1

The History of Early Dead Reckoning and Celestial

Navigation: Empirical Reality Versus Theory
Douglas T. Peck
The European Renaissance, centered in the Mediterranean, saw the first meaningful but
tenuous advance in the art (or science) of ocean navigation. Ocean navigation advanced from
theory to widespread practical use in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth-century when the
magnetic compass progressed from a magnetized needle floating on a straw to the 32 point
compass in use during the Columbian period.
The basic form of navigation during this period was the simple and easily mastered dead-
reckoning, using the magnetic compass for direction, and an estimate of the distance sailed
plotted on a portolan chart to fix position. By the late fifteenth-century, dead-reckoning
navigation had been refined to the point that Columbus and other competent navigators were
making long ocean passages to the New World and return with skill and accuracy.
During this same period, celestial navigation, which in an earlier crude form pre-dated dead-
reckoning, was also being developed for marine navigation. Fixing one s position on the face of
the earth by reference to the heavenly bodies had been practiced by mathematicians and
cosmographers since ancient times. However, it was during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth-
century that an attempt was made to move celestial observations out of the hands of the land-
bound and learned mathematicians and cosmographers and make it available for practical marine
navigation.
Integration of this new, complicated, and developing marine celestial navigation into the
established and trusted dead-reckoning navigation produced arguments pro-and-con between the
learned cosmographers and the experienced, practical, and conservative seamen and pilots
concerning the true role and application of celestial observations to ocean navigation of the
period. These arguments and indeed the conduct of just the basic dead-reckoning navigation, as
well as the conduct and application of celestial observations, were little understood by the
historians and writers of the period. For this reason the true picture of late fifteenth and early
sixteenth-century navigation is filled with misconceptions, distortions, and in some cases,
patently unfounded fiction.
Much of what we know of early navigation comes from the extant sixteenth-century writings
of Columbus, Martin Cortes, Pedro de Medina, Amerigo Vespucci, Peter Martyr, Richard Eden,
William Bourne, and Richard Hakluyt. The most prominent twentieth century writers on the
subject are, D. W. Waters, Eva G. R. Taylor, and Samuel Elliot Morison, who draw heavily from
these early writers and allied early documents. It should be noted that most of the sixteenth-
century writers on navigation were land-bound theoretical mathematicians, cosmographers, or
independent writers with little or no empirical experience in navigation at sea. And in like
manner, most of the current widely published writers who interpret these early documents and
write on the history of early navigation are also from the ranks of theoretical rather than
experienced professional navigators. This over-emphasis on theory versus practical application
has produced an undue acceptance of numerous misconceptions related to early navigation.
This study examines the writings of both the early sixteenth-century and later twentieth century
historians to identify these misconceptions and errors that have been introduced into the written
history of early navigation.
2
Each individual misconception is listed as a bold sub-heading followed by a dialectical
analysis and technical explanation of the source and reason for the particular misconception..
The first misconception is that late fifteenth and early sixteenth-century dead-reckoning
navigation using the 32 point magnetic compass, was inherently inaccurate and unsuited
for the long ocean passages of the Columbian era, so celestial navigation was required to
supply that needed accuracy.
This misconception in current historiography was first voiced by the learned cosmographers
who were advisors to the kings of Portugal and Spain, the first of the maritime nations to venture
across the Ocean Sea. And this alleged essential use of celestial navigation to augment what was
considered inaccurate dead-reckoning navigation has been strengthened by prominent and
respected twentieth century writers. An example of this is in the prolific writing of Eva G. R.
Taylor, Emeritus Professor of Geography, London University, and Honorary Member of the
Royal Institute of Navigation, who stated in her comments on William Bourne s A Regiment for
the Sea: During the reign of Henry VIII there was scarcely an Englishman to be found who was
skilled in the New [Celestial] Navigation , new because it made use of mathematics and
astronomy. Spanish pilots were employing it for their regular sailings to the New World, and
Portuguese pilots for reaching Brazil, India and the Far East (emphasis added). The portion
of this statement concerning the early Spanish and Portuguese pilot s use of the New Celestial
Navigation for navigation to the New World and the Far East is categorically and historically
untrue!
The Spanish and Portuguese pilots during this period were still accurately navigating to their
destination (and return) by dead-reckoning. The so-called New Navigation was not navigation
at all, but consisted of occasional celestial observations usually performed on land, not by the
pilots who were navigating the vessel by dead reckoning, but by learned cosmographers who
were sent along on the voyage to determine the latitude of the destination. The latitude of the
destination and prominent capes en-route were needed so these geographical landmarks could be
located on the master chart maintained by the crown. This master chart was not for navigation,
but primarily for use by geographers and cartographers to establish sovereignty rights to new
discoveries. The Portolan charts used by the pilots contained no latitude lines or notations. The
pilots did not navigate or steer to a latitude in degrees on a chart, but followed their dead
reckoning sailing directions or rutter which gave them the magnetic heading and distance from
their departure point to the destination.
A recent article by W. G. L. Randles in The Journal of Navigation , Vol. 51, Cambridge
University Press (1998), contains a comprehensive account of the performance and use of
celestial observations related to early Portuguese voyages to Africa and India. Randles article is
on the broad subject of nautical astronomy and shows that the primary purpose of these early
celestial observations, performed for the most part on land, was not for navigation, but to correct
the charts used by the navigators to show the correct relative linear distances to and between
their several destinations. Yet Randles article also contains a misleading statement by an Italian
passenger on a 1505 voyage who stated: The Portuguese navigate by the altitude of the sun or
by that of the Pole Star with the aid of an astrolabe. The Portuguese on occasion did fix the
latitude position of their destination or a cape by limited celestial observations, but they
navigated to that cape or destination by their
3
Figure 1
Enhanced drawing of the Carta Pisana portolan navigational chart showing the milage scale (in circles)
and the method of portraying magnetic compass courses to the principal central and eastern
Mediterranean ports.
trusted dead reckoning. This Italian passenger, like so many modern historians, confused an
occasional celestial observation to obtain (or confirm) a geographical position as their basic
navigation at sea. An uninformed Italian passenger can hardly be considered an expert witness
to describe the navigation method in use by the Portuguese pilots.
