Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and

Justice Indicators

Eric Scheye, Independent Consultant

Diana Chigas, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

May 29, 2009

 Table of Contents
I. Introduction

II. HMG Evaluation Needs

III. Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators:

Summary and Explanation
A. Uses and Limitations of the Indicators
B. Categories of Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators
B.I. Differences between conflict and justice and security indicators
B.II. The need for reformulation of conflict indicator categories
B.III. Framework for conflict, justice and security indicators
C. Criteria for Selection of Indicators

IV. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Indicators

A. Undertracking of Important Factors
B. Misleading Indicators

V. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Data

VI. Matrix of Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators

A. Assumptions Underlying the Choice of Indicators
B. Using the Indicators
C. Matrix of Indicators

A. Conflict Intensity
B. Institutions/Mechanisms that Handle Grievances
B.I Capacity of Government to Deal with Grievances
B.II Government Legitimacy and Accountability
B.III Human Rights and Civil Liberties
C. Community Initiatives for Peace
D. Military and Militarisation
E. Justice
E.I Criminal Justice Capacity and Effectiveness
E.II Rule of Law and Administration of Justice
E.III Access to Justice
E.IV Corruption
F. Security Sector
F.I Prisons
F.II Policing
F.III Oversight of Justice and Security Sector
G. Personal Safety and Security

i
Table of Contents, cont.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

VIII. Appendices
A. Example: Application of Indicators to Burundi and Nepal, 2006-2008
B. List of Data Sources Used in the Matrix
C. Matrix of Countries Covered by Indices/Data Sources
D. List of Interviewees

ii
 Report:
Proposed Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators
Eric Scheye and Diana Chigas
May 29, 2008

I. Introduction

HMG and DFID acknowledge their need “to be better at monitoring, evaluating, demonstrating
and communicating the impact and value of its conflict, security and justice activities and
programming” 1 The need to measure more systematically the effect of programming resides at a
number of different levels: global, regional, country, and programmatic. Each of these levels,
however, targets a different audience and addresses different needs, which often are disparate
and do not necessarily coincide or overlap. Consequently, it is not possible to construct a single,
comprehensive set of measures for evaluation that answer all of HMG and DFID’s needs and are
grounded upon “a short list of indicators that can be backed up by credible, [existing] datasets.”2
As a result, this report concentrates only on those conflict, justice, and security indicators that are
“measurable at country level” 3 so as “to help staff monitor trends” 4 and the overall direction in
which a country is moving. 5

More specifically, this report recommends baskets of indicators that are derived from the “most
commonly available global and regional datasets,” which reflect a selected number of conflict,
justice, and security categories, including, but not limited to:

• conflict and armed violence;

• levels of exclusion, participation, representation;
• criminal justice;
• access to justice;
• oversight of the security sector;
• qualitative perceptions of safety and security; and
• violence against women. 6

In developing the baskets of indicators, the authors interviewed a number of DFID and HMG
staff concerning their needs for and experience with indicators. The purpose of the interviews

1
Terms of Reference, 30 January 2009, p. 1.
2
Terms of Reference, 30 January 2009, p. 1.
3
Terms of Reference, 30 January 2009, p. 2.
4
Terms of Reference, 30 January 2009, p. 1.
5
The recommended indicators do not directly measure state fragility, though it may be possible to extrapolate from
the indicators and reach certain conclusions as to a country’s fragility.
6
Terms of Reference, 30 January 2009, pp. 2-3.

1
was to understand better the target audiences for the indicators, as well as needed uses and
abilities to interpret indicators. We also examined a range of existing datasets to develop the
baskets of indicators to determine the validity, timeliness, and accuracy of the data available.

Throughout the report, the baskets of indicators have been constructed by extracting selected
measures from pre-existing datasets. The resulting baskets, therefore, are composed of discrete
indicators, which when combined provide multiple perspectives on a particular category. The
original intent was to assemble baskets that would measure outcome, process, financial
considerations, perceptions, and activity. That objective, however, could not be attained because
of an overall paucity of data from existing databases. In a number of cases, individual indicators
are, at best, proxies to measure the stated phenomenon, which is noted when appropriate in the
comments section of the category/indicator matrix.

II. HMG Evaluation Needs

A small number of DFID, MOD and FCO staff, both in headquarters and in the field, were
interviewed to elicit their needs, experience with indicators, and ability to interpret them. The
interviews revealed a variety of views regarding the organization’s priority needs for conflict,
justice and security indicators. Depending upon the responsibility and perspective of the
interviewee, the stated need was global, regional, country, and/or programmatic. It is safe to
conclude that there is no consensus on either HMG or DFID’s priorities. In the opinion of the
authors it is also unlikely that such a consensus is attainable or desirable. It may be most prudent
to develop different evaluation products to address the wishes and needs of the varying
audiences.

Most interviewees emphasized the need to “measure impact,” though how impact was defined
varied depending upon the stated purpose. The purposes ranged from, inter alia:

• programmatic outcomes for country offices;

• sustainability of programmes;
• submissions to thematic or regional pools of funding;
• demonstration of impact on the ground to the British public;
• establishment of baseline against which normal programming trends in fragile or
conflict situations can be ascertained;
• measurements of mandatory DFID processes such as PSAs and CGAs; to
• compilation of reports for parliamentary oversight.

A significant group of interviewees identified the need for country offices to measure progress
and monitor trends at a higher level than at the programme or sectoral level. In addition, these
interviewees noted that once programmes are designed, and, in particular, once goals are well-

2
defined, it is not veryexceedingly difficult to specify indicators to help evaluate their
effectiveness. Moreover, as one person noted, the existing datasets do not have enough
“granularity” to be useful at a country programme level. Those who identified the country office
level as a priority also stated a desire to have a menu of indicators, from which they could choose
in the design and implementation of actual programmes and which could give country offices an
idea of what a good indicator would look like.

There was general recognition that a single set of indicators cannot meet everyone’s needs.
Choices will have to be made concerning the level and uses of these indicators. It was suggested
that those choices could be reached, reflecting efforts of other donors and organisations, such as
the Oslo Democracy Centre/UNDP effort to provide guidance on indicators of fragility and
conflict and DFID/HMG’s own initiative to develop indicators for accountability, transparency,
fragility, etc. All agreed that it would be wise to avoid a proliferation of indicators and important
to build consensus with other organisations.

III. Matrix of Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators: A Summary and

Explanation

The following section outlines an approach to the development of baskets of indicators for
conflict, justice and security, summarizes the categories and indicators propose, and identifies
their most appropriate uses. There are also a number of challenges to the usefulness and
robustness of the recommended baskets of indicators as measures of effectiveness. Attempts
have been made to address these challenges in the criteria and process for selecting the discrete
indicators, in the groupings of indicators into baskets, and in the variety of perspectives and
methodologies included for measurement.

A. Uses and Limitations of the Indicators

In the conflict and justice and security, Tthe range, level and nature of indicators provided in
existing datasets suggest that they may be appropriate as high level indicators to monitor broad
trends and the direction in which movementing is occurring, such as deaths in conflicts,
fractionalization, overcrowding of prisons, days a court case requires, etc. Valid uses of the
indicators, therefore, would include:

• To assess broad trends and directions of a country and region; and

• To assess the impact of DFID and HMG strategies, policies and assistance on the
situation (peace, security, justice) “writ large.”

3
Caution should be exercised in using the indicators for the following:

• Country comparisons. There is limited utility in comparing these gross numbers across
countries and regions, given the incommensurability of the data and the requisite need to
interpret the data. Individuals may be displaced because of conflict or typhoons and a
gross statistic cannot discriminate between causes. Prisons may be overcrowded due to a
police service’s misguided arrest regime, an inadequate bail system, and/or an overloaded
prosecutorial agency. Moreover, many of the datasets rank countries one against another.
This may have some ‘quick glance’ usefulness to determine which countries are the most
violent, conflictual, and fragile, but rankings are not prudent methods of understanding
the country context and the direction in which a country is progressing or deteriorating.
The advancement of a country up a ranking list may indicate an improvement in that
country’s situation. It is equally likely, however, that it silently bemoans the deterioration
of the situation in the country or countries that had been ahead of it the list the year(s)
before.

• Programme or project evaluation. Existing datasets are not useful for use at the
programme or project level, for a number of reasons;

i. The indicators are highly aggregated, especially in the conflict area. Many different
indicators are combined into one score, and because there is no consensus both within
the field or across countries on which observable traits combine for measuring a
concept, use of the indicators at the programmatic level is problematic.
ii. There is also aggregation with regard to ethnic group, sex/gender, race, etc., which
makes discrimination and interpretation challenging, at best.
iii. There are significant gaps in data and thematic areas covered, as explained later in this
report. These include: the activities of non-state actors, private security actors and civil
society and community-based actors and local government. Many of these activities
receive significant donor support, and thus could not be covered by the indicators.
Even for programmes focused on governance or government capacity to provide justice
and security, the lack of data in these areas makes it difficult to understand the impact
of those activities on justice, security or peace “writ large.”
iv. Public perception surveys exist, but their coverage is scanty and spotty. There is little
consistency in the countries covered or the questions probed. Timeliness is an addition
challenge. As a result, the existing datasets over-rely on expert opinion, and have little
data that could help measure impacts of programmes on the intended beneficiaries.
v. Proxy indicators are often used, making it difficult to assess the relevance and validity
of the indicators in specific contexts. They may be valid in some contexts, but not in
others.

4
 vi. The indicators used in existing datasets do not permit attribution of progress to specific
programmes or projects, as they measure the elements of the justice, security or conflict
system, but not causes of improvements.
vii. The time delays in availability of data may make the existing datasets less useful for
programmes of short duration, lasting two to three years.
viii. The degree of contextualisation needed to determine relevance and significance of the
indicators makes these baskets less useful at the programmatic or project level.

This does not mean that the baskets of indicators presented here are irrelevant for programmes or
projects. They can be used to assist in monitoring and evaluation of programme and project
impacts, but only as supplemental evidence and then only when carefully done. When deployed
to evaluate a programme, these baskets of indicators must be bolstered by specific country-level
information that is directly related to the initiative under examination. A country-wide pre-trial
detention number may hold little relevance, for example, unless reinforced by statistics that trace,
over a number of years, the length of days in jail for those who have not yet been sentenced.

The baskets need to be understood and used in light of guidance outlined in the OECD DAC
Guidelines for Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (working draft): 7

• Conflict and context analysis. Conflict/context analyses do not need to be of the depth
required by the SCA. An analysis of the specific drivers of conflict, as well as those
affecting justice and security in the country, will help country offices and programme
staff identify which indicators are most relevant and whether other indicators are needed
or data gathered. For example, in Georgia, an analysis of the conflicts in that region
would suggest that indicators related to fairness of elections or governance effectiveness
would not be very relevant to assessing impact on conflict. By contrast, levels of
grievances would be particularly useful. Conflict and context analysis would also assist in
the determining attribution of impacts to DFID/HMG programmes by permitting the
identification of various factors that may contribute to escalation or mitigation of conflict.

• Examination of theories of change. The OECD DAC Guidelines recommend that

evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities identify and test the
theory(ies) of change and implementation of the intervention—the the programme’s
assumptions and logic about how and why it will work to change the conflict or situation
and how the program activities will lead to the desired outcomes and impacts. This is
important for selection of the appropriate indicators that will allow for testing of that
theory in the particular context, as well as for consideration of whether any progress (or

7
OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and the DAC Network on Development
Evaluation, Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Working Document for
Application Period) (Paris: OECD, 2007).

5
 lack thereof) can reasonably attributed to DFID/HMG’s programmes. For example, a
capacity-building programme for the courts in a post-conflict country may be based on
the theory that improved rule of law will reduce tensions by building a minority’s
confidence in the government and by providing a viable avenue for addressing
grievances. The programme would want not only to examine indicators of criminal
justice effectiveness and access to justice, with a focus on minority perceptions, but to
look at indicators related to grievances and legitimacy of the state, also disaggregated by
demographic group. This would likely require additional information related an
examination of the kinds of cases being resolved in the courts (i.e. are they addressing
issues at the heart of grievances that drive conflict?).

• As country indicators and not as a means to evaluate programme outputs and outcomes.
As mentioned above, the indicators in the baskets outlined here do not directly refer to
programme outputs or outcomes. They are country level indicators. In the example
above, the programme would need to establish and monitor indicators related to the
quality and outcomes of the capacity-building (e.g., are the beneficiaries gaining and
using knowledge and skills; have behaviors changed; are new structures and processes
being put into place and utilized; etc.). The next step would be to assess whether those
changes instigated by the programme have contributed to improvements in the overall
situation. The indicators supported by the datasets can be helpful to the latter question,
but the diversity of contexts, needs and programmes make it impossible to establish
relevant programme indicators.

The indicators presented below and in the Matrix should also be used and interpreted with care in
light of the aforementioned problems and weaknesses inherent in the existing datasets. They
therefore should be used with caution as guides for policy.

B. Categories for Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators

The terms of reference proposed four categories of conflict prevention and peacebuilding
indicators, in addition to measurement of “death/injury rates” as a result of conflict and armed
violence:

• formal peacebuilding structures (including elections, parliament, human rights, media);

• informal peacebuilding structures (traditional mechanisms, peace committees, mediation
capability, etc.);
• qualitative peacebuilding (attitudes/ perceptions between groups, of state/non-state
structures, etc.); and
• social cohesion. In the justice and security field.

6
For justice and security, the TORs requested indicators in:
• rule of law;
• security sector; and
• personal safety and security.

The full framework and indicators for conflict, justice and security follows in Section VI.C. of
this report. This section provides an explanation of the framework of categories of indicators and
the criteria for selecting indicators and grouping them into baskets.

(i) Differences between conflict and justice and security indicators. Differences in the fields,
respectively, of conflict and peacebuilding and justice and security necessitate different
approaches to the development of indicators. In the justice and security field, a limited number
of indicators can be used to gauge the overall “health” of the system. The characteristics of a
functioning system and the impacts on the population are relatively well-defined in number,
especially if conceived as measuring processes across the individual institutions, agencies, and
organizations of the sector, though how the provision of justice and security is ‘experienced’ by
citizens and residents cannot be overlooked. Indicators relating activities and resources (by
courts, police, prisons) to results (objective and perceived) can reveal salient features of the
system. For example, the rate of conviction per arrest may highlight relevant information as to
the effectiveness and efficiency of the criminal justice system, especially if correlated to various
public perception data. While the indicators may not disclose the causes of any strengths and
weaknesses or may hide possible systemic ethnic discrimination if not disaggregated, they still
provide a set of standards for tracking basic progress. Interpretation is still required as to what
specifically the collected data means, but the indicator is a good starting point, will raise
pertinent questions, and is highly suggestive of what a country office should explore further .

In the conflict field, by contrast, there is no generalized theory of conflict. There is also little
consensus on a standard set of variables and drivers of conflict. In any particular context,
different variables can indicate strength or weakness. For example, successfully holding free and
fair elections are often viewed as improvement in a conflict situation and a step toward building
or strengthening democracy. However, in transitions to democracy, elections can, in some cases,
exacerbate conflict. Similarly, government provision of basic services to the population and the
strength of the economy are often associated with reduced conflict. In a situation in which the
public expects little from its government, however, the lack of effective service delivery by the
government may bear little to no relation to conflict. In other words, the indicators must be
directly tied to an analysis of the conflict analysis to ensure their relevance. It is also likely that
the indicators will change depending on what factors are driving the particular conflict.

The conflict indicators proposed here are designed to track elements of a transition to peace, not
necessarily the presence (or absence) of structures and processes characteristic of a “healthy”
system, such as elections, checks and balances, government services, GDP per capita, etc. By

7
contrast, the justice and security indicators track the “health” of the system and can be used
throughout the programme or policy cycle – from needs assessment, implementation monitoring
through to mid-term and end of programme evaluation. Under any and all circumstances, conflict
and country analyses are critical for assessment of the characteristics of a “healthy” transition to
peace. Different conflicts have different causes, different drivers, and different dynamics.
Failure to undertake a conflict analysis may result in the selection of indicators that are not
relevant to the conflict. Similarly, it is good practice once indicators are selected, to test the
indicators at the time of conducting the baseline to confirm their validity and reliability and to
ensure there are not other more valid indicators.

(ii) The need for reformulation of conflict indicator categories. The authors have
reformulated the categories and the indicators for conflict from those suggested in the TORs to
ensure that issues of impact of interventions can be tracked. The authors deemed this necessary
for several reasons. First, several of the indicators/categories in the TORs refer to structures or
outcomes, rather than impact. In other words, they do not indicate whether and how these
elements reduce conflict, and, therefore, may not be as good indicators of reduction of conflict as
they are of the establishment of mechanisms that we assume are good regulators of conflict.
Second, many of the indices from which conflict indicators can be drawn do not make
conceptual distinctions between statebuilding, peacebuilding, governance and development.
Clearly all of these phenomena are related, and activities in all domains—socio-economic,
governance, justice and security, and reconciliation and culture 8—are needed. They are,
however, not all the same. State weakness is not the same as conflict, nor its only cause, even
when it may be a contributor to its escalation. Similarly, conflict can be seen as a result, a
symptom or a cause of fragility. 9 Consequently, the categories of indicators of fragility cannot be
equated with those of conflict.

