Regional Powers and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within Regional

Security Complexes
Derrick V. Frazier
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois, Urbana- Champaign
361 Lincoln Hall
702 S. Wright St.
Urbana, Il 61801
dvfrazie@uiuc.edu
and
Robert Stewart-Ingersoll
Department of Political Science
Grand Valley State University
Allendale, MI 49401
616-331-8713
ingersor@gvsu.edu
Prepared for the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA,
March 26-29, 2008
Abstract
In this paper we propose a framework for understanding order within Regional Security
Complexes (RSCs), focused upon the importance of regional powers. We argue that there are
three factors one must consider to adequately explain regional security, with respect to the
influence of regional powers: structure, regional power roles and regional power orientations.
The first factor emphasizes the necessary but not sufficient attributes of power and capability in
the regional system in understanding its security dynamics. The last two factors stress the
importance of regional power behavior as being critical to the security process. To this end we
highlight three specific roles and sets of orientations that when examined in the context of
structural factors, provide a clearer picture of regional security orders in RSCs.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a regional framework for understanding international security,
focusing on the importance of regional powers in the development and maintenance of security
orders within Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). Our primary contention is that the
importance of structure needs to be matched analytically with the roles and foreign policy
orientations that regional powers take on. In other words, the outcome of security interactions
within RSCs is both a function of its structure and its regional power(s) behavior. Such a
framework, we believe, will further the development of theories regarding regional security,
providing opportunities to create systematic, testable hypotheses on how both structural and
behavioral factors affect regional security orders. Thus, this regional power approach can help
explain the variation in regional dynamics we empirically observe in RSCs, making it a useful
analytical tool for international security research.
Given the need to fully explicate our approach, this paper does not seek to test the claims
being made. Rather, we intend to demonstrate that such claims merit empirical research and
represent a coherent framework capable of moving forward our knowledge of regional and
international security. The remainder of this paper presents the framework and is divided into six
sections. First, we begin with a brief discussion of RSCs and the importance of regional powers
1
as they pertain to security interactions. We move next to a discussion of security orders, the
outcome of dynamic interactions within the RSC. From there, the next three sections explore the
heart of the proposed framework.
Regional security orders within RSCs, we contend, are driven to a significant degree by
three explanatory variables: regional structure, regional power roles and regional power
orientations. The latter two, we believe, have been largely ignored in building a comprehensive,
theoretical approach to security and thus represent our direct contribution to the security
literature. Consistent with RSC definitions and current neo-realist literature, we infer structure to
include both the level and distribution of material capabilities necessary to affect security. We
define regional power roles in at least three different capacities: leadership, custodianship and
protection. The emphasis on roles extends extant research on security, building off of older
security concepts such as those involving foreign policy behaviors. Finally, we define orientation
in three dimensions as they relate to the following regional system preferences: status quo,
cooperation, and long-term design. The last section concludes the paper with a recap of the
overall framework as well as an examination of how this framework can be useful in generating
and answering various research questions relevant for the current and future study of RSCs.
RSCs and Regional Powers
Work on regionalism and regional security has a long history. The concept in some form
can be identified in the works of many scholars in the field throughout the 20
th
and 21
st
centuries
(e.g. Wight, 1946; Thompson, 1973; Lebovic, 1985; Solingen, 1998). Recently, however, there
has been very little thorough discussion of regionalism in IR beyond political economic concerns
and area specific security. We agree with Lemkes (2002: 60) assessment that this in large part
2
has been due to a failure to specify objective criteria for defining regions and sub-systems.
Works such as Lemkes and Buzan and Waever (2003) represent exceptions to this observation.
Alas, books such as these, despite their conceptualization and operationalization of regional
structures have still inspired far fewer empirical studies than what we generally think would be
useful for understanding regional security dynamics across the globe. More pertinent to this
study, they have also not established a systematic approach to identify regional powers, explicate
their roles, assess their orientations and explain how these all impact the security order in their
regions.
To do this, we take Buzan and Waevers identification of Regional Security Complexes
as our starting point. We do so because unlike simple definitions of regions based on geography,
RSCs allow us to focus upon groupings of states whose actions dominate the security
considerations of other member states. Buzan and Waever (2003: 44) define a regional security
complex as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both
are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart
from one another. Lake and Morgan (1997: 12) echo this description by emphasizing the
importance of security externalities that bind members of a region together, such that the
members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any member, and significant
security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on the others. We
prefer Buzan and Waevers definition, however, as it highlights the high degree of security
interdependence, the process of constructing security concerns and methods for which to deal
with them among member states. This high level of interaction and the inseparability of security
considerations points toward a functioning system that can be systematically identified. The lack
3
of such a reasonable claim about most states at the global level thus points toward the particular
relevance of RSCs as a proper level of focus.
The major contribution of this study that separates it from other regional security work is
the inclusion of the salience of regional powers for understanding security dynamics within a
regional system. It is our contention that regional powers play a significant role in both the
internal dynamics of their region, in our case their RSC, as well as in their regions relationship
with the broader global system. While we concur with Lake and Morgan about the security
externalities created by all members of an RSC, we contend that the influence of regional powers
will have a unique significance for the RSC. As such, their attributes and/or actions constitute
additional independent variables to consider alongside structure as affecting security orders in an
RSC.
<Insert chart 1 about here>
Chart 1 presents an overview of our proposed framework and where regional power
behavior fits in the context of regional security. We believe that regional powers are necessary to
discuss in this framework for two reasons. First, similar to neorealist arguments regarding major
powers, these states are the most likely candidates to have both the interest and the capability to
involve themselves extensively in the development of a security order in their particular region.
