TO METALOGIC
WITH AN APPENDIX ON
TYPETHEORETICAL
EXTENSIONAL AND INTENSIONAL LOGIC
BY
IMRERUZSA
ARON PUBLISHERS * BUDAPEST * 1997
ISBN 963 85504 5 7
ARON PUBLISHERS, H1447 BUDAPEST, P.O.BOX HUNGARY
Imre Ruzsa, 1997.
Printed in Hungary
Copies of this book are available at
Aron Publishers
H1447 BUDAPEST, P.O.BOX487, HUNGARY
and
L. Eotvos University, Department of SymbolicLogic
H1364 BUDAPEST, P.O.BOX107, HUNGARY
Nyomdai CP STUDIO, Budapest
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), ,. .f ~ . r ? : ~ /i' : ,. T i..
In'menuiriammy wife (19421996)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The material of the present monograph originates from a series of lectures held by the
author at the Department of Symbolic Logic of L. Eotvos University, Budapest. The
questions and the critical remarks of my students and colleagues gave me a very
valuable help in developing my investigations. My sincere thanks are due to all of
them.
Special thanks are due to PROFESSOR ISTVAN NEMETI and Ms AGNES KURUCZ
who read the first version of the manuscript and made very important critical remarks.
In preparing and printing this monograph, I got substantial help from my son
DR. FERENC RUZSA aswell asfrom my daughter AGNES RUZSA.
* * *
This work was partly supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Foundation
(OTKA II3, 2258) and by the Hungarian Ministry of Culture and Education (MKM
384/94).
lmre Ruzsa
Budapest, June 1996.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. The subject matter of metalogic
1.2. Basic postulates on languages
1.3. Speaking on languages
1.4. Syntax and semantics
Chapter 2, Instruments of metalogic
2.1. Grammatical means
2.2. Variables and quantifiers
2.3. Logical means
2.4. Definitions
2.5. Class notation
Chapter 3 Language radices
3.1. Definition and postulates
3.2. The simplest alphabets
Chapter 4 Inductive classes
4.1. Inductive definitions
4.2. Canonical calculi
4.3. Some logical languages
4.4. Hypercalculi
4.5. Enumerabilityand decidability
Chapter 5 Normal algorithms
5.1. What is an algorithm?
5.2. Definitionof normal algorithms
5.3. Deciding algorithms
5.4. Definite classes
Chapter 6 The firstorder calculus (QC)
6.1. What is a logical calculus?
6.2. Firstorder languages
6.3. The calculus QC
6.4. Metatheoremson QC
6.5. Consistency. Firstorder theories
vii
1
1
2
4
5
7
7
10
15
19
20
25
25
28
31
31
36
38
42
47
51
51
54
58
61
66
66
67
70
72
74
Chapter 7 The formal theory of canonical calculi (CC*) 76
7.1. Approaching intuitively 76
7.2. The canonical calculus 1:* 78
7.3. Truth assignment 81
7.4. Undecidability: Church' s Theorem 83
Chapter 8 Completeness with respect to negation 85
8.1. The formal theory CC 85
8.2. Diagonalization 87
8.3. Extensions and discussions 90
Chapter 9 Consistency unprovable 93
9.1. Preparatory work 93
9.2. The proof of the unprovabilityof Cons 94
Chapter 10 Set theory 98
10.1. Sets and classes 9R
10.2. Relations and functions 103
10.3. Ordinal, natural, and cardinal numbers 106
10.4. Applications 110
References 114
Index 116
List of symbols 122
APPENDIX (Lecture Notes): TypeTheoetical Extensional
and Intensional Logic 123
Part 1: Extensional Logic 127
Part 2: Montague's Intensional Logic 148
References 182
viii
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Subject Matter of Metalogic
Modern logic is not a single theory. It consists of a considerable (and ever growing)
number of logical systems (often called  regrettably logics). Metalogic is the sci
ence of logical systems. Its theorems are statements either on a particular logical system
or about some interrelations between certain logical systems. In fact, every system of
logic has its own metalogic that, among others, describes the construction of the sys
tem, investigates the structure of proofs in the system, and so on. Many theorems
usually known as "laws of logic" are, in fact, metalogical statements. For example, the
statement saying that modus ponens is a valid rule of inference  say, in classical first
order logic  is a metalogical theorem about a system of logic. A more deeper meta
logical theorem about the classical frrstorder logic tells us that a certain logical calcu
lus is sound and complete with respect to the settheoretical semantics of this system of
logic.
Remark. It is assumedherethat this essayis not the first encounterof the reader withlogic (neither
with mathematics), so that the examples above and some similar ones later on, are intelligible. However,
this doesnot meanthat the understanding of this bookis dependent on someprevious knowledge of logicor
mathematics.
Another very important task of metalogic is to answer the problem: How is logic
possible? To give some insight into the seriousness of this question, let me refer to the
wellknown fact that modern logic uses mathematical means intensively, whereas mod
em mathematical theories are based on some system(s) of logic. Is there a wayout from
this  seemingly  vicious circle? This is the foundational problem of logic, and its
solution is the task of the introductory part of metalogic. The greater part of this essay
is devoted to this foundational problem.
The device we shall apply in the course consists in dealing alternatively with
mathematical and logical knowledge, without drawing a sharp borderline between
mathematical and logical means. No knowledge of a logical or a mathematical theory
will be presupposed. The only presupposition we shall exploit will be that the reader
knows the elements of the grammar of some natural language (e.g., hislher mother
tongue), can read, write and count, and is able to follow socalled formal expositions.
(Of course, the ability last mentioned assumes  tacitly  some skills which can bebest
mastered in mathematics.)
The introductory part of metalogic is similar to the discipline created by David
Hilbert, called metamathematics. (See, e.g., HILBERT 1926.) The aim of metamathe
matics was to find a solid foundation of some mathematical systems (e.g., number the
ory, set theory) by using only socalledfinite means. In Hilbert's view, fmite mathemat
1
ics is sufficient for proving the consistency of transfinite (nonfmite, infinite) mathe
matical theories. In a sense, the foundation of a logical calculus (which is sufficient for
mathematical proofs in most cases) was included in Hilbert's programme. (perhaps this
is the reason that scientists who think that modem logic is just a branch of mathematics
 called mathematical logic  often say metamathematics instead of metalogic.)
Metalogic is not particularly interested in the foundation of mathematical theories.
It is interested in the foundation of logical systems. In its beginning, metalogic will use
very simple, elementary means which could be qualified as finite ones. However, the
author does not dare to draw a borderline between the finite and the transfinite. We
shall proceed starting with simple means and using them to construct more complex
systems.
Every system of modem logic is based on a formal language. As a consequence,
our investigation will start with the problem: How is it possible to construct a lan
guage? Some of our results may tum out to be applicable not only for formal languages
but for natural languages as well .
This essay is almost selfcontained. Two exceptions where most proofs will be
omitted are the firstorder calculus of logic (called here QC, Chapter 6) and set theory
(Chapter 10). The author assumes that the detailed study of these disciplines is the task
of other courses in logic.
Technical remarks. Detailed information about the structure of this book is to be
found in the Table of Contents. At the end of the book, the Index and the List of Sym
bols helps the reader to find the definitions of referred notions and symbols. In the inner
reference, the abbreviations 'Ch .' , 'Sect.' , 'Def.', and 'Th.' are used for 'Chapter',
'Section', 'Definition', and 'Theorem', respectively. References for literature are given,
as usually, by the (last) name of the author(s) and the year of publication (e.g.,
'HILBERT 1926'); the full data are to be found in the References (at the end of the
book).  No technical term and symbol will be used without definition in this book. 
At the end of a longer proof or definition, a bullet '.' indicates the end.  A consider
able part of the material in this book is borrowed from a work by the author written in
Hungarian (RUZSA 1988).
1.2 Basic postulates on languages
On the basis of experiences gained from natural languages, we can formulate our first
postulate concerning languages:
(L1) Each language is based on afinite supply ofprimitive objects. This supply is
called the alphabet ofthe language.
In the case of formal languages, this postulate will serve as a normative rule.
2
In spoken languages, the objects of the alphabet are called phonemes, in written
languages letters (or characters). The phonemes are (at least theoretically) perceivable
as sound events , and the letters as visible (written or printed) paint marks on the sur
face of some material (e.g., paper)  this is the difference between spoken and written
languages. We shall be interested only in written languages.
In using a language, we form fmite strings from the members of the alphabet, al
lowing the repetition (repeated occurrence) of the members of the alphabet. In the case
of spoken languages, the members of such a string are ordered by their temporal con
secution. In the case of written languages, the order is regulated by certain conventions
of writing. (The author assumes that no further details are necessary on this point.)
Finite strings formed from the members, of the alphabet are called expressions  or,
briefly, words  of that language. The reader may comment here that not all possible
strings of letters (or of phonemes) are used in a (natural) language. Only a part of the
totality of possible expressions is useful; this part is called the totality of wellformed or
meaningful expressions. (But a counterexample may occur in aformal language!) Be it
as it is, to define the wellformed expressions, we certainly must refer to the totality of
all expressions. Thus, our notion of expressions (words) is not superfluous.
Note that onemember strings are not excluded from the totality of expressions.
Hence, the alphabet of a language is always a part of the totality of words of that lan
guage. Moreover, by technical reasons, it is useful  although not indispensable  to
include the empty string .called empty word amongst the words ' of a language. (We
shall recur to this problem later on.)
Our second postulate is again based on ~ p r i n s with natural languages:
(L2) If we know the alphabet of a language, we know the totality of its words
(expressions). In other words: The alphabet of a language uniquely determines the
totality of its words.
To avoid philosophical and logical difficulties we need the third postulate:
(L3) The expressions ofany language are ideal objects which are sensibly realiz
able or representable (in any copies) by physical objects (paint marks) or events
(sound events or others).
This assumption is not a graver one than the view that natural numbers are ideal ob
jects. And it makes intelligible the use of a language in communication.,
Thus, in speaking of an expression (of a language) we speak of an ideal object
rather than of a perceivable object, i.e., a concrete representation of that ideal object. In
other words: Statements on an expression refer to all of its possible realizations, not
only to some particular representation of the expression. (Reference to a concrete copy
of an expression must be indicated explicitly.)
1.3 Speaking about languages
Speaking (or writing) about a language, we must use a language. In this case, the lan
guage we want to speak about is called the object language, and the language we use
is called the language of communication or, shortly, the used language. The object
language and the used language may be the same.
The used language is, in most cases, some natural language, even when the object
language is aformal one. However, the used language is, in most cases, not simply the
everyday language, but it is supplemented with some technical terms (borrowed from
the language of some scientific discipline) and perhaps with some special symbols
which might be useful in the systematic treatment of the object language. (If the object
language is a natural one, then the used everyday language is to be supplemented, ob
viously, with terms of linguistics. In the case of formal languages, the additional terms
and symbols are borrowed from mathematics, as we shall see later on.)
The fragment of the used language that is necessary and sufficient for the descrip
tion and the examination of an object language is called usually the metalanguage of
the object language in question. In fact, this metalanguage is relativized to the used
language. (Changing the language of communication, the metalanguage of an object
language will change, too.) If the object language is a formal one, there might be a
possibility to formulate its metalanguage as a formal language. (Theoretically, this
possibility cannot be excluded even for natural object languages.) However, in such a
case we need a metametalanguage for explaining  to make intelligible  the formal
ized metalanguage. This device can be iterated as often as one wishes, but in the end
we cannot avoid the use of a natural language, provided one does not want to play an
unintelligible game.
When speaking about an object language, it may occur that we have to formulate
some statements about some words of that language. If we want to speak about a word,
we must use a name of the word. Some words (but not too many) of a language may
have a proper name (e.g., epsilon is the proper name of the Greek letter e), others can
be named via descriptions (e.g., 'the definite article of English'). A universal method in
'a written used language (to be used in this essay as well) consists in putting the ex
pression to be named in between simple quotation marks (inverted commas); e.g.,
'Alea iacta est' is a Latin sentence which is translated
into English by 'The die is cast' .
(Note that in a written natural language the space between words counts as a letter.)
The omission of quotation marks can lead to ambiguity, and, hence, it is a source
of language humour. An example:
4
 What word becomes shorter by the addition ofa syllable?
 The word 'short'.
Surely, it becomes 'shorter' but not shorter.
1.4 Syntax and semantics
The science dealing with symbols (or signs) and systems of symbols is called semiot
ics. Languages as systems of symbols belong, obviously, under the authority ofsemiot
ics. Semiotics is, in general, divided to three main parts: syntax, semantics, and prag
matics. (See, e.g., MORRIS 1938, CARNAP 1961.)
The syntax of a language is a part of the description (or investigation) of the lan
guage dealing exclusively with the words of the language, independently of their
meaning and use. Its main task is to define the wellformed (meaningful) expressions
of the language and to classify them.
The part of linguistic investigations that deals with the meaning of words and with
the interrelations between language and the outer world but is indifferent with respect
to the circumstances of using the language belongs to the sphere of semantics.
Finally, if the linguistic investigation is interested even in the circumstances of
language use then it belongs to the sphere of pragmatics.
No rigid borderlines exist between these regions of semiotics. In natural languages,
most parts of syntactic investigations cannot be separated from the study of the com
municative function of the language, and, henceforth, investigations in the three regions
become intertwined strongly. Of course, in the systematization of the results of studies,
it is possible to omit the semantical and the pragmatic aspects; this makes possible
pure syntax as a relatively independent area of language investigation.
In case of formal languages, the situation is somewhat different. A formal lan
guage is not (or, at least, rarely) used for communication. It is an artificial product
aiming at the theoretical systematization of a scientific discipline (e.g., a system of
logic, or a mathematical theory). Its syntax (grammar) and semantics are not discovered
by empirical investigations, rather, they are created, constituted. Thus, seemingly, here
we have a possibility for the rigid separation of syntax and semantics. However, if our
formal language is not destined to be a l'art pour l'art game, its syntax must be suit
able for some scientific purposes; at least a part of its expressions must be interpret
able, translatable into a natural language. Consequently, the syntax and the semantics
of a formal language created for some scientific purpose must be intertwined: it is im
possible to outline, create the former without taking into consideration the latter. After
the outline of the language, of course, the description of its syntax is possible inde
5
pendently from its semantics. In this case, the role and function of the syntactic notions
and relations will be intelligible only after the study of the semantics.
In this essay, the following strategy will be applied: Syntax and semantics (of a
formal language) will be treated separately, but in t1l:e description of the syntax, we
shall give preliminary hints with respect to the semantics. By this, the reader will get an
intuitive picture about the function of the syntactic notion. However, our main subject
matter belongs to the realm of syntax.
Fonnallanguages are "used" as well, even if not for communicative purposes, but
in some scientific discipline (e.g., in logic). Applications of a fonnallanguage can be
assumed as belonging to the sphere of pragmatics  if somebody likes to think so.
However, this viewpoint is not applied in the literature of logic.
After these introductory explanations, we should like to tum to our first problem:
How is possible to construct the syntax of a language? However, we shall deal first
with the means used in the metalanguages. This is the subject of the following chapter.
6
Chapter 2 INSTRUMENTS OF METALOGIC
2.1 Grammatical Means
The basic grammatical instruments of communication are the declarative sen
tences. This holds true for any metalanguage  and even for our present hyper
metalanguage used for the description of instruments of metalanguages. We formulate
defmitions, postulates, and theorems by means of declarative sentences. In what fol
lows, we shall speak  for the sake of brevity  of sentences instead of declarative
sentences. Thus, sentence is the basic grammatical category of metalanguages.
Another important grammatical category is that of individual names  in what
follows, briefly, names. Names may occur in sentences, and they refer to (or denomi
nate) individual objects, of course, in our case, grammatical objects (letters, words, ex
pressions). In the simplest case, they are proper names introducedby convention. Com
poundnames will be mentioned later on.
Themostfrequent components of sentences willbe calledfunctors. In thefirst approxi
mation, functors are incomplete expressions (in contrast to sentences and names which are
complete ones insofar theirrole in communication is fixed) containing one or moreempty
places called argument places which canbefilled in by somecomplete expressions (names
or sentences) whereby onegetsa complete expression (nameor sentence):
Remark. Thereexist functors of whichsomeemptyplaceis to be filled in by another functor. In our
investigations, we shall not meet withsucha functor. Hence, the aboveexplanation on functors  although
defective  will sufficefor our purposes.
Functors can be classifiedinto several types. The type of a functor can be fixed by
determining (a) the category of words permitted to fill in its argument places (for each
argument place), and (b) the category of the compoundexpressionresultedby filling in
all its empty places.
According to the number of empty places of a functor, we speakon oneplace or mo
nadic, twoplace or dyadic, threeplace or triadic, ... , multiplace orpolyadic functors.
A functor can be considered as an automaton whose inputs are the words filled in
its empty places, and its output is the compound expression resulted by filling in its
empty places. Using this terminology, we can say that the type of a functor is deter
mined by the categoriesof its possibleinputs and the categoryof its output.
A functor is said to be homogeneous if all its inputs belong to the same category,
i.e., if all its emptyplaces are to be filledin with words of a single category. We shall
deal only withhomogeneous functors.
7
In metalanguages, we shall be interested in the following three types of
(homogeneous) functors .
(1) Sentence functors forming compound sentences from sentences. Their inputs
and outputs are sentences.
(2) Name functors forming compound names from names. Their inputs and out
puts belong to the category of names.
(3) Predicates forming sentences from names. Their inputs are names, and their
outputs are sentences.
Another crossclassification of functors consists in distinguishing logical and non
logical functors. Logical functors have the same fixed meaning in all metalanguages.
All the sentence functors we shall use are logical ones. We shall meet them in Sect. 2.3.
Among the predicates, there is a single one that counts as a logical one: this is the dy
adic predicate of identity. All the other functors we shall deal with are nonlogical ones.
Name functors express operations on individual objects in order to get (new) ob
jects. Wellknown examples are the dyadic arithmetical operations: addition, multipli
cation, etc. Thus, the symbol of addition, '+' , is a dyadic name functor. The expression
5+3
is a compound name (of a number) formedfromthe names '5' and '3'. Here the input places
surround the functor (we can illustratethe empty places by writing' ... +'); this is the gen
eral convention with respect to using dyadic functors (socalledinfix notation).
In metalanguages, the most important dyadic name functor we shall use is called
concatenation. It expresses the operation by which we form a new word from two
given words , linking one of them after the other. For example , from the (English)
words 'cow' and ' slip' we get by concatenation the word 'cowslip' (or even, in the re
versed order, 'slipcow'). This operation will beexpressed as
cow'sllp
where , n, is the concatenation functor. Now, one sees that (in any language) the words
consisting of more than one letter are composed from letters by (iterated) applications
of concatenation. We shall deal with this functor in more detail in Sect. 3.1.
Monadic predicates are used to express properties of individual objects. If the ar
gument place of such a predicate is filled in by a name, we get a sentence stating that
the object denominated by the name (if any) bears the property expressed by the predi
cate. An arithmetical sentence can serve as an illustration:
Eleven is an uneven number.
Here the property is expressed by the predicate ' ... is an uneven number'; and its argu
ment place is filled in by the name 'eleven'.
8
Multiplace (or polyadic) predicates express relations between individual objects.
In arithmetic, the symbol '<' is an abbreviation of the dyadic predicate' ... is smaller
than '; thus, e.g., '9 < 7' expresses a (false) arithmetical statement.
Among the dyadic predicates, it is the logical predicate of identity. Its wellknown
symbol, '=' , can be expressed by (English) words as ' ... is identical with '. Putting
names for the empty places we get a sentence stating that the two names denote the
same object; e.g.,
(1)
(2)
8 + 5 =6 + 7,
9 x 7 = 61.
Obviously, sentence (1) is true (for '8+5' denotes the same number as '6+7' does), but
(2) is false (since 9x7' and '61' denote different numbers) . We can express the denial
of (2) by
9x7:;t:61.
In general, let us agree in using the symbol
':F 
for expressing' .. . is not identical with ' , or, in other words, ' ... differs from '.
No doubt, identity is a logical predicate in the sense that its meaning is uniquely
fixed by the stipulation that its output is a true sentence if and only if their inputs de
note the same object. As a consequence, a sentence of form
a =a
where the letter 'a' is replaced by any name (assuming only that this name refers to a
unique object) is always true (is a logical truth), although it conveys no information.
Remark. Unfortunately, in the literature of mathematics and logic, the term 'equality' is mostly used
instead of ' identity' (and one finds 'equals' instead of ' is identical with'). This is regrettable, for identity
and equality can be clearly distinguished. For example, a triangle may have two equal sides (or angles)
which are not identical. Or, in the eye of the law, we are (supposedly) all equal, but, certainly , not identical
with each other.
The grammatical categories reviewed in this section are very important ones in
metalanguages. However, this is not at all what we need. We cannot dispense with the
use of further means treated in the next section.
9
2.2 Variables and Quantifiers
Let us consider the following sentence speaking about the grammar of a certain
natural language:
(1) Each substantive noun is a noun phrase.
In this sentence no (individual) nameoccurs. We see in it the predicate 'is a noun phrase',
and we suspect that the expression 'substantive noun' refers somehow to the predicate 'is a
substantive noun'. And we realize that the grammatical categories treated in the previous
section areinsufficient forparsingmeaningful metalanguage sentences.
Let us reformulate(1) as follows:
(2) Be it any word, if it is a substantive noun then it is a noun phrase.
Here the two predicates are directly present, but their argument places are filled in by
the pronoun 'it' insteadof a name. The core of (2), namely
(3) if it is a substantivenoun then it is a noun phrase
seems to be a correct sentence of English, although it1 information content is unclear as
long as the referenceof the pronoun is not given. Now the prefix 'Be it any word' tells
us that the reference of 'it' may be any word. Sentences containing pronouns in the
place of names  such as (3)  may be called open sentences. By applying a suitable
prefix  like ' be it any word', or, more generally, 'be it anything'  to an open sentence
we can get a closed sentence having an unambiguousinformationcontent.
In formal languages, it is customary to use special symbols called variables insteadof
pronouns. Thus, variables are artificial pronouns in formal languages. They were con
sciously and regularly used in mathematics in modem times. It proves to be useful to intro
ducethemin metalanguages as well. (Theparsing of our example (l), perhaps, doesnot give
convincing evidence for the useof variables, but our laterexamples will besufficient.) In the
formal objectlanguages, variables mayoccurin several grammatical categories. However, in
metalanguages, we onlyneed socalled individual variables referring to individual objects
(incaseof syntax, towordsof a certain language). Thus, variables mayoccurin everyplace
wherenames may occur. We shall use mainly singleitalicised letters as variables (Roman
andGreekletters, bothupper and lowerease ), but sometimes groups of letters, letters with
subor superscripts willbe used.
Using the letter 'x' as a variable, we can reformulate the open sentence (3) as fol
lows:
(3') if x is a substantive noun then x is a noun phrase.
And for the closedsentence (2), we introduceas its regular form:
10
(2') For all x (if x is a substantive noun then x is a noun phrase).
Here the prefix 'For all x' is to be called the universalquantification of the variable x,
and the open sentence between parentheses following the prefix is to be called the
scope of the quantification. The parentheses serve to stress the limits of the scope
(which might be important if the sentence occurs in a longer text).
Now we shall introduce another device in order to get closed sentences from open
ones, called existential quantification. Let us consider the sentence:
(4) Some adverbs end in 'ly'.
We shall reformulate this as follows:
(4') For some x (x is an adverb, and x ends in 'ly').
This is to be understood as stating that from the open sentence
x is an adverb, and x ends in 'ly'
we can get a true sentence at least in one case by putting a name (of a word) in places
of the variable x. That is, (4') says that there is at least one adverb ending in 'ly'.
Thus, the plural in (4)  which suggests that there are several such adverbs  is ne
glected in this reconstruction.
The prefix 'For some x' in (4') is to be called the existential quantification of the
variable x, and the open sentence between parentheses after the prefix is to be called
again the scopeof the quantification.
For the abbreviation of the prefixes used in the universal and the existential quan
tification we shall use
'I\x' instead of 'For all x', and
'Vx' instead of ' For some x'.
The symbols '/\' and 'V' are called universal and existential quantifiers, respec
tively. These will be used exclusively in metalanguages only. (In object languages, we
shall use other symbols for the quantifiers.) The adjectives 'universal' and 'existential'
are understandable, but the terms 'quantifier', quantification' are somewhat mislead
ing: they came from the logic of Middle Ages.
Now the final parsing of our examples is as follows:
(2") /\x(if x is a substantive noun then x is a noun phrase).
(4") Vx(x is an adverb, and x ends in 'ly').
(In fact, these are not the final results. The expressions 'if... then' and 'and' will be re
considered in the next section as logical sentence functors.)
11
The quantifiers are not functors, at least not in the sense treated in the previous
section. They belong to the category of variable binding operators not occurring in
natural languages.
In order to introduce some fine distinctions, we have to take into consideration that
a variable may occur more than once in a sentence. Thus, we need to speak sometimes
about certain occurrences (e.g., the first, the second, ... , etc. occurrence) of a variable
in a sentence. Now, we say that a certain occurrence of a variable, say 'x', in a given
sentence is a bound one if it falls within a subsentence of form
'/\x( ... )' or 'Vx(... )'
(here the dotting represents the scope of the quantifier), and we say that the quantifier
binds the variable following it throughout in its scope. Occurrences of a variable in a
sentence that are not bound ones will be called free occurrences of that variable in the
sentence spoken of.
Thus, a variable may have both free and bound occurrences in the same sentence.
However, in the metalanguages, we shall try to avoid sentences in which the same vari
able occurs both free and bound.
A sentence is said to be an open one if some variable has some free occurrence in
it, and in the contrary case it is said to be a closed sentence.
An application of a quantifier may be called effective if its variable (i.e., the vari
. '\
able following the quantifier immediately) has some free occurrences in its scope. In
the contrary case, the quantification may be said vacuous or ineffective. In formal lan
guages, vacuous quantification is permitted. In metalanguages , we shall avoid this as
far as it is possible.
Applying an (effective) quantification to an open sentence, the number of (distinct)
free vari,ables in the resulting sentence will diminished by 1  comparing to the sen
tence in its scope.
A name may be again open or closed. A name is open if it involves some vari
ables (think of a name functor whose empty places  or some of them  are filled in by
variables); thus, a variable alone counts as an open name, too. A name is closed if no
variables occur in it. We do not introduce an operator that forms a closed name from an
open one. Thus, variables of a name can be bounded only by quantifiers p p l i ~ to a
sentence involving the name in question.
Substitution offree variables in a sentence. Given a sentence involving free oc
currences of a variable, we can get another sentence by substituting each free occur
rence of the variable by the same closed name. Substituting open names for a variable
is also permitted under the condition that no variable of the name will be bounded in
the resulting sentence. More detailed: If x is the variable to be substituted by a name
involving the variable y, and the sentence in question involves a subsentence of form
12
'Ay( ...r or 'Vy( ... r then x must not occurfreely in this subsentence for, in the con
trary case the quantifier with y would bind a free variable (namely y) of the name. To
see the importance of this condition, let us considerthe following example:
(5) If x is a word then Vy(y is longer thanx).
The universal quantification (with respect to x) of this sentence seems to be true, if
appliedto a language. Thus, one can think that the variablex can be substitutedby any
name without risking the meaningfulness of the result. However, by substituting y for
x, we get:
If y is a word then Vy(y is longer than y).
I suppose, no commentis needed.
Boundvariables are used in order to showclearly the inner structures of quantified
sentences. They cannot be substituted by closed or compound names. However, a
bound variablecan be substitutedby another one. It is unimportant what letter is used
as a variablein a quantifieras long as the scoperemains intact. Thus, we can substitute
a bound variable, say 'x' , by another variable, say ' y', provided y has no free occur
rences in the scope of the quantification. Such a substitution is to be understood as re
placing ' y' for theoccurrence of 'x' following the quantifier andfor all free occurrences
of 'x' in the scopeof the quantifier. For example, in (5), the bound variable 'y' can be
substitutedby 'z'  but not by ' x' :
Ifx is a word then Vz(z is longer thanx).
The substitutionof bound variables is often called renaming of bound variables. In
metalanguages, we shall rarelyapply this device. (In formal object languages, it is an
importantprocedure.)
Bya universal andanexistential sentence let us mean a sentence offonn 'Ax(...)' and
'Vx(...r,respectively, where 'x' is anyvariable. Given sucha sentence, let us omit the initial
quantifier (andthevariable following it), andletus substitute thevariable x bya closed name
in the remaining sentence. The result will becalled an instance or an instantiation of the
original (universal or existential) sentence. Taking into consideration the meaning of the
quantifiers, it is obvious thatwecancorrectly infer
(a) froma universal sentenceto its any instantiation, and
(b) fromany instantiation of an existential sentenceto the existential sentence.
In metalanguages, we are compelled to use variablessystematically. In most cases, our
variables refer to the words of a certain language. In the contrary case, we shall give a
declaration about the permitted reference of the variables. Without such a declaration,
13
the meaning of quantification would be unclear. (What does it mean 'For all x' ifwe do
not know to what sort of objects the variable 'x' refers?)
Tacit quantification. Let us introduce the convention that if a "completed" meta
language sentence (i.e., one which is not a part of a longer sentence) involves free vari
ables then it is to be understood as if its free variables would be bounded by universal
quantifiers standing before the sentence and having as their scope the whole sentence.
This is a usual device applied both in mathematics and metalogic, and is called tacit
universal quantification. Of course, we can never omit an existential quantifier, or a
universal one applied only to a subsentence (a clause).
Naming open expressions. In a metalanguage, sometimes we must refer to ex
pressions involving free variables. Imagine, e.g., a grammatical rule saying that if A
and B are sentences then
(6) if A thenB
is a (compound) sentence as well. Here 'A' and 'B' are used as variables (referring to
the words of some language) , and, moreover, the rule seems to be a universal one, that
is, these variables are tacitly quantified. How can we name the expression standing in
line (6)? Including it by quotation marks would be wrong, for we do not want to say
that the expression 'if A then B' is a sentence. Instead, we should like to say that we get
a sentence from the schema (6) whenever we put sentences in the place of 'A' and 'B'.
Probably, a long and complicated circumscription would be possible, but it is more
simple and economical to introduce some new boundary marks in order to naming
schemata involving variables (such as (6)). We shall use double quotation marks
(double inverted commas) for this purpose. Then, the grammatical rule mentioned
above can be expressed by the following sentence:
(7) AAI\B (if A is a sentence and B is a sentence then "if A then B"is a sentence).
Expressions bordered by double inverted commas  such as "if A then B " above  will
be called quasiquotations. We agree that quantifiers  explicit or suppressed (tacit)
ones  are effective with respect to variables occurring in a quasiquotation (in contrast
to variables occurring in a simple quotation). Now an instantiation of a universal sen
tence involving a quasiquotation is to be formed as follows: Occurrences of variables
within the quasiquotations are to be substituted by words  not by names of words ;
and the signs of the quasiquotation (i.e., the double inverted commas) are to be re
placed by simple quotation marks (i.e., by simple invert,edcommas); and the other oc
currences of variables (outside of the quasiquotation) are to be substituted  as usually
 by names of words. Thus, an instance of (7) is as follows:
14
if 'pro' is a sentenceand 'con' is a sentence
then 'if pro thencon' is a sentence.
