2014 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW

Carlo L. Cruz
SEPARATION OF POWERS - Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive
department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the
implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other
appropriation law Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
pro!ect identi"cation, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and#or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution $ndeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authori%ed to participate in & as Guingona, Jr
puts it & 'the various operational aspects of budgeting,' including 'the evaluation of wor( and
"nancial plans for individual activities' and the 'regulation and release of funds' in violation
of the separation of powers principle )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00,
+ovember 12, ,-134
Checks and Balances The 5resident6s 7disapproval of a bill, commonly (nown as a veto, is
essentially a legislative act8 )Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular uditor 90, 5hil
21,, 210 91230: xxx ;or the 5resident to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows
that there exists a proper 'item' which may be the ob!ect of the veto An item, as de"ned in
the "eld of appropriations, pertains to 'the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts of the appropriation or of the bill' 7;urther, it is signi"cant to point out that an item of
appropriation must be an item characteri%ed by singular correspondence & meaning an
allocation of a speci"ed singular amount for a speci"ed singular purpose, otherwise (nown
as a 'line-item' )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
DELEGATION OF POWERS - $n contrast, what bec(ons constitutional in"rmity are
appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes <ince such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it
cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a 'speci"c appropriation of
money and hence, without a proper line-item which the 5resident may veto As a practical
result, the 5resident would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he "nds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the
entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes ;inally, it may not
be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that
the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to
be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation <ince the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the
implementing authority would, in e=ect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of
the principle of non-delegability )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember
12, ,-134
!residential !ork Barrel - the phrase 'and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the 5resident' under <ection . of 5> 21- constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a su?cient standard to ade@uately
determine the limits of the 5residentAs authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Balampaya ;unds may be used xxx This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the
rest of <ection ., insofar as it allows for the use of the Balampaya ;unds 'to "nance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and pro!ects of the government,' remains
legally e=ective and subsisting Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the
aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Balampaya ;unds would be used & as it
should be used & only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of 5> 21-
5rimarily, <ection 1, of 5> 1.02, as amended by 5> 1223, indicates that the 5residential
<ocial ;und may be used 'to "rst, "nance the priority infrastructure development pro!ects
and second, to "nance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authori%ed by the C?ce of the 5resident of the 5hilippines' The
Court "nds that while the second indicated purpose ade@uately curtails the authority of the
5resident to spend the 5residential <ocial ;und only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities, the "rst indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the
same fund for any infrastructure pro!ect he may so determine as a 'priority' Derily, the law
does not supply a de"nition of 'priority in frastructure development pro!ects' and hence,
leaves the 5resident without any guideline to construe the same To note, the delimitation of
a pro!ect as one of 'infrastructure' is too broad of a classi"cation since the said term could
pertain to any (ind of facility This may be deduced from its lexicographic de"nition as
followsE 'the underlying framewor( of a system, especially public services and facilities 9such
1
as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems: needed to support commerce as
well as economic and residential development' $n "ne, the phrase 'to "nance the priority
infrastructure development pro!ects' must be stric(en down as unconstitutional since &
similar to the above-assailed provision under <ection . of 5> 21- & it lies independently
unfettered by any su?cient standard of the delegating law As they are severable, all other
provisions of <ection 1, of 5> 1.02, as amended by 5> 1223, remains legally e=ective and
subsisting )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-13, En Banc,
5erlas-Fernabe4
$n the cases at bar, the Court observes that the ,-13 5>A; Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identi"cation authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are e=ectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which & as settled in !hilconsa & is lodged in Congress 9!hili""ine Constitution
ssociation v. Enri#uez, G* +os 1131-/, 1131GH, 113G00 I 113..., August 12, 122H, ,3/
<C*A /-0: )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
Petto!er also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court
and to barangay o?cials to issue protection orders xxx Jence, the issuance of a F5C by the
5unong Farangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Farangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from 9a: causing physical harm to the woman or her childL and 9,:
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm <uch function of the 5unong
Farangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Mocal
Government Code to 'enforce all laws and ordinances,' and to 'maintain public order in the
barangay )Garcia v. $rilon, G * +o 1G2,0G, Nune ,/, ,-13, 022 <C*A 3/,4)%ua v.
&angro'ang, G* +o 1G-G-1, Nanuary ,,, ,-1H4
Art"le I &The Archipelago >octrine - teaches that the outermost points of our terrestrial
domain are to be connected with straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby
shall be considered as our internal waters As internal waters, they are sub!ect to the
exclusive !urisdiction of the 5hilippines Archipelagic sealanes are to be laid on these
waters over which foreign ships will have the right of passage as if they were open
seas
Among others, O+CMC< $$$ prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic <tates li(e the 5hilippines and sets the deadline for the "ling of application
for the extended continental shelf

Complying with these re@uirements, *A 2/,,
shortened one baseline, optimi%ed the location of some basepoints around the
5hilippine archipelago and classi"ed ad!acent territories, namely, the Kalayaan $sland
Group 9K$G: and the <carborough <hoal, as 7regimes of islands8 whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime %ones xxx
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for O+CMC< $$$ <tates parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime %ones and continental shelves $n
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which <tates parties exercise treaty-based
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters 9Article ,:, the
!urisdiction to enforce customs, "scal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous %one 9Article 33:, and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources
in the exclusive economic %one 9Article /0: and continental shelf 9Article GG:
)&agallona v. Er(ita - G* +o 1.G10G, August 10, ,-114
)* Convention on the +a, of the Sea - Territorial <ea - provides for a uniform breadth of 1,
miles from the low-water mar( of the coast Contiguous Pone - 1, miles from the outer
limits of the territorial sea & exercise of 7protective !urisdiction8 & in a %one of the high
seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control
necessary to 5revent and 5unish infringement of its customs, "scal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea Economic Pone or 5atrimonial
<ea - extending ,-- miles from the low water mar( of the coastal state & all living and
non-living resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state The
Continental <helf & refers to )a4 the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas
ad!acent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea, to a depth of ,-- meters, or
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the sub!acent waters admits of the exploitation
of the natural resources of the said areas, and )b4 to the seabed and subsoil of similar
areas ad!acent to the coasts of the islands The costal state has the EQCMO<$DE
sovereign right to explore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural resources, and
no one else may do so without its consent
,
Rhether referred to as 5hilippine 7internal waters8 under Article $ of the Constitution or as
7archipelagic waters8 under O+CMC< $$$ 9Article H2 )14:, the 5hilippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air
space over it and the submarine areas underneath xxx The imposition of these
passage rights )right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits4 through archipelagic waters under O+CMC< $$$ was a concession by
archipelagic <tates, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
sub!ect to their territorial sovereignty )&agallona v. Er(ita, G* +o 1.G10G, August
10, ,-114
5etitioners6 argument that the K$G now lies outside 5hilippine territory because the baselines
that *A 2/,, draws do not enclose the K$G is negated by *A 2/,, itself <ection , of
the law commits to text the 5hilippines6 continued claim of sovereignty and !urisdiction
over the K$G and the <carborough <hoalE <EC , The baselines in the following areas
over which the 5hilippines li(ewise exercises sovereignty and !urisdiction shall be
determined as 7*egime of $slands8 under the *epublic of the 5hilippines consistent with
Article 1,1 of the Onited +ations Convention on the Maw of the <ea 9O+CMC<:E a: The
Kalayaan $sland Group as constituted under 5residential >ecree +o 1/20 and b: Fa!o
de Basinloc, also (nown as <carborough <hoal )&agallona v. Er(ita - G* +o 1.G10G,
August 10, ,-114
$n the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codi"ed in O+CMC< $$$,
operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters,
sub!ect to the treaty6s limitations and conditions for their exercise <igni"cantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of 5hilippine law +o modern <tate can validly invo(e its sovereignty to absolutely
forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without ris(ing retaliatory measures from the international community The fact that for
archipelagic <tates, their archipelagic waters are sub!ect to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage

does not place them in lesser footing vis-.-vis continental
coastal <tates which are sub!ect, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and
the right of transit passage through international straits T#e $%o&to! of t#e&e %a&&a'e
r'#t& t#rou'# ar"#%ela'" (ater& u!)er *NCLOS III (a& a "o!"e&&o! +,
ar"#%ela'" State&- ! e."#a!'e for t#er r'#t to "la$ all t#e (ater& la!)(ar) of
t#er +a&el!e&- regardless of their depth or distance from the coast- a&
ar"#%ela'" (ater& &u+/e"t to t#er territorial sovereignty Bore importantly, the
recognition of archipelagic <tates6 archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as
one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
O+CMC< $$$

<eparate islands generate their own maritime %ones, placing the waters between
islands separated by more than ,H nautical miles beyond the <tates6 territorial sovereignty,
sub!ecting these waters to the rights of other <tates under O+CMC< $$$ )&agallona v. Er(ita,
G* +o 1.G10G, Nuly 10, ,-11 9"u'lished under ugust /011 cases:4
3
%he 2"en Seas & res co((unes but a state may exercise !urisdiction on the open seas over
its vessels, over pirates, in the exercise of the right to visit and search and under the
doctrine of hot pursuit
2uter s"ace, li(e the open seas, is res communes and +CT susceptible to discovery and
occupation & not sub!ect to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty A state is
responsible for whatever in!ury or damage any ob!ect it sends to outer space may
cause
The Fangsamoro Nuridical Entity )FNE4 xxx is not merely an expanded version of the A*BB,
the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally
di=erent from that of the A*BB $ndeed, FNE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Bontevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a de"ned territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states Even assuming arguendo that the BCA-A> would not necessarily
sever any portion of 5hilippine territory, the spirit animating it & which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association & runs counter to the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the *epublic )%he !rovince of *orth Cota'ato v. %he
Govern(ent of the 3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines !eace !anel on ncestral $o(ai, G* +o
1.3/21, Cctober 1H, ,--.4
ARTICLE II - generally not a source of enforceable rights EQCE5T the $ncorporation Clause
and <ection ,. on the policy of public disclosure & duty to disclose )which presents a
<5ME+>$> <SBBET*S to Article $$, <ection G on the *ight to $nformation4 <ection 10 &
on ecology & has been implemented by law
+ote that the Constitution now describes the 5hilippines as not only a republican but also a
democratic <tate +CTE provisions on initiative on national legislation )Article D$ 93,:4
and initiative on amendment of the Constitution )Article D$$ 9,:4 - Fesides, the 12.G
Constitution accords to the citi%ens a greater participation in the a=airs of government
$ndeed, it provides for peopleTs initiative, the right to information on matters of public
concern 9including the right to (now the state of health of their 5resident:, as well as
the right to "le cases @uestioning the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege
of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law These provisions enlarge the
people6s right in the political as well as the !udicial "eld $t grants them the right to
interfere in the a=airs of government and challenge any act tending to pre!udice their
interest )!etitioner 2rganizations v. Executive Secretary - G.3. *os. 145067-65, April
1-, ,-1,4 - <EE also & Article $$ ),34 & The <tate shall encourage non-governmental,
community based, or sectoral organi%ations that provide the welfare of the nation
Article Q )1H4 & The 5resident shall provide for regional development councils xxx
composed of local government o?cials, xxx and representatives from non-
governmental organi%ations xxx Article Q )1.4 & The Congress shall enact an organic act
for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the 5resident from
a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies x x x Article Q$$ )24 & The Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the 5resident,
which shall, after consultations with the xxx various private sectors xxx Article Q$$$ )1/4
& The <tate shall respect the role of independent people6s organi%ations Article Q$$$
)104 & The right of the people and their organi%ations to e=ective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-ma(ing shall not be
abridged Article QD$ )1,4 & The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
5resident on policies a=ecting indigenous cultural communities, the ma!ority of the
members of which shall come from the communities
Rhatever good is done by the government is attributed to the <tate but every harm inUicted
on the people is imputed not to the <tate but to the government alone <uch in!ury
may !ustify the replacement of the government by revolution, theoretically at the
behest of the <tate, in a development (nown as direct State action
!arens !atriae & guardian of the rights of the people & Soriano v. +aguardia )G* +o 10HG./,
April ,2, ,--24 -C=ensive language in television may be regulated or even banned for
the sa(e of the children Nusti"cation & "arens "atriae.
H
A belligerent occupation would have no e=ect on the continued e=ectivity of the law on
treason Accordingly, political laws, li(e the Constitution, were merely suspended,
sub!ect to revival under the 8us "ostli(iniu( upon the end of the occupation
<uspension of political laws a=ects only the civilians, and not the soldiers or 7enemies
in arms8 )3u9y v. Chief of Sta94 Also does not apply to treason )+aurel v. &isa4 +on-
political laws, li(e the Civil Code, remain e=ective, unless changed by the belligerent
occupant Nudicial decisions, such as a conviction for defamation, shall remain valid
even after a belligerent occupation, except those of a political complexion
*ight to <elf->etermination & right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development +CTE & Article $$ )G4 & The <tate shall
pursue an independent foreign policy $n its relations with other states the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and
the right to self-determination - $nternal self-determination & a people6s pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framewor( of an existing
state - External self-determination - the establishment of a sovereign and independent
<tate, the free association or integration with an independent <tate or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people The people6s right to self-
determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of
secession
>istinguish the $ncorporation Clause or >octrine of $ncorporation from the >octrine of
Transformation & accepted rules of international law must "rst be enacted into
legislation )+ote & both doctrines are applicable in our !urisdiction There is
7transformation8 when the <enate gives its concurrence to treaties4
Tax treaties are entered into 'to reconcile the national "scal legislations of the contracting
parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two di=erent
!urisdictions' xxx Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax
treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto The F$* must not impose additional
re@uirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international
agreements )$eutsche Bank G &anila Branch v. Co((issioner of Internal 3evenue, G*
+o 1..//-, August 12, ,-134
Section 1: Education - the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning
gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and ob!ectives and how best to
attain them They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study
in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their
graduates This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish re@uirements for graduation,
such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by
their students The courts may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a
clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their !udgment )Cala,ag
v. )niversity of the !hili""ines ;isayas, G* +o ,-GH1,, August G, ,-134
!olitical $ynasties <ection ,0 9of Article $$: is not self-executing due to the @ualifying phrase
'as may be de"ned by law' $n this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
!udicially enforceable constitutional right but merely speci"es guideline for legislative or
executive action Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystalli%es the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue
)Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
ARTICLE 0I & +egislators - The commencement of the terms and the regular election of
legislators may be changed by law An increase in their salaries shall ta(e e=ect after
the expiration of the full term of all the Bembers of the <enate and the Jouse of
*epresentatives approving such increase
<uali=cations - <ec 309g: of *A 210/ re@uiring candidates for senator to be certi"ed illegal-
drug free & unconstitutional & list of constitutional @uali"cations exclusive, may not be
7enlarged8 by Congress )Social Justice Society v. $angerous $rugs Board, G* +o
1/G.G-, +ovember 3, ,--.4
$ndeed, there is no doubt that <ection H-9d: of the Mocal Government Code dis@uali"es those
with dual citi%enship from running for local elective positions There is li(ewise no doubt that
the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citi%en of the country which issued
the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recogni%es the person
named therein as its national $t is un@uestioned that Arnado is a natural born ;ilipino citi%en,
or that he ac@uired American citi%enship by naturali%ation There is no doubt that he
reac@uired his ;ilipino citi%enship by ta(ing his Cath of Allegiance to the 5hilippines and that
he renounced his American citi%enship $t is also indubitable that after renouncing his
/
American citi%enship, Arnado used his O< passport at least six times $f there is any
remaining doubt, it is regarding the e?cacy of Arnado6s renunciation of his American
citi%enship when he subse@uently used his O< passport The renunciation of foreign
citi%enship must be complete and une@uivocal The re@uirement that the renunciation must
be made through an oath emphasi%es the solemn duty of the one ma(ing the oath of
renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to Allowing the subse@uent use of a
foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a
hollow act $t devalues the act of ta(ing of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality The dissent states that the Court has e=ectively left Arnado 'a man without a
country' Cn the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one
+owhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a ;ilipino citi%en Rhat the decision
merely points out is that he also possessed another citi%enship at the time he "led his
certi"cate of candidacy )&ac#uiling v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 12/0H2, Nuly ,,
,-134
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one
resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership The mere purchase of a parcel of
land does not ma(e it one6s residence The fact that the residential structure where petitioner
intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has
not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay xxx A temporary stay in a
stranger6s house cannot amount to residence xxx Approval of voter registration does not
presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to registration )Jalos8os v. Co((ission on
Elections, G* +o 12331H, Nune ,/, ,-134
The prescriptive period under the J*ET *ules )for the institution of election contests4 does
not apply to dis@uali"cation cases based on citi%enship Feing a continuing re@uirement, one
who assails a memberTs citi%enship or lac( of it may still @uestion the same at any time, the
prescriptive period notwithstanding FOT it is the <tate, through its representatives
designated by statute that may @uestion the illegally or invalidly procured certi"cate of
naturali%ation in the appropriate denaturali%ation proceedings $t is plainly not a matter that
may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturali%ed citi%en6s
descendant )Mim(aichong v CCBEMEC, G* +os 1G..31-3,, April 1, ,--24
!arty-+ist 3e"resentatives - The CCBEMEC cannot issue implementing rules and regulations
that provide an additional ground - when the 7nomination is withdrawn by the party8 - for the
substitution of a party-list nominee *A G2H1 lists only 3 grounds & death, disability and
withdrawal by the nominee himself )+okin v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1.-HH3, Nune ,,, ,-1-4
A party-list nominee who changes his sectoral a?liation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral a?liation if the change has been e=ected at
least six months before the elections )(ores v. >3E%, G* +o 1.20--, Nune ,2, ,-1-4
;or every four district representatives, there shall be one party-list representative There is
no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional
legislative districts are created by law <ection /9,:, Article D$ of the 12.G Constitution
automatically creates such additional party-list seat The "lling-up of all available party-list
seats is not mandatory ;our parameters in a 5hilippine-style party-list election systemE )14
Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the Jouse of *epresentatives is the
maximum number of seats available to party-list organi%ations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts ),4 Garnering two
percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organi%ation
one seat The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a "rst round of seat allocation to
parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes )34 The additional seats,
that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to
the party-list organi%ations including those that received less than two percent of the total
votes The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of
the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and
physically prevents the "lling up of the available party-list seats The additional seats shall
be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step
procedure laid down in the >ecision of ,1 April ,--2 as clari"ed in this *esolution )%,o-Ste"
!rocedure - The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 1/,2/-,2--, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation ;irst, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 3., which is
the di=erence between the // maximum seats reserved under the 5arty-Mist <ystem and the
1G guaranteed seats of the two-percenters The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party6s share in the
remaining available seats <econd, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next
0
in ran( until all available seats are completely distributed Re distributed all of the
remaining 3. seats in the second round of seat allocation4 )H4 The three-seat cap is
constitutional The three-seat cap is intended by the Megislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system There is no violation of the Constitution because the 12.G
Constitution does not re@uire absolute proportionality for the party-list system The well-
settled rule is that courts will not @uestion the wisdom of the Megislature as long as it is not
violative of the Constitution )B*% v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1G2,G1, Nuly ., ,--24
$n determining who may participate in the coming 13 Bay ,-13 and subse@uent party-list
elections, the CCBEMEC shall adhere to the following parametersE 1. Three di=erent groups
may participate in the party-list systemE 91: national parties or organi%ations, 9,: regional
parties or organi%ations, and 93: sectoral parties or organi%ations 2. +ational parties or
organi%ations and regional parties or organi%ations do not need to organi%e along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any 7marginali%ed and underrepresented8 sector 1
5olitical parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not "eld candidates in legislative district elections A political party,
whether ma!or or not, that "elds candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is lin(ed to
a political party through a coalition 4. <ectoral parties or organi%ations may either be
7marginali%ed and underrepresented8 or lac(ing in 7well-de"ned political constituencies8 $t is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector The sectors that are 7marginali%ed and underrepresented8 include labor, peasant,
"sherfol(, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas wor(ers The sectors that lac( 7well-de"ned political constituencies8 include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth 2. A ma!ority of the members of sectoral
parties or organi%ations that represent the 7marginali%ed and underrepresented8 must belong
to the 7marginali%ed and underrepresented8 sector they represent <imilarly, a ma!ority of
the members of sectoral parties or organi%ations that lac( 7well-de"ned political
constituencies8 must belong to the sector they represent The nominees of sectoral parties or
organi%ations that represent the 7marginali%ed and underrepresented,8 or that represent
those who lac( 7well-de"ned political constituencies,8 either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a trac( record of advocacy for their respective sectors The nominees
of national and regional parties or organi%ations must be bona-"de members of such parties
or organi%ations 3. +ational, regional, and sectoral parties or organi%ations shall not be
dis@uali"ed if some of their nominees are dis@uali"ed, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains @uali"ed )tong !aglau(, Inc. v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o
,-3G00, April ,, ,-134
There is no arguing that the CCBEMEC *esolution dated Nanuary /, ,-1- granting M5GBA6s
registration has since become "nal <uch "nality, however, pertains only to the *esolution
itself and not to the accreditation of M5GBA as a party-list organi%ation xxx the *esolution
did not create in M5GBA6s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a
party-list organi%ation +either did it grant "nality and indefeasibility to the factual "ndings of
the CCBEMEC on the @uali"cations of the group Foth the accreditation and the facts
substantiating the same can be reviewed and revo(ed at any time by the CCBEMEC, motu
propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set
forth in <ection 0 of *A +o G2H1 )$ayao v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 1230H34
There are two (inds of congressmen & elected from legislative districts and those elected
through the party-list system Cnce elected, the party-list representative has the same
rights, privileges and duties as the district representative They are also sub!ect to the
same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms The
consistent !udicial holding is that the J*ET has !urisdiction to pass upon the
@uali"cations of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of o?ce
)'ayon v. >3E%, G* +o 1.2H00, ;ebruary 11, ,-1-4
&ontesclaros v. Co((ission on Elections 9H33 5hil 0,-, 03G 9,--,:: teaches that 'a public
o?ce is not a property right As the Constitution expressly states, a A5ublic o?ce is a public
trust6 +o one has a vested right to any public o?ce, much less a vested right to an
expectancy of holding a public o?ce' Onder <ection ,9/:, Article $Q-C of the Constitution, the
CCBEMEC is entrusted with the function to 'register, after su?cient publication, political
parties, organi%ations, or coalitions which, in addition to other re@uirements, must present
their platform or program of government' $n ful"lling this function, the CCBEMEC is duty-
bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organi%ations, or coalitions already
registered in order to ensure the latter6s continuous adherence to the re@uirements
prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their @uali"cations and
eligibility to participate in party-list elections The Ar@ui%a Group cannot, therefore, ob!ect to
the retroactive application of CCBEMEC *esolution +o 2300 on the ground of the impairment
G
of <E+$C* C$T$PE+<6 vested right Fe that as it may, even if CCBEMEC *esolution +o 2300
expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court "nds that the CCBEMEC En Banc
indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of <E+$C* C$T$PE+< The reason
for this is that the ground invo(ed by the CCBEMEC En Banc, i.e, the term-sharing agreement
among the nominees of <E+$C* C$T$PE+<, was not implemented xxx $ndubitably, if the term-
sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that
<E+$C* C$T$PE+<, as a party-list organi%ation, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penali%ed by
the CCBEMEC En Banc )Coalition of ssociations of Senior Citizens in the !hili""ines v.
