Mmda vs bel air village association

Ganzon vs Ca
Mathay vs ca
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
Ordillo vs Comelec
Abbas vs Comelec
Metro Traffic Command vs Gonong
Basco vs. PAGCOR (197 SCRA 52)
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp. (234 SCRA 255)

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. CoA (181 SCRA 495)













MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road,
Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that
the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police
power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant toSec.16 of the Code and in
the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development
authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the
rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.




GANZON VS CA

FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local
Government against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on
various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable
grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued 3
successive 60- day suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for prohibition against the
secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. He
also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this
petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any
authority to suspend and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to
exercise said power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority
because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that
the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan,
found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to
say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.






Province of Batangas Vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004

Relevant Background:

It was a case filed by Hon. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, Governor of Batangas petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked
(allocated) for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and
imposed conditions for the release thereof.

It started in 1998 when then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled
ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION to facilitate the
process of enhancing the capabilities of local government units in the discharge of the functions and
services devolved to them pursuant to the Local Government Code. Included in the EO No. 48 is the
appointment of the Oversight Committee authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations
governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs..

Subject of the case are the resolutions passed by the Oversight Committee (Chaired by the Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora). These are the resolutions with numbers OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, and
OCD-99-003. Further, these OCDs were approved by then Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines along with these OCDs as formulated by the Oversight Committee requires the LGUs to
identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals
and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for
the subsequent release of corresponding funds.

For the year 2000 and 2001, the same LGSEF of 1999 GAA were adopted due to failure of Congress to
enact general appropriation laws.

The standing point was when Gov. Mandanas received the LGSEF in the GAA of 1991.

The 5Billion LGESF for 2001 were as follows:

Modified Codal Formula P3.0Billion
Priority Projects P1.9 Billion
Capability Building Fund P0.1 Billion, Total = P5Billion

Furthere, the P3.0Billion of the abovementioned LGESF shall be allocated according to the modified
codal formula and be released to the four levels of LGUs., ie., provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays as follos:

Provinces, 25% - P0.750Billion
Cities, 25% - 0.750
Municipalities, 35% - 1.050
Barangays, 15% - 0.450, Total = P3Billion
Resolved Further, the P1.9Billion earmarked for Priority Projects shall be distributed according to the
following criteria:

1. For projects of the 4th, 5th, and 6th class LGUs, or
2. Projects in consonance with the Presidents SONA

Upon Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual members
of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also
wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution as it violates the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991 but otherwise, approved by Pres. Arroyo on January 25, 2002.

The Petitioner Points the Following Issues:

1. Unconstitutionality and void provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001.

2. Unlawful and illegal imposition of conditions issued by the Oversight Committee requiring
project proposals and documentary requirements prior to the release of LGUs just share in
the IRA is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991 (and that the possible disapproval by the Committee of the
project proposals of the LGUs is a diminution to then latters share in the IRA).

The petitioner contends the following:

In issue No.1 & 3, the respondent theorized that Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs was not intended to be a fixed
determination of share in the national taxes as the Congress may enact other laws, including the
aforementioned oppropriations law providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 merely
intended to be the default share of the LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually.

Further, the respondent avers that the petition has already been rendered as moot and academic as
it no longer presents a justifiable controversy because the IRAs of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001
have already been released and therefore, nothing more to prohibit, aside from the fact that the
petition should not have been filed with the Supreme Court because this court is not a trier of facts,
but, the lower courts of jurisdiction.

In issue No.2, the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally
infirm. The respondents stands that Section 6 of Article X of the Constitution does not specify the
just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local Government Code of 1991 and that
the phrase to be determined by law in the same provision means that there exists no limitation on
the power of Congress to determine what is the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. In
effect, the Congress serves as the arbiter of what should be the just share.

Courts Ruling:

The Court finds the petition to involve a significant legal issue. Issue No.1 is the crux of the instant
controversy as contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions infringe the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 and undoubtedly a legal question. However, the
earmarking of the LGSEF, the promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions and the release of the LGSEF
to the LGU following the requirements are not disputed.

Substantive issues stated above, in the course of the argument, although the supervening events as the
IRA including the LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001 had already been released, still, there was a compelling
reason to resolve the substantive issue raised in the instant petition, whether intended or incidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if grave violation of the Constitution is proved even
where the supervening events had made the cases moot in order to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.

