Commentary on Nation issue of November 9, 2009 Ed Friedman November 3, 2009

Review of the November 9, 2009 issue of The Nation devoted to Afghan Policy

It is interesting to read these articles and to compare them with the writings of Ahmed
Rashid, the reporting of Christiane Amanpour and the commentary of David Brooks.

The key questions that are been addressed are: What is at stake? and What can be done?

The most fundamental issue in my mind is that of what is at stake. The writers of the
Nation articles take a limited view of the situation. Stephen Walt and John Mueller are
both focused on issues of safe havens. Also the connections between Al Qaeda and the
Taliban are minimized. It strikes me as if one were preoccupied with the role of the Mafia
in New Jersey and arguing that one can never rid the place of the Mafia and even if you
could they would go to West Virginia where they could never be dislodged. One might
also comment on how the Mob in Atlantic City is really a gang from Las Vegas and not
interested in joint efforts with the New Jersey miscreants. Such a point of view leads to
anti-Mafia activity in New Jersey that is more than laissez faire, but less than a crusade.

However, if one believed that the Mafia were behind the assassination of JFK and were
preparing for a putsch against the U.S. Government and that these groups from around
the country, including those in Miami, LA and Chicago were plotting together, then one
would certainly advocate a different approach in New Jersey.

Walt and Mueller do not recognize that an Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban is of
enormous strategic importance to militant jihadism (a phrase which I think is preferable
and more appropriate than others). Militant jihadism is international and virulent. Ahmed
Rashid makes clear that the former “stans” of Soviet Central Asia are all unstable and
could be overthrown by jihadist forces. Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal, is vulnerable to
jihadist takeover. Manan Ahmed’s article about the growing strength of democracy in
Pakistan is sheer fantasy. The economic difficulties, corruption and domination by the
military and ISI reveal Pakistan to be an extremely unstable country. None of the Nation
writers point out, what is not often mentioned in the Western press, that Baluchistan has a
quite strong independence movement, which the central government has not been able to
contain. Pakistan could easily facture with both Baluchistan and the NWFP breaking off.

It is extremely naïve for Mueller to accept the reports of Mullah Omar having ruptured
relationships with Al Qaeda. Who remembers that a daughter of Osama bin Laden
married a son of Mullah Omar? This traditional binding of tribes is of profound
significance. It is also said that the Taliban are not interested in affairs outside of
Afghanistan. Who remembers that the supporters and trainers of the group, which
engaged in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, were militant jihadists from
Afghanistan? Militant jihadism knows no borders.

The gang who perpetrated the 1993 bombing was caught. They and the blind Mullah
testified in open trial in New York City. They all admitted having been at terrorist
training centers in Afghanistan and having met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Gulbuddin
was a student at the Engineering College at Kabul University when I was the director of
Commentary on Nation issue of November 9, 2009 Ed Friedman November 3, 2009

USAID development program for that institution. In 1972 he murdered a political

opponent. I was peripherally involved in his arrest. He escaped from prison in 1975 and
was given safe haven in Pakistan by General Zia. The Pak’s anticipated someday using
him to help them take over Afghanistan. When the U.S. Congress voted for billions to
support the Mujahadin in their struggle against the Soviets, the funds were channeled to
the Afghans by the CIA through the ISI. The ISI provided disproportionate resources to
Gulbuddin in anticipation of his future efforts to fight the more liberal Muj (like
Massoud) in an effort to control Afghanistan. He almost succeeded. Gulbuddin waged a
fierce civil war and for a short time was Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Massoud
eventually defeated him in 1994. It was then that the Paks created the Taliban. It did not
exist before 1994!

It was Gulbuddin who helped bring Osama bin Laden into Afghanistan. It was Gulbuddin
who established the first terrorist training camps in Afghanistan for militant jihadists
from the region and from the Middle East and various Arab countries. The nurturing of
militant jihadism in the region dates back to the mid eighties and earlier.

Gulbuddin today is a leading figure in the Afghan conflict. He is a third force, since he
maintains independence from the Taliban and from Al Qaeda. He represents the kind of
militant jihadism that must be eliminated from the region. That can only happen through
a restructured Afghanistan and a reformed Pakistan. Simultaneously we need to cripple
the funding sources from the Arab countries for militant jihadism. What is needed is a
comprehensive, strategic approach throughout the Middle East, Gulf States and Central
and South Asia. A major failing of the Nation articles is their failure to recognize this or
to deal with this comprehensive perspective.