Co((ission on Elections, G* +os ,-0.HH-H/, Nuly ,3, ,-134
Onder <ection H of *A +o G2H1, a party-list group already registered 'need not register
anew' for purposes of every subse@uent election, but only needs to "le a manifestation of
intent to participate with the CCBEMEC These two acts are di=erent from each other Onder
<ection / of *A +o G2H1, an applicant for registration has to "le with the CCBEMEC, not later
than ninety 92-: days before the election, a veri"ed petition stating its desire to participate in
the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organi%ation or a coalition of
such parties or organi%ations xxx Onder this legal reality, the fact that CCCC;E> did not
obtain su?cient number of votes in the elections does not a=ect the issue of the validity of
the CCBEMEC6s registration A "nding that the CCBEMEC gravely abused its discretion in
canceling CCCC;E>6s registration would entitle it, if it is so minded, to participate in
subse@uent elections without need of undergoing registration proceedings anew xxx
CCCC;E>6s failure to submit a list of "ve nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so
before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under <ection 09/: of *A +o G2H1
xxx Given this driving idea, a party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing
'not less than "ve nominees' and consider the de"ciency as a waiver on its part Aside from
colliding with the plain text of the law, this interpretation is not in harmony with the statutory
policy of enhancing the party-list-groups6 chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and therefore does not serve as incentive to ;ilipino citi%ens belonging to these
groups to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation

)C2C2?E$
v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o ,-G-,0, August 0, ,-134 )lliance for *ationalis( and
$e(ocracy @*$A v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o ,-02.G, <eptember 1-, ,-134
*A +o G2H1 did not re@uire groups intending to register under the party-list system to
submit proof of their trac( record as a group xxx <ectoral parties or organi%ations, such as
AFA+G M$+GKC>, are no longer re@uired to adduce evidence showing their trac( record, i.e
proof of activities that they have underta(en to further the cause of the sector they
represent $ndeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector Ctherwise stated, it is su?cient that the ideals represented by
the sectoral organi%ations are geared towards the cause of the sector#s, which they
represent $f at all, evidence showing a trac( record in representing the marginali%ed and
underrepresented sectors is only re@uired from nominees of sectoral parties or organi%ations
that represent the marginali%ed and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the
sector represented by their party or organi%ation )'ang +ingkod !arty-+ist v. Co((ission
on Elections, G* +o ,-02/,, Cctober ,,, ,-134
+egislative $istricts 7Gerrymandering8 is a term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in
power xxx The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative
district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and ad!acent territory
)*avarro v. Er(ita, G* +o 1.--/-, ;ebruary 1-, ,-1-4
The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants
of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein )>errera v. C2&E+EC 4
Each additional legislative district in a city need not have ,/-,--- inhabitants provided that
the initial or original district formed in said city had, at the time of its establishment, a
population of ,/-,--- )&ariano v. C2&E+EC4
Congress may not authori%e the A*BB to create provinces and cities because the power to
create them inherently involves the power to create a legislative district, which only Congress
possesses The A*BB may, however, be authori%ed by law to create municipalities and
barangays )Se(a v. C2&E+EC , G* +o 1GG/2G, Nuly 10, ,--.4
.
A proposed province composed of one or more islands need not comply with the ,,---
s@uare meter contiguous territory re@uirement under the Mocal Government Code, as
provided for under the exemptions in the $** of the MGC )*avarro v. Er(ita, G* +o
1.--/-, April 1,, ,-114
<ection /93: of the Constitution re@uires a ,/-,--- minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province The 7,/-,--- inhabitants8
re@uirement does not apply to creation of additional legislative districts for a province
)#uino v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1.2G23, April G, ,-1-4
A law is passed dividing Cagayan de Cro City into two legislative districts +o need for a
plebiscite under Article Q, <ection 1-, because the territory remains a single unit )Baga'uyo
v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1G02G-, >ecember ., ,--.4
Section 14 Inhi'itions - To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in e=ect, be chec(ing
on activities in which they themselves participate Also, it must be pointed out that this very
same concept of post-enactment authori%ation runs afoul of <ection 1H, Article D$ of the
12.G Constitution xxx Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
pro!ect implementation & a matter before another o?ce of government & renders them
susceptible to ta(ing undue advantage of their own o?ce xxx $n sum, insofar as its post-
enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate <ection 1H, Article D$ of the
12.G Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the ,-13 5>A; Article and other
forms of Congressional 5or( Farrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional
)Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
+egislative "o,er - appropriation, taxation, expropriation - not exclusive to Congress &
initiative and referendum may be exercised directly by the people & *A 0G3/ & includes the
power to amend or repeal
A law providing for the establishment of a congressional oversight committee which would
have the authority to disapprove regulations promulgated by the executive Franch in its
enforcement of a law is unconstitutional Megislative Deto - entitles Congress, pursuant to its
7oversight functions,8 to disapprove )or approve4 administrative regulations promulgated by
the Executive Franch, pursuant to a validly delegated power, in the course of its enforcement
of a duly enacted law )A MEG$<MAT$DE DETC $< O+CC+<T$TOT$C+AM4
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namelyE scrutiny - to determine economy and e?ciency of the
operation of government activitiesL investigation & under <ection ,1L and supervision &
which connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area Rhile both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve in@uiry into past executive branch actions in
order to inUuence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows
Congress to scrutini%e the exercise of delegated law-ma(ing authority, and permits Congress
to retain part of that delegated authority xxx The re@uirement that the implementing rules
of a law be sub!ected to approval by Congress as a condition for their e=ectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment Every bill
passed by Congress must be presented to the 5resident for approval or veto $n the absence
of presentment to the 5resident, no bill passed by Congress can become a law - The so-
called 7rule on presentment8 pertains to the submission of a bill to the 5resident for his
appropriate action )'akada Guro !arty +ist ;. !urisi(a, G* +o 100G1/ August 1H, ,--.4
<ee &acalintal v. C2&E+EC, G* 1/G-13, Nuly 1-, ,--3 & CCBEMEC rules implementing *A
21.2 sub!ect to approval by Congressional oversight committee & $+DAM$> & constitutes a
legislative vetoL contradicts the independence of the CCBEMEC
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative &
springs from its authority to de"ne and prescribe punishment for crimes )<uarto v. the
>onora'le 2('uds(an Si(eon &arcelo, G* +o 102-H,, Cctober /, ,-114
The superma!ority vote re@uirement set forth in <ection 1, Article QD$$ of *A +o 2-/H
)<ection 1, Article QD$$ of *A +o 2-/H providesE 7Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Crganic Act may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of the
5hilippines upon a vote of two-thirds 9,#3: of the Bembers of the Jouse of *epresentatives
and of the <enate voting separately84 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that
Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws )$atu &ichael 'as Bida v. Senate of the !hili""ines,
G* +o 120,G1, ;ebruary ,., ,-1,4
2
Re rule out the "rst option & holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative
positions in the A*BB during the ,--.-,-11 term & as an option that Congress could
have chosen because a holdover violates <ection ., Article Q of the Constitution xxx
Thus, the term of three years for local o?cials should stay at three 93: years as "xed by
the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress xxx $f it will be
claimed that the holdover period is e=ectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new
term This view & li(e the extension of the elective term & is constitutionally in"rm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, ie, to act in a way
that would e=ectively extend the term of the incumbents xxx Congress cannot also
create a new term and e=ectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term This is e=ectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the 5resident )!i(entel v.
Er(ita, G* +o 10H2G., Cctober 13, ,--/4 Jence, holdover & whichever way it is
viewed & is a constitutionally in"rm option that Congress could not have underta(en
)$atu &ichael 'as Bida v. Senate of the !hili""ines - G* +o 120,G1, Cctober 1.,
,-114
The 5resident, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a
public utility that are exclusive in character )<ection 11, Article Q$$ of the 12.G
Constitution4
The 5resident may not invo(e <ection 1G of Article Q$$, which would authori%e her during the
emergency to temporarily ta(e over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business a=ected with public interest without authority from Congress FOT the
5resident alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he
has no power to ta(e over privately-owned public utility or business a=ected with public
interest )$avid v. rroyo, G* +o 1G1320, Bay 3, ,--04
*on-legislative "o,ers of Congress & canvass of presidential elections )D$$, /4, declaration of
existence of a state of war )D$$, ,3 9,:4, con"rmation of amnesties )D$$, 124, and of
presidential appointments )D$$, 104, amendment or revision of the Constitution )QD$$4, and
impeachment )Q$4
1-
*ature of Congress - Congress is not a continuing body )Meague of Cities of the 5hilippines v
CCBEMEC - G* +o 1G02/1, +ovember 1., ,--.4 The <enate as an institution is
7continuing,8 as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members Jowever, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
<enate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the <enate of the
Congress before it Accordingly, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e, unpassed
bills and even legislative investigations, of the <enate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on
the <enate of the succeeding Congress to ta(e up such un"nished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the "rst time )Garcillano v Jouse of
*epresentatives - G* +o 1G-33., >ecember ,3, ,--.4 FOT +CTE rnault v. *azareno
& the <enate is a continuing body for purposes of its power of contempt
Electoral %ri'unals - The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characteri%es the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of !udicial power xxx At the
higher levels & city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial &
exclusive and original !urisdiction is lodged in the CCBEMEC and in the Jouse of
*epresentatives and <enate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally
spea(ing, courts of law Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered
to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of !udicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in <ection ,9,:, Article $Q-C
9for the CCBEMEC: and <ection 1G, Article D$ 9for the <enate and Jouse Electoral
Tribunals: of the Constitution Fesides, when the CCBEMEC, the J*ET, and the <ET
decide election contests, their decisions are still sub!ect to !udicial review & via a
petition for certiorari "led by the proper party & if there is a showing that the decision
was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lac( or excess of
!urisdiction )&acalintal v. !residential Electoral %ri'unal, G* +o 12101., +ovember
,3, ,-1- and Nune G, ,-114
Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole !udges of all contests relating to the election, returns and
@uali"cations of their respective 7Bembers8 - the !urisdiction of an Electoral Tribunal
begins once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, ta(en his oath, and assumed
o?ce, for it is only after the occurrence of these events that a candidate can be
considered as either a Bember of the Jouse of *epresentatives or a <enator According
to the <upreme Court, to be considered a 7Bember8 of the Jouse of *epresentatives,
7there must be a concurrence of the following re@uisitesE 9a: a valid proclamation, 9b: a
proper oath, and 9c: assumption of o?ce8 $t stressed that a 7proper oath8 would be
one ta(en before the <pea(er of the Jouse of *epresentatives 7in open session,8
consistent with the provisions of <ection 0 of *ule $$ 9Bembership: of the *ules of the
Jouse of *epresentatives )3eyes v. C2&E+EC, G* +o ,-G,0H, Nune ,/, ,-134
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the CCBEMEC of !urisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
@uali"cations of the proclaimed representative in favor of the J*ET 9Jalos8os, Jr. v. C2&E+EC,
G* +os 12,HGH, 12,G-H, and 123/00, Nune ,0, ,-1,, 0GH <C*A /3-, /3H-/3/: The
phrase 'election, returns and @uali"cations' refers to all matters a=ecting the validity of the
contestee6s title 9;inzons-Chato v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1G,131, April ,, ,--G, /,- <C*A 10G,
1G., citing *asul v CCBEMEC, 3G1 5hil G0-, G00 91222:: $n particular, the term 'election'
refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votesL 'returns' refers to the canvass of the
returns and the proclamation of the winners, including @uestions concerning the composition
of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returnsL and '@uali"cations'
refers to matters that could be raised in a @uo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inade@uacy of his CoC 9$d at 1G2, citing
Bar'ers v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 10/021, Nune ,,, ,--/, H0- <C*A /02, /.,: xxx )C4onsidering
that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Bember of the Jouse of *epresentatives for
the Hth >istrict of Vue%on 5rovince on Bay 10, ,-13, as she has in fact ta(en her oath and
assumed o?ce past noon time of Nune 3-, ,-13, the Court is now without !urisdiction to
resolve the case at bar As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and
the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the
scope of the terms 'election' and 'returns' as above-stated and hence, properly fall under
the J*ET6s sole !urisdiction )%anada v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +os ,-G122-,--,
Cctober ,,, ,-134
11
Co((ission on ""oint(ents - shall rule by a ma!ority of all its Bembers xxx The 5resident
may not be compelled to submit his 7acting8 appointments to the CA for con"rmation
)!i(entel v. Er(ita4 xxx d interi( appointments shall remain e=ective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the ad!ournment of the next
special or regular session of Congress )Guevarra v. Inocentes4 $n a special session, the
Congress may consider 7general legislation or only such sub!ects as the 5resident may
designate8 $n a regular session, 7the power of the Congress is not circumscribed
except by limitations imposed by organic law8 )raneta v. $inglasan4
+egislative In#uiries - <ection ,1 relates to the power to conduct in@uiries in aid of legislation
$ts aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation Cn the other hand,
<ection ,, pertains to the power to conduct a @uestion hour, the ob!ective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress6 oversight function <imply stated, while
both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct in@uiry, their
ob!ectives are di=erent )*eri v. Senate Co((ittee on ccounta'ility of !u'lic 2Ccers,
G* +o 1.-0H3, Barch ,/, ,--.4

The <enate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the @uestioned legislative
in@uiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional re@uirement +ew session, new publication of rules )Garcillano v. >ouse
of 3e"resentatives - G* +o 1G-33., >ecember ,3, ,--.4
Executive privilege with respect to the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invo(ed
not only against citi%ens6 demands for information, but also in the context of legislative
investigations )BBD* v. #uino - G* +o 1G-/10, Nuly 10, ,--.4 The sub!ect of
a legislative in@uiry is a political @uestion )$e la !az v. Senate, G* +o 1.H.H2,
;ebruary 13, ,--24
""ro"riations - an ite( of a""ro"riation as 'an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a
stated purpose' )A4n 'item' is indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any
purpose other than the speci"c purpose stated in the item );ootnote ,11, Belgica v.
Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of <ection ,291:, Article D$ of the
12.G Constitution exists when a provision of law 9a: sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and 9b: allocates the same for a particular public purpose xxx $n this
relation, it is apropos to note that the ,-13 5>A; Article cannot be properly deemed as a
legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier
stated, it contains post-enactment measures which e=ectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations
meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is
passed, they occur outside the law As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation
made under the ,-13 5>A; Article is not the 5,HG2 Fillion allocated for the entire 5>A;, but
rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to
repeat, occurrences outside of the law $rrefragably, the ,-13 5>A; Article does not
constitute an 'appropriation made by law' since it, in its truest sense, only authori%es
individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
Enrolled Bills - That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the
deliberation of the <enate Fill does not detract from its validity As early as 12HG and
reiterated in subse@uent cases 9<ee &a'anag v. +o"ez ;ito, +o M-11,3, G. 5hil 1 9Barch /,
12HG:L Casco !hili""ine Che(ical Co., Inc. v. Gi(enez, +o M-1G231, G <C*A 3HG 9;ebruary
,., 1203:L &orales v. Su'ido, +o M-,20/., ,G <C*A 131 9;ebruary ,G, 1202:L and !hili""ine
Judges ssociation v. !rado, G* +o 1-/3G1, ,,G <C*A G-3 9+ovember 11, 1223::, this
Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a
provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such
provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Jouses
)Central Bank E("loyees ssociation v. Bangko Sentral ng !ili"inas and the Executive
Secretary, G* +o 1H.,-. >ecember 1/, ,--H4
+og-rolling legislation - refers to the process in which several provisions supported by an
individual legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation
supported by a ma!ority of legislators on a @uid pro @uo basisE no one provision may
command ma!ority support, but the total pac(age will )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G*
+o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
1,
$nstances when vote needs to be recorded & at the re@uest of 1#/ )10, H4, vote on third
reading ),0, ,4, overriding vote in case of veto ),G, 14, J* impeachment vote )Q$, 3, 34
5residential certi"cation )economic emergency4 does away with the re@uirements of three
readings on separate days and distribution of "nal copies three days before enactment
)%olentino v. Secretary of ?inance4
+ote Article D$$, <ection 1- & simultaneous vacancies in the o?ces of the 5resident and the
Dice-5resident - The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certi"ed under
paragraph ,, <ection ,0, Article D1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its
approval on third reading by the Congress +o special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has established the so-called
Conference Co((ittee, composed of representatives from the <enate and the Jouse of
*epresentatives, which is a 7mechanism for compromising di=erences8 between their
respective versions of a bill or !oint resolution $t has been ruled that 7it is within the power
of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found
either in the Jouse bill or in the <enate bill8 and whatever changes may be agreed upon by
the Conference Committee need not undergo another 7three readings8 in the <enate and the
Jouse of *epresentatives )%olentino v. Secretary of ?inance4
5artial veto & general rule & approve entirely or disapprove in toto, except with respect to
appropriations bills
!o,er of %axation - <ince building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not
impositions from which petitioner is exempt )ngeles )niversity ?oundation v. City of
ngeles, G* +o 1.2222, Nune ,G, ,-1,4
$ou'le taxation - petitioner should not have been sub!ected to taxes under <ection ,1 of the
Banila *evenue Code for the fourth @uarter of ,--1, considering that it had already been
paying local business tax under <ection 1H of the same ordinance )S,edish &atch
!hili""ines, Inc. v. %he %reasurer of the City of &anila, G* +o 1.1,GG, Nuly 3, ,-134
Inititatives & Any proposal to enact laws or approve or re!ect any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress shall be valid only if rati"ed by a ma!ority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than forty-"ve days but not later than ninety days
after the certi"cation by the Commission on Elections of the su?ciency of the petition
ARTICLE 0II & The 5resident is granted 2rdinance !o,ers under Chapter ,, Foo( $$$ of
Executive Crder +o ,2, 9Administrative Code of 12.G: and may issue any of the followingE
xxx <ec , Executive Crders W Acts of the 5resident providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers
shall be promulgated in executive orders <ec 3 Administrative Crders W Acts of the
5resident which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders <ec H
5roclamations W Acts of the 5resident "xing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a speci"c law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order <ec / Bemorandum Crders W Acts of the 5resident on matters
of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a
particular o?cer or o?ce of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders <ec
0 Bemorandum Circulars W Acts of the 5resident on matters relating to internal
administration, which the 5resident desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or o?ces of the Government, for information or compliance,
shall be embodied in memorandum circulars <ec G General or <pecial Crders W Acts and
commands of the 5resident in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed ;orces of the
5hilippines shall be issued as general or special orders
A verbal pronouncement to the e=ect that EC +o 3-H is suspended should not have been
given weight An executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution
)Civil Code, Article G4 )3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines v. Bayao, G* +o 1G2H2,, Nune /, ,-134
Re have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and
e=ect of law 9S"ouses l(eda v. Court of ""eals, 3,0 5hil 3-2, 3,1 91220:: Thus, the
rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Crder of +ational Artists !ointly issued by the CC5
Foard of Trustees and the +CCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the
13
force and e=ect of law Ontil set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative
agencies, including the 5resident himself#herself as chief executor of laws )l(ario v.
