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Marriage: Concept and Requisites

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS: On July 27, 2000, Alejandro Estrada filed a complaint with Judge Coijes against court interpreter Soledad
Escritor for living with a man not her husband and having a child with him despite of her being married to another
man, and his live-in partner, Luciano Quilapio Jr, married to another woman. Escritor testified that she was already a
widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999, and that her husband died in 1998. She admitted that she started
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was
still alive. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. She also admitted that Quilapio was also married to
another woman. But being members of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society, they were able to contract a conjugal arrangement in conformity with their religious beliefs
and has the approval of the elders in their congregation. On July 28, 1991, they executed a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness." This Declaration may only be entered by parties who want to enter a marital relationship with a
person belonging to the same religious sect, but cannot contract such due to legal impediments. However, witnesses
from the congregation attested that an investigation will first be conducted by their members to check whether or
not the parties contracting the Declaration are already separated from their spouses. In the case at bar, the
congregation found out that Escritor is separated from her husband who has another woman, and Quilapio, also
separated from his wife. Hence, they were qualified to execute the Declaration in conformity to their religious belief.
ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor is guilty of immoral conduct for living with a man not her husband
HELD: Pursuant to the Freedom of Religion clause of the Constitution, the law recognizes actions which are in
accordance to religious beliefs. Escritor executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness inconformity with her
religion, Jehovahs Witness. Escritor is not guilty of immoral conduct and her conjugal agreement with Quilapio is
valid.

In re Santiago, 70 PHIL 66
FACTS: Atty. Roque Santiago prepared for a married couple (who had been separated for 9 years) a document
wherein it was stipulatet that they authorize each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever right
of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if there could be no trouble, respondent
lawyer simplypointed to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and said that he would tear off that document if
the contract turns out to be invalid. Pursuant to the contract, the husband married again.
ISSUE: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the practice of law
HELD: Atty. Santiago was suspended from practice of law for a year on the ground of ignorance of the law or being
careless for giving legal advice by trying to dissolve the marriage through a private contract. The document is
contrary to law, good morals and public order. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulations of the parties.

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Selanova v Mendoza 64 SCRA 69
Facts:
Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document extra
judicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife. One condition of the liquidation was
that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other
and that they waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit
against the other. Respondent relied on Art 191 of the old Civil Code that states the husband and wife may agree
upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. The judge ratified
the document without judicial approval from CFI Negros where the couple was residing, making it void assuming
arguendo that Art. 191 is still in effect.

Issue:
WON the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void.

Held:
It is void. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:

Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community property between husband and wife.
While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, and a contract legalizing
their commission is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

Espinosa v.Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011
FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omanas legal advice on
whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a document entitled Kasunduan
Ng Paghihiwalay. Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal
took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of
Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was not
valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that
she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the
contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of
the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her
signature and notarized the contract.
ISSUE: W/N Omaa violated the CPR in notartizing the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. W/N the Kasunduaan ng
Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The
Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly
what Omaa did in this case.

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Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
FACTS: This is a petition by Rommel Silverio who wishes to change his gender in his birth certificate from male to
female, and from his name Rommel to Mely, in accordance with the sex-assignment surgery he underwent in
Bangkok. Another purpose of this petition is for him to be able to marry his foreigner fianc. RTC ruled in his favor
but the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic filed a petition to CA. CA ruled in favor of the Republic. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE: W/N he should be allowed to change his gender.
HELD: No. Unless there are errors in his birth certificate, change of name and gender shall not be allowed. SC held
that there is no special law which governs sex reassignments and no law authorizes change of gender in civil registrar
for that reason. Pursuant to the Family Code, Art 2 par 1, marriage shall be between a man and a woman.

Republic vs. Cagandahan
GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years,
she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She
likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of
male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such
that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
HELD:The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
People Vs.Santiago
FACTS: Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking him with an automobile that he
was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, Santiago does not agree with
the courts sentence, questioning the constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending order no. 58 stating that all
prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the U.S... Act no. 2886 stating that all prosecutions for public
offenses shall be in the name of the Philippine islands.
ISSUE: Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of the state?
HELD: NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of the states, but it is left in the hand
of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law. It is limited to criminal procedure and its
intention is to give to its provision the effect of law in criminal matters. In pursuance of the constitution of the US
each state has the authority, under its police power rule to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of
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criminal procedure. The delegation to our government needs no demo, the crimes committed w in our territory even
before sec 2 of general orders no.58 was amended, were prosecuted and punish jurisdiction . Act no. 2886 (feb 24
1920) criminal complainant was filed may 10 1920. The silence of congress regarding those laws amendatory of the
said general orders must be considered as an act of the approval.

Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

FACTS:1.It was established before the trial court:a. The Plainti ff met the defendant in
March 1938b.After several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that year c . O n
N o v e mb e r 2 6 t h e s a me y e a r , t h e p l a i n t i f f ma r r i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a Catholic
Cathedral in Baguiod.They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine dayse.Defendant gave birth to a child
of nine months on February 23, 1939f.Following this event, Plai ntiff and Defendant separated.2.On
March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The
plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage becausethe defendant assured him that she was virgin.3.The
trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, thi s appeal .BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plai nti ff) and
Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married onNovember 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March
20, 1939 Godofredo filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that
shewas a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: We see no reason to overturn the ruling
appealed. It isunlikely that the plai ntiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the
defendant, Lui da, waspregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she
must havelooked very pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have knownthat she was
not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on which
society rests. To cancel it,reliable evidence is necessary.*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC

Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M.No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS: Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which exhibit his gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First was on September 27, 1994 when respondent judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit sworn before another judge,
attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October
27, 1994. Domagtoy asserted that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the
parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Domagtoys defense is untenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death rendering his marriage to his first wife
subsisting. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the
joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was
only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, under Art 7 of FC, marriage may be
solemnized by, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
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the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
Aranes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law for solemnizing the
marriage between her and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license. Because their marriage was
nulled, her right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and her entitlement for a pension was not granted.
Judge Occiano averred that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the
petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess a marriage license so he refused to solemnize the
marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent
that they would give the license to him, but they never did.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner
because he officiated the marriage outside his jurisdiction and knowing that the documents submitted to him lacked
marriage license.

Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257
FACTS: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. After the marriage, they did not live
together since their marriage was unknown to Castros parents. They only decided to live together when Castro
discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months and the couple parted ways. When
Castro was fixing her marital status before leaving for the U.S., shediscovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. She then filed for a declaration of nullity of her
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license. As evidence, she presented a certification stating that their
marriage license could not be located. The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. RTC ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
reversed.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid.
HELD: Marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970. Hence, the law governing controlling that time was the New Civil
Code. NCC provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license. It is an essential
requirement, hence, its absence would render the marriage void ab initio.


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Moreno v Moreno
Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge Jose Bernabe on
October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract. The complainant at that time was
pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her husband to be married by him. The complainant then filed a
complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the marriage is valid.
Issue: Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract should be held liable
even if the complaint had expressly withdrawn by the complainant.
Ruling: Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court insisted that it
should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the judiciary and a conduct of a higher level
were expected. The judge displayed ignorance of the law which is unacceptable for his position and is therefore
fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act should be punished severely.
People v. Borromeo
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada
(mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son,
Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susanas hut. There they found
Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands.
The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for
homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day
and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a
chapel by a priest.
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed married unless
proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides
on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence
of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.
(Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs.
Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000

Seguisabal v Cabrera
Facts:
Abdon Seguisabal has charged City Judge Jose R. Cabrera of Toledo City with gross misconductin office and
gross ignorance of the law for having solemnized, on 14 April 1978, the marriage ofJaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy
without the requisite marriage and for having failed totransmit a copy of the marriage contract, signed by him and
the parties, to the Office of the LocalCivil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from the date of
solemnization asmandatorily required.That respondent actually solemnized said marriage without the requisite
license, is shown by themarriage contract issued to the contracting parties. The failure to transmit a copy of the
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marriagecontract to the Local Civil Registrar is substantiated by the Certifications, both issued on 5 June1979, by the
Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City

Issue:
Whether or not Hon. Jose R. Cabrera is liable in solemnizing a marriage without requiring theessential pre-requisite
of a marriage license.


Ruling:
Respondent must be held guilty of the charge filed for in solemnizing the marriage of JaimeSayson and Marlyn
Jagonoy on 14 April 1978 without requiring the essential pre-requisite of amarriage license, respondent had
undoubtedly transgressed Article 53(4) of the Civil Code in theabsence of any showing that the subject marriage falls
under marriages of an exceptionalcharacter wherein a license is not mandatorily required. Respondent was likewise
remiss in hisduty under Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo Citywithin fifteen
(15) days from the date of solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of themarriage contract duly signed by
him as the solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is
unavailing. As a judicial officer, he isexpected to know the law on the solemnization of marriages. His feeling of
sympathy and fairnessto the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy" cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately transgress
ordispense with legal requisites.WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, he shall
pay a fineequivalent to three (3) months salary, the same to be deducted from his gratuity upon hisretirement from
the service.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007
FACTS: On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila
City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for
a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo.
The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license,
procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. A
petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only
filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a
marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of
a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the
marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.





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Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731
FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial what is called Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan were married
before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They executed an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed both
by Martinez and Tan, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before
the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Marriage was solemnized with two
witnesses. The couple did not live together and when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to
file charges claiming that the marriage was not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it
was a paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them appeared before
the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of the document they were
signing.

Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1
FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were man and wife and had one child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio de Leon
died in 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez had a child named Melecio Madridejo. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was
married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by virtue of articulo mortis, by the parish priest of Siniloan.
She died on the following day, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son in her first marriage, and Melecio Madridejo, her
son in her second husband. The parish priest failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid
HELD: Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their
marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the
essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

Trinidad v. CA
289 SCRA 188 (1998)
Absence of a marriage certificate is not proof of absence of marriage. To prove the fact of marriage, the following
would constitute competent evidence: (1) the testimony of witnesses to matrimony; (2) the couples public
cohabitation; and (3) birth and baptismal certificates of children born during the union.

Presumption of marriage:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
towards the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, etc. (Art. 221, FC)
B. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
1. Legal Capacity of contracting parties who must be Male and Female;
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (Art. 2, FC)

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VDA DE JACOB VS. CA
Facts
Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special
Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself
and the deceased. Defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.. Appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not
however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled
for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. CA affirmed trial courts ruling.

Issues:
a.) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was
valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.

Held
The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared
VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.

With regard to the contention the marriage was void ab initio because of the lack of a marriage license, it has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to
this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and
did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. With regard to the loss of the marriage
certificate, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof. In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as
by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage..