL unlformlLy ls deslrable, Whlsh and 8alley, competltloo low (SevenLh edn, Cu 2012), 288, 1emple
Lang, '1he uuLles of Co-operaLlon of naLlonal CourLs under Luropean unlon Law: prlnclples and unresolved
lssues' ln Sharpe CC (ed), llocolo's loo lectotes oo otopeoo low ooJ nomoo klqbts (Wlldy, Slmmonds & Plll
ubllshlng 2012), 70, Cl1, Attlcle 101(J) - A ulscossloo of Nottow vetsos 8tooJ uefloltloo of 8eoeflts. Jlscossloo
oote fot oo Ol1 bteokfost toooJtoble oo 12 Moy 2010 (2010), 3, Coyder and Albors-Llorens, CoyJet's c
competltloo low (llfLh edn, Cu 2008), 326, Wlgger and nlke, 'Lnhanced 8oles of rlvaLe AcLors ln Lu
8uslness 8egulaLlon and Lhe Lroslon of 8henlsh CaplLallsm: Lhe case of anLlLrusL enforcemenL' 43 !ournal of
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
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ulverslLy ln Lu compeLlLlon law has many advanLages. Lconomlcs and pollLlcal sclence show LhaL lL:
furLhers Lolerance, helps solve [urlsdlcLlonal problems, lncreases democraLlc leglLlmacy and
accommodaLes dlverse naLlonal vlews of Lhe good llfe, boLh subsLanLlvely and Lhrough openness Lo
dlfferenL mechanlsms for achlevlng such goals. ulLlmaLely Lhls helps Lo preserve Member SLaLe and
Lu ldenLlLy and allows for mulLlple problem-solvlng sLrlngs ln Lhe face of uncerLalnLy. ?eL, dlverslLy
can undermlne Lhe lnLernal markeL, lncrease Lhe cosL of lnLernaLlonal Lrade, ralse Lhe specLre of
exLernallLles and races Lo Lhe boLLom, and reLard Lhe developmenL of a unlfled body of case law.
ConLroverslally, l argue LhaL ArLlcle 101 should accommodaLe some (llmlLed) dlverslLy. 1hls ls a call
for change ln Lhe subsLanLlve Lu compeLlLlon pollcy-maklng roles: as Lhe Lu 1reaLles change, as Lhe
lnLernal markeL becomes more lnLegraLed,
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and as clLlzens demand more respecL for naLlonal
lnLeresLs. 1here ls noL '.one lnexorable paLh of lnLegraLlon lmplylng harmonlzaLlon and gradual
unlflcaLlon, buL raLher commlLmenL Lo a broad commonallLy wlLhln whlch room exlsLs for varylng
degrees of dlfference and dlverslLy.'
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Cnly Lhen can we be unlLed ln dlverslLy. l belleve LhaL Lhls ls
posslble wlLhouL amendlng Lhe exlsLlng compeLlLlon procedural regulaLlon.
Powever, Loo much dlverslLy could rlp Lhe Lu aparL. Some commonallLy ls needed lf unlLy ls noL Lo
be losL. llrsL, Lhe Lu CourLs'
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case law musL be respecLed. lor Lhe spaces beLween Lu CourL
[udgmenLs, l offer co-ordlnaLed dlverslLy, beLween absoluLe dlverslLy and unlformlLy.
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l examlne Lhe
lnLeracLlon beLween Lhe pollLlcal and legal landscapes Lo charL Lhe llmlLs of Lhe Member SLaLes'
freedom, formal reasonlng ls noL enough.
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1he llmlLs are more procedural Lhan subsLanLlve. lnslghLs

Common MarkeL SLudles, 300, Ceradln and eLlL, '!udlclal 8emedles under LC CompeLlLlon Law: Complex
lssues arlslng from Lhe 'ModernlsaLlon' rocess'', ,' ln Pawk (ed), lotetootloool Aotlttost low & lollcy 2005
(lordham CorporaLe Law lnsLlLuLe 2006), 402-3, lorresLer, 'ulverslLy and ConslsLency: can Lhey cohablL?' ln
Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 342-3,
MonLl ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002),
8, Slragusa, '1he Commlsslon's oslLlon wlLhln Lhe neLwork: Lhe perspecLlve of Lhe legal pracLlLloners' ln
Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 33, 236-7,
Commlsslon, commlssloo xplooototy MemotooJom, ltoposol fot o cooocll keqolotloo lmplemeotloq Attlcles
81 ooJ 82 of tbe 1teoty (2000), 6-7, 14, and nehl, 'Changes ln LeglslaLlon: consLlLuLlonal reform and Lhe role of
Lhe admlnlsLraLor' ln Lhlermann (ed), 1be MoJetolsotloo of otopeoo competltloo low. tbe oext teo yeots
(CLLS Cccaslonal aper no 4 1999), 22-6. Cn Lhe lmporLance of unlformlLy generally, Case C-126/97 co 5wlss
v 8eoettoo lotetootloool [1999] LC8 l-3033, para 40 and Cplnlon of AdvocaLe-Ceneral Sagglo, para 31. A few
auLhors endorse dlverslLy ln ArLlcle 101, ofLen obllquely: SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe
Lu: delegaLlon, decenLrallsaLlon, or experlmenLallsL archlLecLure?' ln Sabel and ZelLlln (eds), xpetlmeotollst
Covetoooce lo tbe otopeoo uoloo. towotJs o oew otcbltectote (Cu 2010), Wllks, 'Agencles, neLworks,
ulscourses and Lhe 1ra[ecLory of Lhe Luropean CompeLlLlon LnforcemenL' 3 Luropean CompeLlLlon !ournal,
448, venlL, '8rave new World: Lhe modernlsaLlon and decenLrallsaLlon of enforcemenL under ArLlcles 81 and
82 of Lhe LC 1reaLy' 40 Common MarkeL Law 8evlew, 339-64, and Pawk and uenael[er, '1he uevelopmenL of
ArLlcles 81 and 82: legal cerLalnLy and efflclency' ln Lhlermann (ed), 1be MoJetolsotloo of otopeoo
competltloo low. tbe oext teo yeots (CLLS Cccaslonal aper no 4 1999), 34.
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olares Maduro, we, tbe coott. tbe otopeoo coott of Iostlce ooJ tbe otopeoo cooomlc coostltotloo (ParL
1998) makes a slmllar polnL ln relaLlon Lo Lhe lnLernal markeL, see also Lhe Cplnlon of AdvocaLe Ceneral
verloren van 1hemaaL ln Case C-231/83 neotl collet v ceotte lecletc 1ooloose [1983] LC8 l-303, 308.
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de 8urca and ScoLL, 'lnLroducLlon', 2 make Lhls polnL more generally.
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1he Lu CourLs are Lhe CourL of !usLlce of Lhe Lu (LC!) and Lhe Ceneral CourL, ArLlcles 231-281 1lLu.
10
1here ls a conLlnuum from hlerarchlcal Lo more collaboraLlve, uledrlchs, 'new Modes of Covernance:
perspecLlves from Lhe legal and Lhe llvlng archlLecLure of Lhe Luropean unlon' ln uledrlchs, 8elners and
Wessels (eds), 1be uyoomlcs of cbooqe lo u Covetoooce (Ldward Llgar 2011), 211-4.
11
uledrlchs, 8elners and Wessels, 1be uyoomlcs of cbooqe lo u Covetoooce (Ldward Llgar 2011), 9, rosser,
'Concluslon: Len lessons' ln Cllver, rosser and 8awllngs (eds), 1be keqolototy 5tote. coostltotloool lmpllcotloos
(Cu 2010), 306, Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks beLween Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles ln Lhe LC and Lhe
uS: dlfferenL pollLles, dlfferenL deslgns' Luropean CompeLlLlon !ournal, 433, Walker, 'Lu ConsLlLuLlonallsm and
new Covernance' ln ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds), low ooJ New Covetoooce lo tbe u ooJ tbe u5 (ParL 2006), 33,
SLurm, 'neLworklng ln uncharLered 1errlLory: Lhe relaLlonshlp beLween Lhe members of Lhe neLwork and Lhelr
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
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from pollLlcal sclence and economlcs provlde a framework for co-ordlnaLed dlverslLy. 1he alm ls Lo
encourage sufflclenL commonallLy and experLlse, whlle slmulLaneously encouraglng experlmenLaLlon
and accepLlng dlverslLy, ln Lu compeLlLlon law and oLher areas Loo.
1hls paper ls relevanL for compeLlLlon lawyers, Lu lawyers, economlsLs and pollLlcal sclenLlsLs.
CompeLlLlon lawyers ofLen dlsregard ArLlcle 101's place wlLhln Lhe Lu 1reaLles. Slmllarly, Lu lawyers
ofLen lgnore Lhe lmpllcaLlons of Lhelr debaLes for compeLlLlon law. lnslghLs from Lhese Lwo
communlLles help us Lo conslder wheLher dlverslLy wlLhln ArLlcle 101's subsLanLlve appllcaLlon ls
legally accepLable ln Lhe exlsLlng legal framework and normaLlvely deslrable. 1he answer affecLs case
ouLcomes. lurLhermore, Lhe LCn ls held ouL as an example of neLwork governance for oLhers Lo
follow.
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lL ls valuable. 8uL we musL beLLer undersLand lLs role and dynamlc before LransplanLlng lL.
2. Cn the comp|ex|ty of the regu|atory task
1he Lu and lLs Member SLaLes have flve ma[or challenges when conslderlng dlverslLy and co-
ordlnaLlon ln Luropean law, and compeLlLlon law ln parLlcular. Cne flnds many of Lhese challenges ln
oLher regulaLory reglmes Loo. llrsL, Member SLaLes have dlfferenL vlews on harnesslng Lhe markeL's
power. 'MarkeL sLrucLures, rules, and norms vary greaLly across naLlons, for example, concernlng
publlc ownershlp and prlvlLlsaLlon, Lhe exLenL of 'deregulaLlon', Lhe role of Lhe sLaLe, and Lhe power
of flrms and organlsed labour.'
13
1he uk has a llberal economy, Cermany encourages more lnLer-flrm
co-operaLlon, lrance lles somewhere beLween Lhe Lwo.
14
CompeLlLlon law ls an lmporLanL organlslng
prlnclple ln Lhe caplLallsL world. ulfferenL markeL vlews affecL Lhe Lypes of compeLlLlon needed and
compeLlLlon law's goals. 1hls ls regulaLory lssue 1 (compeLlLlon v. co-operaLlon).
8egulaLory lssue 2 (publlc pollcy's lmporLance) arlses because Lhe Member SLaLes value goals, such
as envlronmenLal proLecLlon, dlfferenLly. 1here are many leglLlmaLe reasons for Lhls. lor example,
Lhe Member SLaLes have: dlfferenL envlronmenLal problems, rural counLrles may care more abouL
soll quallLy Lhan nolse reducLlon,
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dlfferenL valuaLlons of Lhls harm over Llme, ln Lhe flnanclal crlsls
Lhe uk ls becomlng even less green,
16
and rlch and poor counLrles cannoL afford equal levels of soclal
or envlronmenLal proLecLlon.
17
1he compeLlLlon and lnLernal markeL rules have large fooLprlnLs, Lhey
affecL many Member SLaLes' publlc pollcy goals. ulfferenL relaLlve valuaLlons of publlc pollcy, mean
LhaL some Member SLaLes flnd Lhls large fooLprlnL more problemaLlc Lhan oLhers. lL also makes lL
hard Lo agree unlform levels of proLecLlon ln harmonlsed Lu rules.
18

1hlrdly, even lf agreemenL could be reached on Lhe level and relaLlve lmporLance of publlc pollcy
values, Member SLaLes harness dlverse mechanlsms ln response. Some leglslaLe Lo resolve such

naLlonal governmenLs' ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo
Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 36, hlllpparL and Sle-uhlan-Po, 'llexlblllLy and Models of Covernance for Lhe Lu' ln
ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds), coostltotloool cbooqe lo tbe u. ftom oolfotmlty to flexlblllty? (ParL 2000), 307-8,
olares Maduro, we, tbe coott, 11-23.
12
rosser, 'Concluslon: Len lessons', 314, Commlsslon, A 5loqle Motket fot 21st ceototy otope (2007), 13, and
MonLl, Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 10.
13
1haLcher, 'varleLles of CaplLallsm ln an lnLernaLlonallsed World: domesLlc lnsLlLuLlonal change ln Luropean
LelecommunlcaLlons' 37 ComparaLlve ollLlcal SLudles, 733.
14
Wlgger and nlke, 'Lnhanced 8oles of rlvaLe AcLors ln Lu 8uslness 8egulaLlon 1haLcher, 'varleLles of
CaplLallsm', 733.
13
Ladeur, '1owards a Legal ConcepL of Lhe neLwork ln Luropean SLandard-SeLLlng' ln !oerges and vos (eds), u
commlttees. soclol teqolotloo, low ooJ polltlcs (ParL 2000), 132.
16
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 331, and olares Maduro, we, tbe coott, 103-4.
17
Scharpf, 'Luropean Covernance: common concerns vs. Lhe challenge of dlverslLy' ln !oerges, Meny and
Weller (eds), Moootolo ot Moleblll? A ctltlcol opptolsol of tbe commlssloo wblte lopet oo Covetoooce, vol
!ean MonneL Worklng aper no. 6/01 (8oberL Schuman CenLre for Advanced SLudles, Lul 2001), 3-4.
18
de 8urca and ScoLL, 'lnLroducLlon', 2.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
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Lenslons. CLhers favour co-regulaLlon, or even self-regulaLlon
19
by Lhe relevanL lndusLry. So, some
Member SLaLes wanL publlc pollcy Lo be relevanL ln Lhe lnLernal markeL (leglslaLlon) oLhers ln
compeLlLlon law (self and co-regulaLlon). 1hls ls regulaLory lssue 3 (approprlaLe mechanlsms).
8egulaLory lssue 4 (mulLl-level power dlsLrlbuLlon) ls one of Lhe mosL LesLlng lssues ln sLrucLures llke
Lhe Lu.
20
1he dlsLrlbuLlon of power beLween Lhe Lu and Lhe Member SLaLes ls consLlLuLlonally
guaranLeed. Powever, Lhese '.asslgnmenLs of auLhorlLy are ofLen sLaLed ln vague Lerms, and ln
pracLlce federal and sLaLe governmenLs frequenLly en[oy concurrenL raLher Lhan excluslve
[urlsdlcLlon ln mosL lssue areas.'
21
ower sLruggles arlse beLween Lhe Lu and Lhe Member SLaLes.
22

Some say LhaL power runs lnexorably Lo Lhe Lu, ln facL, lL ebbs and flows.
23
ollack Lalks of cycles of
federallsm, power and auLhorlLy are cenLrallsed '.followed perlodlcally by backlashes ln whlch
sLaLes seek a rebalanclng or devoluLlon of power back Lo Lhe sLaLes.'
24

llfLhly, openlng up markeLs Lo forelgn compeLlLlon and '.advancemenLs ln Lechnology have broughL
abouL a fundamenLal LransformaLlon ln models of buslness organlsaLlon.'
23
verLlcal lnLegraLlon was
Lhe paradlgm, lL was consldered more efflclenL and reduced hold-up problems. 1oday's more volaLlle
markeL condlLlons and advances ln producLlon mean LhaL flrms musL conLlnuously lnnovaLe and
need access Lo new knowledge. 1hey lncreaslngly focus on core acLlvlLles, forglng shlfLlng sLraLeglc
alllances wlLh oLher lndependenL flrms. 1here are more arrangemenLs beLween flrms. CompeLlLlon
law assessmenLs demand complex analysls of Lhe arrangemenLs' poslLlve dynamlc effecLs, lncludlng
on lnnovaLlon, and Lhe poLenLlal for colluslve harm. 1hls ls dlfflculL, Lhere ls llLLle evldence and Lhe
economlcs remalns unclear. 1hls ls regulaLory lssue 3 (uncerLalnLy).
As a resulL, Lhe early LLC proLoLype of one '.lnexorable paLh of lnLegraLlon lmplylng harmonlsaLlon
and gradual unlflcaLlon.' was Loo resLrlcLlve. lL was probably over-sLaLed ln any evenL. SecLlon 3
shows LhaL, ln many areas of Lu law, Lhere ls a '.commlLmenL Lo a broad commonallLy wlLhln whlch
room exlsLs for varylng degrees of dlfference and dlverslLy.'
26
1hls Lakes our flve challenges serlously.
3. D|vers|ty

19
'Self-regulaLlon refers Lo Lhe creaLlon of common guldellnes by economlc operaLors and/ oLher sLakeholders,
co-regulaLlon refers Lo Lhe slLuaLlon whereby Lu secondary law seLs Lhe ob[ecLlves and enLrusLs cerLaln parLles
(economlc operaLors, soclal parLners.) wlLh Lhe aLLalnmenL Lhereof.', Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o
MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy (2007), 12.
20
LlndseLh, 'uelegaLlon ls uead, Long Llve uelegaLlon: managlng Lhe democraLlc dlsconnecL ln Lhe Luropean
markeL-pollLy' ln !oerges and uehousse (eds), CooJ Covetoooce lo otope's loteqtoteJ Motket (Cu 2002),
138.
21
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 29. Slmllarly, Lverson, '1he Crlsls of lndeLermlnacy: an
'equlLable' law of 'dellberaLlve' Luropean markeL admlnlsLraLlon?' ln !oerges and uehousse (eds), CooJ
Covetoooce lo otope's loteqtoteJ Motket (Cu 2002), 233-9.
22
LlndseLh, 'uelegaLlon ls uead, Long Llve uelegaLlon: managlng Lhe democraLlc dlsconnecL ln Lhe Luropean
markeL-pollLy' lnlbld , 160, and Walker, 'llexlblllLy wlLhln a MeLaconsLlLuLlonal lrame: reflecLlons on Lhe fuLure
of legal auLhorlLy ln Lurope' ln de 8urca and ScoLL (eds), coostltotloool cbooqe lo tbe u. ftom oolfotmlty to
flexlblllty? (ParL 2000), 10-4.
23
8especLlvely, uledrlchs, 8elners and Wessels, 1be uyoomlcs of cbooqe, 14, c.f. 44, and Wallace, ollack and
?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 483. lor Lhe Lu and uS: uonahue and ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs
ulsconLenLs: Lhe rhyLhms of federallsm ln Lhe unlLed SLaLes and Lhe Luropean unlon' ln nlcolaidls and Powse
(eds), 1be leJetol vlsloo. leqltlmocy ooJ levels of qovetoooce lo tbe uolteJ 5totes ooJ tbe otopeoo uoloo
(Cu 2001), and keohane and nye, '1ransgovernmenLal 8elaLlons and lnLernaLlonal CrganlsaLlons' 27 World
ollLlcs, 38-62. Pans vedder rlghLly noLes LhaL boLh Lhe Lu and Member SLaLes, qua acLors, and Lhelr lnLeresLs,
are lnLerLwlned, maklng Lhe analysls even more complex.
24
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 29.
23
SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe Lu', 93.
26
de 8urca and ScoLL, 'lnLroducLlon', 2.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
6

1he flve regulaLory challenges seen above, affecL Lhe Lu and Lhe Member SLaLes' ablllLy Lo agree Lhe
rlghL Lype and level of lnLervenLlon. 1he response has been Lo allow Lhe Member SLaLes some
freedom when applylng Lu law. arL (a) shows Lhls for free movemenL of goods. 1olerance of publlc
pollcy ls changlng Lhere (lssue 2), as ls Lhe Member SLaLes' freedom Lo pursue dlfferenL goals, Lo
dlfferenL degrees (lssue 4). ConLrary Lo Lhe prevalllng wlsdom, dlverslLy has advanLages for Lu
compeLlLlon law Loo. arL (b) caLalogues Lhem, along wlLh some dlsadvanLages. llnally, dlrecL effecL,
whlch mlghL have been seen as an obsLacle, allows some dlverslLy, arL (c).
a. D|vers|ty |n LU free movement of goods
1he Lu's openness Lo regulaLlon has changed over Llme. 1ake ArLlcle 34, for example, lL prohlblLs
'.quanLlLaLlve resLrlcLlons on lmporLs and all measures havlng equlvalenL effecL.beLween Member
SLaLes.' ln Lhe 1960s, Lhe Commlsslon (and Lhe Lu CourLs) began Lo use Lhe free movemenL rules,
especlally ArLlcle 34, Lo LargeL naLlonal rules, ofLen soclal regulaLlon. lL wanLed deLalled, harmonlsed,
Lu rules for all. AgreemenL was eluslve, glven Lhe flve regulaLory challenges noLed above
27
and Lhe
need for unanlmlLy for Lu harmonlsaLlon rules aL LhaL Llme. 1hese clashes undermlned publlc pollcy
proLecLlon (lssue 2), and affecLed Lhe Member SLaLe/ Lu balance of power (lssue 4).
28

ln Lhe absence of exhausLlve Lu-level regulaLory harmonlsaLlon, ootloool rules can only be saved lf
Lhey fall wlLhln Lhe mandaLory requlremenLs (M8s), or ArLlcle 36. 1he M8s are '.ln Lhe general
lnLeresL and such as Lo Lake precedence over Lhe requlremenLs of Lhe free movemenL of goods.'
29

1hey lnclude falr commerclal LransacLlons and envlronmenLal proLecLlon.
30
ArLlcle 36 provldes for
some excepLlons based on '.publlc morallLy, publlc pollcy or publlc securlLy, Lhe proLecLlon of healLh
and llfe of humans, anlmals or planLs.or Lhe proLecLlon of lndusLrlal and commerclal properLy.'
As Lhe case law under ArLlcle 34, Lhe M8s and ArLlcle 36 develops, lL affecLs Lhe equlllbrlum under
lssues 2 and 4. ln 1974 Lhe LC! responded Lo Lhe Lu leglslaLlve blockage by expandlng ArLlcle 34.
31

1he balance LllLed Lowards Lhe markeL and Lhe Lu. Member SLaLes responded wlLh new ootloool
rules (re-selzlng power).
32
8y Lhe 1980s Lurope faced an economlc crlsls. Companles complalned of
burdensome regulaLlon. An Lu consensus emerged, favourlng re-regulaLlon aL Lhe Lu level. ln cossls
Je uljoo,
33
Lhe LC! gave Lhe Commlsslon a new Lool for purslng Lhls, muLual recognlLlon. 1he Slngle
Luropean AcL 1983 pushed power Lowards Lhe Lu. lL made generaLlng (harmonlsed) Lu level rules
easler as quallfled ma[orlLy voLlng (CMv) began Lo replace unanlmlLy ln Councll voLlng.
1he Member SLaLes' power Lo dlsrupL Lrade changes ln Lhe shadow of unanlmlLy and CMv. under
unanlmlLy, sLrlcL Member SLaLes wlLh hlgh regulaLory sLandards, can ban 'bad' producLs from Lhelr
LerrlLorles, Lhe cosL falls on producers ln oLher Member SLaLes. under CMv, sLrlcL Member SLaLes
cannoL hold ouL alone.
34
1hls lmpacLs upon democraLlc leglLlmacy (lssues 2 and 4). lurLhermore, Lhe
LC! (an Lu body) decldes upon '.Lhe rlghL balance beLween markeL lnLegraLlon on Lhe one hand and

27
uonahue and ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs ulsconLenLs', 100-2, and uehousse, 'lnLegraLlon v 8egulaLlon?
Cn Lhe uynamlcs of 8egulaLlon ln Lhe Luropean CommunlLy' 30 !ournal of Common MarkeL SLudles, 391.
28
uougan, Notloool kemeJles 8efote tbe coott of Iostlce, 113-9, LlndseLh, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy and Lhe
AdmlnlsLraLlve CharacLer of SupranaLlonallsm: Lhe example of Lhe Luropean CommunlLy' 99 Columbla Law
8evlew, 662-3, and olares Maduro, we, tbe coott, 23-4.
29
Case 120/78 kewe-2eottol v 8ooJesmooopolvetwoltooq [1979] LC8 649, para 14.
30
8especLlvely, Case 120/78, lblJ., para 13, and Case 302/86 commlssloo v ueomotk [1998] LC8 4607, para 8.
Member SLaLes musL (ofLen) accepL ln Lhelr own markeLs producLs approved for sale by oLher Member SLaLes.
31
Case 8/74 ltocoteot Jo kol v 8eooit ooJ Costove uossoovllle [1974] LC8 837.
32
uougan, Notloool kemeJles 8efote tbe coott of Iostlce, 189, and Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq
lo tbe u, 110. 1hese new rules were also suscepLlble Lo Lu challenge.
33
Case 120/78 kewe-2eottol v 8ooJesmooopolvetwoltooq fot 8toootwelo [1979] LC8 649.
34
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 123, uehousse, 'MlsflLs: Lu law and Lhe LransformaLlon
of Luropean governance' ln !oerges and uehousse (eds), CooJ Covetoooce lo otope's loteqtoteJ Motket (Cu
2002), 209, and LlndseLh, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy and Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlve CharacLer of SupranaLlonallsm', 663-
8.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
7

soclal pollcy...' on Lhe oLher, and so conLrols naLlonal regulaLlon (lssues 3 and 4).
33
1he LC! has been
crlLlclsed for falllng Lo adequaLely reflecL a change ln Lhe Lu 1reaLles, as Lhey move from a pure
economlc communlLy, Lo one lncreaslngly based on soclo-economlc values (lssue 2).
36