Provided, of course, that the words ' pro' and 'con' are possible values of the variables
'A' and 'B' occurringin (7).
Let us realizethat an occurrence of a variablecan be considered as an open name,
and, hence, it could be includedbetweendouble invertedcommas. For example, a part
of (7) couldbe writtenas
if "A" is a sentenceand "B" is a sentence ...
Accordingto our convention above, an instantiation of such a sentence would give just
the correct result; e.g.,
if 'pro' is a sentenceand ' con' is a sentence .. .
Thus, considering occurrences of variables as quasiquotations would lead to no confusion.
However, this treatment would be superfluous, and, hence, we.shall avoid its use. Let us
agreethat weshallonlyusequasiquotations in naming complex expressions involving (free)
variables. Also, quasiquotations withina quasiquotation mustbeavoided.
The means introduced in this section will be usedintensivelyin the next section.
Remark. If thereader is familiar withfirstorder logicthenmost of this section seemsto bewellknown for
himlher. Note,however, the special use of variables andquantifiers in metalogic. In fact, our instruments in meta
logic findroomintheframe ofclassical firstorder logic, but wedonotreferheretoany formal systemoflogic.
2.3 Logical means
Our first topic in this sectionis the investigation of sentence functors (mentioned
in Sect. 2.1 already)used in metalanguages.
The single monadic sentence functor we shall use is called negation. It serves to
express the denial of a sentence. In the case of simple sentences, it can be expressedby
insertinga negativeparticle('not' , or 'does not') into the sentence. 0Ne saw in 2.1 how
the denial of an identitysentence can be expressed.) In the general case, negation can
be expressedby prefixingthe sentencewiththe phrase 'it is not the case that'.
"' Our dyadic sentence functors are called conjunction, alternation, conditional,
and biconditional. Conjunction and alternation are expressed by inserting 'and' and
'or', respectively, betweentwo sentences. The formof a conditional is
(1) if A, (then)B
15
provided 'A' and 'B' refer to sentences. HereA is called the antecedent and B is called
the consequent of the conditional sentence (1). The word 'then' is between parenthe
ses, for sometimes it is omitted. Finally, the formof a biconditionalis
(2) A if and onlyif B,
and it is used as an abbreviationof a more complexsentenceof form
(2') if A then B, and if B thenA.
The artificial expression 'if and only if' comes from mathematics but its use became
general nowadays in scientific literature. It is often abbreviated by 'iff '. In what fol
lows, we shall use this abbreviationsystematically.
We shall introduce symbols for expressing these functors, according to the follow
ing conventions where the variables 'A' and 'B' refer to (closedor open) sentences:
(3) "A" for "it is not the case that A";
(4) "A & B" for "A and B";
(5) "A v B" for "A or B";
(6) "A B" for "if A, (then) B";
(7) "A ::> B" for "A if and only if B".
The meanings of our sentence functors will be fixed by the followingtruth conditions
based on the assumptionthat sentences are either true or false.
(a) If A is false then " A" is true, otherwise it is false.
(b) If both A and B are true then "A & B" is true, otherwiseit is false.
(c) If both A and B are false then "A v BH is false, otherwiseit is true. (This
shows that our use of 'or' corresponds to that of 'and/or' rather than to that
of 'either ... or' .)
(d) IfA is true and B is false then "A => B H is false, otherwiseit is true.
(e) If bothA and B are true, or if both are false, then "A ::> B" is true, other
wise it is false. (Takinginto considerationthat accordingto (2'), "A ::> BH
is an abbreviationof "(A B) & (B =>A)", this conditionfollows from(b)
and (d) above.)
Remarks. 1. On the basis of everyday experiences, the reader may doubt the assumption that sen
tencesare either true or false. However, this doubt is not justifiedin metalanguages wheretruth is created
byfiat , i.e., somebasicsentences are true as postulates or as definitions, and other sentences are inferred
fromthese. Perhaps, the reader mayacceptthat in somelimiteddomains, the truefalse dichotomy of sen
tencesis acceptable, especially if we are speaking about ideal objects like in mathematics or '" in meta
logic.
16
2. The truth conditions (a) ... (e) are moreor less in accordance withthe everyday use of the words
expressing our functors. Rule (d) seemsto be most remotefromthe everyday use of 'if ... then', but this is
just the sentence functor very useful in forming metalanguage sentences. In most cases, the symbol
will occur between open sentences standing in the scope of (tacit or explicit) universal quantification(s).
Examples of this useof 'if ... then' are the sentences occurring just in therules(a) ... (e) above.
3. The symbols introduced in this section and in the preceding one will be used sometimes in the fol
lowingexplanations whenever theiruseis motivated by the aimsof exactness and/orconciseness. However,
the everyday expressions of these symbols ('and' , 'or', 'if ... then', 'iff,'for all' etc.) will be used fre
quently.
Given the meaning of our sentence functors, it is clear that they are logical func
tors. They  and their symbols  are often called (sentence) connectives in the literature
of logic. Let us note that in mathematical logic, the terms disjunction, implication, and
equivalence are used instead of our alternation, conditional, and biconditional, re
spectively. These are not apt phrases , for they can suggest misleading interpretations.
ITwe apply more than one of our sentence functors in a compound sentence then
the order of their applications can be indicated unambiguously by using parentheses.
However, some parentheses can be omitted if we take into consideration the properties
of our functors.
First, it follows from the truth conditions above that conjunction and alternation are
commutative and associative, and hence, we can write, e.g.,
"A &B &C" and "A vB vC'
(where the variables 'A" 'B', and 'C' refer to sentences) without using parentheses.
Further, we can see easily that the truth conditions of
"(A&B)oC" and "A o (B o C)"
are the same. That is, if the consequent of a conditional is a conditional then the ante
cedent of the latter can be transported by conjunction to the antecedent of the main
conditional. This suggests the convention to omit the parentheses surrounding the
conditional being the consequent of a conditional, i.e., to write
"A 0 B C" instead of "A (B 0 C)".
Of course, this convention can be applied repeatedly.
Finally, we can realize that the biconditional is
(a) reflexive , in the sense that "A A" is always true,
(b) symmetrical, in the sense that from "A B" we can infer "B A", and
(c) transitive, in the sense that from "A B" and "B C" we can infer "A C".
17
Identity bears the same remarkable properties  the fact which legitimates the use of
chains of identities of form
a=b=c= ...
(where the variables 'a', 'b', 'c' refer to names), practised from the beginning of pri
mary school. Then, chains of biconditionals of form
A ~ B ~ C ...
will be used sometimes in the course of metalogical investigations.
As illustrations of our new symbols, let us reformulate the more detailed logical
structure of some sentences used as examples
(2")* Ax(x is a substantive noun ee x is a noun phrase).
(4")* Vx(x is an adverb & x ends in 'ly').
(5)* x is a word::::::> Vy(y is longer than x).
(7)* I\A/\B ((Ais a sentence & B is a sentence) ::::::> "if A then B" is a sentence).
Inferences. In the metalogical investigations, we draw some inferences from our
starting postulates and definitions (definitions will be treated in the next section) on the
basis of the meaning of our logical words  i.e., quantifiers, identity, sentence functors,
be they expressed by symbols or by words of a natural language. The meaning of these
words or symbols was exactly fixed by their truth conditions in the present and the pre
ceding section. No formal system of logic will be used here as a basis legitimating our
inferences  at least not before Chapter 6 that treats of a system of logic.
However, on the basis of the mentioned truth conditions, a list of important infer
ence patterns could be compiled. In the preceding section, it was mentioned, e.g., in
ference from a universal sentence to its instantiations. The properties of the sentence
functors treated in the present section also contain some hidden inference patterns. In
stead of giving a large list of inference patterns, we only stress two important ones:
(A) From a conditional "A::::::>B" and from its antecedent A we can correctly infer its
consequent B. This pattern is called modus ponens [placing mood] (in formal systems,
sometimes called detachment).
(B) From a conditional "A::::::> B
H
and from the falsity of its consequent, i.e., from
"B H, we can correctly infer to the falsity of its antecedent, i.e., to "A". This pattern is
called modus tollens [depriving mood]. It is the core of the socalled indirect proofs. In
such a proof, one shows that accepting the negation of a sentence would lead to a sen
tence which is known to be false, that is, a conditional of form "A ~ B" is ac
cepted. From this and from the falsity of "B"  i.e., from the truth of B , the falsity of
"A"  i.e., the truth of A  follows by modus tollens.
18
2.4 Defmitions
In metalanguages, we often use definitions, mainly in order to introduce terms or sym
bols instead of longer expressions. Such a definitionconsists of three parts: (a) the new
term called the definiendum, (b) the expression stating that we are dealing with a
definition, and (c) the expression that explains the meaning of the definiendumcalled
definiens. In verbal definitions, (b) is indicated by words such as 'we say that', 'is said
I to be', 'let us understand', etc. Some examplesof verbal definitions:
(1) By the square ofa number let us mean the number multipliedby itself.
(2) We say that a number x is smaller than the number y iff there is a
positivenumber z such that x +z = y.
Here the definienda are italicized, and the words indicating that the sentence is a defi
nition are printed in boldfaceletters. In (2), the definiendumis, in fact, the relation ex
pressed by the dyadic predicate 'is smaller than', but its argument places are filled in
by variables. This s ~ o w s that we cannot avoid the use of free variables in definitions.
Definitionsinvolvingfree variables will be called contextual definitions. In (1), the use
of a variable (referring to numbers) is suppressed due to the fact that it defines a very
simple monadic name functor (i.e., the operation of squaring numbers). In the canoni
cal forms introduced below, a special symbol standing between the definiendum and
the definiens will indicate that the complexexpressioncounts as a definition.
Now, the canonical form of a contextual definition of a predicate has the follow
ing shape:
(3)
where A indicates the definiendum: an open sentence formed from the predicate to be
defined by filling in its argument places with (different) variables, and B indicates the
definiens: an open sentence involving exactly the same free variables which occur in
the definiendum. Of course, the predicate to be defined must not occur in the definiens
(the prohibitionof circularityin defmitions).Furthermore, in order that the definitionbe
reasonable, the definiens must contain only functors to be known already.
For example, the canonical form of (2)  if we use the sign '<' instead of 'is
smaller than'  is as follows:
(2')
x <Y ~ Vz(zis positive & x +z =y).
Thecanonicalform of thecontextual definitionofa namefunctor has thefollowing shape:
(4)
19
where the definiendum a involves the functor to be defined filled in by different vari
ables on its argument places, and the definiens b is an open name involving exactly the
same variables occurring in a. Again, the functor to be defined must not occur in b, and
the functors occurring in b are to be known ones.
In (4), we can put a new name for a, and a compound closed name for b, to get an
explicit definition of a name. Practically, in this case the new name serves as an ab
breviationfor the (probably longer) name in place of the definiens.
As an example , let us reformulate the verbal definition under (1):
square of x =df x.x
or
The sign of definition in (3) is ~ d f and in (4) is '=df " taking into consideration that
the symbol of biconditional can only occur between sentences, and the symbol of
identity can only occur between names.
Contextual definitions are to be understood as valid ones for all permitted values of
the free variables occurring in them. That is, contextual definitions are universal sen
tences with suppressed quantifiers. Consequently, we can infer from such a definition
to its instantiations, omitting even the subscript 'er' from the side of ~ d f or ' =df' .
Furthermore, we can replace in any sentence an occurrence of a definiens of a definition
by its definiendum or vice versa; the resulting sentence counts as a logical conse
quence of the original one and the defmition.
Another important type of definition is the socalled inductive definition. We shall
meet it in Section 4.1.
Remark. Contextual definitions couldbe replaced by explicit onesif we woulduse thesocalled lambda
operator. However, theauthordoesnotseeconsiderable benefit initsintroduction intheseintroductory chapters.
2.5 Class Notation
Instead of saying that 'of is an (English) preposition, we can saythat' of is a member of the
classof (English) prepositions. In general, instead of saying that a monadic predicate holds
for a certain object, we can say, alternatively, that this object is a member of the classof ob
jects of which the predicate in question holds. This class may be called the extension or the
truth domain of that predicate. Instead of a monadic predicate, we can apply this way of
speech to any open sentenceinvolvinga single variable.
This way of speech is sometimes advantageous in metalogical investigations.
Thus, we shall introduce new notational devices for using the terms mentioned above.
20
Let 'fp(x)' denote an open sentence involving the single variable 'x', and let' rp(a)'
denote the sentence resulting from "fp(x)" via substituting a name a for x. Then, ex
pressions of form
(1) {x: rp(x)}
will be called class abstracts. (Recommended reading: "the class of rps".) Intuitively:
(1) is a name of the class being the extension or truth domain of the open sentence
"rp(x)". The variable x is qualified here as a bound one (i.e., the expression "x:" works
as a quantifier) in accordance with the fact that in verbal readings, the mentioning this
variable is often avoidable. For example,
{x: x is a preposition}
can be read as ' the class of prepositions'.
Remark. In the literature, insteadof (1),the following notation is usedas well:
{xl {O(X)}.
The expression of form
(2) a E {x: qJ(x)}
 where a is a name  means, intuitively, that the object denoted by a is a member of
the class "{x: rp(x)}". That is, the symbol 'E' expresses the relation 'is a member of',
the membership relation. However, the exact meaning of (2) will be determined by the
following defmition:
(3)
For example:
a E {x: qJ(x)} ~ fp(a).
'of E {x: x is a preposition} ~ 'of is a preposition.
According to the definition in (3), class abstracts are elirninable; thus, their use does
not compel us to accept the ontological hypothesis about the existence of classes as a
new sort of abstract entities. The use of class notation does not mean, either, an entry
into set theory (this will be treated of in Chapter 10).
A class abstract is acceptable just in the case the open sentence occurring in it is
acceptable. To wit: the class of horses is just as exact as the term 'horse' (or the predi
cate 'is a horse'). Of course, we do not want to speak about the class of horses in our
metalanguages; what we shall deal with will be classes of linguistic entities.
In the following definitions, we shall use Roman capital letters (A, B, C) as vari
ables referring to class abstracts. We shall call them, briefly, class variables, although
they refer merely to class abstracts. These variables are not quantifiable, for we do not
21
assume the existence of the totality of classes, nor even the totality of all class abstracts.
In fact, class abstracts are language dependent (grammatical) entities. Thus, the open
sentences (definitions, statements) involving class variables are to be understood as
follows: Given a language, class variables can be substituted by any legitimate class
abstracts of that language, i.e., by class abstracts of form "{x: tp(x)}" whenever "rp(x)"
is an accepted open sentence (of the language) with a single free variable x.  Further
more, lowercase Roman letters (a, b, c) will refer to names.
Some abbreviations. The denial of a sentence of form "a E A" will be written as
ai!:A
(read: "a is not a member of A"). The compound sentence "a E A & b E A" will be
abbreviated sometimes as
a, hEA.
This convention may be extended to more than two names.
Assume that the open sentence"rp(x)" has the following particular form:
x =a1 v x =a2v .. . x =an, _
that is, it is an nmember alternation of identities of form "r = a,", and, of course, at ,
a2, ... , an are names. Let us include in this form even the case n = 1. Then, the mem
bers of the class "{r. rp(x)}" are just the objects denoted by alt a2, ... , an' This moti
vates the following abbreviation:
(Did you hear the sloganaccording to which a class can be defined in two ways: (a) by a property of its
members, or (b) by enumerating its members? Nowyou see that (b) is merely a special case of (a). Note
howeverthat enumeration holdsonlyforfinite classes the members of which all havenames. Try to defme
byenumeration theclassof treesin a bigforest!
Relations between classes. We say that A is a subclass of B, or B is a superclass
of A  in symbols: " A B "  iff every member of A is a member of B. That is:
(5) A B <=)df 1\x (x E A X E B).
The expressions 'x E A' and 'x E B' occurring in the definiens are eliminable by (3)
whenever A and B are replaced by fixed class abstractions. For example:
{x: tp(x)} {x: 'f/(x)} <=) l\x(fI'{x) => 'f/(x).
If two classes are mutually subclasses of each other then we say that their extensions
coincide. Unfortunately, the symbol expressing this coincidence  used generally in
22
literature  is the sign of identity C='). Thus, according to this convention, the defini
tion of coincidence of extensions is as follows:
(6)
Or, by using (5):
A =B ::>df (A B & B A).
A =B ::> df J\x(xE A X E B)
Note that "A = B" may hold even in a case A and B are defined by different properties
(open sentences). To mention an example, in the arithmetic of natural numbers we find
that
{2} = {x: x is an even prime number}.
Identity between individual object is a primitive relation characterized by the fact that
each object is only identical with itself. (However, an object may bear more different
names, and this fact makes identity useful.) On the other hand, the symbol '=' as used
between class abstracts bears a meaning introduced by definition (6); thus, "A = B"
only means what this definition tells us.
If the extensions of A and B do not coincide, and A is a subclass of B then we say
that A is a propersubclass of B,' in symbols: "A c B". That is:
(7) A c B ::>df (A c B & A;t: B).
It may occur that a quite meaningful predicate defines a class with no members. For
example:
{x: x is a prime number & 7 <x < I I }.
The simplest definition of such an empty class 'is:
{x: x 7= x}.
The extensions of two empty classes always coincide, that is, empty classes are
"identical" with each other (in the sense of (6)). Hence, we can introduce the proper
name ' 0 ' for the empty classes:
(8) o = df {x: x;t: x}.
This definition is to be considered as the concise variant of the following contextual
defmition:
X E 0 ::> df x;t: x.
Analogously, we can introduce a proper name, say r, for any class abstracts
"{x: rp(x)}" by
r =df {x: (x)}.
23
By our definitions in (5) and (8), it is obviousthat
ok A, and AkA.
Operations with classes. We introduce the dyadicclass functors of union, inter
section, anddifference, symbolized by 'u', '(l' ,and '', respectively.
(9) A u B =df {x: x E A v X E B},
(10) A n B =df {x: x E A & x E B},
(11) AB =df {x: x E A & x ~ B}.
Someproperties of theseoperations:
(12) A u B = B u A,'
(13) (A u B) u C= A u (B u C);
(14) A u A =A;
(15) Au 0 =A;
(16) A u (B (l C) = (A u B) (l (A u C);
(17) A(AB) = A (l B;
(18) AS; B ~ (A u B = B) ~ (A (l B = A);
A (l B =Br. A;
(A (l B) (l C = A (l (B (l C);
A (lA =A;
A (l 0 = 0;
A (l (B u C) = (A (lB) u (A (l C);
(AB) u B =A u B;
A B ~ A
Identities (12), (13), (14) tell that union and intersection are commutative, associative,
and idempotent (selfpowering) operations. In (15), the role of the empty class in the
operations is shown. Union and intersection are distributive with respect to each other,
as (16) tells us. In (17), we see important connections between difference and the two
other operations. Finally, in (18), some interrelations between the subclassrelation and
our operations are presented.  The proof of these laws is left to the reader. (Use the
definitions (9), (10), (11), (5), and (8).)
Finally, let us note that two classes are said to be disjoint iff theyhave no common
members, i.e., if their intersection is empty.Thus,
A(lB=0
expressesthat A and B are disjoint classes.
24
Chapter 3 LANGUAGE "RADICES
3.1 Definition and Postulates
In what follows, we shall use script capital letters (Jil, '.B, C, etc.) to refer to an alphabet.
The totality of words formed from the letters of an alphabet Jil will be denoted by "Jil",
and the members of jilO will be called sometimes "jilwords".
According to our postulate (Ll) in Sect. 1.2, an alphabet is always afinite sup
ply of objects. Hence, we can use class notation in displaying an alphabet, e.g.,
where a b ... ,an stand for the letters of jil.
According to the postulate (L2) in Sect. 1.2, if we know Jt then we know jilas
well. By using class notation, we may write:
jilO ={x: x is anxword}.
Of course, this identity cannot serve as a defmition of jilo, for 'is an jilword' is an un
defined predicate.
We mentioned already in Sect. 2.1 that the introduction of the empty word may
be useful for technical reasons (this will be demonstrated in Ch. 4). We shall use the
symbol '0' for the empty word:
o =df the empty word.
Obviously, this notion is languageindependent.
Also, in Sect. 2.1, the name functor concatenation was mentioned; its symbol is
,n , . We can imagine that the words of an alphabet are "produced" starting from the
empty word via iterated concatenation of letters to words given already.
Thus, at the beginning of the description of a language, we have to deal with
four basic notions: the letters of the language, the words of the language, the empty
word, and the name functor concatenation. Up to this point, we have an intuitive
knowledge about these notions. We shall say that these four notions together form a
language radix. Now we shall give a socalled axiomatic treatment of these notions
the significance and the importance of which will be cleared up gradually later on.
2S
DEFINITION. By a language radix let us mean a fourcomponent system of
form
whereJ'i andJ'iare nonempty classes, 0 is an individualobject (the emptyword), fl is
a dyadicoperationbetweenthe members of J'i
0
, and the postulates (Rl) to (R6) below
are satisfied. The members of J'i will be calledletters, and the members of Jil
O
will be
calledwords
Remark. Pointed brackets above under (*) are used to sum up the four components of a lan
guage radix into a whole. The reader need not think of the settheoretic notion of an ordered quadruple 
whichis undefinedup to this point.
(Rl) J'i c Jil
O
and 0 e Jil
O
(R2) x, yeJil
o
=> X fly eJilO.
(Tacit universalquantification of the variables. Similarlyin the following postulates.)
(R3) Concatenationis associative: if x, y, Z e Jil
O
then
(X fl y) fl
Z
=X fl(y fl
Z).
Consequently, parentheses can (and will) be omittedin the of iteratedconcatena
tions.  In what follows, the variables x, y, z will refer to members ofJilo.
(R4)
This tells us that a wordis nonempty iff it has a final letter.
That is, the last letter of a wordis uniquely determined.
(R6) (x fl y =X :) Y =0) & (x fl Y =Y <=> x =0).
That is, a concatenation is identical with one of its members iff its other member is the
emptyword.
Some consequences of our postulates:
By (R6), the emptywordis ineffective in a concatenation:
(1)
x
fl0=x=0 flx.
From"a. eJil & x =Y fl a." it follows by (R4) that "X;1: 0". In other words:
(2) cx eJil=> yfl cx:;t0.
26
Particularly, if y =0 then  with respect to (1)  we get that
(3)
which means that
aEj{:::) a:;t0,
that is, the empty word does not belong to the class of letters. (Note that this was not
explicitly stated in our postulates.)
Assume that x, y Ej{
0
, and
(4)
Now, if y = 0, then, by (R4), it is of form "z n a" where a Ej{. Thus, in this case, (4)
has the following form:
or, with respect to (R3),
However, this is excluded by (2). Hence, (4) excludes the case y:;t 0. On the other
hand, "x n 0 = 0" implies "x = 0 ", by (l). Thus, we have that
(5)
By (1), this holds conversely, too. Hence, we can replace the in (5) by ":>". In
words: The result of a concatenation is empty (i.e., the empty word) iff both its mem
bers are empty.
Our postulates and their consequences are in full accordance with our intuitions
with respect to the four basic notions of a language radix. Among others, they assure
that the empty word can be "erased" everywhere, for it is ineffective in concatenations.
What is more, these postulates determine "almost" uniquely the class j{0: the objects
which are j{words according to our intuitions are really (provably) in j{0. However,
(Rl) . .. (R6) do not assure that jIO contains no "foreign" objects, i.e., objects which are
not words composed from the letters of jI. This deficiency could be supplied e.g. by the
following postulate:
(R7) If B is a class such that
(i) 0 EB, and
(ii) (x EB & a Ej'f) :::) X n a EB,
thenx" c B.
27
In other words: 51 must be a subclass of all classes satisfying (i) and (ii). Another
usual formulation: 51 is the smallest class which contains the empty word and the
lengthening of every contained word by each letter of 51.
Now we see that (R7) involves a universal quantification over classes, and,
hence, it passes the limits of our class notation introduced in Sect. 2.5. On the other
hand, 51 is not perfectly determined by the remaining postulates (Rl) to (R6). We are
compelled to refer to our postulate (L2) introduced already in Sect. 1.2. On the basis of
experiences in natural languages, we can accept that the class of 51words is perfectly
determined by the alphabet 51.  However, the notion of a language radix introduced in
the present section will be utilized later on (mainly in Ch. 7).
Remark. The systems called language radices above are called free groupoids with a unit ele
ment in mathematics when the postulate (R7) is accepted as well. They form a particular family of alge
braic systems. Here is the field of the grupoid, n is the groupoid operation, 0 is the unit element, and
is the class of free generators.  Let us note that accepting (R7) makes possible to weaken some of the
other postulates ; e.g., (3) above is sufficient instead of (R4), and (2) instead of (R6).
3.2 The Simplest Alphabets
3.2.1. Notational conventions. (a) It is an obvious device to omit the sign of
concatenation and using simple juxtaposition instead; i.e., writing "xyz" instead of
"x (") y (") z".
(b) Displaying an alphabet, we have to enumerate its letters between braces.
The letters are objects, thus, in enumerating them, we have to name them. For example,
the twoletter alphabet whose letters are '0' and '1', is to be displayed as
{CO', '1' }.
Could be omitted here the quotation marks? We can answer this question by YES,
agreeing that inside the brackets, the letters stand in an autonymous sense as names of
themselves. However, we can give a deeper "theoretical" argument in doing so.
Namely, if we do not want to use a language for communication, if we are only inter
ested in the structure of that language then we can totally avoid the use of the letters
and words of the language in question  by introducing metalanguage names for the
letters and words of the object language. (For example, the grammar of Greek or of
Russian could be investigated without using Greek or Cyrillic letters.) Hence, we shall
not use quotation marks in enumerating the letters of an alphabet, but we leave unde
cided the question  being unimportant  whether the characters used in the enumera
tion are names in the metalanguage for the letters, or else they stand in autonymous
sense.
28
(c) In presenting an alphabet, different characters denote different letters. That
is, the alphabet contains just as many letters as many are enumerated in the alphabet.
The simplest alphabet is, obviously, a oneletter one:
(1) J{o = {a}.
However, the words of this minimal alphabet are sufficient to naming the positive inte
gers: the words a, CIa, CICIa, ... can represent the numbers 1, 2, 3, ... . (Even, the
empty word can be considered as 0.)  We shall exploit this interpretation of J{o later
on.
The twoletter alphabet
(2)
is used naming natural numbers in the socalled dyadic (or binary) system. In the eve
ryday life, we use the decimal system in writing natural numbers; this system is based
on a tenletter alphabet. However, the dyadic system is exactly as good as the decimal
one (although the word expressing the same number is usually a longer one in the dy
adic system than in the decimal system). This leads to the idea: Is it possible to replace
any multiletter alphabet by a twoletter one? The existence of the Morse alphabet sug
gests the answer YES. In fact, this is a threeletter alphabet I: ,, I} where the third
character serves to separate the the translations of the letters of (say) the English alpha
bet. For example, the translation of ' apple' to a Morseword is:
. I   I   I  I
which shows that Morsealphabet is, in fact, a .threeIetter one.
Let our "canonical" twoletter alphabet be
(3) JI 1 ={CI, ~
Furthermore, let C be an alphabet with more than two letters, e.g.,
We define a universal translation method from C into Jl
1
Let the translation of the letter
Y; the Jlrword beginning with a and continued by i copies of ~ (for 0 ~ i ~ n). This
rule can be displayed in the following table:
the letters of C
translate into
29
Yn
a(3 .,. (3
,.......
n copies of f
Then, the translation of a Cword is defmed, obviously, as the concatenation of the
translations of its letters. Detailed, in a hairsplitting manner: The translation of 0 is
0; and if the translation of a cword c is c", and the translation of Yi is gi then the
translation of "cyi" is c gi " We avoided here the use of a separating symbol by the
rule that the translation of each letter of C begins with a..
Translations of cwords among the Jilrwords can be uniquely recognized: di
vide the given Jilrword to parts, by putting a separating sign, e.g., a vertical stroke,
before each occurrence of the letter a.. Now if it is the translation of some cword then .
each part must be the translation of a letter of C (it is easy to control whether this holds
or not). Retranslating the CIetters, we get the cword the translation of which the
given Jilrword was.  Summing up:
3.2.2. THEOREM. Any finite language based on an alphabet with more than
two letters can be equivalently replaced with a language based on the twoletter al
phabetJil
1
Then Tr(j) is one of the formulas in the list from 82 to 115 (of the rules of 1:*), i.e., it
is a member of PC.  Induction step (a): Assume that H
3
'" g, Tr(g) = A, A is a
theorem of CC*, and we get! from g by substituting certain Jilccwords tl, ... , t1 for
certain Hjvariables Zl, . .. , Zk in g. In A, these H
3variables
are replaced by some
firstorder variables Xl, .. ,XJco Then, we can assume (using QC.4 if necessary) that A
is of form "TIXl .. TIXl B". Then, Tr(j) is the formula
which is deducible from A by k applications of (B4), and, hence, is a theorem of CC*.
 Induction step (b): Assume that H
3
'" g 7J, H
3
'" g where g involves no arrows,
Tr(g 7 f) = "Ql(B::> A)", Tr(g) = "Q2B" where Ql and Q2 are (possibly empty)
strings of quantifiers of form "TIX". Assume that these formulas are theorems of CC*.
82
It is clear that by appropriate choosingof the variables, we can assumethat Q2 is a part
of Q1 (use, if necessary, QC.2), and, by using(B6), we can replaceQ2by Q1' Thus, we
can assumethat our formulas are of form
Fromthese we get "QI A" by QC.5. To get Tr(f) which is of form"Q3 A" we apply
(B4) and QC.2 (if necessary) to omit the superfluous quantifiers and rename the
boundvariables. Thus, Tr(f) is a theoremof CC*.
CC.6. If A is a true closedatomicformula but not of form "(s =t)" then A is a thea
remofCC*.
Proof. According to item (2) of our truth assignment, there is a wordf such
that H
3
.. f, and Tr(f) = A. Then, by CC.5, A is a theorem of CC*.
CC.7. If "(s = t)" is closedand true, it is a theoremof CC*.
Proof. According to item (1) of our truth assignment, we get froms and t the
same term c by deletingthe occurrences of (if any). Now, "(c = c)" is obviously a
theorem of CC* (see QC.6). The omitted occurrences of can be placed back by
using the postulates 66,67, and the basic schema(B8). Hence, "(s = t)" is a theorem
ofCC*.
CC.8. If A is a true closedatomicformula thenA is a theorem of CC*.  This is the
summary of the previous two statements.
The formula ' (ex is obviouslyfalse, hence, by CC.4, it is not a theorem of CC*.
Thus, not all formulas are theorems of CC*. In other words:
CC.9. Theory CC* is consistent. (Cf. Def.s 6.5.1 and 6.5.5.)
COROLLARY. The empty class offormulas  or the class BF of basic formulas  is
consistent.
7.4 Undecidability: Church's Theorem
Let us pose the question: Is it possible to find a procedure  an algorithm  by which
we wouldbeableto decidefor everyformula of .L1* whetherit is a theoremof CC*?
