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The connection between the %aestheticization of politics& and fascism has become'a commonplace', says artin.ay. The main point is that it is possible and plausible to derive from Benjamin not only a critiue of fascist aesthic.ized / + politics but also an alternative conception of a radical democratic aesthetic politics.
The connection between the %aestheticization of politics& and fascism has become'a commonplace', says artin.ay. The main point is that it is possible and plausible to derive from Benjamin not only a critiue of fascist aesthic.ized / + politics but also an alternative conception of a radical democratic aesthetic politics.
The connection between the %aestheticization of politics& and fascism has become'a commonplace', says artin.ay. The main point is that it is possible and plausible to derive from Benjamin not only a critiue of fascist aesthic.ized / + politics but also an alternative conception of a radical democratic aesthetic politics.
Benjamin on aesteti!i"e# $o%iti!s& Benjamin wrote the sound-bite about the fascist connotations of the aestheticization of politics that serves the left as a condensed argument. Yet, Benjamins thoughts on this issue are not as clear-cut as his slogan suggests. His esoteric formulations provide theoretical ammunition both for a variety of conceptions of aestheticized politics, from the prevalent left critiue against the aestheticization of politics, to my contrasting argument that the problem is not that politics is aestheticized, but the ways that it is aestheticized, by fascism and capitalism. !n this essay ! ma"e my own effort at interpreting Benjamins meaning, while paying attention to and evaluating some of the main competing interpretations. #iven that $the connection between the %aestheticization of politics& and fascism has become ' a commonplace, as (artin )ay says, one might e*pect there to be a fairly clear-cut and commonly accepted conception of that connection. + Yet, given the diverse conceptualizations of fascism as aestheticized politics, it becomes even more apparent that the critical charge of $aestheticization resists focus, threatens incoherence and $loses any rigor as an analytical model. , -his is the case because politics is not so much aestheticized as already aesthetic, and because there are multiple forms of articulation between politics and aesthetics. -he main point ! aim to establish in this essay is that it is possible and plausible to derive from Benjamin not only a critiue of fascist aesthic.ized/ + politics but also an alternative conception of a $communist or radical democratic aesthetic politics, a conception that is immanent in the contradictory conditions of technologically mediated politics of capitalist societies. !n spite of Benjamins categorical condemnation of aestheticized politics, his sound bite is better read as e*plicit condemnation of a particular .reactionary fascist/ type of aesthetic.ized/ politics and implicit commendation of another .progressive communist/ type. 0o what does Benjamin mean by the $aestheticization of politics1 His "ey comments, placed in the epilogue to his famous essay, $-he 2or" of 3rt in the 3ge of its -echnological 4eproducibility, reuire some unpac"ing. 5 -he first point to note is that he does not mean it as a synonym for fascism. 2hile $The logical outcome of fascism is an aestheticizing of political life, it does not follow that the outcome of aestheticizing politics is fascism, which is often the way the statement is understood. Benjamin writes instead that $All efforts to aestheticize politics culminate in one point. That one point is war. However, the structure of his argument means that it is only $the aestheticizing of politics, as practiced by fascism that culminates in war, so that logically room is left for other practices of aestheticized politics. !n that case, the $politicizing [of] art by communism could be one of those practices, an alternative organization of the categories of politics and aesthetics rather than a reversal of a causal flow. 6 $Benjamin failed to recognize, 4ichard 2olin writes, $that in practice an aestheticized politics and a politicized art are, at least formally spea"ing, euivalents. 7 , But fascism is not only a political and economic response to capitalist crisis, as in dictatorship and corporativism, but also an aesthetic one. -he aesthetic aspect enters Benjamins account in that fascism $sees its salvation in granting e*pression to the masses - but on no account granting them 8property9 rights. -his e*pressionist aesthetic has a virtual or phenomenalistic sense, in that it does not change the conditions of class division and uneual property relations, but appears to address social conflict. !t is accompanied by the fascist conception, e*emplified by (arinetti, of war both as beautiful though destructive .$war .. enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine-guns/ and as human mastery of technology for its own purposes. :urthermore, fascist war is $the consummation of lart pour lart, referring to the sense of aesthetic autonomy. 2ar also gratifies $sense perception altered by technology, a distorted form of ordinary sense perception that is elevated into an ;lympian, $contemplation which is so detached that $self-alienation has reached the point where it 8human"ind9 can e*perience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure. < !n the epilogue alone there are a cluster of meanings of aesthetics = .inauthentic/ e*pression, .destructive or disharmonious/ beauty, autonomy .of politics as an aestheticized practice from material and ethical concerns/, elevated .anti-material/ sensuousness. -here is significant overlap between this set of meanings of aesthetics and 2elschs networ" of traditional aesthetics. > !t is significant for my argument that Benjamin focuses on certain aesthetic concepts and meanings, those of the #erman !dealist aesthetic tradition, when characterizing the fascist aestheticizing of politics, because this again implies that other forms of aesthetic.ized/ politics are possible. 5 However, this initial presentation offers only limited illumination of Benjamins meaning, as the epilogue has to be understood in light of the preceding essay .as well as the essay in relation to his other wor"/. His notion of aestheticized politics relates not only to a ne*us of fascism, war, technology and idealist aesthetics, touched on above, but also includes in that ne*us the changing character of art, especially in relation to its $aura, and of the human sensorium, or sensory perception. -he artwor" essay belongs to a series of essays written by Benjamin in the +?5@s about the relationship between art and technology, so that at first blush $there appears to be a disproportion between the uestion of what constitutes a wor" of art and the political issues of fascism and communism. A
-he following account demonstrates the proportion between those issues, and in doing so demonstrates both the comple*ity and specificity of Benjamins understanding of aestheticized politics. (y e*position attempts to deal in turn with the themes of war, technology, technological reproducibility and the wor" of art, aura, the arts of technological reproducibility, and the relationship between arts and the masses, although the richly interwoven fabric of Benjamins thought and writing defies any neat separations. 'a( 3 "ey precursor to Benjamins remar"s in the epilogue about aestheticized politics leading to war is his review essay, $-heories of #erman :ascism, where the connection between war and technology is baldly stated asB $3ny future war will also be a slave revolt of technology. ? Benjamin understands fascism and the $imperialist war that 6 ensues from it as a response to a structural contradiction in capitalism between the development of technology as a force of production and the relations of production, especially property relations. -he horror of war is $determined by the discrepancy between the enormous means of production and their inadeuate use. 2ar is the $unnatural use to which the $productive forces ' impeded by the property system are put, war being an uprising on the part of technology, which demands repayment in human material for the natural material society has denied it. +@ 3s 3nsgar Hillach e*plains, in Benjamins (ar*ist schema the $increase in productive forces accompanied by socio-economic limitations is woven into a figure of social $energistic relations, in which war is a $regressive release of energies. ++ 2ar is thus symptomatic of a more widespread $misalignment between the technological dynamic and the mode of social ordering that had become destructive by the twentieth century not only in war, but also in the general dysfunctionality of accelerated technological production for human needs. +,
