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Introduction
Conflict between religious groups has been a consistent factor in international
relations. Casual observation could conclude that a link exists between the religious
differences of the two aggressors and the causation of conflict. Aggressive religious-
based rhetoric flowing from either side would seem to support the theory that the
religious nature of the two actors is the primary cause of conflict. Why do ethnic religious
groups engage in conflict with other ethnic religious groups? Many prevailing theories
place the blame on religion as the causal variable in conflict between religious groups.
Other scholars argue that the religious nature of an actor is not a causal variable.
Disagreement between theories on ethno-religious conflict is primarily over whether or
not religion is the actual cause of conflicts between religious groups.
Within the existing literature there are several different theories regarding
religious conflict. Some theorize that religion can be, and oftentimes is, the primary cause
of conflict between ethnic religious groups (Huntington 1996, Philpott 2007). Some
scholars take the middle road and allow for religion to be a variable that increases the
intensity of conflict, but do not see religion the primary causational variable (Henne
2012, Fox 2003, Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003, Martin 1997, Fearon and Laitin
2003). Breaking from these theories is the realist notion that the religious structure,
religious motivation or religious character of the aggressor means nothing. Proponents of
realism argue that international actors will engage in conflict to ensure survival and well-
being, rendering domestic characteristics irrelevant.


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Religion as the Cause of Conflict
The primordialist view of religious conflict contends that religion should be
factored in as an independent variable when analyzing violent conflict (Hasenclever and
Rittberger 2003, 111). Samuel Huntington claims that religion is the essential, defining
part of the civilization (2003, 109). Huntington presents data collected about fault line
wars as support for his theory. He describes fault line wars as communal conflicts that
arise between different civilizations (Huntington 1996, 252). Huntington contends that
the hundreds of thousands of deaths, due to fault line wars, recorded in these statistics are
primarily due to religion: religion is the defining principle of the civilizations, therefore
fault line wars are primarily religiously based. (1996, 253) For primordialist thinkers,
reasons for blaming conflict between religious groups on their religious nature are not
limited to the intensity of belief of the rival religious groups. Philpott claims that the size
of a religion, the nature of the religions hierarchy, the differences within each religious
group, and the type of community the group develops into, all contribute to the
incitement of violence by religion (Philpot 2007, 522). Religion as an independent
variable in violence causation between religious groups is what distinguishes
primordialist ideology from others.
Religion is an inescapable issue and whether or not it is the cause of violence
amongst religious groups is a relevant question because of the pervasive image of
religion. The prevalence of theories such as primordialism proves that many see religion
as simply an ideological weapon used to eliminate ideological opposition. Primordialists
and others with similar beliefs argue that religion is the most aggressive factor in the
cause of violent conflict. This theory removes any sort of realist thinking from the
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forefront. Based upon a realist view of international relations, ideology, whether
religious, ethnic or cultural, cannot be blamed for causing conflict.
Religion as a Variable in Conflict
Based upon security dilemma theory, religious groups can deem the political
advances, economic advances, military advances and industrial advances of other groups
as a threat to national security. In international relations terms, religiously bent actors are
no different than other actors. Realist international theory denies the domestic structure of
the state any sort of credence when assessing events in international relations. Within the
international system security and survival are the primary aims. The attempt of one group
to further ensure its security, however, can threaten the survival of other states
(Mearsheimer 2001, 31). In light of the advances of religious group A, religious group B
may decide to engage in conflict with religious group A to ensure national security.
Posen gives the following example: if one religious group possesses armored, military
forces, and one does not, the state lacking the armored forces will feel threatened
regardless of the intentions of the state with armored forces (Posen 1993, 28). Within the
realist framework, gains are everything. What does the religious group have to gain,
materially, from engaging in conflict with another religious group? Many political factors
can exist that prevent the religious group from ensuring its own security or acquiring
more power in the international sphere. Fox argues that other factors play a much more
important role: Several other factors are consistently more important than religion in
determining the extent of ethnic militancy. These include repression, international
military support for the minority group, and the spread of conflict across borders (Fox
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2003, 107).The harmonization of the realism, the security dilemma and elements of
instrumentalist ideology creates a viable theoretical framework for my argument.
Instrumentalisms primary argument is that religion is not the cause of conflict.
Scholars argue that religion can increase the severity of violence within warfare, but it is
not an element of causation. The actual causes of conflict vary. Contention between rival
religious groups may be aggravated by religious means, but is almost always rooted in
extraneous political and socioeconomic factors (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003, 108).
Instrumentalism is entirely focused on causation of conflict. Instrumentalists see
Huntingtons primordialist theory as potentially able to explain conflict severity, but
failing to provide enough reason to argue that religion causes conflict.
