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COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE AND
WRONGFUL DEATH 1

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CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER & PREECE LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3900
Seattle, Washington 98154-1051
Tel (206) 625-8600
Fax (206) 625-0900
HONORABLE ROGER S. ROGOFF

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

RYAN M. PSZONKA as personal
representative of the ESTATES OF SHANE
RUTHVEN, KATIE RUTHVEN, HUNTER
RUTHVEN, and WYATT RUTHVEN; and
AMY S. THOMPSON as personal
representative of the ESTATES OF LEWIS
VANDENBURG and J UDEE
VANDENBURG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SNOHOMISH COUNTY, and
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

Defendants.

No. 14-2-18401-8 SEA

WRONGFUL DEATH
Plaintiffs Ryan M. Pszonka as personal representative of the Estates of Shane Ruthven,
Katie Ruthven, Hunter Ruthven, and Wyatt Ruthven; and Amy S. Thompson as personal
representative of the Estates of Lewis Vandenburg and J uDee Vandenburg, by and through their
undersigned attorneys of record, allege as follows:
I. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff Ryan M. Pszonka is a resident of Arlington, Washington. Mr. Pszonka is
the brother of Katie Ruthven and has been appointed as personal representative of the Estates of

WRONGFUL DEATH 2

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Shane Ruthven, Katie Ruthven, Hunter Ruthven, and Wyatt Ruthven by order of the Snohomish
County Superior Court. Mr. Pzsonka brings this action on behalf of the Estates and the Estates
beneficiaries for the decedents claims surviving death pursuant to RCW 4.20.046.
2. Plaintiff Amy S. Thompson is a resident of Spokane, Washington. Ms. Thompson
is the daughter of J uDee Vandenburg and the step-daughter of Lewis Vandenburg and has been
appointed as personal representative of the Estates of J uDee Vandenburg and Lewis Vandenburg
by order of the King County Superior Court. Ms. Thompson brings this action on behalf of the
Estates and the Estates beneficiaries for wrongful death pursuant to RCW 4.20.010 and for the
decedents claims surviving death pursuant to RCW 4.20.046 and RCW 4.20.060.
3. Defendant Snohomish County (County) is a municipal corporation validly formed
and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of Washington.
4. Defendant Washington State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is an
agency of the State of Washington. A portion of the hillside that failed in the 2014 Oso landslide
at issue in this litigation is owned by the State Forest Board, under the management of DNR.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. J urisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to RCW 2.08.010. Plaintiffs served tort
claims on the County and the DNR pursuant to RCW 4.92.100 and RCW 4.96.020 on April 28,
2014 and more than sixty days have passed.
6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to RCW 36.01.050 because an action against
the County may be commenced in King County, and under RCW 4.92.010 because an action against
the State of Washington may be commenced in any county where venue is proper against any other
defendant.
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
7. On March 22, 2014, a large landslide occurred near Oso, Washington (2014 Oso
Landslide). The debris field crossed the Stillaguamish River and engulfed the Steelhead Haven

WRONGFUL DEATH 3

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neighborhood. As of May 27, 2014, the Snohomish County Medical Examiners Office had
identified forty-two people who were killed by blunt force injuries as a result of the 2014 Oso
Landslide. One person remains missing and is presumed dead.
8. On March 24, 2014, J ohn Pennington, Director of Snohomish Countys Department
of Emergency Management stated at a news conference regarding the 2014 Oso Landslide: It [the
hillside] was considered very safe. This was a completely unforeseen slide. This came out of
nowhere.
9. That same day, Snohomish Countys Public Works Director Steve Thomsen said:
A slide of this magnitude is very difficult to predict. There was no indication, no indication at
all.
10. In fact, the County and DNR had been on notice for many years that this landslide
area, commonly referred to in previous years as the Hazel landslide or Steelhead Haven landslide
(Hazel Landslide), was an active deep-seated landslide that posed a significant risk of
catastrophic failure, placing human life at risk.
11. Among the forty-three persons killed by the 2014 Oso Landslide were Lewis
Vandenburg, age 71, J uDee Vandenburg, age 64, Shane Ruthven, age 43, Katie Ruthven, age 35,
Hunter Ruthven, age 6, and Wyatt Ruthven, age 4 (Ruthvens and Vandenburgs).
12. Shane and Katie Ruthven were the owners of 31307 East Steelhead Drive, a property
in the Steelhead Haven neighborhood (immediately south of the Hazel Landslide area), where they
lived with their sons Hunter and Wyatt. Shane and Katie Ruthven were the owners and operators
of the Mountain Lion Glass, a full service glass shop for automobiles, homes and businesses.
Hunter Ruthven was in kindergarten and Wyatt Ruthven attended pre-school.
13. Lewis and J uDee Vandenburg, lived at 31311 East Steelhead Drive, adjacent to the
Ruthven residence on a second lot owned by Shane and Katie. Lewis and J uDee were Shane