However, the logic of Benjamins argument is that there is a $natural use for productive, technological forces that will or could come about when society is $mature enough to ma"e technology its organ, and effect a $harmonious balance between humanity and technology. +5 Benjamin does not hold that technological developments are themselves responsible for the descent into war, which he instead ascribes to the discrepancy between technological and social arrangements. !f imperialist war is the regressive release of technological, productive forces, why is it the culmination of aestheticized politics1 !t is so because of the way that fascism simultaneously abuses technology, art and the masses, the way it directs and releases 7 social energies. :ascism is a way of diverting both the energies of technological productive forces and $proletarianized masses into the destructive e*penditure of warB $only war, ma"es it possible to set a goal for mass movements on the grandest scale while preserving traditional property relations. +6 -he diversion of the energies of the masses is achieved aesthetically, that is, both through a particular "ind of e*pressionist, idealist, autonomous and auratic aesthetics and by means of the modern, technologically reproducible arts, which are more often referred to as mass media. Benjamin e*plains that #erman fascism as an ideology e*presses #erman nationalism, which turns losing the :irst 2orld 2ar into an $inner victory for the $perfect reality of a mystical $eternal #ermany. 3ccording to fascism, war is $the highest manifestation of the #erman nation, a recreation of heroism even though mechanized, technological warfare $dispenses with all the wretched emblems of heroism. +7 :ascism, in effects, aestheticizes war by returning to it a ritual, cultic and auratic value that technological developments have ta"en away from both war and art. +< :ascism, says Benjamin, uses technology to $recreate the heroic features of #erman !dealism, which according to Hillach means that in war social action is aestheticized as symbol and e*pression of $the essential interior, of a metaphysical basis to life and as $a substitute satisfaction for the masses and for $the repressed need for ' 8collective social action9 driven bac" into subjectivity. +> !n fascism, the idealist aesthetic of autonomous subjective freedom is e*pressed e*ternally and technologically. Te!no%o)* < -he articulation of aesthetics and technology is crucial to this understanding of fascism, in that technology should be $mediated by the human scheme of things to use and illuminate $the secrets of nature but instead is applied mystically $to solve the mystery of an idealistically perceived nature. +A 3s Csther Deslie notes, Benjamin follows (ar*s understanding of nature as mediated through human history, as an $anthropological nature that $has no e*istence other than through the process of human history. !n that sense, nature is itself $technological, including $not only the creaturely and physical, but also the man-made, cultural and historical. +? !n contrast, fascisms $idealistically perceived nature is at once supposed to be human .or #erman/ essential nature unmediated by human history but given in a mythical history, and yet is also a nature that is e*pressed technologically in machinic warfare. !t thus becomes possible for war to become beautiful in (arinettis words because it appears as if in war humanity is using technology to fulfill its natural destiny and in doing so blends harmoniously with technologyB $2ar ' establishes mans domination over the subjugated machine ' it inaugurates the dreamed-of metallization of the human body. ,@ But in this fascist articulation of war, technology and aesthetics, technology is not under collective social control but is in revolt against its abuse, while human"ind is so alienated from its potential for collective action that it enjoys its own destruction. Benjamin is uneuivocally opposed to the destructive abuse of technology in the :irst 2orld 2ar, the imperialist war in Cthiopia that (arinetti describes, and the war he senses will come as a result of the Eazi rise to power. But Benjamin is no enemy of technology, of the technologically reproduced arts, of the engagement of sensuousness in > politics and, ! would argue, of aesthetic politics per se. 0o, how should technology be used by society, and how should it be articulated with aesthetics1 3s Deslie says, $0o much hangs off Techni!, meaning the difference between the #erman word and the conventional Cnglish usage of $technology. -he former includes $the $material hardware, the means of production and the technical relations of production, covering the senses of techniue and technical as well as technological. ,+ -he third version of Benjamins artwor" essay omits a significant distinction drawn in the second version between $first Techni! and $second Techni!, which was itself a shift from the first versions distinction between first and second nature. Deslie e*plains that Benjamin anticipates $a harmonization or dialectical interpenetration of the person and technology in techno- consciousness, not a restoration of humanity to its pristine nature but $an augmented nature. ,, !ndeed, for Benjamin technology is ultimately not natures opposite but a $truly new configuration of nature. ,5
Techni! replaces nature because social development draws humanity further away from what might be called its $natural state. -his distancing is also given in the shift from first to second Techni!, which for Benjamin is mar"ed not by its technical development but the difference between first and second Techni!s respective $orientation and aimsB $2hereas the former made the ma*imum possible use of human beings, the latter reduces their use to the minimum, the former tending towards sacrifice, the latter to automation. 3lthough Benjamin associates first Techni! with ritual and magic, he claims that it $really sought to master nature, whereas ' 8second Techni!9 aims rather at an interplay between nature and humanity. -he reasoning behind this is that without the A development of technological productive forces, first Techni! had no prospect of $liberating human beings from drudgery. But on its own, neither will the second Techni!, which can only play between nature and humanity, ma"ing technology a social organ, when $humanitys whole constitution has adapted itself to the new productive forces which the second technology has set free. !n other words, only when the discrepancy between productive forces and social relations has been resolved would the $currently utopian goals of freedom from drudgery .as utopian as $a child who ' stretches out its hand for the moon as it would for a ball/ give way to solutions to $vital uestions affecting the individual. 3s Benjamin adds in a footnote, bringing humanity and technology to play is the $aim of revolutions which are $innervations of the collective. :ar from regarding technology as a reified enemy of humanity, Benjamin considers communism to be the successful harmonization of the two, one in which humanity is not so much in control of technology or nature, as master of its own $elemental social forces. ,6
(iriam Hansen e*plains that this distinction between first and second Techni! distinguishes Benjamins approach from $:ran"furt school critiues of technology that $assume an instrumentalist trajectory from mythical cunning to capitalist-industrialist modernity. 0econd Techni! appears to be concerned primarily with domination of nature only from the perspective of first Techni!, for which there is an e*istential need to dominate nature, and in bourgeois cultures $fetishizing an ostensibly pure and primary nature as an object of individual contemplation. Fnder capitalism and fascism, humanity is regressively attached to a non-e*istent first nature, in an effort to reverse the historical ? process of technological development. :or Benjamin, in contrast, the $issue is not how to reverse the historical process but how to mobilize, recirculate, and rechannel its effects. ,7 !n his materialist understanding of human and natural historyB $-he way in which human perception is organized = the medium in which it occurs = is conditioned not only by nature but by history. ,< -here is a materialist history not only of social and technological development but also of human nature, including human modes of perception or the sensorium. -here can be no $restoration of the sensorium to an instinctually intact, natural state but should be a history of the sensorium that includes $mutations of the physis causedGenabled by technology. ,> 3ccording to Haygill, $all e*perience for Benjamin is technological, since the term technology designated the artificial organization of perception. !t is not then a uestion of contrasting human sense e*perience and perception with its technological mediation, but regarding technology as a patterning of e*perience that is itself $reciprocally subject to change in the face of e*perience. ,A
-he "ey to a progressive channelling of the effects of technology on a humanity that changes with it, says Hansen, is innervation, which Benjamin considers collectively as revolution. 0he e*plains his concept of innervation in relation to a $neurophysiological process that mediates between internal and e*ternal, psychic and motoric, human and mechanical registers. !t is an $empowering rather than $defensive mimetic adaptation, a $two"way process that constructs a $porous interface between the organism and the world rather than shielding the organism from the world. 3ccording to Hansen, innervation will bring about interplay between humans and second Techni! only $if it +@ reconnects with the discarded powers of the first, with mimetic practices that involve the body.