Hennes study titled The two swords: Religionstate connections and interstate
disputes found that religion had very little do to with ethnic conflict causation. Hennes
study implemented variables that measured conflict severity. His study found that
Religious factors play little role in dispute onset but do affect the severity of a dispute.
(Henne 2012, 764). Henne emphasizes that the religious nature of the conflict has much
less to do with causation than do other extraneous factors. That is the focus. Alterior
motives of material or political gain must be identified as the primary factors in causing
conflict between religious groups.
Political factors, specifically regime changes, are also seen as causes of ethnic
conflict that trump religious identity. A study published in the American Journal of
Political Science in January 2010 titled A Global Forecasting Model of Political
Instability concludes, based upon a collection of data, that the majority of ethnic conflict
occurs as a result of regime change (Goldstone 190). While this study is not focused on
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ethnic conflict specifically, the study does offer helpful insights into general political
instability that can contribute to conflict causation. States caught in between the
tumultuousness of a regime change, such as partial autocracies and partial democracies,
are substantially more vulnerable to crisis than their more coherent counterparts.
(192) A state engaged in religious conflict could be caught between regime change,
increasing internal political instability. The Political Instability study continues to
address the effect of factions on the political instability of a state. Scholars who take more
of a primordialist view, like Huntington and Philpott mentioned earlier, would cite the
divisive, factionalizing nature of religion as a sub-variable within the causal religious
variable. The Political Instability study refutes the presence of factions as an
exceptionally impactful piece of data in the analysis of conflict. While religion may cause
antagonists factions, antagonistic factions do not equal conflict all of the time. The study
found that . . . only half of countries coded with factionalism develop instability in our
data. . . (194). Huntington would contest that religion is the defining characteristic of
civilizations, and would logically conclude that significant religious factionalism within a
state would increase conflict. But as this study shows this is simply not the case. Any
variable that produces an outcome only fifty percent of the time cannot be held as a
significant change factor. Political instability, such as regime change, can be linked to a
multitude of factors that place no more significance on the religious nature of conflict
than any other variable.
James Fearon and David Laitin of Stanford University argue in Ethnicity,
Insurgency and Civil War that religion has played a very small role in ethnic conflict
since the end of Cold War. In this study, Fearon and Laitin claim that the existence of
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insurgency within ethnic groups has been the most influential factor in ethnic conflict
causation in the post-Cold War era. They insist that other factors, mainly insurgency, are
better predictors for determining which countries are at risk for civil war (Fearon 88). An
example of specific religious groups, Muslim groups, engaged in conflict, confirms that
the religious nature of the actor is irrelevant in conflict.
The Gurr, Woodward and Marshall study titled Forecasting Instability: Are
Ethnic Wars and Muslim Countries Different? argues for a case in which a specific
religion (Islam) is not immune to economic pressure and political pressure that incites
conflict. Gurr, Woodward and Marshall refute any premises that single out religious
Islamic variables as any different from other variables in ethnic conflict. This study
concluded that the risk of political instability in predominantly Muslim states is caused
by the same three major factors as non-Muslim states (Gurr Forecasting, 12). First,
similar to the previously mentioned study on political instability, this study cites regime
change in any state as an incitement of ethnic conflict. Secondly, is the bad
neighborhood effect, meaning that the Muslim country is bordering states engaged in
conflict or instability. And lastly is economic underdevelopment characterized by several
factors including overall poverty. Missing from these variables is the religious variable,
and it is missing because the study found no empirical grounds to deem it a relevant
characteristic. The scholars purport that Islamic variablesmake no direct
contributions to explaining instability in these countries (12). This specific example
can, and has been, taken and applied more broadly to encompass any sort of religious
bend.
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Ted Robert Gurr argues that three historical attributes of ethno-political groups
(religious groups included) intensify incentives in the international sphere. Gurrs reasons
are as follows: (1) the extent of their material, political and cultural advantages; (2) the
historical loss of political autonomy; (3) the extent to which force has been used to
establish and maintain their subordinate status. (Gurr 2003, 73). The historical
disadvantages of religious groups directly effects behavior in international politics,
including conflict struggles. The material struggle and power struggle between rival
religious groups should be the primary focus of studies on religious conflict. External
pressure via material advantage, political advantage or military advantage threatens the
power and security of a state.
David Martin is not a realist thinker, but does propose several observations about
religious conflict. Martin argues that religious groups are no different from other groups
in regards to the struggle for power. Religions adjust to the general social dynamics of
survival in an intensely competitive world (Martin 1997, 37). Based upon this statement
a political actor is a political actor regardless of their intrinsic nature. Religious groups,
political groups and ethnic groups are all actors and must all be measured on an equal
standard when studying international relations.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis: As the threat to a religious groups existence increases, the likelihood
of conflict increases.

