PROF. MERLIN M.

MAGALLONA,
et.al v . HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HISCAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
et.al
G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011,
EN BANC

The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk thePhilippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends tothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with thet er ms of t he Uni ted
Nati ons Conventi on on t he Law of t he Sea (UNCLOS I I I ), which the Philippines ratified on
February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortenedone baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the
Philippinea r c h i p e l ag o a n d c l a s s i f i e d a dj a c e n t t e r r i t o r i e s s u c h a s t h e K a l a
y a a n I s l a n d Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose
islandsgenerate their own applicable maritime zones.Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
or legislators assailthe constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending thatthe
law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters,t hus subj ecti ng these
water s to the r i ght of i nnocent and sea l anes passageunder UNCLOS I I I , i ncl udi ng
over f l i ght . Peti ti oner s have contended that thesepassage rights will violate the Constitution
as it shall expose Philippine internalwaters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal watersinto archipelagic waters

HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.

The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with thePhilippines national interest. Aside
from being a vital step in safeguarding
thecountr ys mar i ti me zones, t he l aw al so al l ows an i nter nati onal l y-
r ecogni zeddel i mi tati on of t he br eadt h of the Phi l i ppi nes mar i ti me zones and
conti nent al shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters intoarchipelagic waters
will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has
sovereign power that extends to
thewa t e r s e n c l o s e d b y t h e a r c h i p e l a gi c b as e l i n e s , r e g a r dl e s s o f t h e i r d
e p t h o r distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sealanes
passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exerciseof sover ei gnt y over
water s and ai r space, bed and subsoi l and the r esour ces therein

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 183591,
183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008)

Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by
the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and
ancestral lands of the Bangsamorodefined as the present geographic area of the ARMM
constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The
BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also
described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as associative, characterized by shared authority
and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.

Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the
respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to
hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A
subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and
their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.


Issues and Ruling:
1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.
2.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall
be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is
inconsistent with the limits of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments.
Because although the Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace
negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in
any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

3. W/N there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
4. YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of
the peoples right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with
mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to
seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).

5. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

6. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions,
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD
stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective
until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the
MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only
way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

7. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official
copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution
is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.

The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy
of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.

The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,
while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is
normally fulfilled through internal self-determinationa peoples pursuit of its political, economic,
social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself
to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional
act.

Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when
the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international
community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to
give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse.
Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.


Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Pr i vate r espondent, Dandi ng Coj uangco, f i l ed a case t o compel the PCGG t o
al l owhim to inspect corporate books of SMC and UCPB.
ISSUE:
Is this a suit against the state requiring the PCGG to allow Mr. Cojuangco to inspectthe books
of corporations in which he has shares of being a stockholder.
HELD:
T h i s i s n o t a s u i t a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . T h i s i s o n l y a n e x e
r c i s e o f h i s r i g h t a s a s t o c k h o l de r . T h e s t o c k s o r h i s s h a r e s o f
s t i c k s wh i c h h av e b e e n s e q u e s t e r e d h a v e n o t aut omati cal l y become st ocks
of the gover nment. The test of sui t agai nst t he st at e: I f i t r e q u i r e s a n a f f i r ma t i v e
a c t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s t a t e t o di s b u r s e p u bl i c f u n ds o r l o s s
o f gover nment pr oper ty. I n thi s peti ti on, these ar e not at tendant . Besi des, i n the
cor por at ebooks, the stocks are still in the name of Cojuangco.



Tanada v. Angara
Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade
and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective
competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such.
On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO
Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II,
providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10
and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue
Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist
policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it
a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in
government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof
and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits
or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates
a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1)

In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation,
intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway
in Pasig
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and
Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145
housing units
By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa,
Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon
Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each
housing unit"
Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of
the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract,
by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming
Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary
Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit
(what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)
In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the
amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under
Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the
DPWH
In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject
money claims
Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the
respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then
Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld
2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
1. Yes.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view
of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit
in the instant petition
The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or
prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality
"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is
upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit
Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the
DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.