Executive Secretary, G* +o 1.2-,., Nuly 10, ,-134
Executive !o,er - Clearly, the abolition of the 5AGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the C>E<MA is properly within the prerogative of the
5resident under his continuing 'delegated legislative authority to reorgani%e' his own o?ce
pursuant to EC ,2, )!ichay v. 2Cce of the $e"uty Executive Secretary for +egal 9airs
Investigative and d8udication $ivision, G* +o 120H,/, Nuly ,H, ,-1,4
)14 That the authority of the 5resident to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority As
Chief Executive, the 5resident has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more speci"c duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and
lawless violence ),4 Rhile the 5resident does not possess constituent powers & as those
powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
through initiative and referendum & she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers $t will be
observed that the 5resident has authority, as stated in her oath of o?ce, only to preserve
and defend the Constitution <uch presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing
her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision
)%he !rovince of *orth Cota'ato v. %he Govern(ent of the 3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines !eace
!anel on ncestral $o(ain, G* +o 1.3/21, Cctober 1H, ,--.4
Executive !rivilege - The 5resident6s 7executive privilege8 covers all presidential
communications )BBD* v. #uino, G* +o 1G-/10, Nuly 10, ,--.4 Jowever, the privilege
accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one signi"cant @uali"cation being
that 7the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invo(e a
general con"dentiality privilege to shield its o?cials and employees from investigations by
the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing8 This @uali"cation
applies whether the privilege is being invo(ed in the context of a !udicial trial or a
congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation
1H
)14 Executive privilege, which includes conversations and correspondence between the
5resident and the public o?cial covered by this executive order 9l(onte vs. ;as#uez -
G* +o 2/30G, ,3 Bay 122/L Chavez v. !u'lic Estates uthority, G* +o 133,/-, 2
Nuly ,--,:L military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest
of national security should not be divulged 9l(onte vs. ;as#uez, G* +o 2/30G, ,3
Bay 122/L Chavez v. !residential Co((ission on Good Govern(ent, G* +o 13-G10, 2
>ecember 122.:L information between inter-government agencies prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements 9Chavez v. !residential Co((ission on
Good Govern(ent, G* +o 13-G10, 2 >ecember 122.:L discussion in close-door
Cabinet meetings 9Chavez v. !residential Co((ission on Good Govern(ent, G* +o
13-G10, 2 >ecember 122.:L and matters a=ecting national security and public order
9Chavez v. !u'lic Estates uthority, G* +o 133,/-, 2 Nuly ,--,:, BAS FE $+DCKE>
against this legislative power ),4 FOT note that executive o?cials are not exempt by
the mere fact that they are department heads Cnly one executive o?cial may be
exempted from this power W the 5resident on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment A claim of
privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted, and not merely implied $n light of this highly
exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court "nds it essential to limit to the 5resident
the power to invo(e the privilege <he may of course authori%e the Executive <ecretary
to invo(e the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive <ecretary must state
that the authority is 7Fy order of the 5resident,8 which means that he personally
consulted with her The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only
by the highest o?cial in the executive hierarchy $n other words, the 5resident may not
authori%e her subordinates to exercise such power )34 That a type of information is
recogni%ed as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances ;or in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the @uestion that must be as(ed is not only whether the re@uested
information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege
should be honored in a given procedural setting )*eri v. Senate Co((ittee on
ccounta'ility of !u'lic 2Ccers - G* +o 1.-0H3, Barch ,/, ,--.4
)14 7secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information8 )!eo"leEs &ove(ent for !ress ?reedo( @!&!?A v. &angla"us4 7$nformation
on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be sub!ect to reasonable safeguards for the sa(e of national interest8
)Chavez v. !CGG4 >iplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recogni%ed as privileged in
this !urisdiction, the N5E5A negotiations constituting no exception $t bears emphasisL
however, that such privilege is only presumptive ;or as <enate v Ermita holds,
recogni%ing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances Cnly after a consideration of the context in which the claim
is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of
the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status
),4 $nformer6s 5rivilege - the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of
a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to o?cers charged with
the enforcement of that law )34 5rivilege accorded to presidential communications,
which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve
matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege
being that a fran( exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare
of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence
of decision-ma(ing of those tas(ed to exercise 5residential, Megislative and Nudicial
power $t bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential
communications is not absolute, one signi"cant @uali"cation being that 7the Executive
cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invo(e a general
con"dentiality privilege to shield its o?cials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing8 This @uali"cation
applies whether the privilege is being invo(ed in the context of a !udicial trial or a
congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation )H4 >eliberative 5rocess
5rivilege - covers documents reUecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated +otably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on
the need to protect national security but, on the 7obvious reali%ation that o?cials will
not communicate candidly among themselves if each remar( is a potential item of
discovery and front page news,8 the ob!ective of the privilege being to enhance the
@uality of agency decisions The so-called 7deliberative process privilege8 refers to the
decision-ma(ing of executive o?cials )BBD* v. #uino, G* +o 1G-/10, Nuly 10,
,--.4
1/
)14 5residential Communications 5rivilege applies to decision-ma(ing of the 5residentL rooted
in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the 5resident6s uni@ue
constitutional role The elements of presidential communications privilege are - 1: The
protected communication must relate to a 7@uintessential and non-delegable
presidential power8 ,: The communication must be authored or 7solicited and
received8 by a close advisor of the 5resident or the 5resident himself The !udicial test
is that an advisor must be in 7operational proximity8 with the 5resident The
presidential communications privilege remains a @uali"ed privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of ade@uate need, such that the information sought 7li(ely
contains important evidence8 and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority
),4 >eliberative 5rocess 5rivilege applies to decision-ma(ing of executive o?cialsL based on
common law privilege
)34 Onli(e the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege
applies to documents in their entirety, and covers "nal and post-decisional materials as
well as pre-deliberative ones As a conse@uence, congressional or !udicial negation of
the presidential communications privilege is always sub!ect to greater scrutiny than
denial of the deliberative process privilege )*eri v. Senate Co((ittee on
ccounta'ility of !u'lic 2Ccer, G* +o 1.-0H3, Barch ,/, ,--.4
!o,er of ""oint(ent - $n Civil +i'erties )nion v. Executive Secretary, )G* +o .3.20,
;ebruary ,,, 1221, 12H <C*A 31G4 this Court explained that the prohibition contained
in <ection 13, Article D$$ of the 12.G Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by
the Executive o?cials speci"ed therein without additional compensation in an ex-oCcio
capacity as provided by law and as re@uired by the primary function of said o?cialTs
o?ce
The 12.G Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple o?ces, as well as incompatible o?ces,
refers to the holding of the o?ce, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,
words which were not even found in <ection 13, Article D$$ nor in <ection G, paragraph ,,
Article $Q-F To 7hold8 an o?ce means to 7possess or occupy8 the same, or 7to be in
possession and administration,8 which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the o?ce )?una v. Er(ita, G* +o 1.HGH-, ;ebruary 11, ,-1-4
<ection 1/ )of Article D$$, on prohibited or 7midnight8 appointments4 does not apply to the
Nudiciary Onder the Constitution, it is mandatory for the NFC to submit to the 5resident
the list of nominees to "ll a vacancy in the <upreme Court in order to enable the
5resident to appoint one of them within the 2--day period from the occurrence of the
vacancy )$e Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council - G * +o 121--,, Barch 1G, ,-1-4
Con"rmation is re@uired only for the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or o?cers of the armed forces from the ran( of
colonel or naval captain, and other o?cers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution )Sar(iento v. &ison4 Commissioner of Juman *ights not sub!ect to
con"rmationL not included in the "rst sentence )Bautista v. Salonga4 +M*C
commissioners do not re@uire con"rmation )Calderon v. Carale4 Constitutional
Commissioners re@uire con"rmation Bembers of the Nudiciary do not re@uire
con"rmation, only NFC nomination Nudicial and Far Council )regular members4 re@uire
con"rmation Cmbudsman and >eputy Cmbudsmen & no con"rmation, !ust NFC
nomination The Dice-5resident, when appointed to the Cabinet, re@uires no
con"rmation
+ow that the 5hilippine Coast Guard is under the >CTC and no longer part of the 5hilippine
+avy or the Armed ;orces of the 5hilippines, the promotions and appointments of
respondent o?cers of the 5CG, or any 5CG o?cer from the ran( of captain and higher
for that matter, do not re@uire con"rmation by the Commission on Appointments
)Soriano III v. +ista, G* 1/3..1, ,H Barch ,--34
Given that the 5resident derives his power to appoint C$Cs in the A*BB regional government
from law, it falls under the classi"cation of presidential appointments covered by the
second sentence of <ection 10, Article D$$ of the ConstitutionL the 5resident6s
appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis )$atu &ichael 'as Bida v.
Senate of the !hili""ines, G* +o 120,G1, ;ebruary ,., ,-1,4
10
The petitioners also !ointly assert that *A +o 1-1/3, in granting the 5resident the power to
appoint C$Cs in elective positions, violates <ection 10, Article Q of the Constitution,
)<ection 10 The 5resident shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed4 which merely grants the 5resident the
power of supervision over autonomous regions This is an overly restrictive
interpretation of the 5resident6s appointment power There is no incompatibility
between the 5resident6s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous
regions, and the power granted to the 5resident, within the speci"c con"nes of *A +o
1-1/3, to appoint C$Cs xxx Cnce the 5resident has appointed the C$Cs for the o?ces
of the Governor, Dice Governor and members of the *egional Megislative Assembly,
these same o?cials will remain in o?ce until they are replaced by the duly elected
o?cials in the Bay ,-13 elections +othing in this provision even hints that the
5resident has the power to recall the appointments he already made Clearly, the
petitioners6 fears in this regard are more apparent than real )$atu &ichael 'as Bida v.
Senate of the !hili""ines, G* +o 120,G1, ;ebruary ,., ,-1,4
The power granted to the 5resident, via *A +o 1-1/3, to appoint members of the *egional
Megislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by F5 ..1 9the Cmnibus
Election Code: to the 5resident to "ll any vacancy for any cause in the *egional
Megislative Assembly 9then called the <angguniang 5ampoo(: )<ection 3/ ;illing of
vacancy - 5ending an election to "ll a vacancy arising from any cause in the
<angguniang 5ampoo(, the vacancy shall be "lled by the 5resident, upon
recommendation of the <angguniang 5ampoo(E 5rovided, That the appointee shall
come from the same province or sector of the member being replaced4 )$atu &ichael
'as Bida v. Senate of the !hili""ines, G* +o 120,G1, ;ebruary ,., ,-1,4
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the 5resident includes the power to ma(e
temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise speci"cally prohibited by the
Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature
of the o?ce involved )Ca'iling v. !a'ualan, G* +os M-,1G0H and M-,1G0/, Bay 31,
120/, 1H <C*A ,GH4 The 5resident6s power to issue an acting appointment is
particularly authori%ed by the Administrative Code of 12.G 9Executive Crder +o ,2,:
Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of o?ce is to minimi%e the appointing
authority6s opportunity to appoint a ma!ority of the members of a collegial body $t also
intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies A staggered term of
o?ce, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of
acting or temporary appointment $t does not negate the authority to issue acting or
temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants )General v. )rro, G* +o
121/0-, Barch ,2, ,-114
The 5resident is without any power to remove elected o?cials, since the power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of <ection 0-
of the Mocal Government Code )Salali(a v. Guingona, Jr4 )Sangguniang Barangay of
$on &ariano &arcos v. &artinez - G* +o 1G-0,0, Barch 3, ,--.4
The authority of the C<C is only to determine whether or not the appointees possess the
legal @uali"cations and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else )+o"ez v. Civil Service
Co((ission4
The C<C may not approve as 7temporary8 an appointment designated as 7permanent8 by the
appointing authority )+uego v. Civil Service Co((ission4
The C<C classi"ed the position of Graft $nvestigation C?cer $$$ as belonging to the Career
Executive <erviceL appointee to the position re@uired to ac@uire CE< eligibility )CE<
o?cers, under the Administrative Code, are appointed by the 5resident4 Cmbudsman
challenges the classi"cation, saying that it impairs his appointment prerogative as
guaranteed under the Constitution <CE classi"cation would result in absurdity & )a4 it
would vest in the 5resident the power to appoint an employee of the Cmbudsman, in
violation of the Constitution, or )b4 it would include in the CE< a position not occupied
by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code The C<C may not
classify a position )Graft $nvestigation C?cer $$$ of the C?ce of the Cmbudsman4 as
belonging to the Career Executive <ervice and re@uire an appointee thereto to ac@uire
CE< eligibility, because CE< o?cers are appointed by the 5resident This derogates the
appointing power of the Cmbudsman A CE< appointment not e=ected by the 5resident
is contrary to the provisions of the Administrative Code )2Cce of the 2('uds(an v.
Civil Service Co((ission, H/1 <C*A /G-4
1G
An ad interi( appointment is a permanent appointment because it ta(es e=ect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the 5resident once the appointee has @uali"ed into
o?ce )&ati'ag v. Beni"ayo, G* +o 1H2-30, April ,, ,--,4
An ad interi( appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of o?ce The period from the time the ad interim
appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a "xed term nor an unexpired
term )?etalino v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 121.2-, >ecember -H, ,-1,4
The designation of Agra as Acting <ecretary of Nustice concurrently with his position of Acting
<olicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under <ection 13, Article D$$ of the 12.G Constitution Feing
designated as the Acting <ecretary of Nustice concurrently with his position of Acting
<olicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by <ection 13, Article D$$,
whose text and spirit were too clear to be di=erently read Jence, Agra could not validly
hold any other o?ce or employment during his tenure as the Acting <olicitor General,
because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided xxx $t is e@ually remar(able,
therefore, that Agra6s designation as the Acting <ecretary of Nustice was not in an ex
o?cio capacity, by which he would have been validly authori%ed to concurrently hold
the two positions due to the holding of one o?ce being the conse@uence of holding the
other )?una v. gra - G* +o 1210HH, ;ebruary 12, ,-134
$n the voting held on Nanuary ,., ,-1H, by a vote of .-G, the Court resolved to reverse its
<eptember H, ,-1, >ecision insofar as petitioner Gon%ales is concerned 9G* +o 120,31:
Re declared <ection .9,: of *A +o 0GG- unconstitutional by granting disciplinary !urisdiction
to the 5resident over a >eputy Cmbudsman, in violation of the independence of the C?ce of
the Cmbudsman Jowever, by another vote of .-G, the Court resolved to maintain the
validity of <ection .9,: of *A +o 0GG- insofar as <ulit is concerned The Court did not
consider the C?ce of the <pecial 5rosecutor to be constitutionally within the C?ce of the
Cmbudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter en!oys under the
Constitution RJE*E;C*E, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare <ection .9,:
O+CC+<T$TOT$C+AM This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of >eputy
Cmbudsman Emilio Gon%ales $$$ unnecessary, but is without pre!udice to the power of the
Cmbudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of >eputy Cmbudsman Emilio Gon%ales $$$ under pertinent Civil
<ervice laws, rules and regulations )Gonzales v. 2Cce of the !resident, G* +o 120,31,
Nanuary ,., ,-1H, *esolution on Botion for *econsideration4
!o,er of control - raneta, et al. v. >on. &. Gat(aitan, et al, )1-1 5hil 3,. 912/G:4 - if a
certain power or authority is vested by law upon the >epartment <ecretary, then such
power or authority may be exercised directly by the 5resident, who exercises
supervision and control over the departments
ngeles v. Gaite - G* +o 10/,G0, +ovember ,/, ,--2 - Bemorandum Circular +o /.,
promulgated by the C?ce of the 5resident on Nune 3-, 1223 - no appeal from or
petition for review of decisions#orders#resolutions of the <ecretary of Nustice on
preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the C?ce of the
5resident, except those involving o=enses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death -
The 5residentTs act of delegating authority to the <ecretary of Nustice by virtue of said
Bemorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of @uali"ed political
agency
Fut the doctrine of @uali"ed political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Foard
of >irectors of T$>CC*5 despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of
the 5resident to the Cabinet xxx <uch Cabinet members sat on the Foard of >irectors of
T$>CC*5 ex oCcio, or by reason of their o?ce or function, not because of their direct
appointment to the Foard by the 5resident Evidently, it was the law, not the 5resident, that
sat them in the Foard )%rade and Invest(ent $evelo"(ent Cor"oration of the !hili""ines
v. &analang-$e(igillo4
?aithful Execution of +a,s - The 5resident6s discretion in the conferment of the Crder of
+ational Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the
relevant laws The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
5resident, not a separate grant of power $t simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily,
the cardinal principle that the 5resident is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and
execute them This is precisely why the law provides that 'administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution' )l(ario v. Executive Secretary, G* +o 1.2-,., Nuly 10, ,-134
1.
The creation of the 5TC "nds !usti"cation under <ection 1G, Article D$$ of the Constitution,
imposing upon the 5resident the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed
)<ection 1G, Article D$$4 )Biraogo v. %he !hili""ine %ruth Co((ission of /010 , G* +o
12,23/, >ecember G, ,-1-4
<ince the >CN is not a @uasi-!udicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose
decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under *ule H3, the
resolution of the <ecretary of Nustice "nding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa
is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under *ule
H3 )Santos v. Go - G* +o 1/0-.1, Cctober 12, ,--/4
Co((ander-in-Chief - 5ursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the 5resident, as
the Commander-in-Chief of the A;5, can be held liable for a=ront against the
petitioner6s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to
show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with (nowledge of
the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in
conducting the necessary investigations re@uired under the rules The Court also
stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the president6s incumbency )3odriguez v. &aca"agal rroyo, G* +o 121.-/,
+ovember 1/, ,-11, citing Estrada v. $esierto, G* +os 1H0G1--1/, 1H0G3., Barch ,,
,--1, 3/3 <C*A H/,4
$t is evident that under the 12.G Constitution the 5resident and the Congress act in tandem
in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus They exercise the power, not only se@uentially, but in a sense !ointly since,
after the 5resident has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that
the 5resident does not have Conse@uently, although the Constitution reserves to the
<upreme Court the power to review the su?ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise
its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated Cnly when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the
<upreme Court step in as its "nal rampart The constitutional validity of the 5resident6s
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is "rst a political
@uestion in the hands of Congress before it becomes a !usticiable one in the hands of the
Court )?ortun v. rroyo, G* +o 12-,23, Barch ,-, ,-1,4
$n &arcos v. Chief of Sta9, r(ed ?orces of the !hili""ines ).2 5hil, ,H0 912/1:4, this Court
ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Bartial is a 'court'
a(in to any other courts $n the case of *amon *u=y vs Chief of <ta= of the 5hilippine
Army, H3 C= Ga%, .//, we did not hold that the word 'court' in general used in our
Constitution does not include a Court-BartialL what we held is that the words 'inferior
courts' used in connection with the appellate !urisdiction of the <upreme Court to 'review
on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, "nal
!udgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment,' as provided for in section ,, Article D$$$, of the Constitution, do not refer
to Courts-Bartial or Bilitary Courts
The fact that a !udgment of conviction, not of ac@uittal, rendered by a court-martial must be
approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed 9Article of Rar H0:, does not
change or a=ect the character of a court-martial as a court A !udgment of the Court of ;irst
$nstance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the <upreme Court before it can
be executed )Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G* +o 12.//H, Nuly 3-, ,-1,4
The power to con"rm a sentence of the 5resident, as Commander-in-Chief, includes the
power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court
martial )Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G* +o 12.//H, Nuly 3-, ,-1,4
!ardoning !o,er - criminal and administrative remedies for violation of conditional pardon
are not mutually exclusive and may be successively availed of by the 5resident for the
punishment of the conditional pardon & recommitment#criminal prosecution for violation of
conditional pardon#criminal prosecution for new o=ense if violation of the condition
constitutes a separate criminal o=ense )Culanag v. $irector of !risons4
A conditional pardonee committed usurpation of public functions +ew case dismissed for
lac( of witnesses 5resident ordered his commitment <C sustained saying mere
commission, not conviction re@uired for recommitment )Es"uelas v. !rovincial Farden of
Bohol , a?rmed in Su(ulong v. Gonzales4
12
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political o=enses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the sub!ects of another,
who have o=ended, by some breach, the law of nations Amnesty loo(s bac(ward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the o=ense itselfL it so overloo(s and obliterates the
o=ense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no o=ense x x x 5ardon is granted by the Chief
Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts ta(e no notice thereofL while amnesty by 5roclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should
ta(e !udicial notice x x x8 )&agdalo !ara sa !ag'a'ago, G* +o 12-G23, Nune 12, ,-1,4
%reaties - The power to ratify treaties is vested in the 5resident, sub!ect to the concurrence
of the <enate )!i(entel v. Executive Secretary4 Executive Agreements do not re@uire the
concurrence of the <enate for their validity An executive agreement may not amend a
treaty )dolfo v. C?I of Ga('ales4
The Contract Agreement xxx between +orthrail and C+BEG does not parta(e of the nature
of an executive agreement $t is merely an ordinary commercial contract that can be
@uestioned before the local courts )China *ational &achinery H E#ui"(ent Cor"oration v.