1he Commlsslon also persuaded Member SLaLes Lo pursue publlc pollcy Lhrough mlnlmum Lu-level
requlremenLs, leavlng scope for naLlonal varlaLlon, sub[ecL Lo muLual recognlLlon.
37
Member SLaLes
lose some conLrol, buL geLLlng agreemenL ls easler
38
as some flexlblllLy ls preserved.
39
ulverslLy can
undermlne Lhe lnLernal markeL, buL lL can be beneflclal. Lurope's dlverse language, culLural and
consumer preferences are '.an lnvaluable asseL and source of lnnovaLlon.'
40
lrom a democraLlc
leglLlmacy perspecLlve, anger ls dlrecLed aL Lhe Lu when lL does noL respecL naLlonal LasLes/ cholces:
1he perslsLenL soclo-pollLlcal/ soclo-culLural aLLachmenL Lo naLlonal consLlLuLlonal bodles as
Lhe prlvlleged expresslons of democraLlc leglLlmacy ls an emplrlcal reallLy LhaL slmply cannoL
be Lheorlzed away. 1hls aLLachmenL ls a background consLralnL so fundamenLal as Lo be
someLlmes overlooked ln non-hlerarchlcal Lheorles of Lu governance."
41

ue-regulaLlon has a pollLlcal dlmenslon.
42
1he Commlsslon now says LhaL Lhe lnLernal markeL musL
be more responslve Lo Lu clLlzens' concerns, especlally on soclo-envlronmenLal lssues (lssue 2).
43

uemocracy cannoL always be (re)galned aL Lhe Lu level (lssue 4). So, Lhe rlghL acLor, be lL Lu or Lhe
Member SLaLes, musL acL, when necessary, Lo proLecL relevanL values. 1he Commlsslon says LhaL
regulaLlon musL be '.deslgned as closely Lo Lhe markeL as posslble and accounL, where needed, for

33
CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy: an lnsLlLuLlonal ldeal for Lurope?' ln !oerges and
uehousse (eds), CooJ Covetoooce lo otope's loteqtoteJ Motket (Cu 2002), 329. Also, Lverson, '1he Crlsls of
lndeLermlnacy: an 'equlLable' law of 'dellberaLlve' Luropean markeL admlnlsLraLlon?' lnlbld , 233, olares
Maduro, we, tbe coott, 103-11.
36
uemeLrlou and Plgglns, 'lree MovemenL and Lhe LnvlronmenL: seelng Lhe wood for Lhe Lrees' ln Posklns and
8oblnson (eds), A 1toe otopeoo. essoys fot IoJqe uovlJ JwotJs (ParL 2004), 201. C.f. Lhe Cplnlon of
AdvocaLe-Ceneral !acobs ln Case C-379/98 lteosseolektto v 5cbleswoq [2001] LC8 l-2099, paras 223-33,
Cllver (ed) Ollvet oo ltee Movemeot of CooJs lo tbe otopeoo uoloo (llfLh edn, ParL 2010), 219, CersLenberg
and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 329, and WeaLherlll, 'llndlng Space for Closer Co-operaLlon ln Lhe
lleld of CulLure' ln ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds), coostltotloool cbooqe lo tbe u. ftom oolfotmlty to flexlblllty?
(ParL 2000), 244-3.
37
Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, 9, uonahue and ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and
lLs ulsconLenLs', 102-3. Schllllg, kooktetlsletooqskompeteoz ooJ kooktetlsletooqsmetboJeo lm otopolscbeo
ltlvottecbt (ueCruyLer 2009), 38-62 crlLlclses Lhls.
38
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 110-3, and LlndseLh, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy and Lhe
AdmlnlsLraLlve CharacLer of SupranaLlonallsm', 663-6.
39
Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, 10. An example ls Councll ulrecLlve
89/48/LLC, oo o qeoetol system fot tbe tecoqoltloo of blqbet-eJocotloo Jlplomos owotJeJ oo completloo of
ptofessloool eJocotloo ooJ ttololoq of ot leost tbtee yeots' Jototloo, C! 1989 L19/16.
40
Commlsslon, A 5loqle Motket fot 21st ceototy otope, 3.
41
LlndseLh, 'uelegaLlon ls uead, Long Llve uelegaLlon', 142-3. Also, Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq
lo tbe u, 127, CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 301-3, uonahue and ollack,
'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs ulsconLenLs', 76, Ma[one, '8egulaLory LeglLlmacy ln Lhe unlLed SLaLes and Lhe Luropean
unlon' lnlbld , 267-8, and olares Maduro, we, tbe coott, 113. 8esenLmenL ls lncreaslng, Wallace, ollack and
?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 484, and Scharpf, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy under CondlLlons of 8egulaLory
CompeLlLlon: why Lurope dlffers from Lhe unlLed SLaLes' ln nlcolaidls and Powse (eds), 1be leJetol vlsloo.
leqltlmocy ooJ levels of qovetoooce lo tbe uolteJ 5totes ooJ tbe otopeoo uoloo (Cu 2001), 360-2.
42
Chalmers, uavles and MonLl, otopeoo uoloo low. coses ooJ motetlols (Second edn, Cambrldge unlverslLy
ress 2010), 916, and Chang, 2J 1bloqs 1bey uoo't 1ell oo Aboot copltollsm (enguln 8ooks 2010), 10, 247-8.
43
Commlsslon, commlssloo to boost ptotectloo fot posteJ wotkets (2012), SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon
Covernance ln Lhe Lu', 83, Commlsslon, commlssloo stoff wotkloq Jocomeot, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ
5loqle Motket lollcy, occompooyloq tbe commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo lotllomeot, tbe
cooocll, tbe otopeoo cooomlc ooJ 5oclol commlttee ooJ tbe commlttee of tbe keqloos, A 5loqle Motket fot
21st ceototy otope (2007), Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, 17, 20.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
8

naLlonal dlverslLy.'
44
Slnce Lhe 1990s Lhe paradlgm of '.unlformlLy, homogenelLy and one-
dlmenslonal lnLegraLlon ls gradually belng replaced by one of flexlblllLy, mlxlLy and dlfferenLlaLlon.'
43

We have seen LhaL Lhls ls Lrue for free movemenL, slmllar sLorles can be Lold ln: LMu, soclal pollcy,
labour law, culLure and envlronmenLal proLecLlon.
46
1he Llsbon 1reaLy paved Lhe way for sLronger
supranaLlonal feaLures, whlle balanclng Lhls wlLh heLerogenelLy ln new, lnLeresLlng ways (lssue 3).
47

b. D|vers|ty |n LU compet|t|on |aw
1hls parL dlscusses Lhe advanLages and dlsadvanLages of allowlng dlfference or dlverslLy ln Lu
compeLlLlon law, speclflcally ArLlcle 101, whlch deals wlLh anLl-compeLlLlve arrangemenLs. 1he
dlverslLy of nCAs and Lhe law LhaL Lhey enforce changes over Llme.
48

ln essence, ArLlcle 101(1) prohlblLs arrangemenLs beLween underLaklngs whlch may affecL Lrade
beLween Member SLaLes and whlch resLrlcL compeLlLlon wlLhln Lhe lnLernal markeL. ArrangemenLs
LhaL breach Lhls provlslon can be saved by ArLlcle 101(3), whlch has four cumulaLlve condlLlons. ln
brlef Lhe arrangemenL musL: lmprove Lhe producLlon or dlsLrlbuLlon of goods or promoLe Lechnlcal
or economlc progress, and allow consumers a falr share of Lhe resulLlng beneflL. 1he arrangemenL
musL noL: lmpose resLrlcLlons whlch are noL lndlspensable Lo Lhe aLLalnmenL of Lhese ob[ecLlves, and
ellmlnaLe compeLlLlon ln respecL of a subsLanLlal parL of Lhe producLs ln quesLlon.
under 8egulaLlon 17, Lhe Commlsslon, Lhe nCAs and Member SLaLes' courLs (Lhe relevanL acLors) all
lmplemenLed ArLlcle 101(1). Cnly Lhe Commlsslon applled ArLlcle 101(3). Councll 8egulaLlon 1/2003
now allows all of Lhe relevanL acLors Lo apply all of ArLlcle 101.
49

Legal provlslons cannoL be applled perfecLly unlformly. 1he real quesLlon ls how much dlfference ls
deslrable ln Lhe Lu.
30
As all Lhe relevanL acLors applled ArLlcles 101(1) and 102, unlformlLy was noL
presenL. ?eL, many feared LhaL, wlLh Lhe 2004 loss of Lhe Commlsslon's ArLlcle 101(3) monopoly, Lhe
'.unlform appllcaLlon of LC compeLlLlon law would be unwound Lhrough Lhe lndependenL acLlons of

44
Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, 8. Also page 3, Commlsslon, A 5loqle
Motket fot 21st ceototy otope, 12, Commlsslon, otopeoo Covetoooce. o wblte popet (2001), 12-3, 32-4.
43
de 8urca and ScoLL, 'lnLroducLlon', 2. uonahue and ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs ulsconLenLs', 110-1,
8arnard, 'llexlblllLy and Soclal ollcy' ln ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds), coostltotloool cbooqe lo tbe u. ftom
oolfotmlty to flexlblllty? (ParL 2000), de 8urca, 'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'? 1he Case of Lhe lnLernal
MarkeL' lnlbld , 133-4, 140, Shaw, 'ConsLlLuLlonallsm and llexlblllLy ln Lhe Lu: developlng a raLlonal approach'
lnlbld , 340, WeaLherlll, 'llndlng Space for Closer Co-operaLlon ln Lhe lleld of CulLure' lnlbld , 237-8 and 233-3.
46
de 8urca and ScoLL (2006), 8udzlnskl, '1owards an lnLernaLlonal Covernance of 1ransborder Mergers?' 36
n?u !ournal of lnLernaLlonal Law and ollLlcs, 27, 8arnard and ueakln, 'MarkeL Access and 8egulaLory
CompeLlLlon' (1he Legal loundaLlons of Lhe Slngle MarkeL: unpacklng Lhe premlses), Maher and Podson, '1he
Cpen MeLhod as a new Mode of Covernance: Lhe case of sofL economlc pollcy co-ordlnaLlon' 39 !ournal of
Common MarkeL SLudles, 722, eLerson and C'1oole, 'lederal Covernance ln Lhe unlLed SLaLes and Lhe
Luropean unlon: a pollcy neLwork perspecLlve' ln nlcolaidls and Powse (eds), 1be leJetol vlsloo. leqltlmocy
ooJ levels of qovetoooce lo tbe uolteJ 5totes ooJ tbe otopeoo uoloo (Cu 2001), 312, de 8urca and ScoLL,
'lnLroducLlon', LlndseLh, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy and Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlve CharacLer of SupranaLlonallsm', 670-1.
47
uledrlchs, 'new Modes of Covernance', 216-7 and 233-7, and Sabel and ZelLlln (eds), xpetlmeotollst
Covetoooce lo tbe otopeoo uoloo. towotJs o oew otcbltectote (Cu 2010).
48
SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe Lu', 83. ln facL, Cerber reporLs Lhree sLages of evoluLlon
ln Lhe Commlsslon/ nCA relaLlonshlp, Cerber, '1he LvoluLlon of a Luropean CompeLlLlon Law neLwork' ln
Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 46-39.
49
8especLlvely, Councll 8egulaLlon, lltst keqolotloo lmplemeotloq Attlcles 85 ooJ 86 of tbe 1teoty, C! 1939-62,
p. 87, and Councll 8egulaLlon, oo tbe lmplemeototloo of tbe toles oo competltloo lolJ Jowo lo Attlcles 81 ooJ
82 of tbe 1teoty, C! 2003 L1/1.
30
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low (ParL 2009), 183, Waelbroeck ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu,
coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 304-3, 466-7.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
9

Lhe varlous acLors.'
31
Cbvlously, ln Llmes of (legal) doubL Lhe naLlonal courLs can make an ArLlcle 267
reference Lo Lhe LC!. 1hls avenue ls noL open Lo Lhe nCAs. So, recelved wlsdom sLaLes LhaL Lhe nCAs
should mlmlc Lhe Commlsslon's appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101.
32
Some argue LhaL Councll 8egulaLlon
1/2003 Lakes conslsLency ln ArLlcle 101 '.very serlously.'
33
Slmllarly, Lhe Commlsslon wanLs a
'.conslsLenL appllcaLlon of Lhe rules, and Lhe preservaLlon of Lhe unlLy of compeLlLlon pollcy.'
34

A unlform appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101 has many beneflLs. kokoLL argues LhaL lL ensures some parlLy of
purchaslng and selllng condlLlons. 'noL only Lhe fundamenLal ob[ecLlve of equal condlLlons of
compeLlLlon for underLaklngs on Lhe slngle markeL buL also Lhe concern for unlform proLecLlon of
consumer lnLeresLs ln Lhe enLlre CommunlLy.'
33
de vlsser belleves LhaL underLaklngs have Lhe rlghL
Lo have slmllar slLuaLlons LreaLed ln Lhe same way LhroughouL Lhe Lu.
36
ln any evenL, when flrms
play on a level playlng fleld, lL helps Lo encourage compeLlLlon on Lhe merlLs beLween Lhem.
37

Powever, lL ls unclear wheLher a rlghL Lo equallLy goes as far as de vlsser suggesLs. nor musL one
over-sLaLe Lhe value of Lhe level playlng fleld ln Lhe Lu legal order. 1he Lu 1reaLles allow Lhe
Member SLaLes Lo creaLe dlfferenL condlLlons of compeLlLlon aL home.
38
Slmllarly, whlle consumer
lnLeresLs may have a mlnlmal level of proLecLlon LhroughouL Lhe Lu, Lhere are ofLen dlfferences ln
Lhe acLual level of proLecLlon, some Member SLaLes provlde slgnlflcanLly more proLecLlon Lhan Lhls
agreed mlnlmum.
39
lf consumers purchase Lu-wlde, Lhey wlll push compeLlLlon beLween sysLems.
60

lnLernaLlonal Lrade ls affecLed where Lhere ls a rlsk of confllcLlng declslons, even lf boLh answers are
equally leglLlmaLe.
61
1hls ls parLlcularly so lf behavlour ls mandaLory ln one LerrlLory and prohlblLed
elsewhere. Where behavlour ls posslble ln one LerrlLory, buL noL ln anoLher, Lhen lnLernaLlonal Lrade,
even lf feaslble, becomes more expenslve. llrms have cosLs, for example, ln undersLandlng whaL Lhe

31
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, xx-xxl. See also, laull and nlkpay (eds), 1be c low of
competltloo (Second edn, Cu 2007), para 2.03, and Commlsslon, commlssloo xplooototy MemotooJom,
ltoposol fot o cooocll keqolotloo lmplemeotloq Attlcles 81 ooJ 82 of tbe 1teoty, 6.
32
See fooLnoLe 6.
33
laull and nlkpay, 1be c low of competltloo, paras 2.203-4.
34
Commlsslon, otopeoo commlssloo wblte lopet, oo moJetolzotloo of tbe toles lmplemeotloq Attlcles 85 ooJ
86 of tbe c 1teoty (1999), para 104. See also paras 83, 84 and 101-28. Commlsslon, commoolcotloo ftom tbe
commlssloo to tbe otopeoo lotllomeot ooJ tbe cooocll, kepott oo tbe fooctlooloq of keqolotloo 1/200J
(2009), para 47, and Commlsslon, commlssloo Notlce, oo lofotmol qolJooce telotloq to oovel poestloos
coocetoloq Attlcles 81 ooJ 82 of tbe c 1teoty tbot otlse lo loJlvlJool coses (qolJooce lettets) (2004), para 2.
33
Cplnlon of AdvocaLe Ceneral kokoLL, Case C-8/08 1-Moblle NetbetlooJs [2009] LC8 l-4329, para 83. See also,
Cplnlon of AdvocaLe-Ceneral Mazk, Case C-373/09 ltezes utzJo Ocbtooy kookoteocjl l koosomeotw v
1ele2 lolsko sp. zoo, oow Netlo 5A w wotszowle, 3 May 2011, noL yeL reporLed, paras 43-4, Luls CrLlz 8lanco &
Alfonso Lamadrld de ablo, u competltloo low ofotcemeot. elemeots fot o Jlscossloo oo effectlveoess ooJ
oolfotmlty, (2011) lordham 38Lh Conference on lnLernaLlonal AnLlLrusL Law and ollcy [note th|s |s not the
f|na| vers|on], 47, de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 134, and SLurm, 'neLworklng ln
uncharLered 1errlLory', 282.
36
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 133-4. 1hls vlew ls dlscussed aL uougan, Notloool kemeJles
8efote tbe coott of Iostlce, 86-91.
37
8eclLal 8, 8egulaLlon 1/2003, see also arLlcle 3(2), lL does noL defend perfecL unlformlLy. See also, uougan,
Notloool kemeJles 8efote tbe coott of Iostlce, 86-91.
38
lor example, arLlcle 3(3) of 8egulaLlon 1/2003, and ArLlcles 34 and 36 1lLu.
39
Case C-484/08, cojo Je Abottos Je lleJoJ Je MoJtlJ v Aosbooc, [2010] LC8 l-4783, paras 27-44, lnLerpreLlng
ulrecLlve 93/13, oo oofolt tetms lo coosomet coottocts, C! 1993 L93/29.
60
8arnard and ueakln, 'MarkeL Access and 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 10-1, olares Maduro, we, tbe coott, 132,
buL see 139.
61
kozuka, '1he Lconomlc lmpllcaLlons of unlformlLy ln Law' 4 unlform Law 8evlew, 686, 8udzlnskl,
'1ransborder Mergers', 3, 44, and uehousse, 'lnLegraLlon v 8egulaLlon?', 393.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
10

dlfferenL rules are.
62
CosLs arlse as soon as dlfference ls posslble. 1hls affecLs our deslre for unlform
publlc pollcy valuaLlons ln Lu rules (lssues 2 and 4) and ldenLlcal approprlaLe mechanlsms (lssue 3).
Powever, faclllLaLlng lnLernaLlonal Lrade, even wlLhln Lhe Lu, ls noL Lhe only value ln our sysLem.
Where dlfferenL appllcaLlons of ArLlcle 101 would arlse due Lo dlfferenL valuaLlons of anoLher
relevanL value, Lhen lncreased LransacLlon cosLs probably arlse ouL of Lhls dlfference, wheLher or noL
lL ls LoleraLed wlLhln ArLlcle 101 (lssue 3). lmaglne LhaL one Member SLaLe values beneflLs Lo fuLure
consumers ln ArLlcle 101, whlle anoLher Lhlnks LhaL Lhey should be consldered, buL uses oLher laws
lnsLead. llrms musL comply wlLh oLher laws proLecLlng such values, as well as compeLlLlon law. lf
Lhese dlfferenL valuaLlons of e.g. fuLure consumers' beneflLs, musL be achleved Lhrough oLher laws,
LransacLlon cosLs, lawyer's fees, and complylng wlLh all Lhe dlfferenL laws, eLc. mlghL noL change.
63

Moreover, lncreased LransacLlon cosLs may be toletoteJ lf Lhe beneflLs derlved from dlverslLy are
sufflclenLly lmporLanL, or aL leasL lf Lhe cosL of unlformlLy ls more Lhan Lhe beneflLs of prevenLlng
dlverslLy. l focus on Lwo klnds of dlsagreemenLs here: dlsagreemenLs on alms and dlsagreemenLs on
meLhods.
64
l LreaL Lhem separaLely, alLhough Lhey overlap Lo some degree.
1here are several varleLles of caplLallsm, and compeLlLlon law's goals (for example consumer welfare
or Crdollberallsm) are affecLed by Lhe one LhaL we selecL (lssue 1).
63
Many alms have been
suggesLed for ArLlcle 101. Lven wlLhln Lhe consumer welfare sLandard, dlsagreemenL exlsLs abouL
wheLher Lo focus on shorL or long-Lerm galns.
66
ln addlLlon, publlc pollcy goals are lmporLanL ln Lu
law. 8ecenL Lu CourL [udgmenLs conflrm Lhelr relevance ln ArLlcle 101, Lhlnk of values such as:
markeL lnLegraLlon, publlc healLh, envlronmenLal proLecLlon, admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce, culLure, eLc.
67

Many assume LhaL Lhere ls only one 'correcL' resulL ln ArLlcle 101. unlformlLy ls lmporLanL, buL
dlverslLy has beneflLs Loo. Assume LhaL, Lhe nMa (uuLch nCA) conslders Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce

62
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 134, Maher, '8egulaLlon and Modes of Covernance ln LC
CompeLlLlon Law: whaL's new ln enforcemenL?' 31 lordham lnLernaLlonal Law !ournal, 1719-20, especlally
fooLnoLe 36, 1esauro, '1he 8elaLlonshlp 8eLween nCAs and 1helr CovernmenLs', 172, 1haLcher, '1he Causes
and Consequences of 8egulaLlon by neLworks: LelecommunlcaLlons ln Lurope' lnlbld , 132, and 8lbsLeln and
kobayashl, 'An Lconomlc Analysls of unlform SLaLe Laws' 23 1he !ournal of Legal SLudles, 138.
63
1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy (ParL 2009), 33. AlLhough noLe, Commlsslon, ColJelloes oo tbe
ossessmeot of botlzootol metqets ooJet tbe cooocll keqolotloo oo tbe coottol of cooceottotloos betweeo
ooJettokloqs (2004), para 80.
64
Slmllarly, ln Lhe absence of Lu harmonlsaLlon, and wlLhln llmlLs, Lhe Member SLaLes may adopL Lhelr own
procedural rules for compeLlLlon enforcemenL, AdvocaLe Ceneral kokoLL, Case C-8/08 1-Moblle NetbetlooJ
[2009] LC8 l-4329, paras 83-4. SancLlons LhaL are posslble (and applled) ln Lhe Member SLaLes dlffer, so, Lhe
'cosL' of breachlng ArLlcle 101 may dlffer LhroughouL Lhe Lu. 1hls may affecL Lhe klnds of breaches LhaL Lake
place, ln a slmllar way Lo subsLanLlve dlfferences ln Lhe appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101. See, Cenglz, 'MulLl-level
Covernance ln CompeLlLlon ollcy', 663, Maher and 5Lefan, 'CompeLlLlon Law ln Lurope: Lhe challenge of a
neLwork consLlLuLlon' ln Cllver, rosser and 8awllngs (eds), 1be keqolototy 5tote. coostltotloool lmpllcotloos
(Cu 2010), 189-90, SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe Lu', 99-103, Commlsslon,
commlssloo stoff wotkloq popet occompooyloq tbe commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo
lotllomeot ooJ cooocll, kepott oo tbe fooctlooloq of keqolotloo 1/200J (2009), para 203, Commlsslon,
commlssloo, kepott oo competltloo lollcy 2007 (2007), para 436, and , 107. ulfferenL admlnlsLraLlve prlorlLy
crlLerla can also produce slmllar resulLs.
63
1haLcher, 'varleLles of CaplLallsm'.
66
1ownley, '8ememberlng 1hose noL ?eL 8orn: lnLer-generaLlonal lmpacLs ln compeLlLlon analysls' Luropean
CompeLlLlon Law 8evlew, and Wlgger and nlke, 'Lnhanced 8oles of rlvaLe AcLors ln Lu 8uslness 8egulaLlon'.
67
Case C-319/04 Meco MeJloo v commlssloo [2006] LC8 l-6991, para 43, and Case 1-193/02 looteot lloo v
commlssloo [2003] LC8 ll-209, para 102. 1ownley, 'ls 1here (SLlll) 8oom for non-Lconomlc ArgumenLs ln ArLlcle
101 1lLu Cases?' ln Pelde-!rgensen (ed), Alms ooJ voloes lo u competltloo low (u!l ubllshlng 2013),
1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, lnLroducLlon, ChapLer 2 and arL 8, and MonLl, 'ArLlcle 81 LC and
ubllc ollcy' 39 Common MarkeL Law 8evlew 1037. C.f. Wlls, ltloclples of otopeoo Aotlttost ofotcemeot
(ParL 2003), 9-10.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
11

Lo be more lmporLanL ln Lhe ArLlcle 101 balance Lhan Lhe Cl1 (uk nCA). 1hls mlghL be because Lhe
uuLch value admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce more hlghly (lssue 2), or, because Lhe 8rlLlsh do noL belleve ln
publlc pollcy balanclng ln ArLlcle 101 (lssue 3). lmaglne Lwo legally ldenLlcal cases ln Lhose Lwo
counLrles, wlLh dlfferenL parLles, boLh agreemenLs appreclably resLrlcL compeLlLlon under ArLlcle
101, buL Lhere are conslderable beneflLs for Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce. 1he nMa mlghL 'allow' Lhe
agreemenL,
68
buL Lhe Cl1 mlghL prohlblL ln a legally ldenLlcal case. 1he relevanL acLors mlghL form
dlfferenL concluslons, wbeo opplyloq Attlcle 101, because of dlfferenL value [udgmenLs. 1hls ls noL
[usL a LheoreLlcal problem. ln llne wlLh Lu CourL [udgmenLs, Lhe nMa's Aooool kepott 2009 explalns
LhaL lL conslders publlc pollcy goals ln ArLlcle 101.
69
Cn Lhe oLher hand, ln 2010 Lhe Cl1 had a
roundLable Lo dlscuss ArLlcle 101's goals lmplylng LhaL lL would noL.
70
ln 2012 Lhe uk governmenL
proposed changes Lo Lhe uk compeLlLlon reglme, lncludlng glvlng a new compeLlLlon auLhorlLy a
slngle prlmary duLy, even when applylng ArLlcle 101, Lo '.promoLe effecLlve compeLlLlon ln
markeLs.for Lhe beneflLs of consumers.'
71
1hls mlrrors recenL Commlsslon pollcy sLaLemenLs.
72

1here ls a furLher [urlsdlcLlonal reason why dlsagreemenLs on alms wlLhln ArLlcle 101 are valuable.
Lven Lhough compeLlLlon ls an excluslve Lu compeLence and lnLernal markeL ls a shared one,
73
glven
dlfferlng flelds of compeLence for publlc pollcy goals, nelLher Lhe Lu nor Lhe Member SLaLes, are
always able Lo address Lhese clashes (e.g. compeLlLlon (Lu) v culLure (MS)) ln Lhelr enLlreLy alone.
Cood soluLlons musL accepL boLh lnLeresLs.
74
Where dlverslLy ls unavallable, Lhe relevanL acLors can:
accepL Lhe unlform rule, refuse Lo co-operaLe, or 'cheaL' Lo achleve Lhelr ends.
73
As Lhe compeLlLlon
rules' wlde remlL, grudglng accepLance ls hard Lo LoleraLe. So far, Member SLaLes sLlll apply ArLlcle
101, buL Lhere are slgns of 'cheaLlng', someLlmes encouraged by Lhe Lu CourLs, for example,
narrowly deflnlng an appreclable affecL on Lrade beLween Member SLaLes.
76
lf no space ls lefL for
genulne dlfference, declslon-makers may seek Lo achleve unsLaLed alms, secreLly. 1hls conLrlbuLes Lo
legal uncerLalnLy,
77
whlch, ln Lurn, frusLraLes our ablllLy Lo learn and debaLe whlch rules are besL.
ln regulaLory Lheory, Ma[one suggesLs LhaL one can have economlc lnLegraLlon wlLhouL pollLlcal
lnLegraLlon. Lven Lhough compeLlLlon law has dlsLrlbuLlve consequences, he belleves LhaL delegaLlon

