Morten Valkvist

12-6-2009 1
Morten Valkvist
Competence Director, Niras Safety, Denmark
Safety
I:\inf\pr-toolbox\over heads\Firmapres entati on_nov2005.ppt
2
Basic intention in PB design verification:
Verify societys risk acceptance levels
Danish approach
Equal design
Meet deterministic acceptance criteria
E.g. objects discernible within 10 m etc.
Sensitivity studies (failure)
Risk accep. levels are important in PB design
Performance-Based Designs - Verification
Risk
Bldg.
class
Assembly
Acceptance Risk Level?
Compare
Safety
3
Performance-Based Designs - Documentation
Mathematical
Model
Knowledgeable
User
Methodology
of Use
Fire design triangle [Beard, A., (Heriot
Watt Uni.(UK)]:
Requirements to PBFC system:
Control over the risk levels induced by the
three factors
Safety
4
Mathematical Model
Fire modelling in PB design
A priori modelling
Leads to unclear risk levels
PBFC system must control math. assumptions
45 kg/s
75 kg/s
60 kg/s
- 4. diff. math. models
- Identical design fire
Safety
5
Knowledgeable User
Round-robin study of fire modelling
Dalmarnock Fire Tests [Uni. of Edinb. et al.]
A priori modelling (8xFDS+2xCFAST)
Common test description and initial HRR
HRR of initial fire was provided
Pre-flashover well-ventilated round-robin studies
[Rein et al. (2009), Fire Safety Journal 44, pp. 590-602]
+500%T
exp
-30%T
exp
Safety
6
Design fire uncertainty e.g. car fire
DK: Same building owner may be met with
different design fires
Premovement time
Fixed: ~30 s => ~300 s
Distribution of :
Methodology of Use
rd det pre
t t t + =
rd
t
[Okamoto et al. (2009), Fire Safety Journal 44, pp. 301-310]
N
pers
/N
total
t
rd
Office
1.0
Shopping
[EN 12101-5]:
=4,000 kW
Q&
f
Q
&
D
K
:

G
r
e
a
t

v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n

w
i
t
h
i
n

g
r
o
u
p

o
f

F
S
E
s

a
n
d

w
i
t
h
i
n

g
r
o
u
p

o
f

A
H
J
s
Safety
7
Methodology of Use
Vena
contracta
No VC
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Froude no. [1]
d
m
/
d
t

[
k
g
/
(
s
*
m
2
)
]
Horizontal vent

Full vent, A
g
=1.0 d
h
=1.0 AR
v
=1.0
Full vent, A
g
=1.2 d
h
=1.1 AR
v
=0.8
Full vent, A
g
=1.4 d
h
=1.2 AR
v
=0.7
Full vent, A
g
=1.6 d
h
=1.2 AR
v
=0.6
Full vent, A
g
=1.8 d
h
=1.3 AR
v
=0.6
Full vent, A
g
=2.0 d
h
=1.3 AR
v
=0.5
Full vent, A
g
=2.8 d
h
=1.5 AR
v
=0.4
Full vent, A
g
=4.0 d
h
=2.0 AR
v
=1.0
Full vent, A
g
=5.6 d
h
=2.3 AR
v
=1.4
Full vent, A
g
=3.9 d
h
=1.9 AR
v
=0.5
Passive vent, A
g
=1.0 d
h
=1.0 AR
v
=1.0
Passive vent,A
g
=1.2 d
h
=1.1 AR
v
=0.8
Passive vent,A
g
=1.4 d
h
=1.2 AR
v
=0.7
Passive vent,A
g
=1.6 d
h
=1.2 AR
v
=0.6
Passive vent,A
g
=1.8 d
h
=1.3 AR
v
=0.6
Passive vent,A
g
=2.0 d
h
=1.3 AR
v
=0.5
Passive vent,A
g
=2.8 d
h
=1.5 AR
v
=0.4
Passive vent,A
g
=4.0 d
h
=2.0 AR
v
=1.0
Passive vent,A
g
=5.6 d
h
=2.3 AR
v
=1.4
Passive vent,A
g
=3.9 d
h
=1.9 AR
v
=0.5
Vena
contracta
No VC
av g
hv v
av v
fds v fds g
hv g
fds g
fds v
A
C
C
C A
A
A
C
,
,
,
, ,
,
,
,
=
=
Buoyancy-driven vent modelling
Safety
8
Fire safety factors
is adressing uncertainties
The more freedom => the more
What should control
Risk based approach reflecting societal risk
levels within each bldg. class
: Uncertainties in input parameters
and assumptions
Reflected in sensitivity study
Guideline on sensitivity study
: Mathematical model assumptions
and numerical precision
Can be model dependent
Proposed Control Measures
( ) f
( ) 0 ; = FSL RSET f ASET FSL
( ) f
i
in
out
Safety
9
Fire safety factors
IMPLICATIONS for model uncertainty:
Risk based approach
Clear height [EN 12101-5] compared to 2
m height of person:
Public: 3 m =>
Non-public: 2.5 m =>
Not coupled to a certain model
Intentions behind PBFC should still be met
Fire protection costs should be reduced
The good FSE should not be punished
Verify proposed fire safety design
Example: Evac. modelling of spiral stairs
% 25 :
% 50 :
Safety
10
Capacity of spiral stairs
AROS Museum of Modern Art, Aarhus (DK)
Hand rail in 1/3 point to improve capacity
Full-Scale Testing and Verification
[Olafur Eliasson]
Improved
Existing
Handrail
Safety
11
Full-Scale Testing and Verification
Staircase Flow
[pers/10 s]
No handrail 16
Handrail 24
Improved Existing
Full-scale test
3 rep. tests with 200 pers. in each staircase
Findings
Lane Outer Centre Inner
Speed
[m/s]
1.3 0.8 0.6
Up
50%
Compares to 0.7 m/s
Safety
12
Knowledgeable user/Methodology
Fire strategies and documentation
Know your audience (AHJ, eng., arch.)
Assumptions must be clearly stated
Increased requirements to AHJ training
Engineering guidelines should be applied
Ensures conformity in PB design
DK: Task force on CFD guideline
Fire safety engineers must be certified
National standards of minimum competence
Education alone does not cut it
Sanctions can be imposed
Safety
13
Approval and Peer-Review
The approval process must:
Enforce societal risk control
Approved by building AND fire authorities
Design parameters (e.g. design fire)
Requires trained and experienced AHJs
and third party peer-reviewers
Certified FSE reviewers in knowledge
centres
DK: Big difference in training
Prevent the Boiling Frog Syndrome [Senge,
P. M., 1993]
GLOBAL: Bldgs. with unkown risk level
Safety
14
End of Presentation
THANK YOU!
[NRCC/MTQ: Full-scale fire test, Ville-Marie Tunnel, Montreal (CA)]
Safety
15
Commissioning, Operation and Management
Commissioning:
Complete test of the fire safety design
Capacity of sprinklers and SHEVS
Verify fire protection system operation
matrix (FP-SOM)
Test report should accompany design
documentation
DK: FSE contract typically terminates at
this point
Safety
16
Commissioning, Operation and Management
Operation:
Design compliance should be ensured
throughout the building lifetime
System mean life time, L:
Regular verification of FP-SOM by testing
=
=
n
i
i
L
1
1
[Klote (2002)] - Other: 1E-5/hr

[Klote (2002)] - Fan: 1E-6/hr
L=23 months L=9 months

Morten Valkvist

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Morten Valkvist

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12-6-2009 1

[Klote (2002)] - Other: 1E-5/hr

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