G.R. No.

181949 April 23, 2014

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO BIHAG, NAMELY: ALEJANDRA BIHAG, NICOMEDES B. BIHAG,
VERONICA B. ACOSTA, SUSANA B. MINOZA, PAULINO B. BIHAG, DANILO B. BIHAG,
TIMOTEO B. BIHAG JR., EDILBERTO B. BIHAG, JOSEPHINE B. MINOZA, and MA. FEB.
ARDITA,* Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF NICASIO BATHAN, NAMELY: PRIMITIV AB. BATHAN and DUMININA B.
GAMALIER,** Respondents,
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
The doctrine of finality of judgment dictates that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments or orders
must become final at some point in time.
1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari
2
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 26,
2007
3
and January 14, 2008
4
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03019.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, petitioners heirs of Francisco Bihag (Francisco), namely: Teofilo T. Bihag, Jorge
T. Bihag, Leona B. Velasquez, Vivencia B. Suson and Timoteo T. Bihag,
5
represented by his heirs
Nicomedes Bihag, Alejandra Bihag, Veronica B. Acosta, Susana Mioza, Paulino Bihag, Danilo
Bihag, Edilberto Bihag, Timoteo Bihag, Jr., Josephine B. Mioza, and Ma. Fe Bihag, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint
6
for Quieting of Title, Damages, and Writ of
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-1311, against
respondents spouses Nicasio
7
and Primitiva (Primitiva) Bathan and their daughter, Duminina Bathan
Gamalier. Petitioners alleged that sometime in the 1960s, respondent Primitiva approached her
brother, Francisco, to borrow money.
8
But since he did not have money at that time, she instead
asked him to mortgage his unregistered land in Casili, Mandaue City, to the Rural Bank of Mandaue
City so that she could get a loan.
9
She promised that she would pay the obligation to the bank and
that she would return to him the documents, which were submitted to the bank in support of the loan
application.
10
Francisco agreed on the condition that respondent Primitiva would pay the real property
tax of the subject land while it was mortgaged.
11
When Francisco died on December 13, 1976,
petitioners found out that the mortgage had long been cancelled.
12
They confronted respondents to
return the documents but to no avail.
13
Petitioners later discovered that respondents took possession
of the land and were hauling materials and limestones from it to the prejudice of petitioners.
14
Thus,
petitioners prayed that a TRO be issued against the latter to enjoin them from entering the land and
from hauling materials therefrom.
15

On the same day, the RTC issued a TRO
16
against respondents for a period of 20 days, pending the
resolution of petitioners application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondents, in their Answer,
17
denied the material allegations of the Complaint and interposed the
defenses of lack of cause of action and laches. They claimed that respondent spouses already
owned the land when it was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Mandaue City in the 1960s.
18
They
alleged that in 1956, Francisco borrowed money from Primitiva using the tax declarations of the land
as collateral;
19
that he failed to pay the loan;
20
and thus, in 1959, he verbally sold the land to
respondent spouses.
21
Respondents insisted that petitioners knew about the sale,
22
as evidenced by
the Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs with Deed of Sale,
23
which was signed by some of the
petitioners in 1984.
In response, petitioners countered that the signatures of those who signed the Extra-Judicial
Declaration of Heirs with Deed of Sale were obtained through fraud as they barely know how to read
and were in their twilight years when they signed the document.
24

On June 2, 1992, the RTC issued an Order
25
granting petitioners application for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On March 20, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision
26
in favor of respondents. It gave credence to their
version that Francisco sold the land to respondent Primitiva in 1959.
27
In addition, the RTC ruled that
petitioners are estopped from claiming ownership over the said land by reason of laches, pointing
out that respondents have been in possession of the land for more than 30 years and that Francisco,
during his lifetime, never disputed their public and peaceful possession of the land.
28
Thus, the RTC
decreed:
Foregoing considered, the Court decides in favor of the [respondents].
1. the dismissal of the case;
2. Plaintiffs to surrender possession and ownership of the property under consideration to
Nicasio Bathan and Primitiva Bihag-Bathan;
3. Plaintiffs to pay moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); Attorneys fees of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as well as litigation expenses in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
29