The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

Calub and Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced
lumber.The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the
drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a
composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest
products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver,
filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against
petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.


Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suitagainst the State


Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold
the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activitieswithin the scope of their authority in good faith and without
willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In
implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out,
petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the
limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against
the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suitagainst the State. It cannot prosper without the States
consent.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003]
PONENTE: J. YNARES-SANTIAGO


FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de
Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized
housing.
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they
were waiving their objections to NHAs power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of
execution has been granted and the court already appointed commissioners to determine the
amount for just compensation
On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that
the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a
partial judgment has been rendered.
After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR on the
amount for the just compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and support. Both MR was
denied by the court.
While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of judgment and the motion
for execution has been issued, NHA filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA
denied the petition on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and
executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same.
Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE
OR CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
2) WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN
AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE
PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE
3) WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES
APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;
HELD:
The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed.

RATIO:
On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state can be compelled and coerced by the court to
continue exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, since the NHA does not exercise its right to
appeal in the expropriation proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and
executory. In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann and Metropolitan Water District v. De Los
Angeles, an expropriation proceeding was explained.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the
court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the
merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly
state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
Court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous
in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied
party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal there from.
On the second issue, the court held that a socialized housing is always for the public used and that
the public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of
just compensation that the court has fixed.
On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
applied to the NHA, although it is public in character, it is only public in character since it is
government-owned, having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the
funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although
considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.


CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA,
petitioners,v.
HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch
123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZSANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB),
respondents.
G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003

FACTS
:

In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and
17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed thelegality of the
abolition. The CF
I
in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all thedismissed employees and
the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Governmentappealed the
decision but such was dismissed.
In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partialpayment of her back-wages. The others were
paid in full.
In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the
City refused to release the money to Santiago.The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not
entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the
motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was given to Santiago. The City
Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle;properties of the municipality were exempt
from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directedthe sheriff to levy and schedule at
public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance
No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago asback-wages, plus
interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check butthe City Treasurer
cant do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered
the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocancorresponding to
the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the CityTreasurer sent an
advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liablefor any
damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE
:

Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from
execution), to satisfy Santiagos claim.
HELD
:

Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subjectto
his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third
personor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds
deposited inthe PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and
may not besubject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. Eventhough the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the
courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is atliberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of
state property to satisfy judgmentsrecovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will
recognize such judgment as final andmake provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is
not absolute and admits of a well-definedexception, that is, when there is a corresponding
appropriation as required by law.
In such a case, themonetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the
City Council of Caloocanalready approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
allocating the amount of P439,377.14for Santiagos back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell
squarely within the exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced against
such funds.

Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

Facts: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly
awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National
ParksDevelopment Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the
development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as
well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the
profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new
Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal
agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran
privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for
damages andinjunction against petitioner.


Issue: Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the
State, which could not prosper without the States consent


Held: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaintsfiled against public officials for
acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against
the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the
state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the
damages awarded to the plaintiff.

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity,
from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official
is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal
capacity. It is also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.

The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the
ejectment of GABI.

The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man
and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to
occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous
administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to
private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents
cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:p

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy,Bulacan for collection of
sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that acontract was entered into by Lim Chao
and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out
certain developmentalundertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality
of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. However, despite having
made several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos claim for
payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interestand damages
and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment againstthe Municipality. The trial
court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing thesheriff "to attach the estate, real and
personal properties" of the Municipality.The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the claim on which theaction had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds,
pointing outthat there was no written contract or document that would evince the
supposedagreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve
and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking, among
others,immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation,it is
immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution andgarnishment. Lim
Chao on her part, counters that,
the Municipalitys
claim of immunityfrom suit is negated by the Local Government Code, which vests municipal
corporationswith the power to sue and be sued.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts order.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipalityof Hagonoy is valid.

