4-Volume Set

Richard Rorty
CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING PHILOSOPHERS
Edited by James Tartaglia, University of Keele, UK
Richard Rorty (1931–2007) remains one of the contemporary world’s most influential
thinkers. He has been a major figure in philosophy ever since the publication of his first
important paper, ‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories’ in 1965, but it was the
release of his seminal Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that caused the literature
on his work to expand exponentially, a process which has accelerated since his death in
2007; scores of new articles and books about Rorty appear every year, and even his
biography has proved to be an academic bestseller. Rorty’s enduring appeal has a number
of sources. One is the scope and urgency of his views, for he was never shy about
presenting his call for the abandonment of objective truth against the grand backdrop of
the cultural progress of the West. Another is that his views were highly controversial, and
yet could not be easily dismissed, since Rorty was able to claim with some plausibility that
he was simply drawing out the consequences of positions developed by his more
conventionally respectable peers. And another is that Rorty applied his views to a wide
range of topical concerns outside of academic philosophy. For these and many other
reasons, philosophers to this day line up to refute him, students read Rorty before the
philosophers he discusses, and non-philosophy academics produce a continuous stream of
articles applying his views to their own interests.
The daunting quantity (and variable quality) of literature available on Rorty makes it
difficult to discriminate the useful from the tendentious, superficial, and otiose. That is
why this new title in the highly regarded Routledge series, Critical Assessments of Leading
Philosophers, is so urgently needed. Edited by James Tartaglia, the author of Rorty and the
Mirror of Nature (Routledge, 2007), one of the most popular and straightforward books
available on Rorty, this new Routledge Major Work is a four-volume collection of the best
scholarship from the 1960s to the present day; the collected materials have been carefully
selected from a wide range of academic journals, edited collections, and research
monographs, many of which are hard to obtain in their original source.
The first of the four volumes (‘Mind, Language, and Truth’) covers Rorty’s eliminative
materialism in the philosophy of mind, his Davidsonian rejection of conceptual schemes
in the philosophy of language, and his rejection of objective truth. Volume II
(‘Metaphilosophy and Pragmatism’), meanwhile, assembles the best assessments of his
pessimistic metaphilosophy, and his distinctive conception of pragmatism. The third
volume (‘Philosophers’) brings together the key scholarly work on Rorty’s highly original—
but endlessly disputed—interpretations of other philosophers, while the final volume in
the collection (Volume IV: ‘Themes’) explores Rorty’s views as applied to a diverse range
of topics, from feminism to environmentalism and bioethics.
The tightly focused organization of this collection will allow scholars quickly and
easily to access both established and up-to-date assessments of Rorty’s central
positions, and will also make for irresistible browsing. With comprehensive
introductions to each volume, providing essential background information and
relating the various articles to each other, Richard Rorty is destined to be an
indispensable resource for research and study.
Routledge
November 2009
234x156: 1,600pp
Set Hb: 978-0-415-49004-7

Routledge Major Works

Richard Rorty CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING PHILOS
VOLUME I
Mind, Language, and Truth
Richard Rorty
1. Obituary, The Times, 12 June 2007.
2. Stephen Metcalf, ‘Richard Rorty: What Made Him a Crucial American
Philosopher?’, Washington Post, 18 June 2007.
3. Neil Gross, ‘Rorty Reexamined’, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American
Philosopher (University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 301–32.
4. Ermanno Bencivenga, ‘Rorty and I’, The Philosophical Forum, 1993, 24,
307-18.
Mind
5. James W. Cornman, ‘On the Elimination of “Sensations” and Sensations’,
Review of Metaphysics, 1968, 22, 15–35.
6. William G. Lycan and George S. Pappas, ‘What is Eliminative Materialism?’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1972, 50, 149–59.
7. Eric Bush, ‘Rorty Revisited’, Philosophical Studies, 1974, 25, 33–42.
8. Philip Cam, ‘“Rorty Revisited”, or “Rorty Revised?”’, Philosophical Studies,
1978, 33, 377–86.
