POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

1. Cristobal v. Labrador

Facts: Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and was punished with
imprisonment, together with accessory penalties. While in prison serving
sentence, his civil liability was condoned by the complainants.
Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued to be a registered voter
and was seated as mayor of the municipality of Malabon. In 1938, the
Election Code was approved, disqualifying him from voting for having
been convicted of a crime against property. In view of this provision, he
applied to the President for absolute pardon. The President granted the
petition, restoring Santos to his full civil and political rights, except that
with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility.

Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the Santos from the list of
voters in their precinct in Malabon on the ground that the latter is
disqualified. The trial court declared that the pardon extended in favor of
Santos had the effect of excluding the respondent from the
disqualification created by the New Election Code.

It is the Cristobal's contention that the pardon granted by the President
to Santos, did not restore the latter to the full enjoyment of his political
rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not
apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would
amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative
function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the
accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.

Issue: What is the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in
the President by the Constitution? Whether this power extends to
Santos restoration of his power to vote.

Held: Yes. It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the
exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b) that
such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.

Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be
exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes
all disabilities resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the
disability is the result of conviction without which there would no basis
for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment
which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise
extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon
extended to Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it
restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.

The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code
does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the
Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no
way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.


2. Torres v. Gonzales
Facts: Sometime before 1979 Torres was convicted of the crime of
estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of
from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to
thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an
indemnity of P127,728.75
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by
the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board showed that on
22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa which cases were then pending trial, on 26 June

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1985, petitioner had been convicted of the crime of sedition, which was
then pending appeal before the IAC, on 14 January 1986 the NBI,
showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the
petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes.
So the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
The respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President"
an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20)
counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition. Petitioner also contends that
he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of
his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Issue: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court
is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. NOPE
Held: In Tesoro v Director of Prisons, the Court said the determination
of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that
such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had
consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power
that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the
courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered.
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative
Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code,
expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by
Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could
stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not
necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held, secondly, that
Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due
process. This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a convict
"who had already been seized in a constitutional was been confronted
by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime
and been sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally
entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had breached the
condition of his parole by committing a subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity
for any action by the courts in the premises. The executive
clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it,
and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the
governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and
another is that the governor shall himself determine when that
contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly
contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should
conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an
executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should
at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the Court reaffirmed the
continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his
day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself
during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he
was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction,
sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance
thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be
summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms
and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

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2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment
of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial
process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial
and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood
rules and doctrine on this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the
prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular
course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather
the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking
that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines"
for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his
original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the
consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A
convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of
the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the
criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon
him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i)
to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision
correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

3. Monsanto v. Factoran

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
(then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused of
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. They
were sentenced to imprisonment and to jointly and severally indemnify
the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended
on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which
she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Monsantos letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for
resolution. The Finance Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated
to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the
city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 and the costs of
the litigation, be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, Monsanto wrote the
Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1,
1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
The Ministry of Finance referred Monsantos letter to the Office of the
President for further review and action. Said Office, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held that Monsanto was
not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute
pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former
position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for
the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.
Issue: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to
her former position without need of a new appointment. (NO)
Held: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the
penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to
the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious
belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever
may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how
pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned
convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly
maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Therefore, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that
pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that
office.
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for
the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They
cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic
reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power
from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, Monsanto may apply for reappointment to
the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be
entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, Monsanto has sought exemption from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige
her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason
the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Monsantos civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.


4. Llamas v. Orbos
Facts: Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the
Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a
decision of the Office of the President, the governorship. Mariano Un

