No.

1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2

1

Lidia Gelig v. People,
GR 173150, 28 July 2010
(Direct Assault-Art. 148, 151)

FACTS:

Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the Decision promulgated by the Court
of Appeals that vacated and set aside the Decision of the RTC, Cebu City, Br
23, RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the
crime of slight physical injuries.

Lydia and Gemma B. Micarsos, were public school. Lydia's son, Roseller,
was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case. On July 17, 1981, at
around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning
from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped
Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a
wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion
in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in
the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience
abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August
28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was
diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly,
a medical certificate

was issued.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical
Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal .

2. WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of Slight
Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.


[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

1. Liable for Direct Assault It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense
against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion
of such performance.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her
official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of
pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already
angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused
to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the
victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal's office but Lydia followed and resorted to the
use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma's
fall to the floor. Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

2. NOT liable of Unintetional Abortion - There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and
pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the
abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma's attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca),
was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to
prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident. It was
therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if
any, between Lydia's assault and Gemma's abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to
ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's abortion.


No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



2

People v. Julio Recto,
GR 129069, 17 October 2001
(Direct Assault)

FACTS: April 18, 1994, Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his residence
together with Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Barangay
TanodMelchor Recto, appellants cousin. They were trying to settle a land
dispute involving Linda Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the meeting was in
progress, Orbe was summoned by SPO4 FortunatoRafol to proceed to the
bodega of Rance. While SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the
premises, the group Julio Recto, et. al. arrived. The group stopped at the first
trampa near the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create
trouble, but, Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards
them. Thereafter, Recto, while holding a balisong or fan knife, approached
Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling the former to surrender
the balisong. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a
gun, a de sabog. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while
Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised
and uttered the words: Do not do it. Well just settle this. (Ayoson ta langine).
Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay
KagawadMacalipay, causing him to fall down on the ground. While running,
Julio Recto shot him hitting the latters thigh. Before he could take a step, he was
also shot by Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running
and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded
Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the other hand, both
Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano Renato Santos died due
to multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant.
RTC: Convicted them to 4 offenses

ISSUE:
WON Julio is guilty of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide as one count of the complex crime.

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

Qualified Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971)
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority
or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance. The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, without the element of public uprising. The
second mode, on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault
is committed with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender
lays a hand upon a person in authority.
For MELCHOR RECTO (Criminal Case No. 1970)
An agent of a person in authority is any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority.
In the case at bar, the victim, MelchorRecto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong,
Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the
trial court, he was not engaged in the performance of his official duties at the time he was shot. Neither was he
attacked on the occasion of such performance, however, at the crime scene he was a mere
bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties
that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault. (HE MUST IN THE ACTUAL
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY)
For PERCIVAL ORBE (Criminal Case No. 1971)
the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on PERCIVAL ORBE then a barangay captain,
a person in authority -- amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked on the occasion
of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting to pacify appellant and to keep the peace
between the two groups.
Evidently, appellant had not yet been able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to bring about the
death of Orbe, because the latter was able to run away after being fired at. Although appellant had already
directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able
to consummate that felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he
committed attempted homicide. Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the
complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To be imposed therefor should be the penalty
for the most serious crime -- in this case qualified direct assault -- the same to be imposed in its maximum
period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law should also be applied in this case.

No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



3

Arnel Sison v. People,
GR 187229, 22 February 2012
(Rape-Illegal Possession)

FACTS:

On April 21, 2003, two (2) separate Informations were filed with the RTC
against petitioner for Kidnapping with Rape and violation of P.D. 1866, as
amended by R.A. 8294 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). The
accusatory portions of the two (2) Informations respectively state:

Criminal Case No. Q-03-116710 (RAPE)

On or about the 16
th
day of April 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, armed
with firearm, kidnap and rape one [AAA] in the following manner, to wit: said
[AAA] boarded the Mitsubishi Adventure with plate no. CSV-606, driven by the
accused who was then plying his route at Bocaue Toll Gate going to Cubao,
Quezon City, and upon reaching EDSA corner New York Street, Cubao, this
City, accused suddenly poked his gun at her, kidnap and detain her and
forcibly brought her at the Town and Country, Sta. Mesa, Manila, where
accused had carnal knowledge of her by force and intimidation against her will
and without her consent.
[3]


Criminal Case No. Q-03-116711 (ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM)

On or about the 17
th
day of April 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
accused, Arnel Sison without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) Peter Stahl .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number A414 with five
(5) ammunitions, without first having secured the necessary license/permit
issued by the proper authorities.



ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of separate crime of rape and illegal possession of
firearm.

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

RAPE

that AAA failed to put up a strong resistance to repel petitioner's physical aggression, such failure
does not mean that she was not raped. Petitioner had a gun which was sufficient to intimidate her and to submit
to his lustful desire. It is well settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation
is exercised upon a victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists advances because of
fear for her life and personal safety.

There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the
assailant is physically near. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. In a given situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence.
Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first opportunity cannot be
construed consent to the sexual intercourse.

In rape cases, the essential element that the prosecution must prove is the absence of the victims
consent to the sexual congress. The gravamen of the crime of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force
or intimidation and without consent. Force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the
parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at
the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.

The victim's moral character in rape is immaterial where it is shown that intimidation was used for the
victim to have sex with the accused.

ILLEGAL POSSESSION

that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms.

Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



4

Union Bank v, People,
GR192565, 28 February 2012
(Perjury-Art. 183)

FACTS:

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, was filed on March 15,
2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly,
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that
she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized
inMakati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati Citysubsequently denied
Tomas motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: The issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be
Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and
the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place
where the offense was committed.

is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that
time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through
false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where
the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be
at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made
the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus,
Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati City, not Pasay City.

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the
case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.
No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



5

PCGG Chairman v. Reiner Jacobi, et.al.,
GR 155996, 27 June 2012
(Falsification-presumption

FACTS:

The records show that on two occasions - evidenced by the December 22,
1988 and May 6, 1991 letters - then PCGG Commissioner, and later Chairman, David
M. Castro, purportedly acting for the PCGG, agreed to pay Jacobi a fee of ten percent
(10%) of any amount actually recovered and legally turned over to the Republic of the
Philippines from the ill-gotten wealth of Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his family,
associates, subordinates and cronies, based on the information and evidence that
Jacobi would furnish the PCGG. Chairman Castro sent another letter
dated December 19, 1991 to Jacobi confirming that actual recovery [of] the Kloten
gold account managed by Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) subject of [Jacobis]
information and other efforts done will be properly compensated as previously
committed. A few years later, a similar letter dated August 27, 1998 (De Guzman
letter) was sent by the new PCGG Chairman, Felix M. de Guzman, to Jacobi,
confirming the PCGGs promise (as contained in the PCGG letters) to pay Jacobi and
his intelligence group a 10% fee for the US$13.2 billion ill-gotten wealth of Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, trustee or fronts in UBS still/now being
claimed and recovered by the Philippine Government.

ISSUE: Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion - in finding that no probable cause for falsification
and use of falsified document exists against the respondents?

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

a. Determination of probable cause, an
executive function

, the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the
prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too,
cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive.

To justify judicial intrusion in1to what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive,
[130]
the
petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the
petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
[131]
before judicial
relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained. All these, the petitioner failed to establish.

Lack of probable cause for falsification

For purposes of filing an information in court, probable cause refers to facts and circumstances
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents
probably committed it. To guide the prosecutors determination, a finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused; the quantum of proof to establish its existence is less than the evidence that
would justify conviction, but it demands more than bare suspicion.

No definitive basis to determine probable cause has been established, except to consider the
attendant facts and circumstances according to the prosecutors best lights.
[133]
No law or rule states that
probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.
[134]
In going
through the process, the prosecutor should carefully calibrate the issues of facts presented to him to the
end that his finding would always be consistent with the clear dictates of reason.



No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



6

Richard Chua v. People,
GR 183132, 8 February 2012
(Art. 172-elements)

FACTS:
In 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired Richard Chua as a
general clerk in its International Banking Division which processed the opening of
domestic and international letters of credit, domestic and international remittances as
well as importation and exportation. Specifically, Chua was tasked to process trust
receipts, accept trust receipt payments and issue the corresponding receipts for these
payments.
In response to a complaint of a bank client regarding the non- application of
his payments, an internal audit was conducted. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine
(29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus foreign remittances were
discovered. The audit led to a finding that these remittances were not supported by
the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign bank concerned. Two of these
remittances were with instructions to credit specified amounts to Savings Account No.
1000-209312 which turned out to be under Chuas name.

1. Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 29
October 1984 in the amount of 16,729.96:

2.Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of Credit dated 6
August 1984 in the amount of 16,024.70:


ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of the
crime of Falsification of Commercial Documents considering that it has categorically ADMITTED that
there is no direct proof that petitioner was the author of the falsification in the case at bar.


[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

appellant (Chua) did not acquire juridical possession over the subject payments. The absence of a
direct proof that Chua was the author of the falsification is of no moment for the rule remains that whenever
someone has in his possession falsified documents and uttered or used the same for his advantage and
benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have
the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had
complicity in the forgery. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.

Applying this to the present case, all three elements are undeniably present (i) Chua is a private
individual; (ii) he used fictitious inward foreign remittance advice of credit to cause the funneling or transfer of
the two named bank clients payments into his own account,
[23]
squarely falling under paragraph 2 of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code
[24]
; and (iii) the falsification was committed in two commercial documents, namely,
inward foreign remittance advice of credit and the debit tickets. Without doubt, his subsequent conviction to a
lesser crime was not unfounded.

Mark Clemente v. People
GR 194367, 15 June 2011
(Art. 168-elements forged notes)
FACTS:
Mark Clemente was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of
the RPC under an Information, that on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila,
the said accused, in his possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four
(24) pcs P500.00 bill. Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7,
2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and
Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill
from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail
Bakery. JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's
cell for a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black
wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of
P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same
and marked. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to
appellant. Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant
were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a
Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit.

ISSUE: WON the possession of false treasury or bank notes alone is punishable?

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or
other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit
not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said
instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used orpossessed with intent to use any of such forged or
falsified instruments.

As held in People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a
criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent
to use said false treasury or bank notes.


No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



7

Eliseo Soriano v. Ma. Consoliza Laguardia, et.al.
GR 164785, 29 April 2009
(Obscenity)

FACTS:

Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating
Daan, a popular television ministry aired nationwide everyday from 10:00 p.m. to
midnight over public television. The program carried a general patronage rating from
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
The Ang Dating Daans rivalry with another religious television program, the Iglesia ni
CristosAng Tamang Daan, is well known. The hosts of the two shows have regularly
engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations and counter-accusations with
respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices.

It appears that in his program Ang Tamang Daan, Michael M. Sandoval
(Michael) of the Iglesia ni Cristo attacked petitioner Soriano of the Ang Dating
Daan for alleged inconsistencies in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced
recordings of Sorianos statements, matched with subtitles of his utterances, to
demonstrate those inconsistencies. On August 10, 2004, in an apparent reaction to
what he perceived as a malicious attack against him by the rival television program,
Soriano accused Michael of prostituting himself with his fabricated presentations.
Thus:
.gago ka talaga Michael. Masahol ka pa sa putang babae. O di ba? Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, kay Michael ang gumagana
ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng demonyong ito
Michael and seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint
against petitioner Soriano before the MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter preventively
suspended the airing of Sorianos Ang Dating Daan television program for 20 days,
pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986 and its related
rules.
Petitioner Soriano challenged the validity of that preventive suspension
before this Court in G.R. 164785. Meanwhile, after hearing the main case or on
September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and imposed on
him a penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the Ang Dating Daan
program. Soriano thus filed a second petition in G.R. 165636 to question that
decision. The Court consolidated the two cases.
On April 29, 2009 the Court rendered a decision, upholding MTRCBs power
to impose preventive suspension and affirming its decision against petitioner Soriano
with the modification of applying the three-month suspension to the program And
Dating Daan, rather than to Soriano.



ISSUES:
(1) What constitutes onscenity?
(2) WON a televised bible exposition program does automatically accord them the character of a religious
exemption of using freedom of speech - even the words in context show that he was moved by anger and
the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit:
(a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. x x x What remains clear is that obscenity
is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the
judges sound discretion.
Petitioners flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse
consequences, under the guise of free speech, does not lend itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We
repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains
speech should be greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates
speech or expression is per se invalid. This only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and
expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or regulate speech.
The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at
another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place
his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any
religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements
respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-
language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for
the low road. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and
religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group.