The synthesis of the security dilemma theory and the instrumentalist theory
regarding the impact of religion on political conflict provides the theoretical framework
for my argument. The propensity of religious conflict cannot be pinned solely on the
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religious nature of the conflict. The religious nature of the conflict is irrelevant if there is
anything to be gained by the victory besides religious gain. While religious differences
may be a reason for conflict, religious differences are not the primary cause of conflict.
Conflict is conflict, religious bends may have some sort of effect on the severity of
conflict, and the ideology behind conflict, but religion cannot be pinned as the cause of
conflict. Survival, the desire of a group to simply exist, is paramount to all extraneous
factors. The question at hand (why do religious groups engage in conflict with other
religious groups?) demands an answer free of the extraneous ideological stances and the
irrelevant ideological stances of the actors. The realist point of view provides a
comprehensive, ordered explanantion of why religious groups engage in conflict. The
security dilemma that religious groups can be placed in provokes religious conflict.
Realism strips away all potential roadblocks to analysis and redirects the focus onto the
power relationships between actors.
Data and Models
To test the hypothesis the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset was used. The
Minorities at Risk Project was begun by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986 via the Center for
International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland
(Minorities 1). The primary result of this project was the MAR dataset. Gurr and
others involved in the projects history describe the MAR dataset as focused on allowing
researchers to monitor and analyze status and conflicts of politically-active communal
groups in all countries with a current population of at least 500,000 (1). Based upon
years of observation and analysis Gurr and the MAR team have determined a minority at
risk to be an ethnopolitical group that possesses the following characteristics: a)
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collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis--vis other
groups in a society; and/or b) collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-
defined interests (1). Recurrence in this data is important to understand. The MAR
project was done in several phases, each of which added more ethnopolitical groups. The
data that I will be drawing from is from the 2006 MAR dataset. While there are 852 cases
in the dataset, there are only 282 ethnopolitical groups that are included (Minorities
2). Some groups have four to five cases of data, others have two or three. So when
examining the data and considering the results of the model, keep in mind that there are
282 ethnopolitical groups being considered.
In order to eliminate all irrelevant cases, a filter was placed on the data to
disregard all non-religious ethnic groups. Groups most common religion or sect is a
variable within the MAR dataset that was manipulated to filter out all non-religious
ethnic groups. This measure is a nominal measure that lists the religious plurality of a
group from 1-10 (6). For example 1 is Roman Catholic, 2 is Orthodox, 3 is Protestant,
etc. All groups that have a plurality religion fall under one of these ten categories. All
ethnic groups that had no basis for judgment were given a value of -99 (6). Cases in
which the most common religion is -99 should not be included in the model because
these ethnic groups do not have a uniform religious identity. The point of the model is to
examine ethnopolitical groups that are religious in nature. The groups most common
religion or sect variable was recoded into a new variable, Presence of Religion
(ReligPresent), that granted all religious ethnic groups (previously given respective
values of 1-10) a new value of 1, and granted all ethnic groups that had no basis for
judgement (-99) the same value of 0. Once recoded, all 0 values were changed to be
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seen as discrete missing values. Presence of religion, the final variable, was then used to
filter out all non-religious ethnic groups by ordering all cases to be filtered out if the
value is 0. The result is that all ethnic groups that are not religious in nature are filtered
out, leaving only those ethnic groups that are religious ethnic groups left to be measured.
After applying this filter the sample was reduced from and N of 852, to an N of 786.
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the model is rebellion. The rebellion variable will be
used to measure the likelihood of conflict of a religious group. Rebellion is a variable
taken straight from the MAR dataset and is measured on a scale of 0 to 7. The values of 0
to 7, based upon values determined by the MAR project, are described in detail in Index
A. The rebellion variable shows whether or not the religious group was involved in
conflict, as well as the intensity of the conflict itself.
Figure 1. Presence of Rebellion

Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Political banditry,
sporadic
terrorism
87 11.1 50.6 50.6
Campaigns of
terrorism
10 1.3 5.8 56.4
Valid Local rebellions
1 .1 .6 57.0
Small Scale
Guerilla Activity
15 1.9 8.7 65.7
Intermediate
guerilla activity
40 5.1 23.3 89.0
Large scale
guerilla activity
18 2.3 10.5 99.4
Civil War
1 .1 .6 100.0
Total
172 21.9 100.0
Missing -99
6 .8

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None Reported
608 77.4

Total
614 78.1

Total (N)
786 100.0

Based upon the frequency table for rebellion (above), several pertinent results
must be discussed. Out of the total N of 786 cases, only 172 cases have been reported to
been involved in ethnic conflict. As stated earlier, the amount of cases given in the MAR
dataset was filtered for the purpose of examining only religious ethnic groups. This
frequency distribution table tells us that 77.4% of religious ethnic groups have not
engaged in ethnic conflict during the allotted time of MAR date collection. While the
frequency of war amongst ethnic groups is not examined in this study, the results are
nonetheless interesting. If the study ended here we could conclude that the likelihood of a
religious group engaging in conflict under any circumstance is very small, being that only
21.9% of religious ethnic groups reported conflict. The model that I have created will
examine the reasons why 21.9% of religious groups engage in conflict in the first place.
The Independent Variable
The independent variable employed is a recoded variable drawn from three
different variables in the MAR dataset. The hypothesis is that the threat to a religious
groups existence will increase the likelihood of conflict. What a threat to a groups
existence is must be measured. For this measure I decided to focus on group
displacement, political discrimination and economic discrimination as factors threatening
existence.
In order to measure the threat to a religious-ethnopolitical groups existence, three
variables were taken from the MAR dataset: displacement based upon political and
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economic reasons, economic discrimination and political discrimination
(Minorities10). Internal displacement for political and economic reasons is measured
on a scale of 0 to 3: 0 being the least amount of internal displacement, 3 being the highest
amount of internal displacement (refer to Index B). Combining the internal displacement
of the religious group with the level of economic discrimination and political
discrimination against the religious group creates a comprehensive measure of the threat
to the existence of the religious group.
Both economic discrimination and political discrimination measure discrimination
against the ethnic group by the government of the state in which they live
(Minorities11). Economic discrimination and political discrimination are measured
upon the same value scale from 0 to 4: zero being the lowest level of discrimination; 4
being the highest level of discrimination (refer to Index C). Since displacement for
political and economic reasons is measured on a scale of 0 to 3, I decided the recode
economic discrimination and political discrimination to be based upon the same scale of
measurement as displacement for political and economic reasons. Economic
discrimination and political discrimination were both recoded, changing the original
values of 0 and 1, to both equal 1 in the new variables Economic Discrimination
(EconDiscr) and Political Discrimination (PolDiscr). These new values are now coded
on a scale of 0 to 3: 0= little to no discrimination; 1= neglect, no remedial policies; 2=
social exclusion/ neutral policy; 3= exclusion/repressive policy.
After recoding the variables of displacement for political and economic reasons,
economic discrimination and political discrimination, I was able to create the variable
threat to existence (ExistThreat). Threat to existence is a new variable combining
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displacement for political and economic reasons, economic discrimination and political
discrimination into one variable. All three variables were originally coded, in the case of
displacement for political and economic reasons, on a scale of 0 to 3, or were recoded, in
the case of economic discrimination and political discrimination, into a scale of 0 to 3.
The resulting variable is measured on a scale of 0 to 9. Threat to existence is measured on
a 0 to 9 scale because of the summation of displacement for political and economic
reasons, economic discrimination and political discrimination. All three are measured 0
to 3, and when added together will therefore produce values ranging from 0 to 9:
1- Very little threat
2- Some threat
3- Low moderate threat
4- Moderate threat
5- Moderate high threat
6- High threat
7- Very high threat
8- Intense threat
9-Very intense threat