One reason given for the alleged inaccuracy of early dead-reckoning is tied to the
unsupported notion that early magnetic compass s were inherently inaccurate. The flawed and
even naive reasoning in this instance is that the very configuration of the card (or face) with only
4
32 points indexed instead of 360 degrees would introduce a mathematical built-in error of 5.6
degrees (one-half of the 11.25 degree space between index points). It is unreasonable for a
theoretical mathematician to assume that an experienced early pilot could not adapt to the
limitations of the 32 point compass with methods of extrapolation to steer to any desired heading
with accuracy. Even the modern compass in use by the military services and the airlines does
not contain 360 index points and the spacing between index points is normally between 2 and 4
degrees apart. Applying this same theoretical (but unrealistic) reasoning would condemn the
modern compass now in use to a built-in error of 1 to 2 degrees.
The commonly-held belief that dead-reckoning navigation was inaccurate and unsuited for
the long ocean passages during the Columbian period flies in the face of documented historical
fact. There is ample evidence to show that Mediterranean navigators developed dead-reckoning
to a fine art and accurate science well over two centuries before the Columbian era. The thirty-
two point compass was refined into a usable and accurate marine instrument in Amalfi and
subsequently adopted and used by the navigators of Pisa, Genoa, and Venice. The oldest extant
maritime dead-reckoning chart (frequently referred to as a portolan chart) is the Carta Pisana
dated to about 1275 (see Figure 1). This chart derives its name from the fact that it was
discovered in the archives of Pisa, which along with Amalfi was one of the principal ports of
Italy before the rise of Genoa and Venice. The Carta Pisana chart shows sixteen primary winds
(magnetic compass courses) which cover the shorelines of central and eastern Mediterranean.
The chart also carries an identical East-West and North-South scale for ease of pricking off
distance with dividers, and thus provides the essential elements for accurate dead-reckoning
navigation (i.e. magnetic compass course and distance from departure point to destination). This
general pattern of a Mediterranean pilot s portolan chart was adopted by Spain (quite possibly
introduced by Columbus) and continued in use for dead reckoning navigation well into the
seventeenth-century. But these portolan charts used by the pilot s for navigation were kept
aboard the vessels or in the hands of the pilots rather than being filed away in the archives in
Seville so none have survived.
The maps from Ptolemy s Geography from earlier times, well before development of portolan
charts, showed latitude and longitude data on the borders for use in scaling distances based on
the length of a degree. But the Carta Pisana chart and later portolan charts, prepared by pilots for
use in dead reckoning navigation, depended only on the arbitrary scale of distance and compass
courses on the chart, independent of and without reference to latitude and longitude. The
Spanish schematic world maps produced for the crown (Padron Real) were not for navigation,
lacked definitive and accurate shoreline details, and were primarily for the use of geographers
and cartographers to establish sovereignty rights to new discoveries.
In his four voyages to the New World, Columbus followed Mediterranean practice and
navigated solely by dead-reckoning, and he wisely chose to ignore his few defective and wildly
inaccurate celestial observations. Using only dead reckoning, Columbus was able to sail with
accuracy to the islands and capes of his previous voyages and then with the same unerring
accuracy returned to his home port in Spain. The historian Andres Bernaldez, a friend and
confidant of Columbus, confirmed this accuracy of dead-reckoning navigation of the period
when he reported that: A good pilot or
master is not considered such if, in traveling over a great distance from land to land, out in the
open sea with no indication of any land, he is off by ten leagues even when the trip is a thousand
leagues long. The successful conduct of Columbus s four voyages provides general prima-
facie evidence of his competence in performing accurate dead-reckoning navigation. But the
detailed log of Columbus s first voyage (from Bartolome de Las Casas summary)
5
containing the recorded compass headings (not courses) and estimated distance sailed (through
the water, not over-the-bottom) for 136 different legs, in sailing two ocean passages from a
known departure point to a known destination, provides adequate navigational data to arrive at a
finite mathematical degree of accuracy for his dead-reckoning navigation. In a 1991
scientifically controlled empirical reconstruction of the voyage from the data in the log, it was
categorically and mathematically determined that Columbus s dead-reckoning for the two long
passages (west-bound and return), had an accuracy factor of 99.7 percent. A complete report of
this scientific empirical reconstruction of Columbus s voyage conducted by an experienced
professional ocean navigator is contained in, Peck, Douglas T., Cristoforo Colombo - God s
Navigator, Columbian Publishers, Columbus, WI, (1993), pp. 51-115. The navigational data
from this research was verified for accuracy and validity in an independent audit by Admiral
William Lemos, USN (ret), an experienced ocean navigator and authority on 15
th
and 16
t h
century seafaring and navigation and member of the President s Columbus Quincentennial
Commission. An abridged summary of the reconstruction was contained in, Re-thinking the
Columbus Landfall Problem, Terrae Incognitae, Vol. 28, (1996), pp. 12-35.
Another misconception is the erroneous belief that the early pilots were unaware of and
did not correct for the unknown magnetic variation on long voyages, therefore the courses
given in their rutters, and navigation logs were unreliable and inaccurate.
The unknown magnetic variation had no effect whatsoever on the dead-reckoning navigation
performed by the early pilots! The reason for this is that they sailed a magnetic heading to their
destination (and return) rather than a true course as performed by the modern navigator who has
an accurate chart showing local magnetic variation and the true geographical latitude and
longitude of his destination. There is a mistaken belief that early pilots needed the same
information and data available to the modern navigator in order to perform accurate dead-
reckoning navigation.
The early pilot who discovered new lands reported the magnetic heading and distance to
reach that destination, and it is this magnetic heading (frequently mis-labeled a course) that
appeared in their sailing directions and rutters. It was also these uncorrected magnetic headings
from their rutters which they sailed and plotted on their charts that enabled them to sail to that
destination and return with accuracy. Columbus is mistakenly credited with being the first to
note the magnetic variation in the North Atlantic on his 1492 voyage. Columbus only noted the
3 _ degree procession of Polaris and considered it of little import since he followed the
observation with the comment: .... it seems that the star [Polaris or North Star] moves like the
other stars, and the compasses always seek the truth [in this case the truth is magnetic north]
(emphasis added). Columbus at this time was in an area with very little magnetic variation, but
his comment has been mistakenly interpreted (or misinterpreted) as indicating a large westerly
variation.
The early Spanish pilots fully understood that only the magnetic headings from their rutters
were needed for accurate dead-reckoning which is why they so vehemently resisted the efforts of
the court cosmographers to include the inclined (oblique) latitude scale on the western edge of
the charts. This inclined latitude scale was introduced early in the sixteenth-century because of
the extreme westerly variation in the northern area of Newfoundland reported by John Cabot and
others who sailed in far northern waters. The Spanish pilots argued (quite correctly) that the
corrected latitudes disagreed with their basic and proven magnetic headings that they knew
would direct them across the Ocean Sea to their destination and return with accuracy. This is an
6
important point to understanding early dead reckoning practice and methodology and is little
understood by many historians writing on the subject. For further reading on the subject, see:
Winter, Heinrich, The Pseudo-Labrador and the Oblique Meridian, Imago Mundi, Vol.
