G.R. No.

L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
!E !ONORA"LE COUR OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOME#, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELIA
JUGO,respondents.

GUIERRE#, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 198, as amended !" the resolution
dated Au#ust 1$, 198, declarin# as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the
resolution dated %ecem!er 8, 198 den"in# petitioner&s motion for reconsideration.
'artin Ju#o died on Jul" 1(, 19)* in 'ala!on, +i,al. -e left a last .ill and Testament dul" si#ned !"
him at the end of the .ill on pa#e three and on the left mar#in of pa#es 1, and * thereof in the
presence of Celestina Ale/andro, '"rna C. Corte,, and 0eandro 0eano, who in turn, affi1ed their
si#natures !elow the attestation clause and on the left mar#in of pa#es 1, and * of the .ill in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the 2otar" 3u!lic. The .ill was ac4nowled#ed !efore
the 2otar" 3u!lic +omeo 5scareal !" the testator and his three attestin# witnesses.
6n the said .ill, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner 7ofia J. 2epomuceno as his sole
and onl" e1ecutor of his estate. 6t is clearl" stated in the .ill that the testator was le#all" married to a
certain +ufina 8ome, !" whom he had two le#itimate children, 9scar and Carmelita, !ut since 19:,
he had !een estran#ed from his lawfull" wedded wife and had !een livin# with petitioner as hus!and
and wife. 6n fact, on %ecem!er :, 19:, the testator 'artin Ju#o and the petitioner herein, 7ofia J.
2epomuceno were married in ;ictoria, Tarlac !efore the Justice of the 3eace. The testator devised
to his forced heirs, namel", his le#al wife +ufina 8ome, and his children 9scar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The .ill reads in part<
Art. 666. That 6 have the followin# le#al heirs, namel"< m" aforementioned le#al wife,
+ufina 8ome,, and our son, 9scar, and dau#hter Carmelita, !oth surnamed Ju#o,
whom 6 declare and admit to !e le#all" and properl" entitled to inherit from me= that
while 6 have !een estran#ed from m" a!ove>named wife for so man" "ears, 6 cannot
den" that 6 was le#all" married to her or that we have !een separated up to the
present for reasons and /ustifications 4nown full" well !" them<
Art. 6;. That since 19:, 1 have !een livin#, as man and wife with one 7ofia J.
2epomuceno, whom 6 declare and avow to !e entitled to m" love and affection, for all
the thin#s which she has done for me, now and in the past= that while 7ofia J.
2epomuceno has with m" full 4nowled#e and consent, did comport and represent
m"self as her own hus!and, in truth and in fact, as well as in the e"es of the law, 6
could not !ind her to me in the hol" !onds of matrimon" !ecause of m"
aforementioned previous marria#e=
9n Au#ust 1, 19)*, the petitioner filed a petition for the pro!ate of the last .ill and Testament of the
deceased 'artin Ju#o in the Court of ?irst 6nstance of +i,al, @ranch AAA6;, Caloocan Cit" and
as4ed for the issuance to her of letters testamentar".
9n 'a" 13, 19):, the le#al wife of the testator, +ufina 8ome, and her children filed an opposition
alle#in# inter alia that the e1ecution of the .ill was procured !" undue and improper influence on the
part of the petitioner= that at the time of the e1ecution of the .ill, the testator was alread" ver" sic4
and that petitioner havin# admitted her livin# in concu!ina#e with the testator, she is wantin# in
inte#rit" and thus, letters testamentar" should not !e issued to her.
9n Januar" (, 19)(, the lower court denied the pro!ate of the .ill on the #round that as the testator
admitted in his .ill to coha!itin# with the petitioner from %ecem!er 19: until his death on Jul" 1(,
19)*, the .ill&s admission to pro!ate will !e an 6dle e1ercise !ecause on the face of the .ill, the
invalidit" of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent>appellate court.
9n June , 198, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of ?irst 6nstance of +i,al
den"in# the pro!ate of the will. The respondent court declared the .ill to !e valid e1cept that the
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article )39 in relation with Article 1$8 of
the Civil Code of the 3hilippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads<
.-5+5?9+5, the decision a quo is here!" set aside, the will in Buestion declared
valid e1cept the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The
properties so devised are instead passed on in intestac" to the appellant in
eBual shares, without pronouncement as to cost.
9n June 1:, 198, oppositors +ufina 8ome, and her children filed a C'otion for Correction of
Clerical 5rrorC pra"in# that the word CappellantC in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the
decision !e chan#ed to CappelleesC so as to read< CThe properties so devised are instead passed on
intestac" to the appellees in eBual shares, without pronouncement as to costs.C The motion was
#ranted !" the respondent court on Au#ust 1$, 198.
