A.M. No.

133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J :
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a
judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred
on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla
Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a)
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal
heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of
Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the
deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all
the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were
acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made,
those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated
solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1)
Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3)
Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145
as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and
Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)
Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being
the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of
one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner
of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a
manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes
Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of
two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from
the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro,
O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment
shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the
parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved;
(10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola
to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and
two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the
parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a
project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the
fact that the project of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective
counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23,
1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval
the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita
Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern
part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western
part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions
awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares,
provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively
to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above
which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this
Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective
parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made
after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the
above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that
they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such
papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of
the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective
properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform
such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of
giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh.
U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof
with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive
property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the
plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when
the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs.
F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the
Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of
around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which
particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At
the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia
Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with
Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The
Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging
four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case
No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce,
Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of
judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16,
1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia
Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second
cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in
business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be
exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted
an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R.
Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of
partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It
appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio
Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed,
having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the
remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant
Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc.
Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez,
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and
Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and
authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two
Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral
damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary
damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR
HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,
WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection
of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of
action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The
Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA
641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed
an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended
order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8,
1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the
plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and
the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold
on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for
taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of
their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in
which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is
of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his
two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer
subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the
aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and
consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not
during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this
connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by
respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of
which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order
of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the
Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him
and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr.
Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses.
Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I
believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration
from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp.
391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition
although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to
Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,
That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24,
January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh.
A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral
Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of
title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered
and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola
onOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition
dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22,
1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot
1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth
of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth
was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of
partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as
per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the
cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr.
Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been
kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated
to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any
direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of
the real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area,
location, kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is
nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him
to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that:
"A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to
have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused
it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One
who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of
the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be
such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular
case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations
open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his
court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife
were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his
official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the
lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the
integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1
and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in
business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge
or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate
territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is
part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some
modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic
of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the
new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion,
Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief
during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26
U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of
the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the
government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the
newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from
having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that
respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not
that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was
held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition
on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his
official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by
reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in
contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A.
40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business
operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or
another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant
except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"wherein the
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his
interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary
from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not
contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage
in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district
judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore
stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is
political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a
property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent
Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No.
3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of
litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959
prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or
law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in
private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt
practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules,
We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder,
particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department
..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act
No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the
Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion,
or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly,
the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of
inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the
existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any
subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year
without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII
is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial
Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself
state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and
under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action
against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their
removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided
by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and
regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong
to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not
covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No.
2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is
clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his
judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967
from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation
of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized
that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife
therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it
became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent
Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of
her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not
appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all
the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for
disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa
Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with
his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but
natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face
value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at
baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon
of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence
his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible
convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa
Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or
that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor
said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in
itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social
relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405,
rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any
law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by
joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the
Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
lambino vs. comelec case digest

Amendment vs Revision
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each
legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by
local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI
and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the
president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31
Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions
to amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that
the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents
present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The
proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden
of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove
that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains.
Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the
proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in
violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed
amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to
enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is,
the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices
of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution
thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC GR NO. 127325


MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers
of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375
failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left
to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known
that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be
dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did
not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be
held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace
the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on
people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written
ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin
Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures
in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no
public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully
from the majoritys two other rulings.



















G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J .:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution,
1
as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-
315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question
2
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General,
3
this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,
4
this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely
by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC
7
:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity
apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In
similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank
8
to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban
9
sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
10
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles,
11
the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the
same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal
laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.


Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J ., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does
not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise.
1
I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette.
2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.
3
It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.
4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I
am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.
5
In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity.
6
In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to
this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative
or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,
1
citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.
2
To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette
is not necessary for their effectivity
3
would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which
is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.

PLANA, J ., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity
date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly,
it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J ., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J ., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.



Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J ., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and
effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the
pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does
not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require
the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise.
1
I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette.
2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.
3
It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as
pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.
4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I
am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For
prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.
5
In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential
decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity.
6
In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as
to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to
this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative
or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That
would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find
myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,
1
citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code
(based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the
law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise
that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.
2
To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette
is not necessary for their effectivity
3
would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which
is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree
itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy
vested rights.

PLANA, J ., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity
date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly,
it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette,
determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of
general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it
holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J ., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J ., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.