MCMXXXVII, (1937), pp. 61-73, and Jean Rotz s treatise on magnetic variation in his Boke of
Idrography, (1542), reproduced and edited by Helen Wallis, Oxford, (1981). The argument
between the Spanish pilots and the cosmographers over charts with the inclined western latitude
scale is fully discussed in, Lamb, Ursula, Science by Litigation : A Cosmographic Feud, Terrae
Incognitae, Vol. 1, #1, (1969), p. 54.
A frequently voiced misconception is that speed was computed mathematically by
recording the time a chip of wood took to pass from the bow to the stern of a vessel of
known length.
This completely unrealistic and unworkable procedure has been put forward by theoretical
mathematicians, with little seafaring and navigation experience, from early times to the present.
The reason for this is because the early theoretical mathematicians who wrote on the subject did
not believe that an experienced seaman could accurately estimate his speed by just observing the
action of the wake and feel of the ship. The experienced pilot would have learned from years
of experience how to judge their speed when sailing from points of a known distance in a known
time, and then could easily pass this expertise on to the apprentice seamen who served under
them for many years learning the trade. In the late thirteenth-century the author of the
Documenti d Amore pointed out: For every master and pilot prided himself on knowing
exactly how much way [speed] his ship was making. He knew the ship, he considered the wind,
he watched the sails, he watched the water. In fact, it was a matter which just could not be
explained to the landsman. (emphasis added).
Just consider the involved and impractical mathematical exercise the unlettered pilot must go
through to use this method of estimating speed. As an example, the pilot would be compelled to
calculate that if the wood chip, by his estimate (without a stop-watch), took 10 seconds to go 60
feet (the length of the vessel), then in one second the boat would go six feet, and in one hour
(3600 seconds) go 6 X 3600 = 21,600 feet, and since there is 6076 feet in a nautical mile then
21,600 divided by 6076 equals 3.5 knots or nautical miles per hour. This complicated and
impractical mathematical procedure was far beyond the ability of the unlettered pilots, yet
modern writers faithfully and erroneously report that this unworkable method, or variations of it,
was used by the early pilots to estimate their speed.
Since Columbus s log of his 1492 discovery voyage contains different estimates of
distances reported by Columbus for his navigation and for that furnished to the Spanish
crew, and neither of the figures agree with the distance actually covered; there is a
mistaken belief that either Columbus erred in his reported distances or he was keeping a
secret log so only he could find his way back to the Indies.
This misconception can be explained by quoting from the referenced report of the 1991
research and reconstruction of Columbus s 1492 voyage: From about day 9 to day 27,
Columbus was carried along in distance by the North Equatorial Current and gained between 7-
12 miles each day because of the westerly flowing current. Columbus was not aware that he was
gaining this induced 7-12 miles each day which explains why his actual distance covered was
greater than his estimate in the log. This simple and elementary navigational fact, so easily
7
understood by any trained and experienced navigator, is misunderstood by most historians who
come up with all manner of invalid and convoluted explanations for that difference in the log.
The unsupported explanations for this difference range from Columbus gross inability to
estimate his speed and distance, to preposterous theories about how he was trying to conceal the
truth from the Spanish pilots.
Much of the misinterpretation of the data in Columbus s log stems from the fact that
Columbian historians are unaware (or refuse to accept) that he was using his Mediterranean
(Genoese) mile of 2.67 nautical miles to the league for navigation rather than the widely different
Portuguese or Spanish data for the length of a mile. The 2.67 nautical miles to the league
control factor is based on the Genoese navigator Columbus using the Mediterranean 5000 palm
mile of 4060 feet to the nautical mile for his navigation. James E. Kelley Jr., fully substantiated
this mile factor as that used by Columbus for his navigation in a paper contained in the,
Proceedings of the First San Salvador Conference, in 1986. Kelley s factor of 2.67 nautical mile
to the league was proven accurate when it was used in the 1991 empirical reconstruction of
Columbus voyage from the known departure point of Samana Cay, Hispaniola, to the known
destination of Santa Maria in the Azores. The 2.67 nautical mile factor was then used in the
empirical reconstruction of Columbus s voyage from the known departure point of Hierra to the
unknown landfall on Guanahani. A full report of this research which established San Salvador
as Guanahani, the landfall of Columbus is contained in, Peck, Douglas T., Cristoforo Colombo -
God s Navigator, Columbian Publishers, Columbus, WI, (1993), pp. 51-115, and an abridged
summary in, Terrae Incognitae, Vol. 28, (1996), pp. 12-35. This well supported research has
established that Columbus s detailed log is accurate and easily understood by an experienced
navigator with expertise in early dead reckoning methodology.
The apocryphal myth of Prince Henry the Navigator s school of navigation at Sagre
and the myth of the superiority of early Portuguese navigators.
The general consensus pictures the Infante Prince Henry the Navigator assembling learned
Moorish, Genoese, and Spanish scholars at Sagres in the fifteenth-century to instruct the
Portuguese pilots in advanced ocean navigation. As a result, many less than erudite historians
mistakenly considered Portuguese pilots as leaders in early ocean navigation. There is no valid
evidence that this school for navigators ever existed. A crude circle of stones on the barren
windswept Sagres peninsula is pointed to as a compass rose related to Prince Henry s school.
This archaeological site has not been dated with authority to Prince Henry s time, and circles of
stones related to ancient religious rites are common throughout southwestern Europe. Prince
Henry was not interested in ocean navigation nor were his organized voyages down the coast of
Africa seeking a way to the Indies. The astronomers Henry assembled did not instruct the
Portuguese pilot s in celestial navigation, but instead went along on the voyages only to establish
the latitude of each new discovery. This latitude was needed, not for navigation, but for insertion
on the master chart in Lisbon to establish Henry s ownership of the new trading port or colony.
It is a complete misreading of history to take a few random facts and conclude that Prince Henry
had organized a school to train Portuguese pilots in advanced navigation.
The school that actually instructed the Portuguese pilots in navigation was formed in Lisbon
in the previous century (1317) by the Portuguese monarch King Denis. Having no skilled
Portuguese navigators, King Denis commissioned the Genoese Manuele Pessagno as Grand
Admiral of the Navy for life to insure that the Portuguese navy would always have twenty-two
skilled Genoese sea captains to instruct the Portuguese pilots and to lead the fleet when required.