If we had such a procedure then we wouldbe able to decide, amongothers, for
all formulas of form"A(t)" wheret is an whether it is a theorem of CC*.
Now, r* r A(t) iff H
3
" At (byCC.4 andCC.8). However,
H
3
" At iff t EAut
83
(cf. 4.4.3). Hence, in the presence of a decision procedure, we would beable to decide
for all numerals (i.e., {a}words) whether it is an autonomous one. By Th. 4.4.4, the
class of nonautonomous numerals (J'oAut) is not an inductive class. Then, by Th.
5.4.4 and its corollaries, Aut is not a definite class, and, according to Markov's Thesis
(see 5.4.2) it is not a decidable one. Hence, the answer to our question turned to be a
negative one: no normal algorithm can decide the theoremhood in CC*, and, if we ac
cept Markov's Thesis, no decision procedure exists for the class of theorems of CC*.
Summing up:
7.4.1. THEOREM. Theory CC* is undecidable in the sense that the class of its theo
rems is not a definite subclass of its formulas.
Since "A is a theorem of CC*" means the same as "T* A" we get from the result
above that in QC, no general procedure (or, at least, no normal algorithm) exists to de
cide the relation "T A". Of course, we can imagine a general decision procedure as
a schematic one that can be adjusted in some way or other to all particular firstorder
languages. To be more unambiguous, we can state that no decision procedure exists for
the maximal frrstorder language (see 4.3.2 and the first paragraph of Sect. 6.2.). For,
this maximal language includes 1*; hence, if we had a decision procedure for the
former then it would be applicable for the latter as well.
Let us realize, furthermore, that "r * A" tells the same as "P61 :::) ... :::)P115 :::)A"
where P6h .. . ,P
115
are the members of r* (the formulas in 1:.* enumerated from 61 to
115)  according to the Deduction Theorem (see PC.5). Thus, it follows from the un
decidability of "T * A" that the class of provable formulas of 1* is undecidable.
The same holds, afortiori , for the class of provable formulas in the maximal firstorder
language. Summing up:
7.4.2. THEOREM. (Church's Theorem.) In QC, there exists neither a universal pro
cedure (representable by a normal algorithm) for deciding the deductibility relation
t"r A") nor for recognising the provable formulas ( It A").
This theorem was first proved by Alonzo Church (CHURCH 1936) in another way than
the one applied here.
Obviously, this undecidability theorem holds for all larger logical calculi includ
ing QC.
In some firstorder languages there exist decision procedures for the deductibil
ity relation; obviously, this does not contradict our theorem. For example, if a firstorder
language involves only names and monadic predicates as (nonlogical) constants then it
is decidable. The same holds for zeroorder (i.e., propositional) languages.
* * *
The investigations of the present chapter showed us an interesting example for the
defmition of a firstorder theory by means of a canonical calculus, and, in addition, pre
sented a very important metatheorem on the firstorder calculus QC.
84
Chapter 8 COMPLETENESS WITH RESPECT
TO NEGATION
8.1 The Formal Theory CC
In Sect. 7.3, we saw that every theorem of CC* is true (see CC.4). If the converse
holds too (up to the present point in this essay, this question was not yet answered)
then the identity
(1) {A: A is a true formula of CC*} ={A: A is a theorem of CC*}
holds true. Using that for any formula A, exactly one of the pair A, " A" is true, it
follows from (1) that for all formulas A, either A, or " A" is a theorem of CC*, or, as
we shall express this property, the theory CC* is complete with respect to negation.
8.1.1. DEFINITION. A firstorder theory Tis said to be complete with respectto nega
tion briefly: negcomplete  iff for all formulas A of T, one of A, "A" is a theorem
ofT.
An inconsistent theory is, trivially, negcomplete. Thus, the problem of neg
completeness is an interesting one only for consistent theories, such as CC*. Intui
tively, we can say that a consistent and negcomplete theory grasps its subject matter
exhaustively.
Since any consistent class of formulas can serve as a basis (postulate class) of a
consistent theory, it is not surprising that many consistent firstorder theories are not
negcomplete. As we shall see later on, this is the case even with CC* that means that
identity (1) does not hold. Moreover, there are surprising cases of negincomplete theo
ries, theories which are irremediably negincomplete in the sense that any consistent
enlargement (with new postulates) of the theory remains negincomplete. Such a theory
is especially interesting if we can give a truth assignment of its formulas according to
which all its theorems are true, and, in addition, our intuition suggests that the postu
lates of the theory characterize exhaustively the notions represented by the constants of
the language of the theory.
We shall give an example of such a surprising frrstorder theory. It will be a
fragment of CC*, let us call it CC.
The intuitive background of CC* is the hypercalculus H
3
In CC, we shall
rely on Hz, instead. Let us remember that Hz defines the notion of a canonical calculus
and the derivability in a canonical calculus. The additional notions defined in H
3
are
the lexicographic ordering, the Gooel numbering, and the autonomous numerals. These
considerations show that the theory CC that will be based on the hypercalculus Hz is
85
the smallest firstorder theory of canonical calculi whereas CC* is one of the.possible
enlargements of it. (However, CC* was useful in demonstrating the undecidability of
QC.) According to our intuitions, 8
2
regulates exhaustively the notionsinvolved in it.
This gives the (illusory) hope that the theoryCC basedon 8
2
will be negeomplete.
The formulation of CC is simple enough: we get it by certain deletions from
CC* (cf. Def. 7.1.1).
8.1.2. DEFINITION. The firstorder theoryCC is defmedby
CC = (10, r
o
)
where .10 is a firstorder language basedon the 23letteralphabet
Jt
cO
= {(,), t, x, ,::>, =, 'if, ~ a, ~ ~ <, *, I, L, V, W, T, R, K, D, S},
and
.10 =(Log, Var, Con; Terms, Forms)
where
Cono = Nou Po,
and No = N* (cf. Def. 7.1.1), and
Po = {I, L, V, W, T, R, K, D, S}.
The definition of Terms, Forms, and To will be givenbelowby means of a canonical
calculus 1:.
Remark. Up to this point, CC differs from CC* merely by the omissionof the predi
cates A, F, and G. We shall see that Terms = Term", and Forms ~ Form*.
Again, the full description of CC will be givenby a canonical calculus1:.
8.1.3. DEFINITION. The canonical calculus 1: is that fragment of 1:* (cf. Sect. 7.2)
whichwe get from 1:* by omittingthe rules 20, 23, 24, 35, 36, and 107to 115.
In referring to the rules of : ~ we retain their original numbering given in 1:*. The
omittedrules are just those involving the omittedpredicates A, F, and G.  The sub
sidiaryletters and variablesin 1: are exactlythe same as in 1:* (see at the end of Sect.
7.1).
Then:
Terms = {x: 1:'" Tx} = Term*.
Forms = {x: 1:'" Fx} ~ Form*.
To ={61 ... 106} u {SUD}
86
i.e., the members of To are the formulas enumerated from 61 to 106 as inputfree
rules in 1:*, and a further postulatedenotedby 'SUD' which will begiven in the next
chapter (in section9.2]. Furthermore:
A E Forms =? (To ~ A;)1:'" A).
The truth assignment defined in 7.3.1 can be applied to Forms (since Forms c
Form*), of course, by referring to H
2
insteadof H
3
in item(2). Thus, we can speak
on true andfalseformulas of CC. Furthermore, the statements CC.1 to CC.9 (in Sect.
7.3) hold  mutatis mutandis  for CC as well. The truth of the additional postulate
SUD will be shownin section9.2. Hence:
8.1.4. THEOREM. Theory CC is consistent.
8.2 Diagonalization
We know that any alphabet can be replaced by the twoletter alphabet 51} = {o, ~ }
(see Th. 3.2.2). Let us consider the 32letteralphabet 5I
cO
v Sc which is the full al
phabet of the canonical calculus 1:. Givena translation of this alphabet into51} , we can
extendthis to get a translation of 1: as a single word of the fiveletter alphabet J(cc =
{o, ~ , ~ , <, .}, replacing the 1:variables by ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ , ... , and the arrow ~ by
'<', and using '.' between the translations of the rules of 1:. Given this extended
translation, let us denote the translation of a word f by (f]A E 5t
cc
0
where the square
bracketswill be omittedif f consistsof a singleletter or a metavariable.
Now, 1: is translatedinto a single wordof J(cc , say
1:'" = cr.
Then, in the hypercalculus H
2
, the word 'Kc' is derivable. Moreover, if 1: ~ f, then
r is derivable in o whichmeansthat
Now let us remember the translating function Tr introduced at the beginning of
Sect.7.3 which translates words derivable in H
3
into formulas of CC*. Let us re
strict Tr to H
2
by whichits applications result CCfonnulas. We thenget:
Tr(aDf"') =D(a)(fA) EForms
wherer is a closedterm(i.e.,r E 5t
cc
0). It follows from(1)  by our truth assign
ment  that "D(a)(fA)" is a true atomicformula, and, according to CC.8, it is a theo
remof CC. Summingup:
87
~ ~ ~ ~  ~    ~        
8.2.1. LEMMA. If 1: f, then Fo r D(a)(f')  where o =1:".
Now assume that A e Forms, A" =a eJ'ltO, B =Aa/x, X e Var, B" =
b e J'llo , B is a closed formula, and F
o
r B. (The stipulation that B is closed is, in
fact, unessential . For, Fo r B implies that B is true (cf. CC.4 in Sect. 7.3); and, if B is
not closed, this means that its universal closure is true.) Then, the following words are
derivable in 1::
(2)' FA, BSASaSx
t
B.
Hence, by our previous Lemma, the following atomic formulas are theorems of CC:
(3) D(cr)(F"a), D(cr)(bS"a[SaSxY'), D(a)(b).
Then, obviously, their conjunction is a theorem of CC as well. Let us abbreviate this
conjunction by "Diago(a/x,b)".
(4) Diagda/x,b) =df (D(a)(F"a) & D(cr)(bS"a[SaSx] " ) & D(cr)(b.
Here the term 'Diag' reminds us that the formula B is, in a sense, a diagonalization of
A: we get B from A via substituting its own translation A" for the variable x. The sub
script 'a' reminds us that our procedure depends essentially on the canonical calculus
1: (whose translation is a). However, in what follows, we omit this subscript whenever
no misunderstanding can arise by its omission.
8.2.2. THEOREM. Whene ver a, be J'llo, Diagia/x.b}is a theorem of CC ifffor some
Ae Forms, A"= a, [A
QIX
] " = b, and the (closed) formula Aa/x is a theorem ofCC.
Proof. Half part of this statement is proved above. Concerning its other half,
assume that F
o
r Diagia/xb). Then, by CC.4 (cf. Sect. 7.3) "Diagia/x.b]" is true.
With respect to its definition under (4), we have that all the atomic formulas in (3) are
true, and, by CC.8, they are theorems of CC. According to our truth assignment, this
means that the following words are derivable in Hz:
crDb.
Since a is just the translation of 1:, a word is derivable in o iff it is a translation of a
word derivable in 1:. Thus, there must be words A and B such that the words in (2) are
derivable in 1:. Then, really, B = Aa/x,and Fo r B.
Now let us consider the open formula
and assume that
[A
o
]" =a.
88
and
By our preceding theorem:
(5) (To I 'tXt'tXfa Diag(xlxltJ2 (To I Diag(arfx,b
o)
With respect to the basic schema (B4), we have:
(6) (To I 'tXI'tXfa Diag(aO'/xl
t
J2) ) (To I Diag(aclx,b
o))
From (5) and (6) we get immediately:
(7) (To I Diag(ao/x,b
o)
(To I Diag(ao/x,b
o)
).
Since CC is a consistent theory, we have that
(8) 'Diag(aolxtb
o)
' is not a theorem of CC.
Then, by (5):
(9) ''tXI'VXfa is not a theorem of CC.
However, we can show that this formula is true. For, let us consider the conjunction
that is abbreviated by ' Diag(ao,/XttXfa}' (cf. (4 :
By (9), L ... Eo does not hold, thus (according to QC) L'" A
o
cannot hold either.
Then
D(o)(b
o)
and D(a)(ao) are false atomic formulas .
According to our 'definitions of A
o
and Eo , the following words are derivable in L:
(Concerning the second word, take into consideration that Xl is not a free variable of
Ao) Then, the following atomic sentences are true:
By the rules 30 to 49 (of 1:.), the substitution of variables by terms  represented by the
fourplace subsidiary letter S  is uniquely determined in the sense that if 1:. ... vSuStSx
then the word v is uniquely determined by the words x, t, and u. This means that the
second conjunct of (10) is true iff
Xfa is replaced by b
o
and Xl is replaced by X, or
Xfa is replaced by ao and Xl is not x
89
However, in both cases, the third conjunct of (10) is false (as we have seen above).
Henceforth, (10) that is,  is false by any substitution of the variables
Xl and xt; hence, its negationis "always" false; consequently, its universal closure
... is true. Then, its negation is false. ByCCA, no falseformula
is a theorem of CC. Hence:
(11) '  VXlVxt Diag(aolxt,XtJ' is not a theorem of CC.
With respect to (9) and (11) (andDef. 8.1.1)it is provedthat:
8.2.3. THEOREM. Theory CC is not complete with respect to negation.  In other
words: The class oftheoremsof CC is aproper subclass of the trueformulas of cc.
8.3 Extensions and Discussions
To investigate the possible generalizations of Th. 8.2.3, let us look over carefully its
proof. It is very important here the diagonalization procedure, i.e., the introduction of
the schema"Diag(T(a/x,b)". Sinceo =L", it is exploitedhere that CC is defined by a
canonical calculus :E. Reference to the hypercalculus H
2
is unavoidable. Furthermore,
the truthassignmentto Forms was exploitedin the proofof Lemma8.2.1, ofTh. 8.2.2,
and of the statements in (8) and(11) of the preceding section.
Now assume that T is a frrstorder theory including CC (in the sense that all
theorems of CC are theorems of 1). Assume, further, that T is defined by a canonical
calculusK. Then, we can defmethe translation of K into the alphabet Jit
cc
; say, K"= k.
Retainingour truth assignment with respect to the formulas of CC, we can prove the
analogueof Lemma8.2.1: If K f then "D(k)(f')" is a theorem of T. Furthermore,
we can introduce the diagonal schema "Diag, (a/x,b)", using k instead of o every
where. Now, the proofof the analogue of Th. 8.2.2 is unproblematic, if we assume, in
addition, that no falseformulas of CC are theorems of T (fromthis, the consistency of
T follows obviously). For, take into consideration that "Diag, (a/x,b)" E Forms (i.e.,
that it is a formula of CC), and, hence, if it is a theorem of T, it cannot be false. Also,
the explanations from (5) to (11) in the preceding section, mutatis mutandis, remain
correct. As a final consequence, we get that theory T is incomplete with respect to ne
gation.  Let us summarise theseobservations:
8.3.1. THEOREM. Let Tbeafirstorder theory satisfying theconditions (i) to(iii) below:
(i) CC is a subtheory of T (every theorem of CC is a theorem of 1).
(ii) The classof theorems of T is definable by meansof a canonical calculus.
(iii) No false formula of CC (in the sense of the truth assignment defined in
Sect. 7.3) is a theoremof T (hence, Tis consistent).
Then: T is incomplete with respect to negation.
90
COROLLARY: Theory CC* (Ch. 7) is incomplete with respect to negation.
Remark. Condition (i) can be fulfilled by means of a translation procedure from the
language of CC to the language of T satisfying some obvious provisos. '
What may be the reason of the negincompleteness of CC? Our postulates translating
the rules of Hz seem to give an exhaustive report on canonical calculi and on deriva
tions in them. However, we can be suspicious with respect to our postulates corre
sponding to the language radix postulates (Rl) to (R6). We noted in Sect. 3.1 that the
supply of these postulates is incomplete: they do not determine uniquely the class of JiI.
words (where JiI. is an alphabet). We should have the further postulate (R7)  but we
abandoned it because it involves a quantification over classes. Thus, we can suspect
that the negincompleteness of CC is caused by the incompleteness of our formulation
of the notion of language radices.
However, we can try to formulate the content of (R7). Let us consider the fol
lowing rule that can be added to 1::
(1) Fx? tSxSt'}Sx ? ySxSx<xSx ? ? ? vSxSx< Sx ?
wSxSx.Sx t & Vx(x:J (y & z & u & v & w :::> Vx x).
(Here x, y, t. Z, .u. v, w are 1:variables.) To grasp more easily the content of this rule,
let us assume that x is a monadic open formula having some free occurrences of the
variable x; let us write "<p(xt for x, and "<p(s)" for r/X where s is any term. Then we
have that t. y, Z, u; v, w are just the formulas
<p(t'}), <p(x<X), <p(x<), <p(x.),
respectively. Then, the final output of the rule under (1) can be written as follows:
(2) <p(t'}) & Vx(cp(x) :J (cp(x<X) & & & cp(x<) & <p(x.:::>
Vx <p(x).)
Its content is: If cp is a monadic predicate which
(a) holds for the empty word, and
(b) whenever it holds for an Jil.eeword a then it holds for all words getting from
a by suffixing it a letter of Jil.
ee

then <p holds for all Jil.eewords.
This seems to bethe content of (R7) applied to Jil.
ee
Is this correctly included in
the rule (1)? The assumption that x is a monadic open formula involving x is missing
from (1).
However, if x is free from x, the output of (1) is as follows:
x & Vx(x:J (x & x & x & x & x) :J Vx z],
and this is a harmless logical truth. Hence, it is sufficient to assume that x is free from
all variables other than x. This means that  that is, t  is a closed formula.
91
Now, we can enlarge 1: by new rules to define closeness. Let C be a new
subsidiary letter expressingthe predicate 'is closed'. We need a list of inputfree rules
tellingthat the lettersof j[cO (see 8.1.2)  exceptx and 'if  are closed, e.g.,
C, C'6, ce, CL, ... ;
this means21 rules.Then, we finishby the following tworules:
~ y ~ Cxy,
Fu ~ Vx ~ vSuS'6Sx ~ Cv ~ C'ifxu.
Finally, we can includeinto (1) the input "Cr".
Despiteof all our efforts, enlarging1: and CC in the wayoutlinedabovegives
a theory for whichTh. 8.3.1 is applicable, that is, the enlargedtheory remained incom
pletewithrespect to negation. Hence, we can suspectthat the forceof the schema(2) is,
nevertheless, less than that of (R7).To understand this situation, takeinto consideration
that a monadic predicate defmes a subclass of J'lcc (the class of words of which the
predicate holds true). We can define as many subclasses of j[cc as many monadic
open formulas exist in the language 10. Schema (2) deals just with such formulas,
Now, it may happen that j[cc
o
has more subclasses than as many monadic predicates
are expressible in 10 . However, theexact meaning of this conjecture can be explained
only in set theory (seeCh. 10) where, in addition, its truthis provableas well.
It was Kurt Godel who gave the first (nontrivial) example of a formal theory
that is incomplete with respect to negation (GODEL1931). He showed that if a theory
includesthe arithmetic of naturalnumbers, and no false formula of arithmetic is among
its theorems then the theory cannot be complete with respect to negation. This result is
cited in the literature of metamathematics as Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem. In
Godel's proof, a fragment of the theory of recursive functions playedthe role analogous
to the roleof Hzin our approach.
Theorem8.3.1 is, obviously, an analogue of Godel's First Incompleteness Theo
rem. Its peculiarity  whichdeserves some attention  is that it refersto no mathemati
cal theory. Whereas Godel's proof is arithmetically based, our approach is purely
grammatically based. It conforms the motto: Keep aloof metalogic from arithmetic (in
general: from mathematics) as long as it is possible.  But this is not possibleto the
very last  as we shall see in Ch. 10.
92
Chapter 9 CONSISTENCY U1'WROVABLE
In this chapter we shall show that although the consistency of the theory CC is ex
pressible in its language by means of a formula, this formula is not a theorem of CC.
9.1 Preparatory Work
The consistency of CC can be expressed by the formula
(1) Cons.; =df 3x(D(cr)(FJ\x) & ~ D c r x
meaning that for some u, 1: ... Fu but not 1: ... u.
If both FA and A are derivable in 1: then (and only then) A is a theorem of
CC. This leads us to define the schema of theoremhood
(2) Thora) =df (D(a)(FJ\a) & D(a)(a.
In what follows, the subscript '0' will be omitted both in (1) and (2).
9.1.1. LEMMA. If 1: ... f ~ g ~ h, and the words f and g involve no arrows then
(3) r 0 ~ D(a)(f')::> D(a)(gJ\) ::> D(a)(hJ\).
Proof. By Lemma 8.2.1, it follows from our assumptions that
(4) F 0 ~ D(a)(f'< gA< hJ\).
Rule 106 of 1:* is a postulate of CC (a member of r 0) from which we get by appli
cations of the basic schema (B4) (of QC) that
(5) Fo ~ D(a)(f')::J D(a)(f'< g"< h")::> T(fA) =:l D(cr)(g"< h").
Furthermore, ''T(f')'' is obviously true, and , hence, by CC.8 (see in Sect. 7.3)
(6) ro ~ T(f').
We get from (4), (5), and (6)  by PC  that
(7) Fo ~ D(a)(f')::> D(a)(gJ\< h").
Again, we get from the postulate under 106 that
(8) Fo ~ D(a)(g")::> D(a)(g"< h") ::> T(g") ::> D(a)(hJ\)
and
(9) F
o
~ T(g").
93
From(7), (8), and (9) we get by PC:
which was to be proven.
We see that if h involvesan arrow i.e., if h/: is of form"h
I
A
<h
2
A
"  we can
continueour proof to get "D(a)(h
I
A
) :::> D(cr)(h
2
A
) " insteadof "D(a)(h
A
) " provided h,
involvesno arrow.Thus, we can extendour Lemmafor rules of 1: containingmorethan
two arrowfree inputs.
Furthermore, our result is independent of the fact whetherthe rule in questionis
an original one  i.e., listed in the presentation of 1:  or is a derived rule of 1:. To
mentionjust a derivedrule of 1: which will beimportant in the following discussions,
let us considerthe followingone:
(l0) 1: + Fu vSuStSx Fv.
Obviously, we get a formulafroma formulavia substitution. Thus, if the two inputs in
(l0) are derivablein 1: then the output "Fv" must be derivablein 1: as well.
9.2 The Proof of the Unprovability of Cons
Let us considerthe followingabbreviations (introduced partlyin Sect. 8.2):
A
o
=df VXIV'X2  ao =df A
o"
;
e, =df b
o
=df B
o";
Co =df Diag(aoIx,b
o
); Co =df Co"
Let us recall the mainresults of Sect. 8.2:
(1) (F
o
Co) :> (Fo B
o)
(2) (Fo Co) => (Fo Co)
(3) None of B
o
, B
o
is atheorem ofCC.
Our proof will be detailedin several steps.
Step 1. Since 1: + we have by Lemma 8.2.1 that
We know that here the word b
o
is uniquely determined by the words ao, ao" and x.
Henceforth, the following conditional is true:
94
To accept this formula as a theorem of CC, the following auxiliary postulate is suffi
cient:
(SUD)
Since To K(o) we have that (4) follows from SUD (Substitution Uniquely Deter
mined) by QC; thus, (4) is a theorem of CC.
Remark. Theintroduction of the auxiliary postulate SUD wasmentioned in Def. 8.1.3 already.
Wecouldformulate a moregeneral version of SUD, e.g.,
However, thepresent version suffices ouraims.  If someone objects toSUD, he/she canomitit fromL and
Fa;the results of Chapter 8 remain correct without SUD as well. However, SUD is indispensable in the
present chapter (except if you finda proofof (4) without usingSUD; this possibility is not ab ovo ex
cluded).
A particular case of (l0) of the preceding section is:
1: ... FA
o
vSAoSaoSx Fv
(where v is a 1:variable) . Then, by Lemma 9.1.1:
From (4) and (5) we get by PC:
(6) To (D(cr)(F"ao) & & :)
& (b
o
= &
Here the antecedent is and the consequent yields ''D(o)(F''b
o
) &
D(o)(b
o
)" , by the basic schema (B8) of QC. The latter formula is  by (2) of the pre
ceding section  just "Th(bol'. Hence:
To Th(b
o)
.
Then, by QC:
(taking into consideration that 'Th(b
o
r is free from x, Xl, and x,a). Here the antecedent
is just the negation of BOo Thus, our fmal result is that:
(7) To Bs: Th(b
o).
95
Step 2. By (1), if one of Co, B
o
is deducible in 1: thenso is the other. Thus, we
have the following derivedrules:
and
Then, by Lemma9.1.1 and PC, weget easily:
Fo D(a)(b
o)
== D(cr)(co)
Withrespectto the definition of 'Th' (see(2) in the preceding section) we thenhave:
F
o
Th(b
o)
Th(co)
Fromthis and (7) we get:
(8) Fo e, Th(Co ).
Step 3. By (2), if Co is derivable in 1: then so is its negation. This yields the
derived rule:
Then, similarly as in the previous step, we have:
(9) F
o
Th(Co ) Th( _/\ co).
Step 4. By PC, froma pair (of formulas) A, "A" , anyformula is deducible.
Hence, we have the derivedrule:
1: .. Fu U Fu u Fv v,
Then, usingthe generalization of Lemma9.1.1 and applying the definition of'Th' , we
get:
Fromthis it then follows by QC:
Fo (Th(co) '& tu co)
Herethe consequent is exactlythe negation of 'Cons' (see(1) in Sect. 9.1). Hence:
(10) F
o
(Th(co) & Thi> co)  Cons.
Step 5. We get from(8), (9), and (10), by PC, that
Fo B
o
Cons .
96
Or, by contraposition:
Fo Cons B
o
.
Hence, if 'Cons' would be a theorem of CC then so would be B
o
. By (3), B
o
is not
a theorem of CC. Consequently, 'F
o
Cons ' does not hold. Our aim was just to
prove this statement.
Our result can be extended to certain enlargements of CC. The conditions are the same
as in Th.8.3.1.
The metatheorem just proved is an analogue of Godel' s Second Incomplete
ness Theorem which states that the consistency of Number Theory is unprovable 
although expressible  within Number Theory.
Concluding remarks. We have finished our work on the pure syntactic means of
metalogic. However, every system of logic is defective without a semantical foundation
.  at least according to the views of a number of logicians (including the author). Thus,
if the question is posed, ' How to go further in studying metalogic?' the natural answer
seems to be, 'Tum to the semantics!'. Now, a logical semantics which is best connected
to our intuitions concerning the task and applicability of logic can be explained within
the frames of set theory.
Set theory is a very important and deep discipline of mathematics. We need
only a solid fragment of this theory in logical semantics (at least if we do not go far
away from our intuitions concerning logic). Fortunately, set theory can be explained as
a firstorder theory. After studying its most important notions and devices, we can in
corporate a part of this theory into our metalogical knowledge, and we can utilize it in
developing logical semantics.
Our next (and last) chapter will give a very short outline of set theory as well as
some insights on its use in logical semantics. We assume here (similarly as in Ch. 6)
that the reader had (or will) take a more detailed course in this discipline  our expla
nations are devoted merely to give the feeling of the continuity in the transition from
syntax to semantics.
Let us mention that another field of logical semantics is the algebraic seman
tics. This is foreign to the subject matter of the present essay, for, in the view of the
author, it does not help us to understand the truly nature and essence of logic. However,
it is a very important and nowadays very fashionable field of mathematical logic pre
senting interesting mathematical theorems about systems of logic.
97
Chapter 10 SET THEORY
10.1 Sets and Classes
10.1.1. Informal introduction.
The father of set theory was Georg Cantor (18451918). It became a formal
theory (based on postulates) in the 20. century, due to the pioneering works of Ernst
Zermelo and AbrahamFraenkel (quoted as 'ZF Set Theory'). Further developments
are due to Th. Skolem, J. v. Neumann, P. Bernays, K. Godel and many other mathe
maticians. (On the works of Cantor, see CANTOR 1932.)
The intuitive idea of set theory is that some collections  or classes  of individ
ual objects are to be considered as individual objects  called sets which can be col
lected, again, into classes which might be, again, individuals, i.e., sets, and so on.
Briefly: the operation of forming classes can be iterated; and classes which can be
members of other classes are called sets. Thus, according to this intuition, sets are in
dividualized classes. Then, an important task of set theory is to determine which
classes can be individualized (i.e., considered as sets).
Now, formal set theory gives no answer of such questions as 'what are classes?'
or 'what are sets?'. Its universeof discourse is the totality of sets, and most of its pos
tulates deal with operations forming sets from given sets. There exist different formula
tions of (the same) set theory.
In most formulations, set theory is presented as a firstorder theory whose single
nonlogical constant is the dyadic predicate 'E' (' is a member of), and the possible
values of free variables are assumed (tacitly) to be sets. Thus, in the formula "x E y",
both x and y are sets; members of sets (if any) must be, again, sets. Moreover, identity
of sets is introduced via definition:
(1) (a =b) <=>df 'Vx((x E a) =(x E b)).
From this "a = a"  and "'Vx(x = x)" is deducible; hence, the basic formula (B7)
of QC is omitted. The same holds for (B8); instead of the latter, a postulate called
axiomof extensionality is accepted:
(a = b):::) 'Vxa EX):::) (b EX.
In QC, "3x(x = x)" follows from "'v'x(x = x)". This means that the domain of indi
viduals is not empty. Hence, we need not a postulate stating that there are sets (for, in
this approach, everything is a set).
In logical semantics, it is advantageous to assume that there are domains  i.e.,
sets  whose members are not sets but other type of individual objects (e.g., physical or
98
L
grammatical objects). By this, we shall depart a little from the usual formulation of set
theory sketched above. The main peculiarity of our approach is "to permit individuals
other than sets, these will be called primary objects, briefly: primobs. Of course, they
will have no members. To differentiate between sets and primobs, we need a monadic
predicate 'i', where "i(x)" represents the open sentence 'x is a set', and "i(x)" tells
that x is a primob. We cannot omit the identity sign '=' from the supply of our logical
constants, for, if we try apply the definition (1) for primobs we get that all primobs are
identical with each other. Thus, we shall use the full machinery of QC, retaining (B7)
and (B8) as well.  Note that we shall not prescribe the existence of primobs, we want
only to permit them.
After these preliminary discussions let us return to the systematic explanation of
our set theory.
10.1.2. The language of set theory. To avoid superfluous repetitions, it is sufficient
to fIXthat in the language of set theory, the class of nonlogical constants is
Con ={i , E}
where i is a monadic and E is a dyadic predicate. No name functors are used  al
though several such ones can be introduced via definitions. Thus, Term = Var.
Notation conventions in our metalanguage. We shall use lowercase Latin let
ters (a, b, c, x, y, z) as metavariables for referring to the object language variables (x,
Xt, xu, .. .). The logical symbols &, v, ==, 3 introduced via definitions (see 6.2.2, Re
marks 4) will be used sometimes. The convention for omitting parentheses (see 6.2.4)
will be applied, too. We write "(x E y)" instead of "E(X)(y)", "(x y)" and "(x :I; y)"
instead of "(x E y)" and "(x = y)", respectively. The expressions "qJ(x)" and
"tp(x,y)" refer to arbitrary monadic and dyadic open formulas, respectively.