9n Au#ust 3, 198, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied !" the
respondent court in a resolution dated %ecem!er 8, 198.
The main issue raised !" the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in e1cess of its
/urisdiction when after declarin# the last .ill and Testament of the deceased 'artin Ju#o validl"
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validit" of the testamentar" provision in favor of herein
petitioner.
The petitioner su!mits that the validit" of the testamentar" provision in her favor cannot !e passed
upon and decided in the pro!ate proceedin#s !ut in some other proceedin#s !ecause the onl"
purpose of the pro!ate of a .ill is to esta!lish conclusivel" as a#ainst ever"one that a .ill was
e1ecuted with the formalities reBuired !" law and that the testator has the mental capacit" to e1ecute
the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of para#raph 1 of Article )39 of
the Civil Code of the 3hilippines were applica!le, the declaration of its nullit" could onl" !e made !"
the proper court in a separate action !rou#ht !" the le#al wife for the specific purpose of o!tainin# a
declaration of the nullit" of the testamentar" provision in the .ill in favor of the person with whom
the testator was alle#edl" #uilt" of adulter" or concu!ina#e.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last .ill and Testament itself
e1pressl" admits indu!ita!l" on its face the meretricious relationship !etween the testator and the
petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alle#ed
i#norance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrar"
evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (1)
7C+A **9) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al.(8.+. 2o. 0> 39*), June ),
19):). +espondents also su!mit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship !etween
him and the petitioner put in issue the le#alit" of the devise. .e a#ree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its /urisdiction when after declarin# the .ill to !e validl" drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validit" of the .ill and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner
null and void.
The #eneral rule is that in pro!ate proceedin#s, the court&s area of inBuir" is limited to an
e1amination and resolution of the e1trinsic validit" of the .ill. The rule is e1pressed thus<
111 111 111
... 6t is elementar" that a pro!ate decree finall" and definitivel" settles all Buestions
concernin# capacit" of the testator and the proper e1ecution and witnessin# of his
last .ill and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforcea!le or otherwise. Fernandez v. !imagi"a,1 7C+A *8)
The petition !elow !ein# for the pro!ate of a .ill, the court&s area of inBuir" is limited
to the e1trinsic validit" thereof. The testators testamentar" capacit" and the
compliance with the formal reBuisites or solemnities prescri!ed !" law are the onl"
Buestions presented for the resolution of the court. An" inBuir" into
the intrinsi# validit" or efficac" of the provisions of the will or the le#alit" of an" devise
or le#ac" is premature.
111 111 111
True or not, the alle#ed sale is no #round for the dismissal of the petition for pro!ate.
3ro!ate is one thin#= the validit" of the testamentar" provisions is another. The first
decides the e1ecution of the document and the testamentar" capacit" of the testator=
the second relates to descent and distri!ution ($umilang v. %amagosa, 1 7C+A
13(9)
111 111 111
To esta!lish conclusivel" as a#ainst ever"one, and once for all, the facts that a will
was e1ecuted with the formalities reBuired !" law and that the testator was in a
condition to ma4e a will, is the onl" purpose of the proceedin#s under the new code
for the pro!ate of a will. (7ec. (:). The /ud#ment in such proceedin#s determines
and can determine nothin# more. 6n them the court has no power to pass upon the
validit" of an" provisions made in the will. 6t can not decide, for e1ample, that a
certain le#ac" is void and another one valid. ... (&astaneda v. Alemany, 3 3hil. *()
The rule, however, is not infle1i!le and a!solute. 8iven e1ceptional circumstances, the pro!ate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
.ill.
6n Nuguid v. Nuguid (1) 7C+A **9) cited !" the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as
universal heir and completel" preterited her survivin# forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter
how valid it ma" appear e1trinsicall", would !e null and void. 7eparate or latter proceedin#s to
determine the intrinsic validit" of the testamentar" provisions would !e superfluous.
5ven !efore esta!lishin# the formal validit" of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez ((* 7C+A
*:) passed upon the validit" of its intrinsic provisions.
6nvo4in# Cpractical considerationsC, we stated<
The !asic issue is whether the pro!ate court erred in passin# upon the intrinsic
validit" of the will, !efore rulin# on its allowance or formal validit", and in declarin# it
void.
.e are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are
of du!ious le#alit", and !ecause of the motion to withdraw the petition for pro!ate
(which the lower court assumed to have !een filed with the petitioner&s authori,ation)
the trial court acted correctl" in passin# upon the will&s intrinsic validit" even !efore
its formal validit" had !een esta!lished. The pro!ate of a will mi#ht !ecome an 6dle
ceremon" if on its face it appears to !e intrinsicall" void. .here practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validit" of the will !e passed upon, even
!efore it is pro!ated, the court should meet the issue (2u#uid v. 2u#uid, (* 9.8.