This chart lays out the frequency of threats to religious groups existence and
provides similar insights to the rebellion frequency distribution table given earlier. The
majority of religious groups experienced little to no threat to existence, and a very small
amount of religious groups experienced a high threat to existence. A low amount of
Figure 2. ExistThreat
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religious groups being threatened agrees with the rebellion table. Very few groups
rebelled, so naturally very few would experience a threat to existence.
Threat to existence is an accurate measure of the threat to an ethnic religious
groups existence for three reasons. Threat to existence takes into account political
discrimination which limits the religious groups ability to express grievances. The higher
political discrimination, the lower the groups ability to combat legislative aims or
governmental measures that may hinder their existence will be. Threat to existence takes
into account economic discrimination which not only threaten the religious groups
chances to grow, but also can prevent the acquisition of basic economic needs to survive.
Threat to existence also takes into account displacement for political reasons or economic
reasons which has a strong effect on group cohesion and group sustainability. If a
religious group is being displaced within the country for political and economic reasons,
the groups ability to maintain itself as a group (group existence) becomes very difficult.
Crosstabulation



Political
Banditry,
Sporadic
Terrorism
Terrorism
Campaigns
Local
Rebellions
Smale
Scale
Guerilla
Activity
Intermedi
ate
Guerilla
Activity
Large
Scale
Guerilla
Activity
Civil War Total
No Threat Count 35 5 1 3 5 4 0 53
% within threat to
existence
66.0% 9.4% 1.9% 5.7% 9.4% 7.5% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
41.7% 50.0% 100.0% 20.0% 13.2% 25.0% 0.0% 32.1%
% of total 21.2% 3.0% 0.6% 1.8% 3.0% 2.4% 0.0% 32.1%
Very
Little
Threat
Count 10 0 0 1 6 9 0 26
% within threat to
existence
38.5% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 23.1% 34.6% 0.0% 100.00%
% within presence
of rebellion
11.9% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 15.8% 56.2% 0.0% 15.8%
% of total 6.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 3.6% 5.5% 0.0% 15.8%
Some
Threat
Count 15 0 0 2 3 0 0 20
% within threat to
existence
75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 15.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.00%
% within presence
of rebellion
17.9% 0.0% 0.0% 13.3% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1%
Figure 3. Threat to Existence--Presence of Rebellion Crosstabulation
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% of total 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1%
Low
Moderate
Threat
Count 4 3 0 3 3 0 0 13
% within threat to
existence
30.8% 23.1% 0.0% 23.1% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
4.8% 30.0% 0.0% 20.0% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
% of total 2.4% 1.8% 0.0% 1.8% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 7.9%
Moderate
Threat
Count 9 0 0 2 4 0 0 15
% within threat to
existence
60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.3% 26.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
10.7% 0.0% 0.0% 13.3% 10.5% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1%
% of total 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 2.4% 0.0% 9.1%
Moderate
High
Threat
Count 6 1 0 2 2 3 0 14
% within threat to
existence
42.9% 7.1% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 21.4% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
7.1% 10.0% 0.0% 13.3% 5.3% 18.8% 0.0% 8.5%
% of total 3.6% 0.6% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.8% 0.0% 8.5%
High
Threat
Count 4 1 0 2 2 0 0 9
% within threat to
existence
44.4% 11.1% 0.0% 22.2% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
4.8% 10.0% 0.0% 13.3% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.5%
% of total 2.4% 0.6% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 5.5%
Very High
Threat
Count 1 0 0 0 10 0 1 12
% within threat to
existence
8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 83.3% 0.0% 8.3% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 26.3% 0.0% 100.0% 7.3%
% of total 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 0.0% 0.6% 7.3%
Intense
Threat
Count 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
% within threat to
existence
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2%
% of total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2%
Very
Intense
Threat
Count 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
% within threat to
existence
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6%
% of total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6%
TOTAL Count 84 10 1 15 38 16 1 165
% within threat to
existence
50.9% 6.1% 0.6% 9.1% 23.0% 9.7% 0.6% 100.0%
% within presence
of rebellion
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of total 50.9% 6.1% 0.6% 9.1% 23.0% 9.7% 0.6% 100.0%

