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Muslim exclusion in India: A review of the literature


Sajjad Hassan
Abstract

Its been 7 years since Sachar Committee published its reports, highlighting the deep and
extensive deprivations Muslims in India face on the range of counts It has been as many
years since the Central !overnment announced a programme of interventions to ameliorate
the condition of Minorities and Muslims "atest development data #India H$I %&''( )SS*,
%&''( )SS* %&'+, do not sho- any significant improvements in the conditions of Muslims
.his is a serious failing It is also true that data collection and systematic trac/ing and
analysing of performance for Muslims have been patchy at best !iven the limited scholarly
attention on Muslim deprivation and development, -e are not yet sure, in a sufficiently
nuanced -ay, -hat -or/s and -hat does not for Muslims, nationally as -ell as in different
regional settings .his is a significant gap, given ho- important Muslim outcomes are for
national policies of inclusive gro-th and political stability .his paper is a revie- of the
literature on exclusion of Muslims in India, and the varying understanding of the
phenomenon, including its regional and local dimensions It see/s to map the terrain, so to
spea/, in an effort to identify gaps and suggest research 0uestions to better understand the
drivers and facilitators of the exclusion, and ho- the developmental challenge for Muslims
could be overcome
Muslim exclusion in India: A review of the literature
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2
Sajjad Hassan
'

1. Introduction
It has been seven years since the Prime Ministers High evel !ommittee on "ocial#
$conomic and $ducational status of Muslim !ommunity in India# %o%ularly called the "achar
!ommittee# %ublished its re%orts# highlighting the dee% and extensive de%rivations Muslims
in India face in the range of sectors & education# em%loyment# %ublic services and the li'e. It
has been as many years since the !entral (overnment announced a %rogramme of
interventions to ameliorate the condition of Minorities# with Muslims ma'ing u% the
overwhelming ma)ority. atest data on develo%ment outcomes *(overnment of India# +,11-
.""/# +,11- .""/ +,101 do not show any significant im%rovements in the conditions of
Muslims. It is however# also true that data collection and systematic trac'ing and analysing
change in those outcomes for Muslims# have been %atchy at best. $2ually# given the limited
scholarly attention on Muslim de%rivation and develo%ment# we are not sure yet# in a
sufficiently nuanced way# what wor's and what does not for Muslims# nationally as well as in
different settings. 3his is a significant ga% in understanding# given that Muslims ma'e u%
145 of Indias %o%ulation *+,11 !ensus1# and are counted# along with "cheduled !aste and
"cheduled 3ribes# among those ma'ing u% the largest section of the marginalised in India.
3his %a%er is a review of the literature on exclusion of Muslims in India# and the varying
understanding of the %henomenon# including its regional and local dimensions. It see's to
ma% the terrain# so to s%ea'# in an effort to identify ga%s and suggest research 2uestions to
better understand the drivers and facilitators of the exclusion# and how the develo%mental
challenge for Muslims could be overcome. 3he %a%er aims to %ro%ose a research agenda# and
2uestions for further ex%loration# based on an understanding of Muslim de%rivation that is
more com%lex and analytical than what is currently available in the literature. In this it ta'es
account of the varying regional and sectoral# besides conce%tual# understanding of
de%rivation and well being. In studying Muslim well6being# this review has focused on more
direct develo%ment outcomes & such as education# em%loyment# %ublic services. 3he review
therefore is necessarily limited# not having examined# in any case not in any detail# the
literature on identity and security7violence# both of which contribute to the realisation of
8direct develo%ment outcomes# besides being develo%ment outcomes themselves.
3he review was conducted based on literature search. "earch engines7sources used were
(oogle scholar# ("9:!# $conomic and Political :eview# and ;"3/:. /ther 8sites included
official websites in India 6 Ministry of Minority Affairs# Planning !ommission and state
government websites. <or wor's on affirmative action %olicies and %ractices in =># which
was a %articularly relevant %oint of com%arison# given its much celebrated multi6cultural
%olicies# I used :unnymede <oundation# besides => (overnment websites. A%art from wor's
identified through these searches# additional wor's were added# based on those identified in
the %revious search out%uts. 3he full list of wor's identified thus is listed in the annexed
bibliogra%hy.
As sign%ost to the rest of the %a%er# I begin# in "ec +# with %roviding a catalogue of
%erformance of Muslims on various counts of develo%ment# doing so in com%arative light# to
show the extent of the de%rivation. Here I also %rovide# in a summary fashion# how %articular
1
Centre for Equity Studies, New Delhi. All correspondence to
i!s""dhssn#$!il.co!

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de%rivations have been understood and ex%lained in the %o%ular literature. In "ec 0# I review
the relevant theoretical literature & on minority rights# hori?ontal ine2uality and social
exclusion & to %rovide a setting for further discussions# followed by a review of the %olicy
im%lications of these understandings# loo'ing first at exclusion conce%tually# followed by the
India case material# es%ecially as it %ertains to the other marginalised grou%s & dalits and
adivasis 6 to draw lesson from for %olicy discussion on Muslims. In "ec 4# I o%en u% a new
front to understand Muslim wellbeing in a com%arative sense# across different %arts of India#
starting with outcomes# followed by the ex%lanations %rovided# so as to %oint to their
inade2uacy in ex%laining variance. Here I also chec' out how )ustifications for overall
%erformance across states com%ares with that for Muslim %erformance. @ut there are intra6
regional variations too in %erformance# and this I ex%lore in "ec A. 3he rest of the %a%er *"ec
B1 summarises the ga%s in literature examined so far# to %ro%ose a research agenda#
identifying 2uestions and suggesting a %otential methodology.
+. How do Muslims %erformC
3hat Muslims %erform %oorly on well6being outcomes is well established. @elow is a
catalogue of the outcomes# based on recent re%orts.
+.1 Poverty:
According to the "achar !ommittee re%ort %overty among Muslims in +,,46,A stood at 01
%er cent# )ust under that for "!s7"3s *at 0A %er cent1. 3his was more %ronounced in urban
areas# where nearly half of all Muslims *44 %er cent1 counted amongst the %oorest# com%ared
to the national average of +D %er cent. 3he "achar re%ort found Muslims in =ttar Pradesh#
@ihar# Assam and Eest @engal# constituting the %oorest sections of the %o%ulation# along with
"! and "3s. 3hese are also states where most Muslims live. In rural areas too# Muslims
lagged behind the national average %overty ratio 6 00 %er cent# against +F %er cent overall.
:ecent measures show similar trends# as shown by India6Human 9evelo%ment :e%ort +,11.
*(overnment of India# +,11:41. 3he significantly high urban %overty among Muslims is
re%orted also by India6H9:# using ."" +,,G6,F data# at +0 %er cent# com%ared to 10 %er cent
for Hindus as a whole. Poverty incidence among Muslims was marginally better than that for
Hindus# in rural areas# at 10.0 %er cent *Hindu: 14.0 %er cent1. *Ibid: 11G1. /ther indicators of
%overty show similar trends. 3he relative de%rivation of Muslims# along with "!s# "3s was
evident in their ownershi% of assets as well & the Access Index of Asset /wnershi%
+
across
social grou%s was the lowest for "!s# while across religious communities it was the lowest
among Muslims *in +,,+&01. *Ibid: B1. And the monthly %er ca%ita ex%enditure *MP!$1#
based on .ational "am%le "urvey +,,D61, returns Muslims and "!s7"3s amongst the
%oorest. *<a?al# +,10:A1.
+.+ <ood security and health:
Malnutrition is an indicator of chronic hunger# which is critically lin'ed to %eo%les health
status. As we 'now India fares badly on this count. According to the International <ood
Policy :esearch Institute re%ort# 1+ of 1G ma)or states of India figure in the 8alarming
category of status of hunger and malnutrition. *Menon et al +,,D1 It is no sur%rise then that a
2
Defined as the share of assets owned by the community divided by the communitys share of %o%ulation
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third of Indias adult %o%ulation has a body mass index *@MI1 of less than 1F.A 6 the number
below which %eo%le are declared malnourished. 3he condition of children and women is
%articularly acute. India has the largest number of malnourished children in the world & so
much so that nearly half of all children under three years of age are malnourished# according
to one re%ort# the severity is twice as much as that for sub6"aharan Africa *(overnment of
India# +,11:B6G# 2uoting .utrition :e%ort +,,D of .<H" 01. Here too Muslims suffer badly.
3he incidence of female malnutrition and children suffering from anaemia and stunting was
above the national average among Muslims# %articularly in =P and @ihar and other states
with a high concentration of Indias Muslims registered a higher incidence of anaemia among
Muslim children# com%ared to others. And while female malnutrition has been reducing over
time# it is increasing for Muslims *data between 1DDF&D and +,,A&B1. *Ibid: F1
And while overall health indicators *outcome & IM:# =AM:# MM:1 are im%roving# and
overtime# these indicators for the marginali?ed grou%s li'e "!s7"3s and Muslims are
converging with the national average *Ibid: F1# %rocess indicators# such as institutional
deliveries# contrace%tion %revalence rate# immunisation rate# are less robust# es%ecially when
it comes to the excluded grou%s. It is in%ut indictors *%ublic investment in health# health
facilities and human resource# sanitation# safe drin'ing water and the li'e1 that there is most
%roblem for Muslims and other li'e them. "3s and Muslims have the highest 3otal <ertility
:ate *3<:1# only one6third of Muslim and "! women have institutional deliveries# only
around A, %er cent of Muslim# "!# and "3 women receive three or more Antenatal A.! *I1#
visits. *Ibid: 1,1
+.0 $ducation
Poverty and education have a well established correlation. According to !ensus +,,1#
Muslims were the least literate among all religious communities. 3he recent .""/ +,,G6,F
survey# education round# further confirms a high %ro%ortion of Muslims as illiterates. 3his
was at %ar with that of "!s7"3s# and higher than for /@!s. Muslim women *4G.0 %er cent1
ma'e u% amongst the most illiterate sections of society# com%arable to "!7"3 *A0.+1 women.
A substantial %ro%ortion of MuslimsH1F %er cent male# and 1A.4 %er cent female 6 had
attained only %rimary education. Meanwhile at higher# u%%er %rimary and above levels#
Muslim %ro%ortion was significantly lower than that among all other grou%s including "!s.
*<a?al# +,10: B1. /f course# the %roblem of %oor education among Muslims is multifaceted.
ess than half Muslim girls in age for %rimary and u%%er6%rimary level school# were enrolled.
*(overnment of India# +,11:D1 Among all religious communities# Muslims had the lowest
.et Attendance :atio *.A:1 at all levels of education# in both rural and urban India. In fact#
in rural India# low .A: among "3s was com%arable with that of the Muslims at the
secondary and higher secondary levels. In urban India# .A: for Muslims was even lower
than that for "!s and "3s at all levels exce%t at the higher secondary level# where they were
similar. *Ibid: 1D,1. 9ata also reveals that it is at =%%er Primary level *mostly in rural areas#
but also urban1 that the .A: for Muslims shows the biggest dro%. And most seriously#
incidence of 8out of school children *of all social grou%s1 was the highest among Muslims.
3he main concern with education among Muslims remains the low retention rate# causing
high dro%6out# and %oor transition# as children %rogress through the school system. Muslim
children constitute 1B.B %er cent of total national enrolment in (rade I# but this declines to F.4
%er cent at (rade IIII. *(overnment of India# +,1+:1+1# leading the re%ort to conclude# 8J
transition to u%%er %rimary stage is one of the ma)or bottlenec's in the education of Muslim
children *Ibid:141. 3he other concern is that around girls education# with only a very
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minuscule %ro%ortion of Muslims girls having com%leted secondary and graduate education.
*Ibid:A1. According to H9: +,11# incidence of out of school children is associated with
%overty. <inancial constraints turn out to be the main barrier to continuation of education#
forcing children into child labour & higher among Muslims *0 51 com%ared to the national
average *+.451. *(overnment of India# +,11: ++D1. Involvement of Muslims in traditional
occu%ations *car%et# glass# loc's# brassware# among others1 that due to old technology attract
child labour1. *Ibid: ++D1. /verall# the literacy %roblem among Muslims is worst in =P# @ihar
and Eest @engal. *Ibid:1FA1
+.4 $m%loyment
Eor'er %o%ulation ratio *EP:1 6 the %ro%ortion of an economys wor'ing6age %o%ulation
that is em%loyed & is a useful measure of the %ro%ortion of %o%ulation that is actively
contributing to the %roduction of goods and services in the economy. Among ma)or religious
grou%s# H9: +,11 found EP: being com%arable among Hindus# !hristians# and "i'hs# but
much lower in the case of Muslims. <or exam%le rural E<P: for Muslim women was only
+A %er cent# com%ared to G, %er cent for Hindu women. 3his is sur%rising given how EP: is
much higher for both "!s and "3s# as com%ared to all# ex%lained by H9: +,11 on account of
the latters %overty# therefore 8must wor' in order to survive *(overnment of India# +,11:
DD1.
0