WRONGFUL DEATH 4

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Ruthvens mother and step-father and moved to Steelhead Haven from Spokane to be closer to
Shane, Katie and their grandchildren after retiring in 2011.
14. Lewis and J uDee Vandenburg are survived by their children who qualify as statutory
beneficiaries under RCW 4.20.020. Shane and Katie Ruthven are survived by siblings and Katies
parents. Hunter and Wyatt Ruthven are survived by one set of grandparents (Katies parents) as
well as several aunts and uncles.
15. In addressing known risks that the Hazel Landslide posed to those living in the
Steelhead Haven community, public safety should have been Defendants number one priority.
Unfortunately, it was not.
16. For example, public safety was ignored when the Steelhead Haven community was
platted and approved by Snohomish County in 1960 without a mandatory flood control permit.
17. After Steelhead Haven was improperly established, the Defendants did very little to
protect the safety of those living in the potential run-out zone of the Hazel Landslide.
18. Defendants also did very little to inform the residents of Steelhead Haven of the life-
threatening dangers they and their families faced living in the potential run-out zone of the Hazel
Landslide.
19. Instead, Steelhead Haven residents were led by the County to believe that the safety
risk posed by the Hazel Landslide was being, and had been addressed, by installation of a log crib
wall in 2006 along the rivers edge at the base of the Hazel Landslide.
20. In fact, installation of this crib wall did little, if anything, to address the public safety
concern or reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of the Hazel Landslide.
21. Significant prior movements of the Hazel Landslide had occurred in at least 1937,
1942, 1951, 1967, 1988 and 2006.
22. County and DNR representatives were aware of these prior landslide events many
years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.

WRONGFUL DEATH 5

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23. In 1988, the DNR put together a team led by Lee Benda to determine the effects of
timber harvesting on the stability of the Hazel Landslide. The teams findings were collected in the
Report of the I.D. Team Investigation of the Hazel Landslide on the North Fork of the
Stillaguamish River (1988 Benda Report). The report concluded that the primary triggering
mechanism of the Hazel landslide is groundwater and that timber harvest in the groundwater
recharge areas would increase groundwater flow which would reduce the stability of the slide.
The team, with a low level of confidence, attempted to map the recharge area for the Hazel
Landslide, recommending that further mapping be done to better determine the boundaries of the
recharge area. The report recommended that no timber harvest take place in the areas responsible
for supplying groundwater to the Hazel Slide now or in the future.
24. County and DNR representatives were aware of the findings and recommendations
in the 1988 Benda Report several years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
25. In 1997, the Washington State Department of Ecology funded a study to evaluate
the impact of toe erosion and timber harvest on the Hazel Landslide, titled Environmental Factors
Affecting the Hazel Landslide, which was authored by Daniel Miller and J oan Sias (1997 Miller
Study). The 1997 Miller Study concluded that the recharge area for the Hazel Landslide was larger
than that estimated in the 1988 Benda Report.
26. County and DNR representatives were aware of the 1997 Miller Study several years
prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
27. DNR failed to incorporate this larger recharge area into its timber cutting approval
process prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
28. In 1999, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers commissioned a study titled
Hazel/Gold Basin Landslides: Geomorphic Review Report, which was authored by Daniel Miller
(1999 Miller Report). Miller noted that the 1967 slide had demonstrated a spectacular example
that the Hazel Landslide can be sudden, fast, and over a large scale. The report calculated that

WRONGFUL DEATH 6

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a progressive failure of the slope could result in a volume of debris flow an order of magnitude
larger than the 1967 slide, with a potential run-out zone in the range of 900 meters (approximately
2900 feet), a distance sufficient to decimate the Steelhead Haven community. The report concluded
that [t]he gradual changes in landslide geometry resulting from failures at the toe can reduce
stability of the entire slide mass (Miller and Sias, 1997), thereby increasing rates of activity upslope
and increasing the potential for a large catastrophic failure.
29. County and DNR representatives were aware of the findings in the 1999 Miller
Report several years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
30. In 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) commissioned a study titled
Steelhead Haven Landslide: Remediation, which was authored by Tracy Drury (2000 Drury
Report). The study evaluated the potential remedial alternatives to address the potential of a
catastrophic failure of the Hazel Landslide: 1) no action; 2) stabilize the toe of the slide; 3) provide
storage area for landslide materials; 4) protect area equivalent to landslide run out potential; and 5)
buying out the residents of Steelhead Haven. The study concluded that taking no action, or
stabilizing the toe of the slide with a wood revetment, would not address the catastrophic failure
potential [that] places human lives and properties at risk.
in the 2000 Drury Report several years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
32. In 2000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with the County as project sponsor,
established an ecosystem restoration plan as detailed in the Stillaguamish River Ecosystem
Restoration Final Feasibility Report (2000 ACE Report). The report reiterated the concern about
a catastrophic failure of the Hazel Landslide that would result in a slide through an area which is
currently owned and occupied by private citizens and places current residents at risk. The report
concluded that [b]ased on available data, and assuming the future resembles the past, [the Hazel
Landslide] poses a significant risk to human lives and private property . . . . The persistence of this