The authors, therefore, have reformulated the categories of conflict indicators to reflect the CDA
Criteria of Effectiveness developed in the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project of CDA
Collaborative Learning Projects. The Criteria summarize what the Reflecting on Peace Practice
Project found to be effective intermediate-level benchmarks for assessing impact on “Peace Writ
Large,” 10 or the broader societal peace:

8
See OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and the DAC Network on
Development Evaluation, Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Working
Document for Application Period) (Paris: OECD, 2007), at 18.
9
Fabra-Mata, Javier & Ziaja, S. 2009 (forthcoming). Users’ Guide on Sources Measuring Fragility and Conflict
(Draft 1.0) Oslo: UNDP and German Development Institute.
10
The CoE emerged from an intensive four-year process of collaborative learning and reflection about what makes
peace process effective vis-à-vis “Peace Writ Large,” or societal-level peace. The process involved 26 case studies
of projects, programmes and groups of programmes and over thirty consultations and feedback workshops with over
a thousand practitioners, policy makers, donors and academics to analyse the cases in comparative perspective,
identify issues and provide feedback and new experience on tentative conclusions. The initial findings are presented

8
 1. Institutions that handle grievances underlying conflict are created or reformed;
2. Beneficiaries and communities develop their own peace initiatives;
3. People (citizens) increasingly resist violence and provocations to violence;
4. People’s security and their sense of security are increased;
5. Inter-group relations, reflected in, for example, changes in group attitudes, public
opinion, social norms and public behaviours, improve meaningfully.

(iii) Framework for Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators. We believe the reformulated
categories preserve the essence of the elements suggested in the TORs. Following is an
explanation of the reformulated categories and types of indicators. As mentioned above, the
conflict indicators are organized around the RPP Criteria of Effectiveness. The justice and
security indicators are organized largely by sector or area of activity: criminal justice, civil and
administrative justice, access to justice criminal and civil justice, security sector (prisons,
policing, oversight), and personal safety. A number of indicators are useful for assessment of
effectiveness in peacebuilding and justice and security development. Comments are included in
the full matrix of indicators in section regarding how to use the indicators as conflict or justice
and security indicators.

A. Conflict intensity: Includes deaths, but also other consequences of conflict, including
displacement, which may be source of conflict and instability, as well as non-physical
conflict intensity

B. Institutions, mechanisms and process that can and do address grievances, inequalities,
injustices, etc. that cause and fuel conflict.

B.I. Capacity of government to deal with grievances. These indicators measure:

• government “effectiveness” (can the government can develop and implement

policies that serve the needs of the population?);
• leadership culture and process (how do the values, relationships and interactions
of leadership fuel or mitigate conflict?).

It should be noted that these are proxies, and look at capacity, not results. In a fragilel
state, there is likely to be little capacity. There also may be limited expectations of
service provision from such a state. Consequently, a “low” score on effectiveness may
not signify a worsening of conflict. Similarly, a “high” score on capacity does not
necessarily mean that conflict is improved.

in Mary Anderson and Lara Olson, Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners (Cambridge, MA:
CDA, 2003).

9
 B.II. Grievances. This category measures the results of government policies and practices. It
also looks at the degree to which group grievances exist that may fuel conflict, including
data, to the extent possible, on actual inequalities and perceptions of unfair treatment and
inequality.

B.III. Legitimacy and accountability of government. This category also relates to the
government’s capacity to deal with grievances, focusing on the relationship between
citizens and the state to provide a proxy for the availability of non-violent means to
address conflict. It includes measures of:
• elections to assess the representativeness and legitimacy of the
government; and
• perceptions of the legitimacy of the state.

This latter variable is a proxy for the degree to which people are likely to look to or
accept the state to handle grievances and promote their well-being. Combined with the
indicators under B.I., these measures could be an assessment of a state’s fragility.

B.IV. Human rights and civil liberties. These are indicators of the availability of peaceful
means to deal with grievances. They are also basic indicators of rule of law, one of the
ways in which conflict and justice and security measurements can be somewhat knitted
together. While B.III measures structural (elections) and perceptual (legitimacy of the
state) aspects of this element, the degree of respect/repression of human rights and civil
liberties assesses government behavior.

C. Community/Popular initiatives for peace. These indicators are intended to measure the extent
to which there are local capacities for peace in the non-governmental sphere and to what
extent do communities, citizens groups and others develop their own initiatives for peace?

D. Resistance to violence or provocations to violence. Military capacity and societal

militarization indicators look at the degree of militarization of society at governmental level,
but are best considered to be proxies of violence and the tendency to utilise violent means.
Because it is difficult to obtain data on non-state armed groups, we have used the
accessibility of small arms and the number of deaths by small arms as proxies for the level of
activity of non-state actors.

E. Rule of Law and Access to Justice

E.I. Criminal Justice Capacity and Effectiveness. Capacity and effectiveness are
measured from three perspectives:

10
 • government activity and results in criminal justice, including data on whether the
system is capable of dealing with the level of crime present;
• popular perceptions of effectiveness of criminal justice; and
• resources (financial) dedicated to criminal justice, as a process indicator of
government commitment and action.

E.II. Civil and Administrative Justice. It is insufficient to examine rule of law with
reference only to the criminal justice system. Consequently, this section looks at a set
of wider issues revolving around judicial independence, perceptions of fairness,
impartiality of decisions and judgments, and the police operating under civilian
control. It should be noted that there is a dearth of reliable indicators that reach
beyond the criminal justice system.

E.III. Access to Justice: State and Non-State Systems. Access to justice indicators include:

• capacity (does the government have the capacity to provide adequate access?);
• access (is access being provided, or are costs, government restrictions of rights or
provision of services undermining access?);
• perception (popular perceptions and experience of frequency with which state and
non-state systems are accessed); and
• women’s access and capacity.

E.IV. Corruption. It is necessary to measure corruption as a phenomenon that can impede

the delivery of justice and security. At the same time, corruption can be a cause of
conflict, as a grievance, and one of its many by-products. There are many ways of
measuring corruption as a perception, an activity, and as a sign of governmental
ineffectiveness.

F. Security Sector

F.I. Prisons. Measurements on prison capacity are ascertainable, but they do not indicate
the treatment received by those who have been incarcerated. Pre-trial detention is a
challenging issue, but there is no method of directing assessing and pinpointing its
causes or ways of measuring that will suggest how to reduce the severity of the
challenge.

F.II. Policing. As with criminal and civil and administrative justice, the basket of
indicators provided is intended to provide three perspectives on policing: a) capacity;
b) behavior and effectiveness (homicides, extrajudicial killings), as well as
perceptions of the police; and c) financial resources/commitment.

11
 F.III. Oversight of Justice and security sector. Appropriate oversight of the actions and
institutions of the sector is a key component of democratization of the justice and
security system. It is a means by which good and effective governance can be
identified. It is, however, difficult to evaluate given existing datasets. The
institutionalization of corruption is one proxy by which to measure oversight, given
the premise that embedded corruption circumscribes the government’s ability to
conduct adequate oversight. Similarly, appropriate oversight may be a means by
which conflict can be addressed before its onset or thereafter.

G. Personal safety and security. Measures perceptions of the effectiveness of justice and
security sectors broadly, and of efforts to mitigate conflict. If the data could be
disaggregated by conflict group, these would serve as more precise conflict indicators, as, in
their current form, they do not distinguish between sources of insecurity nor which
populations feel more or less secure. Most appear not to do so, except perhaps in the case of
the perceptions surveys, where at least the Afrobarometer asks respondents about their
identity/group, and thus in theory disaggregation by ethnicity, religion or group (as well as
gender, etc.) would be possible. An adequate proxy for increase in security/sense of security
related to the conflict might be obtained by looking at conflict intensity, state behavior
violating physical integrity and perceptions of security, in particular concerning fears of
political violence, fears of reprisals for political involvement.

C. Criteria for Selection of Indicators

Within the categories, indicators were selected based on a number of criteria. Some were
identified in the TORs, including:

• Geographical coverage, i.e. data is available for as many countries as possible;

• Time coverage and update, i.e. data is available over time and is regularly updated;
• Validity and reliability, i.e. the indicator measures what it is supposed to measure as
much as possible, and is replicable;
• Sources of measurements that are sensitive to short-term change (to the extent possible);
and
• Consistency with other international indicators, to the extent possible and valid.

The primary criterion for constructing the baskets was to provide a multi-dimensional picture of
each phenomenon or category. The objective of these indicators is to move beyond tracking
discrete institutional activities and evaluate the process and “the impact of the system as a whole

12
on public safety or the rule of law.” 11 For conflict, justice and security, this implies that at least
three distinct elements – activity/process, outcome, and beneficiary perception -- need to be
taken into account to determine the impact of a project or programme. Consequently, clusters or
baskets of indicators are required. The issue is not only what each individual indicator may be,
but how the basket as a whole functions and is balanced. As much as the existing datasets
permitted, the baskets were constructed based on the following considerations:

• To measure structure/capacity (e.g., legal frameworks, rights, human resources relative to

the scale of the problem, etc.;

• To measure process (efforts to achieve outcomes, e.g. budgets dedicated to criminal

justice, military expenditure as % of GDP, etc.);

• To measure outcome (changes in the conditions in the country with respect to conflict,
justice or security).

• To balance more objective (e.g. # homicides) and subjective (perceptions of insecurity)

measures of the phenomenon. For conflict indicators, data on perceptions of people
inside the country is especially important as a measure of impact, in that it reflects how
changes in institutional, structural or political factors are viewed and provide information
on whether these changes may lead to less conflict behavior.

• To minimize explicit or implicit adoption of a particular ideology or theory of change for

conflict indicators.

IV. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Indicators

The existing datasets of conflict, justice and security indicators have several limitations that
should be taken into account as they are used. Any DFID follow-up on these indicators should
take their limitations into account as well.

A. Undertracking of important factors

Several important categories of indicators are not tracked sufficiently or at all by existing
datasets. This significantly affects the usefulness of the existing datasets for measurement of
conflict, justice and security. The gaps include:

11
Todd Foglesong and Christopher Stone, Measuring the Contribution of Criminal Justice Systems to the Control of
Crime and Violence: Lessons from Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. John F. Kennedy School of Government -
Harvard University, April 2007, p. 5.

13
• Non-state capacities, processes and mechanisms for conflict transformation, justice and
security. The conflict indices and justice and security indicators focus primarily on state
mechanisms. The activities of non-state actors are rarely measured in existing datasets.
There is little data on civil society initiatives for peace and equally little information on
non-state mechanisms for provision of justice and security. Similarly, there is little to no
measurement of private security actors, which suggests that another significant slice of
the security arena escapes evaluation. This profoundly affects the ability to measure
justice and security, given that a lack of state-provided access to justice is not equivalent
to an absence of justice. Similarly, given the amount of service delivery, conflict
resolution and peacebuilding work that is done by traditional structures and other non-
governmental actors, and the amount of financial and other support given to them (youth,
women, CSO and NGOs, media, etc.), this lack of data significantly undermines the
ability to understand conflict and conflict resolution and the impact of assistance on
conflict, in a country. What information that does exist on these phenomena is found in
anthropological, sociological and other more qualitative research, is not readily
measurable (or available), and, therefore, cannot be converted into a form consistent with
the datasets. It is a significant missing element that would bear on measures of conflict,
justice and security.

• Perceptions. Most of the datasets rely on expert perceptions of a particular phenomena –

from issues of inclusion (how inclusive is the governance system) to perceptions of the
electoral process to questions of trust and confidence between groups. There are a few
existing sources that try to gauge public perceptions, such as the Gallup World Poll,
Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, among others. However, these instruments often do not
ask questions that are entirely relevant (valid), or, as in the case of the Afrobarometer,
they do not ask the same questions repeatedly over time. Data regarding perceptions of a
representative sampling of sub-groups is also scarce because what survey information
that does exist may not consistently disaggregate the data. As a result, there is an over-
reliance on expert opinion and under-reliance on public perceptions in the existing
datasets. To the extent expert opinions are flawed, biased, or reflect a particular world
view, the data may not be accurate. Greater measurement of public perceptions would
provide direct data on perceptions of actors in and beneficiaries of conflict, justice and
security policies and programmes, and permit more accurate assessment of impacts.

• Inter-group relations. Some indicators regarding factionalization (among leadership) and

the existence of inter-group tensions (expert opinions) do exist and are useful. However,
little data concerning inter-group trust, perceptions, or perceptions is collected
systematically. The indicators focus more on generalized trust (do you trust other
people?). Moreover, information about how different policies and actions affect differing
groups differentially (i.e. data about horizontal inequalities) is not collected

14
 systematically. This could be gathered to a large extent by disaggregating data on other
indicators (e.g., perceptions of justice and security, conviction rates, inequalities of
income, etc.) by ethnic/conflict group. Doing so may be quite sensitive for partner
governments in post-conflict situations. However, without robust data on the state of
inter-group relations and the ways in which policies affect groups differentially
(horizontal inequalities), assessment of impacts of policies, availability of justice and
security for vulnerable groups, and programmes addressing conflict will be difficult to
evaluate.

• Conflict-specific dimensions of justice and security. Conflict indices have integrated

existing human rights, civil liberties, justice and security indicators that were developed
to track progress in these sectors to measure peace and conflict. The same is true for
socio-economic indicators. 12 However, these indicators, by themselves, do not
necessarily measure conflict impacts. While the justice and security indicators available
(and provided in the matrix below) are applicable to justice and security development,
their lack of disaggregating the data makes them imprecise for the conflict impacts of
justice and security. For example, as mentioned earlier, an improvement in the rate of
convictions per arrest may suggest an improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of
the criminal justice system, yet if the majority of those arrested and convicted are from
one ethnic group, this “improvement” may be the source of grievance and conflict. The
sectoral indicators can measure underlying structural-institutional capacities for conflict
resolution and peace, but without disaggregation by demographic group, or other further
information about how they impact conflict actors, they can provide misleading
information about conflict impacts.

B. Misleading Indicators. Several aspects of existing datasets can provide misleading

information about trends in conflict, justice and security in a country. This is, in part, a
consequence of the fact that in most of the categories, the indicators are proxies, rather than
direct measures. A number of patterns emerged regarding ways in which the indicators in
existing datasets can be misleading:

• Ideological/theoretical or normative biases. Most of the peace and conflict datasets are based
on well-defined (although not necessarily explicit) theories of change, or assumptions about
the mechanisms by which peace and stability will come about. 13 In cases where the theory of

12
Despite contributions of human rights, civil liberties, justice and security to peacebuilding, many of the indices
actually are dominated by socio-economic and other governance indicators See F. Barton and K. von Hippel, “Early
Warning? A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2008).
13
See Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions, Part II:
Emerging Practice and Theory (Ulster: INCORE, 2003), at 33, for a fuller discussion of theories of conflict,
peacebuilding and change. See also DAC Guidance on Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at 35

15
 change is quite strong (e.g., Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, which defines
fragility as the cause of conflict), the indicators potentially measure whether the elements of
the theory of change are present, but may not reflect what is occurring in a country with
respect to conflict. This is why we chose not to adopt any one of the peace, conflict and
fragility indices available, but rather included indicators from several of these indices. 14

A similar normative or theoretical bias can also result from the selection of indicators. For
example, a country peacebuilding strategy that focused on improving economic and social
policy capability or government service delivery might choose indicators related to
government effectiveness. This selection of indicators might track whether the government
overall is becoming more effective in service delivery, but would not track whether the
implicit theory of change – that improved service delivery will reduce conflict – is valid in
that context. In this case, additional indicators related for example to group grievances or the
legitimacy of the state would be useful to add to mitigate the theoretical bias.

• Comparisons between countries. The TORs indicate cross-country comparability as a

criterion for indicator selections. A number of problems with cross-country comparison for
conflict and justice and security indicators have been discussed earlier in this report. Most of
the peace and conflict indices compare and rank countries relative to each other. However,
the comparison, especially in light of with the inclusion of highly developed democratic
countries such as Norway or Sweden included in the dataset, skew ratings and are of limited
use. Moreover, comparisons potentially introduce a strong normative bias by defining a
country as an underperformer because it does not have the institutional and social
characteristics of the developed democracies. 15 Finally, as already noted, comparisons
between countries may mislead the user if a country rises in rankings not due to its own
progress, but rather because of the decline of countries previously ranked above it.

In the justice and security sectors, where statistical information is more prevalent, cross-
country comparisons are dangerous. For example, European data suggests that the ratio of
prosecutors/100,000 persons in Switzerland is 5.5; in Sweden, 9.9; and in the Ukraine, 21.0.
Similarly, the total judicial budget/per capita in Switzerland is .28; in Sweden, .23; and in the
Ukraine is .49. Although these statistics may raise important questions about the individual
countries’ judicial systems (when combined with a raft of additional data), in and of
themselves they provide little valid insight into actual judicial performance and, for

for a discussion of uses of theory of change and implementation theories that elaborate the logic and assumptions of
how programmes make a contribution to the larger peace.
14
A useful analysis of the different indices, and their strengths and weaknesses as indices, is being developed by
UNDP (the Oslo Governance Center) and the German Development Institute, in a User’s Guide on Sources
Measuring Fragility and Conflict. A first draft has been made available for comment. It will be a useful
supplement and interpretive guide to these indicators.
15
See Fabra-Mata & Ziaja (2009 forthcoming.)., User’s Guide on Sources Measuring Fragility and Conflict (1st
draft) (2009) for more discussion of this point.

16
 comparative purposes, are misleading. Cross-country comparability is particularly difficult
with respect to criminal justice data, given wide differences in police accessibility, known
variability in what constitutes a criminal act, inconsistent legal definitions in how crimes are
recorded, and vast discrepancies in the rates at which crime is reported. It may be more
possible to compare victimization rates across countries, but even these measures remain
susceptible to some of the aforementioned challenges.