How about em%loyment in the %ublic sector# at national and state levelC According to data
collected by the "achar !ommittee# Muslims re%resented only 4.D %er cent of all em%loyees
*in central and state governments1. 3heir re%resentation in central P"=# at 0.0 %er cent was
only slightly bettered for those in state P"=s# at 1,.F 5. *(overnment of India +,,B: 1BA1.
/verall %ublic sector em%loyment data showed better re%resentation in lower rungs *%oor in
higher managerial levels1# and in university )obs# es%ecially non6 teaching# and in clerical
%ositions in Postal de%artment and the :ailways. 3here was a big %roblem about data
availability 6 com%lete data was received only from >arnata'a# Maharashtra# (u)arat and
3amil .adu. /nly Andhra Pradesh had close to %o%ulation share re%resentation in )obs. /ther
better %erforming states were >arnata'a *at G, %er cent of %o%ulation share1# (u)arat *at AD
%er cent1 and 3amil .adu *at AG %er cent1. *Ibid: 1G,1 @ut there were vast variations across
levels with better re%resentation at lower than higher levels# and also across de%artments and
agencies 6 $ducation# Home# and 3rans%ort *that ty%ically have large numbers of 8foot
soldiers6 teachers# constables and drivers and conductors1# allowed for a better re%resentation
of Muslims at lower ran's. 3hese findings are confirmed by a study of the "achar !ommittee
as %art of its evaluation# of recruitment through state civil service commissions over %revious
A year by select northern states. Hindus6(eneral category was over6re%resented across the
states# while Muslims# along with "! and "3# were severely under re%resented. *Ibid: 1G41.
+.A How are %oor outcome ex%lainedC
/verall# the extent of Muslim exclusion then is all6round and dee%6seated. 8J.the all India
%attern that emerges is of a community stee%ed in %overty# having low educational
attainment# bereft of land and other immovable assets# and largely de%endent on self
%
3he "achar !ommittee %ointed to the lower %artici%ation of Muslim women in economic activities# as the
reason for this %oor EP: among Muslims *rural E<P: for Muslim women was only +A %er cent# com%ared to
G, %er cent for Hindu women1 ex%lained on account of high de%endency rate among Muslims due to a higher
share of younger %o%ulation among Muslim women. *IbidJ.1.
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em%loyment in low income activities. *<a?al K >umar# +,1+:1DA1. Ehat are the %o%ular
ex%lanations for the %oor outcomesC
ets start with education# where Muslims do %articularly badly. 3he received wisdom#
reflecting long6standing stereoty%es about the community# has been that Muslims are not
interested in modern education# rather they %refer to send their children to madrasas# and are
%articularly reluctant to send their girls out to schools. *(ayer K ;affrelot# +,10:41. 3he
"achar re%ort made the %oint that there is a great deal of evidence now to show that Muslims
are as 'een to send their children to schools as any other community# but that they are
%revented from doing so for a variety of reasons. As to madrasas# the re%ort showed that
actually only a minuscule %o%ulation of Muslims %refer madrasas# and that too as other
avenues of education are not available close by. 3he re%ort cites# for exam%le# a recent study
to ma'e the %oint that economic circumstance of households has a ma)or role to %lay in
determining schooling outcome. It ex%lains# school enrolment for different communities is
significantly affected by the local level of develo%ment *e.g.# availability of schools and other
infrastructure1 and the educational status of %arents. *(overnment of India# +,,B: AF1.
3he "achar re%ort demonstrates# using analysis of time trends that des%ite overall
im%rovement in educational status# the rate of %rogress has been the slowest for Muslims.
3his has meant that the ga% between Muslims and other grou%s has widened since
Inde%endence# and %articularly since the 1DF,s. "achar re%ort attributed this to the inability of
Muslims to rea% the benefits of %lanning# noting that while %rogressing through the o%eration
of tric'le down or %ercolation effect# Muslims have gradually sli%%ed further and further
behind other ":!s# *Ibid: F41. It concluded that survey of changes in educational %atterns
across ":!s suggest that "!s and "3s have rea%ed at least some advantages of targeted
government and %rivate action su%%orting their educational %rogress. *Ibid: FB1. 3hese are
about affirmative action & the %olicy of reservation in educational institutions in %ro%ortion to
their share of the %o%ulation. 3here is nothing li'e this for Muslims# at least at the national
level.
:egarding %oor re%resentation in %ublic sector em%loyment# "achar re%ort noted the general
%erce%tion among Muslims alleging discrimination against them# in %rocedures *such as
unhel%ful eligibility criteria1# %ractices *unre%resentative selection boards1# and a general
sense of discrimination in selection %rocesses# as result of absence of Muslims in %ositions of
authority# to raise their voice. 3his# the re%ort noted# meant lac' of any concerted focus at best
and %re)udice at worst# leading to denial of Muslims their rightful share of services# even in
grade II %ositions where high 2ualifications are not re2uired. *Ibid: +,6+11 (iven the
salience of %olitics of %atronage in India# es%ecially in states with large Muslim %o%ulations#
*such a =ttar Pradesh# refer !handra# +,,B on this1# this does not seem li'e a far6fetched
grievance. As for higher %ositions# where there are high eligibility criteria and laid down
%rocedures# "achar re%ort %ro%osed# based on data %rovided by the =nion Public "ervice
!ommission# that the biggest challenge was not enough Muslim youth o%ting to a%%ly#
indicating a %ossible sense of alienation of Muslim youth from the mainstream. *(overnment
of India# +,,B: 1BA6BB1. 3he relevant 2uestion then is# what is behind thisC
astly# Muslim access to %ublic services and develo%ment %rogrammes# es%ecially the many
beneficiary oriented schemes# and those that offer direct and si?eable benefits to the %oor is
%oor. *Ibid: 1GF1 3hese include those for housing# livelihood and em%loyment# in rural as well
as urban areas# health and nutrition schemes# social security schemes such as %ension#
maternity and other benefits and the li'e. "imilar is the case with access to civic amenities
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and infrastructure. Muslims being forced into slums# and increasingly ghettoised# and the
%oor %rovision of services in these slums *missing health centres# aganwadis# and school- ill
'e%t roads# lac' of %i%ed water and sanitation- %oor electricity coverage and that of ban's for
credit %rovision1- large staff shortages there# or at least staff absence# combined with the
negative attitude of staff %osted there# result in overall %oor wor'ing of those services for the
inhabitants of the slums. 3here is little effort too to trac' and measure 2uality of service#
resulting in %oor outcome. Perce%tions among Muslims about why there is such %oor access
and u%ta'e# blamed %oor awareness among the community about these %rogrammes and
wides%read discrimination in %rovision of services# such as when Muslims are hindered#
rather than facilitated# in getting their caste certificates to avail schemes. *(overnment of
India# +,,B: +06+41. Perce%tions also attributed %oor reach of the services to Muslims to low
%artici%ation of Muslims in the %olitical %rocess# es%ecially at the local level# in panchayats
and bloc' samitis# including of women. *Ibid: 1FF1.
0., 3he theoretical literature
0.1 Ehat does the theoretical literature on %overty# marginalisation and exclusion# and
their em%irical counter%arts from India# sayC How does Muslim exclusion differ from that of
other communitiesC Ehat# theoretically# are the drivers and the facilitators of exclusion# and
what does theory say on countering thoseC It is these 2uestions we will engage with in this
current section. Ee will begin with examining how exclusion of Muslims in India has been
framed# and then try to locate it within the wider literature on exclusion of s%ecific social
grou%s# in an attem%t to %ull out com%arable and contrasting themes. 3he effort will be to
evaluate whether existing ways of understanding the %henomenon are ade2uate# and whether
they hel% ex%lain the range of dimensions of the %roblem# or are there large ga%s in
understanding that need to be ex%lored.
It is often claimed that the %oor are the same everywhere# and suffer similar disabilities. @ut
being a %oor from a Muslim bac'ground %oses its own set of challenges. A variety of factors
have been identified to ex%lain the observed relative de%rivation among Muslims in India. As
@asant argues# these include differentials in endowments across social grou%s- actual or
%erceived discrimination- and behaviour %atterns or attitudes and su%%ly of educational and
em%loyment o%%ortunities. *@asant# +,1+: 41 3hus %oor Muslims are further burdened: they
suffer %roblems faced by the %oor generally & %oor assets# %oor ca%abilities# and active
discrimination by state and social forces# wanting to maintain the status 2uo. /n to% of this#
%oor Muslims face the additional disabilities s%ecific to belonging to the Muslim community.
"achar re%ort used the framewor' of identity, security and e0uity# to ex%lain the mutli6
dimensional nature of Muslim exclusion. In essence it showed that %roblems faced by
Muslims relate to a combination of identity# security and e2uity related concerns & and that
these three overla% and feed into each other in myriad ways# to create the lived ex%eriences of
exclusion faced by Muslim communities. *Ibid:111 3o ta'e an exam%le# fact of ones Muslim
identity means that# for Muslim youth# finding a room to rent in mixed habitation settlements#
or being able to land a )ob in a com%any is increasingly becoming difficult. <re2uent and
%eriodic violence against the community in riots or through discriminatory actions by the
%olice# means that the youth# in this case# are constantly in a state of siege# resulting in %oor
mobility or %oor ability to access education o%%ortunities# es%ecially for girls. *Ibid: 141
$xclusion# of course# most directly im%acts what are called 8e2uity concerns. In the case of
education# for exam%le# these are about %oor availability of school infrastructure in Muslim
concentred areas# %oor 2uality of education %rovided# including insensitive text boo's#
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%overty coming in the way of children fully utilising the o%%ortunities that are available# and
low %erceived benefits from education. *Ibid: 1A1 Im%lication is that efforts to ameliorate the
conditions too must ta'e the multidimensionality of %overty7well6being into account.
0.+ In the literature such exclusion & along identity lines & has been defined as 8hori?ontal
ine2uality *as o%%osed to vertical1. Hori?ontal Ine2uality *HI1 exists among grou%s *based on
ascri%tive criteria# caste or religion for instance1 %ersisting over long %eriods# tra%%ing %eo%le#
generation after generation# in a situation of %overty. 3hese also might give rise to social
instability# in extreme cases driving inter6grou% conflicts. HIs# ex%lain its %ro%onents# are
multidimensional 6 main dimensions being economic# social# %olitical and cultural 6 and the
interactions among the dimensions and the elements within them are im%ortant factors
determining %ersistent de%rivations of grou%s. ac' of access to education *a social
ine2uality1 for exam%le may lead to low incomes *an economic one1 and both may be
res%onsible for and also caused by lac' of %olitical %ower. *"tewart K anger# +,,G:A1. In
ex%laining %ersistence of de%rivations# the authors use a framewor' in which
com%lementarities between the %roductivity and accumulation of different ty%es of ca%ital
*%hysical and human# for exam%le1 tend to lead to self6%er%etuating cycles of success and
failure# %articularly given the asymmetric social ca%ital between different identity grou%s. @y
contrast# Iertical Ine2uality# or ine2uality among all individuals or households in a society# is
also ty%ically %ersistent *that is# a continuously high (ini coefficient1# yet individuals or
families may move in and out of %overty# in what has been defined as 8churning. *Ibid: A1
HI is useful conce%t to understand how different social grou%s *blac' and white in the ="# or
!atholic and Protestant in .orthern Ireland# and northern and southerners in (hana1 seem to
be loc'ed in %er%etuating cycles of de%rivation or %rivilege# and why these differences tend to
be so stic'y. 3hus grou%s that start in a %rivileged %osition are able to accumulate more#
having higher returns to assets and thus sustain their %rivilege# while those who start in an
under%rivileged %osition fall into a vicious cycle# or %overty tra%. *Ibid: 1+1. HI has also been
successful in ex%laining why societies with high levels of HI are %rone to violence# because
8grou% ine2uality can be more damaging for individual well6being than similar ine2uality
among a homogeneous %o%ulation# forcing %eo%le in de%rived grou%s to feel tra%%ed in their
situation# hence the feeling of grievance that then eru%ts in violence. *Ibid: A1.Ehat HI fails
to do# however# is to un%ac' the blac'box to ex%lain the %rocesses of the %ersistence of higher
returns to assets of grou%s with a head start# com%ared to how the de%rived are tra%%ed. Ehat
determines %ersistence of the structures and the vicious *or virtuous1 circlesC
3he conce%t of social exclusion is hel%ful here. Ehile 8the clustering of disadvantages of
various 'inds and the mutual reinforcement between the different dimensions# as in HI# hel%s
ex%lain the %ersistence of %overty among the socially excluded J.. *Ibid: F1# it is the
mechanisms driving %rocesses of social exclusion that are critical here. A 'ey one# as .aila
>abeer demonstrates# is the %rocesses of cultural devaluation, through which the social
exclusion of certain grou%s and categories by other dominant grou%s is %er%etuated as a
%ro%erty of societal structures. 83hese %rocesses draw on beliefs# norms and values to
dis%arage# stereoty%e# invisibilise# ridicule and demean these 8des%ised grou%s and categories
and thereby ex%lain and )ustify the denial of full rights of %artici%ation in the economic#
social and %olitical life of that society. *+,,B: 1. "uch %rocesses# >abeer ex%lains# can have
im%lication for demand by excluded grou%s for better %rovision# a%art from affecting the
su%%ly of those# as they 8have %rofound effects on the sense of self6worth and 8sense of
agency of those who are treated in this way and on the terms on which they are able to access
the resources and o%%ortunities in different s%heres of their society. *ibid: F1. 3hese# among
DRAFT
+
others go into ma'ing the lower return to assets for exam%le# that along with low assets to
begin with# ex%lain the difference in %er ca%ita consum%tion between dalit and adivasi
households and the rest of the %o%ulation. *Ibid: 4# 2uoting >o?el and Par'er# +,,01. "imilar
%rocesses may wor' for %oor education attainment and livelihood o%%ortunities. "imilarly#
8biased %rovision of basic services and lac' of %olitical voice & due to %oor re%resentation in
elected councils# civil service )obs and in media *elements that have the %ower to undo 8lower
return and increase %roductivity# thus im%rove well being and livelihood %ros%ects1 are some
of the other %rocesses by which the economic vulnerability of excluded grou%s is reinforced.
*Ibid: 1161+1.