68
Case C-373/09 ltezes utzJo Ocbtooy kookoteocjl l koosomeotw v 1ele2 lolsko, 3 May 2011, noL yeL
reporLed, paras 19-30, does noL allow nCAs Lo flnd no breach of ArLlcle 101 and 102, alLhough Lhey can declde
noL Lo enforce lL. 1he poslLlon ls dlfferenL for Lhe Member SLaLes' courLs.
69
nMa, Aooool kepott. welqbloq lotetests (2009), 9. lL ls hard Lo polnL Lo any cases LhaL acLually Lurned on
publlc pollcy, Lhanks Lo 1[arda van der vl[ver for Lhls polnL, alLhough see Lavrl[ssen, 'WhaL 8ole for naLlonal
CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles ln roLecLlng non-CompeLlLlon lnLeresLs AfLer Llsbon?' Luropean Law 8evlew.
70
Cl1, Attlcle 101(J) - A ulscossloo of Nottow vetsos 8tooJ uefloltloo of 8eoeflts. Jlscossloo oote fot oo Ol1
bteokfost toooJtoble oo 12 Moy 2010, dlscussed ln 1ownley, 'Whlch Coals CounL ln ArLlcle 101 1lLu?: publlc
pollcy and lLs dlsconLenLs' Luropean CompeLlLlon Law 8evlew.
71
hLLp://www.bls.gov.uk/asseLs/blscore/consumer-lssues/docs/g/12-312-growLh-and-compeLlLlon-reglme-
governmenL-response.pdf, para 10.7. 1he drafL LnLerprlse and 8egulaLory 8eform 8lll, secLlon 18, dlluLes Lhls
somewhaL.
72
Commlsslon, ColJelloes oo tbe oppllcotloo of Attlcle 81(J) of tbe 1teoty (2004), para 13. 1he Commlsslon
cannoL conLradlcL Lhe Lu CourLs, 1ownley, 'ls 1here (SLlll) 8oom for non-Lconomlc ArgumenLs?'.
73
ArLlcles 3 and 4 1lLu, Lhere are also dlfflculLles deflnlng Lhe llmlLs of Lhe lnLernal markeL, Cralg and de 8urca,
u low. text, coses ooJ motetlols (llfLh edn, Cu 2011), 78-9.
74
!oerges, ''uellberaLlve ollLlcal rocesses' 8evlslLed: whaL have we learnL abouL Lhe leglLlmacy of
supranaLlonal declslon-maklng' 44 !ournal of Common MarkeL SLudles, 794-3.
73
Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 418, hlllpparL and Sle-uhlan-Po, 'llexlblllLy and Models of Covernance
for Lhe Lu', 303, Walker, 'llexlblllLy wlLhln a MeLaconsLlLuLlonal lrame: reflecLlons on Lhe fuLure of legal
auLhorlLy ln Lurope' ln de 8urca and ScoLL (eds),lbld , 28, and WeaLherlll, 'llndlng Space for Closer Co-
operaLlon ln Lhe lleld of CulLure' ln ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds),lbld , 234-3.
76
Case 229/83 Assoclotloo Jes ceottes Jlsttlboteots JoootJ lecletc v 5tl 'Ao bl vett' [1983] LC8 1, para 20.
1he Commlsslon does Lhls Loo, Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo
Aotbotltles, xxx. [a|so Wouters' paper d|scuss|ng o|and.]
77
Walker, 'llexlblllLy wlLhln a MeLaconsLlLuLlonal lrame', 28.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
12

Lo an lndependenL lnsLlLuLlon ls democraLlcally [usLlflable ln order Lo achleve credlble pollcy
commlLmenLs. ln Lhe uS, Ma[one says LhaL Lhey found LhaL pollLlcs and Lechnlcal lssues could noL be
separaLed. Cne soluLlon was Lo have clear sLaLuLory goals, seL flxed deadllnes for achlevlng Lhem and
empower clLlzens Lo Lake slow-movlng agencles Lo courL.
78
ArLlcle 101 ls such a general provlslon
LhaL Lhls does noL seem posslble.
79
8y conLrasL, Ma[one LhoughL LhaL accounLablllLy should be
'pollLlcal' lf dlsLrlbuLlve concerns prevall.
80
1hls allows separaLlon of Lhe pollLlcal and Lhe economlc.
Powever, Lhls suggesLlon generaLes Lhree problems. ArLlcle 101 cuLs across many pollcy domalns.
Ma[one creaLes a democraLlc deflclL once Lhe local, ofLen Member SLaLe, populaLlon's regulaLory
wlshes are lgnored.
81
Secondly, pure Lechnlcal work ls a chlmera. value [udgmenLs are consLanLly
made. lor example, even lf we could agree a sole consumer welfare goal, re-dlsLrlbuLlve and pollLlcal
(more Lhan merely re-dlsLrlbuLlve
82
), lssues sLlll arlse.
83
1here are also dlsagreemenLs on meLhods.
Many see regulaLory compeLlLlon as an lmporLanL spur for Lu developmenL.
84
1hlrdly, deflnlng a
'(predomlnanLly) efflclency-orlenLaLed declslon' ls crlLlcal, yeL clrcular. CompeLlLlon declslons are
only (predomlnanLly) efflclency-orlenLaLed lf efflclency ls selecLed as Lhe sole goal. Ma[one concedes
LhaL even ln areas of excluslve compeLence, such as compeLlLlon law, Lhe Lendency ls Lo move
Lowards a co-operaLlve parLnershlp wlLh Lhe naLlonal regulaLory auLhorlLles.
83

Lven lf Lhere were agreemenL on ArLlcle 101's alms, allowlng dlfference may also be beneflclal
where Lhere are dlsagreemenLs on meLhods. Assume LhaL ArLlcle 101's sole goal
86
ls consumer
welfare, however deflned. 1here ls conslderable dlsagreemenL abouL how Lo achleve Lhls (lssues 1
and 3).
87
Pow much compeLlLlon ls opLlmal Lo encourage lnnovaLlon and (ulLlmaLely) consumer
welfare? 1o some exLenL, flrms wlLh markeL power have less lncenLlve Lo lnnovaLe Lhan flrms LhaL
face more compeLlLlon. ln a compeLlLlve markeL, flrms have an lncenLlve Lo lnvesL ln Lechnologlcal

78
Ma[one, '8egulaLory LeglLlmacy ln Lhe uS and Lhe Lu', 239, 263.
79
1ownley, 'ls 1here (SLlll) 8oom for non-Lconomlc ArgumenLs?', 1ownley, 'Whlch Coals CounL ln ArLlcle 101
1lLu?: publlc pollcy and lLs dlsconLenLs', and 1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy.
80
CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 297-8, Ma[one, '8egulaLory LeglLlmacy ln Lhe uS
and Lhe Lu', 236, Ma[one, lo commoooot eotopeooe. oo tot tqoloteot (MonLchresLlen 1996), and
Ma[one, '1he 8lse of Lhe 8egulaLory SLaLe ln Lurope' 17 WesL Luropean ollLlcs, so evaluaLe Lhe Lu on
efflclency-orlenLaLed crlLerla, and hlllpparL and Sle-uhlan-Po, 'llexlblllLy and Models of Covernance for Lhe
Lu', 310.
81
CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 302, also page 322, !oerges, '1he Law's roblems
wlLh Lhe Covernance of Lhe Luropean MarkeL' lnlbld , 27, LenaerLs and verhoeven, 'lnsLlLuLlonal 8alance as a
CuaranLee for uemocracy ln Lu Covernance' lnlbld , 36-7, and LlndseLh, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy and Lhe
AdmlnlsLraLlve CharacLer of SupranaLlonallsm', 699-700. Slmllarly, 8hodes and vlsser, 'Seeklng CommlLmenL,
LffecLlveness and LeglLlmacy: new modes of soclo-economlc governance ln Lurope' ln PerlLler and 8hodes
(eds), New MoJes of Covetoooce lo otope. qovetoloq lo tbe sboJow of bletotcby (algrave Macmlllan 2011),
114.
82
!oerges and neyer, 'uellberaLlve SupranaLlonallsm 8evlslLed' Lul Worklng aper Law no 2006/20, 16.
83
1ownley, '8ememberlng 1hose noL ?eL 8orn: lnLer-generaLlonal lmpacLs ln compeLlLlon analysls', 1ownley,
'Whlch Coals CounL ln ArLlcle 101 1lLu?: publlc pollcy and lLs dlsconLenLs'lbld, Cralg, u AJmlolsttotlve low
(Cu 2006), 32, !oerges, ''uellberaLlve ollLlcal rocesses' 8evlslLed', 783, LlndseLh, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy
and Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlve CharacLer of SupranaLlonallsm', 687-9. Slmllarly on sclenLlflc experLlse, uehousse,
'MlsflLs', 210-1, 224-3, and ScoLL and vos, '1he !urldlflcaLlon of uncerLalnLy: observaLlons on Lhe amblvalence
of Lhe precauLlonary prlnclple wlLhln Lhe Lu and Lhe W1C' lnlbld , 283-4.
84
lor example, lerguson, clvlllsotloo (enguln 2011), parLlcularly 39-43.
83
Ma[one, '8egulaLory LeglLlmacy ln Lhe uS and Lhe Lu', 233.
86
l do noL accepL Lhls assumpLlon, see 1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy. Powever, l say Lhls here Lo
slmpllfy Lhe dlscusslon abouL dlsagreemenL on meLhods.
87
8udzlnskl, '1ransborder Mergers', 11-7, 8udzlnskl, 'lurallsm of CompeLlLlon ollcy aradlgms and Lhe Call
for 8egulaLory ulverslLy' no. 14/2003 volkswlrLschafLllche 8elLrge, 3-24. 8egulaLors also need Lo reacL Lo
lnnovaLlon ln anLl-compeLlLlve pracLlces, 8udzlnskl, '1ransborder Mergers', 13, and 8udzlnskl, 'lurallsm of
CompeLlLlon ollcy aradlgms', 29.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
13

developmenL. Successful flrms can reduce Lhelr prlces/ lmprove quallLy, forclng less efflclenL rlvals Lo
exlL. 1hls ls noL a llnear relaLlonshlp, however. llrms' lncenLlves Lo lnnovaLe are noL only deLermlned
by Lhe exlsLence of compeLlLlon. 1hey also conslder Lhelr own ablllLy Lo approprlaLe Lhe resulLs of
Lhelr lnvesLmenL. SLrong compeLlLlon reduces Lhe chances of Lhls and Lhus Lhe lncenLlve Lo lnnovaLe.
So, an lnLermedlaLe level of compeLlLlon ls ofLen opLlmal for encouraglng lnnovaLlon and, ulLlmaLely,
consumer welfare. ?eL, MoLLa says LhaL lL ls hard '.Lo use Lhls resulL for pracLlcal pollcy purposes, for
lnsLance Lo choose Lhe 'rlghL' level of compeLlLlon.'
88
LconomlsLs dlsagree abouL how much
compeLlLlon ls besL for lnnovaLlon. 1hls ls of greaL pracLlcal slgnlflcance ln ArLlcle 101.
89
An nMa
sLudy asked nCAs, and oLhers, abouL Lhe emphasls LhaL Lhey place on lnnovaLlon ln Lhelr consumer
welfare analysls. 1here was no consensus abouL where Lhe approprlaLe balance lles elLher.
90

unlformlLy advocaLes assume LhaL one body can solve problems alone, or by Lalklng Lo oLhers.
Powever, Lhe cosL of explorlng all soluLlons can be Loo greaL, especlally lf Lhere ls a loL of complexlLy.
LxLernallLles may be problemaLlc here, however. unllke Lhe Member SLaLes, Lhe Lu lnsLlLuLlons acL
for Lurope as a whole. 1here may be efflclency (and publlc pollcy) losses lf Member SLaLes favour
Lhelr consLlLuenLs whlle hurLlng people or groups based:
.ouLslde Lhe sLaLe, such as manufacLurers or lssuers...1he cosLs of such laws are
exLernallsed ln Lhe sense LhaL Lhey do noL effecL voLers or, by exLenslon, Lhelr elecLed
offlclals. unlform lawmakers presumably musL Lake lnLo accounL lnLersLaLe soclal welfare
raLher Lhan only Lhe narrow consLlLuenL lnLeresLs LhaL would maLLer Lo sLaLe regulaLors."
91

lf caplLal relocaLes Lo [urlsdlcLlons where Lhe regulaLory cosLs are lower, lL drags Lhe oLher Member
SLaLes down, ln a race Lo Lhe boLLom Lo scrap envlronmenLal, and oLher rules.
92
1hls '.approach
would, ln Lhls vlslon, be raLher lneffecLlve ln proLecLlng values oLher Lhan Lrade llberallzaLlon.'
93
Cne
may geL a race Lo Lhe boLLom lf ArLlcle 101 only pursues consumer welfare and publlc pollcy goals

88
MoLLa, competltloo lollcy. tbeoty ooJ ptoctlce (Cambrldge unlverslLy ress 2004), 37.
89
lLallaner, 'uefls de la pollLlque de la concurrence' (Cercle des Luropeens) dlscusses some cases where Lhe
lmpacL upon lnnovaLlon was lmporLanL.
90
nMa, competltloo ofotcemeot ooJ coosomet welfote. settloq tbe oqeoJo, (2011), 11-4 and 23-31,
avallable aL hLLp://www.lcn-Lhehague.org/page.php?ld78
91
8lbsLeln and kobayashl, 'An Lconomlc Analysls of unlform SLaLe Laws', 139. laull and nlkpay, 1be c low of
competltloo, para 2.203, 8udzlnskl, '1ransborder Mergers', 3, 43, and Ceradln and eLlL, '1he uevelopmenL of
Agencles aL Lu and naLlonal Levels: ConcepLual Analysls and roposals for 8eform' !ean MonneL Worklng
aper <hLLp://cenLers.law.nyu.edu/[eanmonneL/archlve/papers/04/040101.pdf> , 12-3. LC! ofLen proLecLs Lhe
Lu, nexL secLlon, olares Maduro, we, tbe coott, 23, 148. 1hlnk of Case C-360/92 , lobllsbets Assoclotloo,
[1993] LC8 l-23.
92
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 17, llngleLon, '1he ulsLrlbuLlon and ALLrlbuLlon of Cases
Among Lhe Members of Lhe neLwork: Lhe perspecLlve of Lhe Commlsslon/ nCAs' ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu
(eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 333, 1haLcher, '1he Causes and
Consequences of 8egulaLlon by neLworks: LelecommunlcaLlons ln Lurope' lnlbld , 132, and uonahue and
ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs ulsconLenLs', 78-9,. lL happens ln Lhe uS, for example, Pawk and 8ayer, 'Lessons
Lo be urawn from Lhe lnfra-naLlonal neLwork of CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles ln Lhe uS: Lhe naLlonal AssoclaLlon of
ALLorneys Ceneral (nAAC) as a case sLudy' ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of
competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 109, and ln relaLlon Lo free movemenL of goods, see Commlsslon, lltst
8leoolol kepott oo tbe Appllcotloo of tbe ltloclple of Motool kecoqoltloo (1999). Pavlng sald LhaL, lox belleves
LhaL such exLernallLles can normally be deLecLed, lox, '1he Lluslve romlse of ModernlsaLlon: Lurope and Lhe
world' 28 Legal lssues of Lconomlc lnLegraLlon, 144-3. C.f. de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 20,
see also 34-3.
93
hlllpparL and Sle-uhlan-Po, 'llexlblllLy and Models of Covernance for Lhe Lu', 320, ln a dlfferenL conLexL,
buL applles here Loo. 1haLcher ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo
Aotbotltles, 24, glves Lhe example of Lelecoms regulaLlon.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
14

are noL achleved ln leglslaLlon. Powever, regulaLory races Lo Lhe Lop are also posslble,
94
and
evldence of acLual races Lo Lhe boLLom ls llmlLed.
93
lL may be posslble Lo sLop races Lo Lhe boLLom
Lhrough mlnlmum sLandards.
96
Cne has Lo conslder Lhe lmpacL of dlverslLy ln Lhe round ln any evenL.
8lbsLeln and kobayashl noLe LhaL unlformlLy can faclllLaLe Lhe developmenL of a deLalled body of
case law applylng Lhe rules. lL ellmlnaLes Lhe deadwelghL llLlgaLlon cosLs lnvolved ln forum
shopplng.
97
1hls may be parLlcularly lmporLanL for Lhe Lu compeLlLlon provlslons, whlch Lend Lo be
prlnclples, raLher Lhan clear rules. Powever, dlverslLy wlll cause less damage ln Lhls regard lf Lhe
areas of dlvergence are clear and small, and Lhe reasons for dlvergence are expllclLly explalned.
ln facL, ln addlLlon Lo Lhose already menLloned, dlfference has many poLenLlal beneflLs. lL allows
rules Lo be made more easlly. Lveryone's agreemenL ls noL needed. WlLhln llmlLs, Lhe relevanL acLors
can sLrlke Lhe balance LhaL Lhey Lhlnk ls approprlaLe. 1hls helps Lo avold deadlock and faclllLaLes [olnL
work Lowards a common soluLlon ln Lhe end, by demonsLraLlng Lhe efflcacy of an nCA's soluLlons Lo
Lhe oLhers.
98
ln Lurn, Lhls faclllLaLes more LransparenL declslons. 1he cosL of mlsLakes ls also reduced.
8ad cholces malnly affecL Lhe Member SLaLe concerned, noL Lhe whole Lu. lurLhermore, dlverslLy
allows greaLer opLlons golng forward, whlch faclllLaLes modlflcaLlon and re-negoLlaLlon as
clrcumsLances change. ulverslLy also accommodaLes dlverse legal sysLems and helps us Lo beLLer
cope wlLh uncerLalnLy. lor example, lf we do noL undersLand Lhe underlylng problems and so cannoL
easlly predlcL all of Lhe consequences of an acLlon.
99

When soluLlons are applled aL a local level, some say LhaL Lhe relevanL acLors beLLer undersLand Lhe
condlLlons affecLlng lmplemenLaLlon, and can beLLer Lallor soluLlons Lo Lhe speclflc conLexL. 1he
naLlonal admlnlsLraLlons of lrance, 8rlLaln and Cermany are all lncreaslngly able Lo decenLrallse
admlnlsLraLlve conLrol for Lhls reason, and because Lhey favour more regulaLory and admlnlsLraLlve
experlmenLaLlon.
100
1he developmenL makes sense from an experlmenLaLlon perspecLlve, buL, ln
prlnclple, beLLer lnformaLlon Lransfers should allow Lhls Lo occur, even aL Lhe supranaLlonal level. ln
any evenL, Lhls polnL has been made for local auLhorlLles, Lhe ldea ls LhaL Lhey are more accounLable
Lo Lhelr local populaLlons. 1hls mlghL noL be Lrue of lndependenL courLs and nCAs.
101

c. 1o|erat|ng d|vers|ty |n compet|t|on |aw today: Germany and the USA
ulsagreemenLs on meLhods and alms can arlse ln ArLlcle 101. lL ls unclear wheLher we should
LoleraLe, or even encourage, Lhese dlsagreemenLs, or, wheLher we should sLamp Lhem ouL. Pere Lwo
repuLable compeLlLlon [urlsdlcLlons encourage, wlLhln llmlLs, dlsagreemenLs on alms and meLhods.

94
Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon? lnformal neLwork Covernance ln Lu Slngle MarkeL
8egulaLlon' ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL
2002), 142, CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 318, 1haLcher, 'Causes and Consequences
of 8egulaLlon by neLworks', 132, 8arnard and ueakln, 'MarkeL Access and 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 6-8.
93
uehousse, 'lnLegraLlon v 8egulaLlon?', 396.
96
8arnard and ueakln, 'MarkeL Access and 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 37. 1he Commlsslon does Lhls Loo, see
LexL around fooLnoLe 37.
97
8lbsLeln and kobayashl, 'An Lconomlc Analysls of unlform SLaLe Laws', 138. Commlsslon, commlssloo
xplooototy MemotooJom, ltoposol fot o cooocll keqolotloo lmplemeotloq Attlcles 81 ooJ 82 of tbe 1teoty, 8,
for Lhe modernlsaLlon of ArLlcle 101.
98
Slmllarly, for Lhe CMC, see 1rubek, CoLLrell and nance, ''SofL Law', 'Pard Law' and Lu lnLegraLlon' ln 8urca
and ScoLL (eds), low ooJ New Covetoooce lo tbe u ooJ tbe u5 (ParL 2006), 78.
99
lbld, 74. 1hey dlscuss CMC, lL also seems Lrue for Lhe LCn.
100
LlndseLh, 'uelegaLlon ls uead, Long Llve uelegaLlon', 134, for slmllar Lu Lrends, p.133. Also, olares Maduro,
we, tbe coott, 113-26.
101
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 349-30.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
13

ln Cermany, lederal compeLlLlon law ls enforced by a neLwork comprlslng Lhe 8undeskarLellamL and
16 SLaLe compeLlLlon auLhorlLles (ln Lhelr own sLaLes).
102
ConslsLency ln Lhe law's appllcaLlon ls
lmporLanL, yeL, Lhe varlous auLhorlLles' lndependence ls valued Loo.
103
AuLhorlLles declde cases alone
and do noL blnd oLhers. 1he 8undeskarLellamL cannoL relleve SLaLe auLhorlLles of cases, or glve
lnsLrucLlons Lo Lhem. neLwork members musL exchange case lnformaLlon. lnconslsLency remalns on
Lhe flrsL appeal, Lo SLaLe courLs, afLer LhaL Lhe lederal Supreme CourL applles Lhe law unlformly.
104

ln Lhe uSA, Lhe lederal 1rade Commlsslon (l1C) and Lhe ueparLmenL of !usLlce (uo!) apply lederal
anLlLrusL sLaLuLes: lncludlng, ln effecL, secLlon 1, Sherman AcL 1890,
103
Lhelr equlvalenL of ArLlcle 101,
and Lhe ClayLon AcL 1914. 1he sLaLes enforce Lhese provlslons Loo,
106
as do Lhe courLs. MulLlple
acLors apply Lhe same laws. !udge 8randels called Lhe uS SLaLes '.laboraLorles of democracy.'
ln parL, Lo promoLe unlformlLy, Lhe l1C and Lhe uo! lssue [olnL wrlLLen subsLanLlve guldance.
Slmllarly, ln 1983, Lhe MulLlsLaLe AnLlLrusL 1ask lorce of Lhe naLlonal AssoclaLlon of ALLorneys
Ceneral (nAAC) was creaLed Lo lncrease co-ordlnaLlon of enforcemenL by Lhe sLaLes. 1hey produce
guldance Loo. Powever, dlsagreemenLs arlse.
107
Cne example, from Lhe merger arena, concerns Lhe
lssue of whaL consLlLuLes a verLlcal resLralnL. 1here were [olnL l1C and uo! lederal guldellnes on
polnL, now wlLhdrawn. nAAC lssued more aggresslve guldellnes.
108

ulsagreemenLs on boLh alms and meLhods are embraced ln Cermany and Lhe uSA.
109
1hese are
neLworks of equals, all Lake subsLanLlve pollcy declslons, wlLhln Lhe llmlLs of Lhe lederal Supreme
CourL's [udgmenLs and Lhe law. 8oLh counLrles allow dlfference for slmllar reasons. llrsL, Lhe
consLlLuLlonal relaLlonshlp beLween Lhe SLaLes and Lhe lederal auLhorlLles (lssue 4).
110
Secondly,
cenLral enforcemenL may lack sLaLe enforcemenL's senslLlvlLy Lo local concerns (lssues 1-3).
111