Sta. &aria, G* +o 1.//G,, ;ebruary G, ,-1,4
!residential I((unity - The 5resident, during his tenure of o?ce or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law )3u'rico v. rroyo, G* +o 1.3.G1, ;ebruary 1., ,-1-4
ARTICLE 0III & Judicial !o,er - $t is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as
republican schoolmaster 9Merner, *alph, %he Su"re(e Court as 3e"u'lican School(aster,
120G <up Ct *ev 1,G:, a teacher in a vital national seminar 9*ostow, Eugene, %he
$e(ocratic Character of Judicial 3evie,, 00 Jarv M *ev 123 912/,:: There are times when
the controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for
constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case 93u=no v. Endriga,
/,. 5hil HG3, H.2 9,--0:: )l(ario v. Executive Secretary, G* +o 1.2-,., Nuly 10, ,-134
A facial o'8ection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident
as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lac( or excess of !urisdiction )+i'eral !arty v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 121GG1,
Bay 0, ,-1-4
The issuance of subse@uent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of !udicial power
under Art D$$$ of the Constitution, because the execution of the >ecision is but an integral
part of the ad!udicative function of the Court xxx Rith the "nal and executory !udgment in
BB>A, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in BB>A means that until petitioner-
agencies have shown full compliance with the Court6s orders, the Court exercises
continuing !urisdiction over them until full execution of the !udgment )&&$ v. Concerned
3esidents of &anila Bay, G* +os 1G12HG-H., ;ebruary 1/, ,-114
The <upreme Court as guardian of the legal profession has ultimate powers over attorneys
$ts authority to discipline lawyers stems from its constitutional prerogative to regulate the
practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage therein 9<ection /9/:, Article Q,
The 12G3 5hilippine ConstitutionL In 3e Cunanan, 2H 5hil /3H, 12/H: Apart from the
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the <upreme Court over attorneys is an
inherent power incidental to its proper administration of !ustice and essential to an orderly
discharge of its !udicial functions 9%e8an v. Cusi, /G <C*A 1/HL In 3e l(acen, 31 <C*A /0,L
>ilado v. $avid, .H 5hil /G3L In the &atter of the IB! &e('ershi" $ues $elin#uency of
Edillon, G* +o AC-12,. )$F5 Adm Case +o >>-14 August 3, 12G.: ;urthermore,
attorneys are the courtTs constituency - to aid in the administration of !ustice 9$oge S.
State, 32 +E GH/: A lawyer occupies what may be termed a @uasi-!udicial o?ce since he is
in fact an o?cer of the court, and li(e the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of !ustice 9Berlin v. Culkin, 0- AM* ./1: )!eo"le v. Ses'reno4
3e#uisites for Judicial In#uiry & ctual Case or Controversy - The 7moot and academic8
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, ifE "rst, there is a grave
violation of the ConstitutionL second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involvedL third, when constitutional issue raised re@uires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the publicL and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review )$avid v. rroyo4
The expiration of the term generally renders an election protest moot and academic )Sales
v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1GH00.4 FOT said case may still be resolved for purposes of
,-
formulating controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public )tienza v. ;illarosa4,
or in the case of determining a @uestion involving the one-year residency re@uirement for
those running for public o?ce, which is one capable of repetition, under the doctrine of
repetition yet evading review )Gayo v. ;erceles4L or notwithstanding the election and
proclamation of a new set of municipal o?cers, to prevent a repetition of the acts complained
of )l'aIa v. Co((ission on Elections4L or despite the approval by the Civil <ervice
Commission of the @uestioned appointments, to avoid a repetition )ltres v. E("le, G* +o
1.-2.0, >ecember 1-, ,--.4L or the demise of one of the accused, to prevent a
miscarriage of !ustice against a co-accused )Constantino v. !eo"le, G* +o 1H-0/0,
<eptember 13, ,--G4L or even the separation of the petitioner from government service,
because other penalties may be imposed upon her )!agano v. *azarro, G* +o 1H2-G,,
<eptember ,1, ,--G4
Fy the mere enactment of the @uestioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a !udicial controversy even without any other overt act
)!i(entel v. guirre4
+ocus Standi - A perusal of private respondents6 petition for declaratory relief would show
that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger
to sustain some direct in!ury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of *A
23G, +ot far removed from the factual milieu in the <outhern Jemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citi%ens, and taxpayers and infractions which
the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain
untrammeled As their petition would disclose, private respondents6 fear of prosecution was
solely based on remar(s of certain government o?cials which were addressed to the general
public They, however, failed to show how these remar(s tended towards any prosecutorial or
governmental action geared towards the implementation of *A 23G, against them $n other
words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them )3e"u'lic of the
!hili""ines v. 3o#ue, G* +o ,-H0-3, <eptember ,H, ,-134
Earliest 2""ortunity & if not raised in pleadings, cannot be considered at trial and, if not
considered at trial, cannot be considered on appeal $n criminal cases, constitutional
@uestion can be raised any time in the discretion of the court $n civil cases, @uestion can be
raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself $n every case,
except where there is estoppel or laches )%i8a( v. Si'onghanoy4, constitutional @uestion
may be raised at any stage if it involves the !urisdiction of the court
*ecessity of $eciding Constitutional <uestions & !usti"cation -separation of powers )trias
"olitica principle4
%heory of 3elative Constitutionality - Rhile *A +o G0/3 started as a valid measure well
within the legislature6s power, we hold that the enactment of subse@uent laws exempting all
ran(-and-"le employees of other G;$s leeched all validity out of the challenged "roviso xxx
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to
another xxx A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of
altere) "r"u$&ta!"e& Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
con"scatory, its validity, even though a?rmed by a former ad!udication, is open to in@uiry
and investigation in the light of "#a!'e) "o!)to!& )Central Bank E("loyees ssociation
v. Bangko Sentral ng !ili"inas and the Executive Secretary4
2"erative ?act $octrine - The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void The
doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
e@uity and fair play )!lanters !roducts Inc. v. ?erti"hil Cor"oration, G* +o 100--0, Barch
1H, ,--.4
The operative fact doctrine also applies to )executive orders and4 executive acts
subse@uently declared as invalid )>acienda +uisita, Incor"orated v. !residential
grarian 3efor( Council, G* +o 1G11-1, +ovember ,,, ,-114
Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a 'legislative or executive
measure,' meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court ;rom the
passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the
court, the e=ects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good
faith, may have to be recogni%ed as valid $n the present case, however, there is no such law
or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court except F$* *uling +o >A-H.2-
,1
-3 )Co((issioner of Internal 3evenue v. San 3o#ue !o,er Cor"oration, G* +o 1.GH./,
Cctober ., ,-134
?iscal autono(y - means freedom from outside control Congress could not have carved out
an exemption for the G<$< from the payment of legal fees without transgressing
another e@ually important institutional safeguard of the Court6s independence - "scal
autonomy )3eJ !etition for 3ecognition of the Exe("tion of the Govern(ent Service
Insurance Syste( @GSISA for !ay(ent of +egal ?ees, id at ,-2 citing <ection 3, Article
D$$$ of the Constitution, 7)t4he Nudiciary shall en!oy "scal autonomy84 ;iscal autonomy
recogni%es the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees )Id,
citing Bengzon v. $rilon, G* +o 1-3/,H, 1/ April 122,, ,-. <C*A 133, 1/-4 including
legal fees xxx Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the N>; and the <AN; Ondoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally
in"rm for it impairs the Court6s guaranteed "scal autonomy and erodes its
independence )In the &atter of Clari=cation of Exe("tion fro( !ay(ent of ll Court
and Sheri9Es ?ees, AB +o 1,-,--3--, Barch 13, ,-1,4
*egional Trial Courts 9*TC: have the authority and !urisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances )!lanters !roducts
Inc. v. ?erti"hil Cor"oration, G* +o 100--0, Barch 1H, ,--.4 ;amily Courts have authority
and !urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute )Garcia v. $rilon, G* +o
1G2,0G, Nune ,/, ,-134 FOT note British (erican %o'acco v. Ca(acho, G* +o 103/.3,
August ,-, ,--. & the Court of Tax Appeals cannot pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute
3ule-&aking uthority - *ules of procedure of special courts and @uasi-!udicial bodies shall
remain e=ective unless disapproved by the <C
The *ational !o,er Cor"oration )AB +C -/-1--,--<C, Barch 1-, ,-1-4, the GSIS )AB +o
-.-,--1--, ;ebruary 11, ,-1-4 and the +and Bank of the !hili""ines )+and Bank of the
!hili""ines v. 3ivera, G* +o 1.,H31, +ovember 1G, ,--14 are not exempt from paying
"ling fees
d(inistrative Su"ervision - administrative !urisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
<upreme Court, regardless of whether the o=ense was committed before or after
employment in the !udiciary )("ong v C<C - G* +o 10G210, August ,0, ,--.4
This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the e=ective supervision
and management of all courts and personnel under it *ecogni%ing this mandate,
Bemorandum Circular +o ,0 of the C?ce of the 5resident, dated Nuly 31, 12.0, considers
the <upreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations on
foreign travels Thus, the Court came out with CCA Circular +o H2-,--3 9F: )+eave $ivision
v. >eusdens, AB +o 5-11-,2,G, >ecember 13, ,-114
$n view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the sub!ect provision & which re@uires retiring
government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency#non-pendency of
administrative case#s from, among others, the C<C & should not be made to apply to
employees of the Nudiciary To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court6s constitutionally-
enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel xxx a prior clearance of
pendency#non-pendency of administrative case#s from the C?ce of the 5resident 9albeit
some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g, <upreme Court Nustices: or the C?ce
of the Cmbudsman should not e@ually apply to retiring court personnel Derily, the
administrative supervision of court personnel and all a=airs related thereto fall within the
exclusive province of the Nudiciary $t must, however, be noted that since the Constitution
only accords the Nudiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a di=erent treatment
of the clearance re@uirement obtains with respect to criminal cases As such, a clearance
re@uirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate
government agency, i.e, the C?ce of the Cmbudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a
matter beyond the ambit of the Nudiciary6s power of administrative supervision )3eJ 3e#uest
for GuidanceKClari=cation on Section 5, 3ule III of 3e"u'lic ct *o. 101:4 3e#uiring 3etiring
Govern(ent E("loyees to Secure a Clearance of !endencyK*on-"endency of CaseKs fro( the
Civil Service Cco((ission, AB +o 13--2--.-<C, Cctober 1, ,-134
The Cmbudsman is duty bound to have all cases against !udges and court personnel "led
before it referred to the <upreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative
aspect is involved therein )Caoi'es, Jr. v. 2('uds(an4
,,
JBC - The regular members of the Nudicial and Far Council have staggered terms - Congress
may designate only one 91: representative to the NFC )Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,
G* +o ,-,,H,, Nuly 1G, ,-1,4 - A vacancy in the <upreme Court must be "lled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof A vacancy in the lower courts must be "lled within ninety
days from the submission of the list of nominees )Dacancies in the C?ces of the
Cmbudsman and >eputy Cmbudsmen shall be "lled within three months after they occur4
$ecisions - A minute resolution is not a binding precedent xxx The constitutional
re@uirement under the "rst paragraph of <ection 1H, Article D$$$ of the Constitution that the
facts and the law on which the !udgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly
applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions A minute resolution is signed only by the
cler( of court by authority of the !ustices, unli(e a decision $t does not re@uire the
certi"cation of the Chief Nustice Boreover, unli(e decisions, minute resolutions are not
published in the 5hilippine *eports ;inally, the proviso of <ection H93: of Article D$$$ spea(s of
a decision $ndeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which
constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and
certi"ed by the Chief Nustice )$eutsche Bank G &anila Branch v. Co((issioner of Internal
3evenue, G* +o 1..//-, August 12, ,-134
<ection 1H does not apply to decisions in administrative proceedings, li(e those rendered by
the C?ce of the 5resident FOT note the cardinal rights of parties in administrative
proceedings in the landmar( case of Ang Tibay v C$* )<olid Jomes, $nc v Maserna - G* +o
100-/1, April ., ,--.4
ARTICLE I45A - rules of procedure should not encroach upon the constitutional prerogatives
of other bodies, li(e the rule-ma(ing authority )or the competence to admit to the practice of
law4 of the <upreme Court )!hili""ine +a,yers ssociation v. grava4
<ection / 9a: of *ule 3 of the Comelec *ules of 5rocedure and <ection G of Article $Q-A of the
Constitution re@uire that a ma!ority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only
those who participated and too( part in the deliberations, is necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling )&arcoleta v. C2&E+EC, G* +o
1.13GG, April ,H, ,--24
;inal decisions, orders or rulings of Constitutional Commissions may be appealed to the
<upreme Court - by way of a petition for certiorari under *ule 0H, with respect to the
CCBEMEC and The CCA, and *ule H3 with respect to the C<C
The CCBEMEC6s contempt power can be exercised only in connection with its power of
ad!udication, and may not be invo(ed in connection with its exercise of purely administrative
functions )Guevara v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1.13GG, April ,H, ,--24
The <upreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a
"nal resolution of a >ivision of the CCBEMEC, only "nal orders, rulings or decisions of the
CCBEMEC en 'anc, unless the *esolution sought to be set aside is a nullity )Blanco v.
C2&E+EC, G* +o 1.-10H, Nune 1G, ,--.4
Cnly orders or rulings issued in connection with the CCBEMEC6s @uasi-!udicial power can be
the sub!ect of certiorari proceedings under section G *esolutions awarding contracts should
be the sub!ect of ordinary civil actions before trial courts )?ili"inas Engineering and &achine
Sho" v. ?errer4
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on <ec 19,:, Art $Q9>: of the Constitution, vizE
1 The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of o?ce of the "rst set of commissioners, shall always be for
a "xed term of seven 9G: yearsL an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven 9G: years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed
by the Constitution
, Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes 9death, resignation, disability or
impeachment: shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will li(ewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under <ec 19,:, Art $Q9>:
,3
3 Bembers of the Commission, eg CCA, CCBEMEC or C<C, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission Corollarily, the "rst appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment
H A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term
of the departing chairman <uch appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven 9G: years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment The Court clari"es that 7reappointment8 found in <ec
19,:, Art $Q9>: means a movement to one and the same o?ce 9Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman: Cn the other hand, an appointment involving a
movement to a di=erent position or o?ce 9Commissioner to Chairman: would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution
/ Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity )?una v. %he Chair(an, Co((ission on udit - G* +o 12,G21, April ,H,
,-1,4
ARTICLE I456 & 3ule-&aking uthority - Fut while the grant of the C<C6s rule-ma(ing power
is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the C<C interprets and enforces fall within
the prerogative of Congress As an administrative agency, the C<C6s @uasi-legislative
power is sub!ect to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies The
rules that the C<C formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law
it see(s to apply and implement )%rade and Invest(ent $evelo"(ent Cor"oration of
the !hili""ines v. Civil Service Co((ission - G* +o 1.,,H2, Barch /, ,-134
Govern(ent Instru(entalities - The B$AA is a government 7instrumentality8 that does not
@ualify as a 7government-owned or controlled corporation8 The term government
7instrumentality8 is broader than the term 7government-owned or controlled
corporation8 The fact that two terms have separate de"nitions means that while a
government 7instrumentality8 may include a 7government-owned or controlled
corporation,8 there may be a government 7instrumentality8 that will not @ualify as a
7government-owned or controlled corporation8 )&anila International ir"ort uthority
v. City of !asay - G* +o 103-G,, April ,, ,--24
O5 ran(s with B$AA, a government instrumentality exercising corporate powers but not
organi%ed as a stoc( or non-stoc( corporation Rhile said corporations are government
instrumentalities, they are loosely called government corporate entities but not
government-owned and controlled corporations in the strict sense )+ockheed $etective
and Fatch(an gency, Inc. v. )niversity of the !hili""ine, G* +o 1./21., April 1.,
,-1,4
Jurisdiction - Fased on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the C<C may
ta(e cogni%ance of an administrative case "led directly with it against an o?cial or
employee of a chartered state college or university This is regardless of whether the
complainant is a private citi%en or a member of the civil service and such original
!urisdiction is shared with the Foard of *egents of the school )Civil Service Co((ission
v. Court of ""eals, G* +o 1G010,, Cctober 2, ,-1,4
Rhich @uasi-!udicial agency has !urisdiction to hear and decide complaints for illegal
dismissal against an ad!unct government agency engaged in proprietary functionX The
Armed ;orces of the 5hilippines Commissary and Exchange <ervices 9A;5CE<: is a
unit#facility of the Armed ;orces of the 5hilippines 9A;5: organi%ed pursuant to Metter of
$nstruction 9MC$: +o 31, which was issued on +ovember ,-, 12G, by then 5resident
;erdinand Barcos <ince it cannot be denied that petitioners are government
employees, the proper body that has !urisdiction to hear the case is the C<C )>idalgo
v. 3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines, G* +o 1G2G23, Nuly /, ,-1-4
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution $t is su?cient that he is apprised of the
substance of the charge against himL what is controlling is the allegation of the acts
complained of, not the designation of the o=ense $t must be stressed that what the law
re@uires is to simply inform the civil servant of the nature and cause of accusation against
him in a clear and concise manner for the purpose of giving him the right to confront the
,H
allegations against him )$adu'o v. Civil Service Co((ission )G* +o 1-0H2., Nune ,.,
1223, ,,3 <C*A GHG4
The failure to designate the o=ense speci"cally and with precision is of no moment in this
administrative case The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party
be a=orded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense The law simply re@uires that the civil servant is informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise manner to give the person a
chance to answer the allegations intelligently Evidently, 5AGCC* substantially complied with
the re@uirements of due process for administrative cases )!hili""ine (use(ent and
Ga(ing Cor"oration v. &ar#uez, G* +o 121.GG, Nune 1., ,-134
;ormal charges issued by petitioner Government <ervice $nsurance <ystem 5resident without
prior conduct of a preliminary investigation are null and void )Salva v. ;alle, G * +o
123GG3, April ,, ,-134
*A H0G- & under Bagna Carta for 5ublic <chool Teachers & schools have exclusive !urisdiction
over public school teachers Fut <C has declared C<C and Cmbudsman have
concurrent !urisdiction
Rhere concurrent !urisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that "rst ta(es cogni%ance
of the complaint shall exercise !urisdiction to the exclusion of the others $n this case, it was
C<C which "rst ac@uired !urisdiction over the case because the complaint was "led before it
Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the >epEd and
the Foard of 5rofessional Teachers )!at-og v. Civil Service Co((ission, G* +o 12.G//, Nune
/, ,-134
5eriod of preventive suspension pending investigation cannot be deducted from the penalty,
because preventive suspension is not a penalty )<ui('o v. Gervacio4 5reventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitiveL so, if exonerated, respondent is entitled
to be reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension )pending appeal4 Jowever,
if penalty or conviction is a?rmed, the period of preventive suspension pending appeal
becomes part of the penalty of suspension or dismissal )Gloria v. C4
As a matter of law, a department secretary6s decision con"rming the removal of an o?cer
under his authority is immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed
public o?cer )Bangalisan v. C, 3H, 5hil /.0 9122G:L and #uino v. *avarro, +o M-/-02/,
Barch 1., 12./, 13/ <C*A 3014
The present legal basis for an award of bac( salaries is <ection HG, Foo( D of the
Administrative Code of 12.G & 79H: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal
in the event he wins an appeal8 This provision, however, on its face, does not support a
claim for bac( salaries since it does not expressly provide for bac( salaries during this periodL
our established rulings hold that bac( salaries may not be awarded for the period of
preventive suspension )Jon Gloria v CA, 30/ 5hil GHH 91222:4 as the law itself authori%es its
imposition so that its legality is beyond @uestion To resolve the seeming conUict, the Court
crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to bac( salariesE a: the employee
must be found innocent of the charges and b: his suspension must be un!usti"ed
)Bangalisan v. C, 3H, 5hil /.0 9122G:4 The reasoning behind these conditions runs this
wayE although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency
of a successful appeal, the law itself only authori%es preventive suspension for a "xed periodL
hence, his suspension beyond this "xed period is un!usti"ed and must be compensated )Civil
Service Co((ission v. Cruz, G* +o 1.G./., August 2, ,-114
5reventive <uspension 5eriods & C<C & 2- days # 5ublic o?cers with pending criminal cases &
2- days # Mocal elective o?cials # Mocal Government Code & 0- days # Anti-Graft Maw &
suspension pendente lite & 2- days # Cmbudsman & six months
An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to bac( salaries limited only to a
maximum period of "ve years, and not full bac( salaries from his illegal termination up to his
reinstatement )Sen(o v Gungon, G* +os 10/H/- I 10/H/,, August 13, ,--2, /2/ <C*A
/0,, /.-4 The illegally dismissed government employee shall be paid bac( salaries at the
rate he was receiving when he was terminated un@uali"ed by salary increases and without
deduction from earnings received elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal
)Fal@uidra v C;$ of Capi%, Franch $$ +o M-H-H2-, Cctober ,., 12GG, .- <C*A 1,34 Feing an
incumbent at the time, Galang would have continued to receive *ATA, Beal Allowance and
,/
*ice <ubsidy, separate from his salary, had he not been illegally dismissed from service
)Galang v Mand Fan( of the 5hilippines, G* +o 1G/,G0, Bay 31, ,-114
The government party that can appeal the decision in administrative cases must be the party
prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the
administrative case )C<C v >acoycoy, cited in C?ce the Cmbudsman v Miggayu, G* +o
1GH,2G, Nune ,-, ,-1,4
Appointments#<ecurity of Tenure - The mere fact that a particular position belongs to the
career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant <uch right
will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility
or lac( of it )Amores v C<C, G* +o 1G--23, April ,2, ,--24
Acceptance of a temporary appointment divests the temporary appointee of constitutional
security of tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil service eligible
*omualde% v C<C & a person6s acceptance of a temporary appointment results in the
termination of o?cial relations with his former permanent position, to which he may not
demand reinstatement if his temporary appointment is not renewed )Tolentino v de Nesus4
Rhere a temporary employee ac@uires civil service eligibility during his tenure as such, his
temporary appointment does not thereby automatically become permanent )Baturan v
Baglana4
Even if appointment is temporary, appointee may not be removed at will if appointment is for
a "xed period )Ambas v Fuenaseda4
A government employee holding a casual or temporary employment cannot be terminated
within the period of his employment except for cause Thus, they may be laid-o= anytime
before the expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occursE 91:
when their services are no longer neededL 9,: funds are no longer availableL 93: the pro!ect
has already been completed#"nishedL or 9H: their performance are below par E@ually
important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more
serious causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in C<C ;orm +o --1 This is
pursuant to <ection ,, Article $Q9F: of the Constitution and <ection H0 of the Civil <ervice Maw
The reason for this is that their termination from the service could carry a penalty a=ecting
their rights and future employment in the government )5C<C v Mapid, G* +o 1212H-,
April 1,, ,-114
*A 0./- & temporary employees who have been in their positions for G years may be granted
civil service eligibility that will @ualify them for permanent appointment to their positions
A probationary employee may only be terminated for a !ust cause, that is, unsatisfactory
conduct or want of capacity )>a%a v Mugo & G* +o 10.222, April 3-, ,--.4
!ri(arily con=dential one which denotes not only con"dence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the o?ce but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust
or con"dential matters of state )$e los Santos v. &allare4L or one declared to be so upon
recommendation of the C<C )Salazar v. &athayL FOT see !GC23 v. Angara )involving to(en
attendants at the 5AGCC*, whose positions are, by law, classi"ed, as primarily con"dential4,
citing !GC23 v. 3illoraza, CSC v. Salas and !inero v. >echanova an executive or legislative
declaration that a position is primarily con"dential, highly technical or policy-determining is
not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position These
employees still have security of tenure, and are exempt only from the re@uirement of
competitive examinations Examples & private secretaries )Cor"us v. Cuaderno4
bodyguards )Borres v. C4 city legal o?cer )Cadiente v. Santos4 and provincial attorney
)Grino v. CSC4
A driver is not a con"dential employee )<ee 3eJ ;ehicular ccident - AB +o ,--.-13-<C,
+ovember 12, ,--.4
5olicy-determining, highly technical and primarily con"dential employees, are exempted from
the competitive examination re@uirement for eligibilityL they en!oy security of tenure
)Cor"us v. Cuaderno4
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure
All permanent o?cers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong
to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guarantyL they cannot be
removed from o?ce except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process
9Joco( v. Judge 3egalado, ,G. 5hil .3, 2H 91221:, citing %a"ales v. !resident and Board of
,0
3egents of the )niversity of the !hili""ines, 11G 5hil /01 91203:: The concept of security of
tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily con"dential employees due to the
basic concept of a 'primarily con"dential' position <erving at the con"dence of the
appointing authority, the primarily con"dential employee6s term of o?ce expires when the
appointing authority loses trust in the employee Rhen this happens, the con"dential
employee is not 'removed' or 'dismissed' from o?ceL his term merely 'expires' 9Ingles v.