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Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was
suspended from office for a period of 90 days. Oscar Orbos was the
Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is being
impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority
of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency
Ocampo.
Sometime in 1989, Llamas, together with Tarlac Board Members
Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed a verified complaint
against Ocampo before the then DLG charging him with alleged violation
Local Government Code, and other appropriate laws, among them, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices ACt. Prior to that, Llamas filed with the
Office of the Omdusman a verified complainant against Ocampo for the
latter's alleged viloation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The complaint before the DLG, docketed as Administrative Case 10459,
was subsequently tried, where both LLamas and Ocampo presented
their respective evidence.
LLamas maintains that in his official capacity as Provincial Governor
Tarlac, Ocampo entered into and executed a Loan Agreement with
Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization
headed by Ocampo himself as chairman and controlled by his brother-
in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan
Agreement was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board,
in direct contravention of the provisions of the LGC; that the said
Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the Foundation and grossly
inimical to the interest of the Provincial Government (because it did not
provide for interest or for any type security and it did not provide for
suretyship and comptrollership or audit to control the safe disbursement
of said loan); that a total amount of P20M was disbursed to the aforesaid
Foundation; that the transactions constitute a fraudulent scheme to
defraud the Provincial Government; and that the said Agreement is
wholly unconstitutional, illegal, a immoral.
On the other hand, it is the contention of Ocampo that "the funds were
intended to generate livelihood project among the residents of Tarlac
and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by
law and considered the best alternative as a matter of judgment."; that
he resigned from the said Foundation in order to forestall any suspicion
that he would influence it; that it is not true that the Loan Agreement did
not provide for continuing audit by the Provincial Government because
the Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise; and that the
Agreement is not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Provincial Government and respondent governor did not and would not
profit thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for repayment.
After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government
rendered a decision against Ocampo with suspension for 90 days.
Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolution imposed not a preventive
suspension but a penalty of suspension. Ocampo moved for a
reconsideration of the abovequoted decision but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, he appealed the DLG decision to the Office of the President.
On February 26, 1991, Executive Secretary Orbos issued a Resolution
dismissing Ocampos appeal and affirming theDLG decision.
Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to
the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in administrative
suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without
prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, Llamas, on March 1, 1991,
took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative
suspension order, Llamas had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor.
On the same date (March 1, 1991), Ocampo moved for a
reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which
Llamas filed an opposition. From the allegations of the Llamas in his
petition, Ocampo accepted his suspension and turned over his office to
Llamas.
To the surprise of Llamas, however, Ocampo on March 19, 1991, issued
an "administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in which the latter
signified his intention to "(continue, as I am bound to exercise my
functions as governor and shall hold office at my residence," in the belief
that "the pendency of my Motion for Reconsideration precludes the
coming into finality as executory the DLG decision." And, as
categorically stated in the petition, the reassumption ceremony by
Ocampo was held on May 21, 1991.
Without ruling on Ocampos MR, Orbos issued a Resolution, in O.P.
Case No. 4480, which reads: This refers to the petition of Gov. Ocampo
III of Tarlac for executive clemency, interposed in connection with the
decision of the Secretary of then DLG as affirmed in a Resolution of this
Office suspending Ocampo from office for period of 90 days upon the
finality of said decision.

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By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, Ocampo reassumed the
governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to
LLamas.
LLamas posits that the issuance by Orbos of the May 15, 1991
Resolution was "whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction," basically on the
ground the executive clemency could be granted by the President only
in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the
Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
LLamas also contends that since Ocampo refused to recognize his
suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of
the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his
rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive
clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that
despite a finding by Orbos of impropriety in the loan transaction entered
into by Ocampo, Orbos failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of
suspension on the latter. Llamas further alleges that the executive
clemency granted by Orbos was "the product of a hocus-pocus
strategy" because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of
executive clemency filed by Ocampo.
Issues 1. WON the grant of executive clemency is a political question
beyond judicial review. (NO)
2. WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. (YES)
Held: 1. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in
which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the
wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue
involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether
said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, SC will
not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review
does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the
President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the
President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal v.
Cuenco, et al., is very enlightening: Elsewhere in this treatise the well-
known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within
the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative
or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted
by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern
themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of
these discretionary powers. As distinguished from the judicial, the
legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases their action is
necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to
exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute, but,
within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or
together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given
status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences
that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts. xxx xxx xxx
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and
not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated
to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion
determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional
amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such
matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because
they are matters which the people have by the Constitute delegated to
the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to
him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts
within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be
controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but
because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter
under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government
must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and
controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as
through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as
representative as the other, and the judiciary the department which is
charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the
law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle,
unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end
that the government may be one of laws and not men" words which
Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional
document.
Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been
conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other
branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not
they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec.

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

1, Constitution). "Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely
check whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has
a different view"
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not
purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the
Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
2. We must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of
her power of executive clemency is subject to constitutional limitations.
SC held that it will merely check whether the particular measure in
question has been in accordance with law. In so doing, SC held that it
will not concern their selves with the reasons or motives which actuate
the President as such is clearly beyond our power of judicial review.
Llamas main argument is that the President may grant executive
clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.
Llamas, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" applies
solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive
clemency or pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an
administrative case," allegedly because the word "conviction" refers only
to criminal cases. Llamas, however, describes in his very own words,
Ocampo as one who has been "convicted in an administrative case".
Thus, Llamas concedes that the word "conviction" may be used either in
a criminal case or in an administrative case. In Layno, Sr. v.
Sandiganbayan,: For misfeasance or malfeasance ... any [elective
official] could ... be proceeded against administratively or ... criminally. In
either case, his culpability must be established ...
It is also important to note that Ocampo's MR filed on March 1, 1991
was withdrawn in his petition for the grant of executive clemency, which
fact rendered the Resolution dated February 26, 1991 affirming the DLG
Decision.
Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguire debemos," SC cannot sustain Llamas view. In other words, if
the law does not distinguish, so SC must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following Llamas proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, SC do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason
why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative
cases. The SCs considered viewis that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the
exercise of the executive clemency in administrative cases.
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, ..., the President may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon
officers and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and
conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service."
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of
deliberations was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which
reads as follows: "However, the power to grant executive clemency for
violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation." The
Constitutional Commission, however, voted to remove the amendment,