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its August 11, 2006 Order.
30

Unfazed, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2006.
31

On January 5, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
32
denying the Notice of Appeal. The RTC declared
that:
A reading of the Notice of Appeal will show that [petitioners] received a copy of the Decision on April
20, 2006 but filed the Motion for Reconsideration on April 28, 2006 after the lapse of eight (8) days.
Furthermore, [petitioners] received a copy of the Order denying their motion on September 22, 2006
but filed the Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2006 after the lapse of ten (10) days. Thus, the Notice of
Appeal was filed after the lapse of [the] fifteen (15) days reglementary period or to be exact after the
lapse of eighteen (18) days.
x x x x
[Based] on the case cited above, [petitioners] only [have] (7) seven days from the date of receipt of
the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to file the Notice of Appeal.
Considering that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 15th day from receipt of the Order denying
Motion for Reconsideration which is beyond the reglementary period to file the Notice of Appeal, the
same is DENIED due course.
Notify counsels.
SO ORDERED.
33

Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,
34
which petitioners did
not oppose.
On April 24, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
35
granting the Motion and on May 2, 2007, it issued a
Writ of Execution.
36

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On October 10, 2007, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
37
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 26, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution
38
dismissing the Petition for being insufficient in
form and substance. It found that the Petition failed to indicate the material dates as required under
Section 3,
39
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; that no prior motion for reconsideration was taken; that
one of the petitioners, Jorge T. Bihag, failed to sign the verification and certification of non- forum
shopping; that the verification appended to the Petition was a photocopy; that affiants failed to
indicate the date of issue of their Community Tax Certificate; and that petitioners failed to submit the
certified true copy of the RTCs April 24, 2007 Order, granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
40
attaching a copy of the RTCs August 24,
2007 Order and explaining that no motion for reconsideration was filed since they never received a
copy of the RTCs January 5, 2007 Order, denying their Notice of Appeal.
Respondents opposed the Motion, contending that petitioners received a copy of the RTCs January
5, 2007 Order as evidenced by the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster, attesting that
petitioners, through their counsels receiving clerk, received a copy of the Order on January 22,
2007.
41

On January 14, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution
42
denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners for lack of merit.
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction with
the sole issue of "whether x x x the disapproval of the Notice of Appeal undertaken by petitioners
from the judgment of the [RTC] was in accordance with law."
43

Acting on petitioners application for Preliminary Injunction, this Court, in its April 2, 2008
Resolution,
44
issued a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing the May 2, 2007 Writ of
Execution issued by the RTC in Civil Case No. MAN-1311.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners sole contention is that the RTCs denial of their Notice of Appeal contravenes the ruling
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
45
which grants an aggrieved party a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration within which to file the
notice of appeal.
46

Petitioners claim that their Notice of Appeal was timely filed on October 2, 2006 or within 10 days
after they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration on September 22, 2006.
47

Respondents Arguments
Instead of responding to petitioners contention, respondents put in issue petitioners failure to move
for a reconsideration of the denial of their Notice of Appeal.
48
Respondents assert that the absence of
a motion for reconsideration justifies the CAs denial of the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners.
49

Anent petitioners alleged non-receipt of the January 5, 2007 Order, respondents insist that this is
belied by the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster certifying that on January 22, 2007, the
receiving clerk of the office of petitioners counsel received a copy of the January 5, 2007
Order.
50
Respondents further contend that even if petitioners did not receive a copy of the said Order,
they should have at least opposed the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by
respondents or moved for a reconsideration of the RTCs April 24, 2007 Order granting respondents
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
51
Failing to do so, petitioners lost the right to question
the RTCs Orders.
52
Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
The Petition must fail.
An aggrieved party is allowed a fresh
period of 15 days counted from receipt
of the order denying a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration
within which to file the notice of appeal
in the RTC.
In Neypes, the Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and
to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, declared that an aggrieved party has a fresh
period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration, within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC.
53

