Bonaventura Sententiarum 1

COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1: S.
BONAVENTURAE
http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/opera/bon02013.html[2012-09-11 4:41:04]
S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor
Libros Sententiarum
Commentaries on the
Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I. COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I
PARS I.
De creatione humanae naturae quantum ad
principium efficiens in generali.
PART I
On the creation of human nature as much as
regards its efficient principle in general.
ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.
ARTICLE I

Question 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 13-19.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 13-19.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Creationem rerum etc. Scripture introducing at its first beginning etc..
DIVISIO TEXTUS. DIVISION OF THE TEXT
Unde liber iste secundus, qui incipit: Creationem
rerum etc., dividitur in duas partes.
1
In prima agit de
hominis conditione; in secunda de lapsu eius et
tentatione, infra distinctione vigesima prima: Videns
igitur diabolus etc. Prima pars habet duas; quia enim
homo communicat cum . . .
Wherefore this Second Book of his, which begins:
Scripture introducing at its first beginning etc., is
divided into two parts.
1
In the first (Master Peter)
deals with the foundation of man [de hominis
conditione]; in the second with his fall and temptation,
below in the Twenty-First Distinction, (where he
says): Therefore, the Devil seeing, that etc.. The first
part has two (parts); for, because man communicates
with . . .
1
Coniungenda est haec propositio cum fine Prooemii. Cfr. supra
pag. 6, nota 5. Vat., contradicentibus mss. legit sic: Postquam
Magister supra in primo libro determinavit de mysterio Trinitatis,
consequenter in hoc secundo libro determinat de rebus creatis. Et
1
This proposition is to be conjoined with the end of (St.
Bonaventures) Foreword. Cf. above p. 6, footnote 5. The
Vatican edition, contradicting the manuscripts, reads thus: After
Master (Peter) determined above in the First Book concerning the
COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE
dividitur ista pars in duas. In prima etc. Mystery of the Trinity, he consequently determines in this Second
Book concerning created things. And this part is divided into two
(parts). In the first etc. [Postquam Magister supra in primo libro
determinavit de mysterio Trinitatis, consequenter in hoc secundo
libro determinat de rebus creatis. Et dividitur ista pars in duas. In
prima etc.]
p. 14
cum omnibus creaturis, et cetera facta sunt propter
hominem, ideo primo agit de conditione rerum in
generali, secundo vero in speciali, infra distinctione
secunda: De angelica vero natura etc.
all creatures, and all others have been made for the
sake of man, for that reason he first deals with the
foundation of things in general, but second in
particular, below in the Second Distinction (where he
says): And so of angelic nature etc..
Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de
conditione rerum quantum ad principium efficiens, in
secunda vero quantum ad finem, ibi: Et quia non valet
eius beatitudinis
1
etc. Prima pars habet tres particulas.
In prima proponit veritatem, quae exprimitur in
Scripturae sacrae auctoritate. In secunda vero
auctoritatem explanat, ibi: Creare est de nihilo
2
etc.
In tertia vero, quia per illam auctoritatem positiones
erroneae eliduntur, concludit ultimo earum
evacuationem, ibi: Horum ergo et similium errorum
etc. Et quaelibet harum partium habet duas. In prima
namque parte proponit auctoritatem veritatis; in
secunda errorem Platonis ibi: Plato namque etc.
Similiter et secunda duas habet. In prima explanat
auctoritatem et verba auctoritatis. In secunda ponit
errorem Aristotelis, ibi: Aristoteles vero duo etc.
Eodem modo tertia habet duas. Prima enim concludit
errorum improbationem, secunda vero fidei
confirmationem, ibi: Credamus igitur etc.
The first part has two (parts). In the first (Master Peter)
makes a determination [determinat] concerning the
foundation of things as much as regards (their)
efficient Principle, but in the second as much as
regards (their) End, there (where he says): And since
no one can prevail to exist as a sharer of His Beatitude
etc..
1
The first part has three subparts [particulas]. In
the first he proposes the truth, which is expressed in
the authority of Sacred Scripture. In the second,
however, he explains the authority, there (where he
says): to create is properly to make something from
nothing etc.
2
In the third, however, because the
erroneous positions are crushed through that authority,
he concludes, last, their refutation [evacuationem],
there (where he says): Refuting the error, therefore, of
these and similar (men)* etc.. And each of these parts
has two (parts). And indeed in the first part he
proposes the authority of the truth; in the second the
error of Plato there (where he says): For indeed Plato
etc.. Similarly also the second (part) has two (parts).
In the first he explains the authority and the words of
the authority. In the second he posits the error of
Aristotle, there (where he says): But Aristotle said that
(there are) two etc.. In the same manner the third
(part) has two (parts). For the first concludes the
refutation [improbationem] of the errors, but the
second the confirmation of the Faith, there (where he
says): Let us believe, therefore, etc..
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM. TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam vero eorum quae in hac parte
3
dicuntur, quaeritur hic de exitu rerum in esse.
For an understanding, however, of those (things) which
are said in this part,
3
there is here asked of the coming
forth [exitu] of things into being.
Primo quantum ad principii entitatem. First as much as regards the entity of (their)
principle.
Secundo quantum ad unitatem. Second as much as regards (its) unity.
Circa primum duo quaeruntur. About the first two (questions) are asked.
Primo quaeritur, utrum res habeant principium
causale.
First there is asked, whether things have a
causal principle.
Secundo, utrum habeant principium initiale. Second whether they have an initial principle.
ARTICULUS I.

