1970s & 1980s SCOTUS cases

Michelle Bai
1. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education (1969)
a) Facts of the Case: In the case Brown v. Board of Education, Justice Felix demanded
that the opinion order desegregation at deliberate speed. Since the phrase is
somewhat contradictor, the South sought excuses to de! this law. For !i!teen ears,
schools in the South remained segregated. In the summer o! "#$#, the appeals court
as%ed the &nited States 'epartment o! (ealth, )ducation, and *el!are +()*) to
submit desegregation plans !or ,, school districts in Mississippi, so that said
department could implement integration at the beginning o! the new school ear. ()*
was responsible !or these desegregation plans, as declared b the -i.il /ights 0ct o!
"#$12 these plans were submitted on time. 0t the last minute, howe.er, both ()* and
the Justice 'epartment as%ed the courts !or extensions until 'ecember "
st
, claiming
that the new plans would result in setbac%s. Justice (ugo Blac% recogni3ed this dela
as 4ixon5s pao!! to the South, as part o! the Southern Strateg that helped 4ixon
win the presidential election. It was Blac% that ad.ised the 400-6 to bring the case to
the Supreme -ourt.
b) Issue: Should southern schools be !orced to desegregate at the !ederal go.ernment5s
orders7
c) Decision & Reasoning:
i. 8 .otes !or 0lexander, 9 .otes against
ii. :he -ourt ruled in !a.or o! 0lexander and declared that the schools were to be
desegregated. Justice (ugo Blac%, the ;ustice who e.entuall deli.ered the o.erall
ma;orit opinion, recogni3ed that allowing an dela was a signal to the South to
!urther dela desegregation2 he suggested a short, simple order mandating
immediate integration. ).entuall, a ma;orit o! ;ustices agreed on re.ersing the
appeals court5s decision to grant a dela in the submissions. :he -ourt wrote that
the dual school sstem, which re!erred to the separate but e<ual schools, was
to be terminated at once, and that onl unitar schools were to be operated
therea!ter. Southerners could no longer use the phrase deliberate speed to
!urther stall an e!!orts to desegregate.
d) Evaluation of the Case: 0s this case has shown, despite the landmar% decision o!
Brown v. Board of Education, e!!orts to desegregate were o!ten delaed in order to
preser.e the southern wa o! li!e. It was still di!!icult to grant 0!rican 0mericans the
!undamental rights the deser.ed and were granted. It was not until this case was
desegregation !orce!ull implemented in schools, and now that the contradictor
phrase deliberate speed was shot down, the South could no longer use this as
;usti!ication to dela integration. Since this case stated that all schools were to be
desegregated in a timel manner, 0!rican 0mericans gained their unalienable rights as
0merican citi3ens. :he were not being treated e<uall. :his extremel liberal decision
elicited anger !rom the opponents o! the *arren -ourt. Senator Strom :hurmond !rom
South -arolina and 0labama =o.ernor =eorge *allace praised 6resident 4ixon !or his
attempts to stall desegregation and compared the Burger -ourt to the *arren -ourt.
. !wann v. C"arlotte#$ec%len&ur' Board of Education (19(1)
a) Facts of the Case: :he -harlotte>Mec%lenburg Board o! )ducation5s school sstem
consists o! about ?99 s<uare miles. 'uring the "#$8>"#$# school ear, the sstem
ser.ed more than 81,999 students. @! these 81,999, A"B o! the students were white
and C#B o! the students were blac%. 0pproximatel two>thirds o! the 0!rican
0merican population in the school was entirel blac% or ##B blac%. 6ursuant to an
order o! a !ederal district court, the school board adopted a desegregation plan !or
elementar schools that included grouping C or , outling schools with one inner>cit
blac% school and transporting blac% students to the white schools and white children to
the blac% schools.