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was
timely filed as they had a fresh 15-day period from the time they received the Order denying their
Motion for Reconsideration within which to file their Notice of Appeal.
The January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality.1wphi 1
But while we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was erroneously denied by the RTC,
we are nevertheless constrained to deny the instant Petition as the January 5, 2007 Order, denying
petitioners Notice of Appeal, has attained finality. It is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes
final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days
from his receipt of the courts decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding.
54
Once it
becomes final and executory, the decision or order may no longer be amended or modified, not even
by an appellate court.
55

In this case, petitioners, through their counsel, received a copy of the assailed January 5, 2007
Order, under Registry Receipt No. E-0280, on January 22, 2007, as evidenced by the Certification of
the assistant postmaster. As such, petitioners should have filed their motion for reconsideration
within 15 days, or on or before February 6, 2007, but they did not. Instead, they filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10, 2007. At this time, the RTCs January 5, 2007
Order denying the Notice to Appeal had long become final and executory. Petitioners mere denial of
the receipt of the assailed Order cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant
postmaster as we have consistently declared that "[t]he best evidence to prove that notice was sent
would be a certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued
or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made."
56

Considering that the January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality, it may no longer be modified,
altered, or disturbed, even if the modification seeks to correct an erroneous conclusion by the court
that rendered it.
57

In view of the foregoing, we find no error on the part of the CA in denying the Petition for Certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 26, 2007 and January 14,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03019 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 2, 2008 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982
SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA
CACABELOS, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J .:
The Court reverses the appellate court's decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs-respondents the lawful owners of the land in question
and ordering defendant (herein petitioner) to pay P30.00 monthly rentals until possession of the
property is surrendered to respondents, for unless there is partition of the estate of the deceased,
either extra judicially or by court order, a co-heir cannot validly claim title to a specific portion of the
estate and send the same. Title to any specific part of the estate does not automatically pass to the
heirs by the mere death of the decedent and the effect of any disposition by a co-heir before partition
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the dissolution of the communal
estate. What a co-heir can validly dispose of is only his hereditary rights.
Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a complaint before the Court of First
Instance for ejectment and recovery of possession against herein petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. T-1163, alleging that they are the owners in fee simple of a parcel of commercial land, pro-
indiviso, consisting of 150.8 sq. meters, more or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan,
having bought the same from Evaristo G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
April 15, 1964. They also demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property all
P40.00 until the property is surrendered to them.
The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. qmeter land originally owned by Hermogenes
Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo,
Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the ownership of the whole lot.
Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children.
Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is
also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion of the
lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the
southern one-half portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique. The land subject of the controversy
is the most southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children which petitioner claims
he had bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which respondents claim they had bough from
Evaristo on April 15, 1964.
Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed therein as Civil Case No. T-966.
The Court finds merit in the petition for setting aside respondent appellate court's decision finding for
respondents-plaintiffs, for the following considerations:
The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in the lower
court is premature, for what must be settled frist is the action for partition. Unless a project of
partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance.
Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot
dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate
such heirs.
1
Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left wtih respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership
being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
2

While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other
co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any
physical adjudication.
3
An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree.
Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
thing owned in common by all the co-owners.
4
What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided
aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition.
5
Before
partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
6

In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. qqqEspique in favor of respondents
and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of
the property among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are
valid. However, the interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the
parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of
the estate
7
subject to provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-
purchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
8
Respondent court's ruling that the sale by Estefanio
in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is erroneous. Such notice in
writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale
of a portion of the estate, for them to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of
the New Civil Code, that is, the right to redeem the property sold within one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the record to indicate that such right of
subrogation was in effect sought to be exercised upon the co-heirs' having learned of the sale, which is
not in issue here.)
Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the use of
the property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by
metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is
the part in dispute.
Accordingly, respondent court's judgment is set aside and judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint of respondents-plaintiffs in the court below. No pronouncement as to costs.
Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J .:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised
is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her
mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident
of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two
(2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales,
the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she
is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court
which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said
widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation.
1
Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit
either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code,
2
or by the
right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil
Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from
her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the
Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the
Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law
3
refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas,
4
to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
(not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the
Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of
his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented)
who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may,
said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon
the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate
heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.