&utuc, 13/ 5hil 1GG, 1., 9120.:: and the loss of trust and con"dence is the '!ust cause'
provided by law that results in the termination of employment $n the present case where the
trust and con"dence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor 5imentel6s
exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his con"dence in
Gon%ales
<ecurity of tenure in public o?ce simply means that a public o?cer or employee shall not be
suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process $t cannot
be expanded to grant a right to public o?ce despite a change in the nature of the o?ce held
$n other words, the C<C might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner
violated Gon%ales6 right to security of tenure when she was removed without su?cient !ust
cause from her position, but the situation had since then been changed $n fact, Gon%ales
was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subse@uently terminated under the law
prevailing at the time of the termination of her serviceL ie, she was then already occupying
a position that was primarily con"dential and had to be dismissed because she no longer
en!oyed the trust and con"dence of the appointing authority Thus, Gon%ales6 termination for
lac( of con"dence was lawful <he could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator
of Camarines +orte or to any other comparable position This conclusion, however, is without
pre!udice to Gon%ales6 entitlement to retirement bene"ts, leave credits, and future
employment in government service )%he !rovincial Govern(ent of Ca(arines *orte v.
Gonzales, G* +o 1./GH-, Nuly ,3, ,-134
,G
*e"otis( & appointment or designation of relatives within the 3
rd
degree of consanguinity of
a?nity prohibited except & )14 persons appointed in a con"dential capacity ),4 teachers
)34 members of the A;5 )H4 physicians & applies even to designations
$n the local government career service, the prohibition against nepotism extends to the
relatives of the appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or a?nity The nepotism rule covers all (inds of appointments whether
original, promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals
and contractuals except consultants)Galeos v. !eo"le, G* +os 1GHG3--3G, ;ebruary
2, ,-114
!ersonnel &ove(ents - The principal distinctions between a detail )movement from one
agency to another -)Executive Crder ,2,, Foo( D, Title 1, <ubtitle A, Chapter /, <ection
,0 90:4 and reassign(ent )reassignment from one organi%ational unit to another in the
same agency -EC ,2,, Foo( D, Title 1, <ubtitle A, Chapter /, <ection ,0 9G:4 lie in the
place where the employee is to be moved and in its e=ectivity pending appeal with the
C<C Fased on the de"nition, a detail re@uires a movement from one agency to another
while a reassignment re@uires a movement within the same agency Boreover, pending
appeal with the C<C, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a
reassignment order does not become immediately e=ective )3e"u'lic of the
!hili""ines v. !acheco, G* +o 1G.-,1, Nanuary ,/, ,-1,4
$ual ""oint(entsKInco("ati'le 2Cces - Onder <ection 13 of *A 2302, which reiterates
<ection 00 of the Cmnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive o?ce
or position, including active members of the Armed ;orces of the 5hilippines, and
o?cers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his o?ce upon the "ling of his certi"cate of
candidacy Opon the other hand, an elected o?cial is not deemed to have resigned
from his o?ce upon the "ling of his certi"cate of candidacy for the same or any other
elected o?ce or position $n "ne, an elected o?cial may run for another position
without forfeiting his seat )<uinto v. C2&E+EC & G* +o 1.202., )B*4 ;ebruary ,,,
,-1-4
Elective o?cials can be appointed to civilian posts during their term, but they shall be
considered as having forfeited their elective seats upon acceptance of said civilian
posts
Onless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
o?cial shall hold any other o?ce or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries +ot applicable to 5resident, Dice-5resident, Bembers
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, who can hold other o?ces only if
allowed under the Constitution )Article D$$, <ection 134 & )Civil +i'erties )nion v.
Executive Secretary4
The appointment of >r 5osadas as TBC 5ro!ect >irector falls within the prohibition against
holding of multiple positions since there is no distinction in <ection G, Article $Q-F as to the
employment status, i.e, whether permanent, temporary or coterminous 5etitioners failed to
cite any law to !ustify >r 5osadas6 holding of concurrent positions as Chancellor and TBC
5ro!ect >irector )!osadas v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +os 10.2/1 I 102---, Nuly 1G, ,-134
ARTICLE I45C & Co((issioners - complaint for disbarment against CCBEMEC Commissioners
- an impeachable o?cer who is a member of the Far cannot be disbarred without "rst being
impeached )Jar#ue v. 2('uds(an, In 3eJ 3aul &. Gonzales and Cuenco v. ?ernan4 $t bears
emphasis that the provision that ma!ority of Comelec members should be lawyers pertains to
the desired composition of the Comelec Rhile the appointing authority may follow such
constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec
membership is not precluded )&arcoleta v. Borra, AC +o GG3,, Barch 3-, ,--24
!o,ers - 5ower to enforce and administer election laws includes the power to annul an illegal
registry of votersL cancel a proclamation made by a board of canvassersL oust a candidate
already proclaimedL re!ect nuisance candidatesL postpone or continue elections )2ca("o v.
C2&E+EC4L declare a failure of elections )Cmnibus Election Code#Sanchez v. C2&E+EC4
A CCBEMEC resolution re@uired newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than Y
page for the common use of political parties and candidates <CE Onconstitutional &
constituted 7ta(ing8 of private property without payment of !ust compensation )!hili""ine
!ress Institute v. C2&E+EC 9,HH <C*A,G,:4
,.
F5 ..1, <ection 2, re@uired radio and TD stations to give free air time to the CCBEMEC to be
used as the CCBEMEC hour for broadcasting information regarding candidates Challenged
as unconstitutional for constituting ta(ing without !ust compensation, the <C said the law was
a valid regulation by the <tate of the use of the <tate6s air waves Dalid exercise of the police
power )%eleco((unications and Broadcast ttorneys of the !hili""ines v. C2&E+EC 9,.2
<C*A 33G:4
A failure of election may be declared only in the three instances stated in <ection 0 of the
CECE the election has not been heldL the election has been suspended before the hour
"xed by lawL and the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have
given rise to the conse@uent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner
;urthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be force ma!eure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes ;inally, before the CCBEMEC can grant a
veri"ed petition see(ing to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of , conditions
must be established, namelyE 91: no voting has ta(en place in the precincts concerned
on the date "xed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted
in a failure to electL and 9,: the votes cast would a=ect the result of the
election )!res'iterio v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1G...H, Nune 3-, ,--.4
The annulment of election can only be done when the CCBEMEC "nds that an election was
vitiated by widespread and pervasive terrorism and election frauds, which resulted in
the submission at gunpoint of falsi"ed and tampered election returns, and it is
impossible to purge the illegal from the valid returns, so that there are no returns
worthy of faith and credit and from which would be gauged a fair and true expression of
the popular will )Sanchez v. C2&E+EC4 )Sangco"an v. C2&E+EC, G * +o 1G-,10 ,
Barch 1,, ,--.4
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the
cause of the failure of elections is not absolute $t is directory, not mandatory, and the
CCBEMEC possesses residual power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline
prescribed by law The deadline in <ection 0 cannot defeat the right of su=rage of the people
as guaranteed by the Constitution The CCBEMEC erroneously perceived that the deadline in
<ection 0 is absolute The CCBEMEC has broad power or authority to "x other dates for
special elections to enable the people to exercise their right of su=rage The CCBEMEC may
"x other dates for the conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held
within the period prescribed by law $t is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the
CCBEMEC6s broad power or authority to "x other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections,
to enable the people to exercise their right of su=rage The CCBEMEC thus has residual power
to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law The date ,. Cctober
,-13 is reasonably close to 0 April ,-13, and there is no reason why the plebiscite should not
proceed as scheduled by the CCBEMEC The C<G points out that public interest demands that
the plebiscite be conducted )Cagas v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o ,-21./, Cctober
,/, ,-134
The CCBEMEC en 'anc can order a correction of the <tatement of Dotes to ma(e it conform to
the election returns )$ure(des v. Co((ission on Elections, cited in ?lauta v.
C2&E+EC, G* +o 1.H/.0, Nuly ,,, ,--24
Onder <ection /, *ule ,G of the CCBEMEC *ules of 5rocedure, correction of manifest errors in
the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing may be "led directly with the
Commission, even after a proclamation of the winning candidates >espite the
proclamation of the winning candidates, the CCBEMEC still has !urisdiction to correct
manifest errors in the election returns for the <angguniang Fayan candidates A
7manifest error8 is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understandingL that
which is open, palpable, incontrovertible, needing no evidence to ma(e it more
clear )'ainza v. rellano, G* +o 1.10HH, >ecember ., ,--.4
The )restrictive and exclusive4 grounds that must support a pre-proclamation controversy are
limited by the Cmnibus Election Code to the followingE 9a: $llegal composition or proceedings
of the board of canvassersL 9b: The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain
material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsi"ed, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in <ections ,33, ,3H, ,3/ and
,30 of this CodeL 9c: The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authenticL and 9d: Rhen substitute
or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which
,2
materially a=ected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates )<ection ,H34
);illa(or v. Co((ission on Elections4
A pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made, only if
there had been a valid proclamation )$ure(des v. Co((ission on Elections4
Election !rotests - The abduction of a voter, the (illing of a political leader, the threats which
prevented the holding of the campaign sorties, and the intimidation of voters, or of terrorism
)also massive vote-buying and bribery4 are proper grounds for an election protest, not a pre-
proclamation controversy - illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers,
canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsi"ed, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies
thereofL election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authenticL substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially a=ected the
standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates $n fact, had Abayon timely "led an
election protest, bearing the same allegations and raising identical issues, it would have been
given due course The ten-day period for "ling an election contest or a petition for @uo
warranto cannot be considered suspended with the "ling thereof )'ayon v. C2&E+EC and
3aul $aza, G* +o 1.1,2/, April ,, ,--24
The CCBEMEC has @uasi-!udicial, @uasi-legislative and administrative powers CC+TEB5T
power sustained because it was exercised in connection with its @uasi-!udicial power,
i.e, an investigation into alleged massive electoral fraud )Bedol v. C2&E+EC - G* +o
1G2.3-, >ecember 3, ,--24

""eals & The <upreme Court has declared as unconstitutional a law providing that decisions
of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts in barangay elections may be appealed to
regional trial courts )?lores v. C2&E+EC4
Trial courts of limited !urisdiction have exclusive original !urisdiction over election protests
involving barangay o?cials, which include the <K chairman )?ernandez v. C2&E+EC, G* +o
1G0,20, Nune 3-, ,--.4
3-
<ince it is the CCBEMEC which has !urisdiction to ta(e cogni%ance of an appeal from the
decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal
o?cials, then it is also the CCBEMEC which has !urisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate !urisdiction Clearly, petitioner erred in invo(ing this CourtTs power
to issue said extraordinary writ )Galang v. Geroni(o, G* +o 12,G23, ;ebruary ,,,
,-11L see also Bulilis v. *uez, G * +o 12/2/3, August 2, ,-114
There is no @uestion, therefore, that the Court has no !urisdiction to ta(e cogni%ance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the CCBEMEC ;irst >ivision of the special
a?rmative defenses of the petitioner The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for
the CCBEMEC ;irst >ivision to "rst decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special a?rmative defenses to the
CCBEMEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the >ivision upon the
merits xxx Ctherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a "nal resolution issued by a >ivision of the CCBEMEC
)('il v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 1H332., Cctober ,/, ,---, 3HH <C*A 3/.,
30/-300L Cagas v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 12H132, Nanuary ,H, ,-1,4
Onder the exception, therefore, the )<upreme4 Court may ta(e cogni%ance of a petition for
certiorari under *ule 0H to review an interlocutory order issued by a >ivision of the
CCBEMEC on the ground of the issuance being made without !urisdiction or in excess of
!urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or excess of !urisdiction
when it does not appear to be speci"cally provided under the CCBEMEC *ules of
5rocedure that the matter is one that the CCBEMEC en banc may sit and consider, or a
>ivision is not authori%ed to act, or the members of the >ivision unanimously vote to
refer to the CCBEMEC en banc Cf necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to
the Court because the CCBEMEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter
concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed )Bho v. Co((ission on
Elections, G* +o 1,H-33, <eptember ,/, 122G, ,G2 <C*A H03, HG1-HG3L Cagas v.
Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 12H132, Nanuary ,H, ,-1,4
$ivisionsKEn Banc - The CCBEMEC sitting en 'anc, however, does not have the authority to
hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the "rst
instance, as the CCBEMEC in division has such authority The CCBEMEC en banc can
exercise !urisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of
the CCBEMEC in division 5ursuant to *ule 1. of the Cmnibus Election Code, decisions
and resolutions of any division of the CCBEMEC in special cases become "nal and
executory after the lapse of "ve days, unless a timely motion for reconsideration is
lodged with the CCBEMEC en banc )!aci=cador v. C2&E+EC & G* +o 1G.,/2, Barch
13, ,--24
Cnly "nal orders of the CCBEMEC in >ivision may be raised before the CCBEMEC en banc
Clearly, the assailed status @uo ante Crder, being interlocutory, should "rst be resolved
by the CCBEMEC ;irst >ivision via a motion for reconsideration )Cayetano v. C2&E+EC,
G* +o 123.H0, April 1,, ,-114
The <pecial <econd >ivision of the CCBEMEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be
heard and decided by a division <uch action cannot be done without running afoul of
<ection 3, Article $Q-C of the 12.G Constitution $nstead of peremptorily transferring the
case to the Commission en banc, the <pecial <econd >ivision of CCBEMEC, should have
instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its <pecial <econd
>ivision, not only to "ll in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner ;errer, but
more importantly so that the re@uired @uorum may be attained )Eriguel v. C2&E+EC -
G* +o 12-/,0, ;ebruary ,0, ,-1-4
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
CCBEMEC provided under <ection G, Article $Q-A of the 12.G Constitution and <ection 1,
*ule 3G of the CCBEMEC *ules of 5rocedure that has !urisdiction to hear the instant
petition $n this case, the CCBEMEC En Fanc cannot be compelled to resolve Mayug6s
Botion for *econsideration of the *esolution dated Nune 1/, ,-1- that was "led on Nuly
,., ,-1- after said *esolution had already attained "nality $n fact, the CCBEMEC
<econd >ivision denied the same Botion in its Crder dated August H, ,-1- precisely for
the reason that it was "led out of time )+ayug v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o
12,2.H, ;ebruary ,., ,-1,4
Even without a petition under either <ection 1, or <ection G. of the Cmnibus Election Code,
or under <ection H- of the Mocal Government Code, the CCBEMEC is under a legal duty to
cancel the certi"cate of candidacy of anyone su=ering from the accessory penalty of
31
perpetual special dis@uali"cation to run for public o?ce by virtue of a "nal !udgment of
conviction The "nal !udgment of conviction is notice to the CCBEMEC of the dis@uali"cation
of the convict from running for public o?ce The law itself bars the convict from running for
public o?ce, and the dis@uali"cation is part of the "nal !udgment of conviction The "nal
!udgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tas(ed to implement the "nal !udgment under the law )Jalos8os, Jr. v.
C2&E+EC H Cardino v. C2&E+EC, G* +os 123,3G I 123/30, Cctober 2, ,-1,, 0.3 <C*A 1,
at 3,-334 xxx The above-cited constitutional provision re@uiring a motion for reconsideration
before the CCBEMEC En Banc may ta(e action is con"ned only to cases where the CCBEMEC
exercises its @uasi-!udicial power $t "nds no application, however, in matters concerning the
CCBEMEC6s exercise of administrative functions xxx $n ratea v. C2&E+EC 9Aratea: 9G* +o
12/,,2, Cctober 1,, ,-1,, 0.3 <C*A 1-/, 1H/:,

the Court similarly pronounced that the
dis@uali"cation of a convict to run for public o?ce, as a?rmed by "nal !udgment of a
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the
conduct of elections

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the CCBEMEC
En Fanc did not exercise its @uasi-!udicial functions when it issued *esolution +o 2013 as it
did not assume !urisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or
any of its divisions *ather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election
laws in cancelling petitioner6s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute dis@uali"cation, the
fact of which had already been established by his "nal conviction $n this regard, the
CCBEMEC En Fanc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a
motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under <ection 3, Article $Q-C of the
Constitution, the same being re@uired only in @uasi-!udicial proceedings )3o(eo Jalos8os v.