Second, unlike neorealist arguments, we are convinced that capability alone does not determine
security orders. As the most influential and strongest states, what regional powers do with their
capability will have substantive implications for the security environment. Thus, understanding
their behavior through roles and foreign policy orientations provides a clearer picture of how a
security order is shaped in the context of structure, not simply because of it.
4
There are significant differences, however, in discussing the capabilities of regional
powers compared to global ones. Since the early 1970s there has been the realization that
military power and dominance were no longer the most accurate yardsticks with which to judge
how nations were able to effect beneficial outcomes in foreign affairs, (Stoll and Ward, 1989:
2). Additionally, with a focus on regional integration from the 1970s through 1990s, integration
theorists have discussed power multi-dimensionally in the context of requirements for political
and economic cooperation (e.g. Barrea, 1973; Cantori and Spiegel, 1973; Keohane and Nye,
1977). We believe these observations are even more relevant to understanding regional power.
In light of these arguments that call for a re-conceptualization of power, we contend that regional
powers should not be identified solely on the basis of aggregate military or economic
capabilities, but also on their performance in executing various roles that link regional actors
together on the basis of security issues. This behavior clearly requires some minimum level of
capability beyond which certain states can attempt to occupy a place at the top of their regional
hierarchy. It is the performance of these roles, and the manner in which they are performed
though, that we consider paramount to explaining the influence of states at or near the apex of
regional structures.
In sum, regional power capability and behavior within RSCs represents the principle
component of our proposed framework. Below we discuss in greater detail how these behaviors
are central to understanding security orders. We begin by examining the various security orders
that might exist within RSCs.
Regional Security Orders
5
Both structure and process figure into determining the security dynamics that define an
RSC. Our contention is that particular states within those RSCs will drive both the structure and
process to a disproportionate extent. While structure and process will be dynamic variables over
time, consistent patterns in each should lead toward a certain type of regional order, the outcome
variable of our proposed framework.
Buzan and Waever (2003) describe the general security dynamics of an RSC as ranging
along a continuum of enmity and amity, and falling into the three categories of conflict
formation, security regime, and security community. These three classifications are determined
essentially by the degree to which member states anticipate and plan for violent conflicts, and the
extent to which mutually agreed upon rules of conduct restrain the use of violence when disputes
arise. They acknowledge that these three classifications generally correspond to Wendts (1999)
Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anarchy, which focus upon the generalized manner
in which system members view others within their system: as enemy, rival, or friend. The
degree to which regional cultures have been socialized toward more conflictual or cooperative
orientations is an ultimate outcome of the interactions of RSC members, largely influenced by
regional powers.
Morgans (1997: 33) classification of the regional security order, however, focuses more
upon patterns of management that can provide a modicum of security than upon dimensions
of friendship or difference. He asserts that one should set aside other dimensions of
difference and start instead with a conception of management options open to RSCs, using this as
a basis for comparative analysis. Using this typology as the outcome variable, the analyst is
able to make use of the amity-enmity continuum as well as other process-related descriptions in
two important ways. First, these regional dynamics may play a large role in the selection of
6
particular types of regional security orders. Such patterns will surely shape both the roles that
regional powers play as well as their orientations in doing so, and will be captured in more in
depth analyses of the behavior of regional powers. Second, having made such management
decisions, these dynamics may illuminate degrees of success or failure in creating regional
security. It may be that certain regional security orders are more conducive to conflict or
cooperation at the regional level, for example.
We therefore find Morgans use of management classifications as a useful tool in
understanding the particular influence that regional powers have upon the security dynamics of
an RSC. After all, it is because of their substantial involvement as leaders, custodians and
protectors of such security orders that regional powers are afforded a unique influence. Morgan
designates security orders as hierarchical to include the following: power restraining power,
great-power concert, collective security, pluralistic security community, and integration. We
borrow Morgans term regional security order to identify the outcome that RSC power
distribution, regional power role and regional power orientation create, but differ with respect to
two factors.
First, we find no objective reason to treat these security orders as rungs on a ladder up
which regional security complexes may climb as they pursue security management, (Morgan,
1997: 33). Such an ordinal classification would be appropriate for the classification schemes of
Buzan and Waever (2003) or Wendt (1999) as these categories imply levels of security
attainment. As stated above though, the successfulness of differing regional security orders at
achieving higher levels of accommodation and de-securitization is really an empirical question.
It is also one that is likely to be particularly influenced by the orientations that regional powers
demonstrate. Thus we simply provide a framework through which we can understand the part
7
that regional powers play in determining regional security orders here, and leave judgments on
the efficacy of such orders for subsequent analyses.
Second, while we clearly are influenced by Morgans typology, we do find some of his
classifications to be difficult to distinguish between in practice. For instance, the distinction
between collective security, pluralistic security community, and integration seem to us to be
marginal. Moreover, the latter two tilt toward focusing upon levels of cooperation and amity,
rather than management techniques. We therefore modify this typology to include five possible
ideal designations of regional security order in an RSC: hegemonic, collective security, power
restraining power, concert, and unstructured. Each of these classifications is quite distinct from
the others in form, and depending upon the distinctive manner in which they are influenced by
their member states (particularly their regional powers) and their interactions, they will have
varying influences on securitization and de-securitization of regions.