We do not want to list all postulates of set theory in advance. Instead, we shall
present postulates, definitions and theorems alternatively, giving a successive construc
tion of the theory. Now, if T, denotes the class of postulates of our set theory, we shall
write "Ir A" instead of "T, A" in this chapter. Most theorems  including postu
lates  will be presented by open formulas; these are to be understood as standing for
their universal closures.
10.1.3. First postulates:
(PO) 3x(x E a) ::> i(a).
(PI) i(a) ::> j(b) ::> Vxx E a) == (x E b ::> (a = b).
(According to our conventions, (PO) stands for "Va(3x(x E a) ::> i(a", and (PI) is to
be prefixed with 'VaVb' .)
" 99
(PO) says that if something has a member, it is a set. (But it does not state that
every set has a member.) By contraposition:
Sea) 3x(x e a),
i.e., primobs have no members.  (PI) tells us that if two sets coincide in extenso
(containing the same members) then they are identical. Here the conditions sea) and
s(b) are essential, without them all primobs would be identical.
Before going further, we shall extend our metalanguage.
10.1.4. Class abstracts and class variables. As in Sect. 2.5, we introduce class ab
stracts and class variables, with the stipulation that in the class abstract
{x: qJ(x)},
rp(x) must be a monadic open formula of the language of set theory. Then, class ab
stracts and class variables (A, B, C) will be permitted in place of the variables in
atomic formulas (that is, everywhere in a formula except in quantifiers), but these oc
currences of class symbols will be eliminable by means of the definitions (01.1) to
(01.6) below. Thus, the introduction of these new symbols does not cause an extension
of our object language; it gives only a convenient notation in the metalanguage.
(Note that the class of monadic open formulas is a definite one; hence, the same
holds for the class of class abstracts which is the domain of the permitted values of our
class variables .)
The six definitions below show how a class symbol is eliminable in atomic
formulas.
(D!.l)
(01.2)
(01.3)
(01.4)
(01.5)
(01.6)
a e {x: qJ(x)} :>df tpta).
(A = B) :>df 'Vxx e A) == (x e B)).
(a =A) :> (A =a) :>df sea) & 'v'xx e a) == (x E A)).
(A e b) :>df 3aa = A) & (a E b)).
(A E B) :>df 3a(a = A) & (a E B)).
seA) :>df 3a(a =A).
We get from (Dl.3) that
Ir Sea) (a *A)
(primobs are not classes).
By (01 .6), a class is a set iff it is coextensive with a set, Hence, "s(A)" means
that the extension of A coincides with no set. In this case, A is said to be a proper class.
10.1.5. Proper classes. Set theory would be very easy if we could assume that every
class is a set (as Cantor thought it before the 1890's). As we know today we cannot
100
assume this without risking the consistency of our theory. Here follow the definitions of
some interesting classes:
(D1.7)
(D1.8)
(D1.9)
(D1.10)
lnd =df {x: (x = x)}.
o =df {x: (x:;e x)} .
Set =df {x: s(x) }.
Ru =df {x: .o(x) & (x x)}.
lnd and Set are the classes of individuals and of sets, respectively. 0 is the empty
class. Ru is the socalled Russell class: the class of "normal" sets (which are not mem
bers of themselves). Except 0, all these are proper classes. It is easy to show this about
Ru.  Assume, indirectly, that j(Ru). Then there is a set, say r, such that
Vxx E r) == (j(x) & (x x).
Then, by (B4) of QC, we get
(r E r) == (j(r) & (r r ,
which implies that "  j (rt, contradicting our indirect assumption. Hence:
(Th. 1.1) Ir j(Ru),
i.e. , Ru is a proper class. Since Ru Set c lnd, we suspect that Set and lnd are
proper classes, too. (Proof will follow later on.)
Thus, there "exist" proper classes . This  seemingly ontological  statement
means merely: We cannot assume, without the risk of a logical contradiction, that for
all monadic predicates " rp(x)" of the language of set theory there is a set a such that
"Vxx E a) == rp(x)" holds.
Remark. The Russell class Ru was invented by Bertrand Russell in 1901.
(See e.g. RUSSELL 1959, Ch. 7.) The existence of proper classes was recognised (but
not published) by Cantor some years earlier (see CANTOR 1932, pp. 443450). These
recognitions led to the investigations of fmding new foundations for set theory.
10.1.6. Further definitlons and postulates.  From now on, our treatment will be
very sketchy.
Let us introduce an abbreviation for the simplest class abstractions:
(D1.11) a
E
= df {x: (x E a)}.
l
By (D1.3) and (D1.1) we have:
(a = == (j(a) & Vx(x E a) == (x E a).
101
From this we get by QC:
(Th.1.2)
(a == j(a).
That is, any set a coincides with the class a
E
Thus, all sets are classes (but not con
versely). By this theorem, all definitions and theorems on classes hold for sets as well.
On the other hand, if a is a primob, a
E
has no members, and, by (01.2), it c0
incides with the empty class 0 :
(Th.1.3) j(a)::::> (a
E
= 0).
In what follows, we shall use all notions and notations introduced for classes in Sect.
2.5  see especially (4), (5), (7), (9), (10) and (11) in 2.5. In case of sets, we speak on
sub and superset instead of sub and superclass, respectively.
We define the unionclass of a class A  in symbols: "u(A)"  as follows:
(01.12) u(A) =df {x: 3yx E y) & (y E A}.
Note that by (PO), " (x E y)" implies "i(y)". Thus, if no set is a member of A then u(A)
=0. Particularly:
j(a)::::> = 0)
Now we can formulate two further postulates:
and u(0) = 0.
(n)
(P3)
j({a, b})
[Axiom of pairs.]
[Axiom of union.]
We omit the proof of the following consequences of these new postulates:
(Th.1.4)
(Th.l .5)
j({a}).
j(a
E
u
If a, b are sets, we can write "u(a)" and "a u b" instead of and "a
E
u bE ",
respectively.
Let us introduce provisionally Zermelo's postulate:
(Z) j(a
E
(J A)
which will be a consequence of the postulate (P6) introduced in the next section. Its
important consequences (without proof):
(Th.l.6)
(Th.1.7)
(Th.1.8)
(Bc ::::> j(B).
j(aEB).
j(0).
It follows from (Th.l .6) that Set and Ind  as superclasses of Ru  are proper classes.
102
The set corresponding to 0 is uniquely determined and is called the empty set.
In set theory, it represents the natural number 0, hence, we shall use '0' as its proper
name. However, the use of '0' in formulas is eliminable by the following contextual
defmition:
(D1.13) ~ 1 } ::>df 3a(s(a) & ~ a & Vx(x ~ a.
We define the power class of a class A  in symbols: "po(A)"  by
(D1.14) pl(A) =df {x: sex) & (x
E
~ An.
(The denomination is connected with the fact that if A has n members then po(A) has 2
n
members.)  Our next postulate:
(P4) [Axiom of power set.]
This states that the power class of a set a is, again, a set, called the power set of a.
Our next postulate  among others  excludes that a set could be a member of
itself:
(P5) (aE;f. 0) ~ 3xx E a) & (x
E
l'I a
E
= 0 . [Axiom of regularity.]
Its important consequences:
(Th. l. 9)
(Th.1.10)
I ~ (a E b) ~ (b ~ a).
I ~ (a ~ a).
These mean that the relation fe' is asymmetrical and irreflexive (cf. Def. 10.2.4).
10.2 Relations and Functions
10.2.1. Ordered pairs. An ordered pair (or couple) is an (abstract) object to which
there is associated an object a as its distinguished (or first) member, and an object bas
its contingent (or second) member. Such a pair (couple) is denoted as "(a,b}"; the case
b = a is not excluded. This seems to be an irreducible primitive notion that can be
regulated only by means of the postulate:
(1) ( {a,b} = (c,d' ::> a =c) & (b = d) ).
However, in set theory, there is a possibility of representing (or modelling) ordered
pairs. Within set theory, this representation has the form of a definition:
(D2.1) (a,b) =df {{a}, {a,b}}.
103
This definition satisfiesthe postulate under (1). Notethat (a,a) is reducible to, o{{a}}.
Furthermore, if a, b e Ind then ~ ja, b.  In what follows, we shall deal with or
deredpairsonly withinset theory.
In defining classes of ordered pairs, we have to use class abstracts of form
(2) {z: 3x3y z = (x,y)) & If/(x,y) ) }.
Let us agreeto abbreviate (2) by
{(x,y) : tf/(x,y)}.
The Cartesian product of the classesA and B  in symbols: "A x B"  is definedby
(02.2)
(02.3)
A x B =df {(x,y) : (x E A) & (y E B) }.
A (2) =df
A x
A.
It is easy to show that a
E
x bE c po(po(a
E
u b1). Then, by (Th.1.5), (P4), and
(fh.l.6), we have that:
(Th.2.1)
The class of all orderedpairs, Orp, is
(02.4) Orp =df Ind x Ind.
10.2.2. Relations. A class of ordered pairs is a possible (potential) extension of a dy
adic predicate. Such a predicate expresses a relation (cf. Sect. 2.1). This is the reason
that in set theory, subclasses of Orp are called relations (although, in fact, they are
onlypotential extensions of relations). We introduce the metalogical predicate 'ReI' by
(02.5) Rel(A) ~ f A c Orp.
In the following groupof definitions, let us assumethat R is a relation.
(D2.6) xRy ~ f (x,y) E R,
Dom(R) =df {x: 3y(xRy)},
Im(R) =df {y: 3x(xRy)} ,
Ar(R) =df Dom(R) u Im(R).
HereDom(R), Im(R), and Ar(R) are said to bethefirst domain, the second or image
domain, and the area orfield, respectively, of the relationR. A relation R maybe con
sideredas a projection fromDom(R) to 1m(R).
The restriction of a relationR to a classA  denotedby "RJ,A" is defined by
(02.7) RJ,A =df {(x,y) : (x E A) & xRy } =R (l (A x Im(R).
104
If aRb holds, we can say that b is an Rimage of a. The class of all Rimages of
a will be. denoted by "Rcz::ta}". We extendthis notation to an arbitrary class A in the
placeof {a} :
(02.8) RCCA =df {y: 3x(x E A) & xRy)}.
If everymember of Dom(R) has a single Rimage then R is said to be afunc
tion. The metalogical predicate 'Fnc' is defmed by
(02.9) Fnc(R) <=>df Rel(R) & 'Vx'Vy'VzxRy & xRz):J (y = z.
Nowwe canformulate Fraenkel's postulate of set theory:
(P6) Fnc(R):J i(R
CC
a ~
tellingthat the Rimage of a set is a set, provided R is a function.
Now, let "Id 1.A " be the class {(x,x): XE A}, the identity relation restricted to
the class A. Obviously, Id1.A is a function. Then, by (P6), we have:
~ iId1.A)cc a ~
However, (I d1.A)CC a
E
= a
E
(l A. hence:
whichis exactlyZermelo's postulate (Z) in 10.1.6.
. If R is a function, we can write
"R(a) = b" instead of "aRb".
10.2.3. Further notions concerning relations. The following definitions are useful in
logical semantics.
Changingthe twodomainsof a relationR we get its converse denoted by"R
v
,,:
(02.10) R
U
=df {(x,y): yRx}.
The relative product of therelations R and S denoted by "RIS"  is defined by
(02.11)
(D2.12)
RIS =df {(x,y): 3z(xRz & zSy)}.
A function is said to be invertibleiff its converse is, again, a function.
The classof all functions fromB intoA  denoted by ,JlA"  is defined by
(02.13) BA =df if: i(f) & Fnc(f) & i f ~ B'x A) & Dom(f) = B}.
lOS
(fh.2.3)
(Th.2.4)
(Th.2.5)
(02.14)
It (i(A) & i(B)) ::> i(BA).
~ ~ = {OJ).
It (A;t 0) ::> (A 0 =0).
1 =df {OJ.
This is the set theoretical representation of the natural number 1. Using it, (Th.2.4) can
be writtenas
It ~ = 1).
10.2.4. DEFINITION. The relation R is saidto be
reflexive iff Vxx E Ar(R)::> xRx),
irreflexiveiff Vx(xRx),
symmetricaliff VxVy(xRy::> yRx),
antisymmetrical iff VxVyxRy & yRx)::> (x = y)),
asymmetricaliff VxVy(xRy::> yRx),
transitiveiff VxVyVzxRy & yRz) ::> xRz),
connectediff VxVy(x E Ar(R) & (y E Ar(R)& (x;t y))::> (xRyv yRx)),
an equivalence iff it is bothsymmetric and transitive,
a partial orderingiff it is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive,
a linear ordering iff it is irreflexive, transitive, andconnected.
Note that
(Ris symmetric and transitive) ==:> Ris reflexive,
(Ris asymmetric) ==:> Ris irreflexive,
(R is irreflexive and transitive) ==:> Ris asymmetric.
10.3 Ordinal, Natural, and Cardinal Numbers
The successorof an individual a  denoted by "a+"  is definedas follows:
(03.1)
Natural numbers in set theoryarerepresentable by the following definitions:
(03.2) o =df 0, 1 =df 0+ = {OJ, 2 =df 1+ = {O, I},
3 =df 2+ = {O,1,2}, 4 =df 3+ = {O,1,2,3},
and so on. Intuitively: any natural number n is the set of natural numbers less than n.
Or: if a natural number n is defined already then the next natural number is defined as
n+ = n u in}.
106
Howcan we define the class of all natural numbers?This workneeds a series of
further defmitions.
10.3.1. Ordinal numbers.
We say that the relation R wellorders the class A  in symbols: "R.Wo.A" 
iff RLA is connected, its area is A, and everynonempty subset a of A has a singular
membernot belongingto Im(RLa). In details:
(03.3) R.Wo.A :)df VxVy(x E A) & (y E A) & (x *" Y::J (xRyv yRx &
Va(i(a) ::J (a
E
k A) ::J (a 0) ::J 3xx E a) & 3y(y E a) & yRx).
One can prove that if R.Wo.A then RLA is a linear ordering.
(03.4) A class A is said to be transitive iff
Vxx E A) ::J (i(x) & x
E
k A.
Let us denoteby 'Eps' the relation 'is a memberof' , i.e.,
(03.5) Eps =df {(x,y): (x E y)}.
Now, all the sets 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 in (D3.2) are wellordered by Eps and are transitive.
(D3.6) A class A is said to be an ordinal iff it is transitiveand Eps. Wo.A.
Ordinals whichare sets will be called ordinal numbers. Their class, On, is definedby
(D3.7) On =df {x: i(x) & x
E
is an ordinal}.
10.3.2. The following statements can be proved:
(1) Everynonempty class of ordinal numbers has a singular member with re
spect to the relationEps.
(2) Every memberof an ordinal is an ordinal number.
(3) On is an ordinal.
(4) Everyordinal other than On is a memberof On.
(5) On is a proper class, i.e., B(On).
(6) The successorof an ordinal number is an ordinal number (i.e., (a EOn) ::J
(a+EOn .
We shall use lowercaseGreekletters  a, P, r  referringto ordinal numbers.
An ordinal number other than 0 mayor may not be a successor of another ordi
nal number; if not, it is called a limit ordinal number. Now, the class of nonlimit ordi
nal numbers, On" is defmedby
(D3.8) On, =df (a: (a =0) v 3f3(PEOn) & (p += a)},
107
whereas
is the class of limit ordinal numbers.
10.3.3. Natural numbers.  In set theory, natural numbers are represented by those
members of On
I
which, starting from 0, are attainable by means of the successorop
eration. Thus, the definition of the classof naturalnumbers, co, is as follows:
(03.9)
Now, co is provedto be an ordinal. Hence, eitherco = On, or else co E On. Mathemat
ics cannotbe devoid of the following postulate:
(P7) i(co).
Fromthis it thenfollows that co is a limit ordinalnumber.
1
.1
i
(D3.10) (a < /1) ~ (a E /1); (a ~ fJ) ~ a <fJ) v fa =fJ) .
We omit the details howthe full arithmetic of natural numbers  including arithmetical
operations  can be developed in the frames of set theory. The essenceis that accepting
set theoryin metalogic, we can use the notions of arithmetic as well.
By induction on co, we can definethe notionof ordered neltuple (n ~ 2) as an
orderedpair whosefirst memberis an orderedntuple. We agreein writing
Similarly, we definefor n > 0
10.3.4. Sequences. Where a is an ordinal number, by an asequence let us mean
any function defined on a, i.e., a memberof alnd. If s is an asequence, and P< a
thenthe simageof Pis calledthe Pth member ofs. The usual notation:
(sP}fkrx .
Sequences defined on a natural number (a member of co) are calledfinite sequences.
The singleOsequence is O. If co ~ a (a EOn), the asequences are calledtransfinite
sequences, whereas cosequences are saidto be (ordinary) infinite sequences.
If S =(Si}i<n and T ={ti}i<Jc are finite sequences (n, k E co) then their con
catenation canbe definedby
S (1 T =S u {{n+i, x}: (i,x) E T}
(here '+' denotesarithmetical addition whichis definable in set theory).
108
10.3.5. Finite and immite sets
(i) Sets a, b are said to be equivalent or ofequal cardinality  in symbols:
"a == b"  iff thereexists an invertible functionj' such that Dom(f) = a, and lm(f) = b
(or conversely). This relationis an equivalence on the class Set.
(ii) A set a is said to be
finite iff for somen E ro, a == n,
denumerably infinite iff a == c.o,
denumerable iff for some a co, a == a.
(iii) We say that set a is of smallercardinality that set b iff for some b/C b,
a == b' , but a == b does not hold. As Cantor showed, everyset a is of smaller cardinal
ity than po(a). Applying this theorem to co we get that there are nondenumerable
infinitesets (e.g., po(c.o.
10.3.6. Cardinal numbers. If a E On, the class
A = {p: <p EOn) & p== a}
has a minimal member ao that will be calledthe cardinal number of each memberof
A (hence, of a, too).
In general, an ordinal number a is saidto be a cardinal number iff
't://3(/3 EOn) & p== a)::J a fJ),
and if a is a cardinal number then it is said to be the cardinal number of any set a of
which a == a holds. (Thus, if a and b are of equal cardinality  in the sense of 10.3.5
(iii)  and theyhave a cardinalnumberthentheyhavethe same cardinalnumber.)
Does any set havea cardinalnumber? The investigations of Zermelo lead to the
result: if there exists an invertible function which wellorders a set a then there is an
ordinal number a such that a == a, and, hence, the cardinal number of a is the cardi
nal numberof a. To provethat each set can be wellordered, Zermelo neededthe axiom
ofchoice (AC), the final postulate of set theory:
(P8) (i(a) & 't:/xx E a) ::J3y(y EX ::J
3f(Fnc(f) & (a Dom (j) & 't:/xx E a) ::J (f(x) EX).
This postulateis rarelyusedin logical semantics.
The arithmetic of ordinal and cardinal numbers coincide in the finite (natural
numbersare cardinalnumbers, too) but bifurcatein the infinite(the simplestexample:
c.o + == co, hence, co + is not a cardinal number.
109
Remark. We posed the question at the end of Sect. 8.3: Why is it impossible to en
large theory CC into a negcomplete firstorder theory? Now, set theory gives an an
swer. The class JtcO is denumerably infinite (if we assume that it is a set). Then, its
subclass, the class of all monadic predicates definable in [}o is a denumerable one.
However, the truth domain of such a predicate is a subclass of Jt
cc
o
. Then, the class of
all possible truth domains is 0) which is not a denumerable class (taking into
consideration that Jt
cc
0
== (0). That is, there are more possible extensions of monadic
predicates than as many such predicates are expressible in a firstorder language.
If the postulates from (PO) to (P7) form a consistent system (what we hope but
do not know) then it remains consistent by adding either (P8) or the negation of (P8).
In this sense, (P8) is independent from the other postulates of set theory. The same
holds for the socalled generalizedcontinuumhypothesis (GCH) which is proved to be
independent even from (P8); GCH tells that if a is an infmite cardinal number (00 a)
then no cardinal number exists between a and the cardinal number of po(a). The case
a =00 is the original hypothesis  its truth was believed by Cantor.
Remark. Our (sketchy) treatment of set theory follows the style of TAKEUTI &
ZARING 1971  except the permission of primobs (which is missing in that work).
10.4 Applications
10.4.1. Inductive definltlens ,
We say that a class A is closed with respect to the relation R iff for some n >0 I A(n) c
Dom(R), and A.
Let a be a set, b a, and let a beclosed with respect to the relations Rt , ,
R
k
(k 1). A class C is said to be an (b, R
t
, . , Ridinductive class iff b C, and C
is closed with respect to RJ, ... , Ri . By our assumption, a is a (b, R
h
... ,R
k
) 
inductive set.
Now, the intersection of all (b, Rt, ... , Ridinductive subsets of a, i.e.,
Co =df {x: Vc c a & cis (b, R
t
, ... ,Rt}inductive) (x E c)}
is obviously the smallest (b, Rt , .. . ,Ridinductivesubclass of a. Since Co a, we have
that Co is a set. We can say that Co is inductivelydefined by the conditions (b,RJ, ... ,Rid
where b is the base of the induction, and Rt, ... ,R
k
are the inductive rules (cf. Sect.
1.4).  Now we see how inductive definitions can betransformed into explicit defini
tions in set theory  of course, if some conditions are fulfilled.
110
10.4.2. Reconstruction of syntax in set theory.
Let Jil be a (finite) alphabet. We can assume that the members of Jil are primobs in our
set theory. Sincethe membersof Jil can be enumerated, we get by (P2) and (P3) that Jil
is a set.
Jilwords consisting of n letters can be represented as nsequences of letters
(members of nJil). Concatenation of words can be expressed as concatenation of se
quences (cf. 10.3.4). Then, the empty word 0 is represented by the empty sequence,
i.e., by O. Finally, the class of Jilwords can be definedby
Jil
O
=df u{x: 3nn eO & (x e ')i[}.
By referringto the postulates (P3), (P6), and (P7), we get Ir j(Jil
O).
Also, canonical calculi can be represented in set theory. We omit here the de
tails, but we showan examplein reconstructing a rule of a canonical calculus. Assume
that the rule in questionis of form:
and the variables occurring in it are replaced by the frrstorder variables XI , . .. , X
n
n
] , 60, 61
N
MF
, 58
name, individual, 7, 41
closed/open, 12
functors, '7, 41
naming
openexpressions, 14
119
namingwords, 4
natural deduction, 67
natural language, 1, 2
numbers, 3, 106, 108
negation, 15,67
negcomplete (theory), 85
Neumann, J. von, 98
nonlimitordinalnumbers, 107
nonlogical functors, 8
nonstop commands, 53, 54
normal algorithm, 52, 54
notation conventions
in firstorder languages, 70, 79
in inductivedefinitions, 33
in presentinga language, 28
in set theory, 99
NumberTheory, 1,97
numerals, 33, 46
autonomous, 46
o
object language, 4
occurrences of a variable, 12
in a formula, bound/free, 69
On, OnI, Onu, 107, ~
openformula, 70
sentence, 10, 12
term, 69
operations, 8
, orderedpairs, 103
ntuples, 108
ordering, linear/partial, 106
well, 107
ordinal, 107
numbers, 107
Orp, 103
output,of a functor, 7
ofa rule, 33
p
P,68
P*,77
Po, 86
P,78
(PO), (PI), 99
(P2), (P3), 102
(P4), (P5), 103
(P6), 105
(P7), 108
(P8), 109
parentheses, 11, 17, 67
PC,72
PC.1 ... PC.14, 73
phonemes, 3
po, 103
polyadic functors 7
Post, Emil L., 42
postulates on languages, 2, 3
of a theory, 75
of CC*, 7981
of CC, 86
power class/set, 103
pragmatics, 5
predicates, 8,41,68
premises, 66
primary objects, 99
primobs, 99
procedure, 47,49
pronouns, 10
proof rules, 66
proper class, 100
properties (of individual objects) 8
propositional calculus, 72
logic, 3840
Q
quantification
effectivenneffective, 12
existential/universal, 11
vacuous, 12
quantifiers, 11, 67, 69
quasiquotation, 14
QC, 66, 7071
QC.l ... QC.9, 73
questions of an algorithm, 51
quotation sign, double, 14
simple, 4
R
(Rl) ... (R6), 26
(R7), 27
recursive functions, 52
reflexive relation, 17, 106
Rei, 104
120
relations, 103106
relative product, 105
renaming of bound variables, 13, 73
representability (of an algorithm
by a canonical calculus), 62
restriction of a relation, 104
Rimage, 105
RU,101
rules of a canonical calculus, 36
releasing, 39
. of deduction, 66
Russell, Bertrand, 101
Russell class, 101
s
5
1
, 43
5
c I
78
S,78
satisfiability, 112
scope of quantification, 11
semantical foundation (of a logical
system), 97, 111
semantic consequence, 66, 112
value, 112
semantics, 5, 97, 111
semiotics, 5
sentence, declarative, 7
closed/open, 10
functors, 8, 1516
sequences (finite, infinite), 108
sequent calculus, 67
Set, 101
set theory, 1, 2, 98100
Skolem, Thoralf, 98
Smullyan, Raymond, 42
soundness, 1, 112
steering (of an algorithm), 51
stop command (of an algorithm), 53
subclass, 22
proper, 23
subformula, 69
subsidiary letters, 35,37,54,56
substitution of free variables
in formulas, 70
in sentences, 12
successor, 4748, 57
in set theory, 106
SUD, 8687, 95
superclass, 22
symmetricalrelation, 17, 106
syntax, 5
reconstruction of, in set theory, 111
T
T,78
tacit quantification, 14
Takeuti, G., 110
Term, 6768
Term*, 77,81
Terms , 86
terms (in firstorder languages),42,68
atuples of, 68
ThJa), 93
theory, firstorder, 75
of canonical calculi, 7677
Tr, 81
transfmite (mathematics), 2
transitiveclasses, 107
relation, 17, 106
triadic functors, 7
truth and falsity, 16
truth assignment (in CC*), 8182
conditions, 16
domain (of a predicate), 21
Turing machines, 52
u
VG,73
undecidability (of QC), 84
union class, 102
121
unionof classes, 24
universalclosure (of a formula), 74
generalization, 73
universalquantifier, 11, 41, 67
sentence, 13
used language, 4
v
V,78
vacuousquantification, 12
validformula, 112
valuationof variables, 112
Var, 6768
variable, 10, 68
boundand free occurrencesof, 12
in canonical calculi, 36
binding operators, 12
V(U), 112
w
wellformedexpressions, 3, 30
wellordering, 107
WO,107
words (of a language), 3,26
z
Zaring, W. M., 110
Zermelo, Ernst, 98, 102, 105, 109
Zermelo's postulate, 102
zeroorderlanguage, 72
ZF Set Theory, 98
LIST OF SYMBOLS
(Symbols composed from Latin letters aretobefound inthe alphabetic INDEX.)
(J
8,25,108 53
7.
= 9 # 55
=:.
9, 79 r 65
Ax 11
t
66
Vx 11

69
16,39,67 3 69
& 16,69
[At
x
70
v 16,69
i)
76
=>
16
r*
77,81
16 1:* 77
19 r
o
86
=df
19 1: 86
{x: 21 a 87
E 21,99 fA
87
22,99 i 98,99
{ah .. . , an} 22
Ir
99
c
22 a
E
101
c 23 u(A) 102
0 23, 101 o(empty set) 103
u 24 (a,b) 103
(1
24 AxB 104
AB 24 RJ,A 104
51.0
25 IfIA .
105
(0
25 R
U
105
7 33,36,53
RIS 105
*
36,43,55
B
A 105
+
36 1 = {OJ 106
:::> 39,67
a+
106
t 39 (J)
108
1t 39 108
x 41

109
0 41 (V,p) 111
'if 41,67
112
l; 43
1=
112
<
43
122
APPENDIX
(LECTURE NOTES)
TYPETHEORETICAL
EXTENSIONAL AND INTENSIONAL LOGIC
123
L _
CONTENTS
TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
PART I: EXTENSIONAL LOGIC
1.1. THESEMANTICAL SYSTEM EL
1.1.1.The extensional typetheory
1.1.2. The grammar of the EL languages
1.1.3. Semantics for EL languages
1.1.4. Somesemantical metatheorems
1.1 .5. Logicalsymbols introduced via definitions
1.1.6. The generalized semantics
1.2. THECALCULUS EC
1.2.1. Definitionof EC
1.2.2. Someproofs in EC
1.2.3. ECconsistent andECcomplete sets
1.2.4. The completeness of EC
PART 2: MONTAGUE'S INTENSIONAL LOGIC
2.1. THESEMANTICAL SYSTEMS IL ANDIL+
2.1.1 . Montague'stypetheory
2.1.2. The grammar of IL and IL+
2.1.3. The semantics of IL and IL+
2.1.4. The generalizedsemantics of IL
2.2. GALLIN'S CALCULUS IC
2.2.1.Defmiton of IC
2.2.2. The modallawsof IC
2.2.3. ICconsistent andICcomplete sets
2.2.4. Modal alternatives
2.2.5.The completeness of IC
2.3. APPLICATIONS OFIL+
2.3.1. Afragment of English: L
E
2.3.2. Translation rulesfromL
E
intoL(ij
2.3.3. Reduction of intensionality: meaning postulates
2.3.4. Somecriticalremarks
REFERENCES
124
125
127
127
127
127
129
130
132
133
134
134
135
142
144
148
148
148
149
150
155
156
156
156
159
160
162
166
166
171
176
179
182
TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
This Notes contain only the most important technical parts of the lectures held
by the author.
In this Notes, thecanonical symbols of set theory will be used where it is necessary.
The emptyset is denoted by '0', and the set of natural numbers by '0)'. An expression of
form "{x: rp(x) }"refers tothesetof objets x suchthat rp(x) where lp stands for somepredicate.
Theset ofjunctions from a setBintoa setA willbedenoted by,48A".
In speaking about a formal language and its expressions, a metalanguage will
be used whichis commonEnglishaugmented by some terms and symbolsof set theory,
by other symbols introduced via definitions, and by isolated letters (sometimes by
groups of letters) used as metavariables. (The detailed use of metavariables will be
explained in due course, preceding their actual applications in the text.) In speaking
about a particular expression, say, about a symbol, we shall include it in between
(simple) invertedcommas, e.g.
'&'.
However, symbols will be mentioned sometimes autonymously (omitting the inverted
commas) if this does not lead to a confusion. We often have to speak about compound
expressions of an object language; in such a case, we shall use schemata composedof
metavariables and some symbols of the object language. These schemata will be in
cluded in betweendouble invertedcommas(servingas quasi quotational marks), e.g.
"((A &B) ::J. C)".
(Here A, B and C are metavariables referring to certain expressions of an object lan
guage.) Double inverted commas will be omitted if the schema is bordered by some
symbol introducedin the metalanguage.