It is also laughable to read John Mueller’s comments about Saudi Arabian government
being such a strong foe of Osama bin Laden. While the Saudi government may be
opposed to Osama, they have been unwilling or unable to stop the large flow of funds
that come from Wahabi extremists in Saudi Arabia to fund the Taliban. The Soviet Union
provided 700 million to fund the Viet Cong in 1967. We provided billions to fund the
Mujahaddin in 1987. I do not believe Kim Barker’s assertion that the Taliban funding is
mostly from drug money and local sources. Arab money is a critical component.

A deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan, without shutting down the recruiting and training
of terrorists in Quetta and the support of fanatical indoctrination efforts at Madrassahs in
Pakistan (that are funded with Arab Wahabi money) will lead to continued regional
growth and capacity of militant jihadism which will inevitably perpetrate attacks in
Europe and the United States.

I am particularly puzzled by the long article by Ann Jones about Women and Conflict in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan, which was once a model for movement toward gender equality
in a Moslem country, has been brutalized by thirty years of war and oppression. Horrible
things happen. However. Kim Barker and Christiane Amanpour ( AJ and I were with her
at a talk which she gave for the Foreign Policy Association) assert that the position for
women has been advancing since the removal of the Taliban in 2001. More girls are in
Commentary on Nation issue of November 9, 2009 Ed Friedman November 3, 2009

school each year and more women are participating in the workplace and in public life.
While much more remains to be done Ann Jones does not offer any plan for
improvement. A return to Taliban rule would be hell for the women of Afghanistan. Ann
Jones does not comment on how the Taliban kept women out of school and stoned
women to death for infidelity. In 2003, I hosted nine Afghan women science professors
for a summer program at Stevens. The U.S. Dept of State funded the program. Two of the
women told us how they taught girls secretly at their homes during the Taliban years.
These brave women risked their lives to do so.

The Nation articles also say little about the Taliban being an outside force that was
developed in Pakistan with the use of Mullah Omar as a figurehead. The financing,
recruiting, training and operational goals originate in Pakistan. The suicide bombers are
also predominantly from the Madrassahs of Pakistan and are not Afghans. The exceptions
seem to be Afghans who are very sick and/or deranged.

Selig Harrison comments appropriately on the ethnic issues. Like most commentators, he
fails to note that for many years the various groups lived together in peace in
Afghanistan. In the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s there was a national government, with a national
Army and a national university in which people from all tribal groups participated.
Selig’s solution of engaging regional countries to promote stability in Afghanistan is
naïve without strong American leadership. In the best of circumstances it will take years
to evolve. (as a side note – AJ and I provide a home away from home for a Stevens
student whose father was, until recently, the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan)

However, an ethnic strategy for U.S. policy could be implemented if we were to focus on
cities. Michael Barry, a leading Afghan scholar at Princeton, and I agree that it would be
advisable for the U.S. to put great resources into major cities. The cities are quite stable
and much could be done to improve water and sanitation resources, health care, schools,
the business environment, etc. We could gain the respect of the population and promote
democratic values. Karzai could be pushed and cajoled to support such an effort.

A cities strategy would be an ethnic strategy. We would be engaging the Uzbeks and
Tajiks in Mazar i Sharif, the Shiites in Heart, the Pashtuns in Kandahar and in Jalalabad
and the multi-ethnic population in Kabul. While doing so, we could seek to keep the
status quo in the countryside. However, I would make a big push in the Helmand Valley.
That region was a major development area for the United States in the 50’s and 60’s. A
dam, irrigation works, roads and housing were built by the U.S. It is a region that we can
retake and rebuild. It is also the source of 90% of the poppy production. Hence, we could
simultaneously cut off a major source of Taliban funding.

While I often disagree with David Brooks, I find that he has had some insightful columns
about Afghanistan. On October 30th he noted that when speaking with people who knew
Afghanistan well and had spent significant time there, that they agreed that the situation
could be turned around and stabilized. I agree.