The classification of an RSC as demonstrating a hegemonic security order implies that
one state has such a preponderance of structural strength that it is capable of creating and
maintaining essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the
international system, (Volgy and Bailin, 2003: 41). Chase-Dunn et al. (1994: 365) point out
that this sort of structural leadership implies that hegemony is the capability of a state to lead
the system of states itself in a desired directionin ways that buttress rather than undermine the
world power of the hegemon. Hegemony then, is distinct from unipolarity in that it moves
beyond calculations of relative capabilities (Wilkinson, 1997). It implies a relationship between
hegemon and system (for us, the regional system), based upon a certain dominating behavior on
the part of the central power. Therefore, a concentration of power in a single regional state will
not be sufficient to qualify an RSC as hegemonic.
8
A collective security designation for an RSC implies that states agree to abide by
certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop
aggression, (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995: 398). This security order involves all members of
the RSC in a mutual agreement that forswears aggression against one another, and accedes that
violations of this agreement represent an attack on all. The objective is to create a
preponderance of force against any would-be aggressor such that it is irrational to act violently
toward any other member state. In practice, this type of security order will likely be one part of a
broader institutional framework that seeks to promote cooperation, provide conditions for
increased security, and manage conflicts that do arise.
In an RSC that is designated by order created through power restraining power, states
pursue security primarily via establishment and maintenance of what they consider a suitable
or stable distribution of power, (Morgan, 1997: 33). In RSCs whose structure is either bipolar
or multipolar, this order will present itself in traditional balance of power terms. In other words,
self-interested states will build up conventional strength through internal arms buildups and/or
coalition building such that no state has sufficient strength to make aggression rationally feasible.
Mearsheimer (1990: 18) explains, imbalances in such a power distribution invite war by
increasing the potential for successful aggression. However, it may be different from balance of
power in that a power restraining power order could be unipolar, where a single state has a
sufficient preponderance of power to deter aggression by other members, but lacks the sort of
structural influence that is implied by the hegemonic classification. It is the primary reliance
upon conventional methods of deterrence or compellence with the maintenance of a particular
distribution of power as the goal that distinguishes this type of order from others.
9
A concert system is one in which the most powerful states in a region band together to
maintain stability. These states will meet with some level of regularity, and will cooperatively
determine how to address threats to regional security. Morgan (1997: 34-35) explains that these
powerful states derive their legitimacy by providing order and security for all RSC members.
They do so while maintaining a competitive posture toward one another. But they temper the
self-help dynamic in an effort to maintain a degree of system stability, distinguishing the concert
system from a balance of power dynamic. Kupchan and Kupchan (1995) contend that this type
of order fits within the scope of collective security. It may be that correspondence with system
norms and the preponderant deterrence against destabilization make the two similar. We contend
though, that it is important to distinguish between the universal quality that is described above as
collective security and the exclusive role that large powers play in a concert system.
The final security order that we use designates an RSC as unstructured. Here it is
essentially the lack of a consistent means for managing regional security that is the defining
characteristic. Buzan and Waever (2003) use this term to describe a region in which either of two
conditions is present:
First, where local states have such low capability that their power does not
project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and, second, where
geographical insulation makes interaction difficult (for example, islands
separated by large expanses of ocean) (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 62).
They actually do not designate such areas as regional security complexes because they argue that
the lack of interactions within such regions does not create sufficient security interdependence.
While this may be true for the latter point, we do not necessarily agree that this is true for the
former. It may be that internal instability within a regional member state may create negative
security externalities for other members of the region (Lake, 1997). This could be true even if
these member states are incapable of effectively projecting conventional power beyond their own
10
borders. While Buzan and Waevers description of their lack of power projection capacity
negates the capacity even to restrain power with power, this does not imply that security
interdependence does not exist. Therefore, we prefer to consider such an area an RSC that lacks
any effective means of creating and maintaining order.
While the unique position of regional powers is practically explicit in some of these
regional security orders, we assert that regional powers will have a significant impact on the
determination, durability, and effectiveness of all of them. This influence will be partially
determined by the number and relative strength of the regional powers within an RSC. It is to
this point that we now turn.
Regional Structure
Regional powers can serve a unique set of functions: ranging from the development and
maintenance of the internal dynamics of their RSCs, to the relationship of their RSCs with the
broader global system. These states possess a higher degree of relative power than most other
states within their RSCs, but also behave differently. Although we stress the behavioral
attributes of regional powers in understanding security orders, the relative power of states within
an RSC is critically important to uncovering the identities and orientations of regional powers.
In fact, attention to the distribution of material capabilities within these regional systems is an
essential step in understanding their dynamics.
Buzan and Waever (2003: 53) argue that the essential structure of an RSC is defined by
four variables: its boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction. While we do
not specify the first two variables here, the designation of the geographical make-up of an RSC
provides us with the definition of its borders, and each ones multi-state membership satisfies the
11
anarchic structure criteria. To determine the polarity of the RSC we identify the number of power
centers (in this case, regional powers rather than great powers) within the complex. Realists
generally contend that the identity of great powers as well as their behavior is determined
predominantly by the international systems material capability distribution. A simple
translation of this logic to the regional level would indicate that the identity and behavior of
regional powers should be determined by the regional distribution of these same material
capabilities. Such an approach is usually assumed when scholars as well as practitioners allude to
a commonly accepted list of so-called regional powers.
It is clearly important that one pays particular attention to the level of material
capabilities that a given state possesses relative to other states within its complex to determine
whether or not it qualifies as a regional power. Identifying how many states within an RSC
possess sufficient power to define the complexs polarity is an important first step in identifying
regional powers and their influence.