8
This Genoese colony in Lisbon consisted not only of seamen and navigators, but skilled
cartographers that produced the world maps for the Portuguese crown that were derived from
exploration voyages. This little-known, but significant historical fact, is covered in detail in the
writings of Paolo Emilio Taviani and summarized in his, Christopher Columbus - The Grand
Design, translated by L. F. Farina, Orbis Publishing Limited, London (1985). These
cartographers (and Bartolome Colon may have been one) would have benefitted in their trade
from the latitudes that Prince Henry furnished for his African and later offshore island colonies.
The existence of latitude observations made on the shore by cosmographers is no indication of
the superiority of Portuguese pilots in celestial navigation at sea. The Portuguese under the
auspices of Prince Henry claimed to have discovered Madeira and Porto Santo in 1419-20 and
the Azores in 1427 and this fact has influenced the unfounded view of the superiority of early
Portuguese navigators. Yet these offshore islands in the Atlantic were known and charted by
Genoese navigators over a century earlier than the Portuguese claims. The Canary Islands were
discovered (or re-discovered) by the Genoese navigator Lanzarotto Malocello in 1336.
Following this discovery, the Italian charts of the fourteenth-century show the Canaries,
Madeira, Porto Santo, and the Azores with the Genoese coat of arms prominently displayed.
The belief that the Portuguese were the leaders in ocean navigation and that Columbus
learned his navigation while in Portugal has been promoted primarily by prominent Portuguese
historians (Bensaude, Coutinho, Fontoura da Costa, and Cortesao). The prominent historians
Eva G. R. Taylor in England and Miles H. Davidson in the USA have agreed with this
unsupported view in their published works, thus giving this historical error a seeming legitimacy
that it does not deserve. With the preponderance of valid historical evidence showing that the
Portuguese learned their navigation from the Genoese, it is difficult to understand why the belief
still exists that the experienced Genoese navigator Columbus learned his navigation from the
Portuguese pilots.
Another well established and widely published misconception is that the term latitude
sailing is synonymous with celestial navigation since it is erroneously believed that
latitude was maintained by constant reference to celestial observations.
With the advent of the magnetic compass, latitude sailing was performed in the North Atlantic
by sailing due west on a compass heading from a known departure point with a known latitude.
Columbus practiced latitude sailing on his first voyage by sailing a compass heading due west
from Gomera and Hierra when he believed his destination was at that latitude. At his destination
in the Bahamas he gave his position as due west of Hierra and not in degrees of latitude from a
celestial observation. John Cabot practiced latitude sailing when he departed on a compass
heading due west from Cabo Dursal (Dursey Head) since he believed his sought-for destination
lay at that latitude. He reported his latitude in Newfoundland as due west of Cabo Dursal and
not in degrees of latitude from a celestial observation.
There is no indication that Cabot had either a quadrant or astrolabe or knew how to use them,
yet Samuel Eliot Morison in his, The European Discovery of America: The Northern Voyages,
(1971), adopted unfounded literary license and reported that: At a quiet anchorage or ashore,
he [Cabot] took a meridional altitude of the sun, and dawn and evening sights on Polaris,
working them out as the approximate latitude of Dursey Head, Ireland, 51 degrees, 33 minutes
N. Morison s description of this apocryphal celestial observation reveals his confusion and
inexperience with instruments used for sixteenth-century celestial observations. It is the modern
sextant that requires the use of a visible horizon for star sights, thus necessitating an observation
9
at dawn or early evening. Neither the astrolabe or the quadrant require a visible horizon since
they depend on gravity to obtain their sidereal angle. And the weak Polaris is best sighted in the
dark of night and is barely visible or disappears at dawn or early evening. This unfounded
fiction should be ignored, however, Morison is generally regarded as an experienced seafarer and
navigator because he was given a captain s commission (later Admiral) in the USN Reserve for
writing the Naval history of WW II and earlier had somewhat followed Columbus s route in a
chartered yacht. Morison was a respected professor of history at Harvard and well-read in
general library navigational knowledge, for which he should be commended. However, his
limited knowledge in practical celestial observations is revealed by this error-filled comment on
Cabot s alleged observation together with his improbable assertion that Columbus, when
anchored off Cuba, mistook the weak and unlikely star Alfirk for the North Star.
Cartier and Frobisher also practiced latitude sailing, but there is no indication they maintained
their latitude at sea by celestial observations rather than maintaining a westerly compass heading.
Frobisher had tables of declination and instruments aboard furnished by the investors of the
enterprise and he was coached in their use by John Dee, but it is doubtful they were ever used as
Frobisher, speaking for himself and the other pilots, confessed themselves not able to be
scholars.
Thus, the latitude sailing performed by the early pilots was actually dead reckoning on a
magnetic course, and not a form of celestial navigation, as asserted (or inferred) by many current
writers on navigation.
The commonly held belief that the Norsemen performed latitude sailing and offshore
navigation by reference to the North Star, has no basis in extant historical evidence.
Long before the advent of the magnetic compass, a crude and inaccurate form of offshore
navigation was performed by the Norsemen (often mistakenly called Vikings), but their
navigation did not include latitude sailing by reference to the North Star. Morison is responsible
for much of the consensus that the Norsemen used the North Star for navigation. In what can
only be labeled as naive and unfounded fictional nonsense, Morison asserts: The Norsemen
managed navigation by what through the ages has been called latitude sailing. Once having
found the Faroes [Faeroes], Iceland, and Cape Farewell of Greenland, the Norse navigators took
the latitude of each place by crudely measuring the angular height of the North Star - and you
can do it with a notched stick. The Norsemen had no concept of latitude and in their offshore
navigation used only the known seasonal winds, the temperature and characteristics of the sea,
the appearance of sea life with known habitats, the flight of migratory birds, the lead line when
on the continental shelf, and possibly the sun. A description of Norse navigation is contained in
the Icelandic sagas which are detailed accounts (over 2500 pages) of voyages made in the eighth,
ninth, and tenth centuries to points in Norway, Ireland, Iceland, Greenland and Newfoundland.
For a full discussion of offshore navigation of the Norsemen, see, Marcus, G. J., Ocean
Navigation of the Middle Ages: Northern Waters, University of Oxford Press, Oxford (1954),
and, Grenlands Historiske Mindesmaerker, Copenhagen, 1838-1848, reprinted by Rosenkilde &
Bagger, Copenhagen (1985), and, Thirslund, Soren, Sailing Directions of the North Atlantic
Viking Age (from about the year 860 to 1400), The Journal of Navigation, Cambridge
University Press, Vol. 30, #1, (1997).