1:), 1) 7C+A **9. Compare with 7umilan# vs. +ama#osa 0>313:, %ecem!er (,
19(), 1 7C+A 13(9= Cacho v. Ddan 0>1999(, April 3$, 19(:, 13 7C+A (93).
There appears to !e no more dispute at this time over the e1trinsic validit" of the .ill. @oth parties
are a#reed that the .ill of 'artin Ju#o was e1ecuted with all the formalities reBuired !" law and that
the testator had the mental capacit" to e1ecute his .ill. The petitioner states that she completel"
a#rees with the respondent court when in resolvin# the Buestion of whether or not the pro!ate court
correctl" denied the pro!ate of 'artin Ju#o&s last .ill and Testament, it ruled<
This !ein# so, the will is declared validl" drawn. (3a#e *, %ecision, Anne1 A of
3etition.)
9n the other hand the respondents pra" for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals& decision in toto.
The onl" issue, therefore, is the /urisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentar"
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
.e sustain the respondent court&s /urisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra'(
.e pause to reflect. 6f the case were to !e remanded for pro!ate of the will, nothin#
will !e #ained. 9n the contrar", this liti#ation will !e protracted. And for au#ht that
appears in the record, in the record, in the event of pro!ate or if the court re/ects the
will, pro!a!ilit" e1ists that the case will come up once a#ain !efore us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validit" or nullit" of the will. +esult, waste of time, effort,
e1pense, plus added an1iet". These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a !elief that we mi#ht as well meet head>on the issue of the validit" of the provisions
of the will in Buestion. (7ection , +ule 1, +ules of Court. Case, et al. v. Ju#o, et al.,
)) 3hil. :1), :). After all, there e1ists a /usticia!le controvers" cr"in# for solution.
.e see no useful purpose that would !e served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper
court in a separate action for that purpose simpl" !ecause, in the pro!ate of a will, the court does not
ordinaril" loo4 into the intrinsic validit" of its provisions.
Article )39 of the Civil Code provides<
The followin# donations shall !e void<
(1) Those made !etween persons who were #uilt" of adulter" or concu!ina#e at the
time of the donation=
() Those made !etween persons found #uilt" of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof=
(3) Those made to a pu!lic officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, !"
reason of his office.
6n the case referred to in 2o. 1, the action for declaration of nullit" ma" !e !rou#ht !"
the spouse of the donor or donee= and the #uilt of the donor and donee ma" !e
proved !" preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1$8 of the Civil Code provides<
The prohi!itions mentioned in Article )39, concernin# donations inter vivos shall
appl" to testamentar" provisions.
6n Article 666 of the disputed .ill, e1ecuted on Au#ust 1:, 19(8, or almost si1 "ears !efore the
testator&s death on Jul" 1(, 19)*, 'artin Ju#o stated that respondent +ufina 8ome, was his le#al
wife from whom he had !een estran#ed Cfor so man" "ears.C -e also declared that respondents
Carmelita Ju#o and 9scar Ju#o were his le#itimate children. 6n Article 6;, he stated that he had !een
livin# as man and wife with the petitioner since 19:. Testator Ju#o declared that the petitioner was
entitled to his love and affection. -e stated that 2epomuceno represented Ju#o as her own hus!and
!ut Cin truth and in fact, as well as in the e"es of the law, 6 could not !ind her to me in the hol" !onds
of matrimon" !ecause of m" aforementioned previous marria#e.
There is no Buestion from the records a!out the fact of a prior e1istin# marria#e when 'artin Ju#o
e1ecuted his .ill. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and 'r. Ju#o lived to#ether in an
ostensi!le marital relationship for "ears until his death.
6t is also a fact that on %ecem!er , 19:, 'artin Ju#o and 7ofia J. 2epomuceno contracted a
marria#e !efore the Justice of the 3eace of ;ictoria, Tarlac. The man was then :1 "ears old while
the woman was *8. 2epomuceno now contends that she acted in #ood faith for "ears in the !elief
that she was le#all" married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a findin# of innocence or #ood faith. As ar#ued !" the private
respondents<
?irst. The last will and testament itself e1pressl" admits indu!ita!l" on its face the
meretricious relationship !etween the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
7econd. 3etitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alle#ed
i#norance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrar" evidence.
6n short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validit" of the le#ac" #iven in
the will to petitioner !" the deceased testator at the start of the proceedin#s.
