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SOHIC and H2S damage in Aging Gas
Plant Pressure Vessels
SOHIC and H2S damage in Aging Gas
Plant Pressure Vessels
Ana Benz, IRISNDT
Greg Murray, SemCAMS
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Two Vessels
An Amine Contactor and a Deethanizer Feed Drum
Both vessels have been in service for more than 40
years.
Their extensive service in streams containing
hydrogen sulphide mandated internal inspections
during 2008.
The inspection plans, and the inspection findings for
the two vessels are summarized here.
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Amine Contactor Inspection Planning
Considerations
The contactor has a double external sleeve reinforcing a
shell section that had had internal corrosion losses.
Only the shell surfaces exposed through a false manway
can be externally inspected with ultrasound testing (UT).
Equipment Surrounding
the Contactor
Sleeve Inspection Port
(False Manway)
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Amine Contactor Inspection Planning
Considerations
Further vessel changes were to be made during the
turnaround. As a consequence:
A fitness for service (FFS) evaluation of the
repaired area considering potential further losses
was required. The last ultrasonic thickness
measurements through the inspection port were to
be evaluated.
Detailed inspection plans were required; they
needed to consider schedules and special surface
preparations required to apply a metal spray.
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Amine Contactor FFS
Several finite element analyses considering varying corrosion
losses were evaluated.
Several finite
Figure 5. Actual 54elevation corrosion profile through center of measured portion compared with
Magnified corrosion profiles used in sensitivity study
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Amine Contactor FFS
Figure 6. 2x, 3x and 4x scale factor meshes used in the sensitivity study.
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Amine Contactor FFS - Conclusion
The accessible shell section thickness values were within the range considered
acceptable.
Several times the current amount of corrosion could occur without this vessel
section needing repairs.
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Amine Contactor External Inspections
Amine Contactor External Inspections
Pre-Turnaround Inspection Tasks
1. Visual External Inspection of vessel prior to turnaround.
2. Verify over pressure protection.
3. Color contrast magnetic particle inspection (MPI) of the
top and bottom welds attaching the repair sleeves to the
outside of the vessel.
4. Ultrasonic testing (UT) 30% of top and bottom welds
attaching the repair sleeves to the outside of the vessel
for toe cracks into shell.
5. UT of shell section exposed through the false manway.
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Amine Contactor External Inspections
Pre-Turnaround Inspection Tasks
Sleeve
Sleeve
Inspection
Port
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Amine Contactor External Inspections
Amine Contactor External Inspections
Amine Contactor areas inspected (view from outside)
Pre-Turnaround Inspection Tasks
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Amine Contactor Internal Inspection
Considerations and Tasks
1. Internally, the area that had had corrosion losses was clad with
stainless steel sheets.
2. The internal cladding was to be removed during the turnaround.
Then, the repaired area was to be coated with sprayed metal.
3. The cladding and its attachment welds required inspections prior
and during removal. The inspections were to be performed after
the first steam cleaning.
4. After removal, the covered areas and attachment welds required
wet fluorescent magnetic particle inspections (WFMPI).
5. Previously covered areas required grit blasting prior to applying a
spray metal coating. WFMPI had to be performed before grit
blasting; otherwise, the inspections would be ineffective.
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Amine Contactor Internal Inspection
Considerations and Tasks
After Removing Cladding, the tasks to be performed were:
1. WFMPI on all inside surfaces.
2. Internal phased array (PA), shear wave and time of flight diffraction TOFD UT
mapping of the sleeve inspection port shell section and of the vessel wall
opposite to it. The objective of these UT inspections was to detect and
locate possible H2S blistering, stress oriented hydrogen induced
cracking (SOHIC) and hydrogen induced cracking in shell sections
reinforced externally with the sleeves.
3. PA, SW and/or TOFD of areas identified as suspect with WFMPI.
4. A second vessel steam cleaning (24 hour window for initial testing and
inspection). The cleaning was to remove contaminants where the metal spray
coating was to be applied.
5. Monitor/inspect the spray metal coating process.
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Amine Contactor Internal UT Inspected
Areas
Amine Contactor Internal UT Inspected
Areas
Ultrasound Examination
1. Sections of shell circumferential butt welds (externally
covered by the sleeve).