The sailing directions in the Icelandic sagas contain only the name of the point of departure,
the name of the destination (given as an easily recognized high promontory), the direction (given
as one of sixteen cardinal points from north), and the distance (expressed in sailing days ). The
10
sailing directions also give a detailed description of en route sea characteristics but there is no
mention of the North Star to fix a position for reasons that are well known to navigators of far
northern latitudes. In the sailing season between May and October there is too much light for the
weak Polaris to be seen by the naked eye. However, the Norse were familiar with Polaris which
they called Leitharstjaerna, but since it was only visible in their dark stormy winter nights, it
probably was of interest only to astrologers and priests and of no use to the ocean navigator.
There is evidence that the Icelandic seafarers possessed a navigational instrument called a
Solskuggefjol or Sun shadow board, a circular board with an upright post in the center and
floating in a bowl of water. When sailing on an east or west heading, a measurement of the
shadow of the Sun at noon on successive days would indicate if the vessel had strayed north or
south of the desired course. But the discussion of offshore navigation in the Icelandic sagas
indicates that the well known seasonal winds were the primary directional factor used for
navigation (common also to early Mediterranean navigation) and there is no mention of use of
the Sun shadow board or any other sidereal measuring device. Thus the commonly held belief
that the early Norsemen used the North Star for offshore navigation (or latitude sailing) has no
merit.
Another common misconception is that the office of Pilot Major ( Piloto Mayor), which
was established soon after Columbus first voyage, gave instruction to Spanish pilots who
were then able to perform the New celestial navigation.
The Casa de Contratacion established the office of Pilot Major ( Piloto Mayor ) soon after
Columbus s discovery when it was realized that navigation to and from the New World was a
vital factor in success of the venture. Columbus was first offered the position of Pilot Major but
declined and continued his exploration. Peralonzo Nino was then appointed as the first Pilot
Major probably around 1496. The twenty-four year old Peralonzo, who learned his limited dead-
reckoning skills from Columbus on the first voyage, was hardly qualified for the job so this was
manifestly a political appointment because his family owned the Santa Maria and was one of the
principal supporters of the enterprise. Amerigo Vespucci followed Nino as Pilot Major in 1508,
and in the next few decades, the office of Pilot Major passed from Vespucci to Juan de Solis, to
Sebastian Cabot, followed by Alonso de Chaves in 1552 which is the period covered by this
study.
Historians are quick to assume that because instruction in navigation was ordered by the
crown that it was indeed carried out, and thus (without foundation) report this instruction of the
pilots as historical fact. The historical fact is the office of Pilot Major was slow in growing into
an effective instrument of government because the political appointees to the office lacked the
ability to give instruction in either dead-reckoning or celestial navigation. This study will later
show that two of the most prominent Pilot Major s, Amerigo Vespucci and Sebastian Cabot, who
held the office for the longest period of time, were incompetent dilettantes who were incapable
of giving instruction in either
celestial navigation or dead-reckoning. The pilots did receive instruction but it was at sea in the
time honored apprentice program (60% of Columbus s crew were apprentice seamen) where they
learned only dead-reckoning.
The over-blown and inaccurate picture of the effectiveness of the office of the Pilot Major in
producing Spanish pilots who were proficient in celestial navigation originated for the most part
with English writers rather than Spanish sources. D. W. Waters, in his, The Art of Navigation
(1958), reports this admiration of the English for Spanish navigation expertise was
11
understandable in that, in 1558 probably not one English seaman was capable of navigating to
the West Indies without the aid of Portuguese, French, or Spanish pilots. It was in this
environment that Stephen Borough, Chief Pilot of the Muscovy Company and an agent for the
Trinity Houses visited the office of the Pilot Major in Seville in 1558. Speaking only to the
officials in Seville who were responsible to the crown for conduct of the office, he came away
with a glowing report of how the Spanish office of Pilot Major had produced manuals and
instruments for celestial navigation and instructed the Spanish pilots in their use. Borough
brought back a copy of Martn Cortes s Arte de Navegar where it was translated into English by
Richard Eden. Eden was a scholarly linguist and writer and not a trained and experienced
navigator, although he quickly attained a reputation as such because of his published translation
of Cortes and other plagiarized works on navigation. Eden restated the glowing reports of
Borough concerning the (alleged) celestial navigation expertise of Spanish pilots and asserted his
translation of Cortes was a manual of navigation designed from the start and written throughout
for the instruction and use of practical seamen. Neither of these claims were true.
The contents of Cortes s manual is primarily devoted to construction of the new navigational
instruments (with little said about their use), but also contains some limited tables of
declinations. Cortes s tables were based on the Almagest of Claudius Ptolemy (circa 150 AD)
and while correcting some, inherited many of Ptolemy s errors. A simple way to study the errors
of Ptolemy s data is to compare his map with a modern map of the Mediterranean and the
significant errors become apparent. William Bourne in 1574 wrote a manual of navigation, The
Regiment for the Sea, based largely on Eden s translation of Cortes, which was billed as a
manual for the common seaman. In commenting on Cortes s Arte de Navegar, Bourne stated
that even the older [experienced] men could not handle an astronomer s Ephemerides or work
out the sun s declination from his place in the Zodiac as Cortes apparently expected pilots to do.
Bourne asserted his book was written for the common sailor rather than for the educated scholar
and it was some improvement in that respect, but the fact is he was writing far above the
comprehension of the ordinary English sailor or pilot (i.e. Frobisher s comment).
Most modern historians base their description of the Spanish Office of Pilot Major on the
sixteenth-century writings of the secondary and poorly informed English works of Richard
Hakluyt and Richard Eden. Currently, the little-known published works of Ursula Lamb related
to the subject are the most unbiased and accurate accounts of the Office of Pilot Major since they
are based on contemporary Spanish sources. See, Lamb, Ursula, The Cosmogaphies of Pedro de
Medina, Estudios de Erudicion que le Ofrecen o Hispanistas, Madrid, (1966); Science by
Litigation, Terrae Incognitae, Vol. 1, #1, (1969), pp. 40-57; The Spanish Cosmographic
Juntas of the Sixteenth-Century, Terrae Incognitae, (1973), pp. 51-63; A Navigator s Universe:
The Libro de Cosmographia of !538, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1972).
