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B
uc h a n a n, wa s t h at you throwing the eggs?” were the
first words I heard from the 37th President of the United
States.
His limousine rolling up Pennsylvania Avenue after his inaugu-
ral had been showered with debris. As my future wife, Shelley, and
I were entering the reviewing stand for the inaugural parade, the
Secret Service directed us to step off the planks onto the muddy
White House lawn. The President was right behind us. As he
passed by, Richard Nixon looked over, grinned broadly, and made
the crack about the eggs.
It was a sign of the times and the hostile city in which he had
taken up residence. He had won with 43 percent of the vote. A shift
of 112,000 votes from Nixon to Vice President Humphrey in Cali-
fornia would have left him with 261 electoral votes, nine short, and
thrown the election into a House of Representatives controlled by
the Democratic Party. In the final five weeks, Humphrey had closed
a 15-point gap and almost put himself into the history books along-
side Truman—and Nixon alongside Dewey. But the question that
puzzled friend and enemy alike that January morning in 1969 was:
1968. California was replacing New York as first state and the gov-
ernor’s chair in the Golden State was an ideal launching pad for a
second presidential run.
But in 1962 Nixon had lost again. He had begun the campaign
behind, but had been gaining ground when the Cuban missile crisis
aborted his surge. Kennedy’s perceived triumph over Khrushchev
had given a boost to every Democrat. Then came the “last press
conference,” where Nixon berated his tormentors and declared
himself finished with politics. “It had seemed the absolute end of
a political career,” wrote Norman Mailer. “Self-pity in public was
as irreversible as suicide.” Career over, Nixon packed up his fam-
ily and moved to New York, the city of his old antagonist Nelson
Aldrich Rockefeller.
So it was that Nixon began the sixties losing to Kennedy, losing
to Pat Brown, quitting politics, and moving east to practice law. He
had lost his political base and seemed to have no political future.
How did this politician of the forties and fifties, an Eisenhower
Republican of moderate views and middle-class values, a two-t ime
loser, emerge from a decade of assassinations, riots, sexual revolu-
tion and social upheaval, and the rise of a radical New Left and a
militant New Right to win the presidency?
In “The Snows of Kilimanjaro,” Hemingway writes of a mys-
tery on the mountain. “Close to the western summit there is the
dried and frozen carcass of a leopard. No one has explained what
the leopard was seeking at that altitude.” This book is an effort of
the aide closest to Nixon in his now-legendary comeback to explain
how he maneuvered through the conflicts and chaos of that most
turbulent decade of the twentieth century to reach the “western
summit”—and become President of the United States.
T
h e r ise of Richard Nixon was spectacular.
First elected in 1946, he entered the Republican-
controlled 80th Congress with another young veteran,
John F. Kennedy, and was put on the House Un-A merican Activ-
ities Committee investigating Communists in the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations. Nixon swiftly made a name for himself
and became a national hero for standing by ex-Communist Whit-
taker Chambers and helping expose the wartime treason of Alger
Hiss, an icon of the liberal establishment. As the best-k nown fresh-
man congressman in the country, Nixon won the nominations of
both parties in his Orange County district in 1948. For this bipar-
tisan young member of Congress was no Robert Taft conservative.
He supported the Marshall Plan, endorsed Dewey at the GOP con-
vention in 1948, and backed NATO in 1949 and military aid to
Turkey and Greece, then battling Soviet subversion. Nixon was a
Cold Warrior in tune with his times whose anti-Communism paid
dividends. Running for the Senate in 1950 against Helen Gaha-
gan Douglas, the ultraliberal wife of actor Melvyn Douglas, Nixon
amassed more votes than any candidate in the history of California.
Early in that campaign, Jack Kennedy, his colleague and friend,
came over to Nixon’s Senate office with a $1,000 check from Joe
Kennedy for Nixon’s campaign against Douglas, whom neither JFK
nor his father could stand.
In the battle for the nomination in 1952, Nixon again went
against his majority leader, Senator Taft, Mr. Conservative, to sup-
port Ike. The Eisenhower-Taft battle was the test of loyalty for
conservatives of that era. But Nixon had made the right call. Eisen-
hower won and put him on the ticket. On January 20, 1953, Rich-
ard Nixon, forty years old, six years into his political career, was
inaugurated as the second-youngest vice president in U.S. history.
Only John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky, James Buchanan’s vice
president at thirty-seven, had been younger.