Ar)an de Haan too highlights this focus of social exclusion on process and relations that
create and recreate %overty# going beyond 8social ine2uality# in examining dis%arities
between grou%s of %eo%le# by loo'ing not only at structures and constraints on o%%ortunity
*low assets and low returns on those1# but em%hasise also the role of actors# in building and
transforming these structures &through behaviour# attitudes and active denial. *1DDD: 0G1. 3he
focus on the relational nature of de%rivation em%hasises the need to address the social
%rocesses and institutions that underlie de%rivation# by as'ing why and how some grou%s are
included and others excluded# while focusing on actors 6 who excludesC *Ibid: 041. 3he core
here is the social as%ect of de%rivation & which# as de Hass ex%lains# are not only the outcome
of de%rivation# nut also an integral %art of it. *see also ("9:.1. 3his also connect to the
other %oint that de Hass ma'es with regards social exclusion & about the necessity of the
social exclusion framewor' being informed by a notion of rights. 8=ltimately# social
integration needs to refer to individuals and grou%s right to be integrated and the right to a
societys %roducts and valuesJ..*Ibid: 0F1. 3he advantage in ado%ting a human rights
a%%roach is of course that 8Jbeneficiaries of develo%ment are considered to be rights6
holders# not sub)ect to charity# and are thus able to ma'e legitimate claims on governments
for their rights to be res%ected */.eill et al: +,,0: 01.
0.0 Ehat are the %olicy im%lications of using HI and social exclusion %rismsC According
to de Haan# first is that emanating from stress on multi6dimensional nature of de%rivation 6
%ointing to the need to integrate sectoral a%%roaches *de Haan# 1DDD:041. Im%rovements in
lives of the %oor are %ossible only if there is %rogress on health# nutrition# social %rotection
along with livelihood security. "tewart et al %ro%ose something similar when they argue for a
com%rehensive a%%roach that ac'nowledges the multi6dimensionality of exclusion &
simultaneously address the multi%le de%rivations and their sources. *+,,G:J.1. <urther# the
s%ecificity of intervention & targeting s%ecific disabilities of excluded grou%s 6 is recognised#
but this should best be done combining with 8universal a%%roaches & for# as >abeer notes#
universality builds solidarity7oneness# and brings the advantaged into %olicy connection with
the disadvantaged & through e2ual %rovision of services for exam%le. *+,,B: 141 Hass too
%ro%oses building a %olicy community su%%ortive of fighting social exclusion. 3his also
echoes notions of inclusive 8%olitical settlement and 8social contract su%%ortive of %ro6%oor
growth. *see eftwich +,,F1.
/ther %ro%osed interventions include those that might reduce ine2ualities in ca%ital
accumulation# so as to offset %ast discrimination and undo the discriminatory im%act of %ast
discriminations & through eliminating barriers in entry to education# %rovision of loans and
credit# and access to housing loan and su%%ort. $2ually im%ortant is im%roving the rate of
return on the various ty%es of ca%ital. 3his last has been found %ossible by %roviding
com%rehensive su%%ort *eg. education su%%ort# along with that for better access to
em%loyment o%%ortunities# %ossible through fair em%loyment legislation such as 2uotas1. And
DRAFT
1,
im%ortant towards enhancing the rate of return on ca%ital# as "tewart et al have shown# is
enhancing social ca%ital & to enable the excluded to use networ's an collective action. !learly
here it will be the use of 8bridging social ca%ital that will have greater im%act. *"tewart#
+,,G1
3he 'ey role of %olitics *im%lying here rebooting the %ower imbalance to give the excluded
more say and re%resentation1 in su%%orting and driving change here# has been a commonly
stressed theme. "tewart et al show# in their successful cases how HIs were reduced in
Malaysia and .orthern Ireland# in the former case# a Malay6dominated national government
%ushed through a strong %rogramme of affirmative action and redistributive %olicies to
im%rove the condition of the Malays# com%ared to the !hinese dominant business class. In a
the case of .orthern Ireland# it was a national government at Eestminster and and external
agency of the $uro%ean =nion government# that forced change on the ground# in o%%osition
to local Protestant =nionist ma)ority# to e2ualise education and em%loyment o%%ortunities and
access to services for catholic re%ublics. *Ibid: D6011. In the final analysis# as >abeer notes# it
is the degree to which we are able to move from ameliorative to transformative a%%roaches
*through social7%olitical mobilisation# em%owerment and ca%acity building1 allowing the
greater %artici%ation of 8excluded grou%s in the design of %rogrammes and in the %olitical
decision6ma'ing %rocessesJ towards rewriting the social contract and crafting a new
%olitical settlement# that will determine the success of inclusive efforts. @uilding a %olicy
community 6 with elements from .(/s# (overnments# donors# organisations of the %oor and
cor%orations & is central here. *+,,B:141
0.4 Ehat of the s%ecific literature on IndiaC How has Indias %oor %erformance on
fighting exclusion and %overty been understoodC !hronic Poverty :esearch !entre reminds
us# the main wea'nesses of the Indian effort at fighting %overty & des%ite the many tools and
models used 6 have been# inter alia# the lac' of disaggregated and dynamic analysis of
%overty# %reventing addressing its s%ecific drivers and maintainers. 3here is also %oor effort at
targeting the %oor# most %rogrammes diffusedly attem%ting to reach the nebulous %oor. Eea'
im%lementation ca%acity# %oor commitment of resources# and local 8ca%ture by %olitician6
bureaucrat6contractor nexus# combine with %owerful structural maintainers & social
hierarchies# and une2ual land distribution# %articularly & to create the failure that we see all
around us. *!P:!# +,,G: 41.
And Piron K !urran# in examining %olicies in India to address social exclusion# highlight the
adverse role of %olitical economy im%airing effective im%lementation# %ointing to the nature
of the %arty system# %atronage structures & including between the administration and elite
grou%s & and the need for broad6based coalitions. 3his last connects to the %oint about
8%reconditions for %olicy ado%tion 6 # most im%ortant being recognition# among the %olicy
community that 8exclusion exists and is not acce%table as %art of the 8social contract. *+,,A:
iii1. 3his# of course# also lin's u% to !P:!s %oint about building a %olicy community around
social %rotection. Indias %rinci%al failure# the authors show# has been %oor im%lementation of
e2uity enhancing %olicies# ex%lained by Piron et al# due to a combination of technical
constraints# including administrative barriers that %revent the %oor accessing entitlements- a
result of lac' of genuine commitment to %olicy ob)ectives by those charged with
im%lementation- that itself is nurtured by %revalent institutionalised discrimination & caste#
communal and corru%tion. It is thus elite interests *and this could ta'e different form1 that
essentially sideline %olicies and sabotage their im%lementation. *Ibid:+G6011. Among other
things# the authors underline %articularly# the role of social mobilisation among the %oor
themselves# as the way out.
DRAFT
11
$x%laining the severe and durable dis%arity between social grou%s in /rissa# ta'ing the case
of adivasi in %articular# Ar)an 9e Haan# blames the lac' of %erformance of those very %ro6
%oor %rogrammes on 8J..a lac' of accountability within the administrative system# and that
the very dis%arities that the %olicies try to address# %ermeate the system of delivery
res%onsible for these. *de Haan# +,,4:11. He shows how a narrow *%olitical and
administrative1 elite in /rissa# with little incentive to o%en u% its social base to the %oor#
im%lementing a slew of social %rogrammes# all to% down with little tribal *or indeed
subaltern1 %artici%ation# both within administrative systems and civil society# in a context
where civil society generally# and adivasi association and voice %articularly# is very wea'#
results in rendering many of the %otentially6%rogressive %rogrammes and institutions#
ineffective at best and ex%loitative at worst. He reminds us# at the heart of this is the
unre%resentative %ower structure in the state# that among other things# drives the %ush for
industrialisation# focuses on investment in mineral sector & to the exclusion of agriculture#
and %erformance for adivasis and dalits 6 and can afford to deny the incidence of acute
malnutrition and hunger# and starvation deaths. *+,,4: 1D6+,1.
In my own accounts of tribal destitution elsewhere# I have shown how rather than addressing
the une2ual %ower imbalance that sustains dis%arity and destitution# norms# %ractices and
interests of 'ey state agencies for tribal develo%ment# combine with %oor control of the tribals
over resources and o%%ortunities that determine their lives# in the context of wea' %ro6%oor
%olicy commitment and wea'er tribal 8voice# to reinforce the ex%loitative system 6 leading
to exclusion from forest resources# %oor access to land and other %roductive assets# and denial
of services and entitlements. *Hassan. +,10a1. @roadly similar dynamics wor' for tribals
elsewhere in central India. It is similarly# the unre%resentative %ower structure that over6
determines the durable failures of %rogrammes to reach the dalits *%overty alleviation#
nutrition# health and education# among others1 resulting in the continuing %overty and
marginalisation of the %oorest of the %oor grou%s. :emar'able here is the fact that the elite
tas'ed with im%lementing the many %ro6%oor %rogrammes have little interest in reversing the
une2ual order that %er%etuates the subservience of grou%s li'e dalits# to serve the interests of
the rich. !entral here is the role of identity6based exclusion behind marginalisation. As Hasan
et al note# 8Poverty accentuates social hierarchies of caste# religion and gender. *Hasan et al#
+,10:D1.
0.A Ehat are the lessons from this for Muslim exclusionC
An assessment of the wor'ing of schemes for Muslims *4 years after "achar re%ort1# based on
2ualitative research in three districts with large Muslim %o%ulations# had revealed serious
drawbac's in the wor'ing of those schemes
4
. 3hese were traced to a combination of factors:
%oor design of so6called flagshi%s %rogrammes for Muslim develo%ment# %oor resourcing of
the %rogrammes# resulting in them being little more than symbolic gestures# if even that- and
a wea' institutional environment that %revents robust im%lementation & the last to include
wea' and adhoc structures and %rocesses# and %oor ca%acities of im%lementing agencies#
combined with a %ervasive inability on the %art of those agencies to connect %ur%osefully
with Muslim grou%s and communities. *!entre for $2uity "tudies# +,11:4,1.
3he evaluation re%orted that a handful of stand6alone schemes and %ro)ects# with modest
budgets and coverage# and little thought for integrating those as a com%rehensive %rogramme
&
-rincipl ones .ein$ /ulti0Sectorl De1elop!ent -ro$r!!e 2/sD-3, 1' -oint
-ro$r!!e nd Scholrship Sche!es
DRAFT
12
for Muslim u%lift tailored to the s%ecific needs of the community# resulted in very little
im%act. 3here seemed little focused monitoring too# to chec' out%uts and im%act# indeed little
disaggregated data collection and trac'ing. And rather than combining universal and targeting
a%%roaches# so as to target im%rovements in living conditions of Muslims using 8universal
develo%ment measures and a%%roaches *not culturally6defined ones1# so as to mainstream the
community# the interventions# in the final analysis# though intended for Muslims and other
minorities# became an area %rogramme# with little es%ecially for Muslims. .eedless to add# in
the absence of this# there was little su%%ort to im%rove ca%ital accumulation or attem%t to hel%
increase returns on the ca%ital# that could have hel%ed undo the ine2ualities. 3he re%ort#
%ointing to how unambitious the interventions have been# noted how 8J.diffidence at %olicy
level to clearly focus on Muslims and their de%rivations translates into active reluctance by
im%lementing agencies on the ground# to target Muslims and the drivers of their
de%rivations... *Ibid: 411
Hasan et al say much the same to ex%lain the dismal outcomes for Muslims. !riticising the
area a%%roach of %rogrammes for Muslims *Ms9P %articularly1 rather than addressing their
s%ecific bac'wardness# and labelling them as minority %rogrammes & demonstrating the
anomaly at the heart of %olicy ma'ing for Muslims# targeting Muslims not as Muslims# but as
Minorities# under the guise of unconstitutionality of %rogramming along 8communal lines.
*Hasan# +,10:F1 3hey %oint to the 8Jthe failure *of the state1 to enlarge the sco%e of state
intervention and budgetary allocation to reverse *Muslim1 de%rivation. *Ibid: +401. 3his is
des%ite "achar committee# as the authors note# having firmly succeeded in reconstructing the
Muslim community as 8develo%mental sub)ects of the state# rather than as a religious and
cultural community *Ibid: +4+1.
3his then is the central failure of %olicy ma'ing for Muslims in India & inability to see
Muslims as a legitimate sub)ect of develo%ment# and by extension# of affirmative action
%olicies. 3here have been many attem%ts by %owerful %olicy bodies to get the (overnment to
shar%en the Muslim focus of its 8Minority %rogrammes. @ut these have yielded little results#
showing how entrenched the o%%osition is on im%lementation# but more dramatically at
%olicy level. 3he .ational Advisory !ouncil to the Prime Minister# in its memorandum on
Muslim rights as'ed for the government to shar%en its Muslim focus. And the "tanding
committee of the Ministry of "ocial ;ustice and $m%owerment severely criticised the
%erformance of (overnment on minority welfare# ma'ing the %oint that Ministry of Minority
Eelfare was not addressing the root of the %roblem highlighted in the "achar re%ort. *Hasan#
+,10: +4G1. And yet moves %ro%osing establishing 9iversity !ommission and $2ual
/%%ortunities !ommission# made by the (overnments own $x%ert (rou% on 9iversity Index
to e2ualise o%%ortunities# turned out to be non6starters for want of ade2uate %olitical su%%ort#
and %ro%osals for a minority sub6%lan# on the lines of 3ribal "ub Plan and "! "%ecial Plan#
were shot down by the Planning !ommission# arguing it would communalise the %lanning
%rocess# again citing constitutional hurdles. */% !it1.
3he evident limited %olicy commitment for Muslims clearly has im%lications for access of
Muslims to entitlements and services on the ground. $vidence %oints to discrimination in
%ublic %rovision of services to Muslims# as well as %lay of mar'et discrimination *in relation
to em%loyment1# both formal and informal structures %er%etuate this exclusion. *Hasan et al#
+,10:D1. 3here is a rich body of evidence %ointing to the discrimination against Muslims in
)ob mar'et# even more than dalits# in the %rivate sector# and %articularly in the %ublic sector.
*: ;eery et al# 1DDG- ;effrey !. +,1,- 3horat "> et al# +,,G- 3horat et al *Ibid1- @asant : et al
*eds1L. India6H9: %rovides some useful insights into how this discrimination %lays out and
DRAFT
1%
what that im%lies for Muslims. In (overnment schools already %lagued by %oor %erformance#
the under6re%resentation of teachers belonging to excluded socio6religious grou%s *Muslims
besides "! and "31 creates a social distance between teachers and students of the excluded
community that is not conducive to learning and ac2uiring an education. <or children of
%oorer bac'grounds & where Muslims# along with "! and "3s are over re%resented 6 %rivate
schools# with their stee% fee structure are hardly an o%tion# further widening the learning ga%
and subse2uent ine2uality. *(overnment of India +,11: 1+1
A recent case study of Muslim develo%ment ex%eriences at multi%le sites across the country
ma'es much the same argument about social distance# when it re%orts that communal
%olarisation in @araban'i district combined with %oor hold of Muslims over %olitical7
bureaucratic %ower there enables discrimination by state agents *school teachers# %anchayat
wor'ers1 against %oor Muslims# forcing most Muslims to withdraw their wards from
government schools# and )oin madrasas, that themselves are not %articularly effective centres
of learning. /n the other hand# absence of communal %olarisation along with the %resence of
Muslim Anganwadi wor'ers and A"HA wor'ers in Murshidabad and >atihar# districts
enables the *Muslim1 community there to access services better while 'ee%ing the services
relatively a%%roachable to Muslims. *3rivedi# +,10: +001. 3he author concludes# 8it is this
communal character that induces discrimination in the form of social welfare schemes not
reaching the Muslims. *Ibid: +0A1. 3he dominant %ower structures *in @araban'i in this case1
use the communal card to mono%olise bureaucratic and %olitical %ower *%anchayats elections1
and that im%acts the %rovision of services to %oor Muslims# or not. !ommon to all four case
studies in the said study# the author notes# is the 8mar'ed failure of the state in overcoming
hurdles %ut u% by dominant classes in %roviding legitimate rights to JMuslims8 *Ibid: +0F1#
the %oint of elite ca%ture made by de Haan *+,,41
!ommenting on the a%%arent inability of national government to agree to a Muslims "ub Plan
*on the lines of 3"P and "!"P1 and other tools to more directly target Muslims de%rivations#
Hasan et al note# 8the sce%ticism *has1 more to do with fears of a %olitical fallout than
conce%tual or constitutional doubts with regard to the efficacy of the sub6%lan. *+,10: +4B1#
%ointing to the su%erior courts having re%eatedly re)ected %etitions 2uestioning the legality of
merit cum means scholarshi%s *one of the ma)or intervention for Minorities1# arguing that
they hel% to e2ualise o%%ortunities for de%rived sections# *Ibid: +4F1 to refute the %oint of
unconstitutionality. Indeed# a handful of state governments *including Andhra Pradesh and
Mani%ur recently and @ihar# 3amil .adu# >arnata'a and >erala in the %ast1 have gone ahead
and enacted affirmative action legislations for Muslims s%ecifically# through creating sub6
2uotas for Muslim /@!s within the /@! 2uota for reservations in )obs and educational
institutions# arguing that the entire /@! Muslim section was socially and educationally
bac'ward# and hence eligible for affirmative action under Art 1A *41 of the constitution. A
%olitical settlement has thus been crafted in those states & enabling access to entitlements for
Muslims# in the %rocess shoring u% state legitimacy & in a way that has not ha%%ened
elsewhere# es%ecially in =P and @ihar and Eest @engal# )ust to name a few ma)or states.
Hasan et al conclude thus that it is not that recognition of religious minorities for %olicy
attention is not constitutionally acce%table# rather that 8 it is still not %olitically acce%table#
because it can lead to a ma)oritarian bac'lash..# %ointing to the fear of Hindu rightwing
blowbac'# to anything that targets Muslims directly. *Ibid: +4G1.
3his low a%%etite for targeting 8Muslims is an as%ect of the communal character# more
accurately communal %olarisation of society. "cholars have shown# this itself is the %roduct of
re%eated instrumental violence# es%ecially in the 1DF,s and 1DD,# in the framewor' of the
DRAFT
1&
:am)anmbhoomi movement. *(ayer K ;affrolet# +,1+: 01B1. !ommunal %olarisation is a
factor in enabling discrimination by the state and its actors against Muslims# and im%acts the
ability of Muslims to access rights and services e2uitably. oo'ing at the condition of
Muslims across multi%le cities# (ayer et al found that it was the absence *or %resence1 of
communal violence *'ee%ing other factors constant1 that determined much of the resilience of
Muslim communities *cosmo%olitanism1 in the %eaceful cases *in >ho?hi'ode and @angalore#
as o%%osed to Ahmedabad and uc'now1 & in the latter case resulting in ghettoisation of
Muslims# resulting from organised violence# 8and only secondly of economic marginalisation
or discrimination in the housing mar'et. *Ibid: 0+A1 A similar conclusion is re%orted by
"achar re%ort# based on a com%arative study of access to basic services in four cities# three
southern# with little history of communal violence and uc'now with fre2uent violence
%roviding the same evidence of wide variation in 2uantity and 2uality of services available to
Muslim ma)ority as o%%osed to Muslim minority localities# ma'ing the %oint that communal
%olarisation in uc'now results in service %roviders weighing communal considerations in
service delivery *to the disadvantage of Muslims1# in ways that those in the southern cities do
not. *(overnment of India# +,,B: 14D1
Ehile the chief %rotagonist in this game of marginalisation of Muslims# through the
instrumental use of violence1 is the @haratiya ;anata Partys 8%olitics of %olarisation# an
e2ual accom%lice# argue Hasan et al# is the !ongresss 8%olitics of to'enism# that see's 8to
retain and bolster its Muslim constituency# without any sincere effort at addressing their
de%rivations and reducing ine2ualities. *+,10:+4F1. And (ayer et al highlight this limited
%olicy s%ace for Muslims# when they %oint to the bac'lash by Hindu nationalist forces to the
"achar and Mishra committee re%orts and recommendations
A
framing the actions on the
re%orts ta'en by the =PA government & in the case of the : Mishra !ommittee re%ort# not
even being tabled in the Parliament so far. *+,10: 41.
Part of the %roblem is the nation6ma'ing %rocess and the routes to social %olicy ta'en. (rou%6
based %rovisioning & affirmative action %olicies# including reservations in educational
institutions and %ublic sector )obs# as well as %riority in welfare schemes & are established
instruments of social %olicy in India. Indeed the im%ortance of these affirmative action
%olicies to e2ualising o%%ortunity in the country# is such that a total of A, 5 of all %ublic
sector )obs are reserved for various grou%s & "!# "3 and /@!. @ut such social )ustice
agenda# argue Muslim activists and %olitical thin'ers# are denied to Muslims. 3hey trace it to
the set u% of the constitution. Political safeguards *for minorities1 in constitutional drafts and
deliberations encom%assed %rovisions for reserved seats in legislatures# 2uotas in government
em%loyment# re%resentation in the !abinet and the creation of administrative machinery to
ensure su%ervision and %rotection of minority rights All minority grou%s *religious as well as
so called 8bac'ward sections1 hitherto %referred were included within the ambit of these
%rovisions in initial %ro%osals and in the first draft of the !onstitution %ublished in 1D4F. In a
remar'able reversal# however# by the time of the final draft of the !onstitution# religious
minorities were excluded from the %urview of all %olitical safeguards# which came to be
restricted mainly to the "cheduled !astes and tribal grou%s
B
.*@a)%ai# +,,+: 41 what accounted
for thisC :ochana @a)%ai ex%lains:
8in the nationalist legitimating vocabulary# the %olitical ideals of secularism#
democracy# )ustice and national unity were construed in ways that %recluded %olitical
safeguards for minority grou%s. Political safeguards were regarded as legitimate only
for a tem%orary %eriod and for a s%ecific %ur%ose# that of ameliorating the social and
'
4r$niser rticle 5.
(
6oy 7sn5
DRAFT
1'
economic disabilities of the so6 called Mbac'ward sections6 the "cheduled !astes and
@ac'ward 3ribes. In this context# demands for *religious1 minority safeguards#
undermined# in the eyes of nationalists# national unity by endangering the %olitical
integrity of the nation# by inhibiting the develo%ment of a common national identity#
and by undermining the creation of a modern# secular democratic citi?enshi%.
*Ibid:101
:ecent readings of these choices made by the founding father# are more critical. Ansari
claims# 8by refusing to define citi?enshi% in ethno6religious terms# the leaders denied dee%6
rooted cleavages within society# *Ansari: 1# a %oint su%%orted by @aner)ee who argues that the
Indian .ational !ongress might have been ins%ired by a homogeni?ed# unitary# cultural
nationalism that created much dee%er conflict among communities than it solved# referring to
the language movement dramatically %ointing to these social and %olitical cleavages and
conflicts.*+,,G:+A6+B1.
G
As to %olitical and economic safeguards# rather than being
tem%orary# they have endured and loo' to do so in the foreseeable future. 3hat reluctance of
the nationalist leadershi% to ac'nowledge Muslim safeguards# continues to this day. 3his is
des%ite clear evidence now# that Muslims# at least the %oorer among them# are falling behind
the rest of the %o%ulation on all counts of develo%ment# and need su%%ort. "o while dalits and
adivasis face very wea' im%lementation of social %olicies around safeguards and affirmative
action for them# in the case of Muslims# %olicies and safeguards for im%rovement &
affirmative action %olicies# %romotional schemes and %olicies and the li'e 6 themselves are
missing. 3here is am%le evidence emerging %ointing to safeguards and affirmative action
%olicies for "!s and "3s resulting in im%roved outcomes for the grou%s# whereas absence of
similar safeguards for Muslims means e2ually marginalised sections among the latter are
either catching u% very slowly or not at all. *(ayer et al# +,10: 0# 01B.1
Indeed# it is not )ust state action for Muslims that is sha%ed by fears of a Hindu bac'lash#
rather# (ayer et al argue# the fear of the Hindu bac'lash also tem%ers Muslim %olitical
action# claiming 8Indian Muslims have generally been reluctant to form their own %olitical
%arties# fearing that their %olitical mobilisation on a communal basis would reinforce
religious %olarisation in the country *+,10:A1# concluding# 8the feelings of insecurity of
Indian Muslims have nurtured a minority com%lex which hel%s to ex%lain the %olitical
inhibitions of this %o%ulation.. *Ibid: B1. /f course# there are %ractical %roblems in %utting u%
a Muslim %olitical formation# as Hasan %oints to# 2uoting "yed "hahabuddin
F
: 8JMuslim
%olitical %arties alone# with their limited areas of influence and their small share of the votes
of the Muslim community# could not create a national consensus. *Hasan 1DDG:+G01. @ut the
real rub has been the force of the Hindu bac'lash.
3he com%arison here with bac'ward castes is interesting. Hasan# notes how bac'ward castes
8neutralised their wea'nesses J..by the use of %olitical mobilisation# using their numbers and
voting strength to secure attention and ca%ture %olitical %ower# as in =P and @iharJ most in
)
4ther fctors contri.utin$ to the sudden chn$e of stnd on !inority sfe$urds for
/usli!s were, the we8enin$ of ll pro!inent !inority for!tions 2/usli! 9e$ue, Si8h
-nthic -rty nd A8li Dl3, due to splits nd !i$rtion, thus re!o1in$ ny si$ni:cnt
opposition to the ;NC position in the Constituent Asse!.ly. Accordin$ to Ret<l=, hd the
initil ti!et.le for the drftin$ of the constitution, which clled for its co!pletion in fll
of 1+&), .een dhered to, the Constitution would h1e included politicl sfe$urds for
reli$ious !inorities. >R. Ret<l=, ?The -ro.le! of Co!!unl /inorities in the Drftin$ of
the ;ndin Constitution?, in R.N. Spnn 2ed.3, Constitutionalism in Asia 2@o!.y, 1+(%3, p.
((A quoted in
*