%he Co((ission on Elections, G* +o ,-/-33, Nune 1., ,-134
Certi=cates of Candidacy - The certi"cate of candidacy of a green card holder who states
therein that he is a resident may be denied due course or cancelled on the ground of material
misrepresentation ))gdoracion v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1G2./1, April 1., ,--.4
The use of a name other than that stated in the certi"cate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as 7material misrepresentation8 under the earlier-@uoted <ection G. of
the Cmnibus Election Code refers to 7@uali"cations for elective o?ce8 xxx A petition for
dis@uali"cation based on material misrepresentation in the certi"cate of candidacy is
di=erent from an election protest The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether
the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the
electorate )Nustimbaste v CCBEMEC, G* +o 1G2H13, +ovember ,., ,--.4
<ection 0. & petition for dis@uali"cation & based on commission of prohibited acts )e.g, vote-
buying, terrorism, overspending, unlawful electioneering4 and the possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country & may be "led anytime after the
deadline for "ling of CoCs but before proclamation & person dis@uali"ed is prohibited
from continuing as a candidate
<ection G. & petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certi"cate of Candidacy )CoC4 & based
on false material misrepresentations )on material matters - statements regarding age,
residence, citi%enship or non-possession of natural-born ;ilipino status , eligibility, as
when one, although precluded from running for a fourth term because of the three-term
limit rule, claims to be nonetheless @uali"ed, or when one claims to be eligible despite
his dis@uali"cation on the basis of an accessory penalty imposed upon him in
connection with his conviction in a criminal case - the false representation must consist
of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible $n other words, it must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one6s @uali"cation for public o?ce4 in the CoC - not later
than ,/ days from the "ling of the @uestioned CoC & person dis@uali"ed is not treated
as a candidate at all & has been li(ened to a petition for #uo ,arranto, but is "led
before, and not after, proclamation
$n ratea v. C2&E+EC, the <upreme Court ac(nowledged that there may be instances when
the grounds for both sections 0. and G. may overlap, as when a candidate who represents
that he is a resident of the place where he see(s election but is actually a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country, in which case, he would clearly also not be a
resident of the place where he see(s election for at least one year immediately preceding the
day of the election $n such cases, the Court clari"ed that one who would li(e to assail the
candidacy of that person may avail himself of either remedy
The cancellation of the certi"cate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed
o?ce renders the o?cer a de facto o?cer )Svetlana Jalos8os v. Co((ission on Elections, G*
+o 12331H, Nune ,/, ,-134
3,
Su'stitution - A candidate may be substituted if he dies, is dis@uali"ed or withdraws
<ubstitutions in cases of death or dis@uali"cation may usually be made until midday of
election day An earlier deadline is usually prescribed for substitutions by reason of
withdrawal Onder <ection 1, of *A +o 2--0, in order to obviate confusion, the name of the
substitute candidate should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as that of the
substituted candidate )?ederico v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 12201,, Nanuary ,,,
,-134 Thus, in ?ederico v. Co((ission on Elections, the Court invalidated the substitution of
a candidate for mayor who ,ithdre, her candidacy for purposes of substituting her husband
as candidate for governor because of the latter6s death $t said that, while her substitution of
her husband because of his death may have been valid because said substitution may be
done until midday of election day, her substitution as a candidate for mayor was invalid
because the deadline for the same had long prescribed The Court stressed that her
substitution as a mayoralty candidate was not by reason of her death or dis@uali"cation A
candidate whose certi"cate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course may li(ewise not
be substituted )%alaga v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 120.-H, Cctober 2, ,-1,L
%agolino v. >3E% and +ucy %orres, G* +o ,-,,-,, Barch 12, ,-13L see &iranda v. 'aya,
G* +o 1303/1, Nuly ,., 1222, 311 <C*A 01G4 7A cancelled certi"cate of candidacy void a'
initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes8 )ratea v.
Co((ission on Elections, G* +o 12/,,2, Cctober 2, ,-1,4
*uisance candidates stray votes - 7Re hold that the rule in *esolution +o H110 considering
the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a "nal !udgment, particularly
where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate,
not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law8 )$e la Cruz v. Co((ission
on Elections, G* +o 12,,,1, +ovember 13, ,-1,4
$is#uali=cation - Dote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects $ts criminal aspect to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the sub!ect of summary hearing
Jowever, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the o=ender should be dis@uali"ed from
o?ce can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character
Flanco v CCBEMEC, G* +o 1.-10H, Nune 1G, ,--. & petitioner was earlier found
administratively, and not criminally, liable for vote-buying, and dis@uali"ed under <ection 0.
of the Cmnibus Election Code $n G* +o 1,,,/., petitioner was dis@uali"ed from continuing
as a candidate only in the Bay ., 122/ elections )Blanco v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1,,,/.4
Second !lacers - a subse@uent dis@uali"cation of a winning candidate will not entitle his
opponent, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner )2ca("o v. >ouse of 3e"resentatives Electoral %ri'unal4
+CTE - in subse@uent decisions of the <upreme Court, it made clear that its earlier rulings
holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the "rst-placer is dis@uali"ed
or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certi"cate of candidacy of the
"rst-placer was valid at the time of "ling but subse@uently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that too( place, or a legal impediment that too( e=ect, after the "ling of the
certi"cate of candidacy $f the certi"cate of candidacy is void a' initio, then legally the person
who "led such void certi"cate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any
time All votes for such non-candidate should therefore be considered as stray votes and
should not be counted Thus, such non-candidate can never be a "rst-placer in the elections
$f a certi"cate of candidacy void a' initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the
election, prevailing !urisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes
)Cayat v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 103GG0, April ,H, ,--G, /,, <C*A ,34 $f a certi"cate of
candidacy void a' initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such
candidate should also be stray votes because the certi"cate of candidacy is void from the
very beginning This, according to the <upreme Court, is the more e@uitable and logical
approach on the e=ect of the cancellation of a certi"cate of candidacy that is void a' initio
Ctherwise, a certi"cate of candidacy void a' initio can operate to defeat one or more valid
certi"cates of candidacy for the same position )Jalos8os v. Co((ission on Elections, G* +o
123,3G, Cctober 2, ,-1,4
The rule on succession in <ection HH of the Mocal Government Code cannot apply in instances
when a de facto o?cer is ousted from o?ce and the de 8ure o?cer ta(es over The ouster of
a de facto o?cer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Mocal
Government Code There is no vacancy to spea( of as the de 8ure o?cer, the rightful winner
in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position )Svetlana Jalos8os v. Co((ission
on Elections, G* +o 12331H, Nune ,/, ,-13, En Banc, <ereno4
33
!olitical !arties - the CCBEMEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties )tienza v.
C2&E+EC, G* +o 1..2,-, ;ebruary 10, ,-1-4
5olitical coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures,
if they are to be recogni%ed as such and be given the bene"ts accorded by law to registered
coalitions )+i'eral !arty v. C2&E+EC - G* +o 121GG1, Bay 0, ,-1-4
5rosecution of Election C=enses - $t is clear that the grant of the 7exclusive power8 to
investigate and prosecute election o=enses to the CCBEMEC was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by F5 ..1, a legislative enactment )FA+AT v CCBEMEC, G* +C 1GG/-.,
August G, ,--24
$t is clear that the Chief <tate 5rosecutor, all 5rovincial and City ;iscals, and#or their
respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission,
to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election o=enses under the
election laws and to prosecute the same <uch authority may be revo(ed or withdrawn
anytime by the CCBEMEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its !udgment such revocation
or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common
good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the
CCBEMEC )>ino v Clivare%, G* +o 1G-HHG, >ecember H, ,--24
+ot all criminal o=enses committed during the election period are election o=enses
Onder the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as
the >CN, now exercise concurrent !urisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election
o=enses )rroyo v. $e"art(ent of Justice, G* +o 122-.,, Nuly ,3, ,-134
Election#Campaign 5eriods - The election period may be changed by resolution of the
Commission on Elections The election period may, under the Constitution, commence
earlier than ninety days before the day of election - <pecial case & Article D$$, <ection 1- &
special election, to be called within G days after vacancy, and must be held not earlier than
H/ days nor later than 0- days from such call
7Any person who "les his certi"cate of candidacy within )the "ling4 period shall only be
considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he "led his certi"cate of
candidacy8 )5enera v CCBEMEC - G * +o 1.1013, +ovember ,/, ,--24
ARTICLE I45D - 3iel v. Fright $nsular Auditor denied a claim for payment of his salary for
services as a temporary cler( of the <enate on the ground that his services were
unnecessary <CE invalid#this is a matter within the peculiar province of the Megislature and
for which its members are responsible to their constituents $nsular Auditor cannot @uestion
the necessity of an appropriation FOT in &atute v. >ernandez $nsular Auditor refused to
authori%e payment under a contract, which was novated without a second public bidding <CE
valid because the $nsular Auditor can re!ect an account that is demonstrably unlawful
3H
5etitioner, a sociedad anoni(as, is >ECMA*E> a private domestic corporation sub!ect to the
!urisdiction of the <ecurities and Exchange Commission ) !hili""ine Society for the
!revention of Cruelty to ni(als v. Co((ission on udit, G* +o 102G/,, <eptember
,/, ,--G4
The Foy <couts of the 5hilippines is a public corporation and its funds are sub!ect to the
CCA6s audit !urisdiction )Boy Scouts of the !hili""ines v. Co((ission on udit, G* +o
1GG131, Nune G, ,-114
Mocal water districts, such as the MBR>, are GCCCs with special charter 5> +o 12.
constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist )?eliciano v.
ranez , G* +o 10/0H1, August ,/, ,-1-4
MGOs, though granted local "scal autonomy, are still within the audit !urisdiction of the CCA
);eloso v. Co((ission on udit , G* +o 1230GG, <eptember 0, ,-114
The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the CCA to disapprove payments
which it "nds excessive and disadvantageous to the GovernmentL to determine the
meaning of 7public bidding8 and when there is 7failure8 in the biddingL to disallow
expenditures which it "nds unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance
will mean discontinuance of foreign aidL to disallow a contract even after it has
been executed and goods have been delivered Mi(ewise, we sustained the "ndings of
the CCA disallowing the disbursements of the +ational Jome Bortgage ;inance
Corporation for failure to submit certain documentary re@uirements and for being
irregular and excessive Re have also ruled that the "nal determination of the
>epartment of ;inance and the F$* as to a person6s entitlement to an informer6s reward
is conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned and not on the CCA, the
latter being an independent constitutional commission The CCA is traditionally given
free rein in the exercise of its constitutional duty to examine and audit expenditures of
public funds especially those which are palpably beyond what is allowed by law )Bar'o
v Co((ission on udit, G* +o 1/G/H,, Cctober 1-, ,--.4 - in 3odolfo S. de Jesus
and Cat'alogan Fater $istrict v. C2, the Court upheld the authority and !urisdiction of
the CCA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a water
district and declared that such power does not conUict with the !urisdiction of the
courts, the >FB, and the MROA )Sanchez v. Co((ission on udit, G* +o 1,G/H/,
April ,3, ,--.4
<ection ,),4 & the critical function of the CCA authori%es it to DETC disbursements
Bonetary claims must be acted upon by the CCA within 0- days ;ailure to do so within said
period would not result in the automatic approval of the claim pursuant to section1 of
CA 3,G <CE +C, claimant can "le petition for mandamus to compel CCA to render a
decision )!acete v. cting Chair(an of the C24
Rhile the determination of leave bene"ts is within the functions of the Civil <ervice
Commission as the central personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine
accounts and expenditures relating to such bene"ts properly pertains to the
Commission on Audit Even as the <upreme Court recogni%es the Civil <ervice
Commission6s !urisdiction in this case, it is not exclusive as it is shared with the
Commission on Audit )Civil Service Co((ission v. !o're, H3. <C*A 33H4
Fe that as it may, assuming for the sa(e of argument that execution by garnishment could
proceed in this case against the funds of petitioner, it must bear stress that the latter is
a government-owned or controlled corporation with a charter of its own $ts !uridical
personality is separate and distinct from the government and it can sue and be sued in
its name As such, while indeed it cannot evade the e=ects of the execution of an
adverse !udgment and may not ordinarily place its funds beyond an order of
garnishment issued in ordinary cases, it is imperative in order for execution to ensue
that a claim for the payment of the !udgment award be "rst "led with the Commission
on Audit 9CCA: )*>&?C v. 'ayari, G* +o 100/-., Cctober ,, ,--24
3/
An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice
versa The criminal case "led before the C?ce of the Cmbudsman is distinct and
separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the CCA <o also, the
dismissal by Bargarito 5 Gervacio, Nr, >eputy Cmbudsman for Bindanao, of the
criminal charges against petitioners does not necessarily foreclose the matter of their
possible liability as warranted by the "ndings of the CCA )Soria v. Co((ission on udit
- G* +o 10G,12, ;ebruary ., ,-114 Rith respect to the liability of petitioner, we
li(ewise a?rm the CCA6s ruling that he is personally and solidarily liable for the
disallowed amount The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation "nds no
application because C>A is not a private entity but a government agency created by
virtue of *epublic Act +o 0232 in compliance with the provisions of <ection 1/, Article
Q$$ of the 12.G Constitution Boreover, respondents satisfactorily established that
petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the >A5-TEC to modify the initial
result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading
system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened
);ersoza v. Carague, G* +o 1/G.3., Barch ., ,-114
This Court agreed that employees who have erroneously received rice allowances 9gra v.
Co((ission on udit, G* +o 10G.-G, >ecember 0, ,-11, 001 <C*A /03L $e Jesus v.
Co((ission on udit, H/1 5hil .1,, .,H 9,--3::, productivity incentive bonuses 9$e Jesus v.
Co((ission on udit, su"raL Bla#uera v. >on. lcala, 3/0 5hil 0G., G0/-G00 9122.::,
representation and transportation allowances 9*ATA: 9$e Jesus v. Co((ission on udit,
su"ra:, anniversary bonuses 9Id:, year-end bonuses 9Id:, and cash gifts 9Id:no longer need
to refund the same xxx Analogously, when Brs Gruba received the survivorship pension
bene"ts, she accepted them in good faith, (nowing that this Court positively pronounced
that she was entitled to them in the *esolution dated Nanuary 1G, ,-1, Rhen we revo(ed
this *esolution, such revocation should only apply prospectively in the interest of e@uity and
fairness )3eJ ""lication for Survivorshi" Bene=ts, AB +o 1H1//-*et, +ovember 12, ,-134
ARTICLE 4 & +ocal utono(y - Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authori%ed to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the ,-13
5>A; Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional 5or( Farrel is deemed
unconstitutional )Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G* +o ,-./00, +ovember 12, ,-134
3ecall - <ection G- of the Mocal Government Code & 5ercentage re@uirements & at least ,/Z
in the case of MGOs with a voting population of not more than ,-,---#At least ,-Z in the
case of MGOs with a voting population of at least ,-,--- but not more than G/,---, provided
petitioners shall not be less than /,---#At least 1/Z in the case of MGOs with a voting
population of at least G/,--- but not more than 3--,---, provided petitioners shall not be
less than 1/,---#At least 1-Z in case the voting population exceeds 3--,---, provided
petitioners shall not be less than H/,---
The MGO did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a CATD system because it
was the +ational Telecommunications Commission 9+TC: that had the power under EC +os
,-/ and H30 to regulate CATD operations EC ,-/ mandated the +TC to grant certi"cates of
authority to CATD operators while EC H30 vested on the +TC the power to regulate and
supervise the CATD industry )Batangas C%;, Inc. v. Court of ""eals4
<ection H of Article Q of the Constitution con"nes the 5resident6s power over MGOs to one of
general supervision <upervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior bodyL it does not include any restraining authority over such body
$t does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate Jere, what the >CE
see(s to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local o?cials, a power that not even its
principal, the 5resident, has Thus, the 5resident and his or her alter egos, the department
heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within
the scope of their authority Accordingly, the >CE cannot substitute its own discretion for the
discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Banila $n local a=airs, the wisdom of
local o?cials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law )Social Justice Society v. tienza, G* +o 1/0-/,, ;ebruary 13,
,--.4
Governors do not have emergency military powers - *espondents cannot rely on paragraph
1, subparagraph 9vii: of Article H0/ )of the Mocal Government Code4, as the said provision
expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural The governor, as
local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement
emergency measures during these occurrences Fut the (idnapping incident in the case at
bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster *espondents cannot "nd any legal
mooring under this provision to !ustify their actions 5aragraph ,, subparagraph 9vi: of the
30
same provision is e@ually inapplicable for two reasons ;irst, the Armed ;orces of the
5hilippines does not fall under the category of a 7national law enforcement agency,8 to which
the +ational 5olice Commission 9+A5CMCCB: and its departments belong $ts mandate is to
uphold the sovereignty of the 5hilippines, support the Constitution, and defend the *epublic
against all enemies, foreign and domestic $ts aim is also to secure the integrity of the
national territory <econd, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the
local police forces were inade@uate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators $f
they were inade@uate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to as( the assistance of
the <ecretary of $nterior and Mocal Government, or such other authori%ed o?cials, for the
assistance of national law enforcement agencies )Ja(ar &. Bulayan, et al. vs. Gov.
'dusakur &. %an etc., et al, G* +o 1.G,2., Nuly 3, ,-1,4
%hree-%er( +i(it - 1 Rhen a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the
o?cial merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the MGC, then
his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced o?cial cannot be treated as
one full term as contemplated under the sub!ect constitutional and statutory provision that
service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit 9Bor8a, Jr. v. Co((ission on
Elections and Jose %. Ca"co, Jr )G* +o 133H2/, <eptember 3, 122., ,2/ <C*A 1/G 9122.:4:
$f the o?cial runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher
o?ce, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an
involuntary severance or interruption 9&onte'on v. Co((ission on Elections )G* +o
1.-HHH, April ., ,--., //1 <C*A /- 9,--.::
, An elective o?cial, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not see( the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the o?cial6s service ;or, he had become in the interim, ie,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citi%en 9dor(eo v.
Co((ission on Elections )G* +o 1HG2,G, ;ebruary H, ,--,, 3G0 <C*A 2- 9,--,:4 and
Socrates v. Co((ission on Elections )G* +o 1/H/1,, +ovember 1,, ,--,, 321 <C*A H/G4:
3G
3 The abolition of an elective local o?ce due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, wor( to interrupt the incumbent o?cial6s continuity of service
9+atasa v. Co((ission on Elections

G* +o 1/H.,2, >ecember 1-, ,--3, H1G <C*A
0-1 9,--3:
H 5reventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective o?cer6s continued
stay and entitlement to the o?ce remain una=ected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his o?ce during this period
9ldovino, Jr. v. C2&E+EC, G* +o 1.H.30, >ecember ,3, ,--2, 0-2 <C*A ,3H:
/ Rhen a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes o?ce, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from o?ce, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his
term of o?ce had the protest been dismissed 9+onzanida v. Co((ission on Elections,
G* +o 13/1/-, Nuly ,., 1222, 311 <C*A 0-, 91222:and $izon v. Co((ission on
Elections )G* +o 1.,-.., Nanuary 3-, ,--2, /GG <C*A /.2 9,--2:: The brea( or
interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the ma!or part of the 3-year
termL an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is
su?cient to brea( the continuity of service 9Socrates v. Co((ission on Elections )G*
+o 1/H/1,, +ovember 1,, ,--,, 321 <C*A H/G4, citing +onzanida v. Co((ission on
Elections, G* +o 13/1/-, Nuly ,., 1222, 311 <C*A 0-, 91222::
0 Rhen an o?cial is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes "nal after
said o?cial had served the full term for said o?ce, then his loss in the election contest
does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start
to "nish Jis full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of
term limits because the nulli"cation of his proclamation came after the expiration of the
term 92ng v. legre, G* +os 103,2/ I 1033/H, Nanuary ,3, ,--0, HG2 <C*A HG3
9,--0:and 3ivera III v. Co((ission on Elections )G* +os 10G/21 I 1G-/GG, Bay 2,
,--G, /,3 <C*A H1 9,--G::
There can be no @uibbling that, during the term ,--H-,--G, and with the enforcement of the
decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only
on Bay 2, ,--0 and served the term until Nune 3-, ,--G or for a period of a little over
one year and one month Conse@uently, unli(e Bayor Cng in Cng and Bayor Borales in
*ivera, it cannot be said that Bayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire ,--H-
,--G term to which he was otherwise entitled )'undo v. Co((ission on Elections -
G* +o ,-1G10, Nanuary ., ,-134
5unong barangay of municipality of <orsogon for 1st two terms Fy the time he was elected
for his 3
rd
term, the municipality had been merged with another municipality to form
the City of <orsogon Territorial !urisdiction and inhabitants the same +atasa v.