HELD:
No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued byprivate parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds andproperties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations
as required by law. Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects

Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vizon G.R. No. 54705, June 26, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with
respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement
stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main
Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner
Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is
likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew
itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the
date of expiry.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before
August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion
of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive
in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in
March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance
with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated
the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier
verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand,
respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent filed a
complaint against petitioners (RTC) of Makati, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be
sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent
filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has
expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the
Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can be sued.

RULING:
The Supreme Court on the matter ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have
waived its immunity to suit. The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal
action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a
specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The
aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the
other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in
the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of
Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle
recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of
settling the case, except to dismiss it.

The Court stated that the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment is still part sovereign function of the
State. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State
may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of
the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner
Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract
with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official
residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Supreme Court grants the petition and reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

` u a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation
infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as
special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of
the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this
instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages
above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not
called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

Chavez vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004A mere license is always revocable

FACTS:

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising
crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional and Whether or not the
right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.In evaluating a due
process claim; the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest
exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is
neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr. that:Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866
which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and
under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like
ordinary licenses in other regulated fields,...

BFAR VS COA
FACTS:
-

Petitioner Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union,Regional Office No. VII,
Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1999 requesting theBFAR Central Office for a Food Basket
Allowance.
-

It justified its request on the high cost of living, i.e., "the increase in prices of petroleumproducts which
catapulted the cost of food commodities, has greatly affected theeconomic conditions and living
standard of the government employees of BFAR RegionVII and could hardly sustain its need to cope
up with the four (4) basic needs,
i.e.
, food,shelter, clothing and education."
-

It also relied on the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS),
-
The ESIAS "includes the granting of incentives that will help employees overcomepresent economic
difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment anddedication to public service
-
The Commission on Audit

Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Cebu Citydisallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance
under Notice of Disallowance.
-
BFAR Regional Office No. VII, moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of
thedisallowance. It argued that the grant of Food Basket Allowance would enhance thewelfare and
productivity of the employees.
-
Further, it contended that the approval by the Honorable Drilon, Undersecretary forFisheries and
Livestock, of the said benefit was the law itself which vested the specificauthority for its release.
-
The Commission on Audit

Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Regional Office No.VII, Cebu City denied the motion.
-
BFAR appealed to the Commission on Audit

Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO)National, Quezon City. The appeal was denied.
-
Hence, this appeal.Petitioner cites the following grounds for its appeal:1. The disallowance in
question is unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamentalprinciple of the State enshrined under
Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 9.
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensurethe prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from povertythrough policies that provide
adequate social services, promote fullemployment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.
SEC. 10.
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of nationaldevelopment.2. The Undersecretary for
Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture who is an alter-ego of the
President. His approval was tantamount to theauthority from the Office of the President, as
contemplated in DBM Budget Circular No.16, dated November 28, 1998.3. The grant of the Food
Basket Allowance is in conformity with Sec. 12 of the SalaryStandardization Law.HELD: We deny the
petition.

RATIO:
-
First, we rule on the issue of constitutionality.
-
BFAR invokes the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on social justice to warrant thegrant of the Food
Basket Allowance.
-
Time and again, we have ruled that the social justice provisions of the Constitution arenot self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
-

They are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them effect, legislativeenactment is
required.
-

As we held inKilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato
, the principles and state policiesenumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are "not self-
executingprovisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
donot embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