DRAFT
1(
o%%osition to the Hindu :ight# *Ibid: +FA1.3his has fundamentally reconfigured %olitical
%ower in the region# a %henomenon observers have called 8second wave of democratisation
*Nadav# 1DDD- !orbridge K Harriss# +,,,- !handra# +,,41. /n the other hand# whenever
Muslims have asserted themselves %olitically or in the economic s%here# they have suffered a
wave of severe bac'lash# mostly accom%anied by violence# with the com%licity of the state
and its agents 6 %olice# bureaucracy and )udiciary. *Hasan# 1DDG:+FA1.
D
3he hostile rece%tion
to the Muslim !onvention and the Ma)lise Mushawarat *1DB+1
1,
# as an alternative formation
of the Muslims# illustrates# 8how the %olitical %rocess itself im%osed constraints on the
articulation of minority grievances and their redressal through formal %rocedures. */% !it1
In the circumstance# Muslim %arties have# "hahabuddin notes# rather than acting on their
own# at best# serve*d1 as faithful and reliable channels to communicate the 8Muslim
consensus and have some of their demands acce%ted by national %arties*2uoted in Hasan
1DDG: +G01. Eea' %olitical voice has meant# among other things# absence of com%ensatory
%rogrammes for Muslims *affirmative action1 resulting in Muslims being forever loc'ed in
bac'wardness. 3his is behind 8the lac' of Muslim voice in governance bodies# at grassroots
and management and %olicy levels# %ointed out by the "achar re%ort *+,,G:+41# and
manifests in the form of low %artici%ation in local self government bodies resulting in
develo%mental benefits failing to reach areas of Muslim concentration *Ibid:+01- %oor
re%resentation in %ublic sector )obs- cases of non6inclusion of Muslims in voter lists *Ibid: +46
+A1# %reventing citi?ens the right to cast their votes while also denying them %ublic benefits-
and in the un)ust manner of carving out electoral constituencies so as to fragment Muslim
ma)ority areas or turn them into 8reserved constituencies# where only "! or "3 or women
can contest elections. /n the whole# %oor %olitical %artici%ation of Muslims# %revents voice
being raised in their favour. *Ibid:+11
4. Ehat of the com%arative %ictureC
4.1 Ehile outcome for Muslims is clearly %oor relative to other social grou%s# there are
variations in this %icture across states. >ul'arni# based on .!A$:6H9I "urvey 1DD06D4#
shows that on educational achievement and enrolment for instance# Muslim males do better
than or at least as well as Hindu6/ther !astes */!1 males in some states H Andhra Pradesh#
Maharashtra# (u)arat# >arnata'a# Madhya Pradesh# and 3amil .adu. Muslim females are also
close to the corres%onding indicators for Hindu6/! females# in these states exce%t (u)arat.
Indeed# in Andhra Pradesh# Muslims seem to be even slightly better off than Hindus. In
>erala# Muslims have made significant %rogress so much so that the large differences that
existed in educational achievements *literacy in age grou% A,O# middle school education in
ages +AO1 in the %ast# have recently narrowed down 2uite significantly. /n the other hand# it
is Muslims in northern and eastern %arts of the country & =ttar Pradesh# Madhya Pradesh#
:a)asthan# @ihar# Eest @engal and Assam# and Pun)ab and Haryana 6 that are far behind the
rest of the %o%ulation. *>ul'arni#+,,+:101. 3his variance# in Muslim outcomes across states#
exists in other fields too.
3a'ing %overty# "achar re%ort shows how urban %overty is most %ervasive amongst both
Muslims and "!s7"3s# generally# but it is in /rissa# MP# !hhattisgarh# =ttar Pradesh# @ihar#
Eest @engal# ;har'hand# :a)asthan# Maharashtra# >arnata'a# and AP that Muslim6H!:s is
+
A -BDR fct :ndin$ report on Delhi riots of 1+*) concluded CD7indus tend to rise their
eye.rows t the ssertions of n equl sttus .y co!!unity which they h1e .een
used to loo8 down upon s their inferior in the post Eindependence erD. 27sn,
1++)C2*)3
1,
/usli! Con1ention
DRAFT
1)
considerably higher than the state average. In other states# the difference *vis a vis other
communities1 is less acute. And rural %overty among Muslims is significantly high in Eest
@engal and Assam. *(overnment of India +,,B:1AF1 As for ine2uality generally# state6wise
estimates of the (ini coefficient are somewhat high in Maharashtra# >erala and 3amil .adu#
but substantially higher in >erala and Haryana# and least in Assam# @ihar and ;har'hand.
*Ibid: 1AB1
/n em%loyment# EP:# re%resenting level of unem%loyment# also shows this variance# with
Muslims doing better com%ared to other ":!s in several states 6 @ihar# 9elhi# (u)arat#
Haryana# Himachal Pradesh# Madhya Pradesh# Pun)ab# =P and Eest @engal. 3here is also
variance in em%loyment across sectors# with higher Muslim share in Manufacturing# 3rade
and "elf6em%loyment# as com%ared to other ":!s *Ibid: 1,B1. In %ublic em%loyment too# the
overall %icture is a dam%ner 6 in no state does the re%resentation of Muslims in %ublic sector
match their %o%ulation share. Net# Andhra Pradesh does significantly better *Muslims
%ercentage of )obs there is close to their 1+ %er cent share of %o%ulation1 than =ttar Pradesh#
Eest @engal and @ihar. /nly three other states# >arnata'a# (u)arat and 3amil .adu# return
share of )obs as more than A, %er cent of their %o%ulation shares# at G,# AD and AG %er cent
res%ectively. *Ibid: 1G11. And while there is# overall# %oor coverage of Muslims under
different beneficiary oriented %rogrammes *Ibid:1GG6GF1# and there is no clear trend of
s%ecific states delivering these services better to their Muslim %o%ulations# there is a body of
literature# some 2ualitative case studies# others survey based# that show significant variation
in 2uantity and 2uality of services available to Muslims *Ibid: 14D1 as well as in wellbeing
indicators * %roxies being mainstreaming of Muslim communities# termed 8urban
cosmo%olitanism by its authors. *(ayer et al +,10: 0+A1 & across the .orth6"outh divide.
4.+ Ehat ex%lains the varianceC In the literature# %oor achievement in education and
literacy among Muslims *and the large Hindu6Muslim differential1 has been attributed to
multi%le factors 6 lower tendency among Muslims to %ursue academic or white6collar careers
because of traditional association with s'illed manual wor'- tendency to send children to
religious rather than secular schools- bac'wardness of the community as such- sense of
insecurity# and discrimination in schools. *Hasan 1DDG# Ahmad# 1DF1- "axena# 1DF01. Much
of these factors a%%ly to .orthern states with %oor education achievements. It is historical
develo%ments in those states that have been identified as determining the s%ecific dynamic
*of the %ush away from education because of %oor incentive structures# and discrimination in
schools# and corres%onding %ull towards s'illed manual wor' for instance1 at %lay# singly or
)ointly# resulting in %oor education outcomes.
"axena shows# based on education attainment data in late 1D
th
and early %arts of +,
th
century
that Muslims were close to average everywhere# and better than average in what is now =ttar
Pradesh *1DF01. >ul'arni argues therefore that 8Muslim disadvantage in .orth India#
es%ecially in =ttar Pradesh and @ihar# is relatively a recent develo%ment# attributing this to a
variety of factors : decline in the %osition of =rdu from late 1D
th
!entury# under @ritish rule
and es%ecially after Inde%endence with Hindi re%lacing =rdu as the language of government.
Partition *and associated migration# mostly from .orth# central and eastern regions1 removed
the %rofessional classes from among Muslims in India. *Hasan# 1DDG:+FD1. 3his further
reduced the section that uses education most because of its interest in %rofessions and
government )obs *Ahmed# 1DF1:14B11. It also removed the middle class and intelligentsia
*educated classes1# thus de%riving common Muslims of role models that hel% in engendering
the %ush for education. *"axena# 1DF01. 3he com%lete switch to Hindi as the language of
administration in =P and @ihar# and other northern %rovinces# was the final nail# so to s%ea'.
DRAFT
1*
*Hasan 1DDG:+FF1 3hese develo%ments had the combined effect of dam%ening
8J..as%irations of white6collar em%loyment among Muslims in .orthern6!entral6$astern
India. *Ibid: ++1.
"outh and Eestern states faced less of this 8s'imming off of Muslim educated classes# with
only a small section migrating out. Along with this# there is evidence that there was greater
community effort for educational develo%ment in the south *in >erala# >arnata'a and 3amil
.adu1# along with affirmative action %olicies in educational institutions and )obs for Muslims
in all southern states# much before anything li'e this in .orthern states *Hasan 1DDG: 1.
<urther# ex%anding em%loyment o%%ortunities in the (ulf# for those in >erala# but also 3amil
.adu# >arnata'a and Andhra Pradesh# %rovided incentives and motivation for Muslims in the
"outh to see' education. *Ibid:+FF1. And Muslim trading communities# established in Eestern
India# also o%ened u% economic develo%ment and demand for white collar )obs. *Ibid: +01.
astly southern states never faced the loss on account of =rdu language that Muslims in the
.orth faced# as =rdu was never the language of administration there.