Definitions will be, in most cases, inductive ones. A class of expressions will
be definedusuallyas the smallest set satisfyingcertainconditions. Among these condi
tions, there is one  or there are some  serving as the basis of the inductive definition
prescribing that some set(s) defined earlier must be included in the definiendum. The
other conditions prescribe that the definiendum must be closed with respect to certain
operations (in most cases, syntactic operations) applied to its members.  Identity by
definitionwill be expressedby '=df"
Proofs will be, in most cases, of the same inductive nature. To show that all
membersof a set defmedinductively have a certain property it is sufficientto showthat
(i) the members of the basis set (of the inductivedefmition) have that property and (ii)
the propertyis hereditary via the operationsmentioned in the inductivedefinition. This
125
proof method will be called proof by structural induction if it is about a set of gram
matical entities.
The symbol stands for 'if and '(::)' or 'iff 'for 'if and only if'. 'Def.' and
'Th. ' are abbreviations for 'Definition' and 'Theorem', respectively.
Budapest, April 1992.
1. 9{uzsa
126
PART 1: EXTENSIONALLOGIC
1.1 THE SEMANTICAL SYSTEM EL
We shall introduce a semantical system of the full typetheoretical extensional logic
calledEL.
1.1.1. THE EXTENSIONAL TYPE THEORY
We shall use to' (omicron) and 'l ' (iota) for the types of (declarative) sentences and
(individual) names, respectively. A type of an extensional functor will be of form
It a(p)" where p refers to the type of the input (i.e., the argument) and a refers to the
type of the output (i.e., the expression obtainedby combiningthe functor and its argu
ment). The full inductive definition of the set of extensional types, EXTY, is as fol
lows:
l E EXTY
a, p E EXTY "a(p)" E EXTY.
If Pconsists of a single character (0 or r), the parentheses surrounding it will be
omitted. We shall use' a ', Ip', and Iy' as variablesreferringto the members of EXTY.
Insteadof It a(p)" we write sometimes "ap ".
1.1.2. THE GRAMMAR OF THE EL LANGUAGES
SystemEL deals with the grammar and the semantics of a family of typetheoretical
extensional languages.
1.1.2.1. DEFINITION. By an EL languagelet us mean a quadruple
[,0:1 =(Log, Var, Can, Cat}
where:
Log = { (, ), A, = }
is the set of logical symbols of the language (containingleft and right parentheses, the
lambdaoperator A, and the symbol of identity);
Var = U
a e EXTY
Var(a)
is the set of (bindable) variables of the language where each Var(a) is a denumerably
infmiteset of symbolscalledvariables of type a;
Can = U
a e
EXTY Con(a)
is the set of (nonlogical) constants of the language where each Con( a) is a denumer
able (perhapsempty) set of symbolscalled constants of type a;
127
all the sets mentioned up to this point arepairwisedisjoint;
Cat =U ae EXTY Cat(a)
is the set of the wellformed expressions  briefly: terms  of the language where the
sets Cat(a) are determined by the grammatical rules (GO) to (G3) below. For a E
EXTY, Catia) maybe calledthe acategory ofLr:<!.
In formulating these rules  and even in the later developments  we shall use
as metavariables uppercase Latinletters(A, B, C etc.)referring to arbitrary terms and
lowercase latinletters(x, y, z etc.)referring to variables. In a rule (or in a definition, in
a theorem) the first occurrence of any metavariable will be supplied with a type sub
script indicating the typeof terms the metavariable refersto. (Type variables occurring
in a typesubscript refer to arbitrary types.)
Grammatical rules:
(GO) Var(a) u Con( a) s:Cat(a).
(Gl ) Aap(Bp) E Cat( a). [Read: If A E Cati ap) and BE Cat(p) then HA(B)" E
Cat( a).]
(G2) "('A.xpA
a
)" E Cat( ap) .
(G3) "(A
a
=B
a
),' E Cat(0).
We writesometimes "('A.x.A)" insteadof "(AxA)" for the sakeof easierreading.
1.1.2.2. DEFINITION. (i) Anoccurrence of a variable x in a termA is said to be a bound
occurrence of x in A iff it lies in a part of form "(Ax.B)" of A . An occurrence of x in A
is said to be afree occurrence of x in A iff it is not a boundoccurrence of x in A.
(ii) AtermA is said to be a closed oneiff no variable has a freeoccurrence in A.
AtermA is said to be an open one iff it is not a closedone.
(iii) The termA is said to be free from the variable x iff x has no free occur
rencesin A.
(iv) A variable Xa is said to be substitutable by the term B
a
in the termA iff
whenever "(Ay.C)" is a part of A involving someoccurrence of x whichcountsas a free
occurrence of x in A thenB is freefromy.
(v) Bythe result of substituting Bafor xain A let us meanthe termA / obtained
fromA via replacing all freeoccurrences of x byB provided x is substitutable by B in
A. We shall use the notation
[A]/
forA/ . (Thesquarebrackets will be omitted in caseA consistsof a singlecharacter.) In
using this notation, we assumealways the fulfilment of the proviso whichassures that
the freeoccurrences of variables in Bremainfreeonesin A/ as well.
128
(vi) We shall denote by "C[B/A]" the term obtained from C via replacing a
(single) occurrence of A  not preceded immediately by 'A.'  by B, provided A and B
belongto the samecategory. This syntactic operation will be calledreplacement.
1.1.3. SEMANTICS FOREL LANGUAGES
Throughout in this section, letLt)(! be anyEL language.
1.1.3.1. DEFINITION. By an interpretation ofL ~ let us meana couple
Ip = (U, p)
whereU is a nonempty set andp is a function defined on Con such that
A E Con( a) ==: ~ E D( a)
whereD is a function defined on EXTY suchthat
D(o) ={O,I}, Dit ) = U, and D(afi) =D(jJ) D(a).
(Here '0' and '1' stand for the truth valuesFalse and True, respectively.) Given U, the
function D is uniquely determined by theseprescriptions. D(a) is said to be the domain
offactual values of type a..
Afunction v defined on Var is said to be a valuation (of variables) joining to Ip
iff
X E Var( a) ==: v(x) E D( a).
If x E Var( a) and a E D(a), we denoteby "v[x:a]" the valuation which differs from v
(at most) in v[x:a](x) =a. That is: if y is other thanx, then v[x:a](y) =v(y).
1.1.3.2. DEFINmoN. Givenan interpretation Ip of L ~ , we shall define for all termsA
E Cat andfor all valuations v joiningto Ip, thefactual value ofA according to Ip and v
 denoted by "IAI/p"  by the semanticrules (SO) to (S3) below. (In the notation, the
superscript 'Ip' will be usually omittedwhenever Ip is assumed to be fixed.)
Semantic rules:
(SO) If x E Var, lxl, = v(x). If CE Con, ICl
v
=P(C).
(SI) 1Aaj1(BP)l
v
=lAl
v(lBl v
)'
(S2) 1(A.xpAtJlv is thefunction rp E D(aft) suchthat
b e D(fi) ==: ~ b = IAlv[x:b].
In other words, for all b E D(fi),
1(A.x.A)llb) =IAlv[x:bj".
(S3) I(A
a
=BaJ l, =1, if IAl
v
=IBl
v
,. and0 otherwise.
1.1.3.3. LEMMA. The factual values IAI/p are uniquely determined by the rules (SO) to
(S3), and, if A E Cat( a), then IAI/p E D(a).
Proof' by structural induction using the semantic rules. (The details are left to
thereader.)
1.1.3.4. DEFINmoN. Let rbe a set of sentences (Fc: Cat( 0, Ip an interpretation and
v a valuation joiningto Ip.
129
(i) We say that the couple(Ip, v) is a model of riff for all A E I: IAI/p='1.
(ii) ris said to be satisfiableiff rhas a model, and ris said to be unsatisfiable
iff rhas no model.
(iii)The sentence A is said to be a semantic consequence of T  in symbols: "T
~ A"  iff everymodel of r is a model of {A}.
(iv) Sentence A is said to be valid (or a logical truth of EL)  in symbols:
~ A"  iff A is a semantic consequence of the emptyset of sentences.
(v) TermsA and B are saidto be logically synonymousiff ~ (A = B).
Note that if r is unsatisfiable thenfor all sentences A, r ~ A,. and if ~ A then
for all r, r ~ A.
1.1.4. SOME SEMANTICAL METATHEOREMS
Throughout in this section, a language L ~ and an arbitrary interpretation Ip forL ~ is
assumed.
Let us denote by "FV(A) " the set of variables havingsome free occurrences in
the termA. Then:
1.1.4.1. LEMMA. If the valuations vand v/coincideon FV(A), then IAI/p = IAlv'/p .
Proof. Our statement is obviously true if A is a variable or a constant. If A is of
form"B(C)" or H(B= C)" thenuse the induction assumption that the lemmaholds true
for B and C, and take into consideration that in these cases, FV(A) =FV(B) u FV(C)
(anduse the rules (S1) and (83). Finally, if A is of form"(A.xaBp)" then,
FV(A) = FV(B) {x}.
If v and y' coincide on FV(A) then for all b E D(b), v[x:b] and v' [x:b] coincide on
FV(B),' thus, by inductionassumption,
IBlv[x:b] =IBlv'{x:b] .
Then (usingthe rule (S2, for all b e D(ft):
I(AX.B)l
v
(b) =IBlv[x:b] =IBlv'[x:b] =I(AX.B)lv'(b)
whichmeans that I(AX.B)l
v
=I(Ax.B)l
v
"
COROLLARY. IfAis a closedtermthenfor all valuations v and v ~ IAl
v
= I l v ~
1.1.4.2. LEMMA. If for all valuations v, lAaI v =I BuJv, thenfor all valuations v, ICl
v
=
IC[B/A]l
v
' (Cf. (vi) of Def. 1.1.2.2.)
Proof. For the sake of brevity, we writeX'instead of "X[B/A] ". Our statement
holdstrivially if Ais not a part of C, or Cis A. If Cis of form"F(E)" or H(F=E)" then
use the induction assumption that IFl
v
=IF' l, and IEl
v
=IE' l, (for all v). If C is of
form"(AXpE)" then C'must be "('Ax.E')". Using that for all v, IEl
v
=IE' l, we have
that for all v andfor all b E D(ft),
130
IElv[x:bJ =IE"lv[x:bJ
whichmeansthat for all valuations v, I(Ax.E)l
v
= 1(A.x.E")l
v
'
COROLLARY. If i= (A
a
=BaJ then i= (C =C[B/A]).
Let us emphasize a furthercorollary:
1.1.4.3. THEOREM. The lawof replacement. If i= (A
a
= BaJ and i= Cathen
1= C[B/A).
1.1.4.4. LEMMA. Ifxp is substitutable by BPin the termA thenfor all valuations v:
IBlv =b e D(P) 1.4/ l, =IAlv[x:bJ'
Proof. IfA is freefromx thenA/ is the sameas A, and(byLemma1.1.4.1)
IAl
v
= IAlv[x:b].
Nowassumethat A is not freefrom x. Thenwe use, again, structural induction
onA. If A is x thenA/ is B, and, trivially,
IBlv =b =Ixlv/x:b] .
The cases whenA is of form UF(C)" or U(C=E)" are left to the reader. Now let us
consider the caseA is of form"('Ay.C)". Theny '* x (for"(Ax.C)" is freefromx), and B
must be freefrom y (forB is substitutable forx in "('Ax.C)" ). Hence, if y E Var(y) then
for all c E D(y),
IBlv[y:cJ = IBl
v
(byLemma1.1.4.1). Then, for all c E D(y),
1('Ax.C/ )I
v
(c) =le
x
B
Iv[y:, ] = IClv[y:cllx:b] =1('Ay.C)lv[x:b](c),
byinWcticit asswDptiCll
whichyieldsthat 1('Ay.C/)I
v
=1('Ay.C)l
v/x:bJ'
1.1.4.5. THEOREM. The lawoflambdaconversion. If x is substitutable by B in A then
1= ((Axp.Aa)(Bp) =A/.
Proof. We haveby (S1) and(S2) thatif IBl
v
= b then
1('AxpAtJ(Bp)l
v
= I(Ax.A)l
v
(IBl
v)
= IAlv[x:bJ'
According to theprecedig lemma(usingtheassumption on the substitutability):
IAl
v[x
:b] =IA/ l,
Hence:
I(Ax.A)(B)l
v
=IA/ Iv
for all interpretations andvaluations. Our statement follows trivially fromthis fact.
131
L
1.1.5. LOGICAL SYMBOLS INTRODUCED VIA DEFINITIONS
We defme first the sentencesi and J" called Verum and Falsum, respectively:
i =df Ap()p) = (Ap.p; J, =df Ap()p) = (Ap. i .
[Showthat l i ~ l p =1 and IJ,I/p =0, for all Ip and v.]
We continueby introducingnegation, 1_' :
(Df.)
Then A =df(Ap(J,=p(A). By the law of Aconversion, the right side is logically syn
onymousto "(J, =A)". Hence, the contextual defmitionof'' is as follows:
A =df (J, =A).
The explicitedefmitionof the universal quantifier"'i/ a (of type a) is:
(Df."'i/)
Its contextual definitionis:
(Here the type subscript aof"'i/ can be omitted.)We can introducethe usual notationby
"'i/xaA
o
=df "'i/(Ax.A) [= Ax.A) = (AX. t ].
The definition of the conjunction ' &':
(Df.&) & =d f (Apo(Aqo"'i/fro[P= (f(p) =f(q))] .
[For the sake of easier reading, we applied here a pair of square brackets instead of the
"regular" parentheses. This device will be applied sometimes later on.] We shall write
the usual "(A & B)" instead of "&(A)(B)". Thus, the contextual definition of' &' is as
follows:
(A & B ) =df vt.oo(A = (f(A) = fiB)))
whereA and B must be free fromthe variablef.
[Show that our definiton of '&' satisfies the canonical truth condition of the
conjunction.]
The further logical symbolswill be introduced via contextual definitions only:
(Df. o)
(Df. v)
o ~ B
o)
=df  (A &  B)
(A
o
v B
o
) =df  (A &  B),
(We do not need a new symbol for biconditional since"(A = B )" is appropriate to ex
press it.)
132
(Df.3)
(Df. )
3x
aAo
=df V'xA.
(A
a
*B
a
) =df "....(A = B).
1.1.6. THE GENERALIZED SEMANTICS
It follows from a result of KURT GbDEL (1931) that there exists no logical calculus
which is both sound and complete to our semantical system EL (i.e., a calculus in
whichasentence A is deducible froma set of sentences riff r FA holds in EL). How
ever, via following the method of LEONARD HENKIN 1950, it is possible to formulate a
generalized semantics  briefly: a Gsemantics  in sucha waythat the calculus EC 
to be introduced in 1.2  proves to be sound and complete with respect to this G
semantics.
The present section is devoted to formulate the Gsemantics of the EL lan
guages. The semantics introduced in Ll.Lmay be distinguished by callingit the stan
dard semantics.
1.1.6.1. DEFINITION. By a generalizedinterpretation  briefly: a Ginterpretation  of
a languageLo:! we meana tripleIp = ( V, D, p) satisfying the following con"ditions:
(i) Uis a nonempty set.,
(ii) D is a function defined onEXTY suchthat
D( 0) ={0,1}, Dtt) = U, and D( ap) b D(fJ) D( a).
(iii) p is a function defined on Consuchthat
CeCon(a) ~ ~ C e D a .
(iv) Whenever v is a valuation joining to Ip (satisfying the condition v(x
a)
e
D( a) ), the semantic rules (SO) to (S3) in Def. 1.1.3.2are applicable in determining the
factualvalues(according to Ip and v) of theterms of Lo:!.
Comparing Ginterpretations and standard interpretations (defined in 1.1.3.1)
one sees the main difference in permitting 'c' insteadof '=' in the definition of D( ap).
However, the domains D( ap) must not be quite arbitrary and 'too small' ones: the re
striction is contained in item(iv).For example, to assurethefactual valueof the term
U(Axa(X= x) " the domainD(oa) must containa function (/J suchthat for all a e D(a),
f./J(a) = 1hold.
1.1.6.2. DEFINITION. Consider Def. 1.1.3.4. Replace the term 'interpretation' by 'G
interpretation', and prefix 'G' before the defined terms. Thenone gets the defmition of
the following notions:
a Gmodel of a set of F,
Gsatisfiability (andGunsatisfiability),
Gconsequence denoted by r FG A  andGvalidity ( FG A),
Gsynonymity.
Since every standardinterpretation is a Ginterpretation we have the following
interrelations:
133
ris satisfiable ::::> T is Gsatisfiable,
ris Gunsatisfiable ::::> ris unsatisfiable,
r FoA ::::> r FA,
FoA ::::> FA.
We have proved some important semantic laws in Section 1.1.4. Fortunately,
their proofs were based in each case on the semanticrules (SO) to (S3) which remained
intact in the Gsemantics, too. Hence:
1.1.6.3. THEOREM. All logical laws provedin the standard semantics in section 1.1.4
 are logical laws of the Gsemantics as well.
The most important laws  which will be used in 1.2  are the law of the re
placement (1.1.4.3) and the law of the lambdaconversion (1.1.4.5) .
1.2. THE CALCULUS sc
1.2.1. DEFINITION OF EC
The calculus EC introducedbelow will be a pure syntactical system joining to the se
mantical system EL. Our presuppositions here are: the extensional type theory, the
grammar of the Lei\1 languages (includingthe notational conventions), and the defini
tions of the (nonprimitive) logical symbols (as i, J..,  , 'V, &, etc.). (See 1.1.1, 1.1.2,
1.1.5.) EC will be based on five basic schemata (E1)...(E5), and a single proof rule
called replacement.
Basic schemata:
(E1) (A a = Aa)
(E2) (if aft) &foofJ)) = 'Vpo.f(p) )
(E3) x
a
=Ya) ::J if aJx) =f(y))
(E4) (fap= gap) = 'Vxpff(x) = g(x)])
(E5) 'Axp A
a
)(Bp) = A/ )
Herethe metavariables f, g, x, y refer to variables and A, B to arbitrary terms of a formal Ian
guage.L
fJCf
(Of course, in (E5), it is assumed that the termB is substitutable forx inA.)
By a basic sentence (of Lei\1) we mean a sentenceresulting by a correct substi
tution of terms of L ~ into one of the basic schemata. (A substitution is said to be a
correct one if the lowercase letters are substituted by variables of the indicated types
and the uppercaseletters are substitutedby terms of the indicatedtypes.)
Proof rule. Rule of replacement  RR. From "(A
a
= ~ and Co to infer to
"C[B/A]".
Proofs in EC. By a proof we shall mean a nonempty finite sequence of sen
tences such that each member of the sequenceis either a basic sentence, or else it fol
lows fromtwo precedingmembersvia RR.
134
A sentence A (of . ~ is said to be provable in EC  in symbols: "fee A" 
iff thereexists a proof in EC terminatingin A.
(As one sees, our definitions are languagedependent. In fact, we shall be inter
ested, in most cases, in the proofs of sentence schemata rather than of singular sen
tences (of a particular language).)
In what follows, we shall omit the subscript 'EC' in the notation' fee', writing
simply ~ instead. (The distinction is important only if we are speaking of different
calculi.)
The notion"A is a syntacticconsequence of the set r of sentences" (or "A is de
duciblefromr") will be introducedin Section 1.2.3.
It is easy to see that all basic sentences are valid in the semantical systemEL.
Furthermore, by Th. 1.1.4.3, the rule RR yields a valid sentence from valid ones.
Hence:
If ~ A then ~ A.
Let us realize that the above statement holds not only for our standard seman
tics of EL but evenfor the generalized semanticsexplainedin 1.1.6, in consequence of
Th. 1.1.6.3. Consequently:
1.2.1.1. THEOREM. The soundness ofEC with respect to the generalized semantics of
EL. If ~ e A then FG A.
To prove the converse of this theorem, we need first to prove some theorems
about the provability in EC.
1.2.2. Some proofs in EC
In this section, we shall provesome metatheorems about the provability in EC.
Some of these theorems state that a certain sentence, or a sentence schema is provable
in EC, and someothers introducederived proof rules.
At the beginning, the proofs will be fullydetailed. A detailed proof will be dis
played in numbered lines. At the end of each line, there stands a reference between
.square brackets indicating the provability of the sentence/the schema occurringin that
line. Our references will have the following forms:
'ass.' stands for assumption occurringin the formulation of the theorem.
Reference to a basic schema or to a schema provedearlier will be indicated by
the code of the schema (e.g., '(E2)', 'E3.2', etc.), A reference of form "Df. X" (e.g.,
'Df. \/ ', 'Df. :::J') referstothe definitionof thelogicalsymbolstandingin the placeof 'X' .
A reference of form"kim" in line numberedby n states that line n follows by a
replacement (RR) accordingto the identity standing in line k into the schema in line m.
Instead of k or m, we use sometimes codes of schemata proved earlier. We shall refer
often to the basic schema (E5)  the identity expressing Aconversion , in this case
we writesimply 'A' in the placeof k.
135
References to derivedproofrules will be of form"RX: k" or "RX: k.m" where
"RX" is the codeof the rule and k, m are the line numbers (or codes) of the schema(ta)
to whichthe rule is to be applied.
Later on, the proofs will be condensed, leavingsomedetailsto the reader.,
Outermost parentheses will be sometimes omitted. Notethat instead of "(A 0 ~
o ~ Co" we write"A ~ B ~ C'.
Proofs from (E1)
El.I. ~ (A =B) ~ ~ (B =A).  Proof:
1. ~ (A = A) [(El)]
2. ~ (A =B) [ass.]
3. ~ (B= A) [211]
COROLLARY. If ~ (A= B) and ~ Cothen ~ C[B/A). In what follows, we shall
refer to this rule as to our basic ruleRR.
El.2. ~ (A = B) and ~ (B =C ~ r (A =C).  Proof:
1. ~ (A = B) [ass.]
2. ~ (B =C) [ass.]
3. ~ (A = C) [1/2]
EI.3. ~ t [by Df.i and (EI)].
EI.4. ~ (A
o
=i) ~ r A
o
 Proof:
1. ~ (A =i) [ass.]
2. ~ i [El.3]
3. ' ~ A [l/2]
EI.S. ~ Ao=B
o)
and r A ) ~ r B.  Proof:
1. ~ (A = B) [ass.]
2. ~ A [ass.]
3. ~ B [112]
Theseresultswill be used, in most cases, withouta particularreference.
Proofs from (E5)
ES.I. ~ (A ='B) ~ (AxC = B,c) (provided, of course, that C and x belongto
the samecategory, and C is substitutable for x bothin A and B).  Proof:
1. ~ (A = B) [ass.]
2. ~ Ax.A)(C) =(Ax.A)(C [(EI)]
3. ~ Ax.A)(C) = (Ax.B)(C [1/2]
4. ~ Ax.A)(C) =Axc) [(E5)]
5. ~ Ax.B)(C) =B
x
c
) [(E5)]
6. ~ (A
x
c
= B
x
c
) [4,5/3]
Note that line 6 comprises two applications of RR. In what follows, steps such
as 2 and3 will be contractedinto a singlestepwiththe reference[l/(El)].
136
COROLLARIES: We get from (E2) and (E4) by E5.1 that:
(E2*) (FaAi) & F(J, = 'Vpo' F(p) [whereFis free fromp].
(4*) (Fap=Gap) ='Vxp [F(x) =G(x)] [two applications; F and G must be
free fromx].
To apply this device to (E3), remember that "(A ::> B)" is an abbreviation for
"(J, =(A & B". Hence, E5.1 is applicable to (E3) as well. By three applications we
get:
(E3*) (A
a
= B
a
) ::> (Fat (A) = F(B.
E5.2. 'Vx.A
o
( (A/ =i) and A/).  Proof:
1. (Ax.A) = (Ax. T) [ass. and Df. 'V]
2. (Ax.A)(B) = (Ax.i)(B) [1/(EI)]
3. (A/ = i) [A /2, twice]
4. A/ [EI.4: 3]
[Theprovisos are analogousto those of E5.1.]
Proofs from (E4)
E4.1. A =A) =T).  Proof:
1. Ax.A) = (Ax.A = 'Vx[(Ax.A)(x) = (Ax.A)(x)] [(E4*]
2. 'Vx[(Ax.A)(x) = (Ax.A)(x)] [1.5: I,(El)],
3. 'Vx(A =A) [A /2, twice]
4. A =A) =T) [E5.2: 3]
E4.2. ('Vx.i =T).  Proof: H'Vx.i" is "(Ax.i) = (AX.i)". Now apply E4.I.
E4.3. ( J, = T).  Proof' ' J,' is 'J, = J,'. Apply E4.1. .
E4.4. ('Vpo'P = J,).  Use that "'Vp.p" is "(Ap.p) = (Ap.i)", and the latter is
J" by its definition.
E4.5. 'VPJ.p =i) = J,.  Proof:
1. Ap.p) =(Ap.T) = 'Vp(p =T) [(4*) and A]
2. J, ='Vp(p = i) [Df. J, 11]
Completeby usingEI.l.
Proofs from (E2)
E2.1. i &i) = i).  Proof: In (E2*), let F be "(Apotr, and apply A
conversions. At the right side, use 4.2 .
E2.2. (( i & J,) =J,).  Proof' In (E2*), let F be "(Apop)". Apply A
conversions. At the right side, use E4.4.
E2.3. 'VpJ..(i &p) = p).  Proof: Let F be "(APJ..(i & p) =p"in (E2*).
After Aconversions, we have:
t&i) =i) & i&J,) =J,)]= 'Vpi & p) =p).
(i = i) & (J, = J,) [byE2.1 and E2.2],
'.rJ ' .
,i B: 1 [by E4.1, twice],
i [by E2.1].
137
Complete by usingEI.I andEl.4.
E2.4. r & A
o
) =A). [From E2.3, by E5.2.]
E2.S. (( J, =i) =J,).  Proof: Let F be "(Ap(P =i" in (E2*). Use A
conversions, E4.1, E2.4, and (at the right side)E4.5.
E2.6. ( t =J,). [Df.1E2.5.]
E2.7. 'VpJ(P =i) =p).  Proof: In (E2*), let Fbe "(Ap(P =i) =p)".
AfterAeonversions, use E4.1, E2.5, andB2.1. Complete as in the proofofE2.3.
E2.8. A
o
=i) = A). [FromE2.7, by E5.2.]
E2.9. 'VPo (  p = p).  Proof: In (E2*), let F be "(Ap( p = p". Use
E4.3 andE2.6.
E2.10. (  A = A). [FromE2.9, by E5.2.]
R'V. A
o
'VxlJ'A.  Proof:
1. (A = i) [fromthe ass. andE2.8]
2. (( Ax.A) = (Ax.i [l 1(E1)]
3. 'Vx.A [Df. 'V: 2]
R&. ( A and B) (A &B).  Proof:
1. (A =T) [ass. andE2.8]
2. (i & B) = B [B2.4]
3. (A &B) = B [1/2]
4. (B = i) [ass. and E2.8]
5. (A & B) = t [4/3]
6. (A & B) [B2.8/5]
atJ,. If A, B E Cat(o), p E Var(o), Api, and A
p
J, then A/ .
Proof: In (E2*), let Fbe "(Ap.A)". Use the assumptions, R&, andE5.2.
R::J . ( (Ao::J B
o
), and A) B.  Proof:
1. (A = T)
2. (J, = (A & B)
3. (J, =(i & B
4. (J, = B)
5. (J, =B)
6. (i = B)
7. B
[ass. and E2.8]
[ass. and Of. ::J]
[1/2]
[E2.4/3 ]
[4/(El)]
[E2.10, E4.315]
[E1.1,E2.816]
138
 
Proofs from (E3)
EJ.t. (A
a
=B
a
) ::J (B =A).  Proof: In (E3*), let F be "(Axa.(B =x"
whereA andB arefreefromx. After Aeonversions we have:
(A =B)::J (B =A) =(B =B).
Complete by usingE4.1 andE2.8.
E3.2. (I::J I).  Proof: In (E3*),let A andB be I, and let Fbe "(ApoI)".
We have(byAconversions) that:
1. I (I = I) ::J (I = I)
2. I::J 1 [E4.11l]
PuttingJ, forA, we get analogously:
E3.3. I J,::J t [Cf. E2.5.]
E3.4. A
o=>
I. (Verumex quodlibet.)  FromE3.2 andE3.3, by RI J,.
E3.5. I J,::J J, .  Proof: In (E3*), let Fbe"(Apop)", and let A and B be J,
and t, respectively. Use E2.5.
E3.6. I J,::JA
o
. (Exfalso quodlibet.)  FromE3.3 andE3.5, by RI J,.
E3.7. I Ao::J A.  FromE3.2 andE3.5, by RI J,.
Notethat by Df. ::J,
By E4.3, E2.l, andE2.5, this reducesto:
On the other hand, E3.5andE2.8yield:
Similarly, E3.2andE2.8yield:
From(a) and (b) we get by R 1J, that:
E3.8. I (Ao::J J,) =A.
We get analogously from(a) and(c) that:
E3.9. I (I::J A
o
) =A.
It follows fromE3.8. that
I (Ao::J  i) =A.
Usingthat (A ::J I) =df (A &I), this meansthat:
E3.10. I (A
o
& I) =A.
139
[E3.4, E3.9, E2.8]
The Propositional Calculus (PC)
PCI. r Ao::JB
o)
& (B::JA::J (A =B).  Proof"
1. r A::J i) & (i ::J A ::J (A = i)
~ ~ 'vJ
i & A ),::J A
A ::J A [E2.4, E3.7]
2. r A::J J,) & (J,::J A =(,1, = A)
~ ~ 'vJ
~ ~ & i ~ A
[E3.4, E3.9, E2.8]
 A =  A [E3.l0, (El)]
3. r (,1, = A) ::J (A = J,) [E3.l]
4. r A::J ,1, ) & (J, ::JA:::l (A = J,) [2/3]
5. r A::J B) & (B::JA::J (A = B) [Ri,1,: 1,4]
PC2. r (A
a
=B
a)
=(B =A).  Proof"
1. r [A=B)::J (B=A & B=A) ::J (A=B ] ::J [(A=B) = (B=A)] [by PC1]
2. r (A = B) ::J (B = A) [E3.l ]
3. r (B = A) ::J (A =B) [E3.l]
Now use R& and R ::J.
Consider the proof of Pel. In line 1, the main '" :::l' can be replaced by ,"=1.
(Why?)In line 2, '"(,1, =A)' can be replacedby '"(A =,1,)' (accordingto Pe2). Fromthese,
one gets by Ri J, that:
PC3. r Ao::J B
o)
&(B ::>A =(A =B).
PC4. r (A = B ) ::> (A ::> B).  Proof"
1. r (i = B ) ::J (i :::l B)
'vJ ~
B ::J B
2. r (,1, = B)::J (,1,::> B)
'vJ ~
[E2.8, E3.9]
 B::J i "[E3.6, E3.4]
Completeby usingat J,.
The followinglaws can be provedanalogously: substitute i and J" respectively,
for A, and use at t.
PCS. r Ao::J Bo::J A.
PC6. r (Ao::J B
o::>
Co) = A::J B)::> A::J C).
PC7. r ( Bo::J  A
o)
=(A::J B).
By PC3 (and R::, the two latter laws can be weakenedas follows:
PCS. r (A
o::>
Bo::J Co) ::> (A ::J B) ::J A ::J C.