For justice and security development, the establishment of broad guidelines and standards
could, at best, be used as generic goals for countries might be more useful. For instance, the
UN has suggested a ratio of approximately one police officer/450-500 persons. While that
statistic may be a rough and perhaps idealized goalpost, its applicability to any one country
would need significant modification to account for differences in geography, communication
and transportation systems, population demographics, education, GDP, urbanization, etc.
The same can be said for similar justice and security guidelines, such as:

• personnel costs comprising 70-80% of total police budgets (US);

• patrol units comprising 60-65% of total police budgets (US);
• training costs comprising 5% of total police budgets (US);
• personnel costs of judge and court staff comprising 65% of total judicial budgets
(Europe);
• court buildings and premises capital costs comprising 15% of total judicial budgets
(Europe); and
• court fees contributing 10% to total judicial budgets (Europe).

The most suitable indicators for cross-country comparison may be those based upon
perceptions and institutional/systemic processes, each indicator coinciding with the
process and outcome of an activity as it is experienced by the intended beneficiaries. For
these reasons, the baskets of indicators chosen for justice and security development try to
incorporate as often as possible such data.

• Use of Proxy Indicators: Over-inclusiveness and Misleading Conclusions. The difficulty in

direct observation of improvements of conflict, justice and security (especially conflict) has
meant that many indicators in existing datasets and in the proposed baskets are proxies. 16 In
addition, many of the datasets identify conditions that may provide a good environment for
conflict management and prevention and justice and security development, e.g., high GDP
per capita, economic performance, governance according to democratic structures and

16
For example, leadership acceptance of democratic institutions is a proxy indicator for legitimacy of democracy
and for the potential of elections to support peaceful transition rather than conflict. The GNI Coefficient/Uneven
development is a proxy for concentration of wealth and horizontal inequalities. In the rule of law, the number of
days required to resolve a dispute is a proxy for possibility of corruption, and attorney/court/enforcement costs a
proxy for access to state justice systems.

17
 processes, improvement of government services, reduction in poverty, etc. However, while
these factors may correlate highly with peace, they are not necessarily indicators of improved
conflict prevention or peacebuilding. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that conflict has
been reduced if there have been general improvements in the economic, governance and
justice/security indicators, even if these are important structural factors. In a number of
instances—including elections, increased GDP, increased openness of political competition,
etc.—improvements may also bring about increased conflict in the short- to medium-term,
which could undermine long-term development and governance. Similarly, some of the
indicators may indeed be good warnings of a worsening situation, but not of an improving
situation. For example, deteriorating provision of public services, included in the Failed
States Index, may indeed be an indicator of conflict and state failure. However, the reverse
may not indicate improvement of the conflict situation. Caution should be exercised in
interpreting baskets of indicators.

The justice and security indicators, as other sectoral indicators, are important supplements to
the more general conflict indicators provided here. They can help country offices and
headquarters hone in on particular dimensions of the peacebuilding process. However, the
indicators for justice and security development, similar to those for the socio-economic
dimensions of conflict, are not necessarily “conflict-sensitive.” In other words, one cannot
measure the impact of justice and security on conflict using these indicators alone. Indicators
on human rights and civil liberties also lack this conflict sensitivity. For example, if
conviction rates in a particular country increase, this may be interpreted as improvement in
the justice system. If, on the other hand, a significantly greater number of one group is
convicted than another, this reputed general improvement may have negative repercussions
for conflict management. Similarly, numbers of homicides may go down, indicating an
improvement in personal security of the population. However, if one group remains
disproportionately affected by homicides (or other crimes), then an improvement in this
indicator could not be interpreted as an improvement in conflict. Disaggregation of crime,
justice and security indicators by social/ethnic/religious group, therefore, increases the
validity of these indicators as conflict indicators. Disaggregation also increases the utility
for determining how to improve justice and security service delivery. For both conflict and
justice and security development, the broader picture can be obtained by including
perceptions of vulnerable groups about their treatment by their government, group
inequalities and other potential grievances.

• Aggregation. A number of datasets, such as the World Governance Indicators, and a number
of the peace and conflict indices, aggregate indicators from a number of different sources.
Aggregate indicators have a number of advantages. They may be more accurate in that they
provide more precise evaluations of a situation than individual indicators. However, for the
aggregate governance indicators, the margin of error appears to be large, so that small

18
 changes in the indicators over time may not be statistically significant. Therefore, it is
important to balance the use of aggregate and individual indicators, as has been attempted.

• A General Caution Regarding Interpretation. For all the indicators, whether conflict, justice
or security, caution needs to be exercised in determining what conclusions should be drawn
from movements in any one indicator, a series of indicators, and/or in any category of
indicators. This is particularly important if these indicators are to be used in country offices
for programming purposes, which, as already discussed, is not recommended unless
supplemented by a contextual analysis and other data. The indicators have been blended into
baskets for a number of reasons, only one of which is to tackle a category from multiple
perspectives. Equally importantly, broad conclusions should not be derived from the
movement of any single indicator. For instance, an increase in trust in the police is,
frequently, associated with an increase in crime rates as more victims of alleged crimes may
lodge police reports. This rise in reported crime may not occur, however, if the reason the
police have not been alerted to alleged crimes is due to the public’s generalized belief that the
police are ineffective. Similarly, pre-trial detention statistics are notoriously difficult to
interpret. A reduction in detention numbers, which may at first blush be considered a
progressive movement, but may, upon further research, indicate that police have changed
their arresting policy. Raw movements in re-trial numbers, therefore, are not be able to shed
light upon whether that change was for the good. Reductions in pre-trial detentions may also
be the result of increased bond provisions, which, in turn, if not coordinated with the local
neighborhoods, may trigger various forms of extra-judicial killings and lynching.

The dangers of misinterpretations of movements in indicators are equally great in the conflict
arena. For example, a decrease in inter-ethnic physical violence may reflect better security,
an improvement in the conflict situation, or that fewer acts of violence are sufficient to
sustain. The latter conclusion was reached in a study of violence in Kosovo prior to the 2004
riots, when intimidation tactics had shifted from personal assaults to destruction of property
intended to persuade minorities to leave. The same study also found that minorities’
increased movement outside their enclaves, which was interpreted by most as a sign of
increased feelings of security on the part of minorities and improved inter-group
relationships, was, in fact, a reflection of minorities’ confidence in peacekeepers and their
increased knowledge of where they would be protected as they moved. 17 Interpretations of
movements in the indicators should be tested and verified against other indicators and based
on a rigorous analysis of the conflict, justice and security situation.

17
D. Chigas et al., What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made in Kosovo? (Cambridge, MA and Prishtine/Pristina:
CDA and CARE, 2006).

19
 V. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Data
A number of issues regarding the types of data and measurement of indicators from the datasets
should be highlighted:

1. Availability of data. It should be noted that for many of the datasets, information is not
readily available and thus may be of limited short- to medium-term use in guiding country
programmes. While some datasets are updated yearly, many are not, and often it takes up to
a year for the collected data to become publicly available. This implies a significant time lag
in the availability of data for assessment, severely limiting the utility of indicators for
monitoring programmes and adjusting them to events.

2. Consistency. For perceptions data in particular – such as the Afrobarometer, the Arab
Barometer, and the Asian Barometer – there is also an issue of consistency. The same
questions are not asked in each country or each round of a particular country’s surveys.
Given the paucity of perceptions data generally, this is of particular concern.

VI. Matrix of Conflict, Justice and Security Indicators

The matrix presents baskets of indicators designed to assess country trends in conflict, justice
and security so that DFID/HMG can better evaluate the impact and value of its strategies and
assistance. The indicators were developed using existing datasets. The source of the data and
scale for each indicator is contained in the second column of the matrix. More information,
including geographic and time coverage, methodology and sources of the data for the indicators,
is available in the Appendices B and C. The matrix includes brief comments on appropriate and
inappropriate uses and on strengths and weaknesses of most indicators as well.

A. Assumptions underlying the choice of indicators

The conflict, justice and security indicators were developed based on several assumptions and
principles, in order to enhance their accuracy and usefulness.

• No single theory or perspective of conflict. Most of the peace and conflict datasets are based
on well-defined, although not necessarily explicit, theories of change, peace and stability In
cases where the theory of change is quite strong (e.g., Index of State Weakness in the
Developing World, which defines fragility as the cause of conflict), the indicators measure
whether the elements of the theory of change are present. Such indices and indicators,
however, may not reflect what is occurring in a country with respect to conflict.
Consequently, the baskets of indicators do not adopt or rely on any single index, but rather
include indicators from several of these indices, in order to avoid implicit or explicit adoption
of a particular theory of peace or conflict.

20
• Distinction of fragility and conflict. Underlying the choice of indicators is a distinction
between concepts of state fragility and conflict. While fragility and conflict are clearly
related, they are not the same thing. There are many definitions of fragility, but the OECD’s
characterization may best capture the essence of the concept -- state structures lacking
political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed to reduce poverty,
stimulate development, and safeguard security and the human rights of their populations
(OECD 2007). Conflict, by contrast, refers to real or perceived incompatibilities between
needs, values and interests, primarily at the societal level, which have the potential to become
or have become violent. In this sense, fragility can be the result, the cause, or a symptom of
conflict. Therefore, some indicators related to fragility are included as indicators. However,
they cannot be used alone as indicators of conflict or potential conflict.

• The importance of viewing phenomena from variety of perspectives. The baskets of indicators
represent a variety of perspectives on an issue, such as criminal justice, government
effectiveness or grievances. They include indicators on structure, dynamics and outcome.
They attempt to balance objective (# homicides) and subjective (perceptions of insecurity)
measures. This ought to provide a more accurate picture of the phenomenon and underlines
the fact that no one measure is adequate. It should also be noted that many indicators are
proxies for the phenomenon they are intended to measure and this is highlighted in the uses
and comments columns.

B. Using the Indicators

As noted above, the matrix concentrates on conflict, justice and security indicators that are
measurable at country level to help staff monitor trends and the overall direction in which a
country is moving. The indicators should be used in light of the cautions outlined in section
III.A. above (Uses and Limitations of the Indicators).

For purposes of interpretation, it is useful to presume a relationship between and among the
indicators. It is partially for this reason that the baskets of indicators have been developed and
organized to minimize the time required to collect data. At the same time, DFID and HMG’s
strategy or assistance programme may focus on a particular sector, set of issues, or dimension of
conflict, justice or security. A country programme may provide budget support and wish to
assess whether the resources contributed to progress. In this example, use of the entire set of
indicators would make sense.

Care also needs to be exercised to avoid normative or theoretical bias that can result from the
selection of too narrow a set of indicators. For example, a country peacebuilding strategy that
focused on improving economic and social policy capability or government service delivery
might choose indicators related to government effectiveness. This selection of indicators might

21
help to track whether the government is becoming more effective in service delivery. It would
not track whether that improved service delivery reduces conflict and promotes peacebuilding.
Indicators related to group grievances or the legitimacy of the state would be useful to add to
mitigate the theoretical assumption that improved service delivery reduces conflict. Similarly, if
a country wishes to assess trends in justice and security development as they relate to conflict, it
would insufficient to focus only on justice indicators. If data disaggregated by group were not
available, conflict indicators on grievances, inclusion, perceptions of unfair treatment, etc. would
need to be examined. In this case, the combination of justice and conflict indicators would not
directly assess a reduction in conflict due to improvements in justice. Rather, they could provide
a proxy for determining whether general improvements in criminal justice provision also
ameliorate the conflict situation.

(i) Selecting “baskets”: some criteria

a. Use a range of indicators. Too many may be burdensome and reduce focus; too few will
provide insufficient or misleading picture of what is going on.

b. Include measurements of different aspects and different perspectives. Given the paucity
of perceptual indicators and data, perception surveys should be included wherever
possible. They provide an important check of whether actions, policies and strategies are
having desired impacts and whether outsider observations or measures correspond to
people’s perceptions.

c. Avoid overreliance on one kind of source. The indicators rely on a number of sources:
expert/narrative reports, events/numbers, surveys, media analysis, among others.
Although it may not be possible to diversify sources, overreliance on one source will
skew the analysis and introduce potential biases.

(ii) Interpreting the indicators

For all the indicators, as has been previously discussed, caution needs to be exercised in
determining what conclusions should be drawn from movements in any one or several indicators,
or in any one category of indicators.

A few simple questions can serve as a guide to interpreting the indicators and deriving a coherent
analysis of trends.

a. What is the story the movement of indicators tells? The story should be about trends and
progress in the country under examination. It is not about comparisons with other
countries or about the state of the country at a particular point in time. Deciphering the
direction in which a country is moving may be difficult, particularly where indicators

22
 have large margins of error; small changes in any one given year are statistically
insignificant; and time delays or dataset coverage makes timely data unavailable.

 Understand what the indicator can tell you and what it cannot. For example,
government effectiveness can portray what the government may be capable of doing.
It does not reveal what the government actually does. GINI provides information
about the distribution of wealth, but does not disclose the relevance of that
distribution to conflict. The homicide rate bespeaks of the number of people killed,
but does not indicate whether lowering the murder rate is the priority need voiced by
the local population.

 Be careful about attributing meaning to what the indicator says. Can be misleading.

b. Is the story accurate and relevant? Relevance should refer to the analysis of the country
context, conflict and/or justice and security situation. Accuracy takes account of the
degree to which the indicators faithfully represent the phenomenon they are supposed to
measure.

c. What are gaps and weaknesses in the story that the indicators tell? Inevitably there will
be gaps in the story indicators tell, particularly given the lack of reliable data on non-state
justice and security mechanisms and the service provided by private security companies.
Other gaps may exist because of poor perception data. Still others may arise due to the
normative biases of the indicators. Still others may become apparent because data is
aggregated and analysis cannot be conducted into the services provided to different
groups, which is crucial for a conflict analysis. The issue is to be aware of these gaps and
seek ways to address them. It will be important to analysis what the absence of data
implies and how the story may change if data were to become available.

d. Are there contradictions in the story that the indicators tell? Under each and every
circumstance, the contradiction(s) requires explanation. Does the contradiction reveal a
lack of internal consistency within a category of indicators or between categories? Does
the contraction disclose a lack of consistency between individual indicators? Or is the
apparent contradiction disguising an issue for which more analysis is needed? For
example, when government effectiveness improves, grievances may also increase.
Launching a programme to address violence against women will, very likely, increase the
reported incidents of such violence. When trust in the police strengthens, complaints
about alleged police misbehavior and malfeasance may spike up. An initially more
accessible state justice system could lower the satisfaction the citizenry have in the
performance of the state justice system because the demand for justice outstrips its
supply.

23
 e. What is the minimum story that needs to be told? In justice and security development,
the minimum story should outline the priority needs of the citizens and residents of the
country and, if possible, their perceptions of the services delivered to them and by whom
those services are delivered. In conflict, the minimum story should consider conflict
intensity, leadership culture/process and grievances. The other factors are clearly
relevant, but focus on socio-economic, governance, electoral or security factors will vary
depending interest and relevance; they should be interpreted, however, in conjunction
with the three “minimum story” elements.

f. What does the story leave out? Existing datasets have significant gaps in important kinds
of indicators. Specifically, perceptions data is often missing or there are large gaps in
coverage. Country offices can fairly easily obtain this data through surveys or, if
resources are an issue, staff (DFID or others) can go out to listen and ask questions to
people, making sure to travel outside the capital. In addition, data on non-state
mechanisms for conflict resolution, peacebuilding and provision of justice and security is
missing, as is data on private security. These too would need to be collected in-country.
Finally, the indicators that exist for socio-economic dimensions of peacebuilding, for
governance, development and for justice and security, are largely not conflict sensitive.
It is difficult to understand the conflict impact of improvements in justice systems, for
example, from the indicators and the data that is currently available, or from the
indicators of personal security. Measures of social capital (“trust”) also usually refer to
generalized trust rather than amongst conflict groups. To the extent that disaggregated
data can be disaggregated by group, this can provide conflict-sensitivity. A much less
valid alternative is to interpret that data alongside indicators of grievances and conflict
intensity.