1
In fact, we consider the surpassing of a certain threshold of
proportional power within ones RSC to be a necessary condition for qualifying as a regional
power. It is not just any state that is capable of playing the roles that we outline below simply as
a function of the desire to do so. Effective provision of leadership, custodianship, or protection
requires certain capabilities.
Primary among these are military and economic strength. While the overt use of military
power may vary according to the security dynamics of an RSC, military strength continues to be
a foundational source of a states influence. So is the size of its economy, both in terms of its
provision of latent military capacity and its direct use as a means of leverage. Additionally, the
possession of a relatively large amount of these types of power provides states with a higher
stature within their respective systems. Thus, attainment of relatively high levels on
12
conventional indicators of state strength enables states to behave and be treated in a manner that
distinguishes them from other members within their system. Focusing on five conventional
indicators of state strength, we are able to generate a list of regional powers for each of the
eleven currently existing RSCs designated by Buzan and Waever (2003).
2
<Insert table 1 about here>
Using these indicators, several regions demonstrate consistency in strength across
multiple indicators and over time. The resulting polarity and regional powers are shown in Table
1. Unsurprisingly, the clearest leader across every indicator is the United States in the North
American RSC. In the Post-Soviet and South Asian regions, the leading regional powers (Russia
and India, respectively) show a commanding lead in every indicator except for GDP per Capita.
Nor would this exception give rise to serious questions about the concentration of power within
these two states. It is due rather, to the economic size of states with smaller populations (the
Baltic States and the Maldives); not potential regional powers. In the Southern African region,
South Africa stands apart from the rest of the member states on most indicators. The only
exceptions to the South African leadership are in the areas of military spending (where Angola
does not fall far behind), and GDP per Capita (where Botswana enjoys a narrow lead). Again,
these exceptions would not alter traditional assessments of regional polarity, given the
consistency of the South African lead across the other indicators. In Western Africa as well, we
find a clear regional power in Nigeria. Finally, across most indicators, Brazil emerges as the
clear regional power in South America. Each of these regions would be classified as unipolar by
conventional standards.
In three regions, there are multiple states that stand apart from the rest of the regional
membership along these indicators of strength. The Middle East, for instance, demonstrates a
13
multipolar structure, with either three or four states included in this classification. The clear
regional powers in recent years have been Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Israel may fit within
this group as well, given its relatively high regional ranking along three indicators: military
spending, GDP, and GDP per Capita. Europe demonstrates a clear multipolar structure, with
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy each falling toward the top of the power
distribution across each of the indicators. Similarly, there is a clear separation by China and
Japan in the East Asian region from the rest of the member states, though it is interesting to note
that each possesses a clear lead over the other on different indicators of strength. Nevertheless,
their separation from the rest of the region is sufficient for the region to be designated as bipolar.
Perhaps the lack of clarity of leadership across these strength indicators in Central Africa
and in the Horn of Africa partially explains why their security dynamics are too thin to qualify as
full-fledged security complexes, according to Buzan and Waever (2003). They classify these
regions, rather, as proto-complexes.
3
We differ in our characterization of these regions on this
point. As stated above, we instead prefer to classify them as regional security complexes with
security orders designated as unstructured. Nevertheless, each of these RSCs lacks a clear
regional power in terms of relative capabilities measurements and thus any discernable polarity.
We argue that distribution of power alone however, does not effectively complete our
task. The possession of such capabilities is not a sufficient condition for determining whether or
not a state will behave as a regional power. Nor is the state that does so necessarily going to be
the one with the largest military or economic capacity in the region. While standard measures of
power capabilities can be employed to assess a states relative strength, this method falls short of
uncovering the more complex nature of influences that regional powers exert upon other regional
members. In particular, power may be utilized through military and economic strength as well as
14
within the context of other varieties of political and social relationships that constitute the
dynamics of regional security complexes. The relevance of different types of power will depend
to a large extent upon the security context of the RSC. Even our approach to assessing levels of
economic strength may become more complex than a measure of GDP as different RSCs
demonstrate varying degrees of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977).
For example, Booth and Vale (1995) explain that non-traditional security concerns have
become paramount in Southern Africa in the post-Cold War period. Further, it is not apparent
that the clear regional leader along conventional measures of power (South Africa) has
consistently acted as the regional power when called upon for such securitized concerns. Rather,
Botswana has been the target of South African Development Community (SADC) requests for
leadership on at least one regional security issue: food security. Also, given the lack of
militarized interstate conflicts in the South American RSC, non-traditional security concerns
throughout the region and the presence of a legitimate contender in economic strength
(Argentina), South America may not be so clearly unipolar. We can see for instance, the role of
leadership being attempted by an institution (MERCOSUR) in the case of a threat to democracy,
under the joint leadership of both Brazil and Argentina. In this case, MERCOSUR denounced a
threat by the military in Paraguay in 1996 to invade the presidential palace and averted a
potential crisis (Shaw, 2003).
These brief examples are not meant to unequivocally state that these regions are bipolar.
It is simply to point to examples in which other states that do not rise to regional power status
along the conventional measures used above may in certain cases behave as regional powers.
Determining whether or not they do so consistently would provide a basis for potentially
designating states such as Botswana and Argentina as regional powers. In other words, defining
15
the structure of an RSC is simply a first step in identifying and understanding regional powers.
One must also pay particular attention to the process of an RSC. This process will describe the
way in which regional members actually interact and will pay particular attention to the functions
that potential regional powers play.