The court held that, the state shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. (Art. II Sec. 25 of the
Constitution). Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision and has no power to control

The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the mandate of the Constitution. The
State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources.

Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos of the
IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto, transgress the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991.

To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time
to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory
mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The LGUs are,
thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.

That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote local autonomy
can be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M.
Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.





























Ismael Mathay (QC Mayor) v CA, CSC, Tan et al
3 Consolidated petitions | 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
1. During Mayor Simons term, private respondents were appointed to positions in the Civil Service
Unit(CSU);
CSU created pursuant to PD 51 allegedly signed into law in 1972;
2. In 1990, Secretary of Justice rendered an Opinion saying PD 51 was never published so it was
never deemed in force and effect;
Thus, it cant be a basis for CSUs;
3. June 4, 1990, CSC issue a Memo Circular for the recall of all appointments in CSUs because PD
51 never became law;
Private respondents are those affected;
4. For Quezon City employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by a City
Ordinance which established the Department of Order and Safety (DPOS);
Section 3 provides for absorption of the CSU units into the DPOS;
However, the regular and permanent positions in DPOS were not filled due to lack of
funds and the insufficiency of regular and permanent positions created;
5. Mayor Simon provided a remedy by offering private respondents contractual appointments
(June 5 to Dec 41 1991);
These were renewed for the period Jan 1 to June 30, 1992;
6. Come Mayor Mathays term, the appointments were renewed from July 1 to July 31, 1992 but
when were not renewed upon expiry;
Non-renewal is the cause of the 3 petitions;

GR 124374 and GR 126366
Respondents here appealed to CSC which held that the reappointment to the DPOS was
automatic pursuant to the City Ordinance so it ordered reinstatement of respondents. Petitioner filed
Certiorari to SC which referred it to the CA. CA dismissed.

Issue: CA err in ruling that CSC has authority to direct petitioner to reinstate private respondents in the
DPOS. NO.

Ratio:
1. Law applicable is BP 337 and not LGC 1992 which became effective on Jan 1, 1992.
a. Section 3 is invalid for being contrary to BP 337;
b. Section 3 directs absorption of personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS; the
ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions;
c. Hence, the city council, through the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy
the newly created DPOS positions;
d. Under BP 337, the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and
thus cannot be usurped through simple act of enacting ordinances that provide for
absorption of specific persons to specific positions;
2. CA erred in saying that the doctrine of separation of powers is not applicable to local
governments;
a. SC: powers of the city council and the city mayor are expressly enumerated separately
and delineated by BP 337;
3. Law clear:
a. Power to appoint with local chief executive;
b. Power of city council limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and
positions supported by local funds;
i. Council has no power to appoint;
ii. It is not in Section 177 of BP 337 which lists the powers of the council;
expression unios est exclusion alterius;
4. CSC substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power when it ordered petitioner to
reinstate private respondents;
a. CSCs power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment;
5. CSC: were merely implementing Section 3 of the ordinance;
a. SC: ordinance refers to the personnel of the CSU and resos of CSC call for
reinstatement of named individuals, thus there is no room left for the exercise of
discretion;
b. Farinas v Barba: appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by
the sanggunian concerned, since the power of appointment is a discretionary power;
c. When CSC ordered reinstatement, it technically issued a new appointment;
6. CA: at time ordinance was enacted, private respondents were still holders of de jure
appointments as permanent regular employees and therefore, by operation of law, were
automatically absorbed in DPOS;
a. SC: wrong premise;
b. Assuming Section 3 is valid, the absorption contemplated therein is not possible
because since CSU never legally came into existence, the private respondents never held
permanent positions;
c. Thus, respondents appointments were invalid ab initio; for them to enter Civil Service
after cancellation of their invalid appointment, they have to be extended an original
appointment;
7. Axiomatic: right to hold public office is not a natural right; it exists only by virtue of law;
a. Since PD 51 never became law, it could not be a source of rights;
b. Debugaldo v CSC: a void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part
of the holder of the appointment;
8. While CA correct in saying that abolition of an office does not mean the invalidity of
appointments thereto, this cannot apply at case because CSU was not abolished, it simply did
not come into existence;
9. As to concept of automatic absorption, another argument against it is the physical and legal
impossibility given the number of available positions in the DPOS and the number of personnel
to be absorbed;

GR 126354
CSC appealed decision of CA saying it has no authority to compel the mayor of Quezon City to
reinstate one Labajo to the DPOS.
- SC says CSC is not the real party in interest; Labajo is;
- CSC has no legal standing.