WRONGFUL DEATH 7

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landslide, failure potential, and detrimental effects it induces emphasizes the assertion that
immediate attention is given to addressing the current conditions.
in the 1999 ACE Report several years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
34. In 2003, DNR issued a Geological Map of the Mount Higgins 7.5-minute
Quadrangle, by J oe D. Dragovich, that included the Hazel Landslide (2003 Dragovich Map). The
2003 Dragovich Map showed evidence of a previous large landslide along the Whitman Bench just
to the west of the Hazel Landslide, with a run-out zone that extended several thousand feet, crossing
the entire valley floor.
35. It was foreseeable from the 2003 Dragovich Map that the potential run-out zone
from a similar event at the Hazel Landslide might engulf residences in Steelhead Haven, posing a
significant risk to human life.
36. County and DNR representatives were aware of the 2003 Dragovich Map several
years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
37. In 2003, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) contracted for a LiDAR scan of an area that included the Hazel
Landslide. The 2003 LiDAR data showed evidence of a previous large landslide along the Whitman
Bench just to the west of the Hazel Landslide, with a run-out zone that extended several thousand
feet across the valley floor.
38. It was foreseeable from the 2003 LiDAR data that the potential run-out zone from a
similar event at the Hazel Landslide might engulf residences in Steelhead Haven, posing a
significant risk to human life.
39. County and DNR representatives were aware of the 2003 LiDAR data several years
prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.

WRONGFUL DEATH 8

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40. The Hazel Landslide area is also crossed by an active seismic fault line known as
the Devils Mountain fault, thereby increasing the risk of landslide activity in the event of an
earthquake along this fault line.
41. County and DNR representatives were aware of the location of the Devils Mountain
fault, and the added risk this posed, several years prior to the 2014 Oso Landslide.
42. On J anuary 18, 2004, the Snohomish County Council passed Amended Ordinance
No. 03-150 adopting the Stillaguamish River Comprehensive Flood Hazard Management Plan in
order to prevent threats to public health and safety, and to minimize property damage. As to the
Hazel Landslide, the plan warned that a risk to life and property on the opposite river bank may
exist should another major slide occur. While the plan recognized that voluntarily purchasing
all the property and relocating structures would eliminate the threat to life and property, the County
rejected a voluntary buyout in favor of a slide stabilization project that meets public safety as well
as environmental restoration goals, delegating this work to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the Stillaguamish Tribe. DNR authorized the use of state land for the project.
43. The option of installing a wood revetment at the toe of the landslide was chosen
despite reports indicating that it would neither reduce slope failure hazard nor stabilize the slope.
44. In late 2004, DNR approved clear-cutting of a 7.5 acre triangle-shaped area on
Whitman Bench above the Hazel Landslide. The clear-cutting occurred in 2005. A large portion
of this clear-cut area fell within the Hazel Landslide recharge area as delineated in the 1997 Miller
Report.
45. Studies have shown that clear cutting of timber can increase the flow of rain water
into the ground by more than 50 percent. DNR representatives were aware of this fact prior to
approval of this 2005 clear-cutting.