2. Sections of the shell longitudinal butt welds (externally
covered by the sleeve).
3. The Shell to nozzle welds N2 and N12.
4. The shell inside (ID) and outside (OD) surfaced beneath
and near the external Sleeve to Shell Top and Bottom
Circumferential Fillet Welds.
5. The Sleeve Inspection Port area from the inside.
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Amine Contactor Internal Inspection
Amine Contactor Internal Inspection
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Amine Contactor Inspection Findings
Amine Contactor Inspection Findings
1. The contactor had had minimal general corrosion losses.
2. The areas examined were free of WFMPI indications
characteristic of cracking.
3. The areas examined had numerous UT indications
determined to be inherent weld discontinuities, or
inclusions in the shell parent material or geometrical from
weld beads and surface irregularities.
4. Several sections had extensive shell parent material
laminar reflectors.
5. The shell section accessible through the false manhole
may develop several times the current depth of corrosion
losses without needing repairs.
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Inspection
Planning
The deethanizer had had various services prior to being
a deethanizer.
The main inspection planned was internal WFMT
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Inspection
Fracture Surface
Very Brittle
Appearance
Scanning Electron
Microscope Image
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Cross-Sections
Cracks initiate on the deposited weld metal inside
surface. They propagated through the heat affected
zone into the plate.
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Metallography
In the heat affected zone, the cracks
have the tears, steps and orientation
characteristic of SOHIC
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Cracks EDX
Spectrum of Corrosion Filled Cavity and of
the Fracture Surface
The corrosion product filled cavities contain Ca, S, Si, Fe, and O.
The amounts of S and O in the cavities are significantly higher
than on the fracture surface.
Fracture Surface EDX Spectrum
Cavity EDX Spectrum
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Hardness
Measurements
Deethanizer Feed Drum Hardness
Measurements
ALL THE HARDNESS VALUES WERE SIGNIFICANTLY
BELOW 250 HV
The hardness unit is
HV10/15
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Failure
Summary
Deethanizer Feed Drum Failure
Summary
The Deposited Weld Metal DWM cracking in the vessel was due to
environmental stress corrosion cracking (ESCC). The most likely
cause of ESCC in the deethanizer is Carbonate Stress Corrosion
Cracking (CSCC); however, other environments, such as caustic
fluids, may have resulted in the failure. The failure features consistent
with CSCC are:
Carbonate cracking typically propagates parallel to the weld in the
adjacent base metal, but as noted here, can also develop in the weld
deposit or heat-affected zones.
Carbonate cracks are surface breaking oxide-filled cracks. The
deethanizer DWM has oxide filled cracks.
Carbonate cracks are predominantly intergranular and can also be
transgranular. The deethanizer cracks are transgranular. CSCC can
develop in pressure vessel steels subjected to post weld heat
treatments (PWHT) at temperatures below 1150
o
F.
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Deethanizer Feed Drum Failure
Summary
Deethanizer Feed Drum Failure
Summary
The HAZ cracks are different than those in the DWM. These
transgranular cracks have multiple parallel steps. The steps
are linked with cracks perpendicular to the rolling plane. All
these features are characteristic of Stress Oriented Hydrogen
Induced Cracking (SOHIC).
The SOHIC cracks likely originated from the DWM CSCC.
This is stated since High local stresses or notch-like
discontinuities such as shallow sulfide stress cracks can serve
as initiation sites for SOHIC. This suggests that the vessel
cracks were continuing to grow despite its service conditions
having changed.
To prevent SOHIC cracks, one of the guidelines developed is
to use steel with minimal banding. The vessel plate had
noticeable banding.
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Follow Up Inspections?
The Deethanizer Feed Drum was Retired.
The Deethanizer Feed Drum Circuit
Piping Has Small Diameter Asbestos
Insulated Piping. The Piping Will Require
Thorough Inside Surface Inspections.
The Amine Contactor Will Continue to Be
Monitored to Evaluate Its Performance
Now That It Has a Metal Spray.

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