-
Second, petitioner contends that the approval of the Department of Agriculture (DA)Undersecretary
for Fisheries and Livestock of the Food Basket Allowance is the lawwhich authorizes its release.
-
It is crystal clear that the DA Undersecretary has no authority to grant any allowance tothe
employees of BFAR.
-
In the instant case, no Administrative Order has been issued by the Office of thePresident to exempt
BFAR from the express prohibition against the grant of any food,rice, gift checks, or any other form of
incentive/allowance to its employees.
-
In the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance is definitely not in the nature of anallowance to
reimburse expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of
their official functions.
-
It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty.
-
It is a form of financial assistance to all officials and employees of BFAR.
-
Petitioner invokes the rule of statutory construction that "what is not included isexcluded."
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
. Petitioner claims that the Food Basket Allowance is distinct and separate from the specific
allowances/additionalcompensation listed in the circular.
-
Again, we reject petitioners contention.
-
The Food Basket Allowance falls under the 14thcategory, that of incentiveallowance/fee/pay.
Petitioner itself justified the Food Basket Allowance as an incentiveto the employees to encourage
them to be more productive and efficient.
-
We are not convinced that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the incentive awardsystem
contemplated above.
-

In the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance was granted to all BFAR employees,without
distinction. It was not granted due to any extraordinary contribution orexceptional accomplishment
by an employee.
-
The Food Basket Allowance was primarily an economic monetary assistance to theemployees.

HELD:
The petition is
DENIED

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he
also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration
of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written
leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to
interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and
"public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some
valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State
has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To
add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.


Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus
more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the
Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the
day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) vs Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)

FACTS:
PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporationto
promotetherapidintegrateddevelopment and growth of thecoconutand other palm oil industry in all
its aspects and to ensure thatcoconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of,
such development and growththrough a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of
the issuing of licenses to would-becoconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued
Board Resolution No. 018-93 whichno longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing
to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote
free enterprise unhampered by protectiveregulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But
this caused cut-throat competition amongoperators specifically in congested areas, underselling,
smuggling, and the decline of coconut-basedcommodities. The APCD then filed a petition
for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PCA ran inconflictagainst the very nature of its creation.

HELD:
Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez- f ai r eas
aneconomicprinciple. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonethelessreserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare.
As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for
the benefit of thegeneral public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reservesthe power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare
and when the public interestso requires

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque


Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990,
the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006.


Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued
by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;


Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way
that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the
land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature

LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:

Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America
started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-
1. They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to
enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with
its American counterparts; the Balikatan is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the
MDTs objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it
seeks to reaffirm.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

Issue:

Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Ruling:

To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to
engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined.
The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in
particular, from any political activity.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation
must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties intentions. The
Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it
refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside
the aforesaid context.

It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose
from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in
negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than
military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and
surveillance to protect the nations marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist
vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses,
medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that .Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form
under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de
Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum,
was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She
was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision
on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to
regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage
is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the
labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of
a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose
of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

PRC vs. De Guzman

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board
of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names
as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed
that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most
difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and
Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored
100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-
one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.

For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the
test questions.

Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993

FACTS:
The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines,taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." This instant petition was filed to
seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and tocease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a misappropriation or
impairment of the natural resourceproperty and violates their constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution) and the protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

HELD:
1. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

2. The Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that
the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in thefundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution).

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not underthe Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions of
DENR, under whose authority and office the complaint falls. The petitioners right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as DENRs duty to protect and advance the said right. The petitioners
personality to sue in behalf of their own as well as the future generations behalf can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational esponsibility insofar as the said right is concerned.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested
that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was
arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago
and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still
failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it
was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a
motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on
the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and
therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of
judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's
"full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court
held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear
support from the Constitution,the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect
the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shallautomatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,
not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper
legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from
its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise
by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she
has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizingRespondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution
of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment"
or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority

ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007Ponente: NACHURA,
J.
:FACTS
Peti ti oner s Romeo P. Ger ochi ,
Katul ong Ng Bayan
(KB), and Envi r onment al i st Consumer s Net wor k, I nc. (ECN)(peti ti oner s), come
bef or e t hi s Cour t i n t hi s or i gi nal acti on pr ayi ng that
Sect i on 34 of Republ i c Act (RA)
9136, o t h e r wi s e k n o wn a s t h e E l e c t r i c P o we r I n d u s t r y R e f o r m Ac t o f 2 0 0 1
( E P I R A)
, i mp o s i n g t h e Universal Charge
, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR)
Which seeks to implement the said imposition , be declared unconstitutional .Pet i ti oner s al so
pr aythat the Uni ver sal Char ge i mposed upon the consumer s be refunded
and that a pr el i mi nar yinjunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the
respondents to refrain from implementing,charging, and collecting the said charge.Congress
enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent
NationalP o we r Co r p o r a t i o n - S t r a t e g i c P o we r U t i l i t i e s Gr o u p ( NP C-
S P U G) f i l e d wi t h r e s p o n de n t E n e r g y R e g u l a t o r y Co mmi s s i o n ( E R C) a p e t i
t i o n f o r t h e availment
f r o m t h e U n i v e r s a l C h a r g e o f i t s share f or Mi ssi onar yElectrification
. On May 7, 2002, NPC f i l ed anot her peti ti on wi th ERC, pr ayi ng that t he pr oposed
shar e f r om
t heU n i v e r s a l C h a r g e f o r t h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l c h a r g e
b e a p p r o v e d f o r w i t h d r a w a l
f r o m t h e S p e c i a l Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for therehabilitation and management of watershed areas.
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order provisionallyapprovi ng t he
c o mp u t e d a mo u n t a s t h e s h a r e o f t h e NP C-
S P U G f r o m t h e U n i v e r s al Ch a r g e f o r Mi s s i o n a r y Electrification and authorizing the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collectthe same from its end-
users on a monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsiderationasking the
ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003, ERC authorized the NPC to draw
upto P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the
availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.On the basis of
the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo
P.Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric
bills starting from themonth of July 2003.
Petitioners
s u b mi t t h a t t h e a s s a i l e d p r ov i s i o n o f l a w a n d i t s I R R wh i c h s o u g h t
t o i mp l e me n t t h e s a me a r e unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1)
The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented
under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law
is a tax
which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities.
The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of saidpower t o any
execut i ve or admi ni st rat i ve agency l i ke t he ERC i s unconst i t ut i onal , gi vi ng t h e
sameunlimited authority
. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined,fixed and
approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority.2 ) T h e E R C i s a l s o e mp o we r e d t o a p p r o v e a n d
de t e r mi n e wh e r e t h e f u n ds c o l l e c t e d s h o u l d b e u s e d. 3 ) T h e i mp o s i t i o n
o f t h e U n i v e r s a l Ch a r g e o n a l l e n d - u s e r s i s o p pr e s s i v e a n d c o n f i s c a t o r y
a n d a mo u n t s to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
be heard and represented.
Respondent


PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Respondents
Departmentof Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends:
1)
Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is
leviedfor a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry.
2)
It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent
police power
. On this premise, PSALM submits thatt her e i s no undue del egat i on of l egi sl ati ve power t o
t he ERC si nce the l at ter mer el y exer ci ses a l i mi tedauthority or discretion as to the
execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.
3)
Universal
Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax
, that its imposition would redoundt o the benef i t of t he el ectr i c power i ndustr y and not t o
t he publ i c, and t hat i t s r ate i s uni f or ml y l evi ed onelectricity end-users, unlike a tax which is
imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay.
4)
Imposition of the Universal Charge
is not oppressive and confiscatory
since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due
process.
PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary
Electrification andEnvironmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERCCase Nos. 2002- 194 and 2002- 165. Other wi se, PECO
coul d be hel d l i abl e under Sec. 46[24]of the EPI RA, whi chimposes fines and penalties for
any violation of its provisions or its IRR.