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The model of the hypothesis (above) is a crosstabulation of the independent
variable, threat to existence, and the dependent variable, rebellion. The independent
variable is listed in the rows. The dependent variable is listed in the columns. With the
crosstabulation we are given several important values that measure the validity and
strength of my hypothesis: Chi-Square, Tau-c, Gamma and Somers D asymmetric.
Chi-Square
Figure 4. Chi-Square Tests

Value
Degrees of
Freedom
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 105.84
a
54 .000
Likelihood Ratio 94.057 54 .001
Linear-by-Linear
Association
12.070 1 .001
N of Valid Cases 165
a. 60 cells (85.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

To determine the statistical significance of the model, the chi-square value must
be considered. Listed above is the DF or degrees of freedom. For a degree of freedom of
54 the Chi-Square critical value is between the Chi-Square critical values of DF50 and
DF60. Based upon a Chi-Square distribution table there is no exact Chi-Square critical
value for 54, but we can estimate based upon the DF50 and DF60. The Chi-Square
critical value for a degree of freedom 50 is 67.5050, and the Chi-Square critical value for
a degree of freedom 60 is 79.0829. The Chi-Square critical is therefore in between
67.5050 and 79.0829. The Chi-Square actual, labeled above as the Pearson Chi-Square
is much higher than the Chi-Square critical, regardless of where it falls between 67.5050
and 79.0829. Based upon this conclusion the null hypothesis can be denied, therefore
Niehoff 17

there is a statistical significance in the data. The results can be inferred to the population.
To be more precise in the analysis of these results, other measures must be considered.
Symmetric and Directional Measures
Figure 5. Symmetric Measures
Value Asymp. Std.
Err.
Approx T
b
Approx. Sig.
Ordinal by
Ordinal
Kendalls tau-b .197 .061 3.252 .001
Kendalls tau-c .171 .053 3.252 .001
Gamma .257 .078 3.252 .001
N of Valid
Cases
165

Figure 6. Directional Measures

Value Asymp.
Std. Err.
Approx. T
b
Approx.
Sig.
Ordinal
by
Ordinal
Somers d Symmetric .196 .061 3.252 .001
Threat to
existence
(dependent)
.220 .068 3.252 .001
Presence of
rebellion
(dependent)
.177 .054 3.252 .001

By examining Kendalls tau-c, gamma and Somers D, the statistical validity of
the hypothesis is confirmed further, yet its strength is brought into question. For either
the tau measure, the gamma measure or the Somers D symmetric measure the closer the
value is to |1|, the stronger the relationship is between the dependent and independent
variable. To grant validity to my hypothesis the value of gamma and Kendalls tau-c must
be positive. A positive number means that the variables are going in the same direction. I
predicted that as the threat to a religious groups existence increase, conflict increases. So
a positive relationship must exist. While Kendalls tau-b is given, it is irrelevant to our
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model. Kendalls tau-b is only used to measure symmetric models. My model is an
asymmetric 9x7 model, so Kendalls tau-b will not be considered. Kendalls tau-c
measures symmetric models and in this case is valued at .171. The value of gamma is
.257. The value of Somers D symmetric is .196. All three of these measures show that
there is a positive relationship in the data, but the relationship is marginally weak.
Findings

