Lichauco & Co. v.

Apostol
A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a revised statute or a code, that which is best in accord
with the general plan or, in the absence of circumstances upon which to base a choice, that which
is later in physical position, being the latest expression of legislative will, will prevail.


Victorias Milling Co. v. SSS
A statutory definition of term containing a general rule and an exception thereto is amended by
eliminating the exception, the legislative intent is clear that the term should now include the
exception within the scope of the general rule.


Philippines Interisland Shipping Association vs CA

It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an increase in pilotagerates
was given by the then President Marcos through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088
PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE
SERVICESRENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE
AND PUBLICPORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing
pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.

During that time the President was exercising legislative power and was authorized

However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued hastily and it was just
an Administrative Order whereby PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by
issuing A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to
be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract.. Actually Philippine Interisland
Shipping Association of the Philippines is just an intervenor in the factual milieu that lead us to
this issue. For Purposes of Admin Law we should not care about it.

Issue: Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA has the power to
modify the same.

Held: EO 1088 is a law.
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate
fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to
revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA
could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86,
which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to
the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the
nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such
these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.It is not an
answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the
withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an
administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to
fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as
legislative in character.(Note: Bold letters are copied from the Original Supreme Court decision)

DIOSDADO LAGCAO,
DOROTEO LAGCAO and
URSULA LAGCAO,
Petitioners
vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU,
Respondents
G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004

Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots,
including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul
the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter
to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the
final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. After acquiring title, petiti oners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and
issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order
was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the
MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still
looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the
MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which
identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.Petitioners filed with
the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional.

Issue:
WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation
of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution.

Ruling:
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city.
The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority
are denominated ordinances. Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA
7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the SP
of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income
residents of the City. However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most
serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess
unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this
problem. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1)
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied he equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
power of eminent domainis not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself
explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws.

obiter dicta (oh-bitter dick-tah) n. remarks of a judge which are not necessary to reaching a decision,
but are made as comments, illustrations or thoughts. Generally, obiter dicta is simply "dicta."
Stare decisis is a doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in previous judicial
decisions. It is the principal that maintains that previous decisions are to be followed by the courts. This
policy dictates that the court must abide or adhere to decided cases.

Ratio Decidendi
[Latin, The ground or reason of decision.] The legal principle upon which the decision in a
specific case is founded.
The ratio decidendi is also known as the rationale for a decision.