-he second Techni! is distanced from human beings but the first ma"es full use of them, their bodies and senses, including in practices such as yoga mediation whose $imbrication of physical and mental energy har"s bac" to a ritualistic, premechanical conception of the technical.
-he e*panded notion of technology employed by Benjamin includes what :oucault would later call techniues or technologies of the self which are $forms of bodily innervation that can rebalance the relationship between humanity and technology. ,? Benjamin does not only refer to pre-modern and individualized practices but holds hold that the technologies of the reproducible arts, especially film, have the potential $to establish a balance between humans and technology. He puts his hope in $the possibility of countering the alienation of the human sensorium with the same means and media that are part of the technological proliferation of aestheticization. 5@ 3s Hansen writes, Benjamins attitude to the new medium of film, as to much else in modernity, is alert to its $failed opportunities and unrealized promises, through a $redemptive criticism. 5+ -he hope for redemption depends on collective innervation that connects and balances bodily, psychic and productive energies with the powers of both first and second Techni!. Benjamins vision of the potential relationship between technology, humanity and nature, all of which play and develop in relation to each other, glimmers through the crac"s of the actuality of capitalist and fascist abuse of technology and nature, or $the catastrophic effects of humanitys .already/ %miscarried ' reception of technology&. 5,
Fnder fascism, the potentiality of the second Techni! is repressed by using it as first ++ Techni!, as a form of ritual lin"ed to myths of 3ryan blood and soil, about an unchanging, essential nature. Fnder these circumstances, and especially in war, technology confronts humanity $as an uncontrollable force of %second nature,& just as overwhelming as the forces of a more elementary nature in archaic times. 55 -he contrast between progressive and regressive uses of technology is drawn by Haygill as one between $a concept of e*perience which responded to changes in technology, and one which used technology in order to monumentalize itself. :ascism resists changes in e*perience, and by refusing to change property relations adheres to $monumentalised e*isting social relations. !n contrast is the use of technology $to promote the transformation of e*perience itself, which entails transforming social relations to suit the development of technological forces of production. 56 3s we shall see, there is a close parallel between the way fascism abuses technology and the way it abuses aesthetics, or the arts that are technologically reproducible. )ust as there is for Benjamin a potential, progressive, communist relationship of humanity to technology that is countered by an actual, regressive fascist abuse, so is there a similar contrast between communist and fascist articulations of aesthetics and politics. Te!no%o)i!a% (e$(o#+!i,i%it* an# te -o(. o/ a(t -he connection between Benjamins attitude to technology and aesthetics runs through a "ey concept of the artwor" essay, namely technological reproducibility. ;n this point too there is a contrast drawn between the progressive potential of reproducibility and its capitalist and fascist abuse or $miscarried reception. -he basic idea of technological +, reproducibility is uite straightforward. 2hereas the #ree"s could reproduce artwor"s only by casting and stamping, woodcuts and lithography paved the way for photography that subseuently $freed the hand from the most important artistic tas"s, while film e*tended the reproduction of what the camera could capture to include sound. -he significance of the development of technological reproducibility is fourfoldB first, it $transformed the entire character of artI second, it $withers the $aura of the artwor", detaching the object $from the sphere of traditionI third, it $re#olutionizes $the whole social function of artI and fourth, it $changes the relation of the masses to art. 57 3ll four points are closely related and all allow for differing $receptions or responses. -echnological reproducibility changes the traditional concept of art as the manual production of original objects that have $uniue e*istence in a particular place, or a $here and now that grants art objects their $authenticity or $uintessence. 4eproduction jeopardises $the authority of the object by substituting $a mass e$istence for a uni%ue e$istence. 5< Fnderstood as a uniue, authentic object, the wor" of art maintains authority over its reception by appearing to be unchanging and eternally valid, reuiring the viewer to appreciate its conte*t and history. 3s Haygill puts it, Benjamin associates continued adherence to the traditional concept of art with monumentalism, a $refusal to ac"nowledge the passage of time within a wor" of art. 5> ;n this view, the transmissibility or passage of a wor" of art through history is already a form or reproducibility, but one that is denied by the emphasis on origin. -he uniueness and authenticity of the wor" of art relates to its $embededness in the conte*t of tradition and its service in rituals, $first magical, then religious, or its $cult value. 2hile it seems odd +5 that the ritualistic use value of art would still have any purchase in modernity, Benjamin notes that the secularization of cult value involves its displacement by authenticity in the sense of the $empirical uniueness of the artist or his creative achievement, or the replacement of objects of piety with beautiful images, commented on by Hegel.
Benjamin partly characterizes the shift in the transformation of arts nature in terms of the accentuation of e*hibition as opposed to cult value, which includes a shift from monumentality to $transitoriness and repeatability. -he reproducible artwor" is designed to be reproduced, to be detached from a uniue situation, to be able $reach the recipient in his or her own situation rather than in its uniue setting, li"e a recording of a symphony or a photographic negative, which can also pic" up sights and sounds the ear and eye might miss. -he transformation of art by technological reproducibility above all means that the media of reproduction, such as photography and film, become arts. -hey seem not to be arts only from the perspective of their cult rather than e*hibition value, but these uestions of perspective are for Benjamin intimately related to $the mass movements of our day, to fascism and communism.
4ather than mourning the loss of authenticity nostalgically, Benjamin argues that the technical reproducibility of art also has a positive social significance that is most evident in film, namely, $the liuidation of the value of tradition in the cultural heritage. 5A -he conditions for the .re/production of art ma"e it possible for art to brea" away from its role in reproducing the social authority of tradition, including the hierarchies and social distinctions sanctioned by it. However, this possibility will be realized only if the response to technological reproducibility is as +6 revolutionary as is the technology itself, or if the social conditions and the forces of production are aligned. A+(a -he $aura of the artwor" that withers because of technical reproducibility .that being the second of four significant outcomes of technological reproducibility/ as a concept encompasses originality, authenticity, uniueness, tradition, and eternal and cult values. ;n the face of it, the artwor" essay is about the $decay of the aura in art, but perhaps it is more accurate to say the essay turns on the responses to that decay. Benjamins immediate aim is to $neutralize a number of traditional concepts - such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery that serve fascism and replace them with ones that are adeuate to assess $tendencies of the development of art under the present conditions of production and which $are useful for the formulation of re#olutionary demands.
-he traditional concepts refer bac" to aura, reconnecting art to its ritual function. Benjamin uic"ly characterizes some modern developments of art and aesthetic discourse, those which assert the autonomy of art from moral, economic as well as ritual purposes, as responses to the loss of aura. :irst came $the doctrine of lart pour lart, followed in turn by a $negative theology, in the form of an idea of %pure& art, which rejects not only any social function but any definition in terms of a representational content.