Based upon the model we can find several pertinent results that prove my
question to be valid. The question proposed is: Why do ethnic religious groups engage in
conflict with other ethnic religious groups? The model generated from the Minorities at
Risk dataset grants this question validity. Ethnic groups do engage in conflict. The model
shows that out of the 786 religious ethnic groups that exist within the MAR dataset, 172
were engaged in conflict. While this is a small percentage of the total N, some religious
ethnic groups do engage in conflict. Since ethnic religious groups engage in conflict it is
important to ask why they engage in conflict in the first place. Being that this question is
valid, my hypothesis sought to answer this valid question.
Certain measures of the model point toward indirect support for my hypothesis,
but based upon certain limitations in the modeling, my hypothesis cannot be fully
supported. I hypothesized that as the threat to a religious groups existence increases, the
likelihood of conflict increases. The model does show that a positive relationship exists
between the generated variables. The Gamma, tau-c and somers d measures of the model
all show that as the threat to the religious groups existence increases, the severity of
conflict that the religious group is engaged in increases. All of the values, gamma, tau-c
and Somers d, were all, however, marginally low. None of these values exceeds .26, and
Niehoff 19

being that the closer these values are to |1| the stronger the relationship is, the correlation
between the increase in threat to existence and the increases of severity of conflict is a
weak correlation. But a correlation exists nonetheless. While a positive correlation exists
between the independent variable and dependent variable, the model, as a whole, is
limited in several ways.
The model generated using the MAR dataset has statistical relevance that is,
however, limited in scope in that the model does not sufficiently measure the probability
or likelihood of conflict of religious ethnic groups. The model does provide evidence of a
positive correlation between the threat to a religious groups existence and the severity of
conflict that results, but the model has no sufficient measure for the likelihood or
probability of conflict. In order to fully support my hypothesis, a measure of likelihood
and probability had to be included. Out of the total amount of religious groups, 786, the
amount of religious groups engaged in conflict is 172. I initially believed that this result
would be sufficient to measure likelihood, and the further measuring severity would
strengthen the likelihood. But I have concluded that severity of conflict does not equal
likelihood of conflict. I can definitively conclude that conflict involving religious groups
will be more severe if the threat to existence increases. But I cannot definitively conclude
that the threat to existence means the group is more likely to engage in conflict in the first
place. The model only measures the severity of conflict of groups already engaged in
conflict, not the likelihood that the religious group will engage in conflict in the first
place. To provide a more accurate form of modeling other variables must be taken into
account.
Niehoff 20

To sufficiently measure the likelihood of conflict of religious groups, variables
that measure conflict outset should be added. The model I generated is a bivariate model,
so its scope is limited from the outset in that the model only takes into account two
variables. The model generated is relevant. The more severe a conflict becomes as a
result of the threat to existence is an important correlation to establish. Another variable
that can somehow measure how likely the religious groups are to engage in conflict, prior
to conflict outset, based upon other existing factors such as GDP and natural resource
availability could be included. The presence of such a variable would be able to measure
elements that exist within the religious group prior to conflict, allowing for a better
measure of conflict likelihood.
Conclusions
While I did not find the definitive, sufficient support for my original hypothesis
that I had hoped for, the results of the model do provide important insights that
corroborate realist theory and instrumentalist theory adopted at the beginning of this
project. The results require political scientists and policy makers to reconsider the
motivations behind religious ethnic conflict.
Realism is the most reliable theory of international relations and my project
supports this assertion. The security dilemma is a universal concept. The presence of this
dilemma is not and will never be contingent upon the religious nature of the actor. As
stated earlier, realism hones the focus in on the tangible elements of international
relations. Power is the currency of international relations for the realist, with survival
being the ultimate goal. The will to survive is consistent regardless of group makeup. The
variable that measures threat to existence takes into account the political well-being and
Niehoff 21

economic well-being of the religious group. The model shows that as another power
increases the threat to the existence, the political well-being and the economic well-being,
of the religious group, the religious group will respond with more and more severe
conflict. Why? Survival. The religious groups analyzed in this project are inherently
focused on survival, not some sort of extraneous religious gain. I am not denying that
there may be religious factors that affect conflict, but I am denying that these factors
cause conflict. Out of the 786 cases measured, 614 of the cases experienced no threat to
existence at all. None of these 614 cases include a religious group engaged in conflict. It
is natural that these groups would feel no need to engage in conflict because they were
not in a security dilemma that would demand a fight for survival. The religious nature of
ethnic groups is a shroud that is covers up the true underlying causes of conflict.
Political scientists must not grant religious ethnic groups special consideration
when analyzing conflict. Again the focus should be the cause of conflict, not the
motivation. Primordialist thinkers like Samuel Huntington cannot apply theories that
grant measurable significance to religious nature to conflict analysis. The realist approach
may appear to be a materialistic, calculated approach that is ignorant to relevant factors
such as religious nature. But based upon this research project, religious nature should be
disregarded. The focus of political scientists should be upon this question: What does the
religious group have to gain, materially, politically, economically, from engaging in
conflict? If data exists that proves a religious group has literally nothing to gain
materially, politically, or economically, I will be convinced that religious factors are
relevant to conflict. But based upon the data I have examined and the model I have
produced, no such example exists. Realist concepts of conflict must not only affect
Niehoff 22