9. David R. Hiley, ‘Is Eliminative Materialism Materialistic?’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 1978, 38, 325–37.
10. Kenneth T. Gallagher, ‘Rorty’s Antipodeans: An Impossible Illustration?’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1985, 45, 449–55.
11. John Furlong, ‘Scientific Psychology as Hermeneutics? Rorty’s Philosophy
of Mind’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1988, 48, 489–503.
12. Attila Karakus and Andreas Vieth, ‘Is Rorty’s Non-Reductive Naturalism
Reductive?’, in Andreas Vieth (ed.), Richard Rorty: His Philosophy Under
Discussion (Ontos Verlag, 2005), pp. 79–96.
Language
13. Michael Losonsky, ‘Reference and Rorty’s Veil’, Philosophical Studies, 1985,
47, 291–4.
14. Michael Devitt, ‘Rorty’s Mirrorless World’, Realism and Truth, 2nd edn.
(Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 203–19.
15. David Houghton, ‘Rorty’s Talk-About’, in A. Malachowski (ed.), Reading
Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and
Beyond) (Blackwell, 1990), pp. 156–70.
16. Robert B. Brandom, ‘Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism
and Historicism’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and his Critics
(Blackwell, 2000), pp. 156–83.
Truth
17. Simon Blackburn, ‘Observation and Truth: From Locke to Rorty’, Truth: A
Guide for the Perplexed (Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 139–71, 229–31.
18. Mark Okrent, ‘The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth’,
Inquiry, 1993, 36, 381–404.
19. Paul Boghossian, ‘Epistemic Relativism Defended’ and ‘Epistemic
Relativism Rejected’, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism
(Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 58–94.
20. D. Vaden House, ‘Without God or His Doubles?’, Without God or His
Doubles: Realism, Relativism and Rorty (E. J. Brill, 1994), pp. 116–45.
21. Bernard Williams, ‘Accuracy: A Sense of Reality’, Truth and Truthfulness: An
Essay in Genealogy (Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 123–48, 294–6.
Routledge Major Works Intended Contents
VOLUME II
Metaphilosophy and Pragmatism
Reviews of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
22. Quentin Skinner, ‘The End of Philosophy?’, New York Review of Books, 19
March 1981, 46–8.
23. Harry Ruja, ‘Review of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 1981, 42, 299–300.
24. Chris Murphy, ‘Critical Notice of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1981, 59, 338–45.
25. Fred Dretske, ‘Review of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, International
Studies in Philosophy, 1982, 14, 96–8.
26. Richard J. Bernstein, ‘Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind’, Review
of Metaphysics, 1979, 33, 745–75.
27. Ian Hacking, ‘Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?’, Journal of Philosophy,
1980, 77, 579–88.
28. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy’, Journal of Philosophy,
1980, 77, 588–97.
Metaphilosophy
29. Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Philosophy, the “Other” Disciplines, and their
Histories: A Rejoinder to Richard Rorty’, Soundings, 1982, 65, 127–45.
30. David R. Hiley, ‘Edification and the End of Philosophy’, Philosophy in
Question: Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme (University of Chicago Press, 1988),
pp. 143–73, 190–3.
31. Michael Williams, ‘Epistemology and the Mirror of Nature’, in Robert B.
Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics (Blackwell, 2000), pp. 191–213.
32. Michael Williams, ‘Rorty on Knowledge and Truth’, in Charles Guignon
and David R. Hiley (eds.), Richard Rorty (Cambridge University Press,
2003), pp. 61–80.
33. Ernest Sosa, ‘Serious Philosophy and Freedom of Spirit’, Journal of
Philosophy, 1987, 84, 707–26.
34. Konstantin Kolenda, ‘Can Free Spirits be Serious?’, Southwest Philosophy
Review, 1989, 5, 107–12.
35. D. Z. Phillips, ‘Reclaiming the Conversations of Mankind’, Philosophy, 1994,
69, 35–53.
36. Jakob Hohwy, ‘Quietism and Cognitive Command’, Philosophical Quarterly,
1997, 47, 495–500.