:ascism is $the consummation of lart pour lart, because it ta"es the bourgeois ideology of aesthetic autonomy to e*tremes, pursuing the aesthetic value of beauty through war and turning death into an object of aesthetic contemplation. 5? +7 Benjamins concept of aura is more complicated than this uic" summary suggests, precisely because it does brea" with traditional aesthetic concepts that in his view are residues of a superstructure lagging behind transformations of the base. -he essay is often read as a critiue of fascisms attempt to return the aura to art and hence as a complete rejection of aura. !n Hewitts words, Benjamins $model of aestheticization rests upon a stigmatization of fascism as .aesthetic/ anachronism, as a false restoration of arts aura and as a $decadent and reactionary aesthetics. 6@ But Hansen points out that across his wor" $Benjamins attitude to the decline of the aura is profoundly ambivalent. 3lthough in the artwor" essay Benjamin does focus on the way in which technological reproducibility undermines the traditional aesthetics that is complicit with fascism by eliminating aura, Hansen claims he more consistently $tries to redeem an auratic mode of e*perience for a historical and materialist practice. 6+ !n order to use the concept of aura to $reconceptualize e*perience and $counter the bungled .capitalist-imperialist/ adaptation of technology, Benjamin has to $blast ' to pieces the received occultist and theosophist meanings of aura in order to be able to use it as a broader, non-aestheticist term that is not opposed to technological reproducibility. 6, -his would also give aura a sense that unbound it from fascism and aligned it instead with a progressive relationship with technology. ;ther than as a term encompassing traditional aesthetic concepts, aura is variously defined in the second and third versions of the artwor" essay asB $3 strange tissue of space and timeB the uniue apparition of a distance, however near it may be. ;nly the +< latter half of the phrase is included in the third version and e*pressly related to natural objects, such as $a mountain range on the horizon. 3ura is thus about temporal and spatial e*periences, related to something being in a uniue $here and now, or giving rise to a uniue e*perience. :ilm as non-auratic art offers new e*periences of space and time that are appropriate to the development of human perception and technological forces of production. -he #ree"s were compelled $to produce eternal #alues in their art because they could not reproduce them, thus attributing the highest aesthetic value only to artwor"s that were perfected at the very time and place of their creation. !n contrast, film is $the artwor! most capable of impro#ement, the finished product being selected from an e*cess of footage then edited and assembled in a manner that means it could always be reassembled differently. 65 :ilm thus destroys arts aura of eternal value, also demonstrating that art, human perception, productive forces, and the relation between humanity and nature are not fi*ed and eternal li"e a sculpted monument but are capable of transformation and improvement over time. )ust as communism transforms frozen social relations, so does film undo monumental aura, while each $affirms the flu* of identity and the permanent revolution of the organization of e*perience. 66 Hansen derives a second definition of aura from Benjamins $;n 0ome (otifs in BaudelaireB $a form of perception that %invests& or endows a phenomenon with %the ability to loo" bac" at us&. 67 3s in the artwor" essay, Benjamin claims that $photography is decisively implicated in the phenomenon of the %decline of the aura&, because it $records our li"eness without returning our gaze, or loo"ing bac" at us as a human would. $C*perience of the aura thus rests on the transposition of a response common in +> human relationships to the relationship between inanimate or natural object and man. -he e*perience is the same as Jrousts version of involuntary memory, and $comprises the %uniue manifestation of a distanceB, being $inapproachable. 6< 0o, to go bac" to the first definition, auratic e*perience can be distant although near .in time and space/ because it cannot be approached or ta"en hold of. 3s Hansen e*plains, auratic e*perience or returned gaze in the encounter with the non-human $ta"es possession of us and $confronts the subject with a fundamental strangeness within and of the self, or $with an e*ternal, alien image of the self. 6> Benjamins essay on Baudelaire delves into the latters lyrical poetry as a way of conjuring beauty among the shoc"s, fragmentation and ephemerality of urban modernity. )ust as Baudelaire finds beauty in shoc"ing modernity, so does Benjamin find in the shoc"ing encounter of auratic e*perience $self-recognition ua self-alienation and a $field of force set up between the polarities of distance and nearness. -his is one might say a redemptive shoc", a moment of $disjunctive temporality and self-dislocating refle*ivity in which it is possible to $both remember and imagine a different "ind of e*istence. -he uestion then is whether the arts of technical production, such as film, can $reactivate older potentials of perception and imagination that would enable human beings to engage productively, at a collective and sensorial level, with modern forms of self-alienation. 6A Hertainly, the fascist use of those arts that return to cultic practices in respect of both leaders and masses, presenting the latter with spectacles of beautiful semblance for contemplation, obstructs such a reactivation. A(ts o/ te!no%o)i!a% (e$(o#+!i,i%it* +A Yet, at points Benjamin seems to argue that the arts of technological reproduction are inherently progressive because they are anti-auratic. Jhotography, a $revolutionary means of reproduction, he says $emerged at the same time as socialism, as if the former necessarily conforms to the latter, e*cept for early portraits. Jhotographs, uite simply, are detached from their $here and now, from the time and place in which they were ta"en .thus reuiring captions/ and the perspective of an individual viewer is replaced by a technical apparatus. :ilm differs immensely from theatre because, among other things, the presence of the camera in place of the audience means that $the aura surrounding the actor is dispelled = and, with it, the aura of the figure he portrays. -he actors performance in film is also detached from the here and now of the performance, because it is not $a unified whole, but is assembled from many individual performances, recorded by an apparatus that changes the position of viewing with camera angles and close-ups, under technical conditions such as lighting, then reassembled as a montage, through editing. 6? !n the film studio, $the wor" of art is produced only means of montage and has $escaped the realm of %beautiful semblance&, meaning traditional and idealist aesthetics. 7@ -he hopes Benjamin has for the new arts of technological reproducibility vary between the second and third version of the essay, the third seeming more optimistic than the second in terms of the e*pert capacities of the audience, though both versions claim that it is $inherent in the technology of film ' that everyone who witnesses these performances does so as a uasi-e*pert. 7+ !n the third version, the audience is said to have $empathy with the camera, with the apparatus that subjects the performance $to a +? series of optical tests, thus permitting $the audience to ta"e the position of a critic ' -his is not an approach compatible with cult value. 7, -he audience thus seems to identify with the technological process of filming and editing, or the production of the artwor", and can thus be critical about the way the film has been made. 75 !n the second version the parallel passage has the actor performing $before a group of specialists, being tested by $a body of e*perts, as in a wor"-related aptitude test. -he urban audience identify not with the apparatus but the performer $ta"ing revenge on their behalf on the sort of industrial apparatus to which many of them are subjected daily, $not only by asserting his humanity ' against the apparatus, but by placing that apparatus in the service of his triumph. 76 Hhaplin in particular seemed to be a master of performing non-theatrically, $chopping up e*pressive body movements into a seuence of minute mechanical impulses that $render the law of the apparatus visible as the law of human movement. 77