De entitate principii.
ARTICLE I

On the entity of the principle (of things).
QUAESTIO I.

Utrum res habeant principium causale.
QUESTION 1

Whether things have a causal principle?
QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sic proceditur. MOREOVER REGARDING THE FIRST (the argument) is
advanced in this manner:
Cum constet secundum Sanctos et philosophos, quod
omnes res mundanae habuerint principium productivum
tum propter rerum varietatem, tum propter rerum
mutabilitatem, tum propter rerum ordinem, tum etiam
propter imperfectionem multitudo enim ortum habet
ab unitate, et motus sive mutabile ab immutabili, et
ordo ad primum, et imperfectum ad perfectum
originaliter reducuntur
4
ideo hoc supposito, scilicet
quod res habeant principium causale aliquo modo, est
quaestio, utrum res sint productae omnino, hoc est
secundum principium materiale et formale, an tantum
secundum alterum principiorum. Et quod secundum
utrumque, videtur:
Since it is established according to the Saints and
philosophers, that all mundane things had a productive
principle both on account the variety of things, and on
account of the mutability of things, and on account of
the order of things, and even on account of the
imperfection (of things) for a multitude has (its) rise
from a unity, and movement or the mutable from the
immutable, and order is originally lead back to the
first, and the imperfect to the perfect
4
for that reason
with this supposed, namely, that things have a causal
principle in some manner, there is the question,
whether things have been entirely produced, that is
according to (their) material and formal principle, or
whether (they have been produced) only according to
one of (these) principles. And that (they have been
produced) according to each, seems:
1. Primo a parte producentis sic. Quanto producens est
prius et perfectius, tanto plus influit in rem:
5
ergo
primum et perfectissimum influit totum et in totum; et
si hoc, ergo totum producit. Sed primum agens est
huiusmodi: ergo etc.
1. First on the part of the one Producing in this
manner: As much as the one producing is prior and
more perfect, so much more does He inflow [influit]
into the thing (produced):
5
therefore the First and Most
Perfect influences [influit] the whole and (inflows)
unto the whole; and if this, therefore He produces the
whole. But the Prime Agent is of this kind: ergo etc..
2. Item, nobilius et perfectius est agens, quanto
paucioribus indiget ad agendum,
6
ergo agens
nobilissimum nullo extra se eget: ergo si ipsum solum
esset, adhuc res produceret; sed non ex se, cum ipse
nullius sit pars: ergo ex nihilo: patet ergo, quod Deus
potest in totam substantiam creaturae.
2. Likewise, more noble and more perfect is the agent,
as much as it needs fewer (things) for acting,
6
therefore
the most noble agent will need nothing outside of
itself: therefore if it alone were, it would still produce
things; but not out of itself, since it is a part of
nothing: therefore out of nothing: therefore it is clear,
that God is able unto [potest in] the whole substance of
a creature.
3. Item, agens secundum formam potest producere
formam: ergo pari ratione agens secundum se totum
potest producere totum; sed Deus se . . .
3. Likewise, one acting according to form can produce
a form: therefore for an equal reason one acting
according to its whole self can produce a whole; but
God acts according to His whole / self [se toto agit] . . .
1
Plurimi codd. bonitatis.
2
Vat. Creator enim est etc. Sed haec propositio in textu Magistri
praecedit immediate illam, quam nos fide fere omnium codd.
posuimus. Mox codd. cum ed. 1 minus congrue Tertio pro In tertia,
et includit pro concludit.
3
Codd. N Z in littera. Paulo inferius Vat. cum uno alteroque cod.
post entitatem subiungit vel causalitatem.
4
De his cfr. tom. I. pag. 342, nota 5; pag. 420, nota 5. et 7, et pag.
421, nota 2; pag. 78, nota 2, et pag. 157, nota 11; d. 43. q. 3.
in corp.; infra q. 2. fund. 2, et Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 2. (X. c. 2.):
Quo namque pacto ordo erit, non existente aliquo perpetuo, separato
ac permanente? pag. 326, nota 7; pag. 421, nota 2; pag. 77, dub.
1; et Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10: Omne enim, quod
imperfectum esse dicitur, id imminutione perfecti imperfectum esse
perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse
videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquod esse necesse sit. Etenim
perfectione sublata, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur,
exstiterit, ne fingi quidem potest etc.