PC9. t (B
o::>
A
o)
::J A ::> B.
140
Knowingthat PC:5,8,9and R::J are sufficientfor the foundation of PC, we have
that EC containsPC. Note that PC3 and PC4 assure that the identitysymbol '= ' acts,
betweensentences, the part of the biconditional. In what follows, we shall refer by 'PC'
to the laws of the classical propositional calculus.
Laws of Quantification (QC)
QCl. 'VpoC'vxa(P A
o)
=(P 'Vx.A).  Proof" Showthat
'Vx(p A) = (p 'Vx.A)
is provablewith i and J. insteadof p. Then use (E2*).  COROLLARY:
QC2. 'VxJ..C
o::;)
A
o)
::;) C 'Vx.A), providedC is freefromx.
Using that A) [PC] and usingR'V, we get fromQC2:
QC3. A0 'Vxll'A provided A is freefromx.
QC4. 'VxaA
o
::;) A/.  Proof"
1. ((h.A)=(h.i ::;) [(A/rof(B(h.A)=(Af/(b(Ax. i)] [by (E3*)]
[Notethat U(A/rof(Bu,)" E Cat(o(oa)).]
2. h .A)=(h .i ) h.A)(B)=(Ax.i )(B [A11 ]
3. 'Vx.A (A/ = i) [Df. 'Vand A/2]
4. 'Vx.A:::> A/ [E2.8/3]
QC5. 'VxJ..A
o::;)
B
o)
::;) 'Vx.A 'Vx.B.  Proof"
1. 'Vx(A B) (A B) [QC4]
2. r 'Vx.A A [QC4]
3. r ('Vx(A B) & 'Vx.A) ::;) (A & (A ::;) B [PC: 1,2]
4. r (A & (A B ::;) B [PCl
5. r ('Vx(A B) & 'Vx.A) B [pC: 3,4]
6. r 'Vx[('Vx(A ::;) B) & 'Vx.A) ::;) B] [R'V: 5]
7. r ('Vx(A B) &'Vx.A) 'Vx.B QC2, 6]
8. r 'Vx(A B) 'Vx.A 'Vx.B [pc: 7]
The laws QC4, QC5, QC3, (EI), (E3*), andR'V  togetherwith the laws of PC
 are sufficient for the foundation of the frrstorder Quantification Calculus QC. Hence,
all laws of QC are provablein EC, with quantifiablevariablesof any type (in contrast
to QC wherethe quantifiable variablesare restrictedto type z).
QC6. If the variableyp does not occur in the termA
a
then r = (AypAl ). 
Proof" Let A" be Ai , andnotethat  owingtoour proviso  [A"l/ is the sameas AxZ
1. r (Ay.A ")(zP) =[A"] / [(E5), with suitablez]
2. r (Ay.A")(z) =A/ [from1, for [A "]/ =A
x
Z
]
3. r (h.A)(z) =A
x
l
[(E5)]
4. r (Ax.A)(z) =(Ay.A")(z) [3/2]
5. r 'Vz[(h.A)(z) = (Ay.A")(z)] [R'V : 4]
6. (ALA) = (Ay.A") [(E4*) /5]
141
This is the lawof renaming bound variables.
Finally, we provea generalization of (E3) which will be useful in the next Sec
tion.
(E3+) r (Ap = Bp ) ::J (CutiA) = C(B.  Proof: In (E3*), let F be
"('J....x{iC(x) = C(B) ))" (whichbelongsto Cat(ofJ. After Aconversions we have:
r (A =B) ::J([C(A) = C(B)] =[C(B) = C(B)])
~
t
By FA.! andE2.8, we get the requiredresult.
1.2.3. ECconsistent and ECcomplete sets
1.2.3.1. DEFINITION. A sentenceA is said to be a syntactic consequence of the set of
sentences r(ordeducible fromnin symbols: "T ~ c  iff
T is emptyand r A, or
T is nonemptyand there exists a conjunction K (perhaps a onemember one) of
some membersof F such that r K::JA.
[Provethat r A ~ F r A , for all r.  Prove that ru {Co} r A iff
F r C::J A  this is the socalledDeduction Theorem.]
1.2.3.2. DEFINmON. A set ris said to be ECinconsistent iff T r J,; and ris said to
be ECconsistent iff r is not ECinconsistent.
[Provethat tFis ECinconsistent) :> (for all sentences A, F r A) :> (for
some A E T, r r .... A).  Prove that if ris ECconsistent and r r A then ru {A}
is ECconsistent as well.]
1.2.3.3. DEFINmON. A set ris said to beECcomplete iff
(i) ris ECconsistent;
(ii) T is 3 complete (existentially complete) in the sense that whenever
"3x
a
A
o
" E F then for some variableYa, A/ E r,
(iii) r is maximal in the sense that if o ~ r then ru {A} is ECinconsistent.
1.2.3.4. THEOREM. If the membersof F are freefromthe variablev . X
a
does not oc
cur in the sentence A/ t and F r A/ t then T r Vx.A .
Proof. By the assumption, r K::J A/ where K is a conjunction of some mem
bers of T, and K is free fromy. Then, by RV, QC2, and R::J, r K::J 'fIy.A/We get by
QC6 that r K::J 'fIx.A, that is, r r 'fIx.A.
1.2.3.5. THEOREM. Every ECconsistent set of sentences is embeddable into an EC
complete set. More exactly: If ro is an ECconsistent set of sentences of a language
Lao:! then there exists a language Lo:! and an ECcomplete set T of sentences of Lo:!
such that ro ~ r.
142
Proof For each a E EXTY, let Var'(a) be a sequence of newvariables, and let
Lr;t;! be the enlargement of Loo:J containing these new variables. Let (En)n E iV be an
enumeration of all sentences of form"3x
aAo
" of the extended languageLr;t;!. Starting
withthe givenset ro, let us definethe sequence of sets (rn)n E iV by the schema:
r
n
+
1
=Tn if F; u {En} is ECinconsistent; andotherwise
r
n
+1 =T; u { En , En}
where, if En is "3x
a
A
o
" then E is A/ where y is the first memberof Var'(a) occur
ringneitherin the members of F; nor in En .
LEMMA. If T; is ECconsistentthenso is r
n
+1
Proof This is obvious in case r
n
+
1
= r
n
In the other case, F; U {3x
a
A
o
} is
assumed to be ECconsistent. Now assume, indirectly, that F; U {3x.A, A/ } is EC
inconsistent, i.e., that
F; U {3x.A} ~ ...Al .
Using that T; U {3x.A} is freefromy, weget by the precedingTh. that
r
n
U {3x.A} ~ 'v'x. rA .
Since"3x.A" is "'v'x....A" , we have that F; U {3x.A} is ECinconsistent whichcon
tradictsthe assumption.
Continuing the proofof the theorem, let us define
Showthat riV is ECconsistent (usingthat in.the contrary case, for some n, r
n
would
be ECinconsistent) and3complete.
Nowlet (C
n
)n E aJ be an enumeration of all sentences of Lr;t;!. Let us define the
sequence of sets r ~ n E iV by the following recursion:
r ~ + l = T'; if T'; U {C
n
} is ECinconsistent, andin the contrary case:
Obviously, for all n, T'; is ECconsistent and 3complete. Consequently, the same
holdsfor
Furthermore, Fos; r. Finally, showthat r is maximal (use that if A
o
~ I: then for
somen, A is C; , and F'; U {Cn } is ECinconsisteent).
143
1.2.3.6. THEOREM. Assume that r is an ECcompleteset of sentences. Then:
(i) r A A E r.
(ii) {(A =B), C} r UC[BIAj" E F.
(iii) If the termA
a
occursin a memberof r thenfor somevariableXa r
"(A
a
=xa)" E r.
(iv)If "(Cf1/J = Df1/J)" E r thenfor all variables xp "(C(x) = D(x) " E r .
Proof. Ad (i). This follows fromthe maximality of F, usingthat rv {A} is EC
consistent.  Ad (ii), By (E3+), (A =B) ::J (C =C[BIAJ). Nowuse PC and (i).
Ad (iii). By (i), "(A = A)" E r. By contraposition of QC4 we have that
(A =A) ::J 3Ya(A =y), and, hence, "3y(A =y)" E r. By the 3eompleteness of I:
for someX
a
, "(A =X
a
)" E r .
Ad (iv). By (E4*), (C =D) =VYp(C(y) =D(y) (withy such that C and D
are free fromy), and by QC4, r Vy(C(y) =D(y)::J (C(x) =D(x) ), with arbitrary x
a
.
Complete by using(i).
1.2.4. The completeness of EC
1.2.4.1. THEOREM. If r is an ECcomplete set of sentences then there is a G
interpretation Ip = { V, D, p } and a valuation v suchthat
(l) for all A E F, IAI/P =1.
Proof.  Part I: The definition of Ipand v.
We shall define D and v by induction on EXTY.
(a) For p E Var(o), we defmev(p) simply by
v(p) = 1, if p e T; and v(p) = 0 otherwise.
Knowing that i and J. are terms of ()(!, we haveby (iii) ofTh. 1.2.3.6that for somePo
and qo,
"(i =p)" E r and "(J. =q)" E r.
Since r i , we have that pErr and, hence, v(p) = 1. If q E r then, by (ii) of the Th.
just quoted, J, E r which is impossible (by the ECconsystency of Ty; hence, q r ,
and v(q) =0. Thus, we can define:
D(0) = to, I}.
Assumethat "(Po =qoJ" E r, andv(p) =1, that is, p e T: Then, q E F; too, and v(q) =
1. Assumingthat v(q) =1, we get analogously that v(p) =1. Hence: "(p0=q0)" E r iff
v(p) =v(q).
(b) Let (Zn}n E (l) be an enumeration of Var( z). Let us definethe function rp by
rp(Zn ) =k for somek n, "(Zn =Zk )" E r, and for all i < k,
" (Zn =Zj )" r [i, k, n E (J) ]
144
(In other words: let fP{zn) be the smallest number k such that "(z, = Zk )" E r. Note
that "(Zn =z, )"E r. Then fP{zo) =0.) Nowlet U =D(l) be the counterdomain of J,
i.e., U=D(l) ={k E (J) : for somex E Var(l), fP{x) =k }.
We thendefinev for members of Var(l) by vex) =df rp(x).
[Usingthe symmetry and the transitivity of the identity, showthat "(r, = YI )" E r iff
vex) = v(y).]
(c) Nowassume that D(a), D(j3) are defined already, v is defined for the mem
bersof Yarea) u Var(ft>, andthe following twoconditions holdfor r E {a, fJ} :
(i) If C E D(r) thenfor somex
r'
vex) = c.
(ii) "(X
r
= Yr)" E r iff vex) =v(y).
(Notethat by(a) and (b), theseconditions holdfor rE {o, l }.) Nowwe are go
ingto definev for the members of Var(a(p]) as well as the domainD(a(p).
Forf E Var(afJ), a E D(a) , b E D(j3), we let:
v(f)(b) =a iff for someXa , YP suchthat vex) =a, v(y) =b, "(f(y) =x)" E r.
Using (i) and (ii), it is easyto provethat v(f) is a (unique) function from D(j3) to D(a).
 We define:
D(afJ) = { rp E D(jJ)D(a): for somef ap, v(j) = qJ} c D(jJ) D(a).
Nowprovethat (i) and (ii) holdfor r = a(p). (For (ii), use (iv) of Th. 1.2.3.6.)
By (a), (b), and (c), the definition of D and v is completed.
(d) If C E ConCa) then for some Xa , "(C = x)" E r . We then defineP(C) =
vex). Showthat this definition is unambigous.
By these, thedefmition of lp is completed.
Part II: The proofof(1).
(A) We prove(1) firstly for identities of form"(B
a
= Ya)". If B is a variable or
a termof form "f(x)" or a constant, then (1) holds according to the defmition of lp and
v. In other cases, B is a compound termof form"F(C)", " (Ax.C)" , or U(C = D)". We
shall investigate one by one these three cases. Meanwhile, we shall use the induction
assumption that (1) holdstruefor sentences whichare less compound ones than the one
underinvestigation.
(AI) If U(FatiCp) =Ya)" E r then  by (iii) of Th.1.2.3.6  for some vari
ables fap and xs. "(F = f)" E F. and "(C = x)" E r. Furthermore, by the EC
completeness of F, "({(x) =y)" E r. Then, by the definition of lp and v,
(2) I(f(x) =y)l
v
=1.
145
We can assumethat
(3) I(F =f>/v =1 and (4) I(C =x)l
v
=1
for F and Care less compoundterms than"F(C)". From(2), (3), and (4) it then follows
that
I(F(C) =Y)/v =I
whichwas to be proved.
(Thefurthercases will be less detailed.)
(A2) If "'AxfJC
a)
= YaP )" E r then  by (iv) of Th. 1.2.3.6 for all zp,
"'Ax. C)(z) = y(z" E r, and, by 'Aconversion,
(5) "(C/ =y(z) ) E r.
However, for all zpthere is an U
z
E Var(a) suchthat
(6) "(y(z) = u
z
)" E r.
By (5) and (6), we have that for all z E Var(/J) thereis an U
z
E Var(a) suchthat
"(C
X
Z
=U
z
)" E F. By inductionassumption, I(C
x
Z
= U
z
)I
v
=1, and, furthermore,
l(y(z) =U
z
)I
v
=1. Henceforth: I(C/ =y(zl
v
=1, that is"
(7) /'Ax. C)(z) = y(z) )/v = 1
for all zp. Remembering that for all b ED(jJ) there is a zpsuch that v(z) = b, we get
from (7) that for all b E D(jJ), I(AX.C)l
v
(b) =v(y)(b), which means that I(Ax.C)l
v
=
v(y), and, hence: 1('Ax.C) =y)l
v
=1.
(A3) If "C
a
= D
a
) =Po)" E r thenfor someXa, Ya: "(C =x)" E T;
H(D= y)" E F; and
(8)
We can assumethat
(9) I(C = x)l
v
= 1
"(x =y) =p)" E r.
and (10) I(D =y)l
v
= 1.
Now v(p) is 1 or O. If v(p) = 1 then "(p = tr E r, and, by (8), "(x = y) E r, that is,
vex) =v(y). This and (9) and (10) togetherimplythat
(11) I(C=D) = p)l
v
=1.
On the other hand, if v(p) = 0 then "(p =J,)" E r, and, by (8) again, ; (x =y) E r,
hence, vex) ;I:. v(y). This and (9) and (10) togetherimply(11).
146
(B) Secondly, we prove (1) for identities of form "(B
a
= C
a
)"where both B
and Cmay be compound terms, If"(B =C)" E r thenfor somexj andy., , "(B = x)" E
r, "(C = y)" E r, and "(x = y)" E r. By (A), we havethat
I(B= x)l
v
=1, I(C = y)l
v
= 1, and I(x =y)l
v
=1,
whichyieldthat I(B = C)l
v
=1.
(C) Finally, if the sentence A is not an identitythenA E r implies that
"(A =i)" E r. Since IAl
v
=I(A=i)l
v
thiscase reducesto the preceding one.
1.2.4.2. THEOREM. If the set r is ECconsistent then r is Gsatisfiable. This follows
fromTheorems 1.2.3.5 and 1.2.4.1.
1.2.4.3.THEOREM. The completeness ofEC with respect to the Gsemantics. If r A
then r hr: A.
Proof. Assumethat r A. Then I" = r u { A} is Gunsatisfiable, and, by
contraposing the preceding theorem, F' is ECinconsistent whichmeansthat
r u {... A} J,. Then, by the Deduction Theorem, we have that r ( A ::> J,) which
reduces to r A.
1.2.4.4. THEOREM. (LbWENHEIM5KOLEM.) If the set r is Gsatisfiable then r is
"denumerably" satisfiable in the sense that r has a Gmodel Ip ={U, D, p} with a
valuation v suchthat eachD( a) is at most denumerably infinite.
Proof. Note firstly that if r is Gsatisfiable then r is (For if
r J, then ... continue!) Then, by Th. 1.2.3.5, r is embeddable into an EC
complete set I" , and, by the proof of Th. 1.2.4.1, I" has a Gmodel in whichthe cardi
nality of each D(a) is not greater than the cardinality of Var(a) (whichis; of course,
denumerably infinite). That is, I" has a "denumerable" Gmodel. Since r s:I", this is
a Gmodel of r as well.
147
PART 2: MONTAGUE's INTENSIONAL LOGIC
The sourcesof this chapterare the following works:
R. MONTAGUE, Universal Grammar, 1970.
R. MONTAGUE, The ProperTreatment of Quantification in Ordinary English, 1973  briefly:
PTQ.
D. GAllIN, Intensional and HigherOrderModalLogic, 1975.
We shall presentthe essenceof the most important parts of thesewritings, of course, without lit
eral repetititons. The resultsof Part 1 will be utilizedextensively.
2.1. THESEMANTICAL SYSTEMS IL ANDIL+
2.1.1. MONTAGUE'S TYPE THEORY
Montague uses the basic symbols t, e, and s  t for truth value, e for entity, s
for sense  in his type theory. The type of a functor with the input type a and output
typef3is denotedby "( The full inductive definition of his types is as follows:
t and e are types.
If a, p are types, "( is a type.
If a is a type, (s,a)" is a type.
Here t and e correspond to our type symbols 0 and l, respectively (cf. 1.1.1), and
correspondto our f3(a). .Finally, "(s,a)" is the type ofexpressions naming the
sense (or the intension) of an expression of type a. It is presupposed here that there
exist terms naming intensions (senses) of terms. (For example, if A is a sentence, the
term "that A" is a name of the sense (intension) of A; or if B is an individual name 
say, 'the Pope'  then "the concept of B" is a name of the sense (intension) of B.) Note
that the isolated's' is not a type symbol.
However, we shall not use Montague's original notationfor types. Instead, we
shall follow our notation introduced in Section 1.1.1, of course, with suitable en
largements. Thus, our inductivedefmition of the set of Montagovian types denoted
by 'TYPM'  runs as follows:
o, lE TIPM,
=> "a(p}'ETYPM,
p E TYPM =::) "(/J)s" E TYPM.
Again, if Pconsists of a single character(0 or z), the parentheses surrounding it will be
omitted. Furthermore, we write usually"(P'l" instead of "(/J)s" [except when it occurs
in a subscript], and instead of "P'lt " we write simply "(/J)5S "[e.g., d', (55, (Ol)5SSS,
etc.].
148
The unrestricted iterations and multiply embedded occurrences of's' may
provoke somephilosophical criticism, but let us put asidethis problem presently.
2.1.2. THE GRAMMAR OF IL ANDIL+
The semantical systemIL is introduced in Universal Grammar. In PrQ, systemIL
is extended by the introduction of tenseoperators; this extended system will be called
IL+.
2.1.2.1. DEFINITION. By an IL language let us meana quadruple
L (i ) = (Log, Var, Con, Cat)
where
Log = { (, ), A., =, A , v }
is the set of logical symbols of the language (containing left and right parentheses, the
lambdaoperator A. , the symbol of identity, the intensor A, andthe extensor v);
Var = U
a eTYPM
Var(a)
is the set of variables of the language whereeach Var(a) is a denumerably infinite set
of symbols calledvariables of type a;
Can =UaeTYPM Con(a)
is the set of (nonlogical) constants of the language where each Con(a) is a denumer
able(perhaps empty)set of symbols calledconstants of type a;
all the sets mentioned up to this point are pairwise disjoint;
Cat =U ae TYPM Cat(a)
is the set of the wellformed expressions  briefly: terms  of the language where the
sets Cat( a) are inductively defined by the grammatical rules (GO) to (G5) below.
For a E TVPM, Cat( a) maybe calledthe acategory of L{i) .
[Thenotational conventions will be the sameas in 1.1.2.]
Grammatical rules:
(GO) Var(a) u Con( a) ~ Cat(a).
(G1) "Aa/1(BpJ" E Cat( a).
(G2) "(AxpAa) E Cat(ap) .
(G3) "(A
a
= ~ E Cat(0)
(G4) "AA
a
" E Cat( as).
(G5) "vA
as"
E Cat(a).
Let us enlargethe set of logical symbols Log by the symbols 'P' and 'F' (called
past andjUture tense operators, respectively) and let us add the rule (G6) to the gram
maticalrules:
(G6) "PAo", "FAd' E Cat(o).
149
By these enlargements, we get the grammar of the IL+ languages. [In PrQ, some sym
bols introducedvia definitions in Universal Grammar, are treated as primitive ones;
but we do not followhere this policy.]
Remark. Montaguespeaksof a singlelanguage of IL, and, hence,he prescribes that each Con( a)
must be (denumerably) infinite. We follow the policy of Part 1 in dealingwith a family of languages the
members of whichmaydifferfromeachotherin havingdifferent setsof theirnonlogical constants.
2.1.2.2. DEF1NITION. (i) Free and bound occurrences of a variablein a termas well
as closed and open terms are distinguished exactlyas in EL (cf. (i), (ii) and (iii) of
Def. 1.1.2.2).
(ii) The set of rigid terms of I})  denotedby'RGD'  is definedby the fol
lowinginduction:
(a) Vars: RGD; "AA
a
" E RGD.
(b) Fap, Bp E RGD F(B) E RGD.
(c) A E RGD "(Mp A)" E RGD.
(d) A, B E RGD "(A = B)" E RGD.
(e) In case IL": AoE RGD "P(A)", UF(A)" E RGD.
In other words: rigid terms are composed of variables and terms of form"AA" via ap
plications of the grammatical rules (G1), (G2), and (G3). A motivation of the adjective
'rigid' will be givenin the next section.
(iii) A variableXa is said to be substitutableby the termB
a
in the termA iff
(a) whenever "(Ay.C)" is a part of A involving some occurrences of x which
counts as a freeoccurrence of x in A thenB is freefromy; and
(b) if a free occurrence of x in A lies in a part of form"AC' (or  in case of IL+ 
"P(C)" or "F(C)") of A then B is a rigid term.
(iv) The result of substitutingB
a
for Xa in A  in symbols: "[A]/"  and the
replacement ofA
a
by B
a
in a term C  denotedby "C[BfA]"  are definedexactly
as in EL (cf. (v) and (vi) of Def. 1.1.2.2).
2.1.3. THE SEMANTICS OF IL ANDIL+
2.1.3.1. DEFINITION. (a) By an interpretation of an IL languageI./) let us mean a
quadruple
Ip =(U, W, D, a )
where U and Warenonemptysets; D is a function defmedon TYPM such that
and a is a functiondefinedon Con such that
(2) C E Con(a) o(C) E Int(a) =df WD( a).
150
(b) By an interpretation of an IL+ languagewe mean a sixtuple
Ip = (U, T, c, D, a}
where U, and T are nonemptysets, < is a linear ordering of T, D is the same as in
(l) except that
D(a
S
) =I D(a) where 1= WxT,
and a is as in (2) except that Int(a) =I D(a).
(c) Afunction v defmedon Var is said to be a valuation joining to Ip iff
X E Var(a) => vex) E D( a) .
The notation"v[x:al" will be used analogouslyas in EL (cf. Def. 1.1.3.1).
Comments. W is said to be the set of (labels of) possible worlds, Tis the set of
possible time moments, and < represents the 'earlier than' relation between time mo
ments. I = Wx T is said to be the set of indices. For a E TYPM, D(a) is the set of
factual values and Int(a) is the set of intensions, of type a, respectively.
2.1.3.2. DEFINmoN. Given an interpretation Ip of an IL or an IL+ language If), we
shall define for all terms A E Cat and for all valuationsv joining to Ip, the intensionof
Aaccordingto Ip and v  denoted by "IIAII /p " by the semantic rules (SO) to (S6)
below. Accordingto our definition, if A E Cat(a) then
will be satisfied where I =W in the case of IL, and I =W x T in the case of IL+
Hence, II AII /p is defmed iff for all i E I,
IAI/p =df IIAII /p (i) E D( a)
is defmed. We shall exploit this fact in our definition. The object IAI/p may be called
the factual value of A, according to Ip and v, at the world index i.  In what follows,
the superscript"Ip' will be, in most cases, omitted.
(SO) If x E Var, !xlvi =vex). If CE Con, II CII v =o(C).
(SI) IFafJ(Bp)l
vi
=IFl
vi
(IBlvd. _
(S2) I(AXp A
a
)Ivi is the function <p E D(ap) such that
b e D(P) => <P(b) =IAl
v1x
: bJ.i
(S3) I(A
a
= Ba)vi = 1 if IAl
vi
= IBl
vi,
and 0 otherwise.
(S4) l"Alvi = IIAllv'
(S5) IVA
as
I
vi
=IAl
vi
(i). [Notethat if lA
a s
I
vi
E I D(a) then IAl
vi
(i) is defmed
uniquely.]
(S6) [Onlyfor IL+ .]
151
IP(A
o
Jl, (w.t) =1 if for some ( < t. IAl
v
{w.t') =1, and 0 otherwise;
IF(Ao)l
v
(w.t) =1 if for some t' > t, IAl
v
(w.t/ =1, and 0 otherwise.
2.1.3.3. LEMMA. (A) The intensions IIA II /p and the factual values IAIv/P are uniquely
determined by the rules (SO) to (S6), and, if A E Cat(a) then II AII /p E Int(a) and (for
all i E l) IAl
v
/pE D( a).  (B) If A E RGD then II AII /p is a constant function on I,
that is, for all i. j E I, IAl
vi
=IAl
vj
' (Thisfact motivates the name rigid terms.)
Proof' by structural induction, using the semantic rules (SO) to (S6) in case
(A), and using the conditions(a) to (e) ofRGD (see (ii) of Def. 2.1.2.2)in case (B).
2.1.3.4. DEFINITION. Let r be a set of sentences U'; Cat(0), Ip an interpretation, va
valuationjoining to Ip, and i E I an index.
(i) We say that the triple (Ip, v, i) is a model of r iff for all A E I' , IAIv/P = 1.
(ii) r is said to be satisfiable [unsatisfiable] iff rhas a model [has no model].
(iii) The notions semantic consequence, validity, and logical synonymity are
definedliterallyas in EL (cf. (iii), (iv), and(v) ofDef. 1.1.3.4).
2.1.3.5. LEMMA. If FV(A) is the set of variables having some free occurrences in A,
and the valuationsv and v / coincideon FV(A) then II AII v =II AII v' .
Proof. Similarly as in Lemma 1.1.4.1 (put IAl
vi
instead of IAl
v
everywhere),
taking into consideration that FV("A), FV(vA), FV(P(A and FV(F(A are the same as
FV(A).
2.1.3.6. LEMMA. Givenany interpretation, if for all valuations v, IIAall
v
=IIBall
v
then
for all valuations v, II CII v = II C[BIAJII v
Proof' similarlyas in Lemma1.1.4.2.  Acorollary:
2.1.3.7. THEOREM. The law of replacement.
If (A
a
= and Co then C[BIA.
2.1.3.8. THEOREM. The law ofdeleting VI\. (VI\A = A ).
Proof. By (54),
II\Alvi =IIA II v '
and,hence
(3)
Consequently:
II\Alv;(i) = IIAII v(i) = IAl
vi
IVI\Al
vi
= II\Al
vi
(i) = IAl
vi
.
'\ '\
by (S5) by (3)
Our theoremfollowsfromthis fact.
Note that "(I\VA
as
=A)"is not valid. For "l\vAas" is a rigid term, and, hence,
II "vAII \I E Int(as) is a constant function on I whereas II AII \I E Int(d) might be a non
constant functionon I.
152
2.1.3.9. LEMMA. Ifxp is substitutable by BP in the termA then for all valuations v:
IBl
vi
=bE D(P) IA/l
vi
=IAl
v
[ x: bl.i
Proof. The proof method is the same as in EL (see Lemma 1.1.4.4.). The new
cases not occurringin ELare as follows:
Case (G4): A is offonn "AC". Then (assuming that x has some free occurrences
in C) B must be a rigid term, that is,
(4) for allj E I, IBl
vj
= b.
Our induction assumption (writing C' for "C/"):
that is,
Then:
for alIj E I,
II c: II v = II CII v{x: bi
IC' I
vj
= IClv[x: bi.j
Case (G5): If A is offonn rc;: then use the induction assumption that
IC' I
Vi
=IClv[x: su
which implies that for all j E I:
IC' I
Vi
(J) = IClv[i ibl.i (j) .
Then:
IV C' I
Vi
=IC' I
vi
(i) =ICl
v1x:
bi .i (i) =IV Clv[x: bl.i
Case (G6): A is of form "P(C
o
)" or "F(C
o
)" . As in Case (G4) , B must be a
rigid term, i.e., (4) holds. Thus, we can use the induction assumption:
for all t E T,
Then, we get by (86) that
IC' Iv (w.t ) = ICl
v1x
: bJ.(w,t)
IP(C/ )I
vi
= 1P(C)l
v
[ x: b),i ;
and similarlyfor F.
153
2.1.3.10. THEOREM. The lawof lambda conversion. If x is substitutable byB in A
then
rup A
a
)(Bp) = A/ ).
Proof' analogouslyas in Th. 1.1.4.5.
Logical symbols introduced via definitions
.We adopt fromEL the definitionsof the symbols
I, J" , 'V, 3, &, v, ::)
without any alteration. (Cf. Section 1.1.5.)Note that I and J, are rigidsentences.
As new logical symbols, we introduce the signs of the necessity0 aI1cfj}ossibil
ity 0 , by the followingcontextual defmitions:
(Df. O)
(Df. 0)
DA
o
=df ("A = "I),
oA0 =df  0  A.
One sees immediatelythat "DA" and "OA" are rigid sentences.
[Interestingly enough, a correct explicit definitionof ' 0' is impossible.]
The truthconditions of " DA" and "OA" are obvious:
IDAl
vi
=1 iff for all j E I, IAl
vj
=1.
10Al
vi
=1 iff for somej E I, IAl
vj
=1.
2.1.3.11. THEOREM. If A
as
and Bas are rigid terms then
Proof Our assumptions on rigidity mean that for all i E I, IAl
vi
= rp E D(as)
and for all i E I, IBl
vi
= If!E D( a 5). Then for all j E I, IVAl
vj
= qJ(j), and IVBl
vj
= If/(j).
Now,
10(VA = VB)l
vi
= 1 iff for allj EI, rp(j) = If/(]),
i.e., iff qJ = If!, i.e., iff I(A = B)l
v
; = 1.
COROLLARY. O(A
a
= B
a
) = ("A = "B).
Proof Replace ""A" and ""B" for A and B, respectively, in the Th. (noting
that ""A" and ""B" are rigid terms), and delete v" at the left side of the main '=' (by
Th.2.1.3.8).
The theorems and the lemmas of this sectionhold in both systems IL and IL",
In the next section 2.1.4 and in chapter 2.2, we shall deal with IL only.
154
2.1.4. THE GENERALIZED SEMANTICS OF IL
Having the standard semantics of IL we are going to introduce the generalized se
mantics of IL  briefly: the Glsemantics. The calculusIC to be introduced in 2.2 will
be provedboth sound and complete with respect to this Glsemantics. (The enlarged
systemIL+ will not be toucheduponhere.)