!n doing so, he performs the possibility of constructing human subjectivity in concert with a technological modernity that disrupts traditional forms of authentic subjectivity. -he film actor thus demonstrates a productive alignment between technology and humanity, one not achieved between humanity and industrial technology because of the misalignment of social relations and forces of production. !n the second version of the essay, Benjamin ascribes to the reproducible arts a role a"in to second technology in general, in that the $primary social function of art today is to rehearse that interplay 8between nature and humanity ' The function of film is to train human beings in the apperception and reactions needed to deal with a #ast apparatus whose role in their li#es is e$panding almost daily. 3udiences, the masses, have little e*perience of the individual creation of a uniue object, but they do of technological production and industrial ,@ apparatus. !n this lightB $The most important social function of film is to establish e%uilibrium between human beings and the apparatus. 7< :ilm does this in part by rehearsing the $shoc" effects of modernity such as those e*perienced by $each passerby in big-city traffic, thereby providing a way for humanity to adapt itself $to the dangers threatening it. 7> 3s Haygill e*plains, reproducible arts $can serve in modern societies to master the elemental forces of a technological second nature, and as $a site in which to e*plore possible futures of the relationship between technology and the human which will create unprecedented e*periences. 7A Benjamin maintains that $as soon as the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applied to artistic production, the whole social function of art is re#olutionized. &nstead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice' politics. 7? -he change in the social function of art is the third of the four significant impacts of technological reproducibility listed earlier. 3ccording to 2olin, Benjamin means that art becomes $an instrument of political communication, but that is only one aspect of the ways in which, as Haygill says, art $serves to adapt humans to nature and nature to humans and now does so $by means of technology allied to politics rather than magic. <@ He also categorises three different perspectives in Benjamins artwor" essay on the political function of the reproducible arts, especially film, in relating humanity with technology and nature and giving rise to new e*periencesB $as a site for e*perimentationI $as an occasion for tactile critical enjoymentI and $as a form of cathartic inoculation. <+
,+ Hathartic inoculation, discussed only in the second version of the essay, occurs in relation to $the dangerous tensions which technology and its conse%uences ha#e engendered in the masses at large ( tendencies which at critical stages ta!es on a psychotic character. But certain films, themselves part of this dangerous $technologization, such as $3merican slapstic" comedies and Kisney films, as well as film figures that depict the dar"er unconscious, such as (ic"ey (ouse and Hharlie Hhaplin, can immunize the masses against $sadistic fantasies and masochistic delusions by encouraging $a therapeutic release of unconscious energies through $collective laughter at the $grotesue events they contain. !n a footnote, Benjamin ualifies his remar"s, noting that fascism easily appropriates the simultaneous $comic and ' horrifying effect of, and the $acceptance of bestiality and violence as inevitable concomitants of e*istence in such films. <,
-he $tactile critical enjoyment e*perienced through film relates to Kada, the contrast between tactility and contemplation, distraction, and architecture. Benjamin credits Kadaism with trying to produce the effects that film was to produce later, annihilating aura by producing artwor"s that $they branded as reproduction and which were not amenable to the traditional, bourgeois aesthetic attitude to artwor"s of $contemplative immersion. :ilm reuires a different aesthetic attitude which Benjamin labels $distraction .)erstreuung/, a word that also means amusement as well as dissipation. He means by this not inattention but $heightened attention that is induced by films $physical shoc! effect, the $percussive effect of $successive changes of scene and focus and the interruption of images by each other. <5 -his is the sort of shoc" identified ,, above that confronts the viewer with something alien to itself, such that film is the aesthetic .but also technological/ counterpart to $industrial modes of production and transportation. <6 Both Kada .morally/ and film .physically/ shoc" the viewer by $ta"ing on a tactile ' uality, reuiring not a cerebral, detached consideration but a physical, engaged response. <7 3s with most of Benjamins concepts, there is both a $dialectical movement and $constituted ambiguity to shoc", as both $the stigma of modern life, synonymous with the defensive shield it provo"es and thus with the impoverishment of e*perience and also a therapeutic moment of recognition that opens the way for $reclaiming collective and anthropological ' e*periences. << )ust as some form of technology .the reproductive arts/ is a way of transforming the failed capitalist reception of technology, so is a form of shoc" the appropriate response to modernity as a series of shoc"s. -he model for the tactile response to art is architecture, which can be appreciated optically, but for the most is received through $use and $habit. -he role of reproductive arts in rehearsing new relations between humans and technology is pertinent at this point too, in that $the tas!s which face the human apparatus of perception that ta"e $their cue from tactile reception or $reception in distraction, find in film their $true training ground. 0uch tactile reception is critical in that $the evaluating attitude reuires no attention, because evaluation occurs through use and enjoymentB $-he audience is an e*aminer, but a distracted one. <> 3gain, this suggests a very different form of aesthetic judgment to that of traditional aesthetics, which eschews sensuous enjoyment, a point that Benjamin ma"es in the second version when he remar"s that film is also central $for the ,5 theory of perception which the #ree"s called aesthetics, referring to bac" to the sensuous sense of aisthesis. <A -he third perspective on the artwor" identified by Haygill concerns films representation of the new human environmentB $;ur bars and city streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories. !n the third version of the artwor" essay Benjamin writes only of the positive aspects of the unconscious processes in films mediation of e*perience of the urban environment, sidestepping the psychotic reaction to technology. :ilm techniues such as close-up and slow motion further $insight into the necessities governing our lives by altering e*periences of space and time, revealing aspects of modernity to the cameras $optical unconscious that are not given to the conscious, seeing eye. <? Hentral to films e*perimentation with e*perience is $its radical restructuration of spatial and temporal relations, as a counterpart to industrial and urban modernitys e*periences of time and space. >@ -ogether with the psychotic response to technology countered by cathartic inoculation, Benjamins account of the unconscious processes is also dialectical, alert to the actualities as well as potentialities. !t is worthwhile to add to Haygills three categories or social functions of the technological artwor", e*tending Benjamins comments on tactility and the aura, a new or potential relation to things that is covered by the term mimesis. 3s mentioned above, this concept is central to delineating a progressive relation between humanity and technology in general. Hansen argues although Benjamin does not use the notion directly in the artwor" essay, vestiges of his earlier writing on the mimetic faculty are at wor" in it. !n ,6 contrast to the Jlatonic sense of mimesis as the copy of an original or a li"eness, in Benjamins usage mimesis refers to similarities between phenomena, similarities or correspondences that the human mimetic faculty both recognizes and produces. 0imilarities are distinguished from sameness, as in identical copies. (imesis overlaps with aura in that it also spea"s of a sensuous, embodied encounter between the human and non-human, specifically human imitation of nature, as in childrens game. !n particular, $it envisions a relationship with nature that is alternative to the dominant forms of mastery and e*ploitation, one that would dissolve the contours of the subjectGobject dichotomy into reciprocity. -he mimetic faculty is also similar to aura in that, with the countless reified sameness of things under capitalist, technological production of commodities and technological reproducibility of images, it appears to be decaying, though it may also be transforming. !t is transforming through $non-sensuous similarity, as in the $correspondence between a persons moment of birth and the constellation of stars, meaning figurative correspondences. Benjamin hoped that such figurative and generally literary figurations, as in Jrousts involuntary memories, would engender images or e*periences that would reveal, through a distorted perception, the $therapeutic alienation between environment and human beings, between humans and the reified world of commodified sameness as well as technological, mechanised production. >+