37. Gary B. Madison, ‘Philosophy Without Foundations’, Reason Papers, 1991,
16, 15–44.
38. Manuel Arriaga, ‘Richard Rorty’s Anti-Foundationalism and Traditional
Philosophy’s Claim of Social Relevance’, International Philosophical
Quarterly, 2005, 45, 467–82.
Pragmatism
39. Cornel West, ‘The Decline and Resurgence of American Pragmatism: W. V.
Quine and Richard Rorty’, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy
of Pragmatism (University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 182–210, 265–9.
40. Robert Kirk, ‘Rorty’s “Postmodern” Pragmatism’, Relativism and Reality: A
Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 1999), pp. 134–43.
41. H. O. Mounce, ‘Rorty: Hermeneutics and Irony’, The Two Pragmatisms: From
Peirce to Rorty (Routledge, 1997), pp. 193–209.
42. David Hall, ‘An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking’, Richard Rorty:
Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 65–101,
253–9.
43. Ronald Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality’, in
Michael Brint and William Weaver (eds.), Pragmatism in Law and Society
(Westview Press, 1991), pp. 359–69, 382–3.
44. Susan Haack, ‘Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect’, Evidence and
Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology, 2nd edn. (Prometheus
Books, 2009), pp. 239–53, 295–6.
OPHERS
VOLUME III
Philosophers
Davidson
45. John P. Murphy, ‘Post-Quinean Pragmatism’, Pragmatism: From Peirce to
Davidson (Westview Press, 1990), pp. 95–116, 123–5, 132.
46. Maria Baghramian, ‘Rorty, Davidson and Truth’, Ratio, 1990, 3, 101–16.
47. Frank B. Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and Postmodernism: The Recovery of the
World (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 117–47.
48. Bjørn Ramberg, ‘Post-Ontological Philosophy of Mind: Rorty versus
Davidson’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics (Blackwell,
2000), pp. 351–70.
Dennett
49. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Comments on Rorty’, Synthese, 1982, 53, 349–56.
50. Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Postmodernism and Truth’, in Daniel Dahlstrom (ed.),
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (Vol. 8:
Contemporary Philosophy) (Philosophy Doc. Ctr., 2000), pp. 93–103.
Derrida
51. Simon Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private
Ironist or a Public Liberal?’, in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Deconstruction and
Pragmatism (Routledge, 1996), pp. 19–40.
52. Paul Trembath, ‘The Rhetoric of Philosophical “Writing”: Emphatic
Metaphors in Derrida and Rorty’, The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism,
1989, 47, 169–73.
Dewey
53. James Gouinlock, ‘What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism? Rorty’s
Interpretation of Dewey’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1990, 28,
251–69.
54. Richard Shusterman, ‘Pragmatism and Liberalism Between Dewey and
Rorty’, Political Theory, 1994, 22, 391–412.
Gadamer
55. Georgia Warnke, ‘Hermeneutics and the “New Pragmatism”’, Gadamer:
Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Polity Press, 1987), pp. 139–66, 194–7.
Habermas
56. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Coping with Contingencies: The Return of Historicism’,
in Jósef Niznik and John T. Sanders (eds.), Debating the State of Philosophy
(Praeger, 1996), pp. 1–24, 29–30.
Hegel
57. Jonathan Salem-Wiseman, ‘Absolute Knowing and Liberal Irony: Hegel,
Rorty, and the Criterion of Progress’, International Studies in Philosophy,
1999, 31, 139–53.
Heidegger
58. Charles B. Guignon, ‘On Saving Heidegger from Rorty’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 1986, 46, 401–17.
Nietzsche
59. Daniel W. Conway, ‘Disembodied Perspectives: Nietzsche contra Rorty’,
Nietzsche-Studien, 1992, 21, 281–9.
Peirce
60. Susan Haack, ‘“We Pragmatists …”: Peirce and Rorty in Conversation’,
Partisan Review, 1997, 64, 91–107.
Plato
61. William M. Goodman, ‘Theaetetus, Part II: A Dialogical Review’, Antioch
Review, 1984, 42, 393–408.