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since it was in derogation of the powers of the President. As Mr.
Natividad stated:
I am also against this provision which will again chip
more powers from the President. In case of other
criminals convicted in our society we extend probation
to them while in this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can
offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency
extended to them by the President. If we still close this
avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse
than the murderers and the more vicious killers in our
society ....
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from
protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to
trust in the discretion of Presidents and refrained from putting additional
limitations on his clemency powers.
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore,
that the President's executive clemency powers may not be limited in
terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that
is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation
of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C,
Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in
court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should
likewise be extended the same benefit.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an
individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants
to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal
and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other
hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere
substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the
admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It
will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively
of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency
cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision
to subserve the interest of the public.
Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, Section I,
Book III of which provides: SECTION 1. Power of Control. The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless
otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships
shall be categorized and defined as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control
shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units;
determine priorities in the execution of plans and
programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass
supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. ...
(emphasis supplied)
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial
or city officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of
Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and
ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however,
is the "supervision and control" power of the President to reduce, if
circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the
suspension or removal order, even "in the sense" of granting executive
clemency. "Control," within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power
to substitute one's own judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the
doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive
departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are
presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or
reprobated by her. Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor
General that in the present case, the President, in the exercise of her
power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may
substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where
the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is
clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate
against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts
alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged
executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve
the public interest. "the relative success of . . . livelihood loan
program."
SC wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, SC refer only to all
administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the government.
Noteworthy is the fact that on March 1, 1991, Ocampo filed a motion for
reconsideration and the same may be regarded as implicitly resolved,
not only because of its withdrawal but also because of the executive
clemency which in effect reduced the penalty, conformably with the
power of "control."
On Llamas argument that Ocampos MR has abated the running of the
reglementary period for finality of judgment in O.P. Case No. 4480 (that
is, there being no final judgment to speak of, the pardon granted was
premature and of no effect, SC reiterate the doctrine that upon
acceptance of a presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have
waived any appeal which he may have filed. Thus, it was held that:
The commutation of the penalty is impressed with legal
significance. That is an exercise of executive clemency
embraced in the pardoning power. According to the
Constitution: "The President may except in cases of
impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and, with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant
amnesty. "Once granted, it is binding and effective. It
serves to put an end to this appeal."
Consequently, Ocampos acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves
to put an end" to the MR and renders the subject decision final, that of
the period already served.
Finally, Llamas argument that his constitutional rights to due process
were violated is unmeritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private,
though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the
court. Thus, assuming that Llamas was not notified of the subject
pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. Besides, Llamas
claim that Ocampo has not begun serve sentence is belied by his very
own factual allegations in his petition, more particularly that he served as
Acting Governor of Tarlac effective from the date he took his Oath of
Office on February 28, 1991 up to the time Ocampo reassumed the
governorship of Tarlac on May 21, 1991. It is, therefore, error to say that
Ocampo did not serve any portion of the 90-day suspension meted upon
him.
SC failed to see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction committed by Ocampo.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) DECLARING that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the May 15, 1991 Resolution granting on the
grounds mentioned therein, executive clemency to Ocampo and that,
accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional (without prejudice to
criminal proceedings which have been filed or may be filed against
Ocampo), and (2) DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition for
being unmeritorious, moot and academic. No costs.
Separate Opinions

Justice Cruz: Dissenting Opinion: I concur in the result and would s
the challenged resolution of May 18, 1991, on the basis only of the
President's control power. I think the discussion of the pardoning power
is unnecessary and may even be misleading as the ponencia itself says
that it was not by virtue thereof that the private respondent's penalty was
reduced. The correct approach, if I may respectfully suggest it, is to
uphold the resolution solely on strength of the President's power of
"control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices" under
Article VII, Sect 17, of the Constitution. SC have held in many cases that
a Cabinet member is an alter ego of the President whose acts may be
affirmed, modified reversed by the latter in his discretion. What
happened in this case was that President Aquino saw fit to amend the
decision rendered by the Secretary of Local Government on September
21, 1990, by reducing 90-day suspension imposed on Gov. Ocampo.
The President had the authority to do this, and she could exercise it
through Executive Secretary. His act, not having been "reprobated

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

disauthorized" by her, is presumed to be the act of the Preside herself.
The Court is not concerned with the wisdom of that act, on its legality. I
believe the act is legal but reserve judgment on its wisdom.