3ccording to Hansen, by the time of the artwor" essay Benjamin had lost confidence in the political potential of such figurative correspondences. -he changed perception of the masses which caused the decay of aura is mar"ed by a $sense of sameness in the world that $e*tracts sameness even from what is uniue and an urge ' ,7 to get hold of an object ' in a facsimile ', a reproduction that $differs unmista"ably from the image or figuration. >, 0ubtle differences between similarity and sameness have sun", while, Hansen claims, Benjamin identifies $sameness with the proletarian masses, tas"ing film with $a positive identification with masses. 0ome of the remnants of mimetic figuration she finds in the artwor" essay are synonymous with the shoc" effect off aura, of things returning the gaze. Yet, she overloo"s a "ey e*ample of mimesis in the third version of the essay when she dismisses the audiences identification with apparatus as congealment of $polytechnic education, popular e*pertise and a pseudo-scientific notion of %testing which cannot be dissociated from its industrial-capitalist origin. >5 !t is precisely this $empathy with the camera and adoption of a testing attitude that demonstrates through a playful mimetic inhabitation of reproductive technologies and industrial relations techniues how people can have a non-instrumentalist relationship with technologised nature. !t is not the actuality of industrial capitalism that determines the shape of Benjamins argument, which also navigates towards revolutionary and transforming possibilities immanent in current conditions. Hansens discussion of mimesis in the artwor" essay is bac" on trac" when she points to $the mimetic capability of film ' 8that9 e*tends to specific techniues designed to ma"e technology itself disappear. >6 Benjamins argument seems to oppose to Hansens view when he claims that film $offers a hitherto unimaginable spectacle and that $the euipment-free aspect of reality has become the height of artifice. -his claim sounds li"e the familiar critiue of the reality effect of photography and film, for presenting a world that appears real and yet is a technological illusion, thereby repeating the ideological ,< inversion of commodity fetishism and capitalism. But according to Benjamin, it is this $e%uipment"free aspect of reality that people $are entitled to demand from a wor! of art. !n other words, the interplay between humanity and technology, technology and nature, does not reuire the elimination but $the height of artifice, because the potential imbrication of social energies with productive forces will occur on the basis of the most intensi#e interpenetration of reality with e%uipment, just as much as film or mediated reality does. By contrast, $the vision of immediate reality has become $the Blue :lower in the land of technology, meaning $the unattainable object of the romantic uest. >7
Human and technological development precludes the possibility of a non-technologised human reality, but film rehearses the pleasure people can ta"e in a technological reality that serves their rather than capitals purposes. !n accord with the dialectical structure of Benjamins argument that ac"nowledges potentialities and actualities, both versions of the essay deny that film and reproducible arts in general currently fulfil a new social function in a progressive manner. -he ways that reproducible art may be articulated with politics are not necessarily revolutionary, just as the ways in which humanity may be related to technology will not be revolutionary if social structure is out of step with the forces of production. 3s Haygill puts it, the articulation of politics and democracy $may result either in the intensification of democracy or in the use of the new technology for auratic ends, effectively subordinating politics to ritual, just as $the changes in the character of e*perience can lead $either to transformation or catastrophe . >< !n Benjamins wordsB $0o long as moviema"ers capital sets the fashion and $until film has liberated itself from the fetters ,> of capitalist e*ploitation, film will have no $revolutionary merit other than $criticism of traditional concepts of art. Hapitalist film regains the aura through $the cult of the movie star and the $magic of the personality that derives from $the putrid magic of its own commodity character. 0imilarly, in the politics of bourgeois democracies the reproducibility of the presentations of leaders, their subjection to e*hibition value and recorded appearances before the masses rather than other elected representatives in parliament, means that they are tested not so much by the public as $a new form of selection = selection before an apparatus = from which the star and dictator emerge as victorious. !n this prescient comment, Benjamin captures a good deal of the critiue of mediatised politics, organised as $an immense publicity machine that favours $the e*hibition of controllable, transferable s"ills and that spea"s more to the ability of a candidate to win an election than govern, and enables populism and demagoguery to dominate the parliamentary process.
!t is significant that Benjamins remar"s about aestheticized politics appear in a discussion of a shift from $auratic art to $mass media, because so many contemporary complaints about aestheticized politics refer to mediatised politics. But his comment refers more precisely to the growth of fascism in parliamentary rule and fascisms $corruption of the revolutionary opportunities of the reproductive arts for $the class consciousness of the masses. >>
A(t an# te masses -he fourth significant impact of technological reproducibility is on the relation between art and the masses. 3lthough Benjamin does not use the terms himself, Haygill remar"s ,A that his approach $uestions the distinction between high and low art. >A 3rt has become media art for the masses, a political force detached from older aesthetic categories and values, under changed conditions of production. -he fourth of the developments wrought by technological reproducibility is a changed relation between the masses and art, a development that is most clearly mar"ed by the divergent responses to it, the actuality of fascism and the possibility of communism. :irstly, the $mass e$istence of reproduced artwor"s that replace the $uni%ue e$istence of traditional artwor"s not only shatters tradition and aura but also gives art such as film increased $social significance. #iven that this process is $intimately related to the mass movements of the day, the shift of arts social function from ritual to politics is also invo"ed. 0econdly, the conditions of reception have changed from individualized contemplation of objects or their reception in $a manifoldly graduated and hierarchically mediated way in churches and at court, to $simultaneous collective reception, as in film theatres. !ndividual reactions are concentrated into a mass and once manifest $regulate each other. >? Hollective and hence political as well aesthetic reactions to art become more prevalent under technological reproducibility. 3s the new audience for art, the masses do not restrict themselves to detached aesthetic judgment. -heir $progressive reaction to $a *haplin film for e*ample is instead $characterized by an immediate, intimate fusion of pleasure =pleasure in seeing and e*periencing = with an attitude of e*pert appraisal. Benjamin does not denigrate this mass pleasure, nor does he object to the publics $bac"ward attitude to art in which he himself finds progressive insight, such as surrealism. His attitude here cannot be ,? dismissed as populist bad faith, because he is certainly not claiming that the public always reacts progressively or that it is immune to the appeal of the cult of the star or the dictator. However, in this case he is ma"ing a claim for an actualized possibility of a progressive reaction, rather than a potential immanent in films relation to the masses, one that depends on the audiences identification both with Hhaplins triumph over the apparatus and with the apparatus as a critical, testing technology. -here is also a cultural populist or at least anti-elitist element to Benjamins point about how since the end of the nineteenth century $the distinction between author and public has been losing its $a*iomatic character as more readers turn into writers and more people gain e*pertise $in a highly specialized wor" process. -he technical division of labour ma"es e*perts of more people as $specialized higher education gives way to $polytechnic training. Benjamin criticises 3ldous Hu*leys elitist complaint about the $vulgarity brought about by the technological reproducibility of $inordinate uantities of reading-matter, seeing-matter, and hearing-matter. A@ !n effect Benjamin argues in favour of the potentially democratizing effects of mass cultural production and circulation on the character of $literary competence, e*tending into what today would also be called media literacy. -he same reasoning applies to his observation that $the greatly increased mass of participants has produced a different !ind of participation, which involves not only these new forms of literacy or e*pertise and the coincidence of the publics $critical and uncritical attitudes in their distracted e*amination of mass artwor"s, but also $the human beings legitimate claim to be reproduced. -he last point refers initially to the appearance of people in newsreels and more significantly in 0oviet films in which people 5@ $portray themsel#es = and primarily their own wor" process. A+ But the right to be reproduced means more than banal $vo* pop and earnest socialist realismI it does not mean simply that the public or the masses have a right to self-representation. 4ather, as )oel 0nyder e*plains, they have a right to e*hibit themselves in their environmentB $:ilm will show man 8sic9 in an environment re-made .reproduced/ and managed by himself. A,