C2&E+EC a?rmed >is@uali"ed to run for a fourth term )+aceda v. C2&E+EC - G* +o
1.,.0G, +ovember ,/, ,--.4
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local o?cial merely served
the balance of the latter6s term of o?ceL it is not a full three-year term $t also goes
without saying that an incumbent elective local o?cial against whom a recall election is
initiated and who nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed as being a
continuing term of o?ce and not as a brea( in rec(oning three consecutive terms - A
recall election term then, not being a full three-year term, is not to be counted or used
as a basis for dis@uali"cation whether it is held prior or subse@uent to the nine-year full
three-term limit )&endoza v. C2&E+EC & +CT BE+T$C+E> in 'undo v. Co((ission on
Elections - G* +o ,-1G10, Nanuary ., ,-134
ARTICLE 4I & I("each(ent - a CCBEMEC Commissioner may not be charged with libel
without "rst being impeached )The *TC, not the Cmbudsman, or the <andiganbayan,
has !urisdiction over libel charges leveled against public o?cers4 )!eo"le v. Beni"ayo -
G* +o 1/HHG3, April ,H, ,--24
FET*ASAM C; 5OFM$C T*O<T - 'acts which are !ust short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of
duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers' $n other words, acts that
should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from o?ce may be less
than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as
the other grounds for impeachment )Gonzales v. 2Cce of the !resident - G* +o
120,31, <eptember H, ,-1,4
3.
Jence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to
cover all (inds of o?cial wrongdoing and plain errors of !udgment, this should remain
true even for purposes of removing a >eputy Cmbudsman and <pecial 5rosecutor from
o?ce Jence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made statutory
grounds for the removal by the 5resident of a >eputy Cmbudsman and <pecial
5rosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope
Fetrayal of public trust could not suddenly 'overreach' to cover acts that are not
vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment
)Gonzales v. 2Cce of the !resident - G* +o 120,31, <eptember H, ,-1,4
32
The Jouse of *epresentatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment
$ndubitably, an impeachment is not a !udicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise
)Gutierrez v. %he >ouse of 3e"resentatives - G* +o 123H/2, Barch ., ,-114
7initiation ta(es place by the act of "ling of the impeachment complaint A+> referral to
the Jouse of Committee on Nustice8 xxx $mpeachment proceedings are sub!ect to
!udicial review )?rancisco v. >3 - G* +o 10-,01 +ovember 1-, ,--34
*eferring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding Rith
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints "led, more than one lighted matchstic(s
)sic4 light the candle at the same time Rhat is important is that there should only be
C+E CA+>ME that is (indled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subse@uent matchstic(s can no longer re(indle the candle )Gutierrez v. %he >ouse of
3e"resentatives, G* +o 123H/2, ;ebruary 1/, ,-114
+o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same o?cial more than once
within a period of one year
Contrary to petitioner6s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution
mentions is impeachment 7proceedings8 <u?ce it to state that the Constitution allows
the indictment for multiple impeachment o=enses, with each charge representing an
article of impeachment, assembled in one set (nown as the 7Articles of $mpeachment8
$t, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable o=ense )Gutierrez v. %he >ouse of 3e"resentatives , G* +o 123H/2,
;ebruary 1/, ,-114
A person no longer in o?ce may still be impeached & penaltyE dis@uali"cation from public
o?ce
5romulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodWthat is, to
ma(e (nown $t is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate
its $mpeachment *ules, in much the same way that the Nudiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the cler( of
court for "ling and publication $t is not for this Court to tell a co-e@ual branch of
government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a
speci"c method of promulgation )Gutierrez v. %he >ouse of 3e"resentatives - G* +o
123H/2, ;ebruary 1/, ,-114 To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word
7promulgate,8 it does not necessarily mean to publish in the C?cial Ga%ette or in a
newspaper of general circulation 5romulgation, as used in <ection 39.:, Article Q$ of
the Constitution, suitably ta(es the meaning of 7to ma(e (nown8 as it should be
generally understood )Gutierrez v. %he >ouse of 3e"resentatives, G* +o 123H/2,
Barch ., ,-114
Sandigan'ayan -Criginal Nurisdiction & )a4 violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt 5ractices Act,
where the accused are o?cials occupying the following positions, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity & C?cial of the Executive Franch with the
position of regional director or higher or with a salary grade level ,G, including
provincial governors, vice-governors, board members, provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads#city mayors, vice-mayors, city
councilors, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department
heads#o?cials of the diplomatic service from consuls or higher#5A-5A; colonels or 5+
captains and all o?cers of higher ran(#o?cers of the 5+5 while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the ran( of senior superintendent or higher#city
or provincial prosecutors and their assistants and o?cials and prosecutors in the C?ce
of the Cmbudsman and <pecial 5rosecutor#presidents, directors, trustees or managers
of GCCCs, state universities or educational institutions or foundations # Bembers of
Congress and o?cials with <G,G and up # Bembers of the !udiciary without pre!udice to
the Constitution # Chairmen and Bembers of the Constitutional Commissions without
pre!udice to the Constitution # All other national and local o?cials with <G,G or higher #
)b4 other o=enses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by public o?cials and employees mentioned above in relation to their o?ce
)where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years or a "ne of 50,----- )&adarang v. Sandigan'ayan4 # )c4
civil and criminal cases "led pursuant to and in connection with EC +os 1, ,, 1H and
1H-A issued in 12.0 & se@uestration cases
H-
Criginal Nurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, ha'eas
cor"us, in!unction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
!urisdiction, provided that !urisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
<C
The <andiganbayan has appellate Nurisdiction over "nal !udgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original !urisdiction or their
appellate !urisdiction
Conse@uently, we agree with the CA6s consolidated decision promulgated on <eptember 3-,
,--. that the *TC 9Franch 13.:, not the <andiganbayan, had !urisdiction because Civil Case
+o -H-1-H2 did not involve a se@uestration-related incident but an intra-corporate
controversy )+ote & 5CTC is a se@uestered corporation4 )!hili""ine 2verseas
%eleco((unications Cor"oration v. frica, G* +o 1.H0,,, Nuly 3, ,-134
All these !udicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be present before
assets or properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namelyE 9a: they must have
'originated from the government itself,' and 9b: they must have been ta(en by former
5resident Barcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means
)3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines v. 3eyes-Bakuna,a, G* +o 1.-H1., August ,., ,-134
The <andiganbayan has exclusive original !urisdiction over the criminal action involving
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Barcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates )frica v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +o
1G,,,,, +ovember 11, ,-134
Diolations of *A +o 3-12 by a municipal mayor come within the exclusive original !urisdiction
of the <andiganbayan because under *A +o 0G/., otherwise (nown as the Compensation
and 5osition Classi"cation Act of 12.2, municipal mayors are local o?cials classi"ed as Grade
7,G8 )Finay v <andiganbayan, Caballero v <andiganbayan - G* +os 13G3//-/.,
<eptember ,/, ,--G4 - The <andiganbayan has !urisdiction over a member of the
<angguniang 5anlungsod whose salary grade is below ,G and charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the 5hilippines )!eo"le v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +o 102--H, <eptember 1/,
,-1-4
Carandang was correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not sub!ect to the
administrative authority of the Cmbudsman and to the criminal !urisdiction of the
<andiganbayan because *adio 5hilippines +etwor(, $nc 9*5+: was not a government-owned
or -controlled corporation, although se@uestered by the 5CGGL hence, he was not a public
o?cial or employee )zarcon v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +o 110-33, ;ebruary ,0, 122G, ,0.
<C*A GHG4 )Carandang v. $esierto, G* +o 1H.-G0, Nanuary 11, ,-114
<andiganbayan has !urisdiction over presidents, directors, trustees or managers of all GCCCs,
whether or not with original charters )!eo"le v. Sandigan'ayan4
Nudges may be prosecuted before the <andiganbayan even if they come under the
administrative supervision of the <C Administrative charges shall defer "ling of
criminal charges based on the same o=ense by the <pecial 5rosecutor before the
<andiganbayan )2ra" v. Sandigan'ayan4 FOT - Balsa(o v. Suan )citing 3allos v. Gako
and Calle8a v. Santelices4 & an administrative case against a !udge must be held in
abeyance if the basis for the administrative case is a case pending review by or appeal
before the CA
Rhile it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the *TC is reviewable by certiorari, the
same was incorrectly "led with the CA Bagno should have "led the petition for
certiorari with the <andiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate !urisdiction over the
*TC since the accused are public o?cials charged of committing crimes in their
capacity as $nvestigators of the +ational Fureau of $nvestigation )&agno v. !eo"le,
G* +o 1G1/H,, April 0, ,-114
2('uds(an - The CBFO><BA+ is the ACT$D$<T RATCJBA+[ )2('uds(an v. 3acho, G*
+o 1./0./, Nanuary 31, ,-114
$n more concrete terms, we rule that sub!ecting the >eputy Cmbudsman to discipline and
removal by the 5resident, whose own alter egos and o?cials in the Executive >epartment are
sub!ect to the Cmbudsman6s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at ris( the
independence of the C?ce of the Cmbudsman itself The C?ce of the Cmbudsman, by
H1
express constitutional mandate, includes its (ey o?cials, all of them tas(ed to support the
Cmbudsman in carrying out her mandate Onfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-
granted independence is what <ection .9,: of *A +o 0GG- exactly did Fy so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the
C?ce of the Cmbudsman, but inevitably with the principle of chec(s and balances that the
creation of an Cmbudsman o?ce see(s to revitali%e Rhat is true for the Cmbudsman must
be e@ually and necessarily true for her >eputies who act as agents of the Cmbudsman in the
performance of their duties The Cmbudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete
trust in her subordinate o?cials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they
are sub!ect to pressures and controls external to her C?ce This need for complete trust is
true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy li(e the 5hilippines where graft
and corruption is still a ma!or problem for the government ;or these reasons, <ection .9,: of
*A +o 0GG- 9providing that the 5resident may remove a >eputy Cmbudsman: should be
declared void )Gonzales v. 2Cce of the !resident, G* +o 120,31, Nanuary ,., ,-1H,
*esolution on Botion for *econsideration4
Fy clear provision of the Constitution, it is only the C?ce of the Cmbudsman, which includes
her >eputies, that is endowed with constitutional independence The inclusion of the C?ce of
the <pecial 5rosecutor with the C?ce of the Cmbudsman in <ection 3 of *epublic Act +o
0GG- does not ipso facto mean that the C?ce of the <pecial 5rosecutor must be a=orded the
same levels of constitutional independence as that of the Cmbudsman and the >eputy
Cmbudsman The law simply de"nes how the C?ce of the <pecial 5rosecutor is attached
and, therefore, coordinated with the C?ce of the Cmbudsman Thus, the provision of <ection
., 5aragraph 9,: of *epublic Act +o 0GG- which provides for the power of the 5resident to
remove the <pecial 5rosecutor is valid and constitutional )Gonzales v. 2Cce of the !resident,
G* +o 120,31, Nanuary ,., ,-1H, *esolution on Botion for *econsideration, Concurring and
Se"arate 2"inion of J. +eonen4
The primary !urisdiction of the Cmbudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public
o?cer or employee applies only in cases cogni%able by the <andiganbayan $n cases
cogni%able by regular courts, the Cmbudsman has concurrent !urisdiction with other
investigative agencies of government )2Cce of the 2('uds(an v. 3odriguez, G* +o
1G,G--, Nuly ,3, ,-1-4
Rhen the City 5rosecutor is deputi%ed by the C?ce of the Cmbudsman, he comes under the
7supervision and control8 of the Cmbudsman which means that he is sub!ect to the power of
the Cmbudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutor6s decision
)Estandarte v. !eo"le, G* +os 1/0./1-//, ;ebruary 1., ,--.4
The Cmbudsman can conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute criminal cases
involving public o?cers and employeesL not only those within the !urisdiction of the
<andiganbayan, but those falling within the !urisdiction of regular courts as well ))y v.
Sandigan'ayan, G* +o 1-/20/-G-, Barch ,-, ,--14
The Cmbudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint
$ndeed, we have said in Bnecht v. $esierto )3/3 5hil H2H 9122.:4 and later in &a('urao, Inc.
v. 2Cce of the 2('uds(an )32. 5hil G0, 9,---:4 and Baraan v. 2Cce of the 2('uds(an
)HG0 5hil /30 9,--H:4 that should investigating o?cers "nd a complaint utterly devoid of
merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal Boreover, it is also within their
discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted The
Court has undoubtedly ac(nowledged the powers of the Cmbudsman to dismiss a complaint
outright without a preliminary investigation in %he !residential d >oc ?act-?inding
Co((ittee on Behest +oans v. $esierto )H3G 5hil G-, 9,--,:4 Re reiterate that the
Cmbudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be "led,
including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted The Court therefore gives due
deference to the Cmbudsman6s decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in
this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent Delasco )Judge ngeles v.
Gutierrez, G* +os 1.2101 I 1.21G3, Barch ,1, ,-1,4
The Cmbudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or
omission of any public o?cial or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
un!ust, or improper $t does not re@uire that the act or omission be related to or be connected
with or arise from the performance of o?cial duty )<ee Santos v. 3asalan, citing ;as#uez v.
>o'illa-linio, G* +os 11..13-1H, April ., 122G, ,G1 <C*A 0G, GH4
The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of the Cmbudsman to investigate o=enses
involving public o?cials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authori%ed
agencies of the government in relation to the o=ense charged )>onasan v. !anel of
H,
Investigating !rosecutors of the $e"art(ent of Justice, G* +o 1/2GHG, April 13, ,--H, H,G
<C*A H04 Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Cmbudsman may share its authority to
conduct an investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other
agencies )li(e the 5residential Anti-Graft Commission or the Civil <ervice Commission4
)+acson v. Executive Secretary, G* +os 10/322 and 10/HG/, Bay 3-, ,-114
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Cmbudsman over a public school teacher is
not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the >epEd, which has
concurrent !urisdiction under the provisions of the Bagna Carta for 5ublic <chool Teachers
)2Cce of the 2('uds(an v. Bedrano, G* +o 1GG/.-, Cctober 1G, ,--.4
There are , (inds of administrative cases against municipal o?cers & )14 those related to the
discharge of the functions of their o?ce )neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other
forms of maladministration of o?ce4 and ),4 those not so connected with said functions
Onder the ,
nd
category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not lin(ed with the
performance of o?cial duties, conviction by "nal !udgment is re@uired as a condition
precedent to administrative action )!al(a v. ?ortich4
Administrative o=enses do not prescribe )2Cce of the 2('uds(an v. de Sahagun, G* +o
10G2.,, August 13, ,--.4
The period )of one year4 stated in <ection ,-9/: of *A +o 0GG- does not refer to the
prescription of the o=ense but to the discretion given to the Cmbudsman on whether it would
investigate a particular administrative o=ense The use of the word 7may8 in the provision is
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion $t is, therefore, discretionary
upon the Cmbudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint even if it
was "led after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of )&elchor v.
Gironella4
The principle of res 8udicata would not preclude the Cmbudsman from ordering another
review of a complaint, for he or she may revo(e, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous
rulings of a predecessor in o?ce )lvarez v. !eo"le, G* +o 12,/21, Nune ,2, ,-114
The decision of the Cmbudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be
stayed by the "ling of an appeal or the issuance of an in!unctive writ The
aforementioned <ection G is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal
and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he
did not receive by reason of the removal The CA6s issuance of a preliminary
mandatory in!unction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Cmbudsman in
this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-ma(ing powers of the
Cmbudsman under <ection 13 9.:, Article Q$ of the Constitution, and <ections 1. and ,G
of *A +o 0GG-, which grants the C?ce of the Cmbudsman the authority to
promulgate its own rules of procedure The issuance of an in!unctive writ renders
nugatory the provisions of <ection G, *ule $$$ of the *ules of 5rocedure of the C?ce of
the Cmbudsman )?acura v. Court of ""eals, G* +o 100H2/, ;ebruary 10, ,-114
Rhere the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a "ne
e@uivalent to one month salary, the Cmbudsman6s decision shall be "nal, executory, and
unappealable )%olentino v. +oyola, G* +o 1/3.-2, Nuly ,G, ,-11, 0/H <C*A H,-, H31-H3,L
2Cce of the 2('uds(an @&indanaoA v. Cruza'ra, G* +o 1.3/-G, ;ebruary ,H, ,-1-, 013
<C*A /H2, //H-///L 3eyes, Jr. v. Belisario, G* +o 1/H0/,, August 1H, ,--2, /20 <C*A 31,
H3-H/L 3e"u'lic v. Canastillo, G* +o 1G,G,2, Nune ., ,--G, /,H <C*A /H0, //,L >errera v.
Bohol, H00 5hil 2-/, 21--211 9,--H:L +o"ez v. Court of ""eals, H3. 5hil 3/1, 3/.-3/2
9,--,:4 $ndeed, in one case, the Court went so far as to declare that in such cases, 'it
follows that the Court of Appeals has no appellate !urisdiction to review, rectify or
reverse')3e"u'lic v. Ba8ao, G* +o 10-/20, Barch ,-, ,--2, /., <C*A /3, 0/, citing
3e"u'lic v. ?rancisco, /32 5hil H33, H/- 9,--0:4 the order or decision of the Cmbudsman
Fut of course, the above principles are sub!ect to the rule that decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared "nal and unappealable by law are still 'sub!ect to !udicial review
if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error
of law, or when such administrative or @uasi-!udicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of
such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the
factual "ndings' )2rais v. l(irante, G* +o 1.112/, Nune 1-, ,-134
H3
$n Soriano v. Ca'ais, G* +o 1/G1G/, Nune ,1, ,--G, /,/ <C*A ,01, ,0/ this Court had the
occasion to discuss the appropriate recourse to ta(e from decisions or resolutions of the
Cmbudsman, and said - $n ?a'ian, we ruled that appeals from the decisions of the
C?ce of the Cmbudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be ta(en to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under *ule H3 of the 122G *ules of Civil
5rocedure, as amended Jere, petitioner6s complaint is criminal in nature $n Estrada
v. $esierto, we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the C?ce
of the Cmbudsman "nding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to "le an original action for
certiorari with this Court, not with the Court of Appeals $n cases when the aggrieved
party is @uestioning the C?ce of the Cmbudsman6s "nding of lac( of probable cause,
as in this case, there is li(ewise the remedy of certiorari under *ule 0/ to be "led with
this Court and not with the Court of Appeals )Belongilot v. Cu, G* +o 10-233,
+ovember ,H, ,-1-4
The Cmbudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service
an erring public o?cial other than a member of Congress and the Nudiciary )3e"u'lic
of the !hili""ines v. Ba8ao, G* +o 10-/20, Barch ,-, ,--24
Fut the "ling of the criminal action against an accused in court does not prevent the
Cmbudsman from exercising the power that the Congress has granted him <ection 1G of *A
0GG- providesE
<ection 1G $mmunities & x x x Onder such terms and conditions as it may
determine, ta(ing into account the pertinent provisions of the *ules of Court,
the Cmbudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other
evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, in@uiry or
proceeding being conducted by the Cmbudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
ob!ectives The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for per!ury
or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
o?ce
Jis above authority enables the Cmbudsman to carry out his constitutional mandate to
ensure accountability in the public service

9<uarto v. &arcelo, G* +o 102-H,, Cctober /,
,-11, 0/. <C*A /.-, 0--: $t gives the Cmbudsman wide latitude in using an accused
discharged from the information to increase the chances of conviction of the other accused
and attain a higher prosecutorial goal

9&a"a, Jr. v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +o 1--,2/, April ,0,
122H, ,31 <C*A G.3: $mmunity statutes see( to provide a balance between the state6s
interests and the individual6s right against self-incrimination To secure his testimony without
exposing him to the ris( of prosecution, the law recogni%es that the witness can be given
immunity from prosecution

9<uarto v. &arcelo, G* +o 102-H,, Cctober /, ,-11, 0/. <C*A
/.-, at /2G: $n such a case, both interests and rights are satis"ed
As it happened in this case, the Cmbudsman had already "led with the <andiganbayan the
criminal action against Bercado and the other respondents in Criminal Cases ,G/11-1H prior
to the Cmbudsman6s grant of immunity to Bercado Javing already ac@uired !urisdiction over
Bercado6s case, it remained within the <andiganbayan6s power to determine whether or not
he may be discharged as a state witness in accordance with <ection 1G, *ule 112 of the *ules
of Criminal 5rocedure )!eo"le v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +os 1./G,2-3,, Nune ,0, ,-134
rticle MI, Section 1: The right of the <tate to recover properties unlawfully ac@uired by
public o?cials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel
ARTICLE 4II &Rhile property of the <tate or any of its subdivisions patrimonial in character
may be the ob!ect of prescription, those 'intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth' are considered property of public dominion and
therefore not susceptible to ac@uisition by prescription )$rea( ;illage *eigh'orhood
ssociation v. Bases Conversion and $evelo"(ent uthority, G* +o 12,.20, Nuly ,H, ,-134
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namelyE
91: As a general rule and pursuant to the *egalian >octrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the <tate and are inalienable Mands that are not clearly under
HH
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the <tate and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposedL
9,: The following are excepted from the general rule, to witE
9a: Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under <ection 11
of the 5ublic Mand Act $f the mode is !udicial con"rmation of imperfect title
under <ection H.9b: of the 5ublic Mand Act, the agricultural land sub!ect of the
application needs only to be classi"ed as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicant6s possession and occupation of
the land dated bac( to Nune 1,, 12H/, or earlier Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises 9*epublic v $ntermediate Appellate Court, +o M-
G/-H,, +ovember ,2, 12.., 10. <C*A 10/, 1GH: and the applicant becomes
the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title Fy legal
"ction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property 9>issenting opinion of Nustice Teehan(ee in Banila
Electric Company v Castro-Fartolome, +o M-H20,3, Nune ,2, 12.,, 11H <C*A
G22, .13 :
9b: Mands of the public domain subse@uently classi"ed or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed
from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of ac@uiring ownership under the Civil
Code $f the mode of ac@uisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the re@uisite ac@uisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine @ua non in observance of the law 9Article 1113, Civil Code: that property
of the <tate not patrimonial in character shall not be the ob!ect of prescription
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present su?cient evidence to establish that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since Nune 1,, 12H/
Rithout satisfying the re@uisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since Nune 1,, 12H/, or earlier -
the land cannot be considered ipso !ure converted to private property even upon the
subse@uent declaration of it as alienable and disposable 5rescription never began to run
against the <tate, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under <ection
1H91: of the 5roperty *egistration >ecree Mi(ewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under <ection 1H9,: of the 5roperty *egistration >ecree unless Congress
enacts a law or the 5resident issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth )>eirs of &ala'anan v.