ISSUE
1 ) W h e t h e r o r n o t , t h e U n i v e r s a l C h a r g e i m p o s e d u n d e r S e c .
3 4 o f t h e E P I R A i s a t a x
2 ) Wh e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e i s u n d u e d e l e g at i o n o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o we r t o t ax
o n t h e p a r t o f t h e E R C. HELD

1
st
ISSUEThe conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which
the charge ismade
. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not
make the imposition a tax. Inexacti ng the assai l ed Uni ver sal Char ge t hr ough Sec. 34 of
t he EPI RA, t he State' s pol i ce power , par ti cul ar l y i tsr egul ator y di mensi on, i s i nvoked.
Such can be deduced f r om Sec. 34 whi ch enumer ates t he pur poses f or whi ch
t heUniversal Charge is imposed.

From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Chargeis not a
tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
2
nd
ISSUE
There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.The principle of separation of powers
ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizanceof and is supreme
in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrineof
separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim
potestas delegatanon del egar i potest
(what has been del egated cannot be del egated). Thi s i s based on the et hi cal
pr i nci pl e t hat suchdelegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind
of another.I n the f ace of the
i ncr easi ng compl exi t y of moder n l i f e, del egati on of l egi sl ati ve power to var i ous spe
ci al i zedadministrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and
variety of interactions intoday's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will
deal adequately with and respond promptlyto the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked toexecute laws in their specialized
fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statuteand effectuate
its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that
theregulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are
denominated as the completeness test andthe sufficient standard test. Under the
first test
, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
thatwhen i t r eaches the del egate, the onl y thi ng he wi l l have to do i s t o enf or ce i t .
The
second test
mandates adequateguidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegationfrom running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and
appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, iscomplete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
1
st
test
- Al though Sec. 34 of the EPI RA mer el y pr ovi des t hat wi thi n one (1) year f r om the
ef f ecti vi ty ther eof , aUniversal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall
be imposed on all electricity end-users, andtherefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid
as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain bythe legislative parameters provided
in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does notenjoy a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and
passesthe first test for valid delegation of legislative power.
2
nd
test
- Pr ovi si ons of the EPI RA such as, among other s, t o ensur e t he total el ectr i f i cati on
of the countr y and t hequal i t y, r el i abi l i ty, secur i ty and af f or dabi l i t y of the suppl y of
el ectr i c power [59]and watershed rehabilitation and management[60] meet the r equi r ements
f or val i d del egati on, as t hey pr ovi de t he l i mi t ati ons on the ERCs power t oformulate
the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power to theERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition
of theU n i v e r s a l Ch a r g e o n a l l e n d -
u s e r s i s o p p r e s s i v e a n d c o n f i s c a t o r y , a n d a mo u n t s t o t a x a t i o n wi t h o u t r
epr esent at i on. Hence, such cont ent i on i s deemed wai ved or abandoned
.
Mor eover, t he det er mi nat i on of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is
an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same
.Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
theremust be a cl ear and unequi vocal br each of the Cons ti tuti on and not one that
i s doubt f ul , specul ati ve, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find noclear violation of the Constitution which would warrant
a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and
void.WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
ABAKADA GURO vs. PURISIMA
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their
revenue targets. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a
system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere
speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared
objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:

Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified
based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or
persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.

The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.
22
With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.
23
Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR
and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function
of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of
the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335
fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.


HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006

CASE This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said
EO 156 prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone.

FACTS
entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor
vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The said provision
prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the
Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions.

y relief were filed by Southwing
Heavy Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers
Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring
Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.

RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with
Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227)
or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of
goods and capital within the Freeport.

CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any
statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the
importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature
and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive
issuance is void.

ISSUE
Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the Presidents quasi-
legislative power. YES.

SC RULING
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged
primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the
President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by
the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended
to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it
must comply with the following requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
statutory bases.
er must be issued or promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive
issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law since the


respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the issuance of EO 156
but instead, what they challenged was the absence of substantive due process in the
issuance of the EO.

with the third
requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic
industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the
prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to
some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is
actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay
Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff
and customs laws are in force and effect."

Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of
the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the
encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is outside
the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter
the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise.

applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but is declared
VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO
97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty Free
Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the
Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be
stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot
be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base area.

Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID insofar as
it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base area.