4.0 Ehile it is true that there seems to be a .orth6south divide in outcomes for Muslims#
it is e2ually true that there is a .orth6south divide in outcomes generally. "outhern states# it is
widely ac'nowledged now# are better at delivering the goods# including those for the wea'er
sections. .orthern states# on the other hand# are recognised as having failed to deliver to the
%oor. *"en K 9re?e +,,+# Eorld @an' +,,F# (overnment of India +,111. Ehat# according to
the literature# ex%lains this north6south dichotomyC In trying to understand the differential on
Muslim outcomes# it will be im%ortant to factor in the extent to which the .orth6"outh divide
on %ro6%oor outcomes generally# accounts for that s%ecifically on Muslims.
3here is an influential body of wor' ex%laining the success of southern states in enabling
inclusive develo%ment. 3a'ing the cue from 9re?e K "en# they %oint to the %articular role of
8determined %ublic action 7 %olitical activism in enabling this. *1DDG:1G1. According to the
authors# the central argument ex%laining existing ine2uality in educational achievement
across states is attributable to 8variation in efforts to ex%and basic education in different
states. */% !it 1DDA1. !entral to this argument is the role of social movements and %ublic
action to undo the lac' of %olitical %ower of socially disadvantaged grou%s *or agency of
scheduled tribe7scheduled caste7Muslim %o%ulation1. *Ibid:+11. In all southern states# the
narrow domination of @rahmin caste was challenged early on# with the effect that since
Inde%endence# %olitical base of %ower in these states has generally been middle castes and
classes# even lower classes# resulting in greater focus on inclusive %olicies# as com%ared to
the .orth# where @rahmin domination was challenged only recently. *9re?e K "en# +,,+1.
India H9: ex%lains: >erala achieved significant lea%s in terms of its human develo%ment
indicators 6 des%ite relatively low levels of economic growth and %er ca%ita income in the
first four decades after Inde%endence & largely due to the 8active role of the state government
to establish well6functioning %ublic health and education systems. *(overnment of India
+,11:+D1 !rucially for our discussion# the benefits of these 8are e2ually shared by the lower
castes also.
"imilar efforts by the government in 3amil .adu# to ensure the effectiveness of %ublic health
and education system# could be traced to the 9ravidian movement in that state# that had as its
dual ob)ective# educating all and eradicating su%erstition. 3his created conditions for the state
government to %rovide o%%ortunities to all# irres%ective of caste# and resulted in higher
enrolment rates for "! and /@! children. It is# ex%lain the authors# a combination of social
movements *of the middle and lower castes1 and technical interventions by the state that
DRAFT
1+
ex%lains better than average health# education# and nutritional status in southern states.
*Mehrotra# +,,B:0,# 2uoted in (overnment of India# +,11:+D1. *see also Harriss:1DFG on
%olitical regime1 Eea' or failed attem%ts at engendering 8social movements in =P and @ihar
among others# des%ite increased %ublic ex%enditure there in infrastructure social services and
social %rotection# creates the enduring exclusion of the %oor in the northern states. *Ibid1. and
borrowing from the "outhern India exam%le# Asadullah et al %oint to the following %re6
conditions for %ro6%oor change: low gender ga% in the labour mar'et# to facilitate household
investment decisions in female schooling- e2ual access to %ublic infrastructure *such as
availability of credit for investment in education1 by various social grou%s- a%art from higher
s%ending to create o%%ortunities# %olicies targeting disadvantaged and7or difficult6to6reach
social grou%s# to e2ualise o%%ortunities- and finally %resence of affirmative action %olicies to
wea'en the adverse effect of discriminatory factors such as caste and religion. *+,1,:+11.
4.4 ets loo' at some of these cases more closely using a Muslim lens. >arnata'a# with a
Muslim %o%ulation %ercentage of 1+.+0 %er cent *+,11 census1 had a large Muslim %resence
in @angalore the ca%ital city# as well as some of the districts. Pre6Inde%endence# the ruling
Eodeyar %rinces followed liberal %olicies towards education and develo%ment that benefitted
Muslims too. 3hese %olicies created a %ush for education in the state# which %ost6
Inde%endence# led to the mushrooming of educational institutions by the states many
communities# including Muslims. Princi%al here being the Al6Ameen educational 3rust *estd.
1DBB1# that set u% a chain of schools and %rofessional colleges# contributing to the s%read of
education among Muslims. /bserves have noted community action in other arenas too & such
as in delivery of civic services# as by the Hira Eelfare /rganisation *in Muslim dominated
"iva)inagar in @angalore1 to fill the ga% left by the absence of state there. *Arif# +,1+:0,G1.
"imilarly the >arnata'a Muslim Mutahida Maha? *>MMM1# an umbrella organi?ation of
ma)or Muslim .(/s and organisations acts to mobilise and aggregate Muslim as%irations
and demands# and engage with %olitical %arties and state and civil society actors.
Alongside# growth of bac'ward class %olitics# and the drive to marginalise the dominant
ingayat# Io''aligas and @rahmins castes# led to the !ongress government *under 9evra)
=rs# 1DG+6F,1 introducing reservations in )obs and education. Muslims as a whole were
included in the @ac'ward !lasses list. *Ibid: +D11. Affirmative action %rogrammes for
bac'ward classes was further formalised in 1DFB# under :ama'rishna Hegde 6 also bringing
in Muslims low caste within the /@! list 6 and further by Ieera%%a Moily *1DD46DA1.
>arnata'a was also the first state in the country to set u% a Minorities !ommission# and a
se%arate ministry for minority welfare *in +,,+1. $arlier# and much before such a thing had
been attem%ted in 9elhi with the "achar !ommittee# >arnata'a had established# in 1DD4# the
high %ower committee on socio6economic and educational survey of religious minorities# as
a means to ma% the de%rivations faced by minorities7Muslims in the state. */% !it1.
!onse2uently# the high re%resentation of Muslims in government in >arnata'a is not a new
%henomenon. In 1DA,# Muslims made u% B.0 5 of state %o%ulation# but accounted for 1,.B 5
of o%en government %ositions. In 1DG1# they re%resented G.1 5 of state )udiciary. *Ibid:+D+1.
And even though observers have noted how the %ositive trend for Muslims in government
and %ublic life might be reversing of late 6 there are no Muslim MPs from >arnata'a in +,,D
o' "abha# and only a handful in "tate Assembly and @angalore Munici%al !or%oration 6 yet
%resence of senior Muslim leaders ensures that Muslims are not excluded from their share of
%ublic goods.