UNDP, in its User’s Guide for governance indicators, advises that indicators should be among
the first questions asked; they should not the last. For additional questions on indicators, there
are several useful resources that can be consulted, in addition to DFID’s own, including:

• UN User’s Guide for Governance Indicators

• Forthcoming User’s Guide on Fragility and Conflict Indices
• DFID Guidance on Governance, and forthcoming on Voice and Accountability

24
 Matrix of Indicators

A. Conflict Intensity
Indicator Source Use Cautions
1. # deaths from Uppsala Conflict Data Direct measure of level of civil war-type violence. There is a difference between deaths
armed conflict Project Uppsala defines armed conflict as “contested attributed to conflict and fatalities from
incompatibility that concerns government and/or other forms of violence, mainly criminal.
territory where the use of armed force between two The number of deaths from non-conflict
parties, of which at least one is the government of a causes far exceeds deaths from war.
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in Consequently, very violent societies may be
one calendar year.” low on this indicator.
2. # displaced as UNHCR This should supplement # of deaths in order to Persons displaced may have had to leave
% of population http://www.unhcr.org/ capture the severity of the consequences and the their homes for reasons other than conflict,
statistics/45c063a82.html level of fighting. such as hurricanes, drought, typhoons, etc.
3. Territory Political Instability Task Measures the scope of conflict. If a conflict is
affected by Force confined to a particular geographical area of the
conflict country, its severity may be considered to be lower,
even if its intensity in that area is high.
4. Seriousness of Bertelsmann Serious conflict may exist without deaths. This BTI is a less reliable indicator, in that
ethnic, religious, Transformation Index (BTI) indicator captures the severity of polarization, experts’ assessment of seriousness or
social conflicts Question 13.3 mobilization of people, and the potential for violence. “irreconcilable” cleavages may differ.
http://www.bertelsmann- However, it is a more valid measure of the
transformation-index.de/ The WGI “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” seriousness of polarization.
fileadmin/pdf/Anlagen_BTI_ reflects a much broader set of stability concerns – WGI is less up-to-date than BTI.
2008/ from the possibility of military coup to political Additionally, while the WGI includes the
assassination and terrorism – and is primarily Bertelsmann measure, it may be too broad
Alternate: World concerned with the stability of the government. BTI is to measure conflict intensity.
Governance Indicators, a more narrow measurement of the intensity of social The WGI could be useful to as a cross-check
“Political Stability and cleavages. and verification. If the two measures are
Absence of Violence,” Choice of the Bertelsmann vs. WGI indicator should not similar, then further analysis may be
http://info.worldbank.org/ be made based on the context. In countries where warranted.
governance/wgi/index.asp political, criminal or terrorism-based violence are of
primary concern, WGI may be more appropriate, as
well as if short–term stability concerns are
paramount.
25
 Indicator Source Use Cautions

5. Neighborhood Peace and Conflict Not a direct indicator of conflict intensity in a Most useful in regions in which there are
War Instability Ledger, University country. It represents an exacerbating factor that can ongoing and/or simmering conflicts, such as
of Maryland prolong and intensify conflict, as well as compound in the Great Lakes region. Can also provide
conflict consequences (e.g., displaced). data regarding risks of flows of refugees
triggering movements in underlying societal
cleavages.

B. Institutions/Mechanisms/Processes that Handle Grievances

B.I. Capacity of Government to Deal with Grievances
The capacity includes capacity to develop and implement policies that address grievances
Effectiveness
Indicator Source
1. Governance Effectiveness World Governance Indicators
http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.asp
2. Efficiency of revenue World Bank Country Policy and
mobilisation Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
Criterion 14
Use
This measures the overall quality of
public service provision, bureaucracy,
competence and independence of
the civil service, inter alia. It reflects
the quality of the “inputs” for the
government to be able to produce
and implement policies that would be
needed to address (or prevent)
grievances.
Measures tax policy and tax
administration. A proxy for the
availability of state resources to
implement policies and provide
services that might address
grievances.
Cautions
Aggregate indicator that includes many
dimensions of effectiveness. Increases
or decreases in the indicator will not
provide sufficient information from
which to draw concrete conclusions
about the impact of interventions. In
addition, small changes are likely to be
statistically insignificant, unless viewed
over a number of years.
While tax mobilization is a common
measure of state capacity, it is also
problematic and should be relied upon
with caution. There is little reliable tax
data in fragile states and the validity of
this measure outside the developed
countries is limited. States can rely on
alternative sources of revenue (e.g.,
natural resources or other national
industries).

26
 Indicator
3. Extent to which
government can
coordinate conflicting
objectives into coherent
policy
4. Access to improved water
sources
Alternatives:
Human Development Index
Primary school enrollment (%
gross)
Youth unemployment
Source
Bertelsmann 15.2
http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/
fileadmin/pdf/Anlagen_BTI_200
8/ Detailed_Results_BTI2008.xls
UNICEF/WHO Global Water and
Sanitation Report; World
Development Indicators
Human Development Index:
UNDP Human Development
Reports
http://hdr.undp.org/en/
statistics/data/
Primary school enrollment and
youth unemployment: World
Development Indicators, WDI
Online.
Use
The capacity of those in government
to formulate policies and develop
consensus. It implies as well the
extent to which the government is or
is not affected by factionalization
and/or polarization, which are
important elements of a country’s
capacity to handle grievances.
We have chosen access to improved
water because it is a key government
service, one which requires
concerted effort and planning,
important for human development
(not just economic growth) and often
destroyed during conflict. If this could
be disaggregated by geographic
region, it would be helpful to assess
inequalities as well.
Updated data may be difficult to
obtain on this indicator.
Consequently, the composite human
development index, or primary
school enrollment might serve as
alternative proxies. Outside
assistance may contribute to
increases in these indicators, so they
are not fully valid as indicators of
government effectiveness. Where
youth unemployment data is
available, employment would be a
useful indicator, in light of evidence
Cautions
A low capacity here may reflect
stalemate over how to deal with
grievances or an inability to put into
place policies and mechanisms to
address problems.
Many socio-economic indicators have
been proposed and are used in the
conflict indices. Infant mortality has been
preferred by several that have found a
correlation with conflict. However,
improvements in infant mortality may
result from outside intervention, even
during conflict. Education would be an
alternative indicator (mean years of
schooling, or primary school enrolment),
but, if there is significant displacement,
education may be provided by churches,
non-governmental organizations or in
refugee camps.
In both cases, there may be a correlation
with conflict, not because of issues of
government effectiveness, but because
conflict affects the government’s ability
to provide services and also affects
access by humanitarian and
development actors to provide the
service. These measures could be used
as indicators of conflict, but caution
should be exercised in attributing
27
 that youth unemployment enhances improvements to an improved conflict
risks of conflict. situation.

These indicators should be viewed in

conjunction with deterioration of public
services (E.II.9), which has more
consistent and recent scoring.
Leadership culture/ process
This is an aspect of capacity, but has been separated out because of its importance to tracking conflict. Additionally, leadership is an oft-forgotten
component of development policy, which needs to be more systematically taken into account. These indicators look at the degree to which the values
and interactions of leaders/elites in governance: a) may or may not escalate political conflict; and b) may or may not support the government’s ability
to acknowledge and deal effectively with grievances that may underlie conflict. Three aspects of leadership are assessed: degree of
polarization/factionalization, degree of commitment or belief of leadership in democratic processes (a proxy for likelihood of abiding by democratic
rules), and degree of inclusiveness of leadership/governance.
Indicator Source Use Cautions/Comments
5. Factionalized Elites Failed States Index/Fund Measures fragmentation of elites along group
for Peace (1.11) lines and degree of polarizing behavior of
http://www.fundforpeace elites and leadership. A direct indicator of elite
.org/web/ relationships amongst elite groups. It is also a
index.php?option=com_c proxy for a power struggle within the elite,
ontent&task polarization, and/or manipulation by elites, all
=view&id=99&Itemid=146 of which has the potential to escalate conflict.

6. To what extent can political
leadership manage political
cleavages?
7. Regime/governance inclusion
(Political legitimacy score)
Bertelsmann
Question 16.3
State Failure Index, Center
for Systemic Peace,
George Mason University
based on Polity IV
Relevant where there are deep societal Although relevant and valid as one
cleavages along ethnic, class, regional or measure of bridging social capital,
religious lines. Measures the capacity of its reliability is problematic. Terms
leadership to bridge these cleavages. If B.I.5 is
such as “depolarization” and
high, indicator is redundant; use if “consensus across the dividing
factionalization is not high. lines” can be interpreted
differently.
Measures inclusiveness of the governance A composite drawing on 4
process -- the degree to which minority groups indicators: Factionalism (Polity IV),
(social, ethnic or religious) are included in Ethnic group political
governance. discrimination (Discrimination
2007), Political salience of elite
ethnicity (Elite Leadership
28
 characteristics), polity
fragmentation. As an aggregate, it
has all the problems with such
types of indicators.
8. Extent to which democratic Bertelsmann Use in conjunction with indicators on elections Concepts of “relevant actors” are
institutions are accepted or Question 4.2 and governance. Provides some triangulation vague and may affect reliability of
supported by relevant actors for the elections’ capacity to support peaceful indicator.
transition rather than greater conflict.
Intended to measure the strength of “veto
powers” or spoilers of democracy, it can also
provide data on the degree of key actor “buy-
in” to democratic processes.
Grievances
These indicators attempt to look at the effects of government policies and practices on the grievances that can cause conflict. Several indicators of
potential inequalities that may be sources of grievance and evidence of unwillingness to address them are included here. These should be seen in
conjunction with indicators measuring perceptions of unfairness and grievance. In conflict situations, it is the perception of grievance that matters
more than the objective measure of the grievance itself. The the nature and severity of grievances, and their potential to lead to violence, will naturally
differ country to country; consequently, these indicators should be selected and viewed in connection with an analysis of conflict, if they are to be
relied upon in a country setting. If grievances are worsening, it is likely that the government does not have mechanisms in place to deal with them.
Indicator Source Use Cautions/Comments
9. Group grievances Failed States Index, Fund for Mostly measures behavior vis-à- Because FSI relies on media material,
Peace (I.3) vis communal groups that could data related to institutionalized political
lead to grievances around which exclusion, atrocities or persecution may
these groups could mobilize, be under- or overweighted. The
including atrocities against potential measurement errors should
groups, political exclusion, public be balanced by the relevance of the
scapegoating, “hate” radio, etc. indicator, one of the few in existing
datasets, measuring this dimension of
conflict.
10. Minority access to education, Minorities at Risk, University of This and the following two refer They may or may not be relevant to a
commerce, professions, etc. Maryland to specific minority rights that particular country situation. Caution
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ are often areas around which should be exercised in reading the data,
mar/data.asp grievances are mobilized. For as the data is coded by minority group;
use if relevant to the context. where there are minority-led
governments, the “majority” group
should be considered.
29
 Indicator Source Use Cautions

11. Restrictions on religion Minorities at Risk, University of

Maryland

12. Restrictions on use of Minorities at Risk, University of

language or language
instruction
13. GINI Coefficient
14. Uneven Development
15. How often has your group
been treated unfairly by the
government?
16. Your group has same, worse,
or better economic conditions
than others
Maryland
World Development Indicators
Failed States Index/Fund for Peace
(1.5)
Afrobarometer
Ghana 2008 survey, Question 82 18
Afrobarometer
Ghana 2008 survey, Question 11
A measure of horizontal
inequalities that could fuel
conflict.
Experiential measure of sense of
exclusion/oppression.
Complements more “objective”
measures of inequalities and
group grievances.
Experiential/perceptual measure
of “horizontal inequalities.”
Complements more “objective”
measures of inequalities.
Should be viewed in conjunction with
uneven development (B.14) or group
grievances (B.9) to provide a picture of
the effects of inequalities of wealth on
conflict.
Combined with the GINI coefficient
could provide a proxy for the degree to
which concentration of wealth is group-
based and may impact on group
relations.
If used in conjunction with human rights
and civil liberties indicators, this public
perception data can provide some
indication of whether human rights/civil
liberties restrictions may be a source of
group-based grievance.
Used in conjunction with more standard
development indicators (GNP per
capita, e.g.), this public perception data
can provide perspective on whether
economic growth is likely to promote or
mitigate conflict.

18
All Afrobarometer sources refer to the 2008 Ghana survey, unless otherwise noted.
30
B.II. Governance Legitimacy and Accountability
Elections free and fair
Is the government representative, does it reflect the voice of the people, and is it legitimate in the eyes of the population? The better the electoral
process and the fairer it is in the eyes of the population, the more likely it is, theoretically, to have popular confidence to discuss and develop adequate
solutions to problems. Strong caution should be exercised in relying only on data related to elections, as free and fair elections can also exacerbate
societal and political cleavages. This indicator should be used, at a minimum, alongside indicators of political cleavage and governance inclusion.
Indicator Source Use Cautions/Comments
17. Electoral Process and Pluralism Economist Intelligence Unit Measures how free and fair EIU index is scored on 1-10 based on
Democracy Index after 2006 elections are, at the national expert assessment of questions cross-
and municipal levels, as well as checked with the World Values survey
Freedom House Freedom in the whether citizens can vote fairly. when feasible.
World, Political Rights A (Electoral Should be triangulated with
Process) and B (Political Pluralism perceptual data from B.II.18.
and Participation) EIU Democracy Index was
http://freedomhouse.org/ created in 2006. Freedom
template.cfm?page=15 (Tables House has earlier data and
and Charts) permits separate examination of
electoral process-related trends
and trends in political
participation and pluralism; EIU
combines both.
18. Confidence in honesty of Gallup World Poll Measures popular perception of Current year’s data available; historical
elections Afrobarometer the fairness of elections. For data available with subscription.
Ghana 2008 survey, Question 71, African and Arab countries
Alternative for Africa/Arab: Arab Barometer Q 211 covered, Barometer questions
“Fairness of last national are more specific and recent.
election?” These surveys should be
substituted when available.

31
Legitimacy of the State
Perceptions of the legitimacy of the state are an important supplement to data and perceptions of elections. Important as it measures the extent to
which people are likely to look to the state and have confidence in the state to handle grievances and promote their well-being.
Indicator
19. Delegitimization of state
20. Relevant groups agree about
citizenship and accept the nation
state as legitimate?
Source
Failed States Index/Fund for
Peace (I.7)
Alternative: State Fragility
Index, Political legitimacy and
Social legitimacy scores
Bertelsmann 1.2
Use
Direct indicator of popular
confidence in the government.
Proxy for the capacity of
government to respond
constructively to grievances and
popular confidence in the
government’s ability to deal
with grievances. Looks at the
degree of delegitimization of the
state, including elite corruption,
resistance of ruling elites to
political representation, loss of
popular confidence in state
institutions (e.g., election boy-
cotts, public demonstrations,
inability of state to collect taxes,
etc.) and linkage of crime
syndicates to ruling elites.
Relevant in the event of possible
separatist conflict, where the
unity of the nation state is in
question. Also can be used in
conjunction with group
grievances, as a component of
the indicator looks at the extent
of discrimination against groups.
Cautions
Delegitimization of the state does not
necessarily lead to conflict, as the
“revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine
suggest. It may, however, reflect
background conditions that, in
combination with other factors, could
result in conflict, such as in Timor-Leste
and the 2006 crisis.
“De facto” exclusion of groups from
political citizenship may be susceptible
to differing interpretations by experts
and, consequently, the indicator may not
be entirely reliable. The fact that the
indicator covers two important concepts
– support for the nation state and
discrimination – makes it very relevant,
but the inclusion of two related by
separate concepts makes it imprecise.
32
 Indicator
21. Public support for government
restrictions on civil liberties
a. Agree or disagree with
statement: "Government
should be able to ban any
organization that goes against
its policies." And the reverse
statement
b. Agree or disagree with
statement: "Government
should be able to close
newspapers that print stories it
does not like." And the reverse
statement
c. Agree or disagree with
statement: "Government
should not allow the expression
of political views that are
fundamentally different from
the views of the majority." And
the reverse statement
22. Control of Corruption
Source Use Cautions
Use in conjunction with Limited coverage, as only Afrobarometer
indicators on human rights and includes these questions.
Afrobarometer civil liberties and/or
Ghana 2008 survey, Question deligitimization of the state. To be an accurate interpretive measure,
19 Provides interpretive data on these indicators should be disaggregated
the significance for conflict of by group. Afrobarometer does ask about
human rights and civil liberties group identity in its surveys. Although
restrictions and delegitimization the published survey results are not
Afrobarometer of the state: is there public disaggregated, disaggregation should be
Ghana 2008 survey, Question support for repressive actions by possible.
20 government? If so, the
repressive actions or corruption
in the government may not be a
source of conflict and
Afrobarometer improvements in those
Ghana 2008 survey, Question indicators may not signify any
21 impact on conflict.
World Governance Indicators Corruption reflects on the
legitimacy of the state, but
there is no direct relation to
conflict. If there is serious
concentration of wealth, and
factionalization of elites (B.I.5.
or 7), this indicator may be
relevant to assessing the degree
to which capture of state
resources is a driver of conflict.
33
B.III. Human rights & Civil liberties
These are indicators of rule of law, as well as a proxy for the potential for the extent to which peaceful mechanisms for handling grievances exist. We
have specifically excluded physical issues here; these have been placed under perception of safety and security.
Indicator
23. Civil liberties
24. Suspension or Arbitrary
Application of the Rule of Law
and Widespread Violation of
Human Rights
25. Allowable advocacy activities
Source
EIU Democracy Index
Freedom House Freedom in the
World D (freedom of expression/
belief), E (associational/
organizational rights), and G
(personal autonomy) for greater
disaggregation and/or data prior
to 2006.
Failed States Index, Fund for
Peace (9)
CIVICUS Civil Society Index 2.5.2
Use Cautions/Comments
Mostly freedom of media- This may be over inclusive as a conflict
related and freedom of indicator, and should be interpreted in
expression data, but also conjunction with other indicators of
includes questions about horizontal (group-based) socio-
mechanisms to redress economic, political inequality, and/or
grievances, security, and grievances.
whether property rights are
protected.
This is an aggregate of four Alternative is State Repression Index
descriptive sentences, ranging from Political Terror Index; FSI is more
from emergence of comprehensive.
authoritarian/ dictatorial rule to
rising number of political
prisoners.
Looks at extent to which CSOs This indicator does not provide any data
are free to engage in advocacy on existing local capacities for peace,
and criticize government. A only the existence of space for action by
proxy for the availability of non- local, non-state actors. It does not
violent means for civil society include traditional mechanisms or
actors to have voice and address processes for conflict resolution, which
grievances. In combination with may, in some contexts, be significant. It
data under C. below, provides is also very limited in its coverage of
an impression of the feasibility countries.
and existence of civil society
initiatives to promote peace.
34
C. Community Initiatives For Peace
Community/Civil society initiatives for peace
This looks at civil society initiatives for peace: to what extent are there local capacities for peace? In general, there is very little data on local,
non-governmental initiatives or capacities for peace that is systematic and covers a wide geographical area. The existing datasets provide very
little, the indicators below have very limited geographic coverage, and do not address the range of issues for which indicators are needed.
Indicator Source Use Cautions/Comments
1. Civil society actions to promote CIVICUS 3.4.2 Measures extent of civil society Note there are similar indicators for
non-violence and peace activity and advocacy for gender equity and democracy. Alternative
peace/non-violence. or additional indicators would be CIVICUS
3.3.2 on how much civil society promotes
tolerance at the societal level.