16
Roles of Regional Powers
In identifying the roles of regional powers, we start with an overview of the foreign
policy roles of states in general. What stands out in the literature is the relationship of roles to
power. Lahneman (2003), for example, claims that power is the method by which states declare
or have their roles ascribed, with declared roles based on a states own evaluation of its power
and ascribed roles based on the reputation and beliefs held by other states. Doran (1991)
identifies roles (informal responsibilities) as a function of position in a system. Roles determine
the difference between leaders and followers, those that provide security and those that are
dependent upon others for security, those that are donors versus those that are recipients and so
forth.
In discussing roles, however, one is compelled to point out the impact of realist theory in
predicting state behavior and subsequent roles in the international system. From this perspective,
the behavior of states is based on power relations and relative power differences (Handel, 1990).
In his seminal work on foreign policy roles, Holsti (1970: 234) highlights three types of states
and their roles in the classical balance of power approach: aggressors, defenders and balancers.
He summarizes this categorization with the apt conclusion that an inability to play these roles
leads to instability, conflict and an opportunity for system transformation.
Constructivist interpretations of international politics, however, have led us to reconsider
the types of roles that states play, their motivations for doing so, and the importance of military
capabilities in driving such decisions. More specifically, constructivism calls us to evaluate the
role of the identity of the nation-state as influencing its foreign policy behavior (Wendt, 1992).
Unlike realist claims that the security dilemma leads to states seeking to maximize power and
thus increasing military capabilities, constructivists posit that socialization, interaction and
17
learning among states influence identity formation and subsequent behavior in the system. This
identity formation is based on the two dimensions referred to at the beginning of this section,
how the state views itself and how other states view it. From the constructivist viewpoint, the
inclusion of identity formation beyond the billiard ball world of realist politics provides a more
robust way of interpreting the true behavior of states in the system; in other words, it identifies
why some states conform to the three categorizations of roles proposed by realism and why other
states break the mold and perform other roles or multiple roles simultaneously.
This range of state identity is based on the process of interaction between states and is a
part of the structure of the environment in which states act. This structure, however, is different
from the material one posited by neo-realists. As Wendt (1987) contends, the structure is a social
one in which states share knowledge, understandings of material resources and consistent
practices. Thus, identity can change as the social structure and interactions change over time.
In linking this approach to RSCs, the social structure provides the context in which
states identities and roles are constructed. An observation across both region and time
demonstrates this point. In some cases, states interact in a Hobbesian environment, forcing them
to take on identities that are egoistic in which given the context of their environment, they are
forced to either be aggressive, defensive or balancing in nature. The states of the Middle East
historically have interacted in this way. We can contrast these identities and behaviors with
todays Europe in which states do not view their environment as hostile and interact with each
other as cooperative members of a security community in the Kantian sense.
If one moves away from traditional measures of power as a direct causal mechanism for
determining roles, there are larger patterns revealed among regional powers throughout the
international system. Doran (1991), for example, does not equate traditional power with role
18
determination. Also important for him is the tradition of international political involvement, the
historical use of power and how other states respond to a country because of its power and/or
prestige. Following Holstis (1970) research on national role conceptions and taking into account
constructivist arguments, we identify three prominent roles regional powers have played
throughout history and across regions: regional leader, regional protector and regional custodian.
All are linked to some measure of traditional power in that there is a threshold required for states
to successfully fulfill these roles. Success or failure to perform, however, cannot be determined
by power alone, making traditional power a necessary but not sufficient factor. This is important
because similar to Holsti we believe that failure to perform these roles will lead to instability,
conflict and/or a transformation of the regional security order.
Regional powers that are leaders act to strongly influence regional members to move in
specific security policy directions. They are responsible for initiating agreements on policy,
shifting courses of other states and leading the region toward preferences more compatible with
their own. When states are presented with a security problem that requires a solution beyond a
unilateral approach, it is regional power leadership that is critical in pushing states to adopt a
coordinated set of policies to effectively deal with the issue.
How do regional powers actually become leaders? One can think of leadership in two
capacities, the first is in terms of a mutual recognition of leadership based on amicable
interactions. Thus, consistent with Lahnemans (2003) notion, some regional powers have
maintained friendly relations with their neighbors, reducing the effect of the security dilemma
which in turn has provided legitimacy for their leadership. In lieu of legitimacy, a second
capacity can be viewed solely in terms of recognition based on overwhelming material capability
and the political will to use that capability to influence member states. In the latter case, the
19
regional power simply employs its capability to push states in certain policy directions and does
so in its own national interest. In other words, regional powers using this type of leadership make
it difficult for states to resist its foreign policy preferences through potential coercion or fear of
retaliation for resistance.
A key point to make about the leadership role is that it is very often difficult to achieve
success. There is often a middle ground, where states are on friendly terms yet still suspicious of
one states attempt to become a system leader (Acharya, 2001). Regardless of success or failure,
however, the leadership actions of regional powers directly affect the security order in a given
region. The Middle East RSC provides a good example of this. Egypts peace treaty with Israel
has failed to lead to a larger Arab-Israeli peace but has altered the manner in which other Arab
states have chosen to engage Israel. Thus, actions taken in an effort to lead an RSC can be
viewed as important in understanding regional security, whether they are successful or not.
This importance cannot be any more apparent than in the role of custodianship. The
regional custodian role places a regional power in the position of engaging in efforts to maintain
and/or stabilize the current security order. This can include powers that actively deter challenges
to the security order within the region or actions that provide resources and supplies for
stabilization of security concerns. Also included are specific efforts to maintain coordination
within the RSC to act against internal and external threats.
As the name implies, regional power custodians are active in maintaining the security
order that has been created. Without a custodian role, security issues have the opportunity to
transform orders through incremental or wholesale changes to the status quo of the region.