Our method will be the same as in 1.1.6at the definition of the Gsemantics of
systemEL. Hence, we canproceed veryconcisely.
2.1.4.1. DEFINmON. By a generalized interpretation  briefly: a GIinterpretation 
of a language L(i) of IL we mean a quadruple Ip = (U, ~ D, a) satisfying the fol
lowingconditions:
(i) Uand W arenonempty sets.
(ii) D is a function defmedon TYPM such that
D(o) ={O,I},
D( afJ) c D(ft D( a),
D(l) =U,
D(a
S
) c WD(a).
(iii) a is a function definedon Con such that
C E Con(a) :=) o(C) E Intia) =df wD(a).
(iv) Whenever v is a valuation joining to Ip (satisfying the condition v(xcz) E
D( a) ), the semantic rules (SO) to (S5) in Def. 2.I .3.2 are applicable in determining the
intensions (according to Ip and v) of the termsof L(i) .
2.1.4.2. DEFINITION. Let Tbe a set of sentences of ~ , Ip a GIinterpretation of L(i) , v
a valuation joining to Ip, and W E W. The triple(Ip, v, w) is to be said a GImodel of T
iff for all A E T, IAl
vw
1
P = 1. The notions GIsatisfiability (GIunsatisfiability) , GI
consequence (r FGI A ), GIvalidity (FGI A ), and GIsynonymity are defined in the
usual way.
Also, the variant ofTh. 1.1.6.3. holds:
2.1.4.3. THEOREM. All logical laws proved in the standard semantics of IL  in the
previous section are logical lawsof the GIsemantics as well.
The most importantlaws whichwill be usedin 2.2  are:
The lawof replacement (2.1.3.7).
the lawof deleting v 1\ (2.1.3.8).
the lawof lambdaconversion (2.1.3.10), and
the law F D(vA
as
= vB
as
) = (A = B) whereA, B are rigid terms (2.1.3.11).
155
2.2. GALLIN's CALCULUS IC
2.2.1. DEFINITION OF IC
The calculus IC will be based on six basic schemata (II) to (I6) and a single proof
rule. Most of the basic schemataare knownalreadyfromthe calculusEC (cf. 1.2.1).
Basic schemata
(II) (VAA =A)
(I2) =(2)
(13) =(3)
(I4) = (4)
(15)=(E5)
(I6) ot fas =v gas) =if= g)
The notion of a basic sentence (of L(i) ) is defined analogously as in EC (in
1.2.1).
Proof rule: Rule of replacement  RR. From "(A
o
= B
o)"
and Co to infer to
"C[B fA]"  exactlyas in EC.
The notionof a proof in IC and the provabilityof a sentenceA in IC  in sym
bols: "he A"  is defined analogously as the corresponding notions in EC.  In the
notation "he", the subscript 'IC' will be usually omitted (except in cases when mis
understanding can arise by its omission).
At the end of the preceding section, Th. 2.1.4.3 verifies that the basic schemata
(11), (I5), and (I6) are GIvalid. (In case (16), take into consideration that the variables
f, g are rigidterms.)By the sameTh., the rule RR yields a GIvalidsentencefromGI
validones. The GIvalidity of the schemata(12), (13), and (14) can verifyeasily.Hence:
2.2.1.1. THEOREM. The soundness of IC with respect to the GIsemantics of IL. If
he A then FGI A.
2.2.1.2. THEOREM. IC includesEC: If Ice A then he A.
Proof It is sufficientto showthat schema(1) is provablein IC. In fact
1. r (vAA=A) [by I ~ ]
2. r (VA A = A) [same]
3. I (A = A) [according to line 1, replace" vAA" byA in line 2, usingRR]
In what follows, we can utilizeall laws of EC. The surplus of IC is hiddenin
the schemata (II) and (16). In the next section, we shall prove the modal laws of IC
most of whichare based on (11) and (16).
2.2.2. THE MODAL LAWS OF rc
We shall prove first a generalization of (16) similarly as we proved in EC the laws
(2*), (E3*), and (4*) as generalizations of (2), (E3), and (4), respectively.
Our proof technique will be the same as in EC, and we shall use the same
methodof reference (cf. the conventions introduced at the beginningof 1.2.2).
156
[(E3+)]
[All]
[(Il)/2]
[Df. 0 and E2.8: 3]
l (DA
o
= A).  Proof'
[(EI) andE2.8]
[Df. 0: 1]
[11.1]
[PC]
[pC: 3,4]
[Ri J,: 2,5]
(16*) IfA, BE RGD then O(vA
as
=vB
as)
=(A =B).  Proof' From (I6)
by E5.1, using that A and B  being rigid terms  are substitutableforf and g, respec
tively,in (I6).
COROLLARY:
16.1. O(A
a
= B
a)
=(AA =AB).  Proof' Use (16*), exploiting that {AA,
AB} RGD, anddelete VA by using (II).
RO  The rule ofmodal generalization. A
o
OA.  Proof'
1. (A = i) [fromthe ass.]
2. (AA = AA) [(El)]
3. (AA = Ai) [1/2]
4. OA [Df. 0: 3]
11.1. DA
o:::>
A.  Proof'
1. (AA = Ai):::> Apos .vp)(AA) = (Ap.vp)(Ai
2. (AA =Ai) :::) (vAA =VA T)
3. (AA = A T) :::> (A = i )
4. DA:::> A
COROLLARY: A
o:::>
OA.
11.2. If A
o
E RGD then O(A
o
:::> B
o
) = (A :::) DB).  Proof'
1. (i:::>B) = B [PC]
2. O(i :::) B) = DB [1/ (E1)]
3. (i :::> DB) =DB [PC]
4. O(i :::) B) = (i :::) DB) [31 2]
5. (J, :::> B) [PC]
6. O(J, :::) B) [RO: 5]
7. (J,:::) DB) [PC]
8. r O(J, :::> B) =(J, :::) DB) [pC: 6,7]
9. O(A :::> B) = (A :::> DB) [Ri J,: 4,8]
Onthe last step, we use that in "o(p0:::> B) = (p :::> DB)", Ais substitutable forp, sinceAis rigid.)
11.3. If A E RGD,
1. Ai = Ai) = I)
2. (01 =I
3. OJ,:::> J,
4. J,:::) OJ,
5. (OJ, =J,)
6. (OA =A)
COROLLARIES:
11.4. (ODA =OA), and (OOA =OA).
It follows from11.3 that if A
o
is rigid then} ( OA =A) .and, hence:
11.5. If A
o
E RGD, (OA= A).
157
COROLLARIES:
11.6. t (OOA =OA), and t (oDA =OA).
Furthermore, usingthat t OA::> A, and t A::>0A, we havethat:
11.7. t 00A ::> A, and t A::>DOA. (TheBrouwerschemata)
11.8. t D(A::> B)::> OA ::> DB, and t D(A::> B)::> oA ::> <B.  Proof"
1. t (D(A::> B) & DA) ::> B [11.1 twice, andPC]
2. t 0 [(D(A::> B ) & DA) ::> B] [RD: 1]
3. (D(A::> B) & DA) ::> DB [11.2: (2 = 3)]
4. D(A ::> B) ::> DA::> DB [pC: 3]
5. t 0( B::>  A) ::> 0 B ::> 0 A [by 4]
6. t 0( B::>  A) =D(A::> B) [PC, (EI), RR]
7. D(A ::> B)::> OA ::> OB [pC: 5,6, andDf. 0]
RD::>. The Lemmon Rules:
t A::>B ==> (t OA::> DB, and t OA ::> oB .J  Proof'
1. t A::>B [ass.]
2. t  B::> A [PC: 1]
3. D(A ::> B) [RD: 1]
4. 0(  B ::>  A) [RD: 2]
5. r OA::> DB [(3::> 5) =11.8]
6. r 0  B::> 0  A [(4::>6) = 11.8]
7. t oA ::> oB [pC: 6, andDf. 0]
Lines 5 and 7 containthe results.
11.9. r (DV'x
a
A
o
=V'x.DA). (Barcan 's schema.)  Proof"
1. r V'xA::>A [QC4]
2. t DV'x.A::> DA [Lemmon: 1]
3. r DV'x.A ::> V'x.DA [RV': 2, and QC2]
4. r V'x.DA::> DA [QC4]
5. t oV'x.DA::> oDA [Lemmon: 4]
6. t ODA::> A [11.7 (Brouwer)]
7. t oV'x.DA::> A [pC: 5,6]
8. t OV'x.DA::> V'x.A [RV': 7, and QC2]
9. t OOV'x.OA ::> DV'x.A [Lemmon: 8]
10. t V'x.DA::> DOV'x.DA [11.7 (Brouwer)]
11.r V'x.DA ::> DV'x.A [pC: 10,9]
12.t (DV'x.A = V'xDA) [pC: 3,11]
COROLLARY: r (03x.A =3x.
O
A.)  (Prove this!)
The next lawwill be usedin Section2.2.4.
158
11.10. ( O(B &A) &O(B & C::J O(C &  A).  Proof:
1. r OB & C)::J (B &A::J O(B & C)::J O(B&A) [11.8]
2. r (O(B&A) &O(B&C ::J OB&C)::J (B&A [pc: 1]
3. r  B & C) ::J (B &A::J (C &  A) [PC]
4. r  OB & C)::J (B &A::J O(C &  A) [Lemmon:3]
5. r (O(B &A) & O(B & C::J O(C &  A) [pC: 2,4]
If thereaderis familiar withmodallogic,he/she realizes that the modalfragment of Ie is an SS
type modallogic.Furthermore, the combination of quantifiers and modal operators yielded a Barcanstyle
systemcharacterized by theschema11.9.
2.2.3. ICCONSISTENT AND ICCOMPLETE SETS
2.2.3.1. DEFINmoN. (a) A sentenceA is said to be an ICconsequence of the set of
sentencesT(or ICdeducible fromT)  in symbols: "T he A"  iff
Tis empty and he A, or
T is nonempty and there exists a conjunction K of some members of r such
that he K::J A.
(b) Compare (a) with Def. 1.2.3.1, the definition of syntactic consequence in
ECI One sees that the difference is merely in the reference to the calculus IC instead of
EC. Consider Definitions 1.2.3:23. Substitute 'EC' everywhere by 'IC'. Then one
gets the definitions of
ICinconsistent/ ICconsistent sets, and
ICcomplete sets.
2.2.3.2. THEOREM. If the members of r are free from the variableYt the variable Xa
does not occur in the sentenceAl , and r he Al then T he Vx.A.  For the proof
see 1.2.3.4.
2.2.3.3. THEOREM. Every ICconsistent set is embeddable into an ICcomplete set.
Proof Consider the EC variant of this theorem: Th. 1.2.3.5,and its proof. The
proof of our present theorem is essentially the same, with obvious modifications. The
starting point is that To is an ICconsistent set of sentencesof a languageLo(i) J and we
shall define an enlargement L
P
) of L/i) by introducingnew variables in all types. Re
placein the quotedproofeverywhere:
'Lot)(! , by 'Lo(i) "
'Lt)(! , by 'LPJ ,,
'EXTY' by 'TYPM "
' EC' by 'IC'.
2.2.3.4. THEOREM. If r is an Iecompleteset of sentences then:
(i) r heA => A E I>:
(ii) {(A a= B
a
), C} r => " C[B/ A]" E r,
(iii) if the termA
a
occurs in a member of r then for some variableX
a
,
"(A
a
=x
a
)" E r,
(iv) if "(Cup = Dup)" E r then for all variablesxp ,"(C(x) = D(x)" E r.
Proof" See Th. 1.2.3.6.
159
2.2.4. MODAL ALTERNATIVES
2.2.4.1. DEFINITION. We say that f/J is a modal alternative to r iff
(i) r and f/J are ICcomplete sets of sentences(of the same language)and
(ii) for all sentencesA, if "OAIII E r thenA E f/J .
2.2.4.2. LEMMA. If f/J is a modal alternativeto r then for all CoE f/J ,
" OC'Er.
Proof. Since r is ICcomplete, one of "<C", u .... oC' must be in r . But
"....o C" E r implies ".... C" E f/J (by (ii) of the preceding Def.) which is impossible if
C E f/J (by the ICeonsistencyof f/J). Hence, "OC" E r.
Note that condition (ii) of Def.2.2.4.1 is equivalent to the following condition
(ii'): for all A
o
E f/J , "oA" E r . Our lemma proves half part of this equivalence.
Prove the other half!
2.2.4.3. THEOREM. Modal alternativeness (as defined in 2.2.4.1) is an equivalence
relation (betweenICeomplete sets), i.e., it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
Proof. (a) Reflexivity. If r is Iecomplete then whenever"OA'" E T; A E r.
(b) Symmetry. Assume that I" is a modal alternativeto r .If "DA" E I" then
"oOA" E r (by the precedinglemma), and, by the Brouwer schema, A E r. By this, r
is a modal alternative to I",
(c) Transitivity. Assume that r /I is a modal alternative to I: ' and r ' is a
modal alternative to r .. we have to show that T" is a modal alternativeto r. If "DA"
E r then "OOA" E F, hence, "OA" E I" and A E F" .
Note that our theorem is not a general lawof modallogic. It holds onlyfor the 85typemodali
ties. Our proof exploits essentiallythe factthat 85 is included in IC.
2.2.4.4. THEOREM. If r is an ICeomplete set and "OB" E r then there exists a mo
dal alternative f/J to r such that B E f/J .
Proof. (i) Let ic, }nE aJ be an enumerationof all sentences of form"3x.A" of
the given language L (i). We shall defme first a sequence tH; }nE aJ of finite sets, and
we shall denote by K; the conjunctionof all membersof H
n
H
o
= {B}.
If "O(K
n
& C; )" r then H
n
+
1
=H; .
Now assume that " O(K
n
&C; )" E r and C; is "3x
a
.A
o
" . We can assume here that
K; is free fromx (if not, let us "rename"it), and so:
(1) (K; & 3x.A) =3x(K
n
& A) [by QC]
(2) O(K
n
& 3x.A) = 03x(K
n
&A) [Lemmon: (1)]
(3) 03x(K
n
& A) =3x O(K
n
&A) [Barcan]
By these, "3x.
O(K
n
& A)" E r. Then, by the 3completenessof r, for someYa
, " O(K
n
&Al )"E r . Furthermore:
160
(4) uc; & Al ) (K
n
& Al & 3x.A) [QC]
(5) O(K
n
& AI) O(K
n
& Al & 3x.A) [Lemmon: (4)]
Hence, for someYa, "O(K
n
&Al & 3x.A)" E r. Choosesuchan Y and define:
H
n
+
1
=n, U {3x.A, Al }
(thenK
n
+
1
"(K
n
&3x.A &Al )"). Notethat
(6) for all n E (J), "oK;" E r.
We nowdefine:
By this definition, HO) is 3eomplete, and, in consequence of (6): if K is any conjunc
tionof some members of H0) then "oK" E r (for Kbeing finite, it must be a subcon
junctionof someK;).
(ii) Nowlet (An}nE 0) be an enumeration of all sentences of LV) . We definethe
sequence ( r.P
n
}n E Q) of sets by the following induction:
r.P
n
+
1
= r.P
n
if for someconjunction K of members of r.P
n
, "O(K & An)" E r,
and tP
n
+
1
= tP
n
U {An} otherwise.
Finally,
Bythedefinition of tP, whenever K is a conjunction of somemembers of tP,
"OK" E r. Since
I  K 0 ... K :=; " ...0 K" E r ,
the ICconsistency of F impliesthe ICconsistency of r.P.
(iii) Using that HQ) r.P we have that r.P is 3complete. To showthat r.P is
ICcomplete we haveto showthat if Co tP then tPu {C} is ICinconsistent.
Assumethat C tP. Then Cis a member of our enumeration (An}n EQ), say, C
is Am . Then C tP
m
+I whichmeans that for someconjunction K of members of tP
m
,
u ... O(K & Am )" E r. On the other hand, if K' is an arbitrary conjunction of some
members of tPthen"O(K & K')" E r. However,
(cf. 11.10), whichmeansthat
(7) for all conjunctions K' of members of F , UO(K' & Am)" E r .
161
Since"Am" occursin our enumeration too, say, it is A
k
, "Am" must be a member of
cP
k
+
1
(for "O(K' &  Am )" E r is excluded by (7) and the ICconsistency of n.
Hence, " Am " E cP, that is, cP u {Am }is ICinconsistent.
(iv) Finally, we have to showthat cP is a modal alternative to r and B E cP .
The latteris obvious, for {B} = H
o
~ H(J) = cPo ~ cP. Nowassumethat "DA" E r. By
the ICcompleteness of cP , oneof A, ; A" must bein cP . If ; A" E cP then "oA" E
r, contradicting the fact that "DAn E r (andr is ICconsistent). Hence, A E cP .
2.2.4.5. DEFINITION. By an ICcomplete family let us meana set Wsuchthat
(i) the members of Ware ICcomplete sets of sentences of a common language
(ii) the members of W are pairwise modal alternatives of each other (cf. Th.
2.2.4.3), and
(iii) whenever "OB" EWE W, thenfor somew' E W, B E w ~
2.2.4.6. LEMMA. Assumethat Wis an ICcomplete family. Then: If A is a rigid sen
tence, andfor someW E W, A E W thenfor all w' e W, {A, oA, DA} ~ w ~
Proof. By n.3, A E W implies that "DA" E w. Using that every w' E W is a
modal alternative to W we havethat A E w', for all w' E W. Then, by the laws Il.3 and
II.5 we get that for all w' E W, {A, oA, DA} ~ w'.
We shall applythis lemmamainly for the cases A is of form Po , "(x
a
=Ya )"
(where p, x, y are variables), "DC
o"
, or "oCo".
2.2.4.7. THEOREM. If r is an ICcomplete set then it is "embeddable" into an IC
complete family: thereexistsan ICeomplete family W suchthat r E W.
Proof. Let {OB
n
}o< n E (J) be an enumeration of all sentences of form"OC' of r.
By Th. 2.2.4.4, for all n > thereexists a W
n
suchthat B; E W
n
and W
n
is a modalal
ternative to r. Let Wo be r, anddefine:
W= {n E tV: W
n
}.
162
2.2.5. THE COMPLETENESS OF IC
2.2.5.1. THEOREM. If W is an ICeomplete family then thereexists a GIinterpretation
lp = {U, ~ a} and a valuation v suchthat
To showthat Wis complete we have to prove that whenever "<C" E W
n
E W then for
some k, C E Wk E W. Now assume that "oC" E W
n
Then "OOC" E Wo = r (cf.
Lemma2.2.4.2), and (byn .5) "OC" E Wo ; hence, for somek >0, Cis B, , and C E Wk
for all W E Wandfor all A E W, IAl
vw
1
p = 1. (1)
Proof. Note first that the set of worlds Win the interpretation lp is the same as
the given ICcomplete family W. Furthermore, consider the analogous Th. 1.2.4.1 of
EC. We shall adapt somedetailsfrom the proofof this theorem by the reference motto
Has in EC". Incaseof suchan adaptation, an obvious modification consists of introduc
ing a reference to a world w, e.g., an expression of form "lAl
v
" is to be replaced by
"lAl
vw
" , andso on.
Part I: Thedefiniton of Ip and v.
We shall define D and v by induction on TYPM. Let us choosea Wo fromW.
Since the variables are rigid terms, in defining v it is sufficient to refer to Wo only
(owingto Lemma2.2.4.6).
(a) For p E Var( 0) wedefme:
v(p) = 1 if p E Wo, andotherwise;
andD(0) = {O, 1}. As in EC, we have that therearePo, q0 such that v(p) = 1 and v(q)
=0; and v(p) =v(q) iff "(p =q)" E Woo
(b) We define v for members of Var(l) and the domainDit) = U exactly as in
EC (but referring to Wo insteadof T).
(c) Assumethat D( a) and D(P) are defmed, v is defined for Var( a) u Var(p),
andfor rE {a, P}, (i) and (ii) belowhold:
(i) a E D(y) for somex
r
' v(x) = a,
(ii) "(x
r
=Yr)" E Wo v(x) =v(y).
We then define v for Var( ap) and the domainD(ap) similarly as in Ee, putting Wo
insteadof r .Then(i) and(ii) holdfor r = a(pJ as well. Furthermore:
(2) " (f afJ (yp) =x
a)"
E Wo v(f)(v(y)) =v(x).
(d)Turning to the type as, we define: for all W E W,
v(X
as
)(w) = a iff for someYa, v(y) =a and "(vx =y)" E w.
Hereour induction assumptions are that v is defined for Var( a), D(a) is defined, and
(i), (ii) aboveholdfor r =a . Nowv(x
as
) E WD(a). Then:
D(a
S
) =df {rp: for someXas , v(x) = rp} WD(a).
Provethat (i) and(ii) holdfor r = as, and
(3) "( v
Xa s
=Ya) E W v(x)(w) =v(y).
(e) If C E ConCa), thenfor all W E W, thereis an Xa such that H(C = x)" E W
(cf. Th. 2.2.3.4, (iii. We thendefine:
(4) o(C)(W) = v(x) iff H(C = x)" Ew.
Nowour definition of Ip and v is completed.
163
Part II:.Theproof of (1).
(A) As in EC, we prove (1) firstlyfor identities of form"(B
a
= Ya )". If B is a
variableor a termof form''f(x)'' then  using that these terms are rigid ones  (1) holds
according to the definitionof Ip and v (see also (2) above which holds not only for Wo
but for.all W E W). If B is a constant then (1) holds by (4). In other cases, B is a com
pound termof form
(Al) "Fap(Cp)", or
(A2) "('Axp c.r. or
(A3) rcc; =o;)", or
(A4) "AC
a
", or
(A5) "v Cas" .
The proof for the cases (AI), (A2), and (A3) runs similarlyas in EC (put
"w E W" for r, and "IXl
vw
" for "IXl
v
" everywhere). Let us turn to the remaining two
cases.
(A4) If "(I\C
a
= Yas )" E Wi E W then, by (16*), using that "AC" and Y are
rigid terms, " D(C =v y)" E Wi ' Then, for all WE W, "(C =V
Y
)" E w. Furthermore, for
all W E W, there is an X
w
E Var(a) such that "(y = x
w
) E w. From these it then fol
lows that for all w, "(C =x
w
)" E W . By (3)
(5) I( y =xw)l
vw
=1.
We can apply the induction assumptions:
(6) for all w, I(C = xw)l
vw
= 1.
From (5) and (6) it then follows that
for all w, I(C =v y)l
vw
=1,
and this implies that
(for all w) ID(C=v y)l
vw
= 1,
or, in another form,
(for all W E W) I(AC= y)l
vw
= 1
(includingthe case W =Wi ).
(AS) If "(Cas =Ya)" EWE W then for somevariableX
as
"(C = x)" E w. Then cc = vx)" E W and "(x = y)" E W. By (3), we have that
(7)
and by induction assumption,
I(C =x)l
vw
=1.
164
The latter impliesthat
This and (7) togetherimplythat
(B) Nowwe can prove(1) for identities of form "(B
a
= C
a
)"  where both B
and C may be compound terms  exactly as in EC [cf. the proof of 1.2.4.1, Part II,
(B)].
(C) Finally,if the sentence A is not an identity then applythe same deviceasin
EC [seethe proofof 1.2.4.1, Part II, (C)].
2.2.5.2. THEOREM. If the set r is ICconsistentthen F is GIsatisfiable.
Proof. By Th. 2.2.3.3, T is embeddable into an ICcomplete set Wo , and by
Th. 2.2.4.7, Wo is embeddable into an ICcomplete family W. By the preceding theo
rem, thereis a GIinterpretation Ip = (U,W,D, (J ) and a valuation v such that the triple
(Ip, v, Wo ) is a GImodel of wo, and, since T ~ Wo, it is a GImodel of T as well.
COROLLARY. (LowenheimSkolem.) If the set T is Glsatisfiable then T is
"denumerably" satisfiable in the sense that T has a GImodel U,~ (J ),v,w) such
that eachD( a) [a e TYPM] is at most denumerably infinite.  Cf. Th. 1.2.4.4.
2.2.5.3. THEOREM. The completeness of IC with respect to the Glsemantics of IL.
If F I=GI A then r he A.  For the proof see Th. 1.2.4.3.
165
2.3. APPLICATIONS OF IL
2.3.1. AFRAGMENT OF ENGLISH: LE
In several papers, Montague formulated some fragments of English as a for
mal(ized) language, giving the lexicon, the syntax, and the semantics of the fragment.
In his last two works (Universal Grammar and PTQ), the semantics of the fragment
was not formulated directly; instead, he formulated translation rules fromthe English
fragment into the language of IL (or IL+ ); thus, the semantics of the fragment was in
directly givenvia the semantics of Montague's intensional logic.
In what follows, we shall present the approach explained in PTQ (with minor
changes in the notation).
Let us call the fragment of English treatedhereoLE (Montague qualifies it as "a
certainfragment of a certaindialect of English"; here the reference to "a certain dia
lect" will mean that LE involves some compound terms unusual in "ordinaryII Eng
lish.)
We shall begin with the defmition of the system of categories of LE' (Here the
categories correspond to the types of logical languages.) The basic categories are t and
e: the category of declarative sentences and of individual names, respectively. The
functor categories are of form " a I P" and "a II P" wherethe difference between the
single and the double slash ('I') is of grammatical nature only, not concerning the se
mantic values. (This will be enlighted belowin the particular cases.) An expression of
either category is to besuch that whenit is combined (in a specified way which is dif
ferent for the two categories) with an expression of category P, an expression of cate
gory a is produced. Thefunctor categories explicitly usedin LE are as follows:
IV= tie, thecategory of intransitive verbphrases.
eN =t lie, thecategory of common nounphrases.
[Comment. Intransitive verbs and common nouns are, obviously, different cate
gories of English (this holds for most languages), theymay get different suffixes etc.
From a logical point of view, both are monadic predicates which means that their se
manticvaluesbelongto the same domain. This motivates the notation.]
NOM=t I IV, the category of nominal phrases.  Roughly, nominal phrases
are expressions whichcanoccupythe subject(andthe directobject)placesof verbs.
[Remark. This category was denoted by 'T' and called 'the category of terms'
by Montague. We use the word 'term' in the sense of 'wellformed expression" of
some language. To avoidconfusion, we have to abandon here Montague's original no
tation.]
TV= IVI NOM, thecategory of transitive verbphrases.
ADV= IVIIV, the category of IVmodifying adverbs.
VIV= IVIIIV, the category of IVtaking verbphrases.
166
j
I
I
[Remark. An example of a VIV phrase is 'try to', e.g., in 'try to find'. Again,
the grammatical rules governing ADV and VIVphrases are different(as we shall see
this later on), but when appliedto an IV phraseboth result a compoundIV phrase. This
motivatesthe notation.]
ADS=tIt, the category of sentencemodifying adverbs.
SV= IVI t, the categoryof sentencetaking verbphrases.
PRE=ADVI NOM, the categoryof adverbmaking prepositions.
The full inductive definition of categories of L
E
is as follows:
t and e are categories.
If a, Pare categoriesthen"a I P" and "aIIP"are categories.
However, onlythe categories listedabove will playa role in LE .
Concerning the lexicon, the set of basic terms of the category a will be de
notedby "B(a )". These sets are givenexplicitlyas follows:
B(lV) = {run, waft taft rise, cfiange },
B(CN) = {man, woman, part [ish, pen, unicorn, price, temperature },
B(TV) = {find, rose, eat, love, {ate, be,seek, conceive },
B(NOM) = {Jolin, Mary, fJ3i{[, ninetg, lie
o
, lie} , 1ie
2
, },
B(ADV) = {rapUffg,sfowfg, vo{untarifg, a{{.geafg },
B(ADS) = {necessarifg },
B(VIV) = {try to, wisli to },
B(SV) = {oefieve tliat, assert that },
B(PRE) = {in, aoout },
BCa) = 0 if a is anycategoryother thanthosementioned above.
We used here script letters in printing the basic terms of LE . In what follows,
even the compound expressions of LE will beprinted similarly, and we shall not use
quotation marks surrounding them (except when the quoted text involves metavari
abies).
Onecanthinkthat the sets B(a) contain only sampletermsandtheycouldbe enlarged by fur
ther "similar" terms, Probably, this is true. However, onemust be cautious in doingso for it may happen
that the application of thefurther rulesto the newtermswillleadto undesirable results.
The set B(NOM) contains a potentially infmite sequence of pronouns with nu
merical subscript (lien)n E aJ . This will beuseful in the construction of some compli
catedsentences.
The basic sets B(t) and B(e) are empty. This is so because (a) in English, there
are no onewordsentences, and (b) individual names are ranked into B(NOM) (why?
 the answer will be givenlater on).
167
Notethat, when applying theMontagovian approach to Hungarian, thebasicset B(t) might con
tain such "subjectfree" sentences as fto.'lJ(U,;t viIlJJrrl;t ta'lJtJ.S.lAAfik Cit is snowing', 'it is lightning', 'spring
is coming') etc.
The set of all terms of category a will be denoted by "T(a )". The inductive
definition of thesesets will be givenby the syntactic rules (S1) to (S17)below.
Syntactic rules
Basic rules
(S1) B(a ) ~ T(a) foreverycategory a .
(S2) If A e T(CN) then the terms "every A", "the A", and "a / an A " are in
T(NOM). Herethe notation"a / anA" is to be understood as to choose the indefinite
articlea or an according as the initial letterof A is a consonant or a vocal. Note that the
spaces (blanks) in the defined complex terms represent interspaces.  Examples: Since
{man, woman, parR. } ~ B(CN) ~ T(CN), {every man, a woman, tfiparR.} c T(NOM).
(S3
n
) If A e T(CN) and Se T(t) then"A suefi tfiat Sen) "e T(CN) where Sen)
comesfrom S byreplacing eachoccurrence of fin or fii1Ttn bylie / she/ it or him/ her/ it
respectively, according as the first common noun in A is of masculine/feminine/neuter
gender. [Here it is assumed that the gender of the members of B(CN) is given in ad
vance.]  Example: Assumingthat 1ie
1
Iooes fiittto e T(t) (cf. the example of (S5) be
low), woman suefi tfiat sheIooes fiittto e T(CN),by (S3} ).
Rules of functor application
(S4) If A e T(NOM) and B e T(lV) then"A B/" e 'I'(t) whereB' is the result
of replacing the first verb (i.e.,member of B(lV) u B(fV) u B(SV) u B(VIV)) in B by
its thirdpersonsingularpresent. [Here it is assumed that the thirdpersonsingularpre
sent form of eachverboccurring in the lexicon is known.]  Example: Sincea woman
e T(NOM) andtalK.. e T(lV), a woman ~ e T(t).
(S5) If B e T(fV) andA e T(NOM)then "B A' "e T(lV) whereA' is fii1Ttn if
A is of formfin , and A' is A in other cases.  Example: Sincelove e T(TV) and lieo e
T(NOM), Iooe fiittto e T(lV), and, by (S4), 1ie
1
loves fiittto e T(t).
(S6) If Be T(PRE) andA e T(NOM)then"B AI" e T(ADV)whereA' is as in
(S5). Example: Sincein E B(PRE)andtlieparR. e T(NOM), in tlieparR. e T(ADV).