Qualitative data, unlike most of the other

2. Activity and success of civil
society in influencing public
policy in human rights
indicators in conflict, justice and security.
CIVICUS 4.1.1 Approximates potential influence
and effectiveness of civil society
on peace issues, premised on the
assumption that human rights, like
peace, is a sensitive issue.

35
D. Capacity/Willingness to Resist or to Escalate Violence
Military and societal militarization
The indicators in this category reflect opportunity to fight/military feasibility of war and justice and security development
Indicator Source Use Cautions/Comments
1. Military expenses as The Military Expenses, numbers of armed forces, and Many security expenditures -- military, intelligence,
% of GDP Balance, security officers/police give an indication police -- may be off-budget. Consequently, this may not
be an accurate reflection of expenses.
Stockholm of the resources dedicated and available
International to the government to engage in conflict.
Policy Research In light of the difficulty in determining the
Institute resources available to non-state actors,
these are used as proxies for the
opportunity and willingness to fight as it is
assumed that a government will increase
its capability to respond to threats of
armed violence.
2. # armed forces per The Military A proxy for resources available to pursue To the extent that international and/or regional
100,000 people Balance, SIPRI conflict. In conjunction with D.3 and D. 1, (i.e. cross-border) conflict is an issue in a region,
assesses the level of resources available this may not be a good indicator of resources
for conflict. available for internal conflict.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting trends
in D.1-D.3. Upward trends may reflect intensifying
conflict, but may also reflect greater outside
threats to security, as well as threats from crime.
3. # security officers 10th Crime Trends Similar to D.2, it is a proxy for resources Have been unable to obtain definition of “security
and police per Survey, UN Office available to pursue conflict. officers” from UNODC.
100,000 on Drug and Crime
4. Ease of access to Global Peace The availability of small arms is a proxy for This is an expert assessment and, as a proxy,
small arms Index (collected the ability of non-state groups to engage cannot be considered reliable. However, as there
by EIU) in violence and conflict. Ease of access to are no other measures of capacity of non-state
small arms, however, also pertains to groups to engage in violence and conflict, this is a
violence that can be committed that has default measure.
nothing to do with conflict.

36
 Indicator Source Use Cautions

5. Intentional UNODC 2.6 Measure of level of violence. More valid Have been unable to obtain a meaningful definition
homicide for security development than as a of “intentional” from UNODC. Even if a consistent
committed by measure of conflict, given the distinctiondefinition were to have been obtained, there will
firearm, per between violence pertaining to conflict be little consistency across countries in how
100,000 and other, usually criminal, activities. “intentional” is determined by the responsible
authorities. Nevertheless, it is the best measure
available.
6. Non-violence within CIVICUS 3.4.1 Measures use of nonviolent means by civil Does not fully measure the propensity to use
the civil society society to express their interests in the violent/non-violence means in the non-
arena public sphere. governmental sphere, as it is limited to civil society
organizations. However, in the absence of other
data, it can provide an indication, which should be
interpreted in light of other contextual knowledge.
The limited coverage of the data, however, further
erodes the indicator’s utility.

37
E. Justice
E.I. Criminal justice capacity and effectiveness
The indicators in this category reflect the overall structure, capacity, and effectiveness of the criminal justice system and its component parts.
Activities and results
Indicator
1. Conviction rate (total # of
persons brought before the
court/# total number of
persons convicted)
2. # of recorded crimes per
100,000 people
Source Use Cautions
UNODC 9.1 This is a process indicator, measuring the Almost all UNODC statistics can be broken
effectiveness of the overall criminal justice down by age, gender, type of crime. The
system, from police through prosecution organization’s indicators, however, cannot be
and courts. It may be the best single non- broken down by group. Consequently, these
perception statistic, although interpreting indicators are useful as the starting points,
what the data means will require additional but would need further specification if they
analysis and investigation. are to be valuable for conflict analysis.
UNODC statistics are compiled from reports
filed by governments with the UNODC.
There statistics, therefore, are as reliable as
the original government database, which
may be questionable. Coverage of UNODC’s
statistics varies too according to if a
government files a report.
UNODC 2.0 Is the standard measure of crime rates Reported crime is a dubious indicator, given
around the world, though admittedly a that a preponderance of crime goes
notoriously unreliable one. unreported. At the very least, reported
crime rates need to be balanced by
victimization studies. It is preferable if
reported crime rates are also interpreted in
light of trust/confidence in the police and
indicators that assess the effectiveness of the
entire criminal justice process, such as E.1.
38
 Indicator
3. # convictions/# police
4. # convictions/# prosecutors
5. # prosecutions/# prosecutors
6. # convictions/# prosecutions
7. # prosecutions/# judges
8. Average # months of criminal
trials
Source Use Cautions
UNODC Measures the efficiency of the police. A low Cannot be used without reference to other
Q11/UNODC 1.1 score should lead to questions about the indicators, namely E.1 and E.4. Also best
overall management and police used in conjunction with police satisfaction
effectiveness. A low score may also be and victimization surveys.
indicative of a poor relation between the
police and the prosecutorial service.
Conversely, a high score may suggest that
the police are addressing only low level
crimes, one for which obtaining a conviction
is relatively easy.
UNODC Measures the efficiency of the prosecutors. As with E.3., this indicator needs to be placed
Q11/UNODC 5.0 All these efficiency statistics can and should within the context of the overall criminal
be used together. justice system and cannot be used as a
stand-alone measure.
UNODC Measures the workload of the prosecutors Care should be used with this indicator
Q7/UNODC 5 and may be indicative of their capacity, because it is possible that prosecutors have
particularly suggestive of their being work rules that determine the number of
underresourced. Needs to be analyzed cases they handle.
alongside E.4.
UNODC Q11 / This is another measure of the effectiveness The significance of this number can be
UNODC Q7 of the criminal justice system. interpreted only in conjunction with the
other criminal justice indicators, in particular
E.I.1. E.!. 3, 4, and 6 are complementary.
UNODCQ7/ Measures the workload of judges. To be Criminal justice is only one type of case
UNODCQ8 used in conjunction with E.5. heard by the judges. This capacity statistic,
therefore, is best used when the judicial
system conducts its work in specialized
courts.
UNODC Q 9.2 Measures the efficiency of the judicial There should be no assumption that the
system. If the average # of months appears speed with which a criminal trial is
to be excessive, it would be a leading dispatched implies that it is more or less fair
indicator from which to probe further. and equitable. Adherence to rule of law
principles cannot be measured by length of a
trial. Therefore, it must be used in relation
to the other indicators.
39
Perceptions
Indicator
9. How well or badly would you
say the current government is
handling the following
matters, or haven’t you heard
enough to say?... F. Reducing
Crime (1 = very badly… 4 =
very well)
10. Who do you think has primary
responsibility for managing
each of the following tasks -
national government? local
government? traditional
leaders? Members of
community? None of them?
Don't know.
11. In your opinion, how often…
do officials who commit
crimes go unpunished?
12. In your opinion, how often…
do ordinary people who break
the law go unpunished?
Source Use Cautions
Afrobarometer Perception question useful to reveal the It suffers from the same weaknesses as all
57F attitude of the population to government other indicators derived from the
policy. It may be suggestive of the Afrobarometer – consistency, timeliness, etc.
population’s confidence in the government
and criminal justice system.
Afrobarometer 58 Perception question meant to begin to There are very few indicators that address
E and H assess the relationship between state- the range of non-state justice and security
provided and non-state provided justice and issues. Hesitancy should be used in its
security. It is only a proxy because there interpretation with respect to the
may be a discrepancy between who is distinctions between local government,
believed to have primary responsibility and traditional leaders, and members of the
to whom individuals go when they have a community, as there may be significant
dispute. overlap between and among these levels.
Afrobarometer Measure of perceived impunity of Perceived impunity may be an important
45 E and D government officials and is one measure of indicator for conflict if it were susceptible to
adherence to rule of law principles. disaggregation.
Afrobarometer Measure of perceived impunity of the Should be used in conjunction with E.10 to
45.E citizenry and is one measure of adherence evaluate the perceived impunity of
to rule of law principles. government vis-à-vis citizenry.
40
E.II. Rule of Law: civil and administrative justice
Indicator
1. # days to resolve dispute
2. # steps to claim, obtain, enforce
contracts
3. To what extent does an
independent judiciary exist?
Source Use
World Bank Doing Though an increase in number can
Business suggest an increased possibility of
corruption, this indicator is, at best, a
proxy. An increase in the number may
also be suggestive of overall
government capacity.
World Bank Doing Business are
perception surveys of 181 economies
and are administered to local business
leaders, lawyers, professionals involved
in regulatory activities, and
government officials. Because the
surveys have been conducted since
2003 and are administered annually,
they are among the most reliable and
consistent perception surveys.
World Bank Doing As with E.11.1, an increase in number
Business can suggest increased possibility of
corruption. This indicator, however,
has the added value of being a proxy
for adherence to rule of law, given that
one of its components is the
enforceability of contracts.
Bertelsmann 3.2 An independent judiciary is one of the
principal criteria of rule of law.
Bertelsmann uses country experts to
write and evaluate so that this
indicator may not be as useful as
perception surveys.
Cautions
In general, World Bank Doing Business
surveys are not meant to be
comprehensive measurements of
corruption, governance, or adherence
to rule of law. Nevertheless, because
they are administered to selected
segments of the population, they are
suggestive and should be used in
conjunction with other indicators to
provide a more rounded assessment. It
should also be noted that the segment
of the population to which these
surveys are administered is a vital
group, even if it is not vulnerable or
marginal one.
This indicator is adherence to the rule of
law from the perspective of those
engaged in regulation and business in
the country’s most populace city.
It is important to note that judicial
independence is only one principle
among many by which rule of law is
evaluated. There is discussion among
justice development practitioners
whether judicial independence is the
judicial paramount principle, but it
remains an open question.
41
 Indicator
4. Court system fair/impartial? Law World Bank Enterprises
and regulations predictable and Survey
consistent
5. Should the President always obey Afrobarometer 37
the law?
6. How much do you trust… Courts
of law?
7. Does the rule of law prevail in
civil and criminal matters? Are
police under direct civilian
control?
8. Do laws, policies, and practices
guarantee equal treatment of
various segments of the
population?
Source Use Cautions
Perception from business leaders,
which, albeit a limited constituency, is
an important one.
This is a perception question whether it Should be used in relation to questions
is believed that the President is of impunity above.
beholden to the law. In this sense, it is
a proxy for popular belief in the rule of
law, one of major principles of which is
that no one is above the law. Again,
however, the difficulty is the phrasing
of the question as “should” cannot be
equated to “does.”
Afrobarometer (49H), If it could be broken down by group
alternatively, see Gallup In addition to being about “trust” per (which for Afrobarometer may be
World Poll for Asia se, it is also presumed that “trust in the possible), could give an indication of
courts” implies a belief that the group grievance/perceptions of
decisions rendered by the courts are exclusion.
fair, impartial, and independent.
Hence, this is also a proxy indicator.
Freedom House, Freedom Freedom House indicators are based This indicator may be best used in
in the World F2 upon the opinion of country experts. relation to E.II.3, as both are
This indicator is an aggregate of seven administered by country experts.
separate questions, ranging from the
political independence of prosecutors, Whether the police are under civilian
detainees access to legal counsel, to control is a primary principle of
law enforcement officials independent democratic governance.
from non-state actors (criminal
enterprises, influential players and
others).
Freedom House. Freedom This indicator is an aggregate of six This is one of the indicators that bridges
in the World F4 separate questions, ranging from justice and security measures and
different groups’ ability to exercise conflict indicator.
their human rights to whether violence
against such groups widespread.
42

E.III. Access to Justice: state and non-state systems
Capacity
Indicator
1. # police per 100,000
2. # prosecutors per 100,000
In addition to measuring an important
criteria of rule of law (equality before
the law), this indicator is a proxy for
exclusion, possibly factionalization. In
conjunction with other indicators, may
help to understand conflict dimension
and impacts of rule of law.
Source Use Cautions
UNODC 1.1 (Rate) Standard measure of police capacity The UN has promulgated that a rough
used around the world. standard would be roughly in the range of 1
police officer per 450 persons. However,
the standard does not take into account
education levels; difficulty of terrain roads,
and communication; equipment/logistics
possessed by the police; poverty rates, and
age distribution of the population, all of
which will affect the needed police
manpower.
UNODC 5.0 (Rate) Measure of prosecutorial capacity. As with other capacity indicators, this does
Should be used in conjunction with not measure activities or outcomes. It may
other capacity and efficiency be suggestive, however, of whether the
indicators. The capacity of the prosecutorial service is understaffed. It can
prosecutorial service is suggestive be eliminated, if process data is
of whether a state-provided court ascertainable – E. 1, 4, 5, and 6.
system can meet a country’s short-
to intermediate-term needs or
whether there ought to be donor
support directed to non-state/local
justice networks.
43
 Indicator
3. # lawyers per 100,000
4. # hours to pay taxes, #
payments per year
Access
Indicator
5. Attorney, court, enforcement
costs as % of claim value
6. Government repression of
groups
7. Deterioration of public
services
Source Use
Law Schools / Bar The number of lawyers in a country
Associations is an important indicator of whether
a state-provided court system can
meet a country’s short- to
intermediate-term needs or
whether there ought to be donor
support directed to non-state/local
justice networks.
World Bank Doing Business This is a proxy indicator under the
assumption that if both increase,
businesses will pay fewer taxes and
funding for state-provided justice
will be limited, compelling people to
resort to non-state system.
Source Use
World Bank Doing The high cost to obtain access to state system will
Business compel people to resort to non-state system.
Minorities at Risk If government engages in repression, equitable
access will, by definition, be limited. This indicator
is an aggregate of three questions on repression.
Failed States This indicator is a proxy, for it is presumed that if
Index/Fund for public services deteriorate justice and security
services do as well.
Peace (8)
Also an indicator of government effectiveness and
grievances; can be used in conjunction with B.I.1,
B.I.4 and B.I.14 to gauge conflict potential of
socio-economic indicators.
Cautions
There is no dataset that contains this
statistic, but it ought to be readily
obtainable by consulting the national Bar
Association or through the country’s law
faculties. Caution must be used in
analyzing the gross number because there
is no certainty that each and every lawyer
practices the law.
To be used with caution and mainly as a
supplemental or supporting indicator.
Cautions
This is not a direct measure and should be
used with caution, but, once again, it is an
attempt to uncover the relationship
between state and non-state justice.
This is not a perception survey, but is scored
by graduate students and reviewed by
experts.
The indicator is estimated based upon
readings of open source media from the
country under examination.
44
Women’s access & capacity
Indicator Source Use Cautions
8. # women police/total police UNODC 1.2/UNODC This is an estimate of gender equity in the Access to justice for women is not
1.1 police. However, as a measure of limited to their employment
representation, this indicator does not record representation, but no other data is
equity in power and authority. available.
9. # women prosecutors/total UNODC Same as above. Save as above.
prosecutors Q5.1/UNODC Q5.0

10. # women judges/total judges UNODC Save as above. Save as above.

Q8.1/UNODC Q8.0

11. # women prison staff/total UNODC Save as above. Should be comparable to # women
prison staff (14.1+14.4)/UNODC prisoners/total prisoners (available from
(14.3+14.0) UNODC or King’s College).
12. Women as % of legislators, IMD World This indicator is a survey of business This source is extremely limited (only 55
senior officials, managers Competitive executives, which is thereafter supplemented countries), but it is the only dataset
Yearbook 2.5.10 by statistical data, when available. Though found that estimates % of women in
the question is one of representation (gross positions of authority and influence.
number), it is suggestive of access and
equality.
Perception
Indicator Source Use Cautions
13. Trust in courts vs. trust in traditional Afrobarometer All below are perception surveys, The comparison of trust in courts vs.
leaders (how much do you trust each?) (Compare 49H vs. measuring to whom people turn traditional leaders is suggestive of which
49I) to for justice. mechanism the citizenry turns toward to
address their disputes. Should be used in
conjunction with other perception data to
disclose discrepancies, if any.
14. Use of wasta (clout)(During the past five Arab Barometer 228 This is a proxy question and not a
years, have you ever used wasta to direct one
achieve something personal, family-
related, or a neighborhood problem?)
15. Reference to traditional leaders Arab Barometer 227
(asks to list the types of wasta – choice 4 is

45
traditional leaders)

16. Go to court to resolve disputes? Arab Barometer 228

(If you were to have a dispute with another
citizen, would you try to resolve it in a court
or in another government institution?)
17. Who would you go to resolve a dispute? Arab Barometer 229

18. Women are/should be subject to Afro Barometer 23.B This question may or may not be in each
traditional laws 19 country survey and the # of the question
depends on which survey it is.