Justice Padilla: Dissenting Opinion: I vote to grant the petition which
seeks to annul the 15 May 1991 resolution of the Office of the President,
for the reason that the Executive Secretary, presumably acting on behalf
of the President, had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in granting
executive clemency to private respondent Ocampo by reducing the 90-
day suspension imposed upon him to the period he had already served.
The administrative sanction of suspension imposed upon private
respondent does not affect the criminal complaint also filed against him
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft Law.
The administrative finding of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, as affirmed by the Office of the President, that Ocampo
had committed neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority while in office,
was not by virtue of a criminal proceeding. Thus, it cannot be said that
there was a criminal conviction of the Ocampo by final judgment. Nor
can it be said that the disciplinary action suspending private respondent
is an execution and/or enforcement of the criminal laws of the land.
Therefore, the President's power to grant executive clemency is not
applicable or even relevant in the case at bar. The President, in the
Constitution, has been delegated the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons "after conviction by final judgment". This
power cannot be stretched even by fiction or imagination to include the
authority to grant similar reprieves, commutations or pardons over
sanctions in administrative proceedings. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to
annul the resolution of the Executive Secretary dated 15 May 1991, as
having been issued clearly in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
or discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.


5. Drilon v. Court of Appeals

Facts: In 1973, Paredes and Ganzon were charged with double murder
before Military Commission No. 34, from which Paredes was acquitted
and Ganzon was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. Gazon
served the sentence until he was placed under house arrest on March
25, 1978.

Ganzon later on joined KBL in 1985 as campaign manager and was
granted pardon by President Marcos on January 27, 1986. In 1988,
upon change in administration, Justice Secretary Ordoez ordered
preliminary investigation on Paredes and Ganzon on the same charge of
double murder. They filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of acquittal
and absolute pardon, respectively. However, their motion was denied.

Issues: W/N the Government may proceed criminally despite the verdict
of Military Commission No. 34. (No)
W/N Ganzon has completed service of his sentence. (Yes)
W/N Ganzon has been pardoned. (Unnecessary to consider)

Held:

1. No. Nullity of the sentence can only be done upon showing of serious
denial of Constitutional rights of the accused. Since neither Paredes and
Ganzon nor the State allege Constitutional violation, a retrial or
reinvestigation cannot be reordered.

2. Yes. Those tried by military commissions have the option to
complete their sentence or be tried anew by civil courts. Ganzon
obviously chose to serve his sentence fully, although it was converted to
house arrest. Thus, he cannot be reinvestigated.

3. Unnecessary to consider. The pardon awarded to Ganzon is
irrelevant upon acceptance that his sentence has been commuted or
reduced by Marcos. The Constitution renders the commutation of
Ganzons sentence final and unappealable and makes the absolute
judgment unnecessary to consider.


6. USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer of the Philippines

Facts: This case concerns the Romulo-Synder Agreement, Usaffe
Veterans (Filipino members of World War II, ex-members of the US
Armed Forces in the Far East) prayed that the Agreement be annulled
and payments there under be declared illegal and that the Philippine
Republic be restrained from disbursing funds from the National Treasury
in pursuance of the Agreement. The money, instead should be
transferred to the Finance Service of the AFP for payment of all pending
claims of the veterans represented.
Plaintiff forwarded 3 propositions: a) Funds to be returned under the
agreement were funds appropriated by the US Congress for the Phil.
Army actually delivered to the Phil. Government and owned by said
Government b) US Secretary Snyder of Treasury ad no authority to

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

retake the funds from the Philippine Government, c) Phil. Foreign
Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to
return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called Agreement.