102
Slmllarly, ln Spaln, 8eglonal CovernmenLs can apply naLlonal compeLlLlon law, buL Lhere are sLrlcL rules on
case allocaLlon, MarLnez Lage ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo
Aotbotltles, 27.
103
lbld, xxll.
104
8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder' ln Lhlermann and
ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 20, 112-3. Cnly Lhe
8undeskarLellamL does mergers and Lu compeLlLlon law.
103
AL leasL lnsofar as ls lmporLanL for our dlscusslon, see Povenkamp, leJetol Aotlttost lollcy. tbe low of
competltloo ooJ lts ptoctlce (1hlrd edn, WesL ubllshlng Co. 2003), 392.
106
8udzlnskl, 'lurallsm of CompeLlLlon ollcy aradlgms', 30-1, Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 424-31,
and Povenkamp, leJetol Aotlttost lollcy, 398.
107
1he uSA may have less dlvergence Lhan Lhe Lu, as Lhere ls a sLronger, [olnLly held, commlLmenL Lo Lhe
markeL and Lhe sLaLes are more closely lnLegraLed. Pawk belleves LhaL ln Lhe uSA neLwork Lhere ls '.far more
commonallLy .ln Lerms of Lhe so-called 'common compeLlLlon culLure' Lhan among Lhe members of Lhe fuLure
Lu neLwork.' A common Lu compeLlLlon culLure may be developlng Lhough, Pawk ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu,
coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 40. Also Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 427,
Scharpf, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy under 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 363.
108
Povenkamp, leJetol Aotlttost lollcy, 399, and Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 426.
109
lor uS law, Pawk and 8ayer, 'Lessons from Lhe uS' lnfra-naLlonal neLwork of CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles', 17,
99, 102-10 and kovaclc, 'CompeLlLlon ollcy ln Lhe Luropean unlon and Lhe unlLed SLaLes: convergence or
dlvergence ln Lhe fuLure LreaLmenL of domlnanL flrms?' CompeLlLlon Law lnLernaLlonal (alLhough noLe Lhe
Surpreme CourL [udgmenL ln cteJlt 5olsse 5ecotltles v 8lllloq 331 u.S. 264 (2007), !usLlce 8reyer, 16), for
Cerman compeLlLlon law, 8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman
Lnder', 113. ulverslLy occurs ln many areas of Cerman lederal law.
110
Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 431-3. ln facL, Lhe sLaLes have more power ln Lhe uS as Lhelr own
anLlLrusL rules have more effecL Lhan Lhose of Lhe Member SLaLes here, 8odger (ed) looJmotk coses lo
competltloo low. otoooJ tbe wotlJ lo footteeo stotles (kluwer Law lnLernaLlonal 8v 2013), 346.
111
lor Lhe uS, Pawk and 8ayer, 'Lessons from Lhe uS' lnfra-naLlonal neLwork of CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles', 109.
As regards Cermany, 8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder'
lnlbld (ParL), 20 and 111.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
16

llnally, Lhe greaL beneflL of '.surfaclng hard lssues for debaLe and creaLlng dlalogue as Lo whaL Lhe
law ls and should be.ulLlmaLely Lo be resolved by Lhe uS Supreme CourL.' (lssue 3).
112

d. D|rect effect a||ows d|vers|ty
ulrecL effecL ls Lhe capaclLy of an Lu norm Lo be applled ln a domesLlc courL or admlnlsLraLlve
proceedlngs.
113
ulrecLly effecLlve 1reaLy provlslons musL be [usLlclable. lf ArLlcle 101 ls dlrecLly
effecLlve,
114
does Lhls prevenL dlverslLy Lhere? Can one balance publlc pollcy lnLeresLs ln dlrecLly
effecLlve provlslons, and can Member SLaLes arrlve aL Lhe same resulLs ln Lhls balance even lf Lhey
value Lhlngs dlfferenLly? 1emple Lang has sald, for example, LhaL naLlonal courLs musL do '.whaL ls
reasonably necessary Lo ensure LhaL CommunlLy law ls unlformly applled LhroughouL Lhe
CommunlLy.'
113
1hls may make dlverslLy lnapproprlaLe ln ArLlcle 101.
Crlglnally, Lhe pre-condlLlon for dlrecL effecL was LhaL Lhe provlslon had Lo conLaln a clear and
uncondlLlonal prohlblLlon,
116
for whlch no furLher leglslaLlve lnLervenLlon was requlred.
117
Powever,
Lhe LC! has relaxed Lhese crlLerla, Lo lnclude many '.1reaLy arLlcles deallng wlLh Lhe common
markeL, even Lhose LhaL dld seem Lo requlre naLlonal or CommunlLy lmplemenLlng acLs and even
Lhose granLlng Lo Lhe Member SLaLes a power Lo derogaLe.'
118
1oday, a 1reaLy provlslon ls dlrecLly
effecLlve lf lL ls '.sufflclenLly operaLlonal ln lLself Lo be applled by a courL.'
119
1hls ls wldely
lnLerpreLed.
120
We have already dlscussed Lhe lnLeracLlon beLween ArLlcles 34 and 36.
121
8oLh
arLlcles are dlrecLly effecLlve, yeL boLh requlre a balanclng of publlc pollcy lnLeresLs wlLhln Lhem.
122

1hls musL be done by Lhe Member SLaLe courLs and admlnlsLraLlve auLhorlLles. 1hey are llkely Lo
arrlve aL dlfferenL resulLs (wlLhln Member SLaLes and across Lhe Lu) when balanclng here.
1he appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101 requlres Lhe relevanL acLors Lo balance shorL and long-Lerm
compeLlLlon (Loday mosL speak of consumer welfare), envlronmenLal proLecLlon and oLher publlc
pollcy goals. lor example, ln wootets, Lhe uuLch courL revlewed Lhe legallLy of an agreemenL under,
dlrecLly effecLlve, ArLlcle 101(1).
123
AL lssue was Lhe uuLch 8ar Councll's 1993 8egulaLlon baslcally
prohlblLlng lawyers ln Lhe neLherlands from formlng parLnershlps wlLh non-lawyers. Mr WouLers, a
lawyer, wanLed Lo enLer an accounLlng parLnershlp. Cn an ArLlcle 267 reference, Lhe LC! found a

112
lor Lhe uS, lox, '1he Lluslve romlse of ModernlsaLlon', 144 and lorresLer, 'ulverslLy and ConslsLency', 341.
As many compeLlLlon lssues musL be llLlgaLed, raLher Lhan belng made Lhrough admlnlsLraLlve declslon, Lhe
analogy wlLh Lhe Commlsslon and Lhe nCAs ls noL perfecL. As regards Cermany, 8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL
and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder' lnlbld (ParL), 20 and 111.
113
de WlLLe, 'ulrecL LffecL, rlmacy, and Lhe naLure of Lhe Legal Crder' ln Cralg and ue 8urca (eds), 1be
volotloo of u low (Cu 2011), 323. Cn Lhe lssue of admlnlsLraLlve proceedlngs, Case 103/88 costoozo [1989]
LC8 1839, paras 30-2, such as an nCA, reclLal 6 and arLlcle 3, 8egulaLlon 1/2003.
114
1hls ls much debaLed, 1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, 97-8, and Lhe references made Lhere, buL l
make Lhls wldely accepLed assumpLlon ln order Lo slmpllfy Lhe argumenLs ln Lhls paper.
113
1emple Lang, '1he uuLles of naLlonal CourLs under CommunlLy ConsLlLuLlonal Law' Luropean Law 8evlew,
13.
116
Case 26/62, Nv Alqemeoe 1toospott-eo xpeJltle OoJetoemloq voo CeoJ & loos v NetbetlooJs lolooJ
keveooe AJmlolsttotloo [1963] LC8 1, secLlon ll(8).
117
Case 8/81 utsolo 8ecket v llooozomt Moostet-looeostoJt [1982] LC8 33, paras 27-40.
118
de WlLLe, 'ulrecL LffecL, rlmacy, and Lhe naLure of Lhe Legal Crder', 330, also 327-9.
119
Cplnlon of AdvocaLe-Ceneral van Cerven ln Lhe 8ooks cose [1994] LC8 l-1209, para 27.
120
Case C-413/99 8oombost [2002] LC8 l-7091, de WlLLe, 'ulrecL LffecL, rlmacy, and Lhe naLure of Lhe Legal
Crder', 334, and Ll[sbouLs, 'ulrecL LffecL, Lhe 1esL and Lhe 1erms: ln pralse of a caplLal docLrlne of Lu law' ln
rlnssen and Schrauwen (eds), ultect ffect. tetblokloq o closslc of c leqol Jocttloe (Luropa Law ubllshlng
2004), 240.
121
See LexL around fooLnoLe 29.
122
hLLp://ec.europa.eu/enLerprlse/pollcles/slngle-markeL-goods/flles/goods/docs/arL34-
36/new_gulde_en.pdf, 37. See, Case 34/79 k v neoo ooJ uotby [1979] LC8 3793 (morallLy), and Case C-180/96
uolteJ kloqJom v commlssloo [1998] LC8 l-2263 (publlc healLh).
123
Case C-234/89 uellmltls [1991] LC8 l-933, para 43, flnds ArLlcle 101(1) dlrecLly effecLlve.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
17

resLrlcLlon of compeLlLlon.
124
Powever, Lhe LC! conducLed a publlc pollcy balanclng exerclse, holdlng
LhaL, for Lhe purposes of applylng ArLlcle 101(1), accounL musL flrsL of all be Laken of Lhe overall
conLexL ln whlch Lhe 8ar Councll's acLlon produces lLs effecLs. More parLlcularly, accounL musL:
.be Laken of lLs ob[ecLlves, whlch are here connecLed wlLh Lhe need Lo make rules relaLlng
Lo organlsaLlon, quallflcaLlons, professlonal eLhlcs, supervlslon and llablllLy, ln order Lo
ensure LhaL Lhe ulLlmaLe consumers of legal servlces and Lhe sound admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce
are provlded wlLh Lhe necessary guaranLees ln relaLlon Lo lnLegrlLy and experlence.lL has
Lhen Lo be consldered wheLher Lhe consequenLlal effecLs resLrlcLlve of compeLlLlon are
lnherenL ln Lhe pursulL of Lhose ob[ecLlves."
123

1he LC! seems Lo balance here, conLrary Lo ArLlcle 267,
126
Lhe relevanL acLors should normally do
lL.
127
noLe Loo LhaL a prlvaLe parLy asks for Lhe balance Lo be done wlLhln ArLlcle 101, and lL ls a non-
sLaLe acLor albelL one wlLh speclal legal prlvlleges, Lhe 8ar Councll, LhaL balances ln lLs 1993
8egulaLlon. rlvaLe acLors assess publlc pollcy balanclng ln Lhe shadow of many 1reaLy arLlcles.
128

Lven lf publlc pollcy balanclng ls compaLlble wlLh dlrecL effecL, ln Lhls balance, musL all of Lhe
relevanL acLors arrlve aL Lhe same ouLcome? rechal says, crlLlcally:
1he esLabllshmenL and proper funcLlonlng of Lhe Common MarkeL as ooe sloqle motket
requlres a sysLem of common rules and prlnclples whlch safeguards lLs unlLy. Any unllaLeral
lnLerference wlLh Lhese rules by Lhe Member SLaLes or oLher acLors has Lo be excluded."
129

?eL, when publlc pollcy balanclng ln Lhe free movemenL rules, Member SLaLes have a margln of
appreclaLlon accordlng Lo Lhelr '.soclal clrcumsLances and Lo Lhe lmporLance aLLached by Lhose
SLaLes Lo a leglLlmaLe ob[ecLlve under CommunlLy law.Lhe measures whlch are llkely Lo achleve
concreLe resulLs.'
130
A slmllar poslLlon has arlsen ln ArLlcle 101. ln wootets, Lhe resLrlcLlon of
compeLlLlon prohlblLed lawyers and non-lawyers enLerlng lnLo parLnershlps. 1he LC! held LhaL:
.Lhe facL LhaL dlfferenL rules may be appllcable ln anoLher Member SLaLe does noL mean
LhaL Lhe rules ln force ln Lhe former SLaLe are lncompaLlble wlLh CommunlLy law (see, Lo LhaL
effecL, Case C-108/96 Moc Ooeo [2001] LC8 l-837, paragraph 33). Lven lf mulLl-dlsclpllnary
parLnershlps of lawyers and accounLanLs are allowed ln some Member SLaLes, Lhe 8ar of Lhe
neLherlands ls enLlLled Lo conslder LhaL Lhe ob[ecLlves pursued by Lhe 1993 8egulaLlon
cannoL, havlng regard ln parLlcular Lo Lhe legal reglmes by whlch members of Lhe 8ar and
accounLanLs are respecLlvely governed ln Lhe neLherlands, be aLLalned by less resLrlcLlve

124
Case C-309/99 wootets v Alqemeoe kooJ voo Je NeJetlooJse OtJe voo AJvocoteo [2002] LC8 l-1377, paras
86-96.
123
lblJ., para 97.
126
Case C-226/11 xpeJlo, 13 uecember 2012, nyr, para 34.
127
1he LC! [usLlfles Lhls wlLh ArLlcle 101 cases - Case C-230/92 ulC [1994] LC8 l-3641, para 33, and freedom of
esLabllshmenL/servlces cases (also dlrecLly effecLlve) - Case 107/83 klopp [1984] LC8 2971, para 17, Case C-
3/93 kelseboto 8toeJe v 5ooJket [1996] LC8 l-6311, para 37.
128
Case C-413/93 uk8 v 8osmoo [1993] LC8 l-4921, para 86, Case C-281/98 Aoqooese v cosso Jl klspotmlo
[2000] LC8 l-4139, Case C-330/96 cleoo cot v looJesbooptmooo [1998] LC8 l-2321.
129
rechal, 'ulrecL LffecL, lndlrecL LffecL, Supremacy and Lhe Lvolvlng ConsLlLuLlon of Lhe Luropean unlon' ln
8arnard (ed), 1be looJomeotols of u low kevlslteJ. ossessloq tbe lmpoct of tbe coostltotloool Jebote (Cu
2007), 39. Also, !ans and rlnssen, '!ans, ! and rlnssen, !., ulrecL LffecL: convergence or dlvergence? ln
rlnssen and Schwauren uL book' ln rlnssen and Schrauwen (eds), ultect ffect. tetblokloq o closslc of c
leqol Jocttloe (Luropa Law ubllshlng 2004), 107, and Lhe LexL around fooLnoLe 31.
130
Case C-394/97 neloooeo [1999] LC8 l-3399, para 43, and Case C-208/09 llooko 5oyo-wlttqeostelo [2010]
LC8 l-13693, para 87. C.f. Case C-473/93 commlssloo v loxembootq [1996] LC8 l-3207, paras 23-30. 1hls may
vary ln dlfferenL areas, see 8arnard and ueakln, 'MarkeL Access and 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 28-34
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
18

means (see, Lo LhaL effecL, wlLh regard Lo a law reservlng [udlclal debL-recovery acLlvlLy Lo
lawyers, Case C-3/93 kelseboto 8toeJe v 5ooJket [1996] LC8 l-6311, paragraph 41)."
131

lnLeresLlngly, when noLlng LhaL Member SLaLes could come Lo dlfferenL vlews on Lhe lmporLance of
publlc pollcy crlLerla, vls-a-vls ArLlcle 101's resLrlcLlon on compeLlLlon, Lhe LC! makes reference Lo
Lhe free movemenL case law Lo supporL Lhls ldea.
132
1here lL ls clear LhaL lf a Member SLaLe proLecLs,
for example, Lhe envlronmenL more Lhan oLhers, lL does noL necessarlly breach Lu law.
133

Powever, [usLlflcaLlons musL serve a leglLlmaLe purpose. ln boLh ArLlcle 101 and Lhe free movemenL
rules, Lhe LC! ls Lhe ulLlmaLe arblLer,
134
and Lhe resLralnL musL be proporLlonaLe.
133
Member SLaLe
rules can be lnapproprlaLe lf Lu leglslaLlon exhausLlvely harmonlses an area. 1he LC! made slmllar
polnLs ln wootets when balanclng publlc pollcy ln ArLlcle 101.
136
lL ls also wary of opporLunlsLlc
proLecLlonlsm. 1he LC! ofLen demands LhaL Member SLaLes proLecLlng speclflc goals show LhaL Lhey
coherenLly and conslsLenLly proLecL Lhem ln Lhelr legal sysLems.
137

As we saw for Lhe free movemenL rules, a unlLary focus ln ArLlcle 101 has lncldenLal lmpacLs on oLher
goals Loo. 1hls would leave a gap ln Lhe soclo-economlc proLecLlon ln Lhe Member SLaLe(s).
138
ArLlcle
101's fooLprlnL means a blg lmpacL, LesLlng accepLance of markeL llberallsaLlon,
139
lssues 1 and 3.
Many argue LhaL, where publlc pollcy goals are lmporLanL, Lhe Member SLaLes should lndlvldually, or
collecLlvely Lhrough Lhe Lu, leglslaLe Lo proLecL Lhem, raLher Lhan dlsLorLlng compeLlLlon. 1hls has
advanLages: many Lhlnk lL more efflclenL and clearer for flrms. As we have seen, lL creaLes problems
Loo: Member SLaLes cannoL always agree, leglslaLlon may noL happen lf leglslaLors are busy, lL
undermlnes [olned up governmenL,
140
and largely abandons self regulaLlon, an efflclenL pollcy Lool:
Self-and co-regulaLlon.mean LhaL relevanL lndusLry players, noL Lhe Commlsslon, edlcL
norms. 1hey may be qulcker Lo adopL and may lead Lo more accepLable resulLs for
sLakeholders, who produce Lhe rules Lhemselves and may even use Lhem as a 'markeLlng
Lool'. Co-regulaLlon may also be a means of accommodaLlng naLlonal dlverslLy by allowlng
naLlonal co-regulaLlon pracLlces on Lhe basls of general Lu regulaLory framework. 8uL Lhere
are also poLenLlal drawbacks LhaL musL be managed, ln parLlcular Lhe rlsk of anLl-compeLlLlve

131
Case C-309/99 wootets v Alqemeoe kooJ voo Je NeJetlooJse OtJe voo AJvocoteo [2002] LC8 l-1377, para
108.
132
1he ob[ecLlves of Lhe compeLlLlon and free movemenL rules are regularly llnked, !olned Cases C-468/06 eLc.
5ot. lelos kol 5lo v Cloxo5mltbklloe [2008] LC8 l-7139, para 63.
133
Cllver, u ltee Movemeot of CooJs, para 8.23.
134
Case C-234/03 commlssloo v 8elqlom [2007] LC8 l-4269, paras 36-7.
133
Case 13/78 qqets v ltele noosestoJt 8temem [1978] LC8 1933, para 30, Case 174/82 5ooJoz [1983] LC8
2443, para 18, and Cralg and de 8urca, u low, 673.
136
Case C-309/99 wootets v Alqemeoe kooJ voo Je NeJetlooJse OtJe voo AJvocoteo [2002] LC8 l-1377, paras
99-110.
137
Case 121/83 cooeqote v cc [1986] LC8 1007, paras 13-6, and Case C-169/07 nottlooet [2009] LC8 l-1721,
para 33, buL see MaLhlsen, 'ConslsLency and Coherence as CondlLlons for !usLlflcaLlon of Member SLaLe
Measures 8esLrlcLlng lree MovemenL' 47 Common MarkeL Law 8evlew. Slmllarly, ln Lhe uS see uorf and Sabel,
'A ConsLlLuLlon of uemocraLlc LxperlmenLallsm' Cornell Law laculLy ubllcaLlons aper 120, 134.
138
Wlgger and nlke, 'Lnhanced 8oles of rlvaLe AcLors ln Lu 8uslness 8egulaLlon', 303, and Wllks, 'Agency
Lscape: decenLrallsaLlon or domlnance of Lhe Luropean Commlsslon ln Lhe modernlsaLlon of compeLlLlon
pollcy?' 18 Covernance, 437.
139
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 137.
140
8arnard, 'SolldarlLy and new Covernance ln Soclal ollcy' ln ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds), low ooJ New
Covetoooce lo tbe u ooJ tbe u5 (ParL 2006), 173, de 8urca, 'Lu 8ace ulscrlmlnaLlon Law: a hybrld model?'
lnlbld , 117-8, and Commlsslon, 5ecooJ kepott oo cooomlc ooJ 5oclol cobesloo (2001)
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
19

colluslon amongsL lndusLry members Lo Lhe deLrlmenL of consumers, as well as Lhe rlsk of
non respecL.[
141
]"
142

1he Lu should be more cauLlous abouL lmposlng lLs own ldeas of how Lhe Member SLaLes should
'regulaLe' speclflc lssues,
143
lssues 3 and 3. 1o do oLherwlse does noL respecL local regulaLory
soluLlons, abandons Lhe prlnclple of regulaLory neuLrallLy,
144
and negaLes a growlng Lu bellef LhaL we
need a smarLer mlx of pollcy lnsLrumenLs. Many oLher subsLanLlve areas of Lu law already do Lhls.
143

1haL ls Lhe Lheory, however Lhere are argumenLs by Lverson and Whlsh and 8alley LhaL may
undermlne lL. 8elylng on vetbooJ Jet 5ocbvetslcbetet, Lverson says LhaL Lhe LC! does noL permlL,
under ArLlcle 101, '.co-operaLlve publlc/ prlvaLe economlc regulaLlon aL Lhe naLlonal level.'
146
1hls
could rule ouL dlverslLy ln ArLlcle 101. ln LhaL case, Lhe parLles sald Lhe Commlsslon could noL apply
ArLlcle 101 Lo Lhe Cerman lnsurance secLor because, ln Lhe absence of Lu harmonlsaLlon, Cerman
leglslaLlon excluded Lhe Cerman equlvalenL of ArLlcle 101, and also, so Lhe argumenL wenL, ArLlcle
101. 1he [udgmenL ls unclear, buL Lhe LC! seems Lo resenL Lhe compleLe excluslon of lnsurance from
ArLlcle 101's scope, raLher Lhan publlc pollcy balanclng of prlvaLe resLrlcLlons wlLhln ArLlcle 101.
AlLernaLlvely, Whlsh and 8alley argue LhaL, ln wootets, llke Lhe free movemenL cases, Lhe rules
baslcally had a publlc law characLer.
147
lf a publlc law characLer ls necessary, Lhls could slgnlflcanLly
resLrlcL dlverslLy's scope. Powever, Lhe LC! dld noL hlghllghL Lhls lssue ln wootets, nor ln Lhe laLer
Meco MeJloo case balanclng publlc healLh ln ArLlcle 101(1), where, no sLaLe acLors were lnvolved.
1he LC! recenLly hlnLed LhaL Lhls was lrrelevanL.
148
ln facL, publlc pollcy has been consldered ln many
cases wlLhouL a publlc law characLer, Lhlnk of Lhe slngle markeL cases, for example.
149
1hls lssue may
noL have arlsen so clearly before because publlc balanclng was normally conducLed wlLhln ArLlcle
101(3), where Lhe Commlsslon had Lhe monopoly unLll 2004, maklng dlvergenL [udgmenLs rarer.
Powever, wootets was debaLed under ArLlcle 101(1), Lhe agreemenL dld noL fall wlLhln a block
exempLlon, nor had lL been noLlfled Lo Lhe Commlsslon aL Lhe relevanL Llme.
130
Some belleve LhaL
demandlng sLaLe lnvolvemenL ln publlc pollcy balanclng ls senslble. CLherwlse, so Lhe argumenL
goes, we abandon Lhe balance Lo self-cenLred companles, raLher Lhan democraLlcally elecLed

141
1he relevanL acLors musL ensure LhaL colluslve ouLcomes do noL resulL. Powever, only lnsofar as Lhls means
LhaL Lhere ls a proper balanclng of compeLlLlon and oLher, relevanL, publlc pollcy goals.
142
Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, 12, also pages 3-11, Wallace, ollack and
?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 127, 483, 1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, ChapLer 1, Commlsslon,
commlssloo stoff wotkloq Jocomeot, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, occompooyloq tbe
commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo lotllomeot, tbe cooocll, tbe otopeoo cooomlc ooJ
5oclol commlttee ooJ tbe commlttee of tbe keqloos, A 5loqle Motket fot 21st ceototy otope, 11, Commlsslon,
A 5loqle Motket fot 21st ceototy otope, 4, 12, Senden, 'SofL Law, Self-8egulaLlon and Co-8egulaLlon ln
Luropean Law: where do Lhey meeL?' 9 LlecLronlc !ournal of ComparaLlve Law, and Commlsslon, otopeoo
Covetoooce. o wblte popet, 21.
143
Sabel and ZelLlln, 'Learnlng from ulfference: Lhe new archlLecLure of experlmenLallsL governance ln Lhe Lu'
ln Sabel and ZelLlln (eds), xpetlmeotollst Covetoooce lo tbe otopeoo uoloo. towotJs o oew otcbltectote (Cu
2010), 1-2.
144
Commlsslon, losttomeots fot o MoJetolseJ 5loqle Motket lollcy, 13, and CLCu, kecommeoJotloo of tbe
cooocll oo keqolototy lollcy ooJ Covetoooce (2012), 17. See also fooLnoLe 132.
143
Wallace, ollack and ?oung, lollcy-Mokloq lo tbe u, 310.
146
Lverson, '1he Crlsls of lndeLermlnacy', 233-4, Case 43/83 vetbooJ Jet 5ocbvetslcbetet v commlssloo [1987]
LC8 403, para 23. My focus ls para 18 and AdvocaLe-Ceneral uarmon's Cplnlon, pp. 427-34.
147
Whlsh and 8alley, competltloo low, 132-3. Slmllarly, Cdudu, 1be 8oooJotles of c competltloo low. tbe
scope of Attlcle 81 (Cu 2006), chapLer 3, parL lv.
148
Case C-1/12 OtJem Jos 1colcos Oflclols Je cootos v AototlJoJe Jo coocottoclo, nyr, 28 lebruary 2013,
para 93.
149
1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, 111-99.
130
Whlsh, competltloo low (llfLh edn, 8uLLerworLhs 2003), 123.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
20

Member SLaLes (unllke leglslaLlon).
131
!usL Lo engage wlLh Lhls argumenL, leL's lgnore Lhe lnfluence
LhaL underLaklngs have over leglslaLlve acLlvlLy Loo. 1he LC! focuses on Lhe ouLcome of Lhe ArLlcle
101 balance, noL underLaklngs' moLlvaLlons.
132
1he Commlsslon, nCAs and Member SLaLe courLs
'[udge' Lhe cases. As a resulL, Lhese publlc acLors can proLecL us ln Lhe balance.
133

ulrecL effecL cannoL be dlscussed ln lsolaLlon, lL ls lnfluenced by meLa-docLrlnes on Lhe naLure of Lu
law.
134
We have seen several regulaLory challenges whlch lmpacL upon declslon-maklng ln Lhe Lu.
Lven before Lhe MaasLrlchL 1reaLy's soclal chapLer expressly LoleraLed lL, Lhere was an esLabllshed
pracLlce of allowlng some '.dlfferenLlaLlon beLween Member SLaLes even wlLhln Lhe mosL hallowed
parLs of Lhe LC's supposedly unlform and shared lnLernal markeL acquls.'
133
Clven Lhe lncreaslng
emphasls on soclal and envlronmenLal goals ln Lhe Lu 1reaLles and Lhe greaLer wllllngness Lo
conslder local preferences, dlrecL effecL should noL prevenL dlverslLy ln ArLlcle 101.
e. Conc|us|on
1he presence of dlsagreemenLs on alms (wheLher Lhey arlse Lhrough lssues 1-4) and meLhods
(wheLher Lhey arlse Lhrough lssues 3 or 3) suggesL LhaL dlverslLy wlLhln ArLlcle 101 furLhers
consLlLuLlonal Lolerance, helps Lo resolve complex [urlsdlcLlonal problems, democraLlc leglLlmacy and
dlverse naLlonal vlews of Lhe good llfe (boLh subsLanLlvely and Lhrough approprlaLe mechanlsms). As
Lberleln noLes, 'uecenLrallsaLlon encourages flexlble rule ad[usLmenL Lallored Lo speclflc local
condlLlons LhaL may vary subsLanLlally wlLh a heLerogeneous pollLy...'
136
PomogenelLy can be a curse.
aradoxlcally, dlverslLy can be '.a pre-condlLlon for preservaLlon of ldenLlLy.'
137
and llberaLe Lhe
neLwork Lo openly experlmenL wlLh dlfferenL alms and meLhods, whlch ls especlally lmporLanL for
resolvlng uncerLalnLy. neLwork members become publlc laboraLorles.
138
Sharlng ouLcomes generaLes
a rlch pool of learnlng experlences.
139
Comparlng resulLs agalnsL Lhe besL performers, and redeflnlng
alms or meLhods when oLhers' are beLLer, should more rapldly lead Lo besL pracLlce and
harmonlsaLlon,
160
or, aL leasL, lnformed dlvergence.
161
Cn Lhe oLher hand, aL a cerLaln polnL, Lhls