Unchecked conflicts, for example, may be more likely to spread, intensifying security dilemmas
which in turn could lead to arms races and undesired hostility among states. Conflict
20
management activities highlight one set of actions that custodians are able to employ to mitigate
such changes.
Unsurprisingly, regional powers that act as custodians will likely need more traditional
power capabilities in this role due to the material support often required by regional members to
tackle security issues. In terms of success or failure then, effective custodianship may
additionally require a certain degree of amity among regional member states lest interference by
a regional power be interpreted as an attempt to infringe upon a states sovereign interests. Such
a perspective suggests that this is possible in some RSCs but not others, which in turn plays a
significant role in the type of security order that is established.
Effectiveness in custodianship also requires one to consider the impact of norms in the
RSC. If norms are present and restrictive, regional powers that attempt to play this role will be
limited in the range and scope of their behavior. Custodial activities in an RSC with a norm of
non-intervention, for instance, may be reduced to nonbinding diplomatic actions such as
mediation. Activities may also be very slow and late responding as regional states signal a
willingness to resist any attempts perceived as intervention. Regional powers thus may become
reluctant to perform their custodial role. Conversely, norms of conflict management and
multilateral diplomacy in security matters could open the range and scope of behavior for
regional power custodians. Activities in an RSC with such norms could include strong
maintenance functions such as arbitration and peacekeeping. In either environment, custodians
will also be tasked with fostering and maintaining the norms that will make the role easier to
perform in the future.
Leadership and custodianship have been portrayed largely as involving internal concerns
which begs the question: what about external factors? Clearly securitized issues need not arise
21
solely from within, leaving states with the need to prepare for challenges that originate outside of
their RSC. Regional powers thus are often tasked with the role of protection. Regional protector
implies that a regional power assumes the burden of defending the area from external security
threats. This defense role can include such activities as deflecting a power away from a region in
an active capacity or traditional deterrence that is focused on prevention. One other possibility in
terms of the protector role is acting as an intermediary between regions (Bernstein and Weldon,
1968). Indeed it is clear that the protector role will be determined in large part by the
identification of security issues from which member states need safeguarding.
A protector role then must include two components: the identification of threat and
overall concerns regarding defense. The identification of threat stands to reason as being
essential. In order to fulfill the role of protector, a regional power must have something against
which to protect the RSC. The challenge to identifying a threat is in achieving some degree of
consensus about the classification. Often times the approach taken is simply to prepare in a broad
manner that focuses on possibilities in lieu of any concrete threat. In some cases, however, as in
Cold War Europe, the identification is fairly straight-forward. General concerns regarding
defense come out through regional power efforts to create some type of defensive establishment.
We are reluctant to state such establishments as defense communities as most regional
attempts are not institutionalized enough to deserve this title. Nonetheless, many RSC member
states seek collaborative military arrangements with their regional powers via training, exercises
and intelligence sharing.
Similar to the leadership and custodianship roles, protection from external threats is a
regional power role that states take on for the advantages it presents. There are three specifically
worth mentioning. First, preparing for external threats helps shift focus on the potential threat of
22
the regional power itself. This is likely to be rather important in multi-polar systems where one
state is gaining in capabilities relative to others. Second, it allows an opportunity for the regional
power to gain greater influence over member states in security policy. This in turn may make it
easier to fulfill both the leadership and custodianship roles. Third, regional powers defray some
of the costs of preparing for threats that are more likely to be problematic for the regional power
itself than for other members of the RSC. This is particularly the case if the regional power is
successful in achieving a consensus on the identity of the threat that is consistent with its own
foreign policy assessment.
In sum, all three roles identify a set of behaviors crucial to our understanding of regional
security orders. There are two final points, however, that merit consideration. First, while we
have discussed these roles separately, they are by no means mutually exclusive. In fact, success
in one role is likely to have positive impacts on success in the others. A regional power that is a
strong leader, for example, is much more likely to provide greater protection than one that has
failed in this task. Strong leaders will be able to convince other states to take seriously their
concerns about defense and identification of threats. Weak leaders will find this task more
challenging. Second, we are not making any claims that regional powers perform these roles for
any altruistic purpose. Regional security will have direct implications for the national interests of
regional powers. To the extent they perform these roles they do so in ways consistent with their
own interests. As it pertains to security, however, we believe that many of their interests are
compatible with these roles and are likely to be protected by executing them, leading regional
powers to carry out some combination of roles with varying degrees of success. As we discuss
below, the orientation of the regional powers in an RSC is a significant factor in determining just
23
how compatible these roles are likely to be in achieving their preferences for a particular type of
security order.
Regional Power Orientation
The final explanatory variable, orientation, delineates how it is that these regional powers
are playing each of the aforementioned roles. We designate this final factor in our framework as
the orientation of the regional power, assessed along three different axes.
The first of these axes considers whether a regional power is satisfied or dissatisfied with
the status quo order of the RSC. Regional powers may be protective of the status quo or they
may be revisionist. Here, we borrow primarily from power transition theory (e.g. Organski,
1958; Kugler and Organski, 1989) and particularly Lemkes multiple hierarchy model that
translates these arguments to the regional level (Lemke, 2002). By status quo, power transition
theory refers to an order that is created by a dominant state that imposes rules of conduct,
regularizes patterns of interactions, and determines how goods are distributed at the international
level. For our purposes, this status quo will translate in large part to be the regional security
order. According to this argument, states may or may not be satisfied with the manner in which
such goods are distributed (Kugler and Organski, 1989). Those states that are dissatisfied with
the status quo and have achieved power parity with the dominant state create conditions that are
conducive for great power war.