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46. In J anuary 2006, the Hazel Landslide experienced another significant failure,
resulting in a debris run-out that blocked the Stillaguamish River, and crossed the river into the
Steelhead Haven community.
47. The J anuary 2006 Hazel Landslide caused a reduction in support along the northwest
edge of the pre-existing landslide area, the concern raised in Mr. Millers 1999 Report that could
result in a new landslide an order of magnitude greater than anything experienced to date.
48. The 2006 slide increased the likelihood of a much more catastrophic failure of the
Hazel Landslide, because it exposed a large area of unstable material, the failure of which would
release a volume of material much larger than the 1967 or 2006 Hazel landslides, with a potential
run-out of several thousand feet that would inundate the Steelhead Haven community.
49. Neither the County nor DNR did anything to evaluate the changed conditions or
increased risk resulting from the 2006 Hazel Landslide, despite recommendations from the County
Hydraulic Engineer that a geotechnical evaluation of the slide be done to evaluate potential run-out
distances of future slides and to determine whether the 2006 slide had created additional
instabilities.
50. Neither the County nor DNR did anything to inform or educate the residents of
Steelhead Haven about the elevated risk resulting from the 2006 Hazel Landslide.
51. Instead, the County proceeded with installation of the wood crib wall along the
rivers edge at the base of the 2006 Hazel Landslide zone, without studying or evaluating whether
this crib wall would in fact protect the lives of Steelhead Haven residents from the risks posed by
the Hazel Landslide, as intended by the County and represented to the Steelhead Haven residents
under the 2004 Hazard Management Plan.
52. Installation of the crib wall was completed in August 2006. The crib wall did nothing
to reduce or divert the amount of groundwater entering the Hazel Landslide area from the Whitman

WRONGFUL DEATH 10

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Bench, which was identified as the primary triggering mechanism for the Hazel Landslide in the
1988 Benda Report.
53. The crib wall was not designed to protect, or adequate to protect, the Steelhead
Haven community from a landslide event of the magnitude forecast in Mr. Millers 1999 Report.
IV. CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE
54. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein.
55. Defendants owed a duty to the Ruthvens and Vandenburgs to use reasonable care to
avoid causing foreseeable injuries.
56. Defendants breached the duties owed to the Ruthvens and Vandenburgs, by, among
other things, (a) implementing the 2004 Hazard Management Plan in a manner that failed to address
the safety risks posed by the Hazel Landslide to the Steelhead Haven residents, in contravention of
the Plan, (b) failing to inform and misleading the Steelhead Haven residents about the true nature
and extent of the risks they faced following the 2006 Hazel Landslide, (c) by approving clear-
cutting of timber above the Hazel Landslide in the groundwater recharge zone for the slide, thereby
increasing the amount of groundwater reaching the slide zone, and (d) otherwise maintaining state
lands in a way that created and increased the risk of a catastrophic failure of the Hazel Landslide.
57. Defendants acts were a proximate cause of the injuries to the Ruthvens and
Vandenburgs and to their estates.
58. Shane, Katie, Hunter and Wyatt Ruthven each suffered economic damages as a
result of the Defendants negligent actions, including, but not limited to, the net accumulations they
would have obtained in their lifetimes.
59. Ryan M. Pszonka, as the personal representative of the Estates of Shane Ruthven,
Katie Ruthven, Hunter Ruthven, and Wyatt Ruthven, is empowered by RCW 4.20.046 to bring this
survival action on behalf of the Estates for the economic damages suffered by the Ruthvens.

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60. Lewis and J uDee Vandenburg each suffered economic and non-economic damages
as a result of the Defendants negligent actions, including, but not limited to, the net accumulations
they would have obtained in their lifetimes and the personal injuries, extreme pain and suffering,
anxiety, and emotional distress suffered as a result of the multiple blunt force injuries inflicted by
the 2014 Oso Landslide that caused their death.
61. Amy S. Thompson, as the personal representative of the Estates of Lewis
Vandenburg and J uDee Vandenburg, is empowered by RCW 4.20.046 and RCW 4.20.060 to bring
this survival action on behalf of the Estates for the economic and non-economic damages suffered
by the Vandenburgs.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: WRONGFUL DEATH
62. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 61 as if fully set forth herein.
63. Lewis and J uDee Vandenburg died as a result of Defendants negligence detailed in
the First Cause of Action.
64. The Vandenburgs deaths caused pecuniary losses of their surviving children as a
result of, among other things, the destruction of the parent-child relationship and a loss of monetary
contributions, support, services, love, affection, care, companionship, training, and society.
65. Amy S. Thompson, as the personal representative of the Estates of Lewis
Vandenburg and J uDee Vandenburg, is empowered by RCW 4.20.010 to bring this action on behalf
of the Estates for the benefit of the Vandenburgs surviving children who qualify as statutory
beneficiaries under RCW 4.20.020.
V. PLAINTIFFS PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs request relief as follows:
a. For judgment against Defendants for negligence and wrongful death;
b. For judgment against Defendants for all general and special damages in amounts to
be proven at the time of trial;

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c. For an award of Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs; and
d. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the
circumstances.
DATED this 1
st
day of J uly 2014.


s/Guy P. Michelson________________
Guy P. Michelson, WSBA No. 07017
Emily J . Harris, WSBA No. 35763
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1059 01 eg01dd143q

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COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE AND

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