b) Issue: *ere !ederal courts constitutionall authori3ed to o.ersee and produce remedies
!or state>imposed segregation7
c) Decision & Reasoning:
i. # .otes !or -harlotte>Mec%lenburg Board o! )ducation, 9 .otes against
ii. :he -ourt ruled in !a.or o! the -harlotte>Mec%lenburg Board o! )ducation. In
de!ault b the school authorities o! their a!!irmati.e obligation to extend
acceptable remedies, the district courts ha.e broad power to !ashion remedies that
will assure unitar school sstems. 6olic and practice with regard to !acult,
sta!!, transportation, extracurricular acti.ities, and !acilities are among the most
important indications o! a segregated sstem and the !irst remedial responsibilit
o! school authorities is to eliminate in.idious racial distinctions in those respects.
:he -ourt ruled thatD remedial plans were ;udged b their e!!ecti.eness and that
the uses o! mathematical ratios or <uotas were legitimate starting points !or
solutions, predominantl or exclusi.el blac% schools re<uired close scrutin b
courts, non>contiguous attendance 3ones were within the courts5 remedial powers,
and no rigid guidelines could be established concerning the busing o! students to
certain schools.
d) Evaluation of the Case: :his case !urthers the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education regarding the unconstitutionalit o! racial segregation in public schools. In
particular, in this case, the Supreme -ourt e.aluated a local school district5s plan to
achie.e racial integration. :he Supreme -ourt held that busing and racial <uotas were
acceptable tools in tring to achie.e racial desegregation. :his decision expands
indi.iduals5 rights as it allows 0!rican 0mericans to be treated e<uall in relation to
whites2 now, with these cases, the can !inall be treated li%e 0merican citi3ens and
not second class citi3ens. Moreo.er, li%e Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education, this case exempli!ied the segregation that occurred in the South e.en a!ter
the ruling o! Brown v. Board of Education2 it highlighted the social issues and ci.il
rights oppression that acti.el continued.
). *ew +or% ,imes v. -! (19(1)
a) Facts of the Case: :he 6entagon 6apers, o!!iciall %nown as (istor o! &.S.
'ecision>Ma%ing 6rocess on Eiet 4am 6olic, were illegall copied and lea%ed to the
press. :he *ew +or% ,imes and the .as"in'ton /ost obtained these documents. 0cting
at the go.ernment5s re<uest, the &nited States district court in 4ew For% issued a
temporar in;unction, a court order, which directed the *ew +or% ,imes not to publish
the 6entagon 6apers. :he go.ernment claimed that the publication o! the papers would
endanger the securit o! the &nited States. :he *ew +or% ,imes appealed the order to
the &nited States Supreme -ourt, arguing that prior restraint, the pre.ention o!
publication, .iolated the First 0mendment.
b) Issue: 'id the 4ixon administration5s e!!orts to pre.ent the publication o! what it
deemed classi!ied in!ormation .iolate the First 0mendment7
c) Decision & Reasoning:
i. $ .otes !or *ew +or% ,imes, , .otes against
ii. :he -ourt ruled in !a.or o! the *ew +or% ,imes. In the ;udgment, the -ourt cited a
pre.ailing precedent, nothingD 0n sstem o! prior restraints o! expression
comes to this -ourt bearing a hea. presumption against its constitutional
.alidit. In other words, the -ourt would not be !a.orabl disposed to sti!ling the
press on the order o! the go.ernment. Justices Blac% and 'ouglas argued that the
extremel .ague word o! securit should not be used to abrogate the
!undamental law embodied in the First 0mendment. Justice Brennan reasoned
that publication would not cause a direct, immediate e.ent imperiling the sa!et o!