Our focus is a bit different from that of power transition theory and its multiple hierarchy
model variant. We are not concerned primarily with predicting wars between the top two powers
within an RSC. Instead, we seek to determine whether the states that are playing the roles of
regional power are doing so in a way that supports or seeks to revise the regional status quo.
24
While war may be one option for seeking to achieve either of these goals, there are a number of
alternative policy options that states may employ in such an effort. Both the leadership and
custodianship roles discussed above imply that regional powers may actively seek to develop and
maintain a status quo order within their RSC. Whether or not regional powers are acting on
behalf of the existing status quo will have a distinct effect on the security dynamics within an
RSC.
An in depth analysis of the various status quo orders of different RSCs and the status quo
orientations of their respective regional powers is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we
are pointing to the necessity of such analyses for understanding how it is that regional powers
influence the security dynamics of their RSC. Such orientations will necessarily encourage or
inhibit changes in the order around which an RSC functions. The manner in which the regional
power seeks to do this and its level of success in doing so will have a significant effect on its
system. Nor do we make any claim at this point about the generally positive or negative effects
of the presence of a revisionist regional power upon regional security. For instance, it seems
logical that the presence of both status quo oriented and revisionist regional powers that possess
relatively equal levels of power are likely to create ripe conditions for conflict. However, it may
also be the case that the presence of a revisionist regional power may encourage development of
a more secure region where the status quo has been an ineffective or non-existent regional
security order. Thus, we leave this empirical question for later studies.
The second axis along which we analyze the orientations of regional powers assesses
their tendency toward unilateralism or multilateralism. Many of the actions taken by regional
powers will in practice, involve and influence multiple states within the RSC. However, as
Ruggie (1992: 567) points out, what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it
25
coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states,but that it does so on the basis of
certain principles of ordering relations among these states. It is these principles of conduct that
are generalized to a group of states that make actions multilateralist. Martin (1992) summarizes
these principles as: indivisibility, nondiscrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. As such,
multilateralism coordinates policies based upon the idea that states within the relevant grouping
treat each other as if their relevant interests are indivisible, they do so equally toward all of the
states involved, and they do so without the need for immediate quid pro quo. Thus,
multilateralism implies a depth of acceptance of limitations upon the freedom of powerful states
to make policy or engage in certain behaviors that simple cooperation amongst several states
does not.
These sorts of multilateralist principles are clearly translatable to the actions of regional
powers in terms of their efforts to develop and maintain security orders within RSCs. A
multilateralist orientation implies that the regional power consistently acts toward several or all
members of the RSC as though it considers each members security to be inseparable from one
another, that they develop rules and patterns of interaction amongst these member states that are
equal across all relevant dyads, and that these rules and patterns of interaction are oriented
toward expectations of long-term cooperation, rather than immediate reciprocation. This
orientation is distinct from a more unilateralist one, which would tend to be demonstrated
through actions that reflect a more individualist sense of security, an overarching concern with
relative gains, a proclivity toward bilateral agreements that are issue and state specific, and
cooperation only when it is in the short-term national interest.
Such a distinction will translate into different styles of role playing by the regional power
and should be expected to have a substantial bearing upon the nature of the regional security
26
order that results. Again, it is not our purpose here to venture expectations about the positive or
negative influences that such orientations will have on regional security. Unilateralist
orientations may in fact result in high levels of regional security. However, it is reasonable to
anticipate that regional security orders that are built upon multilateralist principles will enjoy a
higher degree of legitimacy among most member states, and therefore may enjoy more stability
over the long term.
The third orientation axis that we explore for regional powers evaluates whether the
impetus for which they play their roles is proactive or reactive. The distinction between these
two orientations of regional powers may be less clear than the previous two. After all, the
motivation to provide leadership, custodianship, or protection will always be in response to
something making it by definition, reactive. However, we are concerned with the specificity
and immediacy of this motivation. Some actions that fit within the functions of the regional
power will be directed at changes in the security context of an RSC that are diffuse and long-
term oriented. Others will be responses to very specific and immediate actions or events that
emanate from within or outside of the RSC. A general tendency toward the former description
would imply a proactive regional power, while a general tendency toward the latter would imply
a reactive regional power.
The first factor that will determine whether a regional power is proactive or reactive will
be the time horizon at which the regional powers actions are targeted. Long-term planning for
prevention and management of regional security threats implies a very different type of
leadership than policies that address security threats as they arise on a case by case basis. The
second factor will be the specificity of the security threats that a regional power tends to address.
While it is inevitable that regional powers will be called upon to address specific security issues
27
as they arise, our concern is whether they tend to do so within the framework of a more broad
and cohesive approach to regional security, which has been designed ahead of time.
Ikenberry (2001), for instance, reviews the creation of post-great war international orders
over the past two centuries. Given the destruction of previous orders and fundamental changes
in the power distribution of the international system at these moments in history, great powers
have expended considerable resources on designing and implementing a new order. These
orders are broad approaches to dealing with security concerns that hold a high level of salience
for great powers. While his approach is focused upon the global system level, the same sort of
long-term oriented planning would be expected at the regional system level as well. Such long-
term planning may also arise from the destruction of the old regional order, or it may provide for
more incremental changes of the previous design. What is important is that the actions of the
regional power in the creation and maintenance of this order are targeted at a broad set of
security issues (or individual, but highly salient regional security issues) over an extended period
of time.