Plaintiffs attempt to block repayment because many alleged claims of
veterans have not been processed and paid, having been fixed as the
deadline for the presentation and/or payment of such claims. Plaintiff
calculates that if the return is prevented and the money kept ere, it might
manage to persuade the powers-that-be to extend the deadline anew.
Hence, the two-pronged attack: No obligation to pay & The officers who
promised to repay had no authority.
Issue: W/N the Romulo-Snyder Agreement
Held: The first ground is proven untenable. The first Congreesional Act
of 1941 (Public Law 353) appropriated 269-million available for to the
Philippine Government either in advance of or in reimbursement for all
or any part of the estimated or actual costs. It is undeniable that upon a
final rendition of accounts by the Philippine Government, a superabit
resulted of at least 35 million dollars in favor of the US. Instead of
returning such amount in one lump sum, our Executive Department
arranged for its repayment in ten annual installments.
As to the second, no doubt President Quirino approved the negotiations.
And he had power to contract budgetary loans under Republic Act No.
213, amending Republic Act No. 16. The most important argument,
hover rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by the Senate of
the Philippines to make it binding on this Government.
The agreement is not a treaty as the term is used. It was never
submitted to the Senate for concurrence. However, it must be noted that
a treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume.
For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the
Senate does not exhaust the power of the government over international
relations. In the point of view of international law, there is no difference
between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon
states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers.
Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) Agreements made purely
as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or
without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential
agreements, and (2) agreements entered into tin pursuance of acts of
Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive
Agreement.
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under these two classes for the
Congress specifically authorized the President of the Philippine to obtain
such loans or incur such indebtedness with the US Government.
Even granting, that there was no legislative authorization, it is thereby
maintained that the Agreement was legally and validly entered into to
conform to the second category, namely agreements relating to te
settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens.

7. Gonzales v. Hechanova

Facts: Respondent Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the
importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and
created a rice procurement committee. Petitioner, Ramon Gonzales, a
rice planter, and president of a planters association, filed this prohibition
with prelim injunction alleging that respondents are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because Republic Act No. 3452
which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.
Respondents Hechanova allege that the Government has
already entered into 2 contracts for the Purchase of Rice with Vietnam
and Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements
under international law and became binding effective upon the signing of
representative parties; and that the contracts have already been
consummated and the Government already paid the price of the rice.

Issues
1) WON the contracts with Vietnam and Burma are valid
2) WON petitioner has legal standing
3) WON prohibition on rice importation applies to Government itself


Held:
1) NO. The contracts are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President
may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21

agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function
of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between
a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail,
is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but,
also insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory
may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States
is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of
a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given
as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courtsthe Court said Yes. Our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of
national security predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos
and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem"
- and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of
local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and
accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities
constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national
emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such
emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be
impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers
from engaging in the production of rice.
2) YES, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial
proportion, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it
now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said
commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by
taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality
and interest.
3) YES. Respondent Hechanova allege, that provisions of Republic Act
Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any
"government agency", do not apply to importations "made by the
Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency".
This theory is devoid of merit because the importation permitted in
Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the
Philippines, hence on behalf of the Government.
Further, the restrictions imposed in the Republic Acts are
merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138,
entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the
preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Under the
provision of the Commonwealth Act, in all purchases by the Government,
including those made by and/or for the armed forces,preference shall be
given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved
in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government.
-- SC held: Executive Secretary has no power to authorize the
importation in question.

8. Vinuya v. Romulo

Facts: Petitioner s to file a claim against the Japanese officials
responsible for the atrocities done during WWII, specifically against the
comfort women stations. However, officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Issues: 1. W/N the officials acted in GADLEJ when they refused to
espouse the claims of petitioner?
2. W/N the officials had the obligation to espouse the claims of petitioner
before the International Court of Justice?

POLI Set 8 Article VII Sec 19-21


Held: 1. The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claim against Japan. The
current issue involves a political question. In Taada v. Cuenco, political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." One
category of political questions involves questions of foreign relations.
Though not all cases involving foreign relations present political
questions, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by
our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this
case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such
decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners
herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the
instant petition for certiorari.

Here, the Executive has determined that taking up petitioners cause
would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally committed. Further, it cannot be
argued that the Philippine government was not without authority to
negotiate the treaty of Peace with Japan. Since the Treaty of Japan wipe
out the underlying private claims of petitioner; thereby terminating any
recourse under domestic law, petitioners thus cannot seek for reparation

The Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign
policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and
whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

2. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse
petitioners claims.

In the international sphere, what is being asserted is the states rights
and not the individuals right. The only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the
individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf through the states exercise of diplomatic protection.
The exercise of the states discretion is within the absolute discretion of
the state. The ICJ held in Barcelona Traction that a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it
thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the
natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international
law.

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection
will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It
retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may
be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated
to the particular case.
Further, petitioners cannot insists that the State has the duty and an
underlying obligation to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf
when rights are injured. Even if the acts are morally reprehensible, the
Philippines has no obligation to prosecute international crimes since
petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability
but seek monetary reparations from the State of Japan. Absent the
consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the
Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings
against Japan.