CAN A MARRIED WOMAN USE HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT?

Question: May a woman, who have been using her husbands surname, choose to revert to the use of
her maiden name despite the subsistence of her marriage?
Answer: Yes. Article 370 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBANDS SURNAME, OR
(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR
(3) HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS
MRS.
The use of the word may in the above provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by
the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v.Honorable
Judge Sharia District Court. A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not
only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is
not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in
consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
Question: For purposes of renewal of passport, can a married woman discontinue using her husbands
surname as indicated in her existing passport and now use her maiden name despite the subsistence of
her marriage?
Answer: Generally, no. Such discontinuance in the renewal passport can only be allowed in three
instances, namely: (1) when she has been divorced and the divorce decree is recognized under existing
laws of the Philippines; (2) or widowed; (3) or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as
void. This is consistent with Section 5(d) of Republic Act 8239 which is the law
governing passport issuance. Outside of these three instances, a married woman can not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.
Question: But can such married woman discontinue using her maiden name and now use her husbands
surname in her replacement passport?
Answer: Yes. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands
surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her
new passport, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden
name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. (Ma.
Virginia V. Remo vs. Secretary of ForeignAffairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010)
IN TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION, IS THE TESTATOR PRESUMED TO BE OF SOUND MIND?
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was
not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-
bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in
his will so long as it is legally tenable.
Pursuant to Article 800 of the New Civil Code, every person is presumed to be of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the
time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains
the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon
the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented
by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.
xxx Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and
of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act. xxx (BALTAZAR vs. LAXA, G.R. No.174489, April 11, 2012)
AGRARIAN DISPUTE OR EJECTMENT?
[ OCTAVIO VS. PEROVANO, G.R. No. 172400 , June 23, 2009]
ejectment vs. agrarian dispute

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law at the time the action is commenced, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant.

A scrutiny of the material allegations in respondents complaint before the MTCC shows that it involves
possession de facto, the only issue involved in ejectment proceedings. Enrico alleged he is the lawful and
registered owner of Lot No. 412 and that on or before the first week of January 1999, petitioners Zosimo
and Jesus, by threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered the premises of the land, ploughed it
and started planting sugarcane

Records show that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) promulgated on
June 3, 2005 a Decision ruling that Zosimo and Jesus are not recognized farmer-beneficiaries. Without
waiting for an award of any CLOA, complainants-appellants occupied the landholding. The acts of the
complainants-appellants are similar to that of land grabbing. The agrarian reform law is not enacted to
give license to anybody to grab somebody elses land. Neither [is it] enacted to protect the land
grabbers or the squatters (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners argument that the case involves an agrarian matter divesting the regular courts of
jurisdiction therefore has no merit. They are not farmer-beneficiaries but mere usurpers of the land.

Clearly, therefore, the action is one for ejectment and the MTCC has jurisdiction over it.
EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE NOT REQUIRED
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule.
Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration [Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA
104; emphasis supplied]. In the afore-cited case of Martinez vs. Martinez involving a husband and wife
as complainants and the husbands brother as defendant, it was held that complainants were not
required to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code because of the inclusion and presence of the
wife as one of the plaintiffs in the MTC. The court said that the wife is not a member of the same family
as that of her husband and the respondent brother-in-law.

Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper. Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively
between or among family members [ Hiyas Savings and Loans Banks, Inc. vs. Hon. Edmundo T. Acua,
August 31, 2006].
CAN YOU FORCE YOUR SPOUSE TO LIVE WITH YOU?
Question: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss?
Answer: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by
the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.

The obligation of spouses to live together under one roof is a highly personal obligation on their
respective part, and this should spontaneously flow from mutual love and affection. This cannot be
enforced by law or by the Courts.
In Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio and Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000 and G.R. No.
139808. May 12, 2000, respectively, it was pertinently held that:
With his [husband] full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to
privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas
corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of
subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced
under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power
is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor
child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
means and process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans
free choice.
Needless to say, this ruling equally applies for a wife who voluntarily decides not live with her husband
for purely personal reasons.
ON MOTHER'S LOVE
"Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth
more to a child of tender years than all other things combined." (Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124518, December 27, 2007)
CHURCH ON REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH LAW
The Diocese of Bacolod caused the posting on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of
Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the message Conscience Vote (Team Buhay/Team Patay Tarpaulin).
The tarpaulin contained the names of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial
candidates.

Is the subject tarpaulin an election propaganda subject to regulation by respondent COMELEC pursuant
to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

Recently, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the Supreme Court stopping stopping the
COMELEC from removing the tarpaulin containing the names of both Anti- and Pro-Reproductive Health
Law senatorial candidates put up by the Diocese of Bacolod City at the Bacolod Cathedral. The case is
still pending for resolution on its merits.
You can listen to the AUDIO RECORDING OF THE ORAL ARGUMENT held on March 19, 2013 before
the Supreme Court.