(S7) If B E T(SV) and S e T(t) then"B S" e T(lV).  Example: Since6efieve
tfiat e T(SV) and 1ie
1
roves fiittto e T(t), 6efieve tfiat 1ie
1
roves fiittto e T(lV).
(S8) If B e T(VIV) and C e T(IV) then"B C" e T(lV).  Example: Sincetry
to E B(VIV) andrun E B(lV), tryto run e T(lV).
(S9) If B E T(ADS) and S E T(t) then"B, S" e T(t).  Example: Sinceneces
sarifge B(ADS)andawoman ~ e 'I'(t), neeessarifgJ awoman ~ e T(t),
(SID) If Be T(ADV) and C e T(lV) then "C B" e T(lV).  Example: Since
sfowfgE B(ADV)andwalR. E B(lV), wa[ksfowfg E T(lV).
168
Rules of conjunction and alternation
(SI1) If s., S2 E T(t) then"S! aTUf S2" and"S! or S2" are in T(t).
(SI2) IfA, BE T(IV) then"A aTUf B" and "A or B" are in T(IV).
(S13) If A, B e T(NOM) then"A or B" E T(NOM). [Here the aTUf operation is
absent for "A aTUf B" in subject position requires the plural of the verb, but in this
fragment onlythe thirdpersonsingularfonn of verbsis used.]
Rules of quantification
(SI4
n
) If A E T(NOM) andBe T(t) then"B[A / n]" E T(t) where
(i) if A is of form i e ~ then B[A / n] comesfrom B by replacing all occurrences
of lien or lii"'n by i e ~ or lii"'k respectively,
(ii) and, in other cases,B[A / n] comesfrom B by replacing the first occurrence
of lien or lii"'n by A and all other occurrences of lien or lii"'n by fielsfielit or liim/lier/it
respectively, according as the genderof thefirst common nounor nominalin A is mas
culine/feminine/neuter.
Example: Sincea woman sueli tliat she roves liitno e T(NOM) and rove e T(TV),
rove awoman sueli tliat sheroves liitno e T(IV) (by(S5)), and
lieo roves awoman sueli tliat sheroves liitTto e T(t).
Usingthat every man e T(NOM) we get by (SI4
0
) that
(1) every man roves awoman sucli that sheroves liim e T(t).
(SI5
n
) IfA E T(NOM) and BE T(CN) then"B[A/n]" E T(CN) whereB[A/n] is
as in (SI4
n
).
(S16
n
) If A e T(NOM) and Be T(IV) then " B[A / n]" E T(IV) whereB[A / n]
is as in (S14n)'
Rules of tense and negation
(S17)IfA e T(NOM) andB e T(IV) then"A B''', "A B
F
" , "A BF",
"A B
P
", and"A BF" are in T(t) where
B' is the result of replacing the first verbin B by its negative third personsin
gular present,
~ is the result of replacing thefirst verbin B by its thirdpersonsingularfuture,
BF is the result of replacing the first verbin B by its negative third personsin
gularfuture,
B
P
is the result of replacing the first verbin B by its third personsingular pres
ent perfect, and
~ is the result of replacing the first verbin B by its negative third personsin
gularpresent perfect.
As we see, the majoroperation of forming a sentence consists of a combination
of a nominal phraseandan intransitive verbphrasewherethe latter maybein a tensed
169
and/or negative form. The rules of this operation are (S4) and (S17). The precise char
acterisation of the notions occurring in (S17) such as the (negative) thirdperson sin
gular future or presentperfect form of a verb maybe given, as Montague says "in an
obvious and traditional way"; but the author gives no details. Unfortunately, no exam
ple of a tensedor negated verboccursin PrQ.
The most important novelty of this syntax is the rule (SI4
n
) [and its variants
(S15
n
) and (S16
n
)] not occurring in the earlier writings of Montague. Without this
rule, the construction of sentence (1) would be impossible. These rules are, in fact,
rules of substituting (free) pronouns. The termwhich is substituted for the pronoun is
oftena quantifying expression (as in (1): eve'!! man); probably, this is the reason that
Montague speakson rules ofquantification.
The construction of sentences may be demonstrated by analysis trees (often
used by theoretical linguists). For example, the analysis tree of sentence (1) is as fol
lows: [Thenumbers in squarebrackets refer to the numberof syntactic rule applied at
the indicatedstep.]
every man roves awoman such. tliat she roves him [14
0
]
/ ~ f i tfiat she Iooes Iiima [4]
every man [2] / ~ .
I lie
o
rove awoman sucb that she roves liimo [5]
man ~
rove awoman sfUli that she roves liimo [2]
I
woman sucli that sheroves liimo [3d
r<:
woman fie1 roves liimo [4]
/""
liel rove liimo [5]
1\
rove lieo
The termin eachnodeis eithera basic termor elseit comesfrom termsstandingin in
feriornodesbymeansof the indicated rule.
Montague acknowledges that some sentences of LE are ambiguous. Such a
sentence has two(or more)essentially different analysis trees.His example is:
(2) Jolin seeK.! a unicorn.
Herefollow thetwo different analysis treesof (2):
170
Jolin seek.! aunicorn [4]
Jolin seek. aunicorn [5]
/ \
seek. a unicorn [2]
I
unicorn
Jolin seek.! a unicorn [14
0
]
.> ,
a unicorn. [2] Jolin seek.! liitno [4]
1 r.
unicorn Jolin seek.liitno [5]
1\
seek. neo
As Montague says, "the first of these trees correspond to the de dicto (or nonreferen
tial) readingof the sentence, and the second to the de re (or referential) reading." In
other words: The first readingdoes not presuppose that thereare unicorns whereas the
secondreading maybe paraphrased as follows: "Thereexistsa unicorn such that John
wants to find it." The translation rules (given in the next section) will verify these
statements.
In his Universal Grammar, Montague usedfoursortsof parentheses in orderto
get an unambiguous fragment of English. In the present Zj, , no parentheses are used.
The disambiguation of an ambiguous sentence may be done here by supplying an
analysis tree to the sentence. Thus, we can say that a pair (8, T(S)}  where 8 is a
sentence of.LE andT(S)is an analysis treeof 8  represents a disambiguated sentence
of .L
E
. (To make these notions more exact needs some work; e.g., it is necessary to
defme the relation "not essentially different" between analysis trees of the same sen
tence. For example, applying fie
3
insteadof fie
1
in the analysis treeof sentence (1), the
resulting treeis not essentially different from the one in whichfie
1
is applied. But let
us neglectherethis problem.)
2.3.2. TRANSLATION RULES FROM .L
E
INTO .L{i}
The first step towards the translation is to define a mappingf fromthe catego
ries of .LE to the typesof .L(i). Theintention is that if A E T(a) thenthe translation of A
is to be of type f( a). The inductive definition of thefunction f is as follows:
f(t) =0, f(e) = t ,
f(a I fJ> = f(a IIfJ> = f(a)(f(fJS .
171
L _
This meansthat everyfunctor of LE countsas an intensionalonein the senseof operat
ing on the intension of its argument. Experience showsthat this is not always the case;
e.g., run, man, find are extensional predicates. Montague does not deny this fact; his
remedy willbe treated in thenext section.
Atableauof the mapping f:
a: IV and CN NOM TV ADVandVIV
We use herethe abbreviations:
Concerning the translation of the basic terms, Montague prescribes that if A E
B(a) then with some exceptions  the translation of A is a member of Con(f(a ,
of course, with the precondition that the translations of different terms must bediffer
ent ones. The exceptions are the nominal terms (members of B(NOM, the transitive
verb Be, andthe sentence modifier necessarify; theirtranslations are defined separately.
Montague assumes a uniquelanguage of IL+ , and, hence, he was compelled to
choose some constants of this language as the translations of the basic terms of LE'
However, we havespokenalways about afamily of IL+ languages. Hence, we can as
sumethat thereis a particularlanguage
(i)
L
e
= (Log, Var, Cone ' Cat. ';
such that the (nonlogical) constants of this language are just the basic terms of LE .
We shall proceed this way where the translation rules will be somewhat simpler. The
translation of a term A will be denoted by "[A]* ", but the square brackets will be
omittedif A consists of a single word. The translation rules (Trl) to (Tr17) correspond
to the syntactic rules (8I) to (817) of the preceding section.
Translation roles
Basic roles
(Trl) (a)If A E {Jolin, Mary, 1 3 i ~ ninety} thenA E Conit) and
A* =(Af5s'
v
f("A E Cate(E).
(b) lien * = (Af5s .v f( ~ n E Cat, (e),
where~ n is the 2nth member of Var(l S).
(c) ne'" = (Ages(Ax
zs
.vg("Ayz s(vx = vy ) E Cat, (OgS ),
(d) necessarify* = (Apos.Ovp) E Cate(o d ) .
(e) If A is a basic termof category a not occurring in (a), (b), (c), (d)
abovethenA E Cone (r( a andA* = A.
172
Notethatby (a)and(b), proper nouns and pronouns aretransferred from type l intotype Eo (TI2)below
shows thatthe translations ofcompound nominal terms belong tothesane type.Thisisthe reason that Montague
ranked theproper nouns and pronouns intothecategory NOM (instead ofcategory e).
(fr2) IfA E T(CN) then
[every A]* =(A/&'Vx,S[A*(x)::) vftx)]) E Cat, (e),
[tlie A]* = CA/& 3Yls ['Vx,S(A*(x) = (x = y &v 1(Y)] ) E Catie),
[alan A]* =(A/&3x,S[A*(x) & v ftx)] ) E Cafe (e).
rns, )IfA E T(CN) and S E T(t) then
[Asuelitliat S(n) ]* = & S* E Cafe (0).
[For the meaningof S(n) see (S3
n
).]
Rules of functor application
(fr4) IfA ET(NOM) and BE T(IV) then [A B1* =A*("B*).
[For the meaningof B' see (S4).]
(frS) If BE T(TV) andA ET(NOM) then [B A']* = B*("A*).
(fr6) If B E T(PRE) andA E T(NOM) then [B A']* = B*("A*).
(fr7) IfB E T(SV) and SE T(t) then [B S]* = B*("S*).
(fr8) If B E T(VIV) and C E T(IV) then [B. C]* =B*("C*).
(fr9) If BE T(ADS) and SE T(t) then [B, S]* = B* ("S*).
(frIO) If BE T(ADV) and C ET(lV) then [C B]* = B*("C*).
Rules of conjunction and alternation
(Trll) If S1 ,S2 E 'I'(t) then [S1 ana S2]* = (S1 * & S2*)' and [S1 orS2]* =
(S1 * v S2 *).
(Tr IZ) If A, BE T(IV) then [A ani B]* = (AX
l S
(A*(x) & B*(x) and [A orB]*
= (')...x
lS
(A*(x) v B* (x).
(Trl S)If A, BE T(NOM) then [A orB]* =(A/ & (A*if) v B*if)).
Rules of quantification
(TR14
n
) If A E T(NOM) and B E T(t) then [B[AI n]]* = A*("(Aqn B*. [For
the meaningof "B[A In]", see (S14
n
).]
rrns, )If A E T(NOM) and BE T(CN) then
[B[AI n]]* = .B* (y)]).
(TrI6
n
) If A ET(NOM) and BE T(IV) then
[B [AI n]]* = (AYl sA*("[Aqn .B*(y)]).
Rules of tense and negation
(TrI7) If A E T(NOM) and B E T(lV) then
[A BO]* = A*("B*),
[A Jt]* =F A*("B*),
[A BF]* = FA*("B*)
[A B
P
]* =P A*("B*),
[A Bl']* = P A*("B*).
[Concerningthe superscriptsof B (B"", if, etc.), see (S17).]
173
Examples of translation
We shall use the sign '=' for expressing logicalsynonymity, i.e., "A ::: B" ab
breviates " 1= (A =B)", andwe shallexploitthe transitivity of this relation by writing
sometimes "A t;1 B s::: C s::: ''. Numbers in square brackets refer to thenumbers of translation
rules applied. Thefrequent occurrence of "(A/Bs 1(A
u
)" will be abbreviated sometimes by
"(A)+ ".
As the first example, let us take the step by step translation of sentence (I) of
the preceding section.
(a)
(b)
[rove fiitno]* =rove("fieo *) :::
r:; rove("(Alrs v f( r:;
r:;
[fie
1
roves fiitno]* = fie
1
*("[rove fiitno]*) r:;
r:; (A15s .v r:;
= :::
r:;
[le,5]
[Ib]
[byour abbreviation]
[4]
[by(a)]
[byAeonv.]
[bydeleting v"]
(c) [woman sucfi tfiat she roves fiitno ] * =
= & [fie
1
roves fiitno]* = [Ie,3d
r:; [woman & ) [by.(b)].
Let C abbreviate the term awoman suc.fi tfiat she roves fiitno .
(d) C* = [awoman suc.fi tfiat she roves fiitno]* =
= (A15s 3x
lS
([woman suc.fi tfiat she roves fiitno ]*(x) &v.f(x)) =
r:; & )])(x) &v.f(x)]) r:;
::: (Af3x[woman(x) & &vj(x)]).
[Weusedhere(Tr2), (c), and
(e) [rove C]* = rove("C*) r:; [5]
r:; rove("(Af3x[woman(x) & &vf(x)]) [(d)]
(f) [fie
o
roves C]* = (Airs .v C]*) =
::: v"[Cove r:; [Cove C]*(qo)
(g) [eve1Y man]* = (A15s 'VYls [man(y)::J v.f(y)])
[lb,4]
[AI anddeleting v"]
[1e,2]
(h) [evety man Coves C]* = [evety man]* roves C]* r:; [14
0
]
r:; 'VYls [man(y)::J Coves C]*)(y)] = [(g),(h),AY]
= vv., (man(y)::J [[lie
o
roves [del.v",
174
Finally, we havethat
(1) [eve1Jl man roves awoman suefi tfult she roves fiim]* =
:= V'YlS[man(y) :J rove(A'A/6s.3xlS [woman(x) &rove(A(y)+)(x) &v ftx)])(y)].
The ambiguous sentence (2) of the preceding section has two different transla
tions. Its de dictameaningis expressedas follows:
(a) [seek. a unkorn]* =seek. (A[a unicorn ]*) =
:= seek.(A('A/6s .3x
l
5 [unkorn(x) & vftx)])
[5]
[2]
(2.1) lJofinseek,saunitom]* =Jofin* (A[seek.aunitorn]*) =
:=('A/65 .vf(AJofin(A[seek.(A'A/6s 3x
ls
(unitorn(x) &vftx)])]) :=
=seek.(A('A/6s 3x,S[unitorn(x) &vftx)])("Jofin) [by'A/anddeletingVA].
The translation of the de rereadingis asfollows:
(a)
(b)
lJofin seek,s him]* = seek.(A( 0 )+)("Jolin)
[a unitorn]* = ('A/ 653x
ls
[unitorn(x) & vftx)])
[5,4]
[2]
(2.2) lJolinseek,s aunitorn]* =[a unitorn]* fiimo]*:= [14
0
]
:= ('A/6s 3x[unitorn(x) & = .
:= 3x
,S
[unitorn(x) & seek.(A(x)+)(AJolin)] ['A/, del.VA]
Our next examples will refer to the verb be.
(3) [6e 1Ji{{ ]* = 6e* (A('A/6s v/(A1Ji{C) =
= ('Ages (Ax
ls
Vg[A(AYls (vx =vy ]) (A(X/ 6s vf(
A1Jim
:=
= ('Ax
ls
vA['A/6s v/(A1JifC)(A(AYls (x =vy]) :=
:= ('AxVA('Ay(v
X
=vy (Af}JifC) =
:= (Ax(vx = vAf}JifC = (AXlS (x = 'Rim)
[Ie]
[Ag]
['AJ]
['Ay, del. VA]
(The references ' [Ag]' etc.referto Aconversions with respect tothevariable following A.)
(4) [fie
o
is 1Jift]* = (A/6sVft (x = 'RifC) =
= VA(AX(vX = = (v ='13im [AJ: Ax, del.
vA
]
[tfie temperature]* =('A.f.3y[V'x(temperature(x) =(x =y & "ley)]) [2]
[6e ninety]* = (Ax
,s
(vx = ninety [cf.(3)]
(5) [tfie temperature is ninety]* =
:= 3Yls [V'x
lS
(temperature(x) =(x =y & (y =ninety)].
(6) [tfie temperature rises]* = 3y[V'x(tettperature(x) = (x = y & rise(y)].
(7) [ninety rises]* =rise(Aninety).
175
In referring to the examples (5), (6), and (7), Montague wrote: "From the
premises tlie temperature is ninety and tlie temperature rises, the conclusion ninety rises
would appear to follow by normal principles of logic; yet there are occasions on which
both premises are true, but none on whichthe conclusion is." (Thisexampleis due to
Barbara Hall Partee.) Now, according to the translations above, the argument in ques
tions turns out not to be valid. The reason, according to Montague, is this: "'llie tempera
ture 'denotes' an individual concept, not an individual; and rises, unlike most verbs,
depends for its applicability on the full behaviour of individual concepts, not just on
their extensions with respect to the actual world and (what is more relevant here) mo
ment of time. Yet the sentence tlie temperature is ninety asserts the identity not of two
individual conceptsbut onlyof theirextensions."
Montague continues: "We thus see the virtue of having intransitive verbs and
common nouns denote sets of individual concepts rather than sets of individuals  a
consequence of our general development that might at first appear awkward and un
natural." We can add that the analogous treatment of transitive verbs can be appreci
ated at the light of the translation in example(2.1) above.
Montague remarks also that his translation rule for he adequately covers both
the is of identity and the is of predication. Concerning identity, we have examples (4)
and (5) above. Nowlet us take anexamplefor the predicative/copulative use of is.
[he a man]* =he* (A[a man]* ) = [lc,5]
=('AgEs (Ax
cs
Vg[A('Aycs (vX = Vy ]) (A'Af 6s .3z
cs
[man(z) & Vf(z)])
(AX. vA'A!3z[man(z) &v.f(z)][A(Ay(v
x
=v
y
]) [Ag]
('A.x. 3z[man(z) & vA(Ay(v
x
= Vy(z)]) [Aj]
(Axcs .3z
cs
[man(z) & (vx =v
z
)]) [Ay]
(8) [llifl isa man]* =(Afos .vf(
A
llill) (A('A; 3z[man(z) &(vx =v
z)])
VA(Ax.3z[man(z) & (v
x
= V
z
)])(A1Jift) [Aj]
3z[man(z) &(llill =v
z
)] ['Ax]
We do not have here '(llill =Z)', hence, we cannot get the result man(Allill) [still less
man(lliflJJ. This is so becauseman is in Cone (OlS), not in Cone (or ). It seems here (and
in the earlier examples, too) that the translation rules are "overintensionalized",
Maybe, some functors in our lexicon are really intensional ones, but most of them is
extensional. To get rid of the superfluous intensions, Montague introduces some re
strictions on the possibleinterpretations of L
e
(i)
2.3.3. REDUCTION OF INTENSIONALITY: MEANING POSTULATES
Montaguesuggests the following restrictions (Ml) to (M7) with respect to the
admissible interpretations of c,(i)
176
(M1) The proper namesin B(NOM) must be rigid names. In other words, if A
E {Jolin}f ~ fMarg}ninety } thenthe sentence
3x
l
O(x =A)
must be valid.
(M2) The commonnouns in B(eN)  except price and temperature  are to be
extensional predicates: if A is one of thesetermsthenthe sentence
must bevalid.Then, in the role of vI, the term
will be suitable. We can replace in the translations A by A. (and its argument B by
"VB') everywhere. E.g., example(8) in the preceding sectionreducesto
(8.) ['1Ji[ is a man]* s:: 3x
l
[man. (x) &(fJJiC[ = x)] =: man. (fJJi[[).
(M3) The same holds for the verbs in B(IV), except rise and cfiange. An exam
pIe:
[a man w a ~ ] s:: 3x
l
[man. (x) &wa[k... (x)].
(M4) The transitiveverbs in B(fV)  except seek; and conceive  are to be ex
tensional ones with respect to their both arguments: If A is one of these verbs then the
sentence
is to be valid. Note that we need not apply this postulate to the verb be, for it holds
automatically by the definition of be: . Again,in the role of vI, the term
is suitable in the translations. [Remember that "(I\y)+" abbreviates "(A!as .v.f(l\y".]
E.g., example(1) of the precedingsectionreduces to
(1.) [everg man Coves awoman sucli tfiat sfie Coves liim]* =:
s:: 'VYl[man. (y) ::J 3x
l
[woman. (x) &Cove. (y)(x)]].
(M5) The transitive verbs seek; and conceive as well as the special verbs in
B(VIV) and B(SV) are extensional with respect to their subject argument. The postu
latefor A E {seet conceive } is as follows:
177
Replacing Se byPos or hos onegetsthepostulate forB(SV) or B(VN), respectively. The
examples (2.1), (2.2) in thepreceding section canbesimplified as follows:
(2.1.) [see("(A/o
s
.3x
e
(x) & vit"x)])("Jolin)
(2.2.) 3x
e
(x) & seek,(x)(7olin)]
Here "seek. (x)" denotes the extensional reduct of "seek..("(x)+)", in the sense of our
postulate.
(M6) The preposition in is extensional (but aoout is not!) which can be ex
pressedby the sentence:
Thus, if in. E Cone (TJl) playstherole of vg, then:
['.Bil{ intliepar.tl* == [tlie par.tl* (AYes (in. )(vy)(wa{k)("'J3ilf so:
== (Aj. 3z['<I u(park..(u) =(u =z& vf(z)])("Ay(in. )(vy)(wa{k)("f}Ji{f)
so: 3z
es
['<lu es (park.. (u) =(u =z) &(in. (vz)(wa{()("f}Jiff) so:
s::: 3x
e
[7'Ye (park. (y) =(y =x) & in. (x)(wafk.. )('.Bill) ].
(M7)The verb seek; is to be expressible as trg to fituf, namely:
O[seek.. lfes )(x
es
) =trgto("find(f)(x)] .
These restrictions may be qualified as meaning postulates concerning the ex
tensional functors of LE .
Example: The de dicta and the de re readingsof the sentence Jolin tries tofind
a unicorn are translatedas follows:
trgto("(AYes 3x
e
(x) &find. (x)(vy)])("jolin);
3x
e
[unicorn. (x) &trgto ("(AYes find. (x)(vy)("Jolin )] .
Similarly, Jolin abouta unicorn has two readings:
about. ("(A/os .3x
e
(x) & vit"x)])("tafk..)("Jolin) ;
3x
e
[unuorn. (x) &abou: ("(x)+)("ta{k..)("Jolin)] .
The next exampleshows that ambiguity can arise evenwhen the sentence con
sists of purelyextensional terms. Let us considerthe sentence a woman loves everg man.
We can apply(S4) for the terms a woman and love everg man for gettingthis sentence.
In this case, its translationis:
3x
e
[woman. (x) & '<lYe (man. (y) ::) looe, (y)(x]
178
Onthe otherhand, wecan apply(S14
0
) for the terms every man anda woman Iooes liimo..
The translation of theresultis
Vy, [man. (y) ::J 3x, (woman. (x) & Iooe, (y)(x]
[Every manis loved by somewoman.]
Thesentence
!Mary 6efieves tnat Jolinjintfs aunicorn ani lie eatsit
hasthreedifferent readings:
a) 3x
t
[unicorn(x) &6eCievetnat(Afjini. (x)(Jolin) & eat. (x)(Jolin)])(A!Mary)]
b) 3x
t
[unicorn. (x) & 6eCievetnat[A(jini. (x)(Jolin](A!Mary) & eat. (x)(Jolin)]
c) 6eCievetnat (A3x
t
[unitorn. (x) &jini. (x)(Jolin) & eat. (x)(Jolin)])(A!Mary)
In the following examples  due to the pronoun it  onlythe de re readingis
possible:
Jolin ~ a unicorn ani!Mary ~ it,
Jolin tries tojini aunicorn antfwishes to eat it.
Toget a nonreferential reading of these sentences, anothergrammarand anotherlogic
wouldbe necessary.
2.3.4. SOME CRITICAL REMARKS
(A)Thefirst groupof our remarks concerns the system IL (andIL+).
(a) The system is "overintensionalized" by permitting sequences of types such
as as, aSs , a sss , ... ad infinitum, and by the unlimited iteration of the intensor (A).
No iteration of the type symbol s occurs evenin the translations of sentences and terms
of LE  although we haveexamples of nested occurrences of s. It seems that one has
to fmdanotherdevice for distinguishing extensional andintensional functor types.
(b) Definite descriptions are absent from IL. Hence, the translation rule for the
definite article tlie follows the RussellianQuinean schema[see(Tr2)]. Of course, the
introduction of definite descriptions in type l wouldimplypermitting the possibility of
semantic valuegapswhichis totallyaliento the spiritof the semantics of IL .
(c) Thedomain of individuals  i.e., the domain of quantification of type l is
the same at all indices (at all worlds and time moments), although our intuition sug
gests the variability of this domain. A partial remedy is to introduce a monadic predi
cate E  expressing actual existence  whose truthdomain mayvaryfrom index to in
dex, andto express quantification on "existing individuals" by
"Vxt(E(x)::J F(x" insteadof "v x.Fix)",
179
Thena sentence of form"3x
l
.F(x) &3x(E(x) &F(x)" would say: "There existsa non
existentobjectof which Fholds"  whichis (at least)somewhat curious.
System IL is not strongenough to express differences in meaning. If A and B
are validsentences then F(A =B), i.e., they countas logical synonyms of eachother.
Thus, for all A and B, "A :::::> A" and "B :::::> B" are synonymous, and so are A and "A &
(B vB)". Hence, no difference in meaning can be exhibited in IL between the sen
tences:
!Marg t l i i ~ tliat '13i{{sings.
!Mary tliink tliat '13i{{sings atufJolinsfeeps ordoes notsleep,
(B) Returning to Montague's grammar of a fragment of EnglishLE , the fol
lowingtwo mistakes maybe qualified as simple oversights of the author (easily corri
gable):
(a) By (SI2), wa{R.anita{R. E T(IV). Then,by (S4), Mary wa{k ani taC( E T(t).
For (S4) says that only the first verbis to be replaced byits thirdperson singularpre
sent.
(b) By (S5) and (S4), lieo Coves lieo E T(t). Then, by (S14
0
) , !Mary Coves her E
T(t). According to the translation rule (Trl4
0
) , its translation is Cove. {Marg}{Marg}
which means that Mary loves herself. It is very doubtful that the sentence Marg Coves
herhas such a reading. It seems that (SI4
n
) needs somerestrictive clauses.
Amoreessential reflection:
In the syntax of LE , Montague does not distinguish extensional and inten
sional functors (in the same category). According to the translation rules, all functors
are treatedas intensional ones. Later on, the introduction of "meaning postulates" will
make, nevertheless, a distinction between extensional and intensional functors (in cer
tain categories). All this means that a correct construction of a fragment of English
is impossible withouta sharp distinction of extensional and intensional termsin some
categories. Thenit wouldbe a moreplainmethod to makethis distinction in the syntax
already.
For example, the category of transitive verbs could be handled by introducing
the basic sets B(TVext) and B(TVint), that is, the set of extensional and intensional
transitive verbs, respectively. Then, the translation rules for these verbs would be as
follows:
IfA E B(TVint) thenA E Cone ~ S ), andA* = A.
IfA E B(TVext) thenA E Cone (Oll), and
A* = (Ages [Ax
lS
vg("(AYls A(vx)(vy) )) E cat, ~ t ).
[Cf. (M4) of the preceding section.] Thus, the translation of every transitive verbbe
longsto the same logical type. Let us consider anexample of application:
180
Vimf apen]* =jimf* (A[a pen]*) =::
= (AgEs [Axls.Yg(A(AYlsfimf(Vx)(Yy])(A(Afos .3Zt [pen. (z)& Yf(A
z)])
=
= [Ax(Af3z[pen. (z) & Yf(V
Z)])(A(Ayfi7Ul"tx)ty)]
:::
:= (Axl
s
3z
l
[pen. (z) &jimf(Yx)(z)]) E Cat, (b).
['13ifljitufs apen]* = (AfrsY f(AtJ3ill)(AVimf apen]*) :=
= (Ax.3z
l
[pen. (z) & jimf(Yx)(Z)])(A'13ill) :=
= 3z[pen. (z) &jimf('13i{{)(z)].
An analogous method is applicable for the categories CN, 1':' and PRE. How
ever, one can raise some doubts about the existence of intensional terms in B(eN)
and B(IV).
Montague's example concerning temperature and rise (cf. (5), (6), and (7) in
2.3.2) apparently proves that these predicates are intensional ones. However, tlie tem
perature in the sentence
tlietemperature rises
refers to a function (defined on time) whereas the same term in the sentence
tlietemperature is ninety
refers to the value (at a given time moment t) of that function. This is a case of the sys
tematic ambiguity of natural language concerning measure functions (as, e.g., 'the
velocity of your car', 'the height of the baby', 'the price of the wine', etc.). Mon
tague's solution of this ambiguity seems to be an ad hoc one. Instead, a general
analysis of the syntax and the semantics of measure functions would be necessary.
It seems to be somewhat disturbing that the rules governing the verb be permit
the construction of the sentence:
tliewoman is eve'!! man.
Its translation is:
3x
l
[V'Yl (woman. (y) =(y =x) & V'Zt (man. (z) :J (x =z] .
It is dubious whether an eve'!! expression can occur after is in a wellformed English
sentence.
Let us note, finally, that T( e) is empty in L
E
, for the individual names belong to
T(NOM). In fact, the basic categories of LE are t, IV, and eN; by means of these all
other categories are definable. Why used Montague e at all? The reason is, probably,
that the definition of the function f mapping the categories into logical types (see at the
beginning of 2.3.2) became very short and elegant. If he had chosen t, IV, and CN as
basic categories the definition of f would grow longer with a single line. The mathe
matical elegance resulted a grammatical unelegance: an empty basic category.
181
REFERENCES
BARCAN, R. C. 1946,'A functional calculusof first order based'on strict implication.'
The Journal ofSymbolic Logic,11.
GALLIN, D. 1975, Intensional and HigherOrder Modal Logic. NorthHolland
AmericanElsevier, AmsterdamNewYork.
HENKIN, L. 1950, 'Completeness in the theoryof types.' The Journal ofSymbolic
Logic, 15.
LEWIS, C. I. AND LANGFORD, C. H. 1959, Symbolic Logic, seconded., Dover, New
York.
MONTAGUE, R. 1970, 'Universal Grammar'. In: THOMASON 1974.
MONTAGUE, R. 1973, 'The proper treatment of quantification in ordinaryEnglish.'
In: 1HOMASON 1974.
SKOLEM, TH. 1920, Selected Works in Logic, OsloBergenTromso, 1970, pp.l03
136.
1HOMASON, R. H. (ed.) 1974, Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard
Montague. Yale Univ. Press, NewHavenLondon.
RUZSA, 1. 1991, Intensional Logic Revisited, Chapter 1. (Available at the Dept. of
SymbolicLogic, E.L. University, Budapest.)
182
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