3he case of >erala is more famous. 3here is first the vigorous civic culture among >erala
Muslims# mirroring the civicness of the state as a whole *refer Mc>ibben# 1DDB on civicness
DRAFT
2,
in >erala1 with influential organisations such as >erala Muslim Ai'ya "angham and Muslim
$ducation "ociety# em%hasising secularist %ro6education agenda including for girls. 3hese are
themselves the outcome of social reform movements# under Mu)ahid reformists and Ea''om
Maulvi# ta'ing cues from $?hava social reforms under ".9P and .airs under .air "ervice
"ociety that transformed >erala society as a whole. As :adhi'a >anchana ex%lains# it is the
reformist Islamists leadershi% that has set the agenda among Muslims & with a stress on
8moral as well as socio6economic advancement# engendering as%iration of local Muslim
community to %rogress and com%ete & es%ecially with Hindu and !hristian communities.
3his virtuous circle has led# among other things# to the mushrooming of Muslim educational
institutions# of which <arou2 college >o?hi'ode# is only the best 'nown. >o?hi'ode# the
head2uarters of >erala Muslims# is an educational hub and has a rich %rint tradition that#
along with the almost universal literacy rate in the state# encourages wide6ranging %ublic
debate and discussions. 3he library movement# literary clubs and local trade associations#
encourage a robust associational life# allowing bridging *Muslims with the rest of society1# as
much as bonding *within Muslims grou%s1 ca%ital# enabling >erala Muslims to ma'e use of
the o%%ortunities that are available all around. *+,1+: +B46+BA. Also see Hasan# 1DDG:+FF1
/%%ortunity itself was created first under the liberal and modernising vision of %ast rulers &
3ravancore :a)as & who invested heavily in education and social )ustice %rogrammes#
benefiting all sections of society. 3hese %olicies were carried over into %ost Inde%endence era#
with reservations bought early on for bac'ward classes & these included Muslims in their
fold# hel%ing create avenues for their advancement. 3hat >erala Muslims have had a strong
entre%reneurial tradition that they could call u%on# and the o%%ortunities that the (ulf
%rovided for em%loyment# hel%ed further im%rove o%%ortunities for >erala Muslims# creating
the %ull for education and modernity. @ut it is in the realm of %olitics that >eralas success
with its Muslim %o%ulation must be seen ultimately.
>erala Muslims# according to >anchana# 8have more leverage than Muslims in the rest if
India# attributing it to the %articular %olitical culture of the state# with its coalitional bi6%arty
%olitics# re2uiring both the eft 9emocratic <ront *led by !PI M with strong su%%ort among
!hristians1 and =nited 9emocratic <ront *led by !ongress# who $?havas su%%ort1
formations# including %arties and religious organisations allied to them# to coo%erate# eschew
excesses and be mutually accountable. 3his creates a virtuous circle all around# with all
sections# caste and religious grou%s# getting their share of benefits. *+,1+:+F01. 3his also
enables >erala Muslims to actively %artici%ate in the %olitical %rocess# through Indian =nion
Muslim eague *I=M1# but also other %arties. *Ibid:+F01. In one of the exce%tions of Indian
%olitics# I=M# a %arty %ur%ortedly of and for Muslims# has held im%ortant %ortfolios in state
cabinet# such as education# and been behind the setting u% of !alicut university# creation of a
se%arate Muslim ma)ority district of Malla%uram# and %lays the 'ing ma'er between the two
%olitical formation. Its %hilanthro%ic activities# such as for investment in education# through
its affiliate# >erala Muslim !ultural !entre *>M!!1 which has branches in all (ulf countries
and the =># hel%s it further consolidate its %osition among its constituents. 3he success of
I=M then# as the %olitical voice of Muslims of >erala# is best ex%lained in the words of
Eil'inson# when he notes & li'e large minority grou%s in democracies elsewhere# Muslims
can serve as a crucial voting bloc in India. 3hat there is greater division among Hindu voters
in southern states Pmade Muslims a %ivotal swing grou% in the south very early onQ in a
manner that was not %ossible elsewhere *Ibid:J.1
>anch Ilaiah# in a similar effort to ex%lain %oor outcomes for Muslims in (u)arat com%ared
to their %ositive 8gradual u%ward mobility in all wal's of life in Andhra Pradesh# comes to
DRAFT
21
similar conclusions about the crucial role of %olitical organisation. He notes: 8the
communitarian identity of Andhra Pradesh Muslims was stronger with visible communication
channels such as their own news%a%ers# 3I channels# a %olitical %arty *All India Ma)lis
Ittehadul Muslameen1 and other channels of mobilisation. 8(u)arat Muslims# he notes# 8do
not have their own news%a%ers to re%resent their %roblems# culture and history# adding
8identity formation of Muslims in (u)arat was wea' *+,10:GB1 3he same could be said of
Muslims other northern states & =P# @ihar# Eest @engal# among them.
A. Intra6regional variations: the limited s%ace for manoeuvring
A.1 It is clear from this reading that the %olicy s%ace o%ened u% in southern states &
allowing for creating e2uity in access and e2ualising of o%%ortunities for middle and lower
castes# also facilitated access by Muslims to those services. 3hese dynamics created
conditions for reservations for Muslims in government )obs and education# in >erala and
>arnata'a as Muslims# and in 3amil .adu# as bac'ward classes# besides the gains that
Muslims made from im%rovements in %ublic health and school education# and contribute to
the better Muslim attainments. Perha%s what would be useful here is to see intra6regional
differences# and how contributory factors made use of im%roved %ro6%oor %olicy s%aces to
create outcomes. i'ewise# it will be instructive to com%are intra6regional dynamics in .orth
India# to test how the limitations im%osed by absence of social mobilisation in the .orth#
cou%led with the fear of the Hindu bac'lash is being negotiated %olitical actors among
Muslims in =P and @ihar.

9es%ite the success of >erala Muslims in education# %olitical %artici%ation# and civic activity#
data shows under6re%resentation of Muslims in government )obs or in the %rofessions. */n an
average 1, %er cent re%resentation# against state %o%ulation ratio of +4 %er cent# HP!#
+,,B:1G,1 Indeed high education does not result in high EP: for >erala Muslims too 6 +0.+
%er cent com%ared to 0+.0 %er cent for state as a whole. A %ull down factor# according to
<a?al eta al seems to be extreme low %artici%ation of Muslim women *A.D %er cent1# although
Muslim male EP: too falls behind the rest *4+ %er cent com%ared to A,.+ %er cent1.
Alongside# there is high incidence of self em%loyment and casualisation of wor'. *<a?al et al#
+,10:1D16D41. !loser examination of education data reveals even the success with education
is limited to schooling# with %oor showing for higher education# flagging u% issue of %oor
retention. 3his then is the curious case of Muslims of >erala: very high literacy# somewhat
close to state average# but %oor education attainment# low retention rate# and low a%%etite for
higher education *secondary and college1. Part of the story# might be %oor incentive for higher
education# due to the call if the (ulf. @ut there are stories of discrimination too# in landing
%ublic sector )obs. 3his# des%ite a se%arate 2uota for Muslims *under /@!1 in >erala *1,5
for class6I and 1+ 5 in class6II )obs. *>anchana# +,1+:+GF1. In this context# what ex%lains
better outcomes for Muslims in neighbouring >arnata'a *such as relatively better
re%resentation in government )obs & F.D5 for lower %ositions against state Muslim %o%ulation
ratio of 1+.+ 5# (overnment of India# +,,B:1G,1# es%ecially in the absence of a Muslim
%olitical formation to re%resent their %roblems and voice their demands.
Ee have seen that# com%ared to the south# outcomes for Muslims in the .orth are very %oor#
in states such as =P# @ihar# and Eest @engal. !loser examination reveals fine differences here
too# in outcome terms *education# em%loyment among others1 as well as regards contributory
factors 6 whether in terms of better %olitical organisation and %artici%ation- better
re%resentation in government# or better community action1. 9asgu%ta in examining the failure
in =P of Muslims and other =rdu s%ea'ers to secure official status for the language# notes
DRAFT
22
8J. large %art of the language conflict in =ttar Pradesh is influenced by memories of %ast
conflicts transmitted to Hindu and Muslim communities by the cultural and %olitical leaders.
*9asgu%ta# 1DG,:1A,1. 3his has resulted in all governments dragging their feet on giving
=rdu its due share# many senior %olitical leaders being even o%enly hostile to the idea.
*Hasan# 1DDG: 1 And while @ihar has been no %laying field for =rdu & demands were
strongly o%%osed# and riots occurred# in :anchi in 1DBG 6 the state and %olitical class there
have been more accommodating & =rdu was made *in August 1DFD1 the second official
language of the state. Ehat ex%lains this differenceC
According to Paul @rass# there are multi%le factors at %lay 6 firstly# =rdu and Muslim culture
were more entrenched in =P than in @ihar# therefore the =rdu debate in =P got willy nilly
mixed u% with larger Hindu6Muslim 2uestions# in a way the issue did not in @ihar# where the
sub)ect was %resumably less threatening for the Hindu ma)ority. "econdly# @ihar was more
linguistically heterogenous than =P# and the 2uestion of =rdu was seen as %art of the wider
demand by linguistic minorities & @engali# /riya# Maithli# "anthali et al & rather than )ust
about =rdu. $2ually significant# Muslims# right from Inde%endence# @rass claims# have been
better re%resented in @ihar (overnment than in =P# including at crucial %ositions# thus
hel%ing the cause of =rdu. *1DG4:1+11 Ehat ex%lains other differences & such as better
%olitical organisation among Muslims in @ihar- better re%resentation of Muslims in
government em%loyment in @ihar *such as in $ducation de%artment. HP!# +,,B:1G+1# and
their better coverage in the state /@! lists *Ibid:1DG1.
Indeed# u% until +,,B when the "achar committee re%ort was %ublished# @ihar was the only
state# a%art from the southern ones# that had s%ecial arrangement for affirmative action for
Muslims. =nder the 8>ar%oori formula of 1DGF *amended after bifurcation of @ihar in 1#
bac'ward classes were s%lit into /ther @! */@!1 and Most @! *M@!1 and 10 %er cent and
1F %er cent 2uota res%ectively# reserved for them in educational institutions and government
)obs. Im%ortant for our discussion# Muslim caste grou%s# de%ending on their level of
develo%ment# were included in both the /@! and M@! lists & D in states /@! list and +G in
M@!.
11
@ac'ward Muslim grou%s are included in the central as well as state /@! lists of
most states. @ut that# Muslims claim# does not go far enough for them# as %oor Muslims then
have to com%ete with more advanced Hindu bac'ward grou%s *es%ecially @anias# >urmis#
Nadavs1# thus losing out in the intra6/@! com%etition for )obs and college seats.
1+
@y
bringing a ma)ority of Muslim grou%s in the M@! list# the >ar%oori formula created s%ace for
mobility also among %oor Muslims# as it did for the less advanced sections among Hindu
/@!s. In =P *as most other northern states1# on the other hand# there is a single /@! list# and
some 0, Muslim grou%s figure in that list *Ibid: 1DF1 More %owerful /@! grou%s among
Hindus corner much of the benefits on offer. And while states such as Andhra Pradesh and
Mani%ur have aft the "achar re%ort# ta'en cues from @ihar# and are %utting s%ecial
arrangement for reservation of Muslims# through creating sub62uota within /@! for
Muslims# little of that discussion seems to be on the table in =P.
3his ta'es us to another feature of %olitics in @ihar# as it affects Muslims# that is mar'edly
different from that in =P
10
. 3his is the bac'ward classes %olitics
14
& of which the >ar%uri
11
Ruota for other communities are: 1A5 for "!# 1 5 for "3- and 0 5 for bac'ward caste women# bringing the
total to A,5# the maximum reservation allowed under ruling of the "u%reme !ourt.
12
3his has also been the grievance of the more bac'ward Hindu grou%s among /@!s# and to which the 'ar%uri
formula was res%onding.
1%
3he other states with substantial Muslim %o%ulations are Eest @engal and Assam. Muslim %olitics
1&
<or more on this see @lair *1DF,1.
DRAFT
2%
formula was a %roduct & and which has also s%awned a bac'ward class %olitics among
Muslims. !alled the Pasmanda movement# and cham%ioned by the All India =nited Muslim
Morcha# and the All India Pasmanda Muslim Maha?# Pasmanda movement >halid Ansari
writes# 8reminds us that )ust li'e the Hindu community# Muslim community too is segmented
into at least three caste blocsHashraf *u%%er caste elite1# ajlaf *middle caste shudra1 and
ar1al *lowest caste 9alits1# to claim that and the interests of all are neither homogenous nor
do they necessarily overla%. PM started off as a social movement# and soon entered electoral
%olitics. In the assembly elections in @ihar in +,,A# AIPMM decided to su%%ort .itish
>umars ;9*=1# in o%%osition to aloo Nadavs :;9# which had for over a decade relied on
its Muslim6Nadav constituency to return it re%eatedly to %ower. :;9 was su%%orting calls for
im%lementing recommendations of the : Mishra commission that %ro%osed reservations in
)obs and colleges for Muslims as a whole# as a way to undo Muslim bac'wardess. 3his#
AIPMM and other Pasmanda grou%s contend will lead to the cornering of all benefits by the
advanced sections among Muslims# at the cost of the wea'er sections.
1A
.itish# anxious to
ex%and his constituency# su%%orted the PM and its demands for re)ection of :anganath re%ort#
to retain s%ecial arrangement for bac'ward Muslims alone# by ado%ting the @ihar model
nationally# %utting most Muslims /@!s in the M@! list.
1B