131
Cdudu, 1be 8oooJotles of c competltloo low, 31-2. C.f. lorresLer, 'Where Law MeeLs CompeLlLlon: ls
WouLers llke a Cassls de ul[on or a laLypus?' ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu (eds), otopeoo competltloo low
Aooool 2004. 1be kelotloosblp betweeo competltloo low ooJ tbe (llbetol) ltofessloos (ParL 2004), 293.
132
!olned Cases 29/83 eLc. ckAM v commlssloo [1984] LC8 1679, para 29.
133
lor more dlscusslon on problems wlLh publlc/ prlvaLe dlvlde argumenLs see 1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ
lobllc lollcy, 87-93.
134
de WlLLe, 'ulrecL LffecL, rlmacy, and Lhe naLure of Lhe Legal Crder', 324, and Ll[sbouLs, 'ulrecL LffecL, Lhe
1esL and Lhe 1erms', 240-1, 248-9.
133
de 8urca, 'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'?', 134, ln agreemenL also Shaw, 'ConsLlLuLlonallsm and llexlblllLy
ln Lhe Lu: developlng a raLlonal approach' lnlbld , 340.
136
Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon?', 146. Also, 8udzlnskl, '1ransborder Mergers', 44,
uonahue and ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs ulsconLenLs', 74, Scharpf, 'Luropean Covernance', 4-3, de 8urca,
'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'?', 141, and hlllpparL and Sle-uhlan-Po, 'llexlblllLy and Models of
Covernance for Lhe Lu' lnlbld , 301.
137
CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 291-2.
138
llngleLon ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 180,
alLhough he assumes LhaL Lhese wlll only be compeLlLlon conslderaLlons, slmllarly, 8ge ln lbld, 167, Wlls, 1be
Optlmol ofotcemeot of c Aotlttost low (kluwer Law lnLernaLlonal 2002), 146, and Wlls, ltloclples of
otopeoo Aotlttost ofotcemeot, 17, buL c.f. 44-6.
139
Slmllarly, kllpaLrlck, 'new Lu LmploymenL Covernance and ConsLlLuLlonallsm' ln ue 8urca and ScoLL (eds),
low ooJ New Covetoooce lo tbe u ooJ tbe u5 (ParL 2006), 123 (employmenL), 8arnard and ueakln, 'MarkeL
Access and 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 4 (free movemenL). ln dlfferenL lnsLlLuLlonal seLLlngs, de vlsser, Netwotk-
8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 349-30.
160
Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon?', 146-7, de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c
low, 239, and Maher and 5Lefan, 'CompeLlLlon Law ln Lurope', 183. Slmllarly, for Lhe CMC, see 1rubek, CoLLrell
and nance, ''SofL Law', 'Pard Law' and Lu lnLegraLlon', 89.
161
8udzlnskl, 'lurallsm of CompeLlLlon ollcy aradlgms', 23-30, uonahue and ollack, 'CenLrallsaLlon and lLs
ulsconLenLs', 73, and Sabel and ZelLlln, 'Learnlng from ulfference', 4.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
21

mlghL undermlne Lhe lnLernal markeL, lncrease Lhe cosL of lnLernaLlonal Lrade, ralse Lhe specLre of
exLernallLles and races Lo Lhe boLLom, and reLard Lhe developmenL of a unlfled body of case law.
unlformlLy and dlverslLy are boLh valuable. uesplLe Lhe rlsks Lo Lhe clarlLy of Lhe Lu's message,
162

and Lhe LhreaL of exLernallLles, l see more advanLages ln accepLlng dlverslLy ln ArLlcle 101 Lo deal
wlLh dlsagreemenLs on alms and meLhods. lL allows heLerogeneous sLaLes Lo [oln LogeLher ln Lhe
pursulL of consumer welfare, buL wlLh Lolerance and respecL for Lhelr dlfferences. ln Lhe space Lhey
bulld, Lhey can openly experlmenL, sharlng besL pracLlce ln Lhe pursulL of Lhelr besL soluLlon(s). Pere,
we are more llkely Lo flnd, and Lo flnd more qulckly, beLLer answers. 1here ls unlLy ln dlverslLy.
lL ls dlfflculL Lo allocaLe compeLences ln a mulLl-level governance sLrucLure, we need meanlngful
lnLeracLlon beLween Lhe varlous levels. ln essence, Lhls also demands a balance beLween coherence,
as a baslc condlLlon for Lhe lnLernal markeL, and respecL for local preferences.
163
Some dlverslLy ls
lmporLanL, even ln ArLlcle 101.
164
1hls ls noL a crude grab for power by Lhe Member SLaLes,
163
buL a
raLlonal way Lo deal wlLh dlsagreemenLs on alms and meLhods. Powever, Lhere musL be:
.cerLaln llmlLs Lo flexlblllLy and Lo dlfferenLlaLlon, some mlnlmum degree of commlLmenL
Lo a baslc and shared seL of pollcles. 1hls noLlon of commlLmenL comblnes Lhe ldea of
accepLance of boLh Lhe conLenL of parLlcular pollcles and Lhe speclflc legal and consLlLuLlonal
characLerlsLlcs of such measures."
166

Crowlng Member SLaLe lnfluence and compeLence ln ArLlcle 101 and lncreaslng dlsLrusL ln 'pure'
markeL soluLlons demand a revlLallzaLlon of Lhe Member SLaLes' role. l belleve LhaL ArLlcle 101's core
should be consumer welfare. As l have explalned elsewhere, Lhls goal seems Lo be reflecLed ln Lhe
Lu 1reaLles, lL ofLen also helps us Lo achleve many oLher relevanL publlc pollcy goals, lndlrecLly.
167

SomeLlmes Lhls ls noL Lhe case, Lhen, relevanL publlc pollcy goals may have Lo be dlrecLly consldered
wlLhln ArLlcle 101. 1here should, however, be llmlLs Lo dlverslLy. 1he nexL secLlon explores Lhem.
4. Co-ord|nat|on
1hls secLlon dlscusses Lhe llmlLs Lo dlverslLy. ollcy and lnformaLlon sharlng neLworks are useful for
provldlng Lhe experlmenLaLlon, lnformaLlon and learnlng LhaL ls needed for deallng wlLh Lhe
problems LhaL we have ouLllned above. arL (a) asks wheLher Lhere ls a compeLlLlon neLwork aL all.
1hls may be a surprlslng quesLlon, buL l argue LhaL Lhe Commlsslon ls Lrylng Lo creaLe a hlerarchy
raLher Lhan a neLwork of equals. Pavlng sald LhaL, 8egulLlon 1/2003 leaves room for a pollcy
neLwork. So, arL (b) uses lnslghLs from pollLlcal sclence Lo explaln whaL we need Lo creaLe such a
pollcy neLwork. 1hen, lL lnvesLlgaLes how Lhls could be achleved wlLhln Lhe Luropean CompeLlLlon
neLwork (LCn) as currenLly sLrucLured and asks wheLher beLLer co-ordlnaLlon requlres any changes.
1hese flndlngs are parLlcularly lmporLanL lf Lhe LCn ls Lo be exporLed Lo oLher areas of Lu law.

162
WeaLherlll, 'llndlng Space for Closer Co-operaLlon', 237, and de 8urca and ScoLL, 'lnLroducLlon' ln de 8urca
and ScoLL (eds),lbld , 3-4.
163
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, xxlll.
164
8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder', 167, llngleLon, '1he
ulsLrlbuLlon and ALLrlbuLlon of Cases Among Lhe Members of Lhe neLwork: Lhe perspecLlve of Lhe Commlsslon/
nCAs' lnlbld (ParL ), 180, SLurm, 'neLworklng ln uncharLered 1errlLory: Lhe relaLlonshlp beLween Lhe members
of Lhe neLwork and Lhelr naLlonal governmenLs' lnlbld , 174, alLhough Lhey do noL seem Lo dlscuss Lhls ln
relaLlon Lo dlsagreemenLs on alms, [usL meLhods. C.f. Slragusa, '1he Commlsslon's oslLlon wlLhln Lhe neLwork:
Lhe perspecLlve of Lhe legal pracLlLloners' lnlbld , 267.
163
Some mlghL Lhlnk Lhls ln relaLlon Lo flexlblllLy elsewhere ln Lu law, Shaw, 'ConsLlLuLlonallsm and llexlblllLy
ln Lhe Lu', 339.
166
de 8urca, 'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'? 1he Case of Lhe lnLernal MarkeL' lnlbld , 133, c.f. Shaw,
'ConsLlLuLlonallsm and llexlblllLy ln Lhe Lu: developlng a raLlonal approach' lnlbld . lncreased dlfferenLlaLlon
may sLarL Lo undermlne Lhe Lu as a whole, lbld, 333, and WeaLherlll, 'llndlng Space for Closer Co-operaLlon ln
Lhe lleld of CulLure' lnlbld , 241.
167
1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, ChapLers 1 and 6.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
22

a. Is |t a h|erarchy, or |s |t a network?
1he Commlsslon's pollcy role may leave no room for neLworklng. ArLlcle 17 1Lu lnsLrucLs lL Lo
promoLe Lhe Lu's general lnLeresL and Lo apply Lhe Lu 1reaLles. ArLlcle 103 demands Councll
regulaLlons and dlrecLlves whlch, amongsL oLher Lhlngs, ArLlcle 103(2)(b) '.lay down deLalled rules
for Lhe appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101(3).' and ArLlcle 103(2)(d) '.deflne Lhe respecLlve poslLlons of Lhe
Commlsslon and Lhe.' Lu CourLs. ArLlcle 103(1) adds '.Lhe Commlsslon shall ensure Lhe appllcaLlon
of Lhe prlnclples lald down ln ArLlcles 101 and 102.' ln 2000, Lhe LC! held LhaL, for ArLlcles 101 and
102, Lhe Commlsslon ls '.tespooslble fot Jefloloq ooJ lmplemeotloq tbe otleototloo of commoolty
competltloo pollcy.
168
1he Commlsslon expllclLly Lrled Lo reLaln Lhls role ln Lhe 2004 modernlsaLlon
process, saylng LhaL decenLrallsaLlon musL noL resulL ln lnconslsLenL appllcaLlon:
.of CommunlLy compeLlLlon law. CompeLlLlon pollcy wlll Lhus conLlnue Lo be deLermlned aL
CommunlLy level, boLh by means of Lhe adopLlon of leglslaLlve LexLs and lndlvldual declslons.
1he Commlsslon, as guardlan of Lhe 1reaLles and guaranLor of Lhe CommunlLy lnLeresL
sub[ecL Lo Lhe supervlslon of Lhe CourL of !usLlce, has a speclal role Lo play ln Lhe appllcaLlon
of CommunlLy law and ln ensurlng Lhe conslsLenL appllcaLlon of Lhe compeLlLlon rules."
169

AL flrsL slghL, Lhe Commlsslon appears Lo have allled Lhe Councll Lo lLs cause. Councll 8egulaLlon
1/2003, reclLal 34, reLalns Lhls cenLral role for Lu bodles.
170
1he Commlsslon lssues subsLanLlve
guldellnes and block exempLlons.
171
lLs selecLlon of a sole consumer welfare goal for ArLlcle 101
leaves llLLle room for dlsagreemenLs on alms,
172
lLs guldance mlghL do Lhe same for dlsagreemenLs
on meLhods.
173
1he Commlsslon assumes LhaL lLs declslons explaln Lhe relevanL law Lo all (as well as
maklng pollcy, see above), noL only Lo Lhe declslons' addressees (llke Lu CourL [udgmenLs).
174

under 8egulaLlon 1/2003, all Lhe relevanL acLors can Lake ArLlcle 101 declslons/ [udgmenLs.
173
So
many declslon-makers could undermlne Lhe conslsLency of Lu compeLlLlon law.
176
Powever, ln
MostetfooJs, Lhe LC! held LhaL Lhe Commlsslon cannoL be bound by a declslon glven by a naLlonal
courL. 1he Commlsslon may adopL ArLlcle 101 declslons even where an agreemenL '.or pracLlce has
already been Lhe sub[ecL of a declslon by a naLlonal courL and Lhe declslon conLemplaLed by Lhe
Commlsslon confllcLs wlLh LhaL naLlonal courL's declslon.'
177
lurLhermore, Member SLaLe courLs (and,
probably, nCAs) cannoL declde conLrary Lo Commlsslon declslons, or Lhose ln conLemplaLlon.
178


168
Case C-344/98 MostetfooJs v n8 lce cteom [2000] LC8 1-11369, para 46.
169
Commlsslon, otopeoo commlssloo wblte lopet, oo moJetolzotloo of tbe toles lmplemeotloq Attlcles 85
ooJ 86 of tbe c 1teoty, para 83. Also, Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 421-4, and Wlmann,
'uecenLrallsed LnforcemenL of LC CompeLlLlon Law and Lhe new ollcy on CarLels', 141-2.
170
Whlsh and 8alley, competltloo low, p. 33, c.f. 1ownley, 'ls 1here (SLlll) 8oom for non-Lconomlc
ArgumenLs?', secLlon 3.2.
171
See hLLp://ec.europa.eu/compeLlLlon/anLlLrusL/leglslaLlon/leglslaLlon.hLml
172
See Lhe LexL around fooLnoLe 72.
173
lor example, Lhe proof of fuLure beneflLs LhaL Lhe Commlsslon demands may pre[udlce Lhe Member SLaLes'
freedom Lo emphaslse fuLure lnnovaLlon, Commlsslon, ColJelloes oo tbe oppllcotloo of Attlcle 81(J) of tbe
1teoty, paras 30-8.
174
Commlsslon, commlssloo stoff wotkloq popet occompooyloq tbe commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to
tbe otopeoo lotllomeot ooJ cooocll, kepott oo tbe fooctlooloq of keqolotloo 1/200J, para 86. See also,
Commlsslon, commlssloo xplooototy MemotooJom, ltoposol fot o cooocll keqolotloo lmplemeotloq Attlcles
81 ooJ 82 of tbe 1teoty, 13.
173
8especLlvely, 8egulaLlon 1/2003, arLlcles 3, 7 and 10, see also reclLals 6, 11 and 14.
176
Commlsslon, otopeoo commlssloo wblte lopet, oo moJetolzotloo of tbe toles lmplemeotloq Attlcles 85
ooJ 86 of tbe c 1teoty, 13.
177
Case C-344/98 MostetfooJs v n8 lce cteom [2000] LC8 1-11369, para 48. See also, Case C-478/93
NetbetlooJs v commlssloo [1993] LC8 l-3081, paras 36-42.
178
Case C-344/98 MostetfooJs v n8 lce cteom [2000] LC8 1-11369, paras 31-2. See also reclLal 14 and arLlcle
10, 8egulaLlon 1/2003.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
23

?eL, Lhe conLenL of Lhe Commlsslon's pollcy funcLlon ls conLesLable. ArLlcles 17 and 103 Lell lL Lo
opply, raLher Lhan moke, ArLlcle 101 prlnclples. 8egulaLlon 1/2003 could Lell Lhe Commlsslon Lo lay
down deLalled rules for applylng ArLlcle 101(3), noL ArLlcle 101(1), lnsLead lL undermlnes Lhls pollcy
role, aL leasL compared Lo 8egulaLlon 17. ln addlLlon, when Lhe Lu CourLs speak of Lhe Commlsslon's
compeLlLlon pollcy funcLlon, Lhey: allow Lhe Commlsslon Lo prlorlLlse some complalnLs before lL,
179

and ensure LhaL Lhe Member SLaLes' courLs' declslons do noL confllcL wlLh conLemplaLed Commlsslon
declslons.
180
1he Commlsslon can also declare LhaL conducL LhaL has already been LermlnaLed
lnfrlnges ArLlcle 101,
181
and lL has a loL of freedom over lLs flnlng pollcy.
182
ollcy, Lhen, has more Lo
do wlLh prlorlLlslng resources and dlscouraglng anLl-compeLlLlve behavlour, raLher Lhan ArLlcle 101's
subsLance.
183
ln MostetfooJs, Lhe LC! held LhaL whlle orlenLaLlng and applylng Lu compeLlLlon pollcy
ln lLs declslons and regulaLlons, Lhe Commlsslon ls sub[ecL Lo revlew by Lhe Lu CourLs.
184
Lven when
Lhe Commlsslon en[oys dlscreLlon, Lhe Lu CourLs demand reasons so LhaL Lhey can revlew lL.
183

lo low, Lhe LCn ls noL necessarlly a hlerarchlcal arrangemenL, wlLh Lhe Commlsslon aL Lhe apex. 1he
Councll has lefL room for dlverslLy ln 8egulaLlon 1/2003 as have Lhe Member SLaLes ln Lhe Lu
1reaLles. 1he Commlsslon ls noL Lhe only one wlLh a subsLanLlve pollcy role. 1he Lu CourLs' [udlclal
revlew funcLlon ensures LhaL all (and only) relevanL lssues affecL Commlsslon analysls. Commlsslon
power Lo consLraln Lhe oLher relevanL acLors ls llmlLed, legally. 1he Councll gave lL a power Lo make
block exempLlon regulaLlons, sub[ecL Lo Lhe Lu CourLs' lnLerpreLaLlon of ArLlcle 101.
186
Commlsslon
guldellnes cannoL creaLe legally blndlng obllgaLlons or auLhorlse arrangemenLs LhaL are lncompaLlble
wlLh Lhe Lu 1reaLles, as lnLerpreLed by Lhe Lu CourLs.
187
nor can Lhey blnd Member SLaLe courLs and
Lhe nCAs.
188
lurLhermore, Commlsslon declslons do noL have Lhe precedenLlal value of Lu CourL
[udgmenLs. ArLlcle 288 1lLu says LhaL only Lhe addressees of Commlsslon ArLlcle 101 declslons are
bound by Lhem. MostetfooJs should be lnLerpreLed narrowly: Lhe relevanL acLors only cannoL
devlaLe from Commlsslon declslons for Lhe same parLles, sub[ecL-maLLer, relevanL markeL, eLc.
189

Powever, Lhe LCn may, lo foct, be a hlerarchy.
190
Several mechanlsms seek a conslsLenL appllcaLlon
of ArLlcle 101: Lhe duLy Lo apply Lu law lf Lhere ls an effecL on Lrade, Lhe nCAs' obllgaLlon Lo lnform
Lhe Commlsslon before adopLlng declslons, and Lhe posslblllLy for Lhe Commlsslon Lo relleve Lhe nCA

179
Case 1-24/90 Aotomec v commlssloo [1992] LC8 ll-2223, para 73.
180
Case C-344/98 n8 lce cteom v MostetfooJs ltJ [2000] LC8 l-11369, para 46.
181
Case 1-23/02 5omlko lloe cbemlcols v commlssloo, 6 CcLober 2003, nyr, paras 34-8.
182
Whlsh and 8alley, competltloo low, pp. 276-80.
183
Wlls, 'ulscreLlon and rlorlLlsaLlon ln ubllc AnLlLrusL LnforcemenL, ln arLlcular Lu AnLlLrusL LnforcemenL'
34 World CompeLlLlon, 366-8, and Case C-226/11 xpeJlo, 13 uecember 2012, nyr, paras 29-31.
184
Case C-344/98 n8 lce cteom ltJ v MostetfooJs ltJ [2000] LC8 l-11369, para 46.
183
Case C-119/97 ufex v commlssloo [1999] LC8 l-1341, para 91.
186
8egulaLlon 1/2003, arLlcle 29(2) someLlmes allows a nCA Lo wlLhdraw a block exempLlon.
187
Case 1-9/92 Aotomoblles leoqeot ooJ leoqeot v commlssloo [1993] LC8 ll-493, para 44, and Case C-266/90
ltooc 5obo v nooptzollomt Aoqsbotq [1992] LC8 1-287, para 19.
188
Case C-226/11 xpeJlo, 13 uecember 2012, nyr, paras 29-31, SchuLze, 'lrom Lurope Lo Llsbon: 'execuLlve
federallsm' ln Lhe (new) Luropean unlon' 47 Common MarkeL Law 8evlew, 1404-3, SLefan, 'Luropean unlon
SofL Law: new developmenLs concernlng Lhe dlvlde beLween legally blndlng force and legal effecLs' 73 Modern
Law 8evlew, 892.
189
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 187. C.f. Case 1-63/98 voo Jeo 8etqb [2003] LC8 ll-4633,
para 198.
190
Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 420, Cenglz, 'MulLl-level Covernance ln CompeLlLlon ollcy', 664-6,
Wlgger and nlke, 'Lnhanced 8oles of rlvaLe AcLors ln Lu 8uslness 8egulaLlon'302, and Sevn, '1he naLlonal
CourLs and Lhe unlform AppllcaLlon of LC CompeLlLlon 8ules: prellmlnary observaLlons on Councll 8egulaLlon
1/2003' ln Posklns and 8oblnson (eds), A 1toe otopeoo. essoys fot IoJqe uovlJ JwotJs (ParL 2004), 147. See
also Lhe hlnLs from Commlsslon, commlssloo Notlce, oo co-opetotloo wltblo tbe Netwotk of competltloo
Aotbotltles (2004), paras 31, 43-37.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
24

of lLs compeLence Lo acL lf Lhere ls a serlous rlsk of lncoherence.
191
So, nCA declslons are made ln Lhe
Commlsslon's shadow.
192
1he Commlsslon sees lLself as Lhe arblLer of dlspuLes beLween Lhe nCAs
and as hlerarchlcally superlor Lo Lhem.
193
1he Commlsslon and Lhe Councll made an expllclL aLLempL
Lo reserve cases for Lhe Commlsslon lnvolvlng llnks wlLh oLher Lu pollcles.
194

Many belleve LhaL Lhe LCn ls prlmarlly concerned wlLh enforcemenL raLher Lhan pollcy-maklng.
193

?eL, even lo foct, a pollcy neLwork ls posslble. neLworks are noL llke hlerarchles, Lhey do noL '.have
cenLral dlrecLlon or an esLabllshed seL of auLhorlLy relaLlons.'
196
uecenLrallslng ArLlcle 101's
appllcaLlon decenLrallsed power,
197
even ArLlcle 101(3)'s wordlng lnvokes dlscreLlon.
198
8egulaLlon
1/2003 lnsLrucLs Lhe Commlsslon and Lhe nCAs Lo form a oetwotk of publlc auLhorlLles applylng
ArLlcle 101 '.ln close cooperaLlon.'
199
lL adds: 'lurLher modallLles for Lhe cooperaLlon wlLhln Lhe
neLwork wlll be lald down and revlsed by Lhe Commlsslon, ln close cooperaLlon wlLh Lhe Member
SLaLes.'
200
1he Commlsslon's explanaLory memorandum lncludes Lhe nCAs ln oLher ways Loo:
1he Commlsslon, belng Lhe only auLhorlLy LhaL can acL LhroughouL Lhe Luropean unlon, wlll
necessarlly conLlnue Lo play a cenLral role ln Lhe developmenL of CommunlLy compeLlLlon
law and pollcy and ln ensurlng LhaL lL ls applled conslsLenLly LhroughouL Lhe slngle markeL,
Lhereby prevenLlng any renaLlonallsaLlon of CommunlLy compeLlLlon law. 1he developmenL
and appllcaLlon of Lhe law and pollcy wlll, however, be a concern of all Lhe compeLlLlon
auLhorlLles lnvolved ln Lhe enforcemenL of ArLlcles 81 and 82 [now ArLlcles 101 and 102
1lLu]. ollcy lssues wlll be Lhe sub[ecL of dlscusslon wlLhln Lhe neLwork."
201

1he Councll and Commlsslon [olnL sLaLemenL on Lhe funcLlonlng of Lhe LCn gave Lhe nCAs full
compeLence Lo apply ArLlcle 101, '.acLlvely conLrlbuLlng Lo Lhe developmenL of compeLlLlon pollcy,