1
st
2 petitions granted.
















Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.


FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes
in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676
in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total
population, and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the
abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for
the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province
of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating
COMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably
then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao
on first Monday of March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a
memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board
and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others
that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under
Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of
more than one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary
of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and
restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for
the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until
another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress
and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute
such region.

HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more
than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the
Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising
their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one
of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art
V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI
sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming from different provinces and
cities in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common
regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the
letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical
and illogical.


Abbas vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734
Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled
for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the
Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.
Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details,
thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in
paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the
approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces
and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only
those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included
in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen
(13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total
votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority
in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic
Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By
including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that
Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed
to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria,
the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of
the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the
law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision
in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the
Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under
the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived
from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict
between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be
offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims
involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being
so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.



METRO TRAFFIC vs. GONONG

FACTS
The original complaint was filed by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate,
of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta.
He questioned the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but,
more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the
practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued.

Judge Gonong issued a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction .The parties
also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or
ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach,
remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case
at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or
continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by
PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any
city ordinance to justify the questioned act.

LOI 43, entitled Measures to Effect a Continuing Flow of Transportation on Streets and Highways, was
issued on November 28, 1972, with the following pertinent provisions:

Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways, streets and sidewalks, shall
immediately be removed by their owners/users; otherwise said vehicles shall be dealt
with and disposed in the manner stated hereunder;
1. For the first offense the stalled or illegally parked vehicle shall be removed, towed
and impounded at the expense of the owner, user or claimant;

2. For the second and subsequent offenses, the registry plates of the vehicles shall
be confiscated and the owner's certificate of registration cancelled.

PD 1605 (Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers Related to Traffic
Management, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes) was issued, also by President Marcos, on
November 21, 1978, and pertinently provides:

Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines
and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic
laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and
under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For his purpose, the powers of the Land
Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over
such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan
Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or
revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan
Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or
certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or
revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for
their records update.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed
within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall
subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00
for the second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's
license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver' license for the fifth
offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher
penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or
regulating the use of certain public roads, streets or thoroughfares in Metropolitan
Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but
the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount
of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city
or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National
Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of
issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law enforcement agency concerned shall
endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the
filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an
unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and
corresponding surcharges.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees,
orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).

ISSUE
1. Whether or not LOI 43 is valid.
2. Whether or not private respondents license can be confiscated.

RULING
1. Yes. The petitionerits insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It
contends that there is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with
illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the
flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only.

Private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605, which specifies all the sanctions
available against the various traffic violations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal and
confiscation of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the penalties being
limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or
certificates of public convenience, etc. He claims that removal and confiscation of the license plate
without notice and hearing violates due process because such license plate is a form of property
protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation.

The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled
in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked
in violation of the traffic laws. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and
confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties.
Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise
discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must
be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed."

It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is
an altogether different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as
where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition.
Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of
stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as
engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally
parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not
deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between a stalled
vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a different treatment for either.
"The first means one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which
stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest.

2. No. It is not covered by LOI 43 thus subject to a different penalty. As it has not been shown that
the private respondent's motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other
accidental cause and, no less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent
time, confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. And neither can that sanction
be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that "in case of traffic violations, (even) the
driver's license shall not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. If at all, the
private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific
penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.


Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because
they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the
removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition
of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise
discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that
is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in
case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila,
including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must
not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what
is called the power ofsubordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.








Basco vs. PAGCOR
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR
Facts:
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-
A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977
"to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines."
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy
and order
Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes
and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local
autonomy.
o Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any
"tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether National or Local."
Issue:
Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?
Held
No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on PAGCOR.
Reason:
The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the
principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an
Imperium in imperio it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or
revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to
the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Another Held
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is
a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.
The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by
PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license
fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local
taxes. The National Government is supreme over local governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot
defeat national policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to
defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose
taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it simply means decentralization.






















MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit
to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation
of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police
power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.

Held:
No.
CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances
should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local
Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot
be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.





Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples Liberation
Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not
undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political
negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that they
are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government
and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],
which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the
City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,
the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.


Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides
for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict
with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not
yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the President was still exercising
legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government in the
autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous
regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the
National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into
law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the
autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.