Muslim %olitics in =ttar Pradesh# on the other hand# is mar'ed by the absence of a social
)ustice agenda or any social movement. Muslims have traditionally su%%orted the !ongress#
and increasingly since the rise of the @;P from the late F,s# the "ama)wadi Party. 3he latters
winning formula# as with :;9 in @ihar# has been its Muslim6Nadav alliance. It was this
combine that brought it to %ower in the +,1+ elections# many observers noting how Muslims
voted enmasse for "P# to 'ee% the @;P at bay. Net# changing e2uations are seen to be leading
the "P to begin to mend its fences with the Hindu :ight# to retain its hold over %ower. 3his
has come at the cost of Muslims# with %romises of better re%resentation in )obs and services
belied# rather a return to the insecurity of the %ast years# with a rash of riots eru%ting in the
%ast years. As to those in Mu?affarnagar recently# the role of the state government during the
violence# and subse2uently in %roviding relief and )ustice# demonstrates how far the "P has
travelled from being the %rotector of Muslims. *refer to Ahmad# +,10- :ao et al# +,141
It is clear that the narrow u%%er caste domination in =P has yet to be challenged in the same
manner as it has been in neighbouring @ihar# notwithstanding the much celebrated 8revolution
from below. *Nadav# 1DDD- !orbridge et al# +,,,: 1 Indeed Mayawatis attem%ts at forming
a rainbow coalition# with @rahmin su%%ort as central to it# is %roof of that failure. 3his
ex%lains the continued hold of the Hindu right in %olitics in =P# the ever %resent 8Hindu
bac'lash to even modest attem%ts to reach out to Muslims
1G
and the %rominence of that old
Muslim bugbear & violence and communal %olarisation as an instrument of electoral %olitics.
1'
>A Ansari has demonstrated# using "achar data on grou% re%resentation in %ublic em%loyment and .""/
data on com%osition of %o%ulation# and ta'ing Pasmanda muslim %o%ulation to ma'e u% some FA 5 of total
Muslim# how rather than all Muslims being under6re%resented in %ublic em%loyment# it is the Pasmanda only#
and that Ashraf Muslims *with )ust +.,1 5 of total %o%ulation1 are rather over re%resented. $ven in the field of
%olitical re%resentation# of the GA,, MPs from 1
st
to 14
th
o' "abha# only 4,, have been Muslim. /f these 04,
have been from Ashraf bac'grounds *ma'ing u% 4.A5 of total# as com%ared to +.,1 5 share of their %o%ulation1.
Ansari thus concludes# there is thus no case for reservation for Ashraf Muslims *or Muslims as a whole1# as they
will then corner a large section of o%%ortunities newly made available# due to their cultural ca%ital. >halid A
Ansari. 8Muslim Ruota: >ee% it "im%le# "illyS >afila. "e%tember +# +,11
1(
/ther %asmanda demands include *i1 brining in the many left6out Muslim /@! castes in the !entral /@! list
and *ii1 delisting 8dalit Muslims from /@! list# bringing them in the "cheduled !aste list# by scra%%ing the
1DA, Presidential order that bars all but Hindus# and now "i'h and @uddhists# from "! category.
DRAFT
2&
@ut e2ually# the =P case demonstrates the failure of imagination of Muslim renewal# with
entrenched sections and interests *in both the %rinci%al secular formations# "ama)wadi Party
and the !ongress1 continuing to call the shots# to %rotect their own turfs. :ecent attem%ts at
innovations & Ittehadul Millat and Peace Party & have failed too. 3he former has nothing new
to offer than identity %olitics# and the latter has done little beyond creating a little s%ace for its
leaders. And as o%%osed to the @ihar case# des%ite /@!s ma'ing u% a large section of the
Muslim %o%ulation in =P# Pasmanda movement# with its %otential to rewrite how Muslims
engage with %olitics 6 within as well as without 6 has made little headway there.
=nderstanding =P in this context will be useful.
B. !onclusion and :esearch Agenda
B.1 /ur survey of literature on exclusion of Indian Muslims %ointed to various ga%s in
'nowledge. /verall there is only a thin body of wor' studying Muslims# somewhat corrected
of late# es%ecially after the %ublication of the "achar !ommittee re%ort# although it must be
said that violence that Muslims have suffered has been the sub)ect of a wide array of wor's
*@rass# 1DDB# +,,0- Eil'inson +,,4- Iarshney# +,,+1. Most wor's tend to be descri%tive#
with few analysing the drivers and maintainers of their exclusion. 3here is definitely little
describing and examining# the com%arative disadvantages Muslims face# vis a vis the rest of
the %o%ulation# as well as other disadvantaged grou%s. $arly exam%les of wor's of this nature
were "axena *1DF01# Hasan *1DDG1# >halidi *1DDA1# >ul'arni *+,,+1# su%%lemented of late
by (overnment of India *+,111# <a?al *+,101# @asant *+,1+1# and :anganath !ommission
re%ort +,,A# and "achar committee re%ort +,,B# which in a sense o%ened the gates to more
wor' of this nature.
Part of the %roblem# of course# was the unavailability of reliable data by religion# u% until
2uite recently# which %revented much analytical descri%tion or com%arison. "achar corrected
that anomaly# and recent .""/ data have been returning Muslim figures along with the rest
*.""/ BB
th
and BF
th
rounds1. @ut a more fundamental change was that of %ublic %olicy.
"achar and its less feted counter%art# the :anganath Mishra re%ort# were the %roducts of
ma)or shifts in national %olicy towards Muslims. 3he !ongress6led =PA government in the
!entre# returned to %ower after a considerable ga%# in +,,4# having been voted out of %ower
in 1DDB. Its failure to %revent the destruction of the @abri Mos2ue *1DD+1 and %revent the
large6scale targeted violence against Muslims in Mumbai in its aftermath# had alienated
Muslims from the !ongress. 3he Hindu rights @;P# that ruled in the !entre intermittently
during that ga%# was seen by Muslims as having escalated anti6Muslim rhetoric and %ractices#
including wide6ranging changes in the education system that excluded Muslims. 3he +,,+
violence in (u)arat against Muslims# where the @;P led state government was seen as having
done little to control the selective violence# and its laxity in %roviding relief and )ustice to the
victims# com%leted the %icture of Muslim disenchantment with mainstream %arties.
Parliamentary elections in +,,4 %roved the turning %oint# with the !ongress %lugging into
Muslim grievance# %romising a range of %ro6Muslim initiatives# on the bac' of which it
returned to %ower. 3he =PA government that it led# announced a range of measures for
Muslims 6 high level fact finding commissions on Muslim socio6economic de%rivations *led
by retired )udges :a)inder "achar and :anganath Mishra1# to identify %olicies and schemes
1)
A little 'nown Hindu <ront for ;ustice recently %etitioned the =P High !ourt to direct "tate (overnment to
withdraw its modest scholarshi% scheme for Muslim girls. *8High !ourt see's =P govtTs re%ly on scheme for
Muslim girls. Indian $x%ress +4
th
"e%t. +,10