191
8egulaLlon 1/2003, respecLlvely: reclLal 8, arLlcle 3 and Sevn, '1he naLlonal CourLs and Lhe unlform
AppllcaLlon of LC CompeLlLlon 8ules', 147, arLlcle 11(4), and arLlcle 11(6). Also see, Commlsslon, commlssloo
stoff wotkloq popet occompooyloq tbe commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo lotllomeot ooJ
cooocll, kepott oo tbe fooctlooloq of keqolotloo 1/200J, para 230.
192
Cenglz, '1he Luropean CompeLlLlon neLwork: sLrucLure, managemenL and lnlLlal experlences of pollcy
enforcemenL' Lul Worklng apers, 11-2. PerlLler and Lehmkuhl, 'Covernlng ln Lhe Shadow of Plerarchy: new
modes of governance ln regulaLlon' ln PerlLler and 8hodes (eds), New MoJes of Covetoooce lo otope.
qovetoloq lo tbe sboJow of bletotcby (algrave Macmlllan 2011), 39-61, say one needs Lhe shadow of
hlerarchy as a credlble LhreaL.
193
lL promlses Lo use lLs formal powers sparlngly, MonLl ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u
Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 8.
194
Commlsslon, commlssloo Notlce, oo co-opetotloo wltblo tbe Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, para 13,
and Councll and Commlsslon, cooocll ooJ commlssloo Iolot 5totemeot, oo tbe looctlooloq of tbe Netwotk of
competltloo Aotbotltles (2002), para 19.
193
Wllks, 'Agencles, neLworks, ulscourses', 440.
196
Wllks, 'undersLandlng CompeLlLlon ollcy neLworks ln Lurope: a pollLlcal sclence perspecLlve' ln Lhlermann
and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 67. See also, Lberleln,
'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon? lnformal neLwork Covernance ln Lu Slngle MarkeL 8egulaLlon'
lnlbld , 143.
197
Councll and Commlsslon, cooocll ooJ commlssloo Iolot 5totemeot, oo tbe looctlooloq of tbe Netwotk of
competltloo Aotbotltles, para 6, and 8egulaLlon 1/2003, arLlcle 1, reclLal 4.
198
1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, 233, 261, buL noLe 232, and Wlls, ltloclples of otopeoo Aotlttost
ofotcemeot, 7.
199
8egulaLlon 1/2003, reclLal 13. See also arLlcle 11(1), 8egulaLlon 1/2003, Councll and Commlsslon, cooocll
ooJ commlssloo Iolot 5totemeot, oo tbe looctlooloq of tbe Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, para 2, and,
Commlsslon, commlssloo xplooototy MemotooJom, ltoposol fot o cooocll keqolotloo lmplemeotloq Attlcles
81 ooJ 82 of tbe 1teoty, 11 and 12.
200
8egulaLlon 1/2003, reclLal 13.
201
Commlsslon, commlssloo xplooototy MemotooJom, ltoposol fot o cooocll keqolotloo lmplemeotloq
Attlcles 81 ooJ 82 of tbe 1teoty, 11 and 12.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
23

law and pracLlce.'
202
All compeLlLlon auLhorlLles '.wlLhln Lhe neLwork are lndependenL from one
anoLher. CooperaLlon beLween nCAs and wlLh Lhe Commlsslon Lakes place on Lhe basls of equallLy,
respecL and solldarlLy.'
203
LquallLy ls noL Lyplcal ln a hlerarchy. lurLhermore, Lhe LCn dlscusses
pollcy. uC CCM's webslLe, explalns LhaL Lhere are worklng groups:
.where Lhe neLwork members can dlscuss general lssues or lssues relaLlng Lo cerLaln
secLors. 1here are no voLlng rules, because Lhls Lype of cooperaLlon relles on consensus
bulldlng. 1he Commlsslon as Lhe guardlan of Lhe 1reaLy has Lhe ulLlmaLe buL noL Lhe sole
responslblllLy for developlng pollcy and safeguardlng efflclency and conslsLency."
204

So, here we have a neLwork, based on equallLy, where Lhe members, boLh Lhe Commlsslon and
nCAs, dlscuss Lu compeLlLlon pollcy. 1here are no voLlng rules, Lhe neLwork relles on consensus
bulldlng. 1he nCAs have been Lasked wlLh dlscusslng general pollcy lssues as well as merely decldlng
cases. ollcy ls noL Lhe sole prerogaLlve, or responslblllLy, of Lhe Commlsslon. 1here has been a loL of
conslsLency so far,
203
however, ln pracLlce we also see subsLanLlal dlvergence beLween Lhe
enforcemenL acLlons of Lhe nCAs. lor example, Lhe Cl1 do noL generally proceed agalnsL verLlcal
resLrlcLlons under ArLlcle 101, whereas Lhe lrench auLhorlLles do. ln parL, Lhls may reflecL
admlnlsLraLlve prlorlLy declslons, buL lL ls also llkely Lo reflecL subsLanLlve dlfference.
206

Commlsslon declslons, whlch can conLradlcL Member SLaLe declslons/ [udgmenLs, can be appealed
Lo Lhe Lu CourLs, so Lhe Member SLaLes can challenge Lhem. Slmllarly, quesLlons of Lu law before
Lhe Member SLaLes' courLs can be resolved by Lhe LC! Lhrough ArLlcle 267 references. 1he Lu CourLs
are ofLen relucLanL Lo lnLerfere wlLh Lhe Commlsslon's subsLanLlve appralsals,
207
slmllarly, Lhey ofLen
allow Lhe Member SLaLe courLs a margln of appreclaLlon. 1he Commlsslon could do Lhe same for Lhe
nCAs. erhaps lLs role ls Lo co-otJloote dlverslLy, ensurlng LhaL dlfference does noL rlp Lhe LCn aparL.
AlLernaLlvely, as Lhe Commlsslon lLself Lakes declslons, lL may have more 'rlghL' Lo lnLervene.
208

1he debaLe ls beLLer casL ln Lhe llghL of Lhe dlvlslon of compeLences ln Lhe Lu.
209
AccepLance of
dlverslLy largely depends on one's meLa-consLlLuLlonal vlew of where power should lle beLween Lhe
Commlsslon and Lhe Member SLaLes. Cn Lhe one hand, we geL slgnlflcanL beneflLs from our pursulL
of an ever closer unlon amongsL Lhe peoples of Lurope. 1o achleve Lhls, Lhe Lu shall esLabllsh an
lnLernal markeL, based on free movemenL and compeLlLlon. Powever, Lhe lnLernal markeL musL be
balanced wlLh oLher pollcy goals, such as envlronmenLal proLecLlon and soclal progress.
rlor Lo Lhe Llsbon 1reaLy, Lhe Lu 1reaLles dld noL expllclLly sLaLe whlch areas were ones of excluslve
compeLence. ArLlcle 3 1lLu now llsLs slx such areas. 1he LC! had already caLegorlsed mosL of Lhem ln
Lhls way.
210
Powever, '.Lhe esLabllshlng of Lhe compeLlLlon rules necessary for Lhe funcLlonlng of
Lhe lnLernal markeL.' ls new. 1hls was surprlslng. rlor Lo Lhe Llsbon 1reaLy, Lhe LC! had held LhaL

202
Councll and Commlsslon, cooocll ooJ commlssloo Iolot 5totemeot, oo tbe looctlooloq of tbe Netwotk of
competltloo Aotbotltles, para 6.
203
lbld, para 7, c.f. para 9.
204
hLLp://ec.europa.eu/compeLlLlon/ecn/faq.hLml See also 8egulaLlon 1/2003, arLlcle 14(7), Commlsslon,
commlssloo Notlce, oo co-opetotloo wltblo tbe Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, para 43, Commlsslon,
commlssloo stoff wotkloq popet occompooyloq tbe commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo
lotllomeot ooJ cooocll, kepott oo tbe fooctlooloq of keqolotloo 1/200J, para 114, Commlsslon,
commoolcotloo ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo lotllomeot ooJ tbe cooocll, kepott oo tbe fooctlooloq of
keqolotloo 1/200J, para 34.
203
Wllks, 'Agencles, neLworks, ulscourses', 449-33.
206
1hanks Lo WouLer Wlls for Lhls commenL.
207
lor a more deLalled dlscusslon see 1ownley, 'ls 1here (SLlll) 8oom for non-Lconomlc ArgumenLs?'
208
Slmllarly, see de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 139 and 147.
209
SLurm ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 36. See
dlscusslon ln fooLnoLe 83.
210
lor example, on Lhe common commerclal pollcy, Oploloo 1/75 locol cost 5tooJotJ [1973] LC8 1233.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
26

Lhe Member SLaLes share compeLence wlLh Lhe Lu ln Lhe fleld of compeLlLlon.
211
ln Akzo,
212
Lhe LC!
accepLed LhaL compeLlLlon ls now an area of excluslve unlon compeLence. 1hls undermlnes SecLlon
3's comparlson wlLh free movemenL of goods, whlch remalns an area of shared compeLence.
ArLlcle 2 1lLu says LhaL 'When Lhe 1reaLles confer on Lhe unlon excluslve compeLence ln a speclflc
area, only Lhe unlon may leglslaLe and adopL legally blndlng acLs, Lhe Member SLaLes belng able Lo
do so Lhemselves only lf so empowered by Lhe unlon or for Lhe lmplemenLaLlon of unlon acLs.' Slnce
Lhe Llsbon 1reaLy, have Lhe Member SLaLes losL Lhelr ablllLy Lo pursue dlverslLy wlLhln ArLlcle 101?
1he Lu's webslLe says Lhe Llsbon 1reaLy's '.aLLempL aL clarlflcaLlon [of Lu compeLences] does noL
resulL ln any noLable Lransfer of compeLence.'
213
1hese areas were deflned as excluslve compeLence
Lo conLaln Lhe Lu's power, noL expand lL.
214
under ArLlcle 2(6) 1lLu, Lhe '.scope and arrangemenLs
for exerclslng Lhe unlon's compeLences shall be deLermlned by Lhe provlslons of Lhe 1reaLles relaLlng
Lo each area.' 1he Lu auLhorlsed Lhe nCAs and Lhe Member SLaLes' courLs Lo apply ArLlcle 101.
213

1he Lu CourLs' case law ls blndlng. WlLhln Lhls llmlL, are dlsagreemenLs on alms and meLhods
allowed beLween Lhe relevanL acLors? ls dlverslLy caused by dlsagreemenLs on alms and meLhods
merely Lhe appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101, or are Lhey 'leglslaLlve'? ArLlcles 103 and 103 1lLu are
lnconcluslve. lf one lnLerpreLs 'appllcaLlon' wldely, Lhen one reduces excluslve compeLence's scope
and Lhus Lu power. 1he Commlsslon may be excluslvely responslble for subsLanLlve ArLlcle 101
pollcy developmenL, sub[ecL Lo Lhe Lu CourLs. AlLernaLlvely, subsLanLlve pollcy mlghL be a shared
enLerprlse wlLh Lhe Member SLaLes, or someLhlng beLween Lhe Lwo, see above. SchuLze says LhaL
excluslve compeLence has changed. AL flrsL, Lhe LC! favoured a wlde lnLerpreLaLlon. LaLer, lL
lnLerpreLed '.Lhese compeLences resLrlcLlvely.' 8oLh ln Lerms of Lhe scope of excluslve compeLence
powers, as well as whaL happens when Lhey confllcL wlLh oLher non-excluslve powers.
216

ArLlcle 101 allows dlverslLy. Clven lLs lmporLance (allowlng dlfference and generaLlng
experlmenLaLlon ln uncerLalnLy) l embrace lL. lf Lhe LCn ls a subsLanLlve pollcy neLwork of equals,
Lhen Lhe Commlsslon should only sLep ln as a lasL resorL,
217
e.g., lf dlverslLy's problems become Loo
greaL, relaLlve Lo lLs beneflLs, or lf learnlng ln a cerLaln area ls compleLe (rare).
218
lf Lhe Commlsslon
were leqolly aL Lhe head of a hlerarchlcal 'neLwork' lL should encourage Lhe relevanL acLors Lo
experlmenL, only sLepplng ln lf dlverslLy's cosLs, such as exLernallLles, become Loo greaL. ulverslLy ls

211
Case 14/68 wolt wllbelm [1969] LC8 1. C.f. hLLp://www.developmenLporLal.eu/wcm/lnformaLlon/gulde-on-
eu-developmenL-co-operaLlon/general-lnformaLlon-on-Lhe-european-unlon/compeLencles.hLml
212
Case C-330/07 Akzo Nobel cbemlcols v commlssloo [2010] LC8 l-8301, paras 116-120. See also Lhe
Cplnlon of AdvocaLe-Ceneral kokoLL, paras 174-183.
213
hLLp://europa.eu/leglslaLlon_summarles/lnsLlLuLlonal_affalrs/LreaLles/llsbon_LreaLy/al0020_en.hLm
214
Councll, loekeo ueclototloo (2001), 21-22, Lhe ConvenLlon on Lhe luLure of Lurope, CCnv 337/02, 8russels
21 AugusL 2002, and Cralg, 1be llsboo 1teoty, low, lolltlcs, ooJ 1teoty kefotm (Cu 2010), 139.
213
ArLlcles 3 and 6, 8egulaLlon 1/2003. See also Cralg, 1be llsboo 1teoty, low, lolltlcs, ooJ 1teoty kefotm, 160.
216
SchuLze, ltom uool to coopetotlve leJetollsm. tbe cbooqloq sttoctote of otopeoo low (Cu 2009), 167-
188. C.f. AdvocaLe-Ceneral kokoLL on excluslve compeLence ln ArLlcle 101, Case C-330/07 Akzo Nobel
cbemlcols v commlssloo [2010] LC8 l-8301, paras 174-183. 1hls [udgmenL seems more abouL Lhe Member
SLaLes' llmlLed power Lo force Lhe Commlsslon Lo conslder cerLaln pollcy goals wlLhln lLs ArLlcle 101 cases,
raLher Lhan llmlLlng Lhelr ablllLy Lo generaLe subsLanLlve ArLlcle 101 pollcy.
SubsldlarlLy may supporL co-ordlnaLed dlverslLy, SLurm, 'neLworklng ln uncharLered 1errlLory', 282, buL
ArLlcles 3(3) 1Lu and 3(1)(b) 1lLu lmply LhaL lL ls lrrelevanL ln ArLlcle 101, by lmpllcaLlon nlcolaidls,
'Concluslon: Lhe lederal vlslon 8eyond Lhe lederal SLaLe' ln nlcolaidls and Powse (eds), 1be leJetol vlsloo.
leqltlmocy ooJ levels of qovetoooce lo tbe uolteJ 5totes ooJ tbe otopeoo uoloo (Cu 2001), 446, and ldoL,
l'oppllcotloo Jo ptloclpe Je lo sobslJlotlt Joos le Jtolt Je lo coocotteoce (1993), 3. Marlana 1avares, one of
my hu researchers, quesLlons Lhls lmpllcaLlon ln her work, see also reclLal 34, 8egulaLlon 1/2003.
217
1hrough arLlcle 11(6), 8egulaLlon 1/2003.
218
kovaclc, 'CompeLlLlon ollcy ln Lhe Lu and Lhe uS'.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
27

ofLen ln Lhe Lu lnLeresL.
219
So, how can we harness Lhe power of Lhls neLwork whlle keeplng Lhe dark
slde of dlverslLy ln check?
b. L|m|ts to d|vers|ty?
We have seen subsLanLlve dlsagreemenLs abouL whaL compeLlLlon means (lssue 1), and Lhe
relevance (and welghL) of publlc pollcy conslderaLlons wlLhln ArLlcle 101 (lssue 2). 1here are also
meLhodologlcal dlsagreemenLs abouL how besL Lo achleve Lhese ends (lssue 3) and who should
declde such maLLers (lssue 4). All of Lhls Lakes place wlLhln a cllmaLe of buslness uncerLalnLy, and
uncerLalnLy from economlsLs as Lo whlch paLh wlll besL achleve whaL we wanL (lssue 3).
Pavlng sald LhaL, Lhere ls much common ground. Powever, where Lhls runs ouL (and someLlmes even
before Lhls), we need experlmenLaLlon and learnlng. 1here ls also a need Lo deal wlLh posslble
fallures Lo conslder 'ouLslde lnLeresLs' by Lhe Lu and Lhe Member SLaLes.
220
Pere, Lhe power of
neLworks comes Lo Lhe fore. 1here are an lnflnlLe varleLy of Lhem, and slLuaLlons ln whlch Lhey may
be used.
221
Wllks descrlbes some key elemenLs, lncludlng: lnLerdependencles beLween Lhe acLors, no
domlnanL acLor, neLwork sLablllLy, and Lransparency. lurLhermore, acLors need noL have shared
goals ln pollcy neLworks, Wllks calls Lhem values, buL Lhey musL agree on norms. norms are:
.expressed as shared undersLandlngs abouL subsLance and process (norms, whlch are LaclL
and speclflc, should be dlsLlngulshed from values, whlch are expllclL and generallsed, e.g. 'do
noL reveal confldenLlal lnformaLlon' ls a norm, 'compeLlLlon ls beneflclal' ls a value)."
222

uoes Lhls mean LhaL llmlLs Lo subsLanLlve, or even procedural, dlverslLy are unnecessary? Sabel and
ZelLlln say LhaL, when neLwork members experlmenL wlLh dlfferenL meLhods, framework goals are
needed, and so are measures for gauglng Lhelr achlevemenL. 1hen, members can advance Lhese
ends as Lhey see flL. ln reLurn for Lhls auLonomy, Lhey musL regularly reporL on performance:
.especlally as measured by agreed lndlcaLors, and parLlclpaLe ln a peer revlew ln whlch
Lhelr own resulLs are compared wlLh Lhose pursulng oLher means Lo Lhe same general ends.
lourLh and flnally, Lhe framework goals, meLrlcs and procedures Lhemselves are perlodlcally
revlsed by Lhe acLors who lnlLlally esLabllshed Lhem, augmenLed by such new parLlclpanLs
whose vlews come Lo be seen as lndlspenslble Lo full and falr dellberaLlon."
223

lL ls hard Lo agree speclflc, deLalled ends. Wllks seems relaxed abouL Lhls, and even where Lhere ls
experlmenLaLlon on approprlaLe meLhods, Sabel and ZelLlln speak of agreelng 'general ends', raLher
Lhan demandlng LoLal preclslon. 1hls leaves space for dlsagreemenLs on alms. Cn Lhe oLher hand, l
belleve LhaL Lhere musL be a mlnlmum commonallLy of alms, or aL leasL Lhls alds experlmenLaLlon.
224

CLherwlse Lhere ls llmlLed overlap for muLual learnlng (lnLer-dependency) and Lhe relevanL acLors
may slmply sLop llsLenlng Lo each oLher,
223
and Lhus belng a neLwork ln any meanlngful sense.
226


219
8eclLal 18, 8egulaLlon 1/2003.
220
!oerges and Lverson, '8e-concepLuallslng LuropeanlsaLlon as a ubllc Law of Colllslons: comlLology,
agencles and an lnLeracLlve publlc ad[udlcaLlon' ln Pofmann and 1urk (eds), u AJmlolsttotlve Covetoooce
(Ldward Llgar 2006), 321, 323.
221
!oerges and neyer, 'uellberaLlve SupranaLlonallsm 8evlslLed', 23.
222
Wllks, 'undersLandlng CompeLlLlon ollcy neLworks ln Lurope', 68, c.f. Wllks ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu,
coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 13.
223
Sabel and ZelLlln, 'Learnlng from ulfference', 3.
224
Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, xxlv. Many belleve LhaL
Loo much dlverslLy ln Lhe Lu neLwork for regulaLors caused many problems, 1haLcher, 'Causes and
Consequences of 8egulaLlon by neLworks', and de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 33.
223
Cerber, '1he LvoluLlon of Lhe LCn', 61-2. Cn lnLerdependency see Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 4, 17.
noLe also, de 8urca, 'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'?', 140-141.
226
8y lmpllcaLlon, 8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder', 167,
llngleLon, '1he ulsLrlbuLlon and ALLrlbuLlon of Cases Among Lhe Members of Lhe neLwork: Lhe perspecLlve of
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
28

1he Commlsslon has sald LhaL Lhe sole goal of ArLlcle 101 ls consumer welfare.
227
Some nCAs, such
as Lhe Cl1, appear Lo agree.
228
Powever, Lhls ls noL lnllne wlLh Lhe Lu 1reaLles, or Lhe Lu CourL case
law.
229
We have seen LhaL Lhe Commlsslon ls sub[ecL Lo boLh Lhe Lu 1reaLles and Lhe Lu CourLs, arL
(a). l have argued elsewhere LhaL a consumer welfare LesL should be aL Lhe hearL of ArLlcle 101. 1hls
should provlde a slzeable subsLanLlve core Lo allow Lhe neLwork Lo work, alLhough more research ls
needed on Lhls polnL.
230
l would noL advocaLe uslng goals such as economlc freedom and markeL
lnLegraLlon as parL of Lhls core.
231
Powever, Lhese and oLher relevanL publlc pollcy goals could be
consldered where Lhe lmpacL upon Lhem ouLwelghs any appreclable consumer welfare loss. ln Lhe
wootets case, dlscussed ln SecLlon 3, above, we saw LhaL Lhe LC! ls Lhe ulLlmaLe arblLer of whlch
publlc pollcy goals are relevanL and how much welghL Lhey should have. Powever, boLh wlLhln
ArLlcle 101 and elsewhere ln Lhe Lu 1reaLles, Lhe LC! glves Lhe Member SLaLes a margln of
appreclaLlon ln relaLlon Lo whlch goals are relevanL and whaL welghL Lhey should have. 1hls
subsLanLlve llmlL Lhen glves us scope for agreelng a procedural framework Lo drlve co-ordlnaLlon.
232

8efore conslderlng Lhe oLher relevanL aspecLs of Lhe neLwork, l deflne Lhe neLwork members. 1hus
far, l deflne Lhe relevanL acLors as Lhe Commlsslon, Lhe Member SLaLes' courLs and Lhe nCAs.
8epeaLed lnLeracLlons beLween neLwork members ald pollcy developmenL. neLwork members Lry Lo
lnfluence each oLher. arL (a) dlscusses Lhe LCn, conLalnlng all Lhe relevanL acLors excepL Lhe
Member SLaLes' courLs. 1hls deflnlLlon ls more approprlaLe here. neLworks generaLe llnks beLween
Lhelr members.
233
1hls has lmpllcaLlons for Lhe lndependence of Lhe [udlclary. Member SLaLe courLs
can also make a reference Lo Lhe LC! when Lhe Lu law LhaL Lhey are applylng ls unclear. So, l exclude
Lhem from my neLwork.
234
l also exclude Lhe Lu CourLs from Lhe neLwork. 1hey essenLlally acL as
lndependenL referees, dlcLaLlng whaL space ls avallable for dlsagreemenLs, see above. A slmllar
poslLlon arose ln Cermany and Lhe uSA, boLh encourage llmlLed dlverslLy ln Lhelr compeLlLlon laws.
1he neLwork members' ldenLlLy ls lmporLanL because Lhere ls a Lenslon beLween Lhe slmllarlLy of
Lhem, whlch helps generaLe LrusL and Lransparency, and, on Lhe oLher hand, Lhe creaLlve spark
caused by Lenslon and dlfference. 1rusL ls lmporLanL lf neLwork members, and Lhe lndlvlduals wlLhln
Lhem,
233
are Lo share fallure and success.
236
8oLh conLrlbuLe Lo learnlng.
237
Maher and 5Lefan say LhaL
lnformaLlon neLworks ofLen demand small, closed and sLable populaLlons, repeaLedly deallng wlLh
each oLher.
238
1he same applles Lo pollcy neLworks. Powever, Loo much slmllarlLy makes lL hard Lo
desLablllse currenL pracLlce. A '.powerful robusL neLwork, could also be dangerous: lL could become

Lhe Commlsslon/ nCAs' lnlbld (ParL ), 180, and SLurm, 'neLworklng ln uncharLered 1errlLory: Lhe relaLlonshlp
beLween Lhe members of Lhe neLwork and Lhelr naLlonal governmenLs' lnlbld , 174.
227
See fooLnoLe 72.
228
See fooLnoLe 70.
229
See fooLnoLe 67.
230
lor debaLe on Lhe subsLanLlve core of Lhe free movemenL provlslons, see olares Maduro, we, tbe coott.
231
1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, chapLer 6. C.f. MonLl, 'ArLlcle 81 LC and ubllc ollcy'.
232
Ladeur, '1owards a Legal ConcepL of Lhe neLwork ln Luropean SLandard-SeLLlng', 163-168, emphaslses Lhe
need for meLhodologlcal and procedural aspecLs of declslon-maklng.
233
1here ls also a neLwork of Member SLaLes' courLs for compeLlLlon maLLers.
234
ArLlcle 267 1lLu. 1hls ls noL Lhe same for Lhe nCAs whlch are noL courLs or Lrlbunals, see Case C-33/03
5yoetoltlsmos lotmokopoloo Altollos & Akotooolos (5yfolt) v. Cloxo5mltbklloe [2003] LC8 l-4603, paras 29-38.
233
Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon?', 143, and van Waarden and urahos, 'CourLs and
(LplsLemlc) CommunlLles ln Lhe Convergence of CompeLlLlon ollcles' 9 !ournal of Luropean ubllc ollcy, 928-
32.
236
osL-2004, more lnformaLlon ls clrculaLed, so monlLorlng ls easler, de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo
c low, 240.
237
Wllks, 'undersLandlng CompeLlLlon ollcy neLworks ln Lurope', 13 and 70. Slmllarly, 8ge, '1he
8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder' lnlbld (ParL), 117.
238
Maher and 5Lefan, 'CompeLlLlon Law ln Lurope'., and !oerges, ''uellberaLlve ollLlcal rocesses' 8evlslLed',
3.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
29

ellLlsL, excluslonary, even closed Lo new ldeas and crlLlcal perspecLlves.'
239
8emember LhaL Lhere are
dlsagreemenLs on boLh alms and meLhods. 1he challenge ls Lo seL a framework for dellberaLlng
dlsagreemenLs, among heLerogeneous soclal acLors.
240
neLwork members musL '.see confllcL as a
process Lo be managed raLher Lhan as an evll Lo be avolded or suppressed.'
241

ls Lhere enough slmllarlLy and dlfference ln Lhe LCn? l have assumed, so far, LhaL Lhe nCAs represenL
Lhelr Member SLaLes.
242
ls Lhls correcL? WrlLlng abouL Lechnlcal comlLology commlLLees, vos says:
Pere Lhe dual characLer of Lhese commlLLees musL be emphaslsed: commlLLees are
composed of naLlonal represenLaLlves who generally, buL noL necessarlly, are clvll servanLs.
Cn Lhe one hand, Lhese commlLLees, ln Lhelr composlLlon of naLlonal boteooctots, funcLlon
as a forum of lnLeracLlon and co-operaLlon beLween Lhe Member SLaLes and Lhe
Commlsslon. ln Lhls way, Lhe slgnlflcance of purely naLlonal lnLeresL has been dlmlnlshed,
conLrlbuLlng Lo Lhe overall Lrend of greaLer LransnaLlonal declslon-maklng, ln whlch naLlonal
lnLeresLs are replaced by Lechnlcal experLlse, soclo-economlc lnLeresLs and admlnlsLraLlon.
Cn Lhe oLher hand, however, Lhese commlLLees, ln Lhelr composlLlon of naLlonal
tepteseototlves, have acLed as 'mlol coooclls. 1hey poLenLlally enhance Lhe lmporLance of
naLlonal lnLeresLs and conLrlbuLe Lo Lhe decllne of supranaLlonal declslon-maklng."
243

A slmllar polnL applles Lo nCAs wlLhln Lhe LCn.
244
1hey are !anus-faced. Powever, Lhe nCAs
lncreaslngly see Lhemselves purely as boteooctots. 1hey argue for, and have ofLen obLalned,
lndependence from Lhelr Member SLaLes. under 8egulaLlon 1/2003, nCA represenLaLlves populaLe
Lhe Advlsory CommlLLee, raLher Lhan Lhose from Lhe Member SLaLes.
243
1hls ls an lmporLanL change
because lndependence has been boughL by argulng LhaL Lhe compeLlLlon rules are value-neuLral, and
LhaL Lhose enforclng Lhem are merely LechnocraLs applylng formulalc (apollLlcal) rules.
8egulaLlon 1/2003 seems Lo make a mere Lechnlcal change. Powever, lL ls lmporLanL where an nCA's
vlews confllcL wlLh Lhose of lLs Member SLaLe.
246
Sclence has a pollLlcal dlmenslon,
247
economlcs does
Loo. CompeLlLlon ls noL purely LechnocraLlc (apollLlcal), nor ls Lhe consumer welfare LesL.
248

lurLhermore, consumer welfare ofLen clashes wlLh oLher lmporLanL values LhaL may be beLLer, or
more readlly, proLecLed wlLhln ArLlcle 101 lLself.
249
1he nCAs ofLen share Lhe same compeLlLlon
model, wlLh a sole consumer welfare goal. CuLslde of Lhe LCn, Lhls model ls more conLroverslal.