E.IV. Corruption
Indicator
1. Do you think the government is
doing enough to fight corruption
or not?
2. Corruption perceptions
3. Registering property - # of
procedures, # of days
Source
Gallup World Poll
Transparency Int’l -
Corruption Perceptions
Index
World Bank Doing
Business
Use Cautions
This is not a perception of May be best used in connection with other
corruption, but of the government impunity indicators. If there are variations
response to it. between and among them, this would be
an issue for further investigation.
This is a country’s overall score,
which is derived from thirteen
separate sources, each of which is a
different measure of corruption.
The longer it takes and the more As this is a proxy, its use must be judicious.
complicated it is, the greater the
opportunity for corruption and the
more likely corruption may occur
(especially because of the
involvement of property).

19
In the 2005 survey, respondents were asked: “In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as
men do.” B. “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.” Respondents could agree with
A, B, or neither.
46
 Indicator
4. Gifts given to receive public
services
F. Security Sector
F.I. Prisons
Indicator
1. # prisoners/# beds
2. # juveniles/# beds for juveniles
3. # pre-trial detention prisoners
prior to disposition of case/#
convicted prisoners
4. # persons with AIDS, mental
illness, TB/# prisoners
Source Use
World Bank Enterprise Includes selected questions about
Survey electricity, construction,
inspections, % government
contracts given away, % total
annual sales for business, import
license, operating license.
Source Use
King’s College This is a measure of how Overcrowding is a primary way of
overcrowded the prison system is. evaluating the performance of a prison
system.
King’s College/ UNODC Measure of how overcrowding
affects juveniles.
UNODC/King’s College This is a gross number recording the
depth of the pre-trial detention
challenge. More useful data would
be the average number of months
in prison an incarcerated person
languishes prior to initial disposition
of his/her case, but that data is
unavailable.
UNODC Q Health is a prime issue in prison and
(18.2+18.3+18.4)/ a prime determinant of prison
UNODC 15.0 quality. It would be expected that
overcrowding and health would, in
most circumstances, be closely
correlated.
Cautions
This survey is completed by business
leaders and is an estimate of their
perception of a country’s governance
structure and system and the degree to
which government services have been
effectively privatized.
Cautions
As a gross number, it does not disclose the
causes or reasons why there is a pre-trial
detention problem.
The problem with the indicator is that that
data is unavailable on other illnesses, or on
how much is pre-existing conditions, and
therefore not the result of prison
mismanagement.
47
F.II. Policing
Capacity
Indicator
1. # police per 100,000
Behavior & Effectiveness
Indicator
2. # of intentional homicides
completed per 100,000 people
3. In the last 12 months, were you
assaulted, mugged, property or
money stolen?
4. How much trust do you have in…
the Police
Source Use Cautions
UNODC Q 1.1 (Rate)
Source Use Cautions
UNODC 2.3 (rate) This is the standard measure of There is no consistent or workable
homicide. definition of “intentional,” and none
provided by UNODC.
Gallup World Poll This is the best victimization proxy Victimization surveys are crucial to balance
available. crime rate data and give a depth of
understanding to perception surveys that
measure fear and insecurity. Victimization
surveys are also important means by which
to evaluate questionnaires that look at
public satisfaction in police performance.
Arab (201.4), Asian (13) Trust in the police is a crucial If (5)-(8) could be broken down by group
and Afro-barometers variable and one that ought to be and income, it would give good indication
(49G) measured, if at all possible. of the feelings of security among conflict
parties.
It should be noted that in the first few years
after the cessation of a conflict and with
the rebuilding of the national police, public
trust and confidence in the police often
rises. This increase, however, may be more
aspirational than real and, often, trust in
the police declines sharply thereafter.
48
 Indicator Source Use Cautions

5. Get help from police when Afro Barometer 71 (2005) If police are not forthcoming with In many fragile countries, individuals and
needed? 20 help or assistance, then individuals groups do not appeal, first and foremost, to
might resort to the non-state the police for help. Instead, they opt to
system. consult their local leaders. In some
countries, the police are not accessible, so
that it would be inconceivable to request
help from the police.
6. Difficulty in getting help from the Arab Barometer 213 Same as above.
police? 21

7. Extrajudicial killings
8. Criminalization/ delegitimization
of the state
CIRI Index Important in itself. Killings may be
by police or other government
bodies. When the death is caused
by other actors, the overall issue
remains one that still concerns
policing.
Failed States Index, Fund Broader than policing, but does
for Peace (I.7) raise policing issues. Looks at acts
of resistance to government
(boycott elections, resist taxes,
protests, etc.)
A proxy by which to evaluate the
effectiveness of policing. There may be a
correlation between extrajudicial killings
and the entire criminal justice system, but
the relationship is not contained within the
CIRI Index’s raw score. It will have to be
ferreted out.
The extent to which a state is criminalized
and/or has privatized the provision of its
services is a proxy for the effectiveness of
the criminal justice system.

20
This question was asked in the 2005 survey: “Based on your experience, how difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do
you never try to get these services from government? C: help from the police when you need it. (4=very easy, 1=very difficult).
21
The question asked: “Based on your experience, how difficult is it to obtain the following administrative or social services from the
government?” One option was 4.” Get help from the police when you need it.”

49
F.III. Oversight of justice and security sector
Indicator
1. Security sector operating as a
state within a state
2. Corruption mechanisms
institutionalized
Source
Failed States Index, Fund
for Peace (I.10)
Bertelsmann 15.3
Use Cautions
Looks at emergence of elite guards
that operate with impunity, state-
sponsored private militias, army
within the army.
This is a proxy for oversight, given Should be used in conjunction with E.VII.1.
the assumption that This is presumed that they will be
institutionalization of corruption correlated. If there is a discrepancy, that
implies the absence of effective would be grounds for further investigation.
oversight.

G. Personal Safety and Security

Perception of personal safety and security
In conjunction with indicators from A (conflict intensity), intentional homicide and ease of access to small arms (D. 4, 5; F.II.3), recorded crimes (E.I.2),
and policing, these can give an idea of safety and security. Without disaggregation by demographic group, the indicators cannot provide information
about conflict-related vs. non-conflict-related security concerns.
Indicator Source Use Cautions
1. State behavior violating physical Political Terror Scale This is a broader measure than If these indicators could be disaggregated
integrity extrajudicial killings. by group, they would be more helpful as
conflict indicators.
2. Feel safe walking alone at night Gallup World Poll A perception question measuring Gender and age disaggregation available.
in your community? insecurity. Caution must be used, however, in that the
term ‘community’ is undefined. One could,
for example, feel safe walking within one’s
own community, but not in the neighboring
one.
3. Experienced fear, stress, worry a Gallup World Poll This indicator measures security This indicator borders on human security
lot of the day yesterday? writ large. It is not specifically and should be treated with care.
measuring physical security.
4. Over the past year, how often, if Afrobarometer 9B, C This indicator is a victimization
ever, have you or anyone in your question.
family… B. had something stolen
from your house, C. been
physically attacked?
50
 Indicator Source Use Cautions

5. In this country, how often do Afrobarometer 47 A proxy for psychological security

people have to be careful of
what they say about politics?
6. In your opinion, what are the
most important problems facing
this country that the government
should address? (one choice is
political violence)
7. # reported rapes per 100,000
women
and for conflict-related security
fears.
Afrobarometer 56 Provides a sense of how important
issues of political violence are to
people.
UNODC Violence against women is an There is a lack of data on violence against
underreported crime and rape is a women.
proxy question.

51
 VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

The existing datasets provide a number of indicators that can be useful in monitoring and evaluating the
impacts of conflict, justice and security activities at the country level. While not perfect, they provide a
means of monitoring and assessing the general direction of a country, and thus can provide a
supplemental perspective on assessing the impact of DFID/HMG strategies and activities. They can
help answer a number of questions relevant to assessment of impact, including: How has the situation
changed over time? Which changes in structures, attitudes, behaviours, relationships or practices (of
how many people/classified according to horizontal divisions) can be ascertained? 22
These indicators are not a comprehensive treatment of indicators. Nor do they provide a complete guide
for assessment of impact. For more complete guidance on the selection and interpretation of indicators,
it is advisable to refer to good practices in selecting indicators, the UNDP User’s Guide for Governance
Indicators, and the forthcoming Users’ Guide on Sources Measuring Fragility and Conflict. In addition,
the OECD/DAC Guidance on Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities lays out a
useful framework within which these indicators may be used to measure the impact of DFID/HMG
activities and strategies. The OECD/DAC guidance recommends several preconditions that help staff
and policy makers prepare for, support and learn from evaluations.

Summary: Key steps for policy makers,

programme planners and managers 23

 Establish relevant, clear and measureable objectives

 State an explicit theory of change and programme logic
 Complete and monitor a conflict analysis
 Develop and monitor relevant indicators
 Focus on strategy and policy coherence
 Conduct systematic, rigorous evaluation

Within this framework, there are a number of things DFID/HMG might do to improve the availability of
useful and robust conflict, justice and security indicators.

1. Invest in local capacity to manage performance of the “system,” in particular peacebuilding,

justice and security. Donor effectiveness may be best measured by assessing the performance of
the institutions, agencies, and organizations programmes are designed to support. To the extent
that the sustainability of any intervention for justice and security development or conflict
prevention/peacebuilding depends on local ownership, it is important that justice and security
sector institutions, as well as institutions related to peacebuilding, improve their own systems for
assessing performance. Moreover, development and monitoring of indicators that are relevant
22
OECD DAC Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Working Draft), p. .
23
OECD DAC Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Working Draft), p. 20.

52
 and appropriate to the specific context could supplement and correct for the gaps and
deficiencies in global-level indicators covered in existing datasets and would allow for more
accurate assessment of the impact of interventions, policies and actions. It is, therefore,
recommended that a percentage of assistance to a country be earmarked for the development
performance management capacity, including appropriate indicators and data collection methods
and systems.

2. Development of indicators and datasets for non-state mechanisms and processes for justice,
provision of security and peacebuilding. This should be an area for significant investment—
either at country level or globally. Similarly, there is need to design and support methods of
measuring the performance of private security companies, whose business is booming around the
world, but particularly in fragile countries.

3. Strengthening of indicators and data on perceptions. The Afro- and other barometers can
provide valuable data on public perceptions of conflict, justice and security. However, the
questions are not entirely consistent, the frequency of collection of data not sufficient, and the
coverage also relatively limited. Gallup World Poll has more extensive coverage, but few of the
questions are relevant to the elements of conflict, justice and security that are useful to monitor
in order to assess impact. We would recommend that DFID/HMG invest in Afrobarometer (and
other barometers) to further systematize and expand the collection of data. In addition, at
relatively low cost for DFID/HMG, questions might be proposed or added to the barometers or to
the Gallup polls to gather missing information about perceptions.

4. Disaggregation by group (ethnic/religious/social/ideological). In order for sectoral indicators to

become more conflict-sensitive and provide data on conflict impact, disaggregation by relevant
conflict group would be useful. Some perceptions surveys – such as the Afrobarometer – as
about respondents’ identity, and thus might easily be able to provide disaggregated data. In
some post-conflict situations, such as in Kosovo, information on crime, justice and security has
been disaggregated by ethnicity, and has provided valuable information on distributional impacts
of policies and actions. In other situations, this may be sensitive, but would be useful for
DFID/HMG to take up with host governments.

53
 Appendix A
Example: Application of Indicators to Burundi and Nepal, 2006-2008

A. Conflict Intensity
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. # deaths from Uppsala Conflict Data Project 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
armed conflict
Absolute number 457 0 0-24 137 0-24 missing
Burundi: There is a postive reduction in
2. # and increase UNHCR (in 000) 105 105.5 464 423 most indicators, reflecting the momentum
in IDPs/refugees http://www.unhcr.org/ in the peace process and the negotiations
statistics/45c063a82.html with the last remaining rebel group. The
conflict here would no longer be defined
as an “armed conflict” by UCDP, and one
3. Territory Political Instability Task Force 4 Ended ended ended ended ended sees also a significant reduction in “total
affected by population of concern” (includes IDPs and
conflict 0 = best, 4 = worst refugees), especially in the IDP population.
4. Seriousness of Bertelsmann Transformation 9 Unpub- 8 10 Unpub- 5 Tensions have decreased significantly, but
Index (BTI) Question 13.3 lished lished still are not low.
ethnic,
religious, social 1 = best, 10= worst
conflicts http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation- Nepal: Nepal has also seen a significant
index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Anlage reduction in conflict intensity –
n_BTI_2008/ particularly in deaths (it too would no
Detailed_Results_BTI2008.xls longer be classified as “armed conflict”).
The stable level of displaced includes
Alternate: World Governance returns of about 50,000 IDPs who are
Indicators, “Political Stability counted in the “total population of
concern” because UNHCR is following
and Absence of Violence.”
them. Nonetheless, the level of tension,
http://info.worldbank.org/gove although decreasing, remains extremely
rnance/wgi/index.asp high. The World Governance Indicators
5. Neighborhood Peace and Conflict Instability medium Unpub- n/a Unpub- also suggest high levels of political
War - # Ledger, University of Maryland risk lished lished instability and violence (a rating of -2.13 in
neighboring 2007, from -2.09 in 2006 – a trend within
red = high risk (2 or more) the margin of error).
states
yellow = medium (1)
experiencing
green = low risk (0)
armed conflict
B. Institutions/Mechanisms/Processes that Handle Grievances
B.I. Capacity of Government to Deal with Grievances
The capacity includes capacity to develop and implement policies that address grievances
Effectiveness
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. Governance World 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008

Effectiveness Governance
Indicators -0.82 -0.81 Unpub- -1.26 -1.34 Unpub-
2.5= best lished lished
In both countries, government
-2.5= worst effectiveness is rated as low, and has
not changed in the 2006-2008 time
2. Efficiency of revenue World Bank 3.5 3.5 Unpub- 3 3 Unpub- period. One would not, however, be
mobilisation Country Policy and lished lished able to detect small changes in an
Institutional aggregate indicator such as WGI’s
Assessment (CPIA) governance effectiveness, and,
unfortunately, data is unavailable on
Criterion 14
access to improved water sources. We
1=low, 6=best
turned to HDI and primary school
enrollment to gather some
3. Extent to which Bertelsmann 15.2 5 Unpub- 4 2 Unpub- 3 information about provision of
government can 1 = worst lished lished services. The only indicator with up-to-
coordinate 10= best date data is primary school
enrollment, which increased in
conflicting Burundi and remained the same in
objectives into Nepal. It might be noted that infant
coherent policy mortality (also available through the
4. Access to improved World 89 Unpub- Unpub- 71 Unpub- Unpub- World Development Indicators)
Development lished lished lished lished decreased slightly in both.
water sources
Indicators

.530 .382
Human Development The general picture thus appears to be
Index one of slight improvement, but with
significant challenges, particularly in
114 Unpub-
Primary school light of the slightly deteriorating score
126 126 124 103 lished on B.I.3 (government coordinating
enrollment conflicting objectives) in Nepal, and
the low, even if improving, score for
Burundi.
Leadership culture/ process
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

5. To what extent can Bertelsmann 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
political leadership Question 16.3
10 = best 3 Unpub- 6 4 Unpub- 7
manage political
1= worst lished lished
cleavages? In both countries, the ability of the
leadership to manage the political
6. Factionalized Elites Failed States 9 8.5 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.8
cleavages has improved, which is to
Index/Fund for
be expected given the progress in the
Peace (1.11) peace processes in both Nepal and
0=best, 10=worst Burundi during this period. The
7. Extent to which Bertelsmann 2 Unpub- 4 2 Unpub- 5 increase in both countries in the
democratic institutions Question 4.2 lished lished acceptance of democratic institutions
10 = best is also a positive sign of commitment
are accepted or
1= worst to the peace process.
supported by relevant
actors
8. Regime/governance State Failure Index, 2 0 However, the high scores on
inclusion (Political Center for “factionalized elites” – which is a
legitimacy score) Systemic Peace, much more short-term-sensitive
George Mason indicator of political polarization,
University would suggest that the upward trend
is very vulnerable. There have been
based on Polity IV improvements in Nepal, but
0 = best (stable) Burundian politics remains quite
factionalized despite progress in the
3 = worse (fragile)
peace process.
Grievances
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

9. Group grievances Failed States Index, 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Fund for Peace (I.3)
0=best, 10=worst 9.2 8.9 9 7 6.7 6.7
Several of the indicators (B.I.11-12) are not
relevant in these situations, and
10. Minority access to Minorities at Risk, n/a Unpub- Unpub- 1 Unpub- Unpub-
consequently can be ignored.
education, commerce, University of lished lished lished lished
professions, etc. Maryland, Column
AF
0=no restrictions Burundi: There appears to be improvement
4=worst restrictions in behavior that generates group grievances
11. Restrictions on religion Minorities at Risk, na Unpub- Unpub- 0 Unpub- Unpub- (B.I.9), but little movement on the socio-
economic factors that may underlie group
University of lished lished lished lished
grievances. Viewed in conjunction with the
Maryland
indicators on leadership process and
0=no restrictions relationships, there appears to be less
3=sharply restricted progress on dealing with underlying drivers
12. Restrictions on use of Minorities at Risk, na Unpub- Unpub- 0 Unpub- Unpub- of conflict. Regrettably, the Afrobarometer
language or language University of lished lished lished lished does not include Burundi in its latest polls;
Maryland data on popular perceptions of the
instruction
0=no restrictions government and inter-group relations would
3=sharply restricted be valuable here.