By 1956, because of the rough campaigns he had conducted in
’46 and ’50, and his attack role as number two on the ticket in 1952
and as bayonet of the party in 1954, Nixon was now seen as deeply
partisan. In a stunning gesture, President Eisenhower, who had
been ready to dump Nixon from the ticket during the “fund scan-
dal” of 1952, which Nixon brilliantly countered with his “Check-
ers speech,” urged Nixon to “chart his own course.” Ike offered
Nixon any Cabinet post he wanted in a second term save State,
which was reserved for John Foster Dulles. With Ike showing a new
willingness to drop him from the ticket and move him out of the
line of succession, Nixon, wrote biographers Earl Mazo and Ste-
phen Hess, “planned to quit public life in disgust.” A source close
to Nixon called this “one of the greatest hurts of his . . . career.”
Nixon fought to hold on to his vice presidency. And Ike relented.
But Nixon never forgot.
was one of the closest races in U.S. history. No more than 4 points
separated the candidates in the Gallup polls. And among the rea-
sons for the tightness of the race was the public perception that
Nixon and Kennedy did not really disagree.
Both men were veterans of World War II, in their forties, and
strong anti-Communists, with Kennedy taking a harder line on
Cuba than Nixon, who was aware of Eisenhower’s plan to support
an exile invasion of the island. Nixon took a tougher stance on the
use of force to defend Nationalist China’s offshore islands of Que-
moy and Matsu from the People’s Republic of Mao Tse-tung. So
alarmed were Democrats that Americans saw the two candidates as
almost identical on the issues that Arthur Schlesinger churned out
a book titled Kennedy or Nixon: Does It Make Any Difference?
It was a rough campaign. Kennedy alleged that the Eisenhower-
Nixon administration had allowed a “missile gap” to develop with
the Soviet Union. Yet the Cuban missile crisis, two years later,
would reveal that the gap was massively in favor of the United
States, with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Nixon was por-
trayed by Democrats as a savage and sinister figure, “Tricky Dick,”
with huge photographs of him with a shifty look carrying the cap-
tion “Would You Buy a Used Car from This Man?”
While Nixon was portrayed as a “white-collar McCarthy,” it was
the Kennedys who had been closer to Joe. Father Joe Kennedy had
been a friend, admirer, and supporter of the Wisconsin senator, the
Kennedy girls dated Joe, Bobby had worked for him, Teddy played
football with him at Hyannis Port, and JFK absented himself on
the Senate vote to censure McCarthy. At a Harvard dinner in 1954,
when a speaker expressed satisfaction that the college had never
produced an Alger Hiss or a Joe McCarthy, JFK roared, “How dare
you compare the name of a great American patriot with that of a
traitor!” and walked out.
Kennedy had other advantages. The Democratic Party was far
larger, measured by its relative strength in the House, the Senate,
CALIFORNIA DREAMING
Having lost in the closest race of the century, still a young man in
presidential politics at forty-eight, Nixon returned to California, his
home state, and began to plot his future. Having served six years in
the House and Senate and eight as vice president, he had been a leg-
islator and adviser to a president. He knew the Congress and knew
the White House. What he lacked was executive experience and a
political base, if he were again to seek the Republican nomination.
Against the advice of many close associates, Nixon decided to
run for governor of California, which was replacing New York as
America’s most populous state. Victory would provide him with
an unrivaled political base. As governor, he could be a kingmaker
at the 1964 convention, be drafted for the nomination should the
GOP’s liberal and conservative wings deadlock, or sit out the prob-
able reelection of JFK and seek the nomination in 1968.
The governorship of California perfectly fit the political needs
of the ex–vice president. He had never lost in California, had
won in a record vote in 1950 for Senate, and had carried the state
against JFK. What Nixon did not fully appreciate, however, was
the depth, breadth, and intensity of the rebellion rising in his own
party against the Eisenhower Republicanism he represented and
the centrist campaign he had just conducted. To the New Right,
the Eisenhower-Nixon administration had failed to make good on
John Foster Dulles’s pledge to “roll back” Communism and had
failed to roll back the New Deal. It had permitted the establishment
of a Communist base camp “90 miles from Key West.” The Right
did not want to see Nixon back as party leader in 1964. As early as
April 1961, I had told a college friend that Barry Goldwater was
the man to take on JFK, who was even then wiping the egg off his
face for the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs. Thus when Nixon declared for
governor of California, he found he already had stiff competition.
the governorship as a base from which to plan a second run for the
presidency. Shell’s right-wing backers portrayed Nixon as a card-
carrying member of that suspect sanctum sanctorum of the Eastern
Liberal Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations.