239
Wllks, 'undersLandlng CompeLlLlon ollcy neLworks ln Lurope', 13, also 66 and 70-8.
240
Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon? lnformal neLwork Covernance ln Lu Slngle MarkeL
8egulaLlon' lnlbld , 149.
241
CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy', 337.
242
SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe Lu', 90 and Lhlermann, llngleLon, Cerber, MonLl and
Schaub, ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 13, 37-8 and 62-
3. van MlerL ln lbld, 184, do noL conslder Lhe nCAs and Member SLaLes seperaLely.
243
vos, '8eglonal lnLegraLlon 1hrough ulspuLe SeLLlemenL: Lhe Luropean unlon experlence' MaasLrlchL laculLy
of Law Worklng aper no 2003-7, 33-34.
244
Lhlermann, llngleLon, Cerber, MonLl, Schaub and van MlerL, ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe
u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 13, 37-8, 62-3, 184.
243
ArLlcle 14(2), 8egulaLlon 1/2003. Slmllarly, ln Lelecoms regulaLlon, 8oeger and Corkln, '1he 8eslllence of
SecLor-Speclflc CompeLlLlon Law ln Lhe Llberallsed SecLors' ln Pelde-!rgensen (ed), Alms ooJ voloes lo u
competltloo low (u!l ubllshlng 2013), 9 DkAI1.
246
CourLs geL 'pollLlcal' quesLlons ln many areas, Plrschl, 1owotJs Iotlstoctocy (Parvard unlverslLy ress 2007),
Ma[one, '8egulaLory LeglLlmacy ln Lhe uS and Lhe Lu', 236, 271.
247
!oerges and Lverson, '8e-concepLuallslng LuropeanlsaLlon', 330.
248
See LexL around fooLnoLe 82.
249
1ownley, 'ls 1here (SLlll) 8oom for non-Lconomlc ArgumenLs?', 1ownley, 'Whlch Coals CounL ln ArLlcle 101
1lLu?: publlc pollcy and lLs dlsconLenLs', and 1ownley, Attlcle 81 c ooJ lobllc lollcy, chapLer 1.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
30

1he neLherlands lllusLraLes Lhese Lenslons. ln 2007, Lhe uuLch CourL of AudlL pushed Lhe nMa Lo be
more LransparenL abouL publlc pollcy's relevance ln compeLlLlon law.
230
ollLlcally, a sole consumer
welfare goal was unaccepLable ln Lhe neLherlands. ln lLs lnlLlal response Lo Lhe CourL of AudlL, Lhe
nMa's 8oard argued LhaL Lhere was no polnL developlng a framework for balanclng publlc pollcy
concerns as Lhls was so unusual.
231
1he CourL of AudlL crlLlclsed Lhls response.
232
As a resulL of Lhls
dlsagreemenL, several arllamenLary quesLlons were dlrecLed aL Lhe MlnlsLer of Lconomlc Affalrs,
Lhe nMa ls an lndependenL admlnlsLraLlve body, alLhough lLs personnel are parL of Lhe MlnlsLry of
Lconomlc Affalrs.
233
Cne of Lhe quesLlons asked wheLher publlc pollcy balanclng was prlnclpally a
pollLlcal process, and Lhus lnapproprlaLe for an lndependenL admlnlsLraLlve body, l.e. more sulLed Lo
Lhe pollLlcal arena.
234
1he MlnlsLer agreed LhaL such balanclng ls pollLlcal. She sald LhaL pollLlclans
should frame Lhe lssues Lo be welghed ln Lhe balance. 1he nMa should merely lmplemenL Lhls
framework. She was dlscusslng uuLch compeLlLlon law, buL her commenLs can be read more wldely.
CerLalnly Lhe nMA's response, ln lLs Annual 8eporL 2009, covered ArLlcle 101 as well. 1he nMa
soughL Lo explaln how publlc pollcy goals are relevanL ln, amongsL oLhers, ArLlcle 101.
1he dlvlslon beLween pollLlcs and appllcaLlon ls hard Lo malnLaln. Wllks says, '.a hundred years of
admlnlsLraLlve Lheory have aLLesLed Lo Lhe dlfflculLy of dlvorclng 'pollcy-maklng' from 'pollcy
lmplemenLaLlon'.'
233
1hls sLory lllusLraLes Lhe Lenslons beLween Lhe nMa and oLher uuLch
lnsLlLuLlons when applylng ArLlcle 101. 1here ls (aL leasL someLlmes) a dlfference beLween Lhe nCA
and lLs Member SLaLe). 1hls ls lmporLanL because one of our regulaLory challenges was Lo re-
lnLroduce Member SLaLe values lnLo ArLlcle 101 declslons (lssue 4). noLe Loo LhaL Lhe nMa also
rlsked confllcL wlLh Lhe Commlsslon and oLher nCAs. erhaps because of Lhls, lL dld noL publlclse or
clear lLs Annual 8eporL wlLh Lhe LCn. ln facL, Lhere may be a more general problem wlLh pollcy
communlcaLlons Lhere. 1he Cl1 had a roundLable on ArLlcle 101's goals ln 2010. 1he Commlsslon
was Lhe only LCn member lnvlLed.
236
lf dlfference ls noL embraced, such problems wlll conLlnue.
lncluslveness of relevanL vlews ls lmporLanL.
237
1here ls a rlsk LhaL Lhe LCn ls now Loo homogenous.
1oo much LrusL, noL enough spark. noL only are Member SLaLes' vlews ofLen lgnored, buL Lhe sole
consumer welfare model ls Loo domlnanL. 1he problem ls exacerbaLed as only lndependenL nCAs are
neLwork members. Cne soluLlon ls Lo move away from pollLlcal lndependence for nCAs, or we could
re-lnLroduce Lhe Member SLaLes lnLo Lhe process ln some oLher way. 1hls suggesLlon ls conLroverslal.
l make lL because compeLlLlon declslons are value laden. nCAs rlsk loslng Lhelr lndependence. So
Lhey may noL favour Lhe suggesLlons ln Lhls paper, even Lhough Lhey would osLenslbly galn power
vls-a-vls Lhe Commlsslon.
We also have Lo conslder: domlnance wlLhln Lhe neLwork, lnLerdependencles beLween Lhe acLors,
neLwork sLablllLy and Lransparency. When domlnance ls presenL, neLwork members may be less
wllllng Lo openly share Lhelr experlence (and mlsLakes). 1hls ls parLlcularly lmporLanL Lo us and arL

230
8eporL of Lhe CourL of AudlL, 5opetvlsloo of competltloo by tbe NMo, 30 May 2007 (kamersLukken ll 2006-7,
31 033, nr. 1 and nr. 2), 17.
231
LeLLer by Lhe NMo Lo Lhe CourL of AudlL conLalnlng Lhe formal reacLlon of Lhe NMo Lo Lhe 8eporL of Lhe
CourL of AudlL, p. 3, avallable aL:
hLLp://www.nmaneL.nl/nederlands/home/acLueel/nleuws_persberlchLen/nma_persberlchLen/ersberlchLen_
2007/07-
14_nMa_8apporL_Algemene_8ekenkamer_ls_sLlmulans_voor_verdere_versLerklng_van_markLLoezlchL.asp.
232
8eporL of Lhe CourL of AudlL, 'Supervlslon of compeLlLlon by Lhe NMo', 30 May 2007 (kometstokkeo ll 2006-
2007, 31 033, nr. 1 and nr. 2), p. 24-23.
233
arllamenLary quesLlons on Lhe reporL of Lhe CourL of AudlL 'Supervlslon of compeLlLlon by Lhe NMo' for Lhe
MlnlsLer of Lconomlc Affalrs (kamersLukken ll 2006-2007, 31 033, nr. 4).
234
lblJ., quesLlon 24.
233
Wllks, 'Agencles, neLworks, ulscourses', 442. Sllmllarly, Schllllg, kooktetlsletooqskompeteoz , 136-7.
236
See LexL around fooLnoLe 70.
237
!oerges and neyer, 'uellberaLlve SupranaLlonallsm 8evlslLed', 4.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
31

(a) showed LhaL domlnance need noL be presenL ln Lhe LCn. 8y allowlng neLwork members some
freedom ln applylng ArLlcle 101 we can experlmenL wlLh and learn from dlfferenL goals and meLhods.
Powever, lf comparlson and learnlng ls Lo occur Lhen neLwork members musL regularly, clearly and
openly, reporL on Lhelr performance, measured by agreed lndlcaLors. We need Lo know whaL
worked, as well as, whaL dld noL, for dlsagreemenLs on alms and meLhods. erlodlc poollng of resulLs
reveals Lhe defecLs of parochlal soluLlons:
.and allows Lhe elaboraLlon of sLandards for comparlng local achlevemenLs, exposlng poor
performers Lo crlLlclsm from wlLhln and wlLhouL, and maklng of good ones (Lemporary)
models of emulaLlon. [1hls].depends cruclally on Lhe exploraLlon of posslblllLles, and Lhe
dlscovery of unsuspecLed ones, LhaL occur when acLors come Lo grlps wlLh Lhelr dlfferences
ln Lhe course of solvlng common problems LhaL none can resolve alone."
238

AccounLablllLy of neLwork members ls sLrengLhened by forclng Lhem Lo explaln each declslon. lL ls
helpful Lo expose Lhese declslons Lo Lhe rlsk of appeal or peer revlew.
239
ln parLlcular, Lhey musL
show how Lhey conslder Lhe lmpacL of Lhelr declslons on oLhers. We saw LhaL sharlng lnformaLlon
wlLh Lhe compeLlLlon neLwork ls compulsory ln Cermany. lnformaLlon sharlng beLween nCAs Lakes
place ln Lhe LCn.
260
More ls needed, Lhlnk of Lhe nMa Annual 8eporL 2009 and Lhe Cl1 breakfasL
meeLlng, dlscussed above. ln addlLlon, LCn dlscusslons need Lo be LhoughLful and deeper. Many
nCAs do noL prlorlLlse Lhese wlLh resources and some do noL even read Lhe papers before LCn
meeLlngs. Culdellnes needs Lo be more LransparenL and beLLer explaln Lhelr raLlonale.
lL ls also lmporLanL Lo openly llsLen Lo, and be prepared Lo learn from, oLher neLwork members. ScoLL
noLes LhaL parLlclpaLlon '.ln such neLworks ls llkely Lo change one's world vlew.'
261
Co-operaLlon
and co-ordlnaLlon duLles make LCn members '.dependenL on each oLher for resources such as
lnformaLlon, advlce, leglLlmacy and auLhorlLy (formal and lnformal).'
262
1hls effecL ls more llkely Lo
arlse ln small communlLles, wlLh repeaLed lnLeracLlons beLween acLors.
263
1hls descrlbes Lhe LCn
well, lL ls a closed group of acLors, LhaL meeL regularly Lo dlscuss problems, lncludlng on pollcy.
Powever, lf lnformaLlon ls Lo be of lnLeresL Lo oLher LCn members, lL musL be seen as relevanL. 1hls
depends on how much agreemenL Lhere ls on alms and meLhods. 1here needs Lo be a vlslon LhaL ls
largely shared.
264
lf Lhe Cl1 Lhlnks LhaL consumer welfare ls ArLlcle 101's sole goal lL may noL wanL Lo
dlscuss how Lo balance oLher goals. 1oo much dlverslLy mlghL undermlne Lhe LCn as a whole. We
see Lhls ln oLher areas of Lu law.
263
SLlll, we musL respecL dlverslLy for Lhe reasons sLaLed above.
266


238
Cenglz, '1he Luropean CompeLlLlon neLwork', 7, CersLenberg and Sabel, 'ulrecLly-uellberaLlve olyarchy',
291-2, and SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe Lu', 102-4, 110-4.
239
Sabel and ZelLlln, 'Learnlng from ulfference: Lhe new archlLecLure of experlmenLallsL governance ln Lhe Lu'
lnlbld , 12. AccounLablllLy ls llmlLed ln lndependenL bodles, verdun, 'LxperlmenLallsL Covernance ln Lhe
Luropean unlon: a commenLary' 6 8egulaLlon and Covernance, 390.
260
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 238 says many LCn relaLlonshlps are dlscreLlonary. Also,
Cenglz, '1he Luropean CompeLlLlon neLwork', 19 says LhaL Lhere ls more lnformal co-operaLlon Lhough.
261
ScoLL, '8egulaLory Covernance and Lhe Challenge of ConsLlLuLlonallsm' ln Cllver, rosser and 8awllngs (eds),
1be keqolototy 5tote. coostltotloool lmpllcotloos (Cu 2010), 32.
262
de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 238. See also Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe
u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, xx, 14 and 68.
263
Wllks, 'undersLandlng CompeLlLlon ollcy neLworks ln Lurope', 68. Slmllarly, Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon
wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon? lnformal neLwork Covernance ln Lu Slngle MarkeL 8egulaLlon' lnlbld , 148, and
8arLollnl, 'new Modes of Luropean Covernance: an lnLroducLlon' ln PerlLler and 8hodes (eds), New MoJes of
Covetoooce lo otope. qovetoloq lo tbe sboJow of bletotcby (algrave Macmlllan 2011), 10.
264
Maher, 'neLworklng CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles ln Lhe Luropean unlon: dlverslLy and change' ln Lhlermann
and ALanaslu (eds), coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles (ParL 2002), 224. Also, van
Waarden, 'ulmenslons and 1ypes of ollcy neLworks' 21 Luropean !ournal of ollLlcal 8esearch , 33-6, and
Maher and 5Lefan, 'CompeLlLlon Law ln Lurope', 183.
263
lor example, de 8urca, 'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'?', 131-3, and WeaLherlll, 'llndlng Space for Closer
Co-operaLlon ln Lhe lleld of CulLure' lnlbld , 133.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
32

8easonable dlssenL musL have a reallsLlc chance of belng Laken serlously.
267
l hope LhaL agreelng a
common core wlll blnd Lhe neLwork. An lnLermedlaLe poslLlon ls Lo allow nCAs LhaL agree on cerLaln
goals or meLhods Lo form mlnl-neLworks Lo supporL each oLher.
268
Powever, Lhey (and Lhe oLhers)
should be challenged from Llme Lo Llme by Lhose LhaL do noL agree wlLh Lhelr approach, see below.
1here ls also Lhe rlsk of exLernallLles and reLallaLlon because of Lhem. lL ls posslble LhaL nCAs wlll
glve more welghL Lo effecLs ln Lhelr own LerrlLory Lhan Lo Lhose ouLslde lL. Some dlfference beLween
nCAs ln Lhe way Lhey deal wlLh slmllar ls posslble, buL Lhe [usLlflcaLlon for Lhe dlfference probably
maLLers. ulfference based on parLlsanshlp may be less Lolerable Lhan LhaL based on soclo-economlc
grounds.
269
eer revlew and Lransparency are lmporLanL Lools for dlscouraglng beggar-Lhy-nelghbour
sLraLegles.
270
SecLlon 3 dlscussed Lhls for exLernallLles. Cermany deals wlLh Lhe lssue Lhrough case
allocaLlon, lf more Lhan one SLaLe ls affecLed, Lhe 8undeskarLellamL Lakes Lhe case.
271
Case allocaLlon
ls lnsufflclenL for our kaleldoscope of lnLeresLs and perspecLlves.
272
lox suggesLs LhaL 8egulaLlon
1/2003's rules on Lhe relevanL acLors' auLonomy, such as arLlcle 11(6), are Lhere Lo push Member
SLaLes Lo conslder exLernallLles.
273
lour oLher mechanlsms help Loo: Lhe relevanL acLors' declslons
only apply ln Lhelr own Member SLaLe,
274
Lhe Commlsslon ls parLlcularly well-placed Lo acL lf
compeLlLlon ls affecLed ln more Lhan Lhree Member SLaLes (heLerarchy and hlerarchy ofLen co-
exlsL
273
),
276
publlc pollcy goals musL be conslsLenLly and coherenLly pursued ln oLher areas of
Member SLaLe leglslaLlon,
277
and, ln Lhe llghL of ArLlcle 4(2) 1Lu, Lhe naLlonal ldenLlLles of Lhe
Member SLaLes musL be respecLed. Member SLaLes musL noL lmpose Lhelr values on oLhers Lhrough
Lrade resLrlcLlons.
278
A slmllar polnL may apply ln ArLlcle 101. ubllcally [usLlfylng one's moLlves also
forces Lhe nCAs Lo conslder oLhers' lnLeresLs. 8ase moLlves may merely be hldden ln Lhls process.
Lven Lhls mlghL sub[ecL sLaLes Lo consLralnLs LhaL conslderably modlfy Lhelr acLlon.
279

AnoLher lssue ls Lhe Lransparency of Lhe pollcy dlscusslons wlLhln Lhe LCn. Some LCn lnformaLlon, ln
relaLlon Lo speclflc ongolng lnvesLlgaLlons, for example, ls commerclally senslLlve and musL noL be
dlsclosed. Powever, ln order Lo reflecL socleLal concerns, general pollcy '.dellberaLlon musL noL Lake
place behlnd closed doors.'
280
lL may be LhaL we need Lo have small, closed groups Lo bulld Lhe LrusL
needed for proper debaLe. 8y openlng Lhem up Lhere ls some rlsk of [eopardlslng Lhls. 8uL, hopefully,
Lransparency wlll 're-pollLlclse' Lhese lssues, LranslaLlng Lhem from a 'LechnocraLlc' domaln.
neLwork members musL perlodlcally meeL Lo revlse goals, meLrlcs and procedures. 1hls could
happen wlLhln Lhe annual LCn meeLlngs and ln response Lo speclflc Lu CourL [udgmenLs. A ma[or,

266
Sabel and ZelLlln, 'Learnlng from ulfference', 9-10.
267
!oerges and neyer, 'uellberaLlve SupranaLlonallsm 8evlslLed', 3, 7.
268
Cerber, '1he LvoluLlon of Lhe LCn', 33, he sald common languages may unlLe nCAs, buL lL may be values
Loo. More generally, Scharpf, 'uemocraLlc LeglLlmacy under 8egulaLory CompeLlLlon', 367-70.
269
de 8urca, 'ulfferenLlaLlon wlLhln Lhe 'Core'?', 138 makes Lhls polnL ln oLher 1reaLy areas, and Ma[one,
'8egulaLory LeglLlmacy ln Lhe uS and Lhe Lu', 236.
270
Scharpf, 'Luropean Covernance', 10.
271
8ge, '1he 8undeskarLellamL and Lhe CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles of Lhe Cerman Lnder', 113-3.
272
Cenglz, 'ManagemenL of neLworks', 413-6, and SveLlev, 'neLworked CompeLlLlon Covernance ln Lhe Lu',
114-3.
273
lox, '1he Lluslve romlse of ModernlsaLlon', 144-3.
274
Maher, 'neLworklng CompeLlLlon AuLhorlLles ln Lhe Lu', 223, nehl, 'Changes ln LeglslaLlon', 22, Lhlermann
and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 239, SchuLze, 'lrom Lurope Lo Llsbon:
'execuLlve federallsm' ln Lhe (new) Luropean unlon', 1408-10, and arLlcle 29(2), 8egulaLlon 1/2003. C.f. Wlls,
ltloclples of otopeoo Aotlttost ofotcemeot, 36-8.
273
8hodes and vlsser, 'Seeklng CommlLmenL, LffecLlveness and LeglLlmacy', 127.
276
Commlsslon, commlssloo Notlce, oo co-opetotloo wltblo tbe Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, para 14.
277
See dlscusslon around fooLnoLe 137.
278
Cllver, u ltee Movemeot of CooJs, 236-7.
279
!oerges and neyer, 'uellberaLlve SupranaLlonallsm 8evlslLed', 7.
280
lbld, 4.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
33

flrsL prlnclples, revlew should be conducLed every flve years or so. We need mechanlsms Lo promoLe
Lhe adopLlon of superlor norms (races Lo Lhe Lop). 1he LCn ls seL up Lo do Lhls Lhrough peer
pressure. 1hls may be sufflclenL, alLhough lL should be checked, arLlcle 11(6) cannoL be used Loo
much.
281
CurrenLly, unless Lhe Lu CourLs dlsagree, mechanlsms for opLlng-ln should be volunLary.
282

ln summary, Lhe followlng aspecLs seem lmporLanL ln pollcy neLworks. MosL of Lhem are lmporLanL
ln order Lo generaLe proper dlscusslon, undersLandlng and learnlng. MosL are presenL ln Lhe LCn,
Lhose LhaL are noL should be added Lo LhaL neLwork:
Character|st|c resent |n the LCN?
Common core ?es
lreedom Lo experlmenL on alms and meLhods (margln of appreclaLlon) ?es
Lu CourL ls ulLlmaLe arblLer on freedom Lo dlverge from common core ?es
ulscusslon Laken ln shadow of Commlsslon power/ CMv ?es
Small, closed and sLable neLwork ?es
need pollLlcal, and posslbly, clvll socleLy, 'desLablllslng' lnpuL Loo no (maybe neLherlands)
lnformaLlon sharlng of pollcy papers and cases, before and afLer declded ?es
PlghllghL lmporLanL lssues ln Lhese papers Lo avold lnformaLlon overload no
ArLlculaLed reasons for Lhe ouLcomes ln pollcy and declslons no
Also explaln how Laken oLhers' lnLeresLs lnLo accounL no
1ranslaLe documenLs clrculaLed lnLo languages so all undersLand no
1ake dlssenL serlously. Conslder fundamenLal dlssenL ofLen and openly Maybe
Cpenly share peer (and self) revlew of neLwork members no
Llke-mlnded neLwork members can form sub-neLworks LogeLher Maybe
ubllcaLlon of neLwork pollcy dlscusslons ln clear formaL no
roLecLlon for commerclally senslLlve/ prlvacy lnformaLlon ?es
ArLlcle 101 can beneflL from oLher areas of Lu law, e.g. free movemenL, when lL comes Lo explolLlng
dlverslLy and lLs beneflLs. lL has been suggesLed LhaL Lhe LCn, whlch ls a developed lnformaLlon-
sharlng and pollcy neLwork, has Lhlngs Lo Leach oLher areas when lL comes Lo co-ordlnaLlon. l
lnvesLlgaLe Lhls wlLh reference Lo Lhe Commlsslon and Member SLaLe neLwork deallng wlLh Lhe
provlslon of lnformaLlon on naLlonal Lechnlcal regulaLlons for Lhe lnLernal MarkeL. l use Lhls area
because Lhe neLwork here ls relaLlvely well developed. neverLheless, Lhe LCn has someLhlng exLra Lo
offer. Many oLher neLworks are slgnlflcanLly less developed, Lhere Lhe galns may be even greaLer.
283

1he lnLernal MarkeL ls an area wlLhouL lnLernal fronLlers, free movemenL of goods ls assured. Some
Lechnlcal regulaLlons (e.g. Lhe duLy Lo afflx a slgn where envlronmenLal Laxes are due
284
) are Lrade
barrlers. under ulrecLlve 98/34, Member SLaLes musL ofLen
283
noLlfy drafL Lechnlcal regulaLlons Lo
Lhe Commlsslon sLaLlng why Lhey are necessary. lf Lhe regulaLlons LreaL envlronmenLal, consumer or
publlc healLh concerns, daLa on Lhe anLlclpaLed rlsks musL also be lncluded.
286
1he Commlsslon sends

281
Slmllarly, for Lhe uS, kovaclc, 'CompeLlLlon ollcy ln Lhe Lu and Lhe uS', 10.
282
lbld, 10.
283
See, for example, Sabel and ZelLlln, xpetlmeotollst Covetoooce lo tbe u, de 8urca and ScoLL (eds), low
ooJ New Covetoooce lo tbe u ooJ tbe u5 (2006), !oerges and uehousse (eds), CooJ Covetoooce lo otopes
loteqtoteJ Motket (Cu 2002), and de 8urca and ScoLL (eds), coostltotloool cbooqe lo tbe u. ftom oolfotmlty
to flexlblllty? (ParL 2000).
284
Case C-13/96 8lc 8eoelox v 8elqlom [1997] LC8 l-1733.
283
ArLlcles 1(3), 8 and 10, Luropean arllamenL and Councll, ulrecLlve 98/34, laylng down a procedure for Lhe
provlslon of lnformaLlon ln Lhe fleld of Lechnlcal sLandards and regulaLlons and of rules on lnformaLlon SocleLy
servlces, C! 1998 L204/ 37, as amended (ulrecLlve 98/34). unless Lhere are cerLaln klnds of urgency, see arLlcle
9(7) and Commlsslon, A ColJe to tbe ltoceJote fot tbe ltovlsloo of lofotmotloo lo tbe llelJ of 1ecbolcol
5tooJotJs ooJ keqolotloos ooJ of koles oo lofotmotloo 5oclety 5etvlces (2003), 31.
286
ArLlcles 7 and 8, ulrecLlve 98/34. Also, lbld, 43.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
34

Lhls Lo Lhe Member SLaLes, relevanL Commlsslon unlLs and publlclses lL for economlc operaLors.
287
lL
moy
288
also consulL a SLandlng CommlLLee for lLs oplnlon.
289
1he Member SLaLe musL noL normally
enacL Lhls regulaLlon for Lhree monLhs from when Lhe Commlsslon recelved lL.
290