The misconception by historians that the Spanish office of Pilot Major was effective in
instructing the early pilots in the new celestial navigation results largely from a mistaken belief
that conversion of a celestial sight to a fix on their chart required only a simple procedure with
reference to the tables of declination contained in their almanacs or regiomontanous. Instead, the
procedure required complicated computations in higher mathematics and the regiomontanus did
not contain instructions on how to use the tables. Even today it requires five steps from four pre-
computed tables in HO 249 and a current (annually updated) nautical almanac, and still the
procedure is prone to error unless performed by a trained and experienced navigator using a
calibrated and accurate sextant. Unfortunately this inaccurate picture of Spanish
accomplishments in early celestial navigation, voiced by Borough, Eden, and Hakluyt, has been
repeated without question by modern historians so this misreading of history has been firmly set
12
in current academic and lay literature on the subject.
The continuing controversy over the true landfall of Columbus in the Bahamas and the
true landfall of Ponce de Leon on the shores of Florida.
Both Columbus and Ponce de Leon left detailed logs of their voyages giving accurate
navigational data that can be followed by a knowledgeable navigator to accurately trace their
track from the departure point to the destination. Yet historians in their study of these logs have
been unable to agree on their landfall sites and their conclusions vary hundreds of miles from the
actual landfall site clearly indicated in the logs. The basic reason for this wide disagreement on
the landfall sites is a misunderstanding and a misinterpretation of the navigational data in the
logs because the most widely published academic historians in the discipline lack meaningful
expertise in fifteenth and sixteenth-century navigation and seafaring methodology. .
The location of the landfall of Columbus in the Bahamas has generated the most controversy,
in some cases more emotional than rational, spurred on by the recent Columbus Quincentennial
Celebration. This controversy started in the eighteenth-century when Juan Bautista Munoz in
writing the official history of Spain s overseas empire named Watlings/San Salvador in the
central Bahamas as the Indian island of Guanahani, where Columbus first landed in the New
World. Munoz was followed by a spate of historians who named nine different islands ranging
for hundreds of miles through the Bahamas and Turks islands. These different views with the
date and the island proposed are as follows: -- Munoz (1779) Watlings/San Salvador;
Navarrete (1825) Grand Turk; Irving (1828) Cat Island; Gibbs (1846) Grand Turk; Becher
(1856) Watlings/San Salvador; Varnhagen (1864) Mayaguana; Fox (1880) Samana Cay;
Murdock (1884) San Salvador; McElroy (1941) San Salvador; Morison (1942) San Salvador;
Gould (1943) Conception Island; Verhoog (1947) South Caicos; Weems (1950) South Caicos;
Link (1958) South Caicos; Fuson (1961) South
Caicos; Power (1983) Grand Turk; Molander (1981) Egg Island; Fuson (1986) Grand Turk;
Judge (1986) Samana Cay; Fuson (1987) Samana Cay; Peck (1992) San Salvador; Mitchell
(1992) Conception Island; Keegan (1992) San Salvador; and Pickering (1994) Plana Cays.
All of these widely different views are based on interpretation of the navigational data in the
same source document, - Bartolome de Las Casas s summary of Columbus s log. The reason
for the widely different conclusions is not due to inaccurate data in Columbus s log, but due to a
misreading and misinterpretation of that data. And one of the primary reasons that fuels the
misinterpretation is the mind-set among historians that early dead reckoning navigation was
inherently inaccurate, therefore the logs of the navigators were inaccurate.
13
Figure 2
Chart of Columbus s 1492 voyage: The perceived track, as plotted and recorded in the log, is shown as a
dotted line with an X at day s end.. The actual track over the bottom, as corrected for fifteenth-century
magnetic variation, Columbus s Genoese mile and nautical mile differential, and effect of the ocean currents,
is shown as a solid line with a dot at day s end. This chart graphically illustrates why historians wrongly
conclude that Columbus s log is inaccurate, since the uncorrected (or improperly corrected) track plotted
directly from the data in the log (dotted line) ends a considerable distance northeast of any possible island
landfall. When corrected for influencing factors, - unknown to Columbus, - the data in the log is then
revealed as accurate, and leads to San Salvador as the landfall island in his 1492 discovery voyage. From
Peck, Cristoforo Colombo - God s Navigator.
It is beyond the scope of this study to give a dialectic analysis of each proposed landfall site
and provide an argument to eliminate those with no merit and then an argument to support the
San Salvador site. But such a study does exist in available publications: Cristoforo Colombo -
God s Navigator, (1993), and in Rethinking the Columbus Landfall Problem, Terrae
Incognitae, Vol. 28, (1996). The empirical reconstructed track of Columbus which substantiates
San Salvador as the landfall island, contained in these publications, is graphically portrayed in
Figure 2.
The landfall and landing site of Juan Ponce de Leon on the shore of Florida has produced a
controversy similar to that of the Columbus landfall and for the same reasons. Anton de
Alaminos was Ponce de Leon s pilot (navigator) and his navigational data for the voyage is
contained in Antonio de Herrera s account of the voyage. Herrera s account, which is the only
source giving substantial details of the voyage, is in his, Historia General de los Castellanos en
las Islasi Tierra Firma del Mar Oceano, published around 1601. There are several English
translations of Herrera s account available, but the latest and best of these is that by James E.
14
Kelley Jr. Kelley s work is from the original 1601 script rather than a later modern Spanish
publication, has the Spanish script in the text adjacent to the English translation, and contains
copious footnotes explaining troublesome parts of the script. See, Kelley, James E. Jr., Juan
Ponce de Leon s Discovery of Florida: Herrera s Narrative Revisited, Revista de Historia de
America, Instituto Panamericano de Geografia e Historia, Vol. III, (1991).
Some scholars doubt the validity of the navigational data in Herrera s account, questioning
whether it was obtained directly from the original log. Herrera summarized and abridged Ponce
de Leon s log in the same manner that Bartolome de Las Casas summarized and abridged
Columbus s log. It is quite apparent from the content that both were done from the original
holograph document or a scribe s copy. Unfortunately, Herrera added numerous comments that
were based on knowledge obtained much later than 1513, and were not part of the original log.
However, these additions by Herrera are easily identified, and when they are removed (or
disregarded), the original log entries of compass headings, times, distances, descriptions of
landfalls, latitudes, identification of known islands with Indian names, sea and weather
conditions, all of which are elements of a navigator s log come through with clarity.