13. GINI Coefficient World Development Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- 33 Unpub- Unpub-
Indicators lished lished lished lished lished
Nepal: Uneven development and group
14. Uneven Development Failed States 8.5 9.2 9.2 8.8 8.8 8.8 grievances are very high, and seem to have
Index/Fund for Peace remained stable or become slightly worse,
despite the peace agreement and a
(1.5)
reduction in conflict-related violence. This
0=best, 10=worst
may merely reflect the challenges of
15. How often has your Afro Barometer Inap- Inap- Inap- na na na implementing the peace accord – both the
group been treated Ghana 2008 survey, plicable plicable plicable difficulties encountered in implementation,
unfairly by the Question 82 and the time it will take to address some of
the underlying issues.
government?
16. Your group has same, Afrobarometer Inap- Inap- Inap- na na na
worse, or better plicable plicable plicable
Ghana 2008 survey,
economic conditions
Question 11
than others
B.II. Governance Legitimacy and Accountability

Elections free and fair

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

17. Electoral Economist Intelligence Unit 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 Nepal has experienced significant
Process and Democracy Index improvement in this area; this is
0=worst EIU: .08 EIU: 1.33 EIU: 4.42 EIU: 4.42 consistent with the history of the
Pluralism peace process. This is also reflected
10=best
FH: FH: FH: FH: in popular perceptions of the
Freedom House (FH)
A – 1 (of 12) A–4 A–9 A–9 fairness of elections.
0 = smallest degree of rights
B – 6 (of 16) B–9 B – 11 B–9
Burundi, having experienced a
successful 2005 election that was a
watershed, has remained stable.
18. Perceptions of Gallup, alternatives are 25% 60% 56% While this is a positive sign of the
honesty of Afrobarometer #71 or Arab (Oct 2008) (July 2008) development of democratic
elections Barometer 211 processes, the high degree of
factionalization (leadership culture
and process) suggest that the
electoral process could as easily fuel
as mitigate conflict.
Legitimacy of State

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

19. Delegitimization of state Failed States 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 While the state appears to be
Index/Fund for gaining legitimacy in Nepal,
Peace (I.7) 9.2 8.5 8.3 7.2 7.1 7.1 there is an interesting
discrepancy between this
0=best, 10=worst
indicator and B.I.6 and B.I.8.
The mediocre score, which has
20. Relevant groups agree Bertelsmann 1.2 6 Unpub- 6 6 Unpub- 8 remained unchanged since
about citizenship and 1 = worst lished lished 2006, on B.I.20 suggests that the
accept the nation state 10= best danger of group-based
as legitimate? challenges to the state, and
conflict, remain present.
21. Public support for Afro Barometer Inap- Inap- Inap- na na na Requires further analysis.
government restrictions Ghana 2008 plicable plicable plicable
on civil liberties survey, Question
19
22. Control of Corruption World Governance -0.67 -0.66 Unpub- -1.12 -1.06 Unpub-
Indicators lished lished
best=2.5 worst= -
2.5
B.III. Human rights & Civil liberties
These are indicators of rule of law, as well as a proxy for the potential for the extent to which peaceful mechanisms for handling grievances exist. We have
specifically excluded physical issues here; these have been placed under perception of safety and security.
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

23. Civil liberties EIU Democracy 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Index After 2006
0=worst, 10=best EIU: 5.59 EIU: 5.59 EIU: 4.71 EIU: 4.71 There has been an
improvement Nepal,
FH: FH: FH: FH: given the results of 2008.
Based on the Freedom
Freedom House D – 6 (of 16) D–7 D – 6 (of 16) D–6
House scores, the biggest
(FH) Freedom in E – 3 (of 12) E–6 E – 5 (of 12) E–5 improvement has been in
the World D, E, G G – 6 (of 16) G – 10 G – 9 (of 16) G–8 freedom of expression
0 = worst/smallest and belief. Human rights
and civil liberties remain
at concerning level in
both Nepal and Burundi,
24. Suspension of Rule of Failed States Index, 9.1 8.8 8.8 7.5 7.5 7.5 and are not improving in
Law and Human Rights Fund for Peace Burundi.
0=best, 10=worst
25. Allowable advocacy CIVICUS Civil 2 Unpub- Unpub- na Unpub- Unpub-
activities Society Index 2.5.2 lished lished lished lished

C. Community Initiatives For Peace

Community/Civil society initiatives for peace
This looks at civil society initiatives for peace: to what extent are there local capacities for peace?
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. Civil society actions CIVICUS 3.4.2 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 This is an important category of
to promote non- indicators for which there is nearly no
violence and peace 3 Unpub- Unpub- na Unpub- Unpub- data. CIVICUS does not collect data
lished lished lished lished regularly, and thus comparisons over
time, even for those countries that
2. Activity and success CIVICUS 4.1.1 1 Unpub- na Unpub- Unpub- are covered, is difficult.
of civil society in lished lished lished
influencing public
policy in human
rights
D. Capacity/Willingness to Resist or to Escalate Violence
Military and societal militarization
The indicators in this category reflect opportunity to fight/military feasibility of war and justice and security development
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. Military expenses as The Military Balance, 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
% of GDP Stockholm International
Policy Research Institute 2% 1% 5% 5%
www.milexdata.sipri.org
Data for UNODC is available
2. # armed forces per The Military Balance, 2.298850575 only to 2006. We were
100,000 people SIPRI unable to obtain the Global
th Peace Index data for
3. # security officers 10 Crime Trends Survey, 202.83 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
individual factors, but it
and police per UN Office on Drug and lished lished lished lished lished
should be available through
100,000 Crime
the Economist Intelligence
4. Ease of access to Global Peace Index Unpub- Unpub- na Unpub- na Unpub- Unit or through Vision of
small arms (collected by EIU) lished lished lished lished Humanity, which sponsors
the GPI. Based on the
1=very low, 5=very high current data, militarization
trends cannot be assessed;
it may be useful to go back
further in time.
5. Intentional UNODC 2.6 0.3 Unpub- Unpub- na Unpubl- Unpub-
homicide lished lished ished lished
committed by
firearm, per
100,000
6. Non-violence within CIVICUS 3.4.1 2 Unpub- Unpub- na Unpub- Unpub-
the civil society lished lished lished lished
arena
E. Criminal Justice
E.I. Criminal justice capacity and effectiveness

Activities and results

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. Conviction rate UNODC 9.1 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008

14.29 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-

lished lished lished lished lished
15.93
(2005)
2. # of recorded crimes UNODC 2.0 14.96 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
per 100,000 people 15.07 lished lished lished lished lished
(2005)

3. # convictions/# police UNODC Q11 / 0.052 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
UNODC 1.1 lished lished lished lished lished
0.049
(2005)

4. # convictions/# UNODC Q11/UNODC 13.5 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-

prosecutors 5.0 lished lished lished lished lished
12.6 (2005)
5. # prosecutions/# UNODC Q7/UNODC 5 6.02 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
prosecutors lished lished lished lished lished
6.45 (2005)
6. # convictions/# UNODC Q11 / Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
prosecutions UNODC Q 7 lished lished lished lished lished

7. # prosecutions/# judges UNODCQ7/UNODCQ 1307/232 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-

8 lished lished lished lished lished
1400/195
(2005)
8. Average # months of UNODC Q 9.2 n/a Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
criminal trials lished lished lished lished lished
Perceptions

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

9. Government reducing Afrobarometer 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008

crime? 57F
na Inap- Inap- Inap- na na
plicable plicable plicable

10. Who do you think has Afrobarometer 58 na Inap- Inap- Inap- na na

primary responsibility for E and H plicable plicable plicable
managing each of the
following tasks - national
gov? local gov?
traditional leaders?
Members of community?
None of them? Don't
know.
11. In your opinion, how Afrobarometer
often… do officials who 45 E and D
commit crimes go
unpunished?
12. In your opinion, how Afrobarometer na Inap- Inap- Inap- na na
often… do ordinary 45.E plicable plicable plicable
people who break the
law go unpunished?
E.II. Rule of Law: civil and administrative justice
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. # days to resolve dispute World Bank Doing 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Business

2. # steps to claim, obtain, World Bank Doing 39 39 39 44 44 44

enforce contracts Business

3. Independence of Bertelsmann 3.2 3 Unpub- 3 4 Unpub- 5

Judiciary 1 = best, 10= lished lished
worst
4. Court system World Bank Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- n/a Unpub- Unpub-
fair/impartial? Law and Enterprises lished lished lished lished lished
regulations predictable Survey
and consistent
5. Should the President Afrobarometer 37 Inap- Inap- Inap- na na na
always obey the law? plicable plicable plicable

6. How much do you trust… Afrobarometer 47% na na na

Courts of law? (49H),
alternatively, see
Gallup World Poll
for Asia

7. Rule of law/police under Freedom House, n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
civilian control? Freedom in the
World F2

8. Equal treatment of Freedom House. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
demographic groups? Freedom in the
World F4
E.III. Access to Justice: state and non-state systems
Capacity

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. # police per 100,000 UNODC 1.1 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
(Rate)
202.83 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
lished lished lished lished lished
206.96 (2005)
2. # prosecutors per UNODC 5.0 0.79 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
100,000 (Rate) lished lished lished lished lished
0.80 (2005)
3. # lawyers per 100,000 Law Schools /
Bar
Associations
4. # hours to pay taxes, # World Bank 408 hrs 408 hrs 408 hrs 140 hours 140 hours 140 hours
payments per year Doing Business 34 payments 34 34 32 32 payments 32 payments
payments payments payments

Access

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

5. Attorney, court, World Bank Doing 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
enforcement costs as % Business
26.8 26.8 26.8 38.6 38.6 38.6 There appears to be a deterioration of
of claim value public services in both countries. This
6. Government repression Minorities at Risk n/a Unpub- Unpub- 0 Unpub- Unpub- can be viewed in conjunction with
0=no repression; lished lished lished lished B.I.6 and B.I.8. The question arises is
5=violent whether higher tensions contributed
to the deterioration, or whether the
repression and
deterioration has exacerbated
killing tensions. Has the inability of the
7. Deterioration of public Failed States 6.2 6.6 7 8.5 8.9 9.0 governments to respond triggered
services Index/Fund for unhappiness with the leadership and
Peace (1.8) government agencies?
0=best, 10=worst
Women’s access & capacity

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

8. # women police/total UNODC 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008

police 1.2/UNODC 1.1
1418/56064 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
same in 2005 lished lished lished lished lished

9. # women UNODC 2 women/ Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-

prosecutors/total Q5.1/UNODC 217 total lished lished lished lished lished
prosecutors Q5.0 prosecution
personnel
10. # women judges/total UNODC 3/232 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
judges Q8.1/UNODC lished lished lished lished ished
Q8.0
11. # women prison UNODC 61/658 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
staff/total prison staff (14.1+14.4)/UN lished lished lished lished lished
ODC 61/657
(14.3+14.0) (2005)
12. Women as % of IMD World
legislators, senior Competitive
officials, managers Yearbook
2.5.10
Perception

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

13. Trust in courts vs. trust in Afrobarometer 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
traditional leaders (how do (Compare 49H
vs. 49I) Inap- Inap- Inap- na na na
you trust each?)
plicable plicable plicable

14. Use of wasta (clout) Arab Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap-
(During the past five years, have Barometer plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable
you ever used wasta to achieve 226
something personal, family-related,
or a neighborhood problem?)
15. Reference to traditional Arab Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap-
leaders (list the types of wasta Barometer plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable
– choice 4 is traditional leaders) 227
16. Go to court to resolve Arab Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap-
disputes? (If you were to have Barometer plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable
a dispute with another citizen, 228
would you try to resolve it in a
court or in another government
institution?)
17. Who would you go to to Arab Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap-
resolve a dispute? Barometer plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable
229

18. Women are/should be Afro Inap- Inap- Inap- na na na

subject to traditional laws 1 Barometer plicable plicable plicable
23.B

1
In the 2005 survey, respondents were asked: “In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” B.
“Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.” Respondents could agree with A, B, or neither.
E.IV. Corruption
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. Government doing Gallup World Poll 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
enough to fight
corruption?
Corruption has significantly
increased in Burundi. Once
2. Corruption perceptions Transparency Int’l 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.5 1.9
again, this could be seen in
- Corruption
relation to B.I.6, B.I. 8, and
Perceptions Index E.III.9. Is this an emerging
1=most corrupt overall trend?
10=least corrupt
3. Registering property - # World Bank Doing 3 steps 3 steps 3 steps 5 steps 5 steps 5 steps
of procedures, # of days Business 5 days 5 days 5 days 94 days 94 days 94 days

4. Gifts given to receive World Bank Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- n/a Unpub- Unpub-
public services Enterprise Survey lished lished lished lished lished

5. How many of the Afro Barometer Inap- Inap- Inap- n/a n/a n/a
following people do you 50 (ALL) plicable plicable plicable
think are involved in
corruption?
6. Municipal/national Asian Barometer Inap- Inap- Inap-
officials involved in 114-115 plicable plicable plicable
corruption?
 F. Security Sector
F.I. Prisons
Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. # prisoners/# beds King’s College 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008

0.986450989 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-

lished lished lished lished lished

2. # juveniles/# beds for King’s College/ 50 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
juveniles UNODC lished lished lished lished lished

3. # pre-trial detention UNODC/King’s n/a Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-

prisoners prior to College lished lished lished lished lished
disposition of case/#
convicted prisoners
4. # persons with AIDS, UNODC Q % of Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
mental illness, TB/# (18.2+18.3+18.4)/ prisoners lished lished lished lished lished
prisoners UNODC 15.0 with HIV: 0.6
% with
mental
illness: 0.6
F.II. Policing
Capacity

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. # police per 100,000 UNODC Q 1.1 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
(Rate)
202.83 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
lished lished lished lished lished

2. # cases discontinued/# UNODC 9.0-7.0 n/a Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
cases referred to lished lished lished lished lished
prosecutors
Behavior & Effectiveness

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

3. # of intentional UNODC 2.3 (rate) 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
homicides completed per
1.84 Unpub- Unpubl- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
100,000 people
lished ished lished lished lished

4. In the last 12 months, Gallup World Poll 9% theft

The Nepalese state has
were you assaulted, 4% improved. How does this
mugged, property or assaulted relate to the other indicators
money stolen? that have suggested
deterioration of public
5. How much trust do you Arab (201.4), n/a n/a n/a
services, ability of the
have in… the Police Asian (13) and leadership to address
Afro-barometers policies, etc. The surface
(49G) discrepancy may have to do
with the end of the
6. Get help from police Afro Barometer Inap- Inap- Inap- n/a n/a n/a insurgency vis-à-vis
when needed? 2 71 plicable plicable plicable government services. Needs

2
This question was asked in the 2005 survey: “Based on your experience, how difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do you never try
to get these services from government? C: help from the police when you need it. (4=very easy, 1=very difficult).
7. Difficulty in getting help Arab Barometer Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- Inap- more analysis.
from the police? 3 213 plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable plicable

8. Extrajudicial killings CIRI Index 0 0 Unpubl- 0 1 Unpub-

0=worst, ished lished
practiced
frequently; 1=
practiced
occasionally;
2=best, not
practiced at all
9. Criminalization/ Failed States 9.2 8.5 8.3 7.2 7.1 7.1
delegitimization of the Index, Fund for
state Peace (I.7)
0=best, 10=worst
F.III. Oversight of justice and security sector

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. Security sector operating Failed States 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
as a state within a state Index, Fund for
Peace (I.10) 9 8.3 8.5 7.3 6.8 6.8 In both countries, this
indicator would suggest
0=best, 10=worst
significant improvement, but
2. Corruption mechanisms Bertelsmann 15.3 4 Unpub- 4 2 Unpub- 4 the meaning of that
institutionalized 1 = best, 10= ished lished improvement cannot be
worst ascertained from this one
indicator alone. In the case
of Nepal, this movement
3. General government IMD World correlates well with E.VI.9.
transparency Competitive
Yearbook 2.3.12

3
The question asked: “ Based on your experience, how difficult is it to obtain the following administrative or social services from the
government?” One options was 4.” Get help from the police when you need it.”
 G. Personal Safety and Security
Perception of personal safety and security

Indicator Source/Scale Nepal Burundi Comments

1. State behavior violating Political Terror 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
physical integrity Scale
1=lowest level of 4.5 3.5 Unpubl- 4 4 Unpub-
terror; 5=highest ished lished
It would appear that Nepal
level of political has improved on the political
terror terror scale, which the next
2. Feel safe walking alone at Gallup World Poll 52% data point in the series
night in your community? (2008?) would be able to
verify. However, the lack of
3. Experienced fear, stress, Gallup World Poll data about perceptions of
safety, and the time lag in
worry a lot of the day obtaining data on homicides,
yesterday? small arms and other
4. Over the past year, how Afrobarometer Inap- Inap- Inap- n/a n/a n/a violence makes it difficult to
often, if ever, have you or 9B, C plicable plicable plicable capture any deterioration of
public security such as that
anyone in your family… B.
which has occurred in Nepal
had something stolen over the last two years. In
from your house, C. been light of the absence of data,
physically attacked? these figures could be vied in
5. In this country, how often Afrobarometer 47 Inap- Inap- Inap- n/a n/a n/a connection with B.II.19
(delegitimization of the
do people have to be plicable plicable plicable
state), and A. 4 (seriousness
careful of what they say of social conflicts) as a proxy,
about politics? although that too is not very
6. In your opinion, what are Afrobarometer 56 Inap- Inap- Inap- n/a n/a n/a satisfactory.l
the most important plicable plicable plicable
problems facing this
country that the There appears to be
government should additional correlation with
E.VI.9 and E.VII.1.
address? (one choice is
political violence)
7. # reported rapes per UNODC 0.76 Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub- Unpub-
100,000 women lished lished lished lished lished
 Appendix B: List of Data Sources

Geographic
Producer Index Time Coverage Methodology Data Source Comments
Coverage
Datasets Used for Indicators
Coverage is an issue. And only a
20 sub-Saharan few countries are covered in
Every 2-3 years; earliest
African countries each round.
poll was 1993, but
1 Afrobarometer Afrobarometer (No survey in [Survey] Survey Questions are good, but not all
earlier surveys had very
Ethiopia, Sudan, countries have exactly the same
few countries
DRC, Sierra Leone) Questions, so comparability is
questionable.
10 Arab countries
(five completed),
data not yet First survey in 2006, in
Only five countries so far
available for UAE, five countries; next
2 Arab Barometer Arab Barometer [Survey] Survey Also, questions may not be the
Yemen, Oman, Iraq, wave will add six
same in every countries.
Lebanon, Bahrain. countries
None on Egypt and
Saudi Arabia

First wave (2001-2003)

All major countries are covered
13 Asian countries for 8 countries; second
But like the others, different
3 Asianbarometer Asianbarometer and 5 South Asian wave (2005-2007) for [Survey] Survey
countries may not have the
countries 18 countries; third
same questions
wave being planned

125 transformation
Bertelsmann Bertelsmann countries. Does not Released every two [Survey] + [Expert] Survey w/Bertelsmann
4 Transformation Transformation include US, Canada, years; goes back to Survey w/Bertelsmann questionnaire questionnaire of country
Index Index (BTI) Western Europe, 2003 of country experts experts
Australia, Japan.