Member SLaLes nomlnaLe a cenLral hub Lo send lnformaLlon Lo Lhe Commlsslon and lLs own relevanL
naLlonal mlnlsLrles. 1he Commlsslon, a cenLral hub lLself, Lhen deals wlLh Lhe cenLral hubs ln Lhe
oLher Member SLaLes (LranslaLlng where necessary
291
), as well as Lhe relevanL Commlsslon unlLs.
292

1he whole procedure ls based on a sysLem of elecLronlc daLa exchange.
293
neverLheless, Lhe
Commlsslon reporLs LhaL lL has generaLed close co-operaLlon beLween lL and Lhe Member SLaLes ln
Lhls area.
294
ln parL, Lhls ls also because Lhere ls a SLandlng CommlLLee, whlch musL meeL Lwlce a
year,
293
and ls composed of Member SLaLe represenLaLlves, and chalred by Lhe Commlsslon. lL ls Lhe:
.focal polnL for dlscusslon of all Lhe problems connecLed wlLh Lhe lmplemenLaLlon of Lhe
ulrecLlve. lL Lherefore plays a very lmporLanL role ln supervlslng Lhe operaLlon of Lhe
procedure and ln Lhe examlnaLlon of pollcy lssues ralsed by Lhe noLlflcaLlons and also ln
developlng an admlnlsLraLlve neLwork beLween naLlonal auLhorlLles."
296

1he Commlsslon or a Member SLaLe can brlng any quesLlon relaLlng Lo Lhe lmplemenLaLlon of
ulrecLlve 98/34 before Lhe SLandlng CommlLLee. 1he SLandlng CommlLLee can also express oplnlons
on Commlsslon proposals ln order Lo llmlL exlsLlng or poLenLlal Lrade barrlers. lor example, lL could
ask Lhe Commlsslon Lo encourage Member SLaLes Lo dlscuss such soluLlons beLween Lhemselves.
297

1he Commlsslon auLomaLlcally puLs all noLlflcaLlons whlch are sub[ecL Lo several deLalled oplnlons
onLo Lhe SLrandlng CommlLLee's agenda.
298
1here are also meeLlngs dlrecLly beLween Lhe naLlonal
represenLaLlves embedded wlLhln Lhelr mlnlsLrles and Lhe Commlsslon experLs ln Lhe unlLs.
299

Cnce a Member SLaLe submlLs drafL Lechnlcal regulaLlons, Lhe Commlsslon and Lhe oLher Member
SLaLes can: (a) lgnore Lhe drafL, ln whlch case lL can be adopLed afLer Lhree monLhs,
300
(b) commenL
on Lhe drafL, lf lL complles wlLh Lu law buL ralses lssues of lnLerpreLaLlon. 1he Member SLaLe need
noL reply (Lhey ofLen do
301
and Lhls ls deslrable
302
), buL musL Lake accounL of Lhese commenLs 'as far
as posslble' when formulaLlng Lhe deflnlLlve LexL of Lhe regulaLlon,
303
(c) lf Lhey have serlous

287
lbld, 46. lL only publlshes Lhe drafL regulaLlon for Lhem, noL Lhe Commlsslon or Member SLaLe dlscusslons,
Commlsslon, voJemecom to ultectlve 98/48/c wblcb lottoJoces o Mecboolsm fot tbe 1toospoteocy of
keqolotloos oo lofotmotloo 5oclety 5etvlces (1998), 36-37.
288
1hls ls opLlonal, Commlsslon, voJemecom oo tbe Opetotloo of tbe ltoceJote fot tbe ltovlsloo of
lofotmotloo lo tbe llelJ of 1ecbolcol keqolotloos (1993), 60.
289
ArLlcle 8(1), ulrecLlve 98/34. Also, Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 46.
290
ArLlcle 9(1), ulrecLlve 98/34, Lhls perlod can be exLended for varlous reasons. Also, Commlsslon,
voJemecom 1995, 38.
291
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 46-47 and 73, and Commlsslon, voJemecom 1995, 38.
292
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 43.
293
lbld, 46.
294
Commlsslon, lteveotloq Obstocles to 1toJe lo tbe lotetool Motket (2008), 3.
293
ArLlcle 6(1), ulrecLlve 98/34.
296
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 39. Also, Commlsslon, commlssloo 5toff wotkloq
lopet, Accompooyloq tbe kepott ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe otopeoo lotllomeot, tbe cooocll ooJ tbe
otopeoo cooomlc ooJ 5oclol commlttee - tbe opetotloo of ultectlve 98/J4/c lo 2009 ooJ 2010 (SLC(2011)
1309 flnal, 2011), 11.
297
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 39.
298
Commlsslon, voJemecom 1995, 68.
299
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 60.
300
lbld, 47.
301
lbld, 47.
302
Commlsslon, voJemecom 1995, 64.
303
ArLlcle 8(2), ulrecLlve 98/34. Also, Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 47.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
33

dlfflculLles ln Lhe evenL of adopLlon of Lhe drafL, because lL creaLes obsLacles Lo Lu Lrade,
304

commenL ln a deLalled oplnlon explalnlng Lhe lssues. 1he Member SLaLe proposlng Lhe regulaLlon
musL Lhen Lell Lhe Commlsslon how lLs drafL has been amended Lo Lake accounL of Lhe deLalled
oplnlon,
303
and (d) Lhe Commlsslon can announce LhaL Lhere ls already a proposal (or lL lnLends Lo
propose) a regulaLlon, dlrecLlve or declslon on Lhe lssue, ln whlch case a furLher delay for Lhe
Member SLaLe ensues.
306
unless Lhere ls a relevanL Lu harmonlsaLlon measure ln place, Member
SLaLes musL Lhen publlcally announce LhaL a naLlonal measure has been adopLed ln accordance wlLh
cerLaln formallLles and communlcaLe Lhe LexL of Lhls regulaLlon Lo Lhe Commlsslon wlLhouL delay.
307

lallure of Lhe Member SLaLes Lo observe Lhese obllgaLlons vlolaLes Lu law and Lhe Commlsslon or
anoLher Member SLaLe could brlng lnfrlngemenL proceedlngs.
308
lurLhermore, naLlonal courLs
generally cannoL enforce regulaLlons LhaL should have been noLlfled, buL were noL.
309

1he Lu 1reaLles only provlde for reLroacLlve monlLorlng Lhrough lnfrlngemenL procedures, and Lhese
are rarely used.
310
ulrecLlve 98/34 ls an early warnlng sysLem '.deslgned Lo proLecL, by means of
prevenLaLlve conLrol, freedom of movemenL of goods, whlch ls one of Lhe foundaLlons of Lhe.'
Lu.
311
ln nearly 30 years Lhe ulrecLlve 98/34 process has screened over 12,000 drafLs.
312
ln 12 of
Lhese cases Lhe Commlsslon found LhaL Lhe Lechnlcal regulaLlon could hamper Lrade. Powever, ln
93 of Lhese cases, soluLlons were found before Lhe Member SLaLe adopLed Lhe regulaLlon.
313
A
dlalogue ls proposed. noLlfylng drafL regulaLlons could spur Lu harmonlsaLlon measures and
generaLe besL pracLlce dlscusslons. uC LnLerprlse says LhaL Lhe declslon-maklng process:
.can Lake place aL Lhe mosL approprlaLe level enabllng decenLrallsaLlon whlch safeguards
Lhe dlverslLy of pollLlcal, culLural and reglonal LradlLlons. 1he ulrecLlve has provlded an
lnslghL lnLo naLlonal regulaLory lnlLlaLlves, has led Lo Lhe creaLlon of a genulne dlscusslon
forum, clearlng Lhe way for [olnL acLlon Lo sLrengLhen Lhe lnLernal markeL.1he exchange
and gaLherlng of lnformaLlon ls also an effecLlve way of ensurlng LhaL naLlonal besL pracLlces
become known and are used as a model for oLher regulaLory lnlLlaLlves."
314

lL ls hard Lo see lnslde Lhe SLandlng CommlLLee.
313
lLs dlscusslons are secreL. Many clalms are made
abouL whaL lL can achleve and how lL helps ln relaLlon Lo pollcy ln Lhls area. Powever Lhe
Commlsslon has sald LhaL Lhe Member SLaLes are encouraged Lo focus on cerLaln Lhlngs ln parLlcular:
Lhe wordlng of drafLs, for clarlLy, eLc., Lhe posslblllLy of assesslng all regulaLlons onllne and ln oLher

304
Commlsslon, voJemecom 1995, 63.
303
ArLlcle 9(2), ulrecLlve 98/34, and lbld, 34. Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 44.
306
ArLlcle 9(3) and (4), ulrecLlve 98/34. Also, Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 48, and
Commlsslon, voJemecom 1998, 8.
307
ArLlcle 8(3), ulrecLlve 98/34.
308
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 48, and Commlsslon, voJemecom 1995, 67 and 68.
309
Case C-194/94 clA 5ecotlty lotetootloool v 5lqoolsoo ooJ 5ecotltel [1996] LC8 l-2201, para 40, and Case C-
443/98 uollevet ltollo v ceottol looJ [2000] LC8 l-7333. C.f., Case C-226/97 lemmeos [1998] LC8 l-3711.
310
Commlsslon, A ColJe to tbe ltoceJote fot tbe ltovlsloo of lofotmotloo lo tbe llelJ of 1ecbolcol 5tooJotJs
ooJ keqolotloos (1998), 10.
311
Case C-194/94 clA 5ecotlty lotetootloool v 5lqoolsoo ooJ 5ecotltel [1996] LC8 l-2201, para 40.
312
Commlsslon, lteveotloq Obstocles to 1toJe lo tbe lotetool Motket, 6.
313
lbld, 6.
314
Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol keqolotloos 2005, 7, see also page 11, Commlsslon, A ColJe to 1ecbolcol
keqolotloos 1998, 11, Commlsslon, voJemecom 1998, 7, and vos, '8eglonal lnLegraLlon 1hrough ulspuLe
SeLLlemenL', 63-66.
313
1hanks Lo Lhe uk CenLral unlL aL Lhe ueparLmenL for 8uslness, lnnovaLlon and Skllls, pasL and presenL, LhaL
gave me lmpresslonlsLlc lnslghLs lnLo lLs worklng.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
36

consolldaLed LexLs, and ldenLlflcaLlon of parLlcularly onerous regulaLlons.
316
1he emphasls seems Lo
be more on speclflc lssues ln speclflc Lechnlcal regulaLlons, raLher Lhan developlng pollcy.
Successful pollcy neLworks have several dlmenslons. l suggesLed consumer welfare as Lhe LCn's
subsLanLlve core. Slmllarly, ArLlcle 34 1lLu's prohlblLlon of quanLlLaLlve resLrlcLlons on lmporLs and
all measures havlng equlvalenL effecL, ls a relaLlvely clear core for Lhe Commlsslon and Lhe Member
SLaLes Lo coalesce around.
317
1he mandaLory requlremenLs and ArLlcle 36 leave room for dlverslLy.
Secondly, alLhough Lhe relevanL acLors here are really Lhe Commlsslon, Member SLaLe courLs and
regulaLory auLhorlLles, l wlll lgnore Lhe Member SLaLe courLs ln Lhls dlscusslon. Cur focus ls Lhe
repeaLed lnLeracLlons beLween neLwork members. Slmllarly, Lhe Lu CourLs are noL parL of our
neLwork, alLhough Lhey are, once agaln, Lhe referees ln Lhese dlspuLes.
nexL ls Lhe slmllarlLy of Lhe members and Lhe lmpacL on neLwork performance. 8emember Lhe
Lenslon beLween a need for LrusL and Lhe beneflLs of creaLlve spark, caused by Lenslon and
dlfference. 1he LCn's members are becomlng Loo slmllar. ln Lhe ulrecLlve 98/34 neLwork, slmllarlLy
ls hlgh Loo. uC LnLerprlse ls Lhe neLwork's hub, and Lhere are cenLral hubs ln Lhe Member SLaLes.
1hese are ofLen low level bureaucraLs, focuslng on process raLher Lhan wlder pollcy lssues.
lourLhly, Lechnlcal regulaLlons are agaln LreaLed as lf Lhey had no pollLlcal consequences. lL ls
unclear whaL lnpuL Lhe Member SLaLes have ln neLwork dlscusslons, as opposed Lo Lhe LechnocraLs.
As wlLh Lhe LCn, more Member SLaLe lnfluence may be needed. Cne lmporLanL lssue Lo noLe ls LhaL
mosL communlcaLlon ls done elecLronlcally. 1he only physlcal meeLlngs LhaL occur are Lhe SLandlng
CommlLLee meeLlngs. ?eL, real meeLlngs are fundamenLal for bulldlng LrusL beLween members.
lurLhermore, SLandlng CommlLLee meeLlngs are ofLen done ln speclallsL sub-grouplngs, raLher Lhan
wlLh Lhe same offlclals, for example Lhe SLandlng CommlLLee on ConsLrucLlon. 1hls ls poslLlve
because Lhere ls more Lechnlcal experLlse. Powever, Lhe prlce ls hlgh, llmlLed creaLlve spark. lL ls
lmporLanL Lo ensure LhaL Lhere are general SLandlng CommlLLee meeLlngs every year whlch all
SLandlng CommlLLee members can aLLend and share Lhelr pollcy lnslghLs. 1hls mlghL lnclude wlder
lssues llke besL pracLlce ln Lechnlcal regulaLlons, sLreamllnlng, repllcaLlng and co-ordlnaLlng Lechnlcal
regulaLlon across dlfferenL secLors, and focuslng on how besL Lo deal wlLh publlc pollcy lnLeresLs
sysLemlcally. Such meeLlngs should lnclude clvll servanLs from Lhe mlnlsLrles, buL pollLlcal lnpuL from
Lhe Member SLaLes ls needed Loo.
318
l suggesLed LhaL Lhe LCn sLarL annual pollcy-revlews and flve
yearly ln-depLh ones. 1he SLandlng CommlLLee mlghL beneflL from Lhls Loo lncludlng Lhrough Lhe use
of hlgher level clvll servanLs wlLh greaLer Lechnlcal and pollcy compeLence.
1here ls a rlsk LhaL Lhe Commlsslon ls Loo domlnanL ln Lhe neLwork, maklng lL more hlerarchlcal Lhan
co-operaLlve. ?eL, Lhls does noL seem Lo be happenlng, ln facL. 1he Member SLaLes generaLe slmllar
numbers of deLalled oplnlons as Lhe Commlsslon lLself. As wlLh Lhe LCn, Lhe Commlsslon conLrols
lnformaLlon flow as lL ls aL Lhe cenLre of Lhe neLwork. Powever, Lhe relaLlvely low number of
SLandlng CommlLLee meeLlngs, and Lhe facL LhaL Lhey ofLen use dlfferenL Lechnlcal speclallsLs, Lhere
ls a rlsk LhaL sLrong neLwork ldenLlLy ls noL generaLed and LhaL some neLwork knowledge ls losL.
ArLlcle 11(6), 8egulaLlon 1/2003 allows Lhe Commlsslon Lo wlLhdraw a compeLlLlon case from an
nCA.
319
Slmllarly, lL can suggesL harmonlslng cerLaln lssues or Lake Lhe Member SLaLe Lo Lhe LC! lf lL
breaches ulrecLlve 98/34. 1hese powers cannoL be used Loo ofLen, oLherwlse LrusL breaks down.

316
Commlsslon, kepott ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe cooocll, tbe otopeoo lotllomeot ooJ tbe otopeoo
cooomlc ooJ 5oclol commlttee. tbe opetotloo of ultectlve 98/J4/c ftom 2006-2008 (CCM(2009) 690 flnal,
2009), 9, alLhough see pages 11-12. Also, Commlsslon, kepott ftom tbe commlssloo to tbe cooocll, tbe
otopeoo lotllomeot ooJ tbe otopeoo cooomlc ooJ 5oclol commlttee. tbe opetotloo of ultectlve 98/J4/c
ftom 2002 to 2005 (CCM(2007) 123 flnal, 2007), 10, slmllarly, page 13.
317
AlLhough see Lhe dlscusslon ln olares Maduro, we, tbe coott.
318
!oerges, 'Cood Covernance 1hrough ComlLology?' ln !oerges and vos (eds), u commlttees. soclol
teqolotloo, low ooJ polltlcs (ParL 2000), 313.
319
See Lhe LexL around fooLnoLe 273.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
37

ulrecLlve 98/34 neLwork members may experlmenL wlLh dlfferenL Lechnlcal regulaLlons, unless Lu
harmonlsaLlon ls ln place, or proposed. 8uL, for comparlson and learnlng Lo occur, neLwork members
musL regularly, clearly and openly reporL on Lhelr performance. AlLhough Lhey have Lo say how Lhey
amended Lhelr drafL Lechnlcal regulaLlon Lo Lake accounL of deLalled oplnlons, no mechanlsm pushes
Lhe Member SLaLes Lo say whaL regulaLory soluLlons worked and whaL dld noL. 1hls ls unforLunaLe.
1he Member SLaLes should revlew Lhemselves, and each oLher, and reporL on fallures and successes
so LhaL wlder pollcy learnlng can occur parLlcularly wlLh Lhe defecLs of parochlal soluLlons.
Member SLaLes and Lhe Commlsslon are pushed Lo conslder exLernallLles ln Lhe drafL regulaLlons.
1hey can commenL where Lhey Lhlnk LhaL Lhelr effecL ls dlsproporLlonaLe. 1echnlcal language pushes
Member SLaLes Lo [usLlfy Lhelr acLlon wlLh evldence.
320
1hls alLers Lhelr reasons for acLlon over Llme.
Some reasons are accepLable, oLhers noL. lorclng Member SLaLes Lo reply Lo deLalled oplnlons,
lnvokes [usLlflcaLlon. 1hls affecLs Lhe rules LhaL Member SLaLes seek Lo promulgaLe ln Lhe flrsL place.
As wlLh Lhe LCn, pollcy dlscusslon Lakes place behlnd closed doors. urafL regulaLlons are puL on Lhe
Commlsslon's webslLe, buL Lhe dlscusslon LhaL Lakes place afLer Lhls ls secreL. lL mlghL be senslble Lo
shlne more llghL on Lhe speclflc dlscusslons wlLhln Lhe SLandlng CommlLLee. 1here ls some
lnformaLlon on Lhe speclallsL ones, buL Lhe pollcy dlscusslons are largely hldden. 1hls wlll furLher
push acLors Lo do a beLLer [ob ln balanclng naLlonal lnLeresLs wlLh Lu ones ln accepLable ways.
l suggesLed some slmple changes Lo Lhe ulrecLlve 98/34 neLwork respondlng Lo lnslghLs galned when
reconcepLuallslng Lhe LCn as a pollcy neLwork, Lhrough co-ordlnaLed dlverslLy. 1hls should lmprove
undersLandlng beLween Lhe acLors, generaLe pollcy experlmenLaLlon ln Llme of doubL, and lncrease
muLual learnlng.
S. Conc|us|on
1he Member SLaLes delegaLed compeLence ln llmlLed flelds Lo Lhe Lu. 8esponses Lo legal dlverslLy
affecLlng areas ouLslde of Lhese flelds ofLen requlres co-ordlnaLlon of dlfferenL seml-auLonomous
modes of governance.
321

ln an uncerLaln posL-naLlonal pollLlcal seLLlng.Lhe ablllLy of Lhe Luropean markeL
admlnlsLraLlon and lLs law Lo respond Lo Lhe soclal wlll largely deLermlne lLs long-Lerm
success or oLherwlse: ln Lhe absence of on-golng pollLlcal dlrecLlon, Lhe 'LechnocraLlc' needs
musL be admlnlsLraLlvely balanced agalnsL Lhe 'eLhlcal', whllsL Lhe 'economlcally raLlonal'
musL be welghed agalnsL soclal demands wlLhln Lhe admlnlsLraLlve process."
322

1he Commlsslon ls Lrylng Lo consolldaLe subsLanLlve pollcy-maklng power ln relaLlon Lo ArLlcle 101. lL
wanLs one unlform appllcaLlon of ArLlcle 101. lL wanLs Lo be Lhe one provldlng LhaL lnLerpreLaLlon.
1here ls a compeLlLlon neLwork LhaL lncludes Lhe nCAs, buL Lhe Commlsslon [ealously guards lLs
power from Lhem. 1he debaLe abouL where power should lle wlLhln Lhe neLwork ls pollLlcal, Lhe
process of neLwork creaLlon and dellmlLaLlon:
.ls ln lLself an acuLely pollLlcal process ln whlch argumenLs abouL efflclency, effecLlveness,
value for money, equlLy and legal cerLalnLy are almosL cerLalnly masklng deeper seaLed
concerns abouL proLecLlng and exLendlng Lhe lnLeresLs of Lhe proLagonlsLs."
323

1he paper argues LhaL boLh dlsagreemenL on meLhods and alms should be celebraLed ln ArLlcle 101.
1hls provldes scope for respecLlng dlverse subsLanLlve vlews, lL also generaLes mulLlple sLrlngs of

320
neyer, '1he ComlLology Challenge Lo AnalyLlcal lnLegraLlon 1heory' ln !oerges and vos (eds), u
commlttees. soclol teqolotloo, low ooJ polltlcs (ParL 2000), 222.
321
!oerges, ''uellberaLlve ollLlcal rocesses' 8evlslLed', 792.
322
Lverson, '1he Crlsls of lndeLermlnacy', 231.
323
Wllks, 'undersLandlng CompeLlLlon ollcy neLworks ln Lurope', 79. See also SLurm ln Lhlermann and
ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo Aotbotltles, 173.
DkAI1 chrls.Lownley[kcl.ac.uk
38

pollcy experlmenLaLlon, parLlcularly lmporLanL ln areas of buslness and economlc uncerLalnLy.
Cermany and Lhe uSA boLh embrace some dlverslLy ln Lhelr compeLlLlon laws for Lhese reasons.
?eL, Lhls ls noL a plea for unbrldled dlverslLy. CompeLlLlon and markeL lnLegraLlon are lmporLanL Lu
values. ArLlcle 101 needs a sLrong common core: glven Lhe lmporLance of LrusL, Lhe fear of beggar-
Lhy-nelghbour aLLlLudes, and Lhe efflclency of Lhe whole sysLem. So, l argue for co-ordlnaLed
dlverslLy. 1he ldea ls LhaL Lhe Lu CourLs lay down Lhe law. Powever, Lhe Commlsslon and Lhe nCAs
can experlmenL ln Lhe gaps. 1hls has repercusslons for Lhe Lu CourLs, as well as revlew of Lhe nCAs
by Lhe Member SLaLes' courLs. ln an experlmenLallsL model, Lhelr role may prlnclpally lnvolve
checklng LhaL boundarles have noL been crossed, raLher Lhan deflnlng Lhe acLual conLenL of Lhe
balance, aL leasL unLll Lhe experlmenLal muslc has sLopped.
8y ensurlng LhaL no one domlnaLes subsLanLlve dlscusslons ln Lhe LCn, and by respecLlng dlfference,
we encourage experlmenLaLlon and beLLer proLecL local preferences. 8y ensurlng LhaL Lhese
experlmenLs are regularly reporLed Lo Lhe LCn lLself, and by pushlng members Lo adopL beLLer
soluLlons on Lhelr compeLlLlon [ourney, dlverslLy wlll be beLLer co-ordlnaLed Loo.
CreaLer freedom lmpacLs upon neLwork members' power. 1hey ofLen deny Lhls.
324
1he Commlsslon
wlll noL rellsh loslng power and may reslsL my proposals. 1he nCAs and Member SLaLe courLs rellsh
more lndependence on subsLanLlve pollcy lssues from Lhe Commlsslon
323
and Lhelr Member
SLaLes.
326
1hey are noL only moLlvaLed by power, buL lL ls lmporLanL.
327
1hey galn lndependence here
from Lhe Commlsslon, yeL, Lhe nCAs may noL favour co-ordlnaLed dlverslLy, Lhey generally accepL
Lhe sysLem as lL ls.
328
ulverslLy hlghllghLs Lhe many value [udgmenLs lnvolved, even wlLhln consumer
welfare assessmenLs. 1hls undermlnes Lhelr clalms for lndependence from Lhelr Member SLaLes.
329

Many nCAs glve consumer welfare dlsproporLlonaLe welghL, compared Lo oLher lnsLlLuLlons ln Lhelr
Member SLaLes. CompeLlLlon experLs musL pay more respecL Lo Lhe wlll of Lhelr peoples.
A slmllar polnL applles Lo many oLher areas of Lu/ Lu-relaLed law. l speclflcally dlscuss Lhe ulrecLlve
98/34 neLwork where Member SLaLes musL noLlfy Lhelr drafL Lechnlcal regulaLlons. l made several
suggesLlons as Lo how Lhls neLwork can be lmproved Lo allow more dlverslLy and Lo encourage
learnlng and undersLandlng ln Lechnlcal regulaLlon pollcy. Many less developed neLworks wlll beneflL
even more from Lhls approach. Cnly when we co-ordlnaLe ln Lhls way can we be unlLed ln dlverslLy.


324
See Schaub and 1esauro ln Lhlermann and ALanaslu, coosttoctloq tbe u Netwotk of competltloo
Aotbotltles, 34-3 and 172, respecLlvely.
323
8ge ln lbld, 21, and Cerber, '1he LvoluLlon of Lhe LCn', 62.
326
Lberleln, 'ollcy Co-ordlnaLlon wlLhouL CenLrallsaLlon? lnformal neLwork Covernance ln Lu Slngle MarkeL
8egulaLlon' lnlbld , 148, de vlsser, Netwotk-8oseJ Covetoooce lo c low, 242-3, and Wllks, 'Agencles,
neLworks, ulscourses', 442.
327
8oeger and Corkln, '1he 8eslllence of SecLor-Speclflc CompeLlLlon Law', 4 DkAI1.
328
Cenerally on naLlonal ellLes ln Lu pollcy cycles, Maurer, MlLLag and Wessels, 'naLlonal SysLems' AdapLaLlon
Lo Lhe Lu SysLem: Lrends, offers, and consLralnLs' ln kohler-koch (ed), llokloq u ooJ Notloool Covetoooce
(Cu 2003), 33.
329
Wllks, 'Agencles, neLworks, ulscourses', 464.

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