-hrough the technological production of artificial realities, film demonstrates to wor"ers and the public in general that just as film produces reality, its own environment and nature, so can humanity in its technological interplay with nature, $when humanitys whole constitution has adapted itself to the new productive forces which the second technology has set free. -he progressive and potentially revolutionary character of film is again tied to its rehearsal of humanitys use of technology, but the right to be reproduced also refers to humanitys role in producing and reproducing itself, in changing its own nature, through interaction with technology. -he collective that is innervated through revolutions is $the new, historically uniue collective which has its organs in the new technology. A5 -his is a collective that ma"es itself in reproducing itselfB $2ith the new techniues of technical reproduction, construction ta"es the place of representation, notes Haygill, so the right to be reproduced is the collectives right to be. A6 !t would thus be revolutionary to enhance the control of the collective but differentiated proletarian masses before whom performers are aware that they stand when also confronting the apparatus, such as through $the e*propriation of film capital or the socialization of the means of cultural production .which would be an appropriate way of understanding what the $politicization of art means if it were not so reductive of all 5+ Benjamins implied meanings/. However, $capitalist e*ploitation of film obstructs the human beings legitimate claim to being reproduced, leading instead to $the involvement of the masses through illusionary displays and ambiguous e*pectations. A7 !nstead of allowing the self-reproduction of a collective, fascism mobilizes the $mass as an impenetrable, compact entity in the way that it reproduces the masses, in $great ceremonial processions, giant rallies, and mass sporting events, and in war. Fse of the camera enables $the masses to come face to face with themselves in a $birds-eye view of mass assemblies and in the $counterpart to the cult of the star, namely $the cult of the audience. -he masses come face to face with themselves, but they do not return their own loo", instead regarding themselves as an object for contemplation. -here is no auratic shoc" of the strangeness of the mass to itself, but the aura of the mass uniue and eternal nature. :ascism abuses the possibilities of technological reproducibility and its arts $in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into serving the production of ritual values and at the same time violates the masses by treating them as an auratic artwor". A<
-he revolutionary potential of the new relation between art and the masses is perverted. T-o t*$es o/ aesteti!0i"e#1 $o%iti!s -he potential for an alternative relation between humans and technology, nature, each other, art .or mass media/ and politics would come through the communist response to the decay of aura, in the politicization of politics. 3s stated above, Benjamin devotes most of the artwor" essay to analysing the conditions under which aura decays and e*ploring the potential of technologically reproducible art, rather than condemning it and 5, the fascist response to it. 0o, although he appears to say almost nothing about the communist politicization of art, he actually provides an outline of a new relationship between the masses, technology and technologically reproducible arts. However, he does not refer to it as a communist aestheticization of politics, while his rhetoric insists on the polar opposition of fascism and communism. Cven if Benjamin implicitly outlines a communist imbrication of aesthetics and politics, it cannot be denied that he e*plicitly decries fascist aestheticized politics without referring to any other sort of aestheticized politics. 3ndrew Hewitts study of :uturism and (arinetti in particular indicates some of the shortcomings of a generalised critiue of fascism as aestheticization. He notes that $from a broadly left perspective %the aestheticization of political life& comes to mean the mas"ing of class struggle under a faLade of aestheticized social unity, when analyses focus on connecting $outmoded notions of aesthetic harmony and balance to fascist notions of the organicist 0tate. A> Hewitts "ey point in relation to Benjamin is to reject his opposition between the aestheticization of politics and the politicization of aesthetics, arguing that $aestheticization and politicization become synonymous, or co-originary. AA
Hlaiming to read Benjamin against the grain, though actually reading him dialectically as he should be, Hewitt realises that the difference between the fascist and communist responses to the crisis of art and modernity in general is given in Benjamins distinction between the actual way capitalism and fascism recreate aura in film, and his otherwise favourable treatment of the $liberating potential of technologies of reproduction. Both participate in the same logic because both grasp that with reproducibility comes a 55 $phenomenological mutation of the concept of origin, such that reproduction .Hewitt says representation/ is $essential and primary, rather than incidental and secondary. !n other words, with technological reproduction, reality itself changes, as film and other media are able not only to represent reality, but to $reconstitute the thing itself, including the $essentially reproducible masses. -here is thus a certain, uncomfortable $%truth& of fascism in respect of politics and democracy which is that $politics ' is ' an aesthetic, and that the audience that constitutes the public before whom politics is played out is an aesthetic construct. Honceptions and critiues of aestheticization that treat it as an ideological veil over reality miss the e*tent to which reality has changed. -he difference between $the construction of the spectacle and $the new, historically uniue collective which has its organs in the new technology is thus not a difference between one being aesthetic and the other political, but the way in which each is constructed aesthetically and politically. A? -he upshot is that, following the logic of Benjamins argument, there is not on the side of fascism aestheticized politics and on the side of communism politicized aesthetics, but on each side a response to the ways in which the crisis of modernity unravels the conceptual distinctions between aesthetics and politics and redraws the boundaries between cultural value spheres. Benjamins ambiguity about the relation between technology and humanity, technological reproducibility, the decay of aura, and the relationship of the masses to the technologically reproducible arts is ambiguous because of the different ways in which the boundaries between politics and art are effaced in actuality and potentially. Yet, he does urge that the boundaries between the cultural spheres should be overrun in the $politicization of art. Both fascism and communism reorganize the cultural value spheres, ending their separation, but do so in 56 different ways. !n other words, both fascism and communism could be considered as aesthetic.ized/ politics. 3s a way of summarising the differences between these two models of aesthetic politics, as characterised by Benjamin, a clear contrast is drawn heuristically in the table below. -he table also serves as a conclusion, illustrating that fascism is not synonymous with aestheticized politics, that fascism is not the only form of aesthetic.ized/ politics, and that modern conditions of aestheticization contain the potential for a progressive, even revolutionary form of aesthetic politics. 