3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines, G* +o 1G22.G, <eptember 3, ,-134
H/
Onder the *egalian doctrine, the <tate is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the <tate )3e"u'lic of the
!hili""ines v. I("erial Credit Cor"oration, G* +o 1G3-.., Nune ,/, ,--.4
Mands of the public domain are classi"ed into agricultural, forest or timber )123/
Constitution4 and national par(s )12.G Constitution4 Cnly agricultural lands may be
alienated, but a prior positive act of the Government, declaring land as alienable and
disposable, by way of proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certi"cation, is re@uired )Secretary of the $e"art(ent of Environ(ent and
*atural 3esources v. Da", G* +o 10GG-G, Cctober ., ,--.4
A religious corporation controlled by non-;ilipinos cannot ac@uire and own lands even for
religious purposes )3o(an Catholic d(inistrator of $avao $iocese, Inc. v. +and
3egistration Co((ission4
The 12.G Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from ac@uiring any (ind of
alienable land of the public domain The length of possession of the land by the
corporation cannot be tac(ed on to complete the statutory 3- years ac@uisitive
prescriptive period Cnly an individual can avail of such ac@uisitive prescription since
both the 12G3 and 12.G Constitutions prohibit corporations from ac@uiring lands of the
public domain )3e"u'lic of the !hili""ines v. %..*. !ro"erties - G* +o 1/H2/3, Nune
,0, ,--.4
;orest lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in
any form A certi"cate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classi"ed
as forest, timber or mineral lands )+and Bank of the !hili""ines v. 3e"u'lic of the
!hili""ines - G* +o 1/-.,H, ;ebruary H, ,--.4
The transfer of land from Agro-Bacro >evelopment Corporation to Nambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Nambrich conveyed
the properties to petitioner who is a ;ilipino citi%en <ince the ban on aliens is intended
to preserve the nation6s land for future generations of ;ilipinos, that aim is achieved by
ma(ing lawful the ac@uisition of real estate by aliens who became ;ilipino citi%ens by
naturali%ation or those transfers made by aliens to ;ilipino citi%ens As the property in
dispute is already in the hands of a @uali"ed person, a ;ilipino citi%en, there would be
no more public policy to be protected The ob!ective of the constitutional provision to
(eep our lands in ;ilipino hands has been achieved ))nited Church Board for Forld
&inistries4 )Borro(eo v. $escallar - G* +o 1/231-, ;ebruary ,H, ,--24
in &uller v. &uller, )/-- <C*A 0/4 wherein the respondent, a German national, was see(ing
reimbursement of funds claimed by him to be given in trust to his petitioner wife, a
5hilippine citi%en, for the purchase of a property in Antipolo, the Court, in re!ecting the
claim, ruled thatE *espondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
expressly admitted his (nowledge thereof to this Court Je declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of the petitioner because of the said prohibition
Jis attempt at subse@uently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot
be sustained The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created
and resulted by operation of law in view of petitionerTs marriage to respondent <ave
for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondentTs
dis@uali"cation from owning lands in the 5hilippines is absolute +ot even an ownership
in trust is allowed Fesides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party
who is guilty of the fraud To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition )>o v. Gui - G* +o 13-11/, Nuly 10, ,--.4
Onder *epublic Act 9*A: +o HG,0, otherwise (nown as the Condominium Act, foreign
nationals can own 5hilippine real estate through the purchase of condominium units or
townhouses constituted under the Condominium principle with Condominium
Certi"cates of Title Considering that the rights and liabilities of the parties under the
Contract to <ell is covered by the Condominium Act wherein petitioner as unit owner
was simply a member of the Condominium Corporation and the land remained owned
by respondent, then the constitutional proscription against aliens owning real property
does not apply to the present case )>ulst v. !3 Builders, Inc - G* +o 1/030H,
<eptember ,/, ,--.4
H0
The term 7capital8 in <ection 11, Article Q$$ of the Constitution refers only to shares of stoc(
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to
common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stoc( comprising both
common and non-voting preferred shares )Ga('oa v. ?inance Secretary, G* +o
1G0/G2, Nune ,., ,-114
<ince the constitutional re@uirement of at least 0- percent ;ilipino ownership applies not only
to voting control of the corporation but also to the bene"cial ownership of the
corporation, it is therefore imperative that such re@uirement apply uniformly and across
the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category, comprising
the capital of a corporation xxx The Constitution expressly declares as <tate policy the
development of an economy 'e=ectively controlled' by ;ilipinos Consistent with such
<tate policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public
utilities to 5hilippine nationals, who are de"ned in the ;oreign $nvestments Act of 1221
as ;ilipino citi%ens, or corporations or associations at least 0- percent of whose capital
with voting rights belongs to ;ilipinos The ;$A6s implementing rules explain that ')f4or
stoc(s to be deemed owned and held by 5hilippine citi%ens or 5hilippine nationals, mere
legal title is not enough to meet the re@uired ;ilipino e@uity ;ull bene"cial ownership of
the stoc(s, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential' $n e=ect, the ;$A
clari"es, reiterates and con"rms the interpretation that the term 'capital' in <ection 11,
Article Q$$ of the 12.G Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with
full bene"cial ownership This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of
directors, coupled with full bene"cial ownership of stoc(s, translates to e=ective control
of a corporation xxx The 123/, 12G3 and 12.G Constitutions have the same 0- percent
;ilipino ownership and control re@uirement for public utilities li(e 5M>T Any deviation
from this re@uirement necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exempli"ed
by the 5arity Amendment This Court has no power to amend the Constitution for its
power and duty is only to faithfully apply and interpret the Constitution )>eirs of
Filson Ga('oa v. ?inance Secretary, G* +o 1G0/G2, Cctober 2, ,-1,4
<ection 1H xxx The practice of all professions in the 5hilippines shall be limited to ;ilipino
citi%ens, save in cases prescribed by law
ARTICLE 4III & the provisions of Article Q$$$ are not !udicially enforceable, particularly
<ection 3 thereof Article Q$$$, by itself, without the application of the e@ual protection
clause, has no life or force of its own )Serrano v. Gallant &ariti(e Services, Inc - G*
+o 10G01H, Barch ,H, ,--24
The wording of the provision is une@uivocal&&the farmers and regular farmwor(ers have a
right TC CR+ >$*ECTMS C* CCMMECT$DEMS TJE MA+>< TJES T$MM The basic law allows
two 9,: modes of land distributionWdirect and indirect ownership >irect transfer to
individual farmers is the most commonly used method by >A* and widely accepted
$ndirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative
to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers The afore@uoted <ec H
EQ5*E<<MS authori%es collective ownership by farmers +o language can be found in
the 12.G Constitution that dis@uali"es or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of
farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be
exercised xxx Clearly, wor(ers6 cooperatives or associations under <ec ,2 of *A
00/G and corporations or associations under the succeeding <ec 31, as di=erentiated
from individual farmers, are authori%ed vehicles for the collective ownership of
agricultural land Cooperatives can be registered with the Cooperative >evelopment
Authority and ac@uire legal personality of their own, while corporations are !uridical
persons under the Corporation Code Thus, <ec 31 is constitutional as it simply
implements <ec H of Art Q$$$ of the Constitution that land can be owned CCMMECT$DEMS
by farmers xxx )>acienda +uisita Incor"orated v. +uisita Industrial !ark Cor"oration,
G* +o 1G11-1, Nuly /, ,-11,4
The <tate shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between wor(ers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace )%he )niversity of the I((aculate Conce"tion v. *+3C, G* +o 1.11H0,
Nanuary ,0, ,-114
<ection 1- Orban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a !ust and humane manner +o resettlement of
urban or rural dwellers shall be underta(en without ade@uate consultation with them
and the communities where they are to be relocated
HG
ARTICLE 4I0 - <ection 3 - All educational institutions shall include the study of the
Constitution as part of the curricula They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism,
foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national
heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citi%enship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thin(ing, broaden scienti"c and
technological (nowledge, and promote vocational e?ciency At the option expressed in
writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their
children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours
by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to
which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government
Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards,
shall be owned solely by citi%ens of the 5hilippines or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citi%ens The Congress
may, however, re@uire increased ;ilipino e@uity participation in all educational
institutions The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in
citi%ens of the 5hilippines +o educational institution shall be established exclusively for
aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in
any school The provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools established for
foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by
law, for other foreign temporary residents All revenues and assets of non-stoc(, non-
pro"t educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties Opon the dissolution or cessation of
the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law 5roprietary educational institutions, including those
cooperatively owned, may li(ewise be entitled to such exemptions, sub!ect to the
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment <ub!ect to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments,
donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from tax
$nstitutional academic freedom - consists of four essential freedoms to determine for itself on
academic groundsE 91: who may teachL 9,: what may be taughtL 93: how it shall be
taughtL and 9H: who may be admitted to study +ote that these four essential freedoms
are given to the university as an institution, not to the professors or to the researchers
in that institution )Nustice ;elix ;ran(furter4 Camacho vs Corresis - G* +o 13H3G,,
August ,,, ,--,L 3.G <C*A 0,.L 030-03G -'Academic freedom is two-tiered W that of
the academic institution and the teacherTs
Rhile a school6s academic freedom entitles it to determine 7who may teach,8 said academic
freedom may not be invo(ed because the administrative charges against the
respondent, ie, nepotism, dishonesty, falsi"cation of o?cial documents, grave
misconduct, and conduct pre!udicial to the best interest of the service, are classi"ed as
grave o=enses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal
Although <ection H of *A +o .,2, grants to the board )of the school4 the power to
remove school faculty members, administrative o?cials, and employees for cause, this
power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and
o?cials Feing a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of
the C<C Career or non-career, a civil service o?cial or employee, is within the
!urisdiction of the C<C )Civil Service Co((ission v. So8or - G* +o 10.G00, Bay ,,,
,--.4
Every citi%en has a right to select a profession or course of study, sub!ect to fair, reasonable,
and e@uitable admission and academic re@uirements
<ection G ;or purposes of communication and instruction, the o?cial languages of the
5hilippines are ;ilipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English
ARTICLE 40 - sex reassign(ent & $n our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of the e=ects of sex reassignment The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based $t might
be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recogni%ed as having successfully changed his sex Jowever, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists $t can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-e@ual
branch of government, Congress )Silverio v. 3e"u'lic, G* +o 1GH0.2, Cctober ,,,
,--G4
H.
<ection 3 The <tate shall defend )14 The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthoodL ),4 The
right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
pre!udicial to their development
ARTICLE 40$ & The 5hilippine Uag may be changed only by constitutional amendment The
national anthem may be changed by law, sub!ect to rati"cation in a referendum
State I((unity - Onder the 5*$+C$5ME C; <CDE*E$G+ EOAM$TS C; <TATE< - ADA$MAFME to
foreign states insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local state
)Sy#uia v. l(eda +o"ez4
There are two conUicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and "rmly
established According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recogni%ed only with
regard to public acts or acts 8ure i("erii of a state, but not with regard to private acts
or acts 8ure gestionis 9Emphasis suppliedL citations omitted: xxx The restrictive theory
came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities
remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions This is particularly
true with respect to the Communist states which too( control of nationali%ed business
activities and international trading )>oly See v. 3osario, G* +o 1-12H2, 1 >ecember
122H, ,3. <C*A /,H, /3/, cited in China *ational &achinery H E#ui"(ent Cor"oration
v. Sta. &aria, G* +o 1.//G,, ;ebruary G, ,-1,4
<uit for damages for defamatory remar(s & statements were made by petitioners as o?cers
of the O< Government & considered suit against the state )Sanders v. ;eridiano4
$; A <O$T A<K< ;C* a?rmative relief on the part of the <tate, li(e the passage of a special
appropriations law, then it is against it, and the <tate may invo(e its immunity
Ctherwise, it is only a suit against its o?cers, which can act on the relief prayed for in
the suit without further <tate intervention
Garcia v. Chief of Sta9 & claim for damages for in!uries was considered a suit against the
<tate, since the latter would need to appropriate funds to satisfy the claim - 3uiz v.
Ca'ahug & claim for payment of architectural fees, for which appropriations had already
been made was considered a suit against the <ecretary of +ational defense alone, and
did not involve the <tate - Santiago v. 3e"u'lic & suit purely for the revocation of a
donation on the ground of the failure of the Government to comply with its obligations
is not a suit against the <tate
$f a government agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter The
simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the
functions it is performing Bunicipal corporations, for example, li(e provinces and cities,
are agencies of the <tate when they are engaged in governmental functions and
therefore should en!oy the sovereign immunity from suit +evertheless, they are sub!ect
to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that
they can sue and be sued $f it is not incorporated, it is necessary to determine the
nature of the functions in which the agency is engaged, so as to hold it suable if they
are proprietary and not suable if they are governmental The test in every case is the
nature of the primary functions being discharged
BO+$C$5AM CC*5C*AT$C+< may be suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be suedL FOT they are generally not liable for torts committed
by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if
it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity )!alafox v. !rovince of
Ilocos *orte & where the in!ury occurred in connection with the repair of streetsL and
%orio v. ?ontanilla & where a municipality was held liale for a tort committed in
connection with the celebration of a town "esta, which was considered a proprietary
function $n this case, people were in!ured when the stage for the "esta collapsed4
CC+<E+T & EQ5*E<< & General Maw & CA 3,G, as amended )claims against government to be
"led with the CCA & <pecial Maw & Berritt v Government & special law which allowed a
person to sue the 5hilippine Government for in!uries he sustained when his motorcycle
collided with a government ambulance )Government eventually found not to be liable,
because the ambulance was driven by a regular driver, who was not considered to be a
special agent of the government4
H2
$B5M$E> &when the <tate institutes a complaint FOT +CTE ?roilan v. !an 2riental Shi""ing Co
& where the government was held to have impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
"led a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting a claim for a?rmative
relief against the plainti=, to wit, the recovery of a vessel A+> +i( v. Bro,nell & the
<tate is not considered to have impliedly waived its immunity when it "les, as
successor-in-interest, a complaint in intervention to !oin the defendant in invo(ing the
doctrine of <tate immunity to secure the dismissal of the action $ts purpose was
merely to resist the claim Jence +o waiver of state immunity
& implied waiver when the Government enters into a contract, but, as ruled by the <upreme
Court in O<A v *ui%, suability would follow only if the contract is entered into by the
state in its proprietary capacity Governmental contracts )such as for the repair of
wharves4 do not result in implied waiver of the immunity of the <tate from suit
+ote )S v. Guinto, where the <upreme Court said that the operation by the O< Government
of restaurants in Camp Nohn Jay in Faguio City, and of barber shops in Clar( Air Fase
not covered by the doctrine of state immunity
*epublic v Dillasor & when the <tate consents to be sued, it does not thereby also consent to
the execution of any !udgment against it <uch execution will re@uire another waiver
Re further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invo(ed to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the ta(ing without !ust
compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being "rst resorted to
of the plainti=s6 property )3e"u'lic v. Sandigan'ayan, G* +o 2-HG., +ov ,, 1221,
,-H <C*A ,1,, ,31L &inisterio v. Court of ?irst Instance of Ce'u, +o M-3103/, Aug 31,
12G1, H- <C*A H0HL Santiago v. 3e"u'lic, +o M-H.,1H, >ec 12, 12G., .G <C*A ,2H4
$n *ational Electri=cation d(inistration v. &orales, the order of garnishment against the +EA
funds to implement the *TC >ecision was in issue, and we said that the CCA had
exclusive !urisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims
arising from the implementation of *epublic Act +o 0G/. Re observed therein that
7the *TC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the
parties recourse to the processes of the CCA8 )<ee +ational Electri"cation
Administration v Borales, G* +o 1/H,--, Nuly ,H, ,--G, /,. <C*A G2, .14 $n fact, we
even stated there that 7it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the CCA on the
post-audit to be conducted by it per its $ndorsement dated Barch ,3, ,---8 )$d, cited
in Agra v Commission on Audit - G * +o 10G.-G, >ecember 0, ,-11, En Fanc,
Meonardo-de Castro4
+o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries
Maws on retirement of military o?cers shall not allow extension of their service
The tour of duty of the Chief of <ta= of the armed forces shall not exceed three years
Jowever, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the
5resident may extend such tour of duty
<ection 0 The <tate shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in
scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission The authority of local executives over the police units in their !urisdiction
shall be provided by law
<ection 11 & )14 The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citi%ens
of the 5hilippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and
managed by such citi%ens ),4 The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in
commercial mass media when the public interest so re@uires +o combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed
The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for
the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare Cnly ;ilipino
citi%ens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citi%ens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry
shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive
and managing o?cers of such entities must be citi%ens of the 5hilippines
/-
ARTICLE 40II & Changes in the Constitution may be e=ected by a mere modi"cation in its
interpretation !eo"le v. !o(ar & declared a law granting maternity leave privileges as
unconstitutional, for violating the non-impairment clause
+a('ino v. C2&E+EC - G* +o 1GH1/3, Cctober ,/, ,--0 - )14 Two essential elements must
be present ;irst, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal +o agent
or representative can sign on their behalf <econd, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition The full text of the proposed amendments
may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it $f so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
7amendment8 and 7revision8 of the Constitution A people6s initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments *evision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, li(e altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of chec(s-
and-balances There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change a=ects substantial provisions of the constitution Cn
the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved *evision generally a=ects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally a=ects only the speci"c
provision being amended
The @uantitative test as(s whether the proposed change is 7so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the Asubstantial entirety6 of the constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions8 The court examines only the
number of provisions a=ected and does not consider the degree of the change
The @ualitative test in@uires into the @ualitative e=ects of the proposed change in the
constitution The main in@uiry is whether the change will 7accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision8
Rhether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper sub!ect of
in@uiry Thus, 7a change in the nature of )the4 basic governmental plan8 includes
7change in its fundamental framewor( or the fundamental powers of its Franches8 A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that
7!eopardi%e the traditional form of government and the system of chec( and balances8

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution A shift from
a Ficameral-5residential to a Onicameral-5arliamentary system, involving the abolition
of the C?ce of the 5resident and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, may, with the concurrence of two thirds of all its
members, call a constitutional convention in general terms only Thereafter, the same
Congress, acting this time as a legislative body, may pass the necessary implementing
law providing for the details of the constitutional convention )I('ong v. C2&E+EC4
A plebiscite may be scheduled on the same day as the regular elections )Gonzales v.
C2&E+EC, reiterated in 2ccena v. C2&E+EC4 There can be no piecemeal rati"cation
Rhole proposalfor amendment or revision must be submitted for approval, so the
people can have a proper 7frame of reference8 )%olentino v. C2&E+EC4
ARTICLE 40III & Section /: & After the expiration in 1221 of the Agreement between
the *epublic of the 5hilippines and the Onited <tates of America concerning Bilitary
Fases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the
5hilippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the <enate and, when the
Congress so re@uires, rati"ed by a ma!ority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recogni%ed as a treaty by the other
contracting <tate
may God hold you in the palm of His hand.
/1