Putnam
62. Hilary Putnam, ‘Realism with a Human Face, Part Two: Relativism’, Realism
with a Human Face (Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 18–29, 323–4.
63. Hilary Putnam, ‘Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for
Concepts’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1992, 52, 431–8.
64. Paul D. Forster, ‘What is at Stake Between Rorty and Putnam?’, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 1992, 52, 585–603.
Wittgenstein
65. Greg Hill, ‘Solidarity, Objectivity, and the Human Form of Life:
Wittgenstein vs. Rorty’, Critical Review, 1997, 11, 555–80.
66. Michael Peters, ‘Rorty, Wittgenstein, and Postmodernism: Neopragmatism
and the Politics of the Ethnos’, in Michael Peters and James Marshall,
Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy (Bergin and Garvey, 1999),
pp. 133–51.
VOLUME IV
Themes
Bioethics
67. John D. Arras, ‘Rorty’s Pragmatism and Bioethics’, Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy, 2003, 28, 597–613.
Chinese Philosophy
68. Kwang-Sae Lee, ‘Rorty and Chuang Tzu: Anti-Representationalism,
Pluralism and Conversation (or Resonance of Pipings)’, Journal of Chinese
Philosophy, 1996, 23, 175–92.
Environmental Philosophy
69. Andrew Light, ‘Materialists, Ontologists, and Environmental Pragmatists’,
Social Theory and Practice, 1995, 21, 315–33.
70. Simon Hailwood, ‘Landscape, Nature, and Neopragmatism’, Environmental
Ethics, 2007, 29, 131–49.
Ethnocentrism
71. Matthew Festenstein, ‘Ethnocentrism and Irony’, Pragmatism and Political
Theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Polity Press, 1997), pp. 109–44, 216–24.
Feminism
72. Sabina Lovibond, ‘Feminism and Pragmatism: A Reply to Richard Rorty’,
New Left Review, 1992, 193, 56–74.
Irony
73. Phillips E. Young, ‘The Irony of Ironic Liberalism’, International Studies in
Philosophy, 1997, 29, 121–30.
74. John Horton, ‘Irony and Commitment: An Irreconcilable Dualism of
Modernity’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.), Richard
Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Polity Press, 2001), pp. 15–28.
Literature
75. Jon Stewart, ‘The Philosophical Curriculum and Literature Culture: A
Response to Rorty’, Man and World, 1994, 27, 195–209.
76. Barbara McGuinness, ‘Rorty, Literary Narrative and Political Philosophy’,
History of the Human Sciences, 1997, 10, 29–44.
Moral Philosophy
77. J. B. Schneewind, ‘What has Moral Philosophy Done for Us … Lately?’
(2009) (new for this collection).
78. Christian B. Miller, ‘Rorty and Moral Relativism’, European Journal of
Philosophy, 2002, 10, 354–74.
Nihilism
79. Karen L. Carr, ‘Richard Rorty and the Dissolution of Crisis’, The Banalization
of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to Meaninglessness (SUNY Press,
1992), pp. 85–116, 164–71.
80. M. A. Casey, ‘Rorty: The Post-Metaphysical Solution to Meaninglessness’,
Meaninglessness: The Solutions of Nietzsche, Freud, and Rorty (Lexington
Books, 2002), pp. 77–113.
Politics
81. Alan Johnson, ‘The Politics of Richard Rorty’, New Politics, 2000, 29,
103–21.
82. Norman Geras, ‘Language, Truth and Justice’, Solidarity in the Conversation of
Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty (Verso, 1995),
pp. 107–47.
Religion
83. Nicolas H. Smith, ‘Rorty on Religion and Hope’, Inquiry, 2005, 48, 76–98.
84. James Flaherty, ‘Rorty, Religious Beliefs, and Pragmatism’, International
Philosophical Quarterly, 2005, 45, 175–85.
Social Science
85. Ben Letson, ‘Richard Rorty and The Meaning of Social Science’, International
Social Science Review, 1995, 70, 43–52.
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