The interpretation of this navigational data has suffered the same fate as the Columbus log
and produced controversy because the most prominent Florida historians lack meaningful
expertise in sixteenth-century navigation and seafaring. In this instance, one of the most glaring
errors that adversely influenced accurate determination of the track, was the unfounded belief
that Alaminos was capable of and used celestial navigation rather than the prevalent and proven
dead-reckoning. To a lesser degree than the Columbus problem, but in the same manner,
historians have named several sites for Ponce de Leon s landfall that range for hundreds of miles
along the coast of Florida and into southern Georgia. These different views for the landfall are
listed with the source, date, and location as follows: -- Scisco (1913) Ponce de Leon Inlet; T.
Frederick Davis (1935) St. Augustine; Lawson (1946,1956) St. Augustine; Tio (1972) Ponce
de Leon Inlet; Morison (1974) Ponce de Leon Inlet; Sanz (1984) St Augustine; Weddle
(1985) Ponce de Leon Inlet; Kelley (1991) South of Cape Canaveral; Peck (1992, 1993)
Melbourne Beach; Devereux (1993) Ponce de Leon Inlet; Milanich (1996) offshore island, S.
Georgia; and Fuson (2000) Palm Coast.
The scope of this study is limited to a discussion of why these widely different landfall sites
exist. However, a comprehensive study that supports the Melbourne Beach site and refutes the
others is contained in several published books and papers on the subject. See, Kelley, James E.
Jr., Juan Ponce de Leon s Discovery of Florida: Herrera s Narrative Revisited, Revista de
Historia de America, Vol. III, (1991), p. 56; Peck, Douglas T., Reconstruction and Analysis of
the 1513 Discovery Voyage of Juan Ponce de Leon, The Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol.
LXXI, #2, (1992), pp. 144-147; Gannon, Michael V., The New History of Florida, University
Press of Florida, Gainesville (1996), pp. 17-20; Peck, Anatomy of an Historical Fantasy : The
Ponce de Leon-Fountain of Youth Legend, Revista de Historia de America, Numero 123,
(1998), pp. 70-71; The National Geographic Society s Annotated Map, The Explorers,
(1998); Peck, The Depiction of Florida on the early Conte Ottomano Freducci Map, The
Portolan, Vol. 50, #1, pp. 24-27; and, Peck, The Epic 1513 Exploration Voyage of Juan Ponce
de Leon, Early Seafaring Exploration
15
Figure 3
Annotated chart showing Ponce de Leon s track though the Bahamas from Puerto Rico
to the landing on Florida. From, Peck, Ponce de Leon and the Discovery of Florida.
(1) March 3 - Departed San German off Puerto Rico on heading of northwest by north.
(2) March 8 - Anchored at El Viejo on Banks of Babueca after 3 _ days sail.
(3) March 9 - Anchored at Caycos after an easy day s sail.
(4) March 10 - Anchored at Yaguna again after an easy day s sail.
(5) March 11-12 - Hove-to off Amaguayo after an overnight sail.
(6) March 13 - Passed Manegua during overnight sail.
(7) March 14-25 - Anchored at Guanahani, provisioned and re-rigged the vessels.
(8) March 27 - Passed unidentified island (Eleuthera) on a heading of northwest.
(9) March 29-30 - Hove-to during storm, changed heading to west-northwest.
(10) April 2 - Anchorage and landing on La Florida, at 28 degrees latitude, south of Cape
Canaveral near Melbourne Beach.
Series, Vol. 2, #5, New World Explorers, Inc., Bradenton, FL (2002).
16
The reconstructed track of Ponce de Len s voyage contained and substantiated in these several
publications is shown in Figure 3. Note that the track of Ponce de Leon not only confirms his
landfall at Melbourne Beach, but identifies San Salvador as the Indian island of Guanahani, the
landfall of Columbus in the New World.
Another popular misconception is that Amerigo Vespucci was a learned cosmographer
and navigator and that was the reason for his appointment as Spain s Pilot Major.
Amerigo Vespucci was not a cosmographer, seaman, or navigator. He was a well educated
aristocrat from a leading Florentine family and spent his early years among the great and near
great of that city. He moved to Seville when almost forty as head of a banking and ship
chandlery business for the powerful commercial house of Lorenzo di Pier Francisco de Medici.
Vespucci s first venture at sea was with Alonso de Hojeda s (Ojeda) 1499 exploration voyage
(he may have helped finance it) to the Caribbean as a gentleman volunteer (i.e. paid passenger).
In his published account of this voyage he pictured himself as captain and navigator without
mentioning Hojeda. Following this were two voyages to the coast of Brazil with the respected
Portuguese captain, Goncalo Coelho in 1501 and 1503 in which he also pictured himself as the
principal navigator and savior of the fleet. Details of these voyages as well as a patently
fictitious voyage of 1497 (for which there is no documentation other than Vespucci s account)
are primarily contained in two published accounts, his Lettera in 1504, and his Mundus Novus
circa 1505.
Vespucci s published account of his voyages (including the fictitious 1497 voyage) contained
detailed accounts of his alleged practice of celestial navigation and received wide distribution
throughout Europe, which readily earned him a reputation as one of the leading navigators of the
period. It was solely for this reason, and the fact that he was a high-born favorite of the court,
that he was given the political appointment as Pilot Major in 1508. Queen Joanna instructed
Vespucci
shortly after his appointment as Pilot Major to instruct the Spanish pilots in the new celestial
navigation (no doubt on the advice of the cosmographers in the court), but there is no record of
this instruction ever taking place or attempted. As documented in this study, Amerigo Vespucci
and Sebastian Cabot, who together held the office of Pilot Major for the longest period of time,
were incompetent dilettantes who were incapable of giving instruction in either dead-reckoning
or celestial navigation An examination of Vespucci s reported instances of performing celestial
navigation shows that he does not deserve his reputation as an expert navigator. In his
comprehensive research into the history of the early explorers, Morison devotes twenty-four
pages in text and notes to refute the claim that Vespucci was a competent navigator.
Vespucci received an undeserved major boost in his reputation as an experienced navigator
with publication of Waldseemuller s 1507 book on cosmography in which he lauded Vespucci s
four voyages (including his fictitious 1497 voyage) and on one of his maps accompanying the
book, showed Vespucci in an inset suggesting that he discovered the major shorelines from
Brazil north to the eastern seaboard of the USA. Waldseemuller later recanted his support of
Vespucci as a discoverer, Peter Martyr who usually accepted these tale tales by court favorites
completely ignored him, and Bartolome de Las Casas wrote a scathing repudiation of him as a
seafarer, navigator, and discoverer of the shores of North or South America. However, in spite
of this repudiation of him by his peers, Vespucci in the centuries that followed picked up
advocates from some well known and respected historians (i.e., Harrisse, Fiske, Varnhagen,
Vignaud) none of whom possessed expertise in seafaring and navigation. These historians
17
supported their case for Vespucci with irrational arguments, completely at odds with
mathematical, navigational, geophysical, and geographical reality, and yet current Vespucci
advocates still cite these sources to support their view.