0merican !orces. In this wa, the use o! prior restraint was un;usti!ied.
d) Evaluation of the Case: Similar to *ew +or% ,imes v. !ullivan (1960), this case
expanded -onstitutional guarantees o! the !reedom o! speech and the press2 .ague
terms could no longer be used to pre.ent documents !rom publication. :he signi!icance
o! this case and the wor%ing o! the Justices5 opinions ha.e added important statements
to the histor o! precedents !or exceptions to the First 0mendment, which ha.e been
cited in numerous Supreme -ourt cases since. For example, in the spring o! C999, a
:exas district court ;udge ordered the 0ssociated 6ress +06) not to publish a stor
about a state>guaranteed loan to a :exas shrimp !arm. Gawers !or the 06 cited this
case in their argument. :he ;udge li!ted the order a!ter two das o! hearings.
0. 1oe v. .ade (19())
a) Facts of the Case: Gegislation in :exas made it league to abort a !etus unless the
mother5s li!e was in danger. Jane /oe, single and pregnant, wanted an abortion. 0t
!irst, she said that the pregnanc was caused b rape, but the police did not !ind an
e.idence indicating that she was raped. /oe attempted to get an illegal abortion2
howe.er, the police shut the !acilit down. *ith her attorne, /oe <uestioned the
constitutionalit o! the :exas law. 'allas -ount 'istrict 0ttorne (enr *ade
de!ended the law rigorousl. Its counterpart, 2oe v. Bolton, pertained to the
constitutionalit o! a similar abortion law in =eorgia.
b) Issue: 'oes the -onstitution embrace a woman5s right to terminate her pregnanc7
'oes the 'ue 6rocess clause maintain a woman5s right to an abortion and her pri.ac7
c) Decision & Reasoning:
i. A .otes !or /oe, C .otes against
ii. :he -ourt ruled in !a.or o! /oe. :he right to an abortion, the ;udges ruled,
maintained b the 'ue 6rocess, as was a woman5s right to pri.ac. :his right to
pri.ac was originall recogni3ed in 3riswold v. Connecticut and is protected b
the Fourteenth 0mendment. 'espite the women5s authorit to choose whether or
not to recei.e an abortion, this !ree choice must also be balanced with the
state5s abilit to regulate abortions through protection o! the mother and the !etus.
Moreo.er, the court decided that the abilit to ha.e an abortion depended on what
trimester the woman was in. In the !irst control, the woman in <uestion has
complete control, but the state can institute regulations in the second trimester and
in the third trimester.
d) Evaluation: 1oe v. .ade is extremel signi!icant, because while it rea!!irms a
woman5s right to pri.ac, which was originall established in 3riswold v. Connecticut.
For the !irst time, it gi.es all women to the right to ha.e an abortion, which can be
especiall help!ul in cases o! rape assault, poor li.ing conditions, and other
circumstances in which an abortion would be considered !a.orable. :his case can be
considered sound as not all pregnancies are desired, and there are .alid reasons !or
single, pregnant women to want to ha.e their !etus aborted. :his, similar to pre.ious
court cases, supports indi.idual rights and a!!ects man states5 abortion laws. *omen
are no longer obligated to ha.e children i! the do not want to, which expands
indi.idual rights greatl.
4. -! v. *ixon (19(0)
a) Facts of the Case: 'ue to the *atergate scandal, the !i.e men who illegall entered
the '4- head<uarters in *ashington, '.-. were arrested. :hese men were in.ol.ed in
-/))6, the -ommittee to /)>)lect the 6resident. Still, 4ixon continued to den an
in.ol.ement in the scandal, but when it was disco.ered that he secretl taped
con.ersations held in his o!!ice, 4ixon was as%ed to release the tapes. 4ixon re!used,
as he belie.ed executi.e pri.ilege could pre.ent him !rom releasing the tapes. Instead
o! releasing the tapes in their entiret, 4ixon onl released certain portions, which
caused a prosecutor to demand that 4ixon release them. :his issue was presented
be!ore the Supreme -ourt.