.hether or not petitioner 4new that testator 'artin Ju#o, the man he had lived with
as man and wife, as alread" married, was an important and specific issue !rou#ht !"
the parties !efore the trial court, and passed upon !" the Court of Appeals.
6nstead of limitin# herself to provin# the e1trinsic validit" of the will, it was petitioner
who opted to present evidence on her alle#ed #ood faith in marr"in# the testator.
(Testimon" of 3etitioner, T72 of Au#ust 1, 198, pp. :(>:) and pp. (>(*).
3rivate respondents, naturall", presented evidence that would refute the testimon" of
petitioner on the point.
7e!astian Ju#o, "oun#er !rother of the deceased testator, testified at len#th on the
meretricious relationship of his !rother and petitioner. (T72 of Au#ust 18,19):).
Clearl", the #ood faith of petitioner was !" option of the parties made a decisive
issue ri#ht at the inception of the case.
Confronted !" the situation, the trial court had to ma4e a rulin# on the Buestion.
.hen the court a quo held that the testator 'artin Ju#o and petitioner &were deemed
#uilt" of adulter" or concu!ina#e&, it was a findin# that petitioner was not the innocent
woman she pretended to !e.
111 111 111
3. 6f a review of the evidence must !e made nonetheless, then private respondents
respectfull" offer the followin# anal"sis<
?6+7T< The secrec" of the marria#e of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town
in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. 6f there was nothin# to hide
from, wh" the concealment& E 9f course, it ma"!e ar#ued that the marria#e of the
deceased with private respondent +ufina 8ome, was li4ewise done in secrec". @ut it
should !e remem!ered that +ufina 8ome, was alread" in the famil" wa" at that time
and it would seem that the parents of 'artin Ju#o were not in favor of the marria#e
so much so that an action in court was !rou#ht concernin# the marria#e. (Testimon"
of 7e!astian Ju#o, T72 of Au#ust 18, 19):, pp. 9>3$)
75C92%< 3etitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when the" were still
!oth sin#le. That would !e in 19 as 'artin Ju#o married respondent +ufina 8ome,
on 2ovem!er 9, 193 (51h. 3). 3etitioner married the testator onl" on %ecem!er :,
19:. There was a space of a!out 3$ "ears in !etween. %urin# those 3$ "ears, could
it !e !elieved that she did not even wonder wh" 'artin Ju#o did not marr" her nor
contact her an"more after 2ovem!er, 193 > facts that should impel her to as4 her
#room !efore she married him in secrec", especiall" so when she was alread" a!out
:$ "ears old at the time of marria#e.
T-6+%< The fact that petitioner !ro4e off from 'artin Ju#o in 193 is !" itself
conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had openl" lived for
"ears as man and wife was a married man with alread" two children.
?9D+T-< -avin# admitted that she 4new the children of respondent +ufina 8ome,,
is it possi!le that she would not have as4ed 'artin Ju#o whether or not the" were his
ille#itimate or le#itimate children and !" whomE That is un>?ilipino.
?6?T-< -avin# often #one to 3asi# to the residence of the parents of the deceased
testator, is it possi!le that she would not have 4nown that the mother of private
respondent 9scar Ju#o and Carmelita Ju#o was respondent +ufina 8ome,,
considerin# that the houses of the parents of 'artin Ju#o (where he had lived for
man" "ears) and that of respondent +ufina 8ome, were /ust a few meters awa"E
7uch pretentions of petitioner 7ofia 2epomuceno are un!elieva!le. The" are, to sa"
the least, inherentl" impro!a!le, for the" are a#ainst the e1perience in common life
and the ordinar" instincts and promptin#s of human nature that a woman would not
!other at all to as4 the man she was #oin# to marr" whether or not he was alread"
married to another, 4nowin# that her #room had children. 6t would !e a stor" that
would strain human credulit" to the limit if petitioner did not 4now that 'artin Ju#o
was alread" a married man in view of the irrefuta!le fact that it was precisel" his
marria#e to respondent +ufina 8ome, that led petitioner to !rea4 off with the
deceased durin# their "oun#er "ears.
'oreover, the prohi!ition in Article )39 of the Civil Code is a#ainst the ma4in# of a donation !etween
persons who are livin# in adulter" or concu!ina#e. 6t is the donation which !ecomes void. The #iver
cannot #ive even assumin# that the recipient ma" receive. The ver" wordin#s of the .ill invalidate
the le#ac" !ecause the testator admitted he was disposin# the properties to a person with whom he
had !een livin# in concu!ina#e.
.-5+5?9+5, the petition is %67'6775% for lac4 of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals,
now 6ntermediate Appellate Court, is A??6+'5%. 2o costs.
79 9+%5+5%.