[Statistical Model]: Based results of

studies that identified factors strongly
Correlates of War Project,
correlated with major incidents of
Gleditsch 2002, PITF data,
instability in the past six decades,
Peace and Conflict Polity IV data, Penn World
CIDCM, University including: 1) Recent instability [PITF],
5 Instability Ledger 160+ countries 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008 Table, Uppsala Conflict Data,
of Maryland 2) country size dummy var., 3) regime
(PCIL) International Peace Research
consistency [Polity IV], 4) infant
Institute, World Bank World
mortality, 5) economic openness
Development Indicators
[(X+M)/GDP], 6) Militarization, 7)
Neighborhood War (Upssala, IPRI)
Appendix C: List of Data Sources 2

Geographic
Producer Index Time Coverage Methodology Data Source Comments
Coverage
[Expert]: At least two expert coders for State Department annual
each country meet with the CIRI staff, reports on human rights
then score the indicators based on practices, and Amnesty Relies on subjective coding, and
CIRI Human Rights CIRI Human Rights annually from 1981 - information from the State Dept International's country coders only read two sources, so
6 195 countries
Data Project Index 2007 annual reports on human rights reports, with the latter subjectivity and bias are big
practices, and country reports from treated as authoritative when issues.
Amnesty International there are conflicts between
the two

56 countries in the
latest version. Asia
and Eastern Europe
are best covered. Every 3-4 years. Pilot [Survey]: mainly surveys of experts,
Very little coverage phase in 2001-2002; organizations, population - but Mostly surveys; but also
7 CIVICUS Civil Society Index
in Africa, Middle Phase 2 in process 2008- combined with media monitoring and media reports
East and Latin 2010 existing quantitative data
America; North
America and Central
Asia are excluded

Econmist 167 countries

(missing a few like [Expert]: Survey of experts on 60
8 Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2006, 2008 Expert surveys
Somalia and multiple choice questions
(EIU)
Western Sahara)
foreign and domestic news
Scoring by experts are
[Expert]: Research analysts and reports, academic analyses,
subjective, and it's unclear if
academic advisers produce country nongovernmental
Freedom in the different sets of experts would
10 Freedom House 193 countries Annually, since 1972 reports and propose ratings, which are organizations, think tanks,
World score the same way; the system
then reviewed in a series of regional individual professional
enables cross-country
and then global meetings contacts, and visits to the
comparisons
region
[Expert/Software]
12 Indicators, each assessed by feeding Assumption is that if key
English, web-accessible information phrases appear more times in
Failed States Index (news, reports) through a software the English, electronic media,
11 Fund for Peace 177 countries Annually since 2005 Meltwater News Service
(FSI) that looks for "key phrases" associated then a given issue is more
with each indicator. The more severe or important.
coverage, the higher the score. Each
indicator is scored from 1 to 10.
Appendix C: List of Data Sources 3

Geographic
Producer Index Time Coverage Methodology Data Source Comments
Coverage
150 countries
[Survey]- random telephone interviews
Does not yet The most comprehensive global
Since 2005, in countries where phones are
12 Gallup Gallup World Poll include Bahrain, Survey survey available. Full results are
continuously updated common, and face to face interviews
Oman, Cote only accessible by subscription
where they are not
d'Ivoire, Libya, and
Turkmenistan
Bienen/van de Walle, Center
for Systemic Peace,
Appears to be updated Gurr/Harff, Minority aft Risk,
Good time and country coverage
GMU / Center for State Fragility Index annually, data goes [Expert] Assessments by academics Political Terror Scale, UNDP
13 162 countries Does not report margin of error
Systemic Peace & Related Datasets back to 1946 where based on available literature Human Development Report,
Weighting can be suspect
available UNDP Structure of Trade, US
Census Bureau Intl Database,
Polity IV, World Bank WDI
All major
independent states 1800-2007; appears to
GMU / Center for [Expert] Assessments by academics Published materials,
14 Polity IV dataset from 1800 to 2007 - be updated every few
Systemic Peace based on available literature unspecified
162 countries at this years
moment
55 countries

Missing: all of Africa

World outside S. Africa;
[Survey] of business executives + Surveys and other publicly
15 IMD Competitiveness most of Middle Annual, since 1989
looking at available public data available hard data
Yearbook East, East Europe,
Balkans, all of
Central Asia, much
of SE Asia.
Intl Institute of National governments; NATO;
16 Military Balance 170 countries Annually, since 2004 [Primary data]
Strategic Studies UN; OSCE; IMF
Military National governments; NATO;
17 SIPRI Expenditure 171 countries Annually, since 1988 [Primary data] UN; OSCE; IMF, secondary
Database sources that cite primary data
Appendix C: List of Data Sources 4

Geographic
Producer Index Time Coverage Methodology Data Source Comments
Coverage
Asian Development Bank,
African Development Bank,
Bertelsmann Transformation
Index, Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment,
Transparency Corruption [Composite] Combination of 13 Economist Intelligence Unit,
18 180 countries Annually since 1995
International Perception Index sources that measure corruption Freedom House, Global
Insight and Merchant
International Group; IMD,
Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy, and the World
Economic Forum
UN High
19 Commissioner on Refugee statistics 150+ countries Annually since 1994 [Primary data]
Refugees
86 countries Relies on countries to respond,
Survey of Crime so coverage is spotty. Even
Trends and Missing: almost all Now every two years, Data provided by national when countries do respond,
UN Office on Drug they may leave out important
20 Operations of of Africa; Brazil, used to be every five [Survey] governments to a survey,
and Crime stats; and there may be
Criminal Justice Russia, China, years, since 1970 which can be viewed online
Systems Indonesia, Pakistan, definitional issues that the
Iran, Saudi, UK, etc. country office may need to
h k
[Expert/Student]: Variables are coded
by trained grad and undergrad
Subjective coding, and system
284 groups and 118 students using open source info, then
University of Minority at Risk 1945 - present; updated Unspecified open source for reviewing coding decisions is
23 ethnopolitical reviewed by senior staff. Inter-coder
Maryland Project every 3 years or so information weak. Also, updated only once
organizations reliability has not been tested. Coders
every 3 years.
are "encouraged" to carry out their
own reliability and validity tests

[Expert/Student]: Staff and students State Department annual

Relies on subjective coding, and
assign scores to countries by reading reports on human rights
University of North Political Terror coders only read two sources, so
24 183 countries 1976-2007 State Department annual reports on practices, and Amnesty
Carolina Scale subjectivity and bias are big
human rights practices, and Amnesty International's country
issues.
International country reports reports

Global - all conflicts [Primary data] Uppsala/PRIO

Uppsala Conflict Annually updated, data researchers read primary and Unspecified primary and
25 Uppsala University that match their
Data Program goes back to 1946 secondary sources and count or secondary sources
definition
estimate the numbers
Appendix C: List of Data Sources 5

Geographic
Producer Index Time Coverage Methodology Data Source Comments
Coverage
140 countries Economist Intelligence Unit,
Expert Estimates, Uppsala
Missing: Pacific Conflict Data Program,
[Expert] A combination of existing
Islands, Sierra International Peace Research
Global Peace Index quantitative data and qualitative
26 Vision of Humanity Leone, Liberia, Annually since 2007 Institute in Oslo, UN Office of
(GPI) scores done by Economist Intelligence
Eritrea, Pacific Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
Unit analysts
Islands, but most International Institute of
major countries Strategic Studies (IISS)
covered.

Worldwide See website, too many to list,

212 countries and [Composite] Composite indicators
27 World Bank Governance Annually since 1996 including many sources listed
territories taken from a huge number of sources
Indicators here
World 153 economies and
28 World Bank Development 56 other smaller Annually, since 1960
Indicators economies
Country Policy and [Expert]: World Bank country staff
29 World Bank Institutional 76 countries Annually assign the scores, which then get Lacks transparency
Assessment reviewed by higher levels
[Survey]: Surveys of local experts
30 World Bank Doing Business 181 economies Annually, since 2003 including lawyers, business Surveys
consultants, accountants, government
officials etc
Every three years, since
31 World Bank Enterprise Survey 110 countries [Survey] Surveys
2002
Survey, IMF, World Bank, UN
Population Fund, Economist
Global
World Economic [Survey] of business executives + Intelligence Unit, World
32 Competitiveness 134 countries Annual, since 1979
Forum looking at available public data Health Organization, UNESCO,
Report
etc. - see report for complete
sources
Appendix C

Mozambique

South Africa
Sierra leone

Afghanistan

Bangladesh
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Zimbabwe

Tajikistan

Sri Lanka
Tanzania

Lebanon
Ethiopia

Armenia

Pakistan
Jamaica

Rwanda

Somalia
Burundi

Georgia
Senegal

Uganda
Guyana

Kosovo
Zambia
Nigeria
Guinea

Guinea

Liberia
Bissau

Malawi

Burma
Yemen
Chana

Serbia
Kenya

Sudan

Nepal
OPTs

India
CAR

DRC
Latest

Cd'l

BiH
Source Source Link
data

http://www.pcr.uu.se/resea
Uppsala/UCDP rch/UCDP/data_and_publica 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
tions/datasets.htm

World
Development 2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Indicators

http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ Years
PITF pitf/pitfdata.htm
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Vary

http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-
Bertelsmann index.de/fileadmin/pdf/An 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
lagen_BTI_2008/Detailed_
Results_BTI2008.xls

World
2.5=best
Governance -2.5=worst
2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Indicators
World Bank http://go.worldbank.org/S2T
HWI1X60
2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CPIA Criterion
UNICEF/WHO Latest
Global Water Data
and Sanitation varies
2000- X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Report; World
2007
Development
Indicators
Failed States http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/web/index.php?option=co
Index/Fund for m_content&task=view&id=9
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Peace 9&Itemid=146

State Failure
Index, Center for http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity06.htm
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Systemic Peace
based on Polity

http://www.afrobarometer.
Afrobarometer org/questionnaires.html
2008 X X X X X X X X X X

EIU Democracy http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF

Index Freedom /Democracy%20Index%2020 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
08.pdf
House
Gallup World
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Poll
Failed States http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/web/index.php?option=co
Index, Fund for m_content&task=view&id=9
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Peace 9&Itemid=141

http://www.civicus.org/csi/p
2003-
CIVICUS hase-one/csi-country- X X X X X X X X X X X
reports 2006

SIPRI, The http://www.sipri.org/databa

ses/milex
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Military Balance

SIPRI, The http://www.sipri.org/databa

ses/milex
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Military Balance
2005-
UNODC 2006
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Global Peace http://www.visionofhumanit

Index (collected y.org/gpi/results/rankings/2 2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
008/
by EIU)

World Bank http://www.doingbusiness.o

rg/ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Doing Business

World Bank
http://www.enterprisesurve Years
Enterprises ys.org/
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
vary
Survey
 Mozambique

South Africa
Sierra leone

Afghanistan

Bangladesh
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Zimbabwe

Tajikistan

Sri Lanka
Tanzania

Lebanon
Ethiopia

Armenia

Pakistan
Jamaica

Rwanda

Somalia
Burundi

Georgia
Senegal

Uganda
Guyana

Kosovo
Zambia
Nigeria
Guinea

Guinea

Liberia
Bissau

Malawi

Burma
Yemen
Chana

Serbia
Kenya

Sudan

Nepal
OPTs

India
CAR

DRC
Latest

Cd'l

BiH
Source Source Link
data

Freedom House,
Freedom in the 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
World
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu
Minorities at Risk /mar/assessments.asp?regio 2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
nId=99

Failed States http://www.fundforpeace.or

g/web/index.php?option=co
Index/Fund for m_content&task=view&id=9
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Peace 9&Itemid=145

IMD World http://www.imd.ch/research

Competitive /publications/wcy/list_of_co 2009 X
untries.cfm
Yearbook
http://www.arabbarometer.
Arab Barometer org/reports/countryreports/ 2006 X
comparisonresutls06.html

Transparency
http://www.transparency.or
Int’l - Corruption g/news_room/in_focus/200 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Perceptions 8/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table
Index
http://www.asianbarometer
Years
Asian Barometer .org/newenglish/surveys/Sur X X X X X
veyResults.htm Vary
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/
CIRI Index myciri/my_ciri.asp
2006 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Political Terror http://www.politicalterrorsc

ale.org/
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Scale
Appendix D

Mozambique

South Africa
Sierra leone

Afghanistan

Bangladesh
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Zimbabwe

Tajikistan

Sri Lanka
Tanzania

Lebanon
Ethiopia

Armenia

Pakistan
Jamaica

Rwanda

Somalia
Burundi

Georgia
Senegal

Uganda
Guyana

Kosovo
Zambia
Nigeria
Guinea

Guinea

Liberia
Bissau

Malawi

Burma
Yemen
Chana

Serbia
Kenya

Sudan

Nepal
OPTs

India
CAR

DRC
Latest

Cd'l

BiH
Source Source Link
data

http://www.pcr.uu.se/resea
Uppsala/UCDP rch/UCDP/data_and_publica 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
tions/datasets.htm

World
Development 2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Indicators

http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ Years
PITF pitf/pitfdata.htm
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Vary

http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-
Bertelsmann index.de/fileadmin/pdf/An 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
lagen_BTI_2008/Detailed_
Results_BTI2008.xls

World
2.5=best
Governance -2.5=worst
2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Indicators
World Bank http://go.worldbank.org/S2T
HWI1X60
2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CPIA Criterion
UNICEF/WHO Latest
Global Water Data
and Sanitation varies
2000- X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Report; World
2007
Development
Indicators
Failed States http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/web/index.php?option=co
Index/Fund for m_content&task=view&id=9
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Peace 9&Itemid=146

State Failure
Index, Center for http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity06.htm
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Systemic Peace
based on Polity

http://www.afrobarometer.
Afrobarometer org/questionnaires.html
2008 X X X X X X X X X X

EIU Democracy http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF

Index Freedom /Democracy%20Index%2020 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
08.pdf
House
Gallup World
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Poll
Failed States http://www.fundforpeace.or
g/web/index.php?option=co
Index, Fund for m_content&task=view&id=9
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Peace 9&Itemid=141

http://www.civicus.org/csi/p
2003-
CIVICUS hase-one/csi-country- X X X X X X X X X X X
reports 2006

SIPRI, The http://www.sipri.org/databa

ses/milex
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Military Balance

SIPRI, The http://www.sipri.org/databa

ses/milex
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Military Balance
2005-
UNODC 2006
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Global Peace http://www.visionofhumanit

Index (collected y.org/gpi/results/rankings/2 2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
008/
by EIU)

World Bank http://www.doingbusiness.o

rg/ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Doing Business

World Bank
http://www.enterprisesurve Years
Enterprises ys.org/
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
vary
Survey
 Mozambique

South Africa
Sierra leone

Afghanistan

Bangladesh
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Zimbabwe

Tajikistan

Sri Lanka
Tanzania

Lebanon
Ethiopia

Armenia

Pakistan
Jamaica

Rwanda

Somalia
Burundi

Georgia
Senegal

Uganda
Guyana

Kosovo
Zambia
Nigeria
Guinea

Guinea

Liberia
Bissau

Malawi

Burma
Yemen
Chana

Serbia
Kenya

Sudan

Nepal
OPTs

India
CAR

DRC
Latest

Cd'l

BiH
Source Source Link
data

Freedom House,
Freedom in the 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
World
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu
Minorities at Risk /mar/assessments.asp?regio 2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
nId=99

Failed States http://www.fundforpeace.or

g/web/index.php?option=co
Index/Fund for m_content&task=view&id=9
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Peace 9&Itemid=145

IMD World http://www.imd.ch/research

Competitive /publications/wcy/list_of_co 2009 X
untries.cfm
Yearbook
http://www.arabbarometer.
Arab Barometer org/reports/countryreports/ 2006 X
comparisonresutls06.html

Transparency
http://www.transparency.or
Int’l - Corruption g/news_room/in_focus/200 2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Perceptions 8/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table
Index
http://www.asianbarometer
Years
Asian Barometer .org/newenglish/surveys/Sur X X X X X
veyResults.htm Vary
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/
CIRI Index myciri/my_ciri.asp
2006 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Political Terror http://www.politicalterrorsc

ale.org/
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Scale