No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



8

Gaudencio Fernando, et.al. v. CA,
GR 159751, 6 December 2006
(Article 201-obscene materials)

FACTS:
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers
of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the
National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store
bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5,
1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued
Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The
warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon
Blvd., corner Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following items:

a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.
On the same day, the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy
Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store
attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-
five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed
pornographic.
On September 13, 1999, petitioners with Warren Tingchuy.
Thereafter, the accused waived their right to present evidence and instead submitted
the case for decision.


ISSUES:
(1) What are considered obscene materials?
(2) What are punishable acts related obscene possession?

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.
The trial court in ruling that the confiscated materials are obscene, reasoned as follows:
Are the magazines and VHS tapes confiscated by the raiding team obscene or offensive to morals?

1. OBSCENE MATERIALS:

Pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act appearing in the nine (9)
confiscated magazines namely Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery and two (2)
issues of QUI are offensive to morals and are made and shown not for the sake of art but rather for
commercial purposes, that is gain and profit as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition. The pictures
in the magazine exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and actsThe exhibition of the sexual act in their
magazines is but a clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals,
inspiringlust and lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth.
The VHS tapes also [exhibit] nude men and women doing the sexual intercourse. The tape
entitled "Kahit sa Pangarap Lang" with Myra Manibog as the actress shows the naked body of the
actress. The tape exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and acts. Her dancing movements excited the
sexual instinct of her male audience. The motive may be innocent, but the performance was revolting and
shocking to good minds...
Since the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees were usually not
artists or persons interested in art to satisfy and inspire their artistic tastes but persons who are desirous
of satisfying their morbid curiosity, taste and lust and for [love] of excitement, including the youth who
because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting
effects of the pictures, the display of such pictures for commercial purposes is a violation of Art. 201. If
those pictures were shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and
appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed (People vs. Go Pin, 97 Phil 418).



2. PUNISHABLE ACTS: Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials?

In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene
materials.
that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them
away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the
dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is
committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person be caught in the act of
selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are
offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public.


No. 1 10 of 70 Cases Criminal Law 2



9

Fedrik Nogales,et.al. v. People,
GR 191080, 21 Nov. 2011
(Art. 201-PD 969)

FACTS:
On July 30, 2007, Special Investigator Garry Meez (SI Meez) of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for a search warrant before the
RTC to authorize him and his fellow NBI agents or any peace officer to search
the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-
Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and take into custody the
items/articles/objects enumerated in his application. That he has been
informed, verily believes and personally verified that JUN NICOLAS, LOREN
NUESTRA, FREDRICK FELIX P. NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B.
CABRERA and/or occupants PHIL-PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES
CORP. located at Mezzanine Flr., Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San
Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila have in their possession/control and are
concealed in the above-mentioned premises various material[s] used in the
creation and selling of pornographic internet website, to wit:
1. Computer Sets, 2. Television Sets,
3. Internet Servers, 4. Fax Machines,
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials ,
6. Web Cameras, 7. Telephone Sets,
8. Photocopying Machines, 9. List of clients,
and10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be
used in the commission of the crime.
On the same date of the hearing, the application was granted
and the corresponding Search Warrant,
[5]
issued. Aggrieved by the
issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties.
[7]
In the said
motion, petitioners cited the following grounds:
On December 26, 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed August 6, 2008 Order
of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the
removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials.

[Doctrine(s)] HELD:

Clearly, the provision directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject
law. The CA was lenient with petitioners in modifying the ruling of the RTC in that the CPUs and
softwares, which were initially ordered to be retained by the NBI, should be released in their favor with
only the hard disk removed from the CPUs and destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be
violative of Article 201 of the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should also be forfeited and destroyed in
the manner allowed by law. The law is clear. Only licensed softwares that can be used for legitimate
purposes should be returned to petitioners.

To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was
acquitted.

Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction
of the hard disks and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses the
purpose of minimizing if not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson for those
engaged in any way in the proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country. The Court is not
unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed property rights must be balanced with the
welfare of the public in general.

The hard disk drives containing the pornographic materials and the softwares used in any
way in violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, unlicensed or pirated shall be forfeited in
favor of the Government and destroyed.