b) Issue: Is the 6residentHs right to sa!eguard certain in!ormation, using his Iexecuti.e
pri.ilegeI con!identialit power, entirel immune !rom ;udicial re.iew7
c) Decision & Reasoning:
i. 8 .otes !or &nited States, 9 .otes against
ii. :he -ourt ruled that the president5s executi.e power was limited, which meant
that he could not simpl ignore the prosecutor5s subpoena !or the tapes. :he
;udges belie.ed that expanding the president5s executi.e power could potentiall
o.erpower the Supreme -ourt5s dut. 4ixon, in this wa, was !orced to surrender
the tapes. Moreo.er, 4ixon5s reasoning that the tapes would cause immediate
danger was shot down as a ;udge explained that the release o! these tapes would
not cause an e.ent that would harm the 0merican armed !orces.
d) Evaluation of the Case: -! v. *ixon can be considered a landmar% Supreme -ourt
case as it led to the e.entual resignation o! 6resident 4ixon. Since the ;udges decided
that a president5s executi.e power was limited, an !uture 0merican president would
be limited b this case. In this wa, the argument can be considered sound as 4ixon
attempted to sweep a crime under the rug, and he re!used to gi.e up the .er tapes that
would incriminate him. :his case established the !act that e.en though he was
6resident o! the &nited States o! 0merica, he was still re<uired to abide b the
subpoena. Moreo.er, this case rea!!irmed the purpose o! the chec%s and balances set
!orth b this countr5s !ounding !athers. 0dditionall, this case expanded indi.idual
rights as it establishes that the people ha.e a right to %now in!ormation that would ha.e
been otherwise been destroed.
6. 1e'ents of t"e -niversity of California v. Ba%%e (19(5)
a) Facts of the Case: 0llan Ba%%e, a ,? ear>old -aucasian, applied at the &ni.ersit o!
-ali!ornia Medical School at 'a.is. :wice he was re;ected due to his race. :he
&ni.ersit o! -ali!ornia put aside "$ seats out o! "99 seats !or accepted minorit
students. (owe.er, a!ter Ba%%e learned that minorit candidates with lower
<uali!ications were admitted to a medical school, he !iled suit. :hese reser.ed spaces
were !or disad.antaged applicants. :he -ali!ornia Supreme -ourt ordered the
school, the state>run &ni.ersit o! -ali!ornia, to admit Ba%%e. :he uni.ersit, as a
result, appealed to the &nited States Supreme -ourt.
b) Issue: 'id the &ni.ersit o! -ali!ornia .iolate the Fourteenth 0mendmentHs e<ual
protection clause, and the -i.il /ights 0ct o! "#$1, b practicing an a!!irmati.e action
polic that resulted in the repeated re;ection o! Ba%%eHs application !or admission to its
medical school7
c) Decision & Reasoning:
i. ? .otes !or Ba%%e, 1 .otes against him. @riginall, the .ote was split 1 .otes
against 1 .otes, which made it dependent upon Justice 6owell5s decision.
ii. :he court a!!irmed the ;udgment ordering Ba%%e5s admission to the medical
school o! the &ni.ersit o! -ali!ornia at 'a.is and in.alidated the school5s special
admission program. (owe.er, the -ourt did not prohibit the school !rom
considering a race as a !actor in !uture admissions decisions. Justice Gewis
6owell, Jr., wrote that the guarantee o! )<ual 6rotection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one indi.idual and something else when applied to a person o!
another color.
d) Evaluation of the Case: 1e'ents of t"e -niversity of California v. Ba%%e was a
signi!icant case because it con!irmed that allotting a number o! seats !or a speci!ic rate
in the school admissions process was unconstitutional. Similar to decisions pre.ious to
it, this case protected indi.idual rights since people could no longer be re;ected on the
grounds o! race and based on the !act that a certain number o! spots were set aside !or
people at a disad.antage. :his case establishes a !airer process !or college admission.
In ,exas v. Ho6wood (1996), a !ederal appeals court !ound that a &ni.ersit o! :exas
a!!irmati.e action program .iolated the rights o! white applicants. (owe.er, since the
court assumed that the Ba%%e decision was no longer legall sound, it explicitl ruled
that the law school ma not use race as a !actor in law school admissions.