DRAFT
2'
towards better delivering to Muslims- alongside revival of the 81A Point Programme of old#
being a bunch of develo%ment measures for Muslims- and a %ro%osal for a communal
violence %revention legislation# to better e2ui% !entral government to control communal riots
of the (u)arat ty%e. !ollecting# recording and analysing socio6economic data by religion was
a corollary to this %olicy shift towards addressing Muslim bac'wardness. 3his %olicy shift#
along with s%ecific interventions it enabled & including the schemes rolled out based on
recommendations of the "achar re%ort & have led to greater interest in studying and
understanding Muslims# and have contributed to the increasing scholarly interest in the
condition of the community.
However# as our literature survey shows# there are vast differences in how Muslims in
different %arts of the country fare. Much of the aforementioned literature has a .orth India
bias# but a concentration on the .orth# at the exclusion of other regions & south and west
%articularly & misses the variance that the regions show. >erala# >arnata'a and 3amil .adu#
%articularly show much divergence on education# em%loyment# and %olitical and civic
engagement. Ehile there is a body of wor' loo'ing at Muslims in >erala *Ahmad# 1DFD-
A?i?# 1DD+- Hasan and Menon# +,,A# >anchana# +,1+1 that on >arnata'a and 3amil .adu#
where Muslims do e2ually or even better on various counts of develo%ment# es%ecially in
com%arison with the national story# is very limited. And there is little at all on the $ast#
%articularly Assam and west @engal. Assam has the largest concentration of Muslims in India
*0,51# after ;ammu and >ashmir. 3his is matched closely by Eest @engal *+A51. 3he %oor
*and vastly une2ual1 outcomes for Muslims in Eest @engal# on the range of factors# as shown
by "achar findings & %overty education# and em%loyment# including %ublic em%loyment 6 in
a state ruled by a radical formation for much of its %ost6Inde%endence existence# is %u??ling.
Politics in Assam on the other hand has been much fashioned by the immigrant *meaning
Muslims of @engali descent1 debate# and has fre2uently led to violent mobilisation by
Assamese nationalist grou%s# as well as tribal formations eager to carve areas of autonomous
influence for themselves# resulting in severe marginalisation of Muslims. Net the "achar
re%ort shows some %ositive trends# in %ublic em%loyment. And most significant is the case of
the All India =nited 9emocratic <ront *AI=9<1# as the only %olitical formation of Muslims#
outside the southern states# that has shown success at the hustings# and is today the %rinci%al
o%%osition in the state assembly.
In federal set u% such as Indias# it is %rovincial governments *states1 that# along with central
governments# act on social and economic %olicies# and much of the develo%ment outcomes
then are the functions of the wor'ing of the state government# as much as# if not more than
that of the !entre. <urther# regional differences7variations in the ma'e6u% of society# identity
formation# and colonial %olicies and their im%act on contem%orary %olitics and develo%ment-
among others# ma'e state6level dynamics salient. =nderstanding regional and state6level
variations in Muslim outcomes# and the factors that result in those variations# is going to be
crucial. An e2ually big ga% is more com%arative in nature & there is little analysing the
divergent tra)ectories of Muslims in the south as com%ared to the .orth. Hasan *1DDG1 ma'es
a brief mention# and HP! *+,,B1 refers to the difference indirectly# but there is little serious
wor' examining and ex%laining the difference# so as to draw out general lessons for Muslim
develo%ment. 3his is a serious ga% in literature# not only from a scholarly %oint of view# but
also for %olicy reasons# so as to learn and a%%ly the lessons of the "outh to that in the .orth#
for exam%le.
!loser examination of the regional cases reveals other differences within regions too. 3he
"outh might be better off than the .orth# in aggregate terms# but as we noticed in our survey
DRAFT
2(
of >erala# high literacy and good enrolment in schools# is not reflected in enrolment at higher
levels and in colleges. .either does literacy translate into high wor' %artici%ation. Indeed#
alongside Muslims doing as well as the rest of the %o%ulation on literacy# sits a big ga% in
EP:. "imilarly# %ublic sector em%loyment# although high for Muslim in absolute terms# is
%oor when com%ared to Muslims share of the %o%ulation there. /n the other hand# >arnata'a#
although not so favourably %laced in terms of a strong %olitical formation# or the advantage of
Muslim numbers# does consistently better than >erala on education and em%loyment#
including %ublic em%loyment. Ehat ex%lains thisC A similar divergence could be noticed in
the .orth# between =ttar Pradesh and @ihar# the two states clubbed together for similar social
ma'e u%# their being %art of the Hindi heartland# and nature of %olitical regimes. "o is
Muslim outcomes. Net# as we saw# @ihar has been better at %roviding for Muslims than =P.
:igorous state6level com%arisons might %rovide clues to what wor's and what doesnt for
Muslims# that aggregate studies or state case studies might fail to notice. 3here is a rich
tradition of scholarshi% on India using state level com%arisons to ex%lain outcomes as varied
as %overty and develo%ment *Harriss# 1DFF- >ohli# 1DFG- 1DD,- 9re?e K "en# 1DDG1-
industrial develo%ment *"inha# +,,B1- communal violence *Iarshney# +,,+1 and %olitical
order and state ca%acity *Hassan# +,,F1. !om%aring states for Muslim outcomes has the
%otential to deliver similar benefits. Indeed# studying intra6regional differences on Muslim
outcomes# holds as much %romise if not greater *than inter6regional1# for %olicy interventions#
given how different regions of the country differ so much in terms of social and %olitical
mobilisation and state ca%acity# factors that over6determine %olitical outcomes and cannot be
created artificially.
1F
3his then is the nub of a develo%ing research agenda on Muslim
exclusion and inclusion in India.
B.+ "o the 2uestions for us are these:
i. Ehy are the outcomes for Muslims so %oor across the range of sub)ects & income#
education# em%loyment# access to servicesC
ii. Ehy are im%rovements across the board so slow# com%ared to that of the other
traditionally marginalised grou% 6 dalit# as well as in s%ecific cases# also adivasi.
iii. Ehy isnt there a more robust res%onse to the exclusion of Muslims# by the state &
central and %rovincial 6 than there should have been# given the recognition of
exclusion of Muslims.
iv. Ehat ex%lains the divergence in outcomes# across .orthern *=P and @ihar1 vs
"outhern *>erala# >arnata'a and 3amil .adu1
v. Ehat ex%lains the divergence in outcomes within regions# between com%arable
states# candidates being *a1 >erala vs >arnata'a# *b1 =P vs @ihar# and *c1 Eest
@engal vs Assam C

(iven the significant ga%s in understanding on Muslim exclusion %ointed out in the survey#
any serious attem%t to advance 'nowledge will re2uire the s%read of the %ro%osed research to
be wide. 3his will entail wor' at three levels:
i. .ational# using aggregate data# to examine national level trends
ii. !ountry6wide# using region6wise disaggregated data# to com%are and tease out
regional %atterns
iii. ocal level# using state6level disaggregated data# to com%are and identify state and
local level dynamics that result in divergent outcomes.
1*
limited s%ace for manoeuvring
DRAFT
2)
And based again on the review of literature# the %ro%osed analytical framewor'# given the
social# %olitical and economic bases of develo%ment outcomes# is hybrid: %olitical
mobilisation of the wea'# resulting in social change# and the im%act of the resultant
em%owerment *%artici%ation7engagement1# within the Muslim community on state ca%acity
for delivering to the section. Hence we aim to loo' at the following dynamics# com%aratively
0 "ocial structure among Muslims# and how that has retained or been challenged
0 Political mobilisation# history# %rocesses and im%act & who gains and who loses
0 !ivic engagement *%olitical and social1 and its im%act on %artici%ation78social ca%ital
including for influencing %olicies# and accessing collective entitlements
0 "tate ca%acity: ability of the state to reach out to Muslims# and for Muslims to access
the state# founded on and founding legitimacy

(iven the above# our hy%othesis for the divergence in Muslims develo%ment outcomes across
Indian states could be framed in the following manner:

/ur survey of literature %oints to ga%s in use of a%%ro%riate conce%tual tools to understand
what lies behind differences in outcomes for Muslims. 3he southern states & %articularly
>arnata'a 6 and to a lesser degree @ihar in the .orth# demonstrate that behind much of the
gains made by Muslims in these states is the role of %olitical mobilisation of the bac'ward
classes# including Muslims *by bac'ward sections 'een to undermine u%%er caste
domination1# that set in motion changes within the Muslim sections too# creating the s%ace for
mobility# the drive towards education and the urge for )obs in %rofessions and government
de%artments. Political and social mobilisation led to s%awning of civic engagement & of the
8bonding# but more significantly# 8bridging ty%e# enhancing Muslim %artici%ation in %ublic
life creating social ca%ital# and Muslim ability to convert assets and resources into
o%%ortunities and ca%abilities. 3hese dynamics have effects for state ca%ability# to reach out
to Muslims# with clearly defined %rogrammes and the reach *8social control1 into the
community to both im%lement the %rogrammes and hold %roviders to account.
Ehere there is absence of %olitical *and social1 mobilisation including of Muslims# old order#
overall *elite domination in =P# Eest @engalJ1 as well as within Muslim communities
%ersists. :eflecting this elite control is %ower within the Muslim community that remains in
traditional *and religious1 hands# whose agenda are narrowly defined along identity lines.
3his mirrors elite %ower in society at large. 3he elite use communal %olarisation# including
through use of violence# to retain their hold over society# es%ecially in the face of bac'ward
assertion# recent exam%le being the Hindu right consolidation in =ttar Pradesh &
Mu?affarnagar riots and reluctance of state administration to res%ond actively to the violence
and the large6scale humanitarian crisis# the overwhelming ma)ority of victims being Muslims.
9emand ma'ing by Muslim elite too & %olitical and religious 6 for identity6based as well as
socio6economic rights# results in further bac'lash by Hindu elite. In this context# the state#
re%resenting the interest of the ma)ority elite# is neither embedded in Muslim society *hence
has little legitimacy1 nor is it autonomous from social forces to enable )ustice to Muslims &
the %athetic in)ustices being meted# as we s%ea'# on the victims of Mu?affarnagar riots being
a case in %oint.
3he wide s%read of the research *in terms of levels of analysis & national# state level and local
6 and the range of geogra%hical cases1 will necessarily re2uire its sco%e to be narrowly
defined. 3his is re2uired to better manage data collection and analysis# and will re2uire
narrowing down the sub)ects of study & the 8outcomes for Muslims. At a most aggregate
level# the ob)ective of all develo%ment is human well being. !entral here is human
DRAFT
2*
develo%ment# itself defined# using the now widely used "ens ca%ability framewor' as 8J.the
%rocess of enlarging a %ersons 88functionings and ca%abilities to function# the range of things
that a %erson could do and be in her life# ex%ressed as ex%anding 88choices *"en 1DFD1.
Im%rovements in human develo%ment# seen thus# include better education and health and
nutrition measures- secure and sustainable livelihood# measured in terms of 2uantum of
assets# and the ability to earn a reasonable return on those. "ecure livelihood itself could be
categorised into em%loyment levels# more secure if in the formal sector# including es%ecially
the %ublic sector. All these are what could be called e0uity outcomes. <or religious# ethnic and
linguistic minorities# %rotection of identity is an e2ually im%ortant outcome. 3hese are about
cultural mar'ers 6 language# freedom of faith# and of identity. In the context of religious
minorities in India# Muslims es%ecially# and the fre2uent organised violence they suffer#
"achar committee added a third ob)ective & security. It is on these three criteria of e2uity#
identity and security that much of the examination of 8outcomes for Muslims rests. $ach of
these individual outcomes# themselves are subdivided into a range of sub6outcomes that add
u% to enable the higher level outcome.
Public sector em%loyment is a s%ecial sort of outcome# that is both an end *secure
em%loyment1# as well as a means# to create conditions for enabling develo%ment outcomes#
through its influence on the nature of the state. 3he state is inclusive# if bureaucracy is
re%resentative of the wider society# and exclusive# if it is more homogenous# thus less
committed and li'ely to deliver for all. 3here is a wide body of literature# showing how a
re%resentative bureaucracy wor's better for inclusive e2uitable develo%ment# and %rotection
of rights of minorities. *Peters et al +,1+- "mith +,11- @angura# +,,F- 9emireva *C1. 3here
are various routes to inclusivity in %ublic sector em%loyment# most common being
affirmative action %olicies: li'e those in the =" for blac' and ethnic minorities and
8reservations or fixed 2uotas for under6re%resented grou%s in India# but also other %ositive
actions for the range of %rotected grou%s covered in => $2uality Act +,1,. :e%resentative
bureaucracy & the outcome 6 then de%ends on two things: firstly# the %resence of such
%olicies# which would itself be the result of a range of factors *the history of %olitical
mobilisation and contestations- awareness and acce%tance by the ma)ority of the rightfulness
of a claim for affirmative action- and a%%etite of the ma)ority for %ursuing a social )ustice
agenda# among others1. And secondly # how effectively those %olicies are im%lemented# an
outcome that would de%end on the factors such as the commitment and ca%acity of the state#
as well as the ability of civil society and citi?ens grou%s to act as watchdogs and hold the stat
to account.
It is %ublic sector em%loyment that we will focus on as our sub)ect of en2uiry# loo'ing at
national# inter6regional and intra6regional state level data# and the various %olitical and social
dynamics that %lay out contributing to the outcomes# in order to understand and ex%lain the
general 2uestion# why some states in India are better at %roviding for Muslims while others
are not so# and what lessons that %rovides for Muslim inclusion as a whole. Ee believe# a
tight focus on %ublic sector em%loyment as a %roxy for Muslim outcome# is a better way to
address our wider 2uestion on Muslim outcome# because %ublic em%loyment *commitment#
effort# framewor' and results1 is easier to identify# measure and trac' than some of the more
com%lex outcomes# such as education# %overty or access to %ublic service. And given how
central a role a re%resentative bureaucracy %lays in ma'ing an inclusive state# a focus on
%ublic sector em%loyment is also ex%ected to have greater %olicy im%act.
In loo'ing at %ublic sector em%loyment outcomes# we will see' to un%ac' the blac' box of
%olicy ma'ing to understand what ma'es leaders %rovide 8e2ual o%%ortunity# by %lacing
DRAFT
2+
these %rocesses in the context of history of state ma'ing# develo%ment of social %olicy and
%rovision for minority grou%s# and state effectiveness towards these goals# to ma% divergent
tra)ectories across state cases. Ee will# at the same time# also examine and ma% Muslim
8%artici%ation # in terms of %olitical mobilisation as well as civil society and advocacy grou%
engagement# around develo%ment along identity issues# to understand how 8demand side
measures contribute to %olicy ma'ing and outcomes. 3hese will entail historical analysis#
ethnogra%hic research# and %olicy and %rogramme analysis. 9rawing from international
ex%erience on inclusion and e2ual o%%ortunity %olicy# will be hel%ful# and we %lan to do that#
from the @ritish ex%erience %articularly# to see if and how %ositive handholding hel%s# and
what the triggers for those were# using secondary material.
(iven that bac'ground# we list below %ossible 8inde%endent variables that contribute to our
de%endent variables. 3hese are sub divided into su%%ly and demand side variables.
"u%%ly side *of the state 7 society1
0 History of focused %ublic service delivery
0 "tate %olicies and commitment for the marginalised: social )ustice agenda
0 Political culture: *%arty mono%oly# com%etition or collaboration- ob)ects of
com%etition7collaborationJ1
0 .ature of social structure *and strength of the Hindu right1
0 "tate ca%acity for delivery to marginalised sections 7 Muslim grou%s
9emand *within and from Muslim communities1
At the %olicy level# these could be about:
0 Presence of a Muslim middle class to articulate demands
0 Political %ower and affiliation *Muslim oriented %arties or im%ortant Muslims leaders1
0 Political mobilisation# and its nature *in identity or develo%ment terms# for Muslims or
marginalised Muslims 1
At local level
0 Ability to mediate the state & citi?en interface *role of bro'ers1
0 !ivil society: s%read# fragmented or networ'ed# lin'ed *or divorced1 to wider civil
society# delivery ca%acity# access7%artnershi%s with state agencies
0 !ivil society also as watchdogs: to 'ee% tabs on %erformance# raise voice through
fre2uent re%orting of %erformance# and advocate greater accountability of state actors
to goals they are committed to. 3his would also include minority em%loyees
associations


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