Sebastian Cabot is pictured in most historical publications as a highly qualified seafarer
and navigator who was justly called the Father of English Navigation and served with
distinction as Spain s Pilot Major. None of these claims are true.
This view was popular among the courtiers and aristocracy of Europe during his lifetime and
is the view that still persists in popular literature today. However, a severe scrutiny of extant
source documents of the period reveals a far different picture. Sebastian Cabot was a charismatic
dilettante in the mold of Vespucci, who rode to fame on the coattails of his father John Cabot.
John Cabot was an Italian pilot (Giovanni Coboto), trained in Venice and Genoa for long dead-
reckoning ocean passages who was called by Henry VII to lead the epic 1497 voyage to the New
World because English pilots were experienced only in coastal pilotage and short cape to cape
navigation using the lead line to fix position. John Cabot was hailed as a national hero for his
1497 voyage but he was lost without trace on his follow-up 1498 voyage. Sebastian was only
fourteen or fifteen years old at the time of the first voyage (and there is some doubt that he was
aboard) and he did not accompany his father on the ill-fated 1498 voyage. Yet in the following
years, Sebastian easily inherited the fame of his father and was acclaimed throughout the courts
of Europe as an outstanding navigator.
Sebastian was inept and incompetent in both dead-reckoning and celestial navigation and his
reputation came solely from his own spurious braggadocio, helped along and given authority by
the writings of Peter Martyr and Richard Hakluyt. Martyr and Hakluyt had no first-hand
knowledge of Sebastian s alleged voyages and apparently took Sebastian s accounts as
historically true. They not only lauded him for his navigation expertise, but without foundation
credited him with the discovery and exploration of the entire eastern seaboard of North America
from Canada to Florida.
There are no extant examples of Sebastian s practice of celestial navigation at sea from either
his father s voyage or his one voyage to the River Plate (La Plata), because none are reported.
To verify his expertise as a celestial navigator we are confined solely to an examination of his
bold assertions that he was an expert in celestial navigation far ahead of his fellow navigators.
But strangely, this unfounded braggadocio of a popular and flamboyant court favorite worked on
the Spanish court for Sebastian as it had done for Vespucci, and the Crown appointed him Pilot
Major in 1518.
When confronted by Pedro de Medina and Alonso de Chavs (two of Spain s most
knowledgeable cosmographers) in a celebrated court case in 1544, Sebastian used his argument
by assertion to prove his scientific knowledge of celestial navigation by simply stating when he
had sailed to La Plata (as Captain-General of a fleet well supplied with experienced masters and
pilots) he had lost his instruments on the voyage and had made new ones. In this same court
action, Alonso de Chavs, the Cosmographer Major testified that while Sebastian Cabot was Pilot
Major, the Padron Real was not kept up to date and the pilots had not been instructed in
celestial navigation because Sebastian Cabot knew nothing of regiments [declination
computation] (emphasis added). Pedro de Medina was a respected Spanish cosmographer and
author of the widely distributed, Arte de Navegar, and Alonso de Chaves was a learned
cosmographer in Seville who later became Pilot Major. The account of this court case is in
Ursula Lamb s Science by Litigation : A Cosmographic Feud, Terrae Incognitae, Vol. 1, #1,
18
(1969)), pp. 40-57. Suffering from a lack of knowledge to prove his expertise in celestial
navigation, Sebastian relied not only on bold assertion, but also Divine revelation. Richard
Eden, a long time friend of Sebastian, when speaking of a method of determining longitude in
William Bourne s A Regiment of the Sea, stated with misplaced conviction: Sebastian Cabot on
his death bed tolde me that he had knowledge thereon by Divine revelation, yet so, that he myght
not teach any man.
It is not clear where the pseudo title Father of English Navigation for Sebastian originated
but it was probably coined by Richard Eden, a long time friend and confidant. The title is hardly
appropriate for Sebastian and more properly should belong to William Borough whose heroic
attempts to institute a central office for navigation in London ultimately resulted in England
taking the lead in developing the refined instruments and accurate and usable almanacs that
much later made celestial observations practical as an adjunct to dead-reckoning navigation at
sea.
Conclusions
This study has noted the wide difference between untested theory and practical experience
that applies to both dead-reckoning and celestial navigation. Dead-reckoning remained the basic
and inherently accurate form of navigation in use for ocean passages well into the nineteenth
century. And navigation was not influenced to a significant degree by celestial observations
until the nineteenth and twentieth century, after introduction of John Davis s reflecting backstaff,
the forerunner of the modern sextant, together with improved, accurate, and understandable pre-
computed tables in the nautical almanacs and manuals.
A more significant improvement to the science of navigation in this early period was
provided by the vast improvement in Mercator projection charts which showed islands, capes,
inlets, and harbors in their true geographical latitude and longitude position, together with
accurate isogonic lines, which allowed correcting the magnetic heading sailed in dead-reckoning,
to a true geographical course. This significant improvement in the charts in the late sixteenth
and seventeenth-century was obtained for the most part by celestial observations on land and
geodetic triangulation surveys on land rather than the uncertain celestial observations from
navigators at sea. Contrary to widely accepted beliefs concerning early navigation, pilots of the
fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries, did not have usable almanacs
or instruments, were unskilled in celestial observations, and were navigating to their
destinations by their proven and accurate dead reckoning.
The sextants, tables of declination, and annually up-dated nautical almanacs for the former so-
called celestial navigation are now obsolete being replaced by a stationary satellite and one small
instrument called a GPS. Note that the GPS is not referred to as a form of navigation. The
initials GPS stands for Global Positioning System, and that is all the satellite reading does, - it
provides only a fix or position in latitude and longitude at the moment it is read. However,
within the GPS instrument there is a computer that records a series of positions, and then by
simple arithmetical dead reckoning, computes the speed, course made good (as steered by use of
a magnetic compass), and distance to the destination as programmed. So in spite of our vast
improvement in technology, dead reckoning with use of a magnetic compass, is still the basic
form of navigation, the main difference being the computation (or reckoning) is now performed
by a computer within the modern GPS instrument instead of manually as before.