57 Aesteti!0i"e#1 $o%iti!s Fas!ist Comm+nist 3ctual .failed opportunity, catastrophe/ Jotential .unrealized promise, transformation/ 4egressive Jrogressive (onumental, eternal -ransitory, improvable Fniue, authentic, whole, $autonomous 4eproducible, assembled Hult value C*hibition value 4itual 4evolutionary Hontemplation, detachment !mmersion, tactility, distraction Kistance Hloseness 3ura as magic or monument 3ura as .redemptive/ shoc" !dealist and subjectivist aesthetics 0ensuous aesthetics .pleasure and critiue combined/ 0ymbolic, $beautiful semblance (imetic .imbrication of humanity and technology/ 4epresentation Honstruction -raditional C*perimental .restructuring e*perience of time and space/ Kenial of humanGtechnology interplay .misalignment of technology and society, abuse of technology/ 4ehearsal of humanGtechnology interplay .euilibrium of humanity and technology/ 5< Notes 5> + . (artin )ay, $%-he 3esthetic !deology& as !deologyI ;r, 2hat Koes !t (ean to 3estheticize Jolitics1, *ultural *riti%ue, ,+ .0pring +??,/, p. 6,. , 0ee 3ndrew Hewitt, +ascist ,odernism' Aesthetics, -olitics, and the A#ant".arde .0tanford Fniversity JressB 0tanford, +??5/, p. +57. 5 . 2alter Benjamin, $-he 2or" of 3rt in the 3ge of its -echnological 4eproducibilityB -hird Mersion, trans. Harry Nohn and Cdmund )ephcott, /elected 0ritings' 1olume 2, 3456"27, ed. Howard Ciland and (ichael 2. )ennings, .Bel"nap JressB Hambridge, (3, ,@@5/, pp. ,7+-A5. 6 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, pp. ,<?->@. 7 . 4ichard 2olin, 0alter 8en9amin' An Aesthetic of :edemption .Holumbia Fniversity JressB Eew Yor", +?A,/, p. +A6. < . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, pp. ,<?->@. > . 0ee :igure + in the !ntroduction. A . Howard Haygill, 0alter 8en9amin' The *olour of ;$perience .4outledgeB Dondon, +??A/, p. ?5. ? .2alter Benjamin, $-heories of #erman :ascismB ;n the Hollection of Cssays %2ar and 2arrior&, edited by Crnst )Onger, <ew .erman *riti%ue +> .0pring +?>?/, p. +,@. +@ . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,>@. ++ . 3nsgar Hillach, $-he 3esthetics of JoliticsB 2alter Benjamins %-heories of :ascism&, <ew .erman *riti%ue +> .0pring +?>?/, p. +@5. +, . Csther Deslie, 0alter 8en9amin' =#erpowering *onformism .Jluto JressB Dondon, ,@@@/, p. *i. +5 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,>@I Benjamin, $-heories of #erman :ascism, p. +,@. +6 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<?. +7 . Benjamin, $-heories of #erman :ascism, pp. +,+-,7. +< . $8!9n gas warfare it 8society9 has found a new means of abolishing the aura. Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,>@. +> . Benjamin, $-heories of #erman :ascism, p. +,<I Hillach, $-he 3esthetics of Jolitics, p. +@6-<. +A . Benjamin, $-heories of #erman :ascism, pp. +,<-,>. +? . Deslie, 0alter 8en9amin, pp. +77-<. ,@ . (arinetti uoted in Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<?. ,+ . Deslie, 0alter 8en9amin, pp. *ii-*iii. ,, . Deslie, 0alter 8en9amin, pp. +7<->. ,5 . Benjamin uoted in (iriam Bratu Hansen, $Benjamins 3ura, *ritical &n%uiry ,6 .2inter ,@@A/, p. 5<6. ,6 . 2alter Benjamin, $-he 2or" of 3rt in the 3ge of its -echnological 4eproducibilityB 0econd Mersion trans. Cdmund )ephcott, Howard Ciland and ;thers, /elected 0ritings' 1olume 5, 345>"3456, ed. Howard Ciland and (ichael 2. )ennings .Bel"nap JressB Hambridge, (3, ,@@,/, pp. +@>-A, p. +,6, fn. +@. ,7 . (iriam Bratu Hansen, $Benjamin and HinemaB Eot a ;ne-2ay 0treet, *ritical &n%uiry ,7 .2inter +???/, p. 5,@, p. 5,7. ,< . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,77. ,> . Hansen, $Benjamin and Hinema, p. 5,7, p. 5,,. ,A . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. ?<. ,? . (ichel :oucault, $-echnologies of the 0elf in Duther (artin, Huc" #utman and Jatric" Hutton .eds/ Technologies of the /elf .-avistoc"B Dondon, +?AA/, pp. +<-6?. 5@ . Hansen, $Benjamin and Hinema, p. 5+>, p. 5,+, p. 5+?, p. 5+,, p. 557. 5+ . (iriam Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perienceB %-he Blue :lower in the Dand of -echnology&, <ew .erman *riti%ue, 6@ .2inter +?A>/, p. +A,. 5, . Hansen, $Benjamin and Hinema, p. 5+,, including a uotation from Benjamin. 55 . Deslie, 0alter 8en9amin, p. +7>. 56 . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. ?7, p. ?>. 57 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,75, p. ,7A, p. ,76, p. ,7>, p. ,<6. 5< . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, pp. ,75-6. 5> . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. ?6. 5A . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,7<-<>, p. ,>,, fn. +,, p. ,>,, fn.+5, p. ,77, p. ,76, p. ,75. 5? . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,7,, p. ,7<, p. ,>@. 6@ . Hewitt, +ascist ,odernism, p. ,6. 6+ . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, pp. +A<-<>. 6, . Hansen, $Benjamins 3ura, p. 55A, p. 57>. 65 . Benjamin, %2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, pp. +@6-7, pp. +@A-?.. 66 . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. +@5. 67 . Hansen, $Benjamins 3ura, p. 55?. 0ee 2alter Benjamin, $;n 0ome (otifs in Baudelaire in Hannah 3rendt .ed./ &lluminations' 0alter 8en9amin, ;ssays and :eflections .0choc"enB Eew Yor", +?<?/, p. +AA. 6< . Benjamin, $;n 0ome (otifs in Baudelaire, p. +AA. 6> . Hansen, $Benjamins 3ura, pp. 566-7, p. 56>. 6A . Hansen, $Benjamins 3ura, p. 576, p. 566, p. 55>. 6? . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,7<, p. ,<@, p. ,<+. 7@ . Benjamin, %2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. ++@I Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<+. 7+ . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<,I Benjamin, %2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. ++6. 7, . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,7?-<@. 75 . -his form of criticism is thus different to the sort of critical interpretation of media output that audiences are said to conduct because they view it from a different social perspective to the producers, or when they appropriate different meanings from it than the allegedly hegemonic meaning. 76 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. +++. 77 . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. ,@5. 7< . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, pp. +@>-A. 7> . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,A+, fn. 6,. 7A . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. +@>. 7? . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, pp. ,7<-7>. <@ . 2olin, 0alter 8en9amin, p. +A?I Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. +@>. <+ . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. ++6. <, . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. ++A, p. +5@, fn.5@. <5 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<>. <6 . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. +A6. <7 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<>. << . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. ,+@-++. <> . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<>-<?. <A . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p.+,@. <? . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<7-<<. >@ . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. +A6. 0ee also Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. ++,. >+ . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. +?<, p. ,@>, p. >, . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,77. >5 . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. ,@<, p. ,@,. 2riting nearly twenty years later, in $Benjamins 3ura, Hansen herself discusses films auratic shoc" effects without referring to mimetic figuration. >6 . Hansen, $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. ,@5. >7 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<5-<6I $Benjamin, Hinema and C*perience, p. ,@6. >< . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. +@?, p. ++<. >> . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<+I p. ,>>, fn. ,>I Benjamin, 2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. ++5-+6. -he third version tones down the anti-capitalist language. >A . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. ?,. >? . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,76. p. ,<6. A@ . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<6, p. ,<,I 3ldous Hu*ley uoted on p. ,>A, fn. ,?.. A+ . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,<>, p. ,<6, p. ,<,. A, . )oel 0nyder, $Benjamin on 4eproducibility and 3uraB 3 4eading of %-he 2or" of 3rt in the 3ge of its -echnical 4eproducibility& in #ary 0mith .ed./, 8en9amin' -hilosophy, ?istory, Aesthetics .Fniversity of Hhicago JressB Hhicago, +?A?/, p. +>+. A5 . Benjamin, 2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. +@A, p. +,6, fn. +@. A6 . Haygill, *olour of ;$perience, p. +@?. A7 . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, pp. ,<,-5. A< . Benjamin, $2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. ++7, p. +,?, fn. ,6, p. ++5I Benjamin, $2or" of 3rt, p. ,A,, fn. 6>, p. ,<?. A> . Hewitt, +ascist ,odernism, p. +57. AA . Hewitt, +ascist ,odernism, p. A<. A? . Hewitt, +ascist ,odernism, p. +>@, p. +<<, pp. +<A-<?, p. +?,, p. +><I Benjamin, $2or" of 3rtB 0econd Mersion, p. +,6, fn. +@..