The John Birch Society, whose founder and leader, Robert
Welch, in his privately circulated book, The Politician, had described
Ike as a “dedicated, conscious agent of the communist conspiracy,”
became a major issue. Nixon had denounced the Birchers. But the
state party platform, though it condemned the society’s leaders,
did not condemn the society itself. Shell argued that the Birchers
should be allowed to remain active in the GOP.
After Nixon rolled up a 2–1 victory in the primary, Shell began
to make demands as the price of his endorsement. Liberal Republi-
can Tom Kuchel, who had been named by Governor Earl Warren
to fill Nixon’s Senate seat when he became vice president, refused
to endorse Nixon. Governor Pat Brown said Nixon wanted to
“double-park in Sacramento” before running again for president.
Buffeted from left and right, his momentum halted by the Cuban
missile crisis, Nixon lost. His defeat became the stuff of legend
when, exhausted and bitter the morning after, he told the press this
was the end of his political career and fired a virtual 12-gauge blast
into the faces of his tormentors: “Think of all the fun you’ll be
missing. . . . You don’t have Nixon to kick around anymore because,
gentlemen, this is my last press conference.” Even admirers agreed
that Nixon’s hour at the apex of American politics was over.
ABC’S “OBITUARY”
The following Sunday, November 11, Howard K. Smith anchored
ABC’s “The Political Obituary of Richard M. Nixon,” an hour-long
hatchet job. In the opening, Smith introduced Jerry Voorhis, who
called Nixon “a ruthless opponent.” Voorhis was followed by Alger
Hiss, who had been convicted of perjury for lying under oath about
being a wartime spy for Stalin, and whose treason Nixon had helped
to expose. Implying that he had been railroaded, Hiss said Nixon
had seemed “less interested in developing facts than in presenting
some kind of preconceived case.” Smith twice called Nixon a “sav-
age political fighter,” who had “accused great and patriotic Ameri-
cans like Adlai Stevenson of things they and others cannot forgive.”
Smith added that Nixon possessed an “un-subtle mind, a two plus
two equals four mind, someone called it—agile but not deep.”
The “obituary” seemed to confirm everything Nixon had said
about a hostile and vindictive press. Tens of thousands of telegrams
poured in to ABC. Four ABC stations refused to carry the pro-
gram. The Schick Safety Razor Company, Kemper Insurance, and
Pacific Hawaiian Company, makers of Hawaiian Punch, sought to
cancel their advertising with ABC.
Among the many newspapers that condemned ABC was the Los
Angeles Times. In an editorial, “The Inning of the Anti-Nixon Lib-
erals,” the Times called the use of Hiss the “central obscenity”:
For years the liberals have been panting for the Walpur-
gis Night when they would all dance on the grave of Rich-
ard Nixon. They performed the first of their ghoulish revels
on Sunday night and it was so thoroughly in the medieval
crossroads-and-gibbet spirit that even some seasoned Nixon
haters must have hurried away to be sick.
It was done with television (ABC, Howard K. Smith as
witch-master) and Alger Hiss held the position of chief gloater.
read Capable of Honor, the new novel by Allen Drury, who had won
a Pulitzer for Advise and Consent in 1960. Drury lacerated America’s
TV commentators and liberal columnists as systematic distorters
of the truth for political ends. Nixon loved the satirical novel and
would carry it back and forth to work. Drury’s book made up in bile
what it lacked in subtlety.
with Goldwater, even if it meant going over the cliff. Nixon then
volunteered to speak at the convention and introduce Goldwater.
Cleveland was forgotten when Nixon took the podium at the San
Francisco Cow Palace to deliver his call for party unity:
his Great Society, with 295 Democrats in the House and 68 in the
Senate, the Republican Party was at its nadir. In the twelve years
since Ike had first taken the oath of office with Republicans in con-
trol of both houses, party strength in Congress had been cut to less
than one-half that of the Democratic Party.
“Will the GOP Survive?” was a common theme in those middle
years of the sixties, when liberalism and the Democratic Party held
sway over all. And Nixon was now written off as a chronic loser
in what the columnists and authors were calling “The Party That
Lost Its Head.”