political scientists, but these concepts must also convince government officials to narrow
the focus when addressing international ethnic conflict.
Religious warfare, especially Islamic based warfare of late, must be seen by
government officials as conflict between two actors focused on survival. Again the
religious nature of actors within ethnic conflict veils the world from the real issues at
hand in religious ethnic conflict. The United States in particular should adopt a foreign
policy that acknowledges that ethnic groups engaged in conflict may be religiously based,
but treats these groups no differently than the non-religious groups. U.S. policy makers
must adopt a realist approach to the growing threat of conflict begun by Islamic groups.
Officials should be asking what material, political and economic factors are causing these
Islamic groups to engage in conflict? And subsequently, what then can the United States
do to influence these groups materially, politically, and economically to prevent more and
more severe conflicts from arising? Completely ignoring the religious nature of an ethnic
group is political suicide and must not be a favored approach. Public relations should
allow for a discussion of the religious bent of a group, but this should not affect policy.
Only after the U.S. government eliminates any pre-conceived notion that religious groups
should be given special consideration can we successfully limit ethnic conflict from
religious groups.
Overall, this project did not result in a definitive answer to the proposed question,
but the results were relevant nonetheless. Further expansion of the concepts, data and
model employed in this project could eventually provide a conclusive answer. This
project does show that religious ethnic conflict is not as simple as one aggressive
religious group acting upon its religious motivations. Extraneous factors such as political
Niehoff 23

gain, material gain and economic gain do have an effect on conflict. And because of these
results I would consider this project to be a success.



































Niehoff 24

Index A
Detailed description of values of variable rebellion

0- None reported
1- Political banditry, sporadic terrorism
(fewer than 6 events)
2- Campaigns of terrorism (more than 6
events)
3- Local rebellions
Armed attempts to seize power in a locale except
cases that are the beginning of a
protracted guerrilla or civil war during the
reported year.
4- Small-scale guerrilla activity
Includes all three of the following traits
fewer than 1000 armed fighters
sporadic armed attacks (less than 6 reported per
year)
attacks in a small part of the area occupied by
the group (or in one or two other locales)
5- Intermediate guerrilla activity. Includes one
or two of the defining traits of large-scale
activity and one or two of the defining traits of
small-scale activity
6- Large-scale guerrilla activity
Includes all three of the following traits
more than 1000 armed fighters
frequent armed attacks (more than 6 reported
per year)
attacks affecting large part of the area occupied
by group
7-Civil war
Protracted civil war fought by rebel military
Has all the characteristics of large-scale guerrilla
activity, plus rebels control large
scale base areas that are secure over time

Index B
Detailed description of values for variable DISPLACE

0- Condition not present
1- Condition minor
Affects less than 1% of group population
2- Condition of medium significance
Affects between 1 and 10% of group population
3- Condition serious
Affects more than 10%
-99- No basis for judgment
Index C
Detailed description of values for MAR variables ECONDIS and POLDIS

0 No discrimination
1 Neglect/remedial polices
Significant poverty and under-representation
in desirable occupations due to historical
marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public
policies are designed to improve the group's
material well being.
2- Neglect/no remedial policies
Significant poverty and under-representation
due to historical marginality, neglect, or
restrictions. No social practice of deliberate
exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at
improving the group's material well-being.
3- Social exclusion/neutral policy
Significant poverty and under-representation
due to prevailing social practice by
dominant groups. Formal public policies
toward the group are neutral or, if positive,
inadequate to offset active and widespread
discrimination.
4- Exclusion/repressive policy
Public policies (formal exclusion and/or
recurring repression) substantially restrict
the
group's economic opportunities by contrast
with other groups.
-99 No basis for judgment
Niehoff 25

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