Conclusion - Framework to Empirics
The purpose of this paper has been to establish an analytical framework through which
we can better understand security dynamics in RSCs, particularly the influential functions that
regional powers play in developing and maintaining security orders. Our primary contribution
centers on understanding the behavior of regional powers in this regard. Thus, we have argued
for the identification of three types of regional power roles (leadership, custodianship and
protection), along with three dimensions of regional power orientation (status quo/revisionist,
unilateral/multilateral and proactive/reactive).
28
Such a framework, however, is useless if it can not lead to empirical validation and thus
help build our knowledge of regional and international security. Throughout the paper we have
hinted at possible ways in which this can be done. Building upon these allusions, we conclude
this paper with a brief discussion on the direction of future research utilizing this framework.
While we believe there are a plethora of testable questions, we include examples here of the
types that researchers might examine with respect to regional power behavior, the primary
contribution of this framework.
First, the impact of the presence, absence or even level of regional power roles on the
security order merit empirical examination and suggest several hypotheses. For example, ceteris
peribus, a lack of leadership in an RSC, and/or low levels of leadership over time should more
likely lead to unstructured and balance of power orders. The logic here is that without a regional
power to strongly influence regional members movement toward security policy directions
consistent with their own there is unlikely to be any regional consensus on security policies thus
making a concert, security community or hegemonic security order difficult to develop. Another
hypothesis would be that RSCs lacking or possessing low levels of regional power custodianship
should be more susceptible to changes in regional security orders. The logic here being that
without custodianship, security orders have a greater potential to degrade due to unmanaged
conflict and a lack of norms guiding RSC member behavior. Several hypotheses along these
lines are thus possible and should add to our knowledge base.
In terms of orientation, several additional hypotheses exist. One possibility, for example,
is that RSCs with multilaterally oriented regional powers are more likely to be stable than those
where regional powers are unilaterally oriented. As mentioned earlier, the rationale for this
hypothesis is that multilateral interactions are more likely to create greater legitimacy and thus
29
lead to a greater adherence to the current order. Another hypothesis could focus on the
implications of a proactive versus reactive regional power for regional security order. RSCs with
proactive regional powers should possess a higher degree of regional stability over the long term
than those with reactive powers. The rationale here is that proactive powers seek to develop and
implement a more comprehensive regional approach to dealing with internal and external
security threats than reactive ones. Thus, there should be a higher degree of predictability to
interactions amongst member states, as well as with extra-regional states in these types of RSCs
compared to RSCs with reactive powers.
Beyond the simple yet important hypotheses mentioned above are still more complicated
conditional effects for which one might account. Propositions concerning the various impacts of
different orientations along the three dimensions, in addition to those that examine possible
orientations combined with any of the roles should also lead to helpful observations about RSC
dynamics. Due to space constraints, however, we only mention these possibilities here, leaving
even suggestions about predicted behaviors for future research.
In sum, we contend that this regional power framework provides a systematic method for
uncovering and comparing the numerous influences of regional powers within regional security
complexes. In particular, we are concerned with the impact of regional power behavior on
regional security orders. The regional security orders that we propose as capturing the spectrum
of possible variations are hegemonic, collective security, power restraining power, concert, and
unstructured. Each of these orders provides a different method through which long-term security
is organized as well as how emergent security threats are addressed. Further, each implies a
different function that the regional power plays in such security management relative to other
30
members of the RSC, all in the context of regional structure which includes the distribution of
power (polarity) as well as the material capabilities present in aggregate terms.
While there is a growing recognition that the regional level is increasingly pertinent to an
understanding of international security and that certain regional powers hold a special position
atop their respective sub-systems, there has as of yet not been created a framework for such an
exploration. We have developed such a framework here, while additionally proposing several
examples of relevant research questions intended to move the discipline forward. Such empirical
application should help to identify actual regional powers based upon both capacity and
behavior, in addition to explaining how variation across each of the three variables (structure,
role and orientation) leads toward different regional security orders as well as actual processes of
securitization and de-securitization.
31
Chart 1: A Proposed Regional Security Framework
32
Table 1: Conventional RSC Structures with Regional Power Designations
4
Region Polarity Regional Powers
North America Unipolar United States of America
South America Unipolar Brazil
Europe Multipolar Germany, United Kingdom,
France, and Italy
Western Africa Unipolar Nigeria
Central Africa No Regional Power NA
Horn of Africa No Regional Power NA
Southern Africa Unipolar South Africa
Middle East Multipolar Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
possibly Israel
Post-Soviet Union Unipolar Russia
South Asia Unipolar India
East Asia Bipolar China and Japan
33
Notes
1
For a more detailed explanation of how these designations of polarity are made at the regional
level, including the differentiation between superpowers, great powers, and regional powers, see
Buzan and Waever (2003: 34-37). Within our framework, any of these three types of states
could qualify as regional powers with respect to their relationship to their own RSC. It is the
extent to which they influence the broader global system that would additionally qualify them for
great or super power status.
2
We use version 3.02 of the National Material Capabilities Index (CINC) along with the World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006). The CINC score is an index that includes
measures of numbers of military personnel, military expenditures, national energy production,
national iron and steel production, nominal urban population, and nominal total population. For a
detailed description of the data, see Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972) and Singer (1987).
3
Buzan and Waever , Regions and Powers, define a proto-complex as being present when
there is sufficient manifest security inter-dependence to delineate a region and differentiate it
from its neighbors, but the regional security dynamics are still to thin and weak to think of the
region as a fully fledged RSC, p. 64.
34
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