5
Haec propositio formata est ex prop. I. libri de Causis, quam vide
tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3, et pag. 638, nota 2.
6
Secundum Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 62. seqq. (c. 12.).
Paulo inferius ed. 1 producere posset pro produceret. Verborum
immediate sequentium sed non ex se etc. fusiorem probationem
invenies I. Sent. d. 8, p. II. q. 2; d. 19. p. II. q. 3, et d. 31. p. II. a. 2.
q. 1.
7
Supponitur hic et in tota fere quaestione Aristotelis de materia et
forma doctrina, in specie, quoad omnis actio naturalis praesupponit
subiectum, in quod transit, et hoc est materia, utpote principium
passionis, et quod forma est principium actionis, mediante qua
similis forma producitur. Cfr. I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. 9.); I. de
Gener. et corrupt. text. 55. (c. 7.) et II. text. 53. (c. 9.).
1
Very many codices have Goodness [bonitatis] for Beatitude
[beatitudinis].
2
The Vatican edition reads For a creator is he etc. [Creator
enim est]. but this proposition in the text of Master (Peter)s
precedes immediately that, which we have placed here, trusting in
nearly all the codices. Next the codices, together with edition 1,
have less congruously Third [Tertio] for In the third [In tertia], and
includes [includit] for concludes [concludit].
3
Codices N and Z have in the text [in littera] for in this part [in hac
parte]. A little below this the Vatican edition, together with one or
the other codex, after entity [entitatem] subjoins and/or causality
[causalitatem].
4
On these (doctrines) cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p.
342, footnote 5; d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, p. 420, footnote 5 and 7, and p. 421,
footnote 2; d. 3, p. I, Doubt 1, p. 78, footnote 2, and d. 8, p. I, a.
3, q. 1, p. 157, footnote 11; d. 43, q. 3, in the body of the
Question; (and) below in q. 2, 2nd argument of the fundament, and
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 2 (Bk. X, ch. 2): For by what
pact will there be an order, with nothing perpetual, separate and
permanent existing ? d. 18, a. sole, q. 3, p. 326, footnote 7; d. 24,
a. 1, q. 1, p. 421, footnote 2; d. 3, p. I, Doubt 1, p. 77; and (St.
Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III;
prose 10: For everything which is said to be imperfect, is held to
be imperfect according to the lessening of the perfect. Whence it
comes to be, that if something seems to be imperfect in any genus, it
is necessary, that in that (genus) there also be something perfect.
For indeed with perfection borne away, from which that, which is
held (to be) imperfect, existed, etc.
5
This proposition has been formed from the proposition in the first
Book of Causes, which is cited in Sent., Bk. I, d. 27, p. I, a. sole, q.
2, p. 471, footnote 3, and d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 638, footnote 2.
6
According to Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. II, text 62
ff. (ch. 12). A little below this edition 1 has it could still produce
[producere posset] for it would still produce [produceret]. You will
find a more lengthy proof of the words immediately following: but
not out of itself etc. [sed non ex se etc], in Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q.
2; d. 19, p. II, q. 3, and d. 31, p. II; a. 2, q. 1.
7
There is supposed here and in nearly the entire Question the
doctrine of Aristotle concerning matter and form, in particular, that
every natural action presupposes a subject, into which it passes, and
this is the matter, or rather the principle of the passion, and that form
is the principle of the action, by means of which there is produced a
similar form. Cf. Physics, Bk. I, text 81 f. (ch. 9); On Generation
and Corruption, Bk. I, text 55 (ch. 7), and Bk. II, text 53 (ch. 9).

* [Trans. note: Here the critical text reads the equivalent of Refuting
(the assertions), therefore, of these and similar errors [errorum]
instead of Refuting the error, therefore, of these and similar (men)
[errorem], on account of the fact, as often will occur, that the codices
of st. Bonaventures commentaries have a variant reading of
Lombards work than that employed here by the Quaracchi editors;
in fact, in the 1493 Freiburg Edition of St. Bonventures
Commentary, folio Aa 2 v, and Aa 3 r, respectively, the reading of
Bonaventure here seems to be errorum, where as that of Lombard on
the next page is errorem, the same as that of the Quaracchi edition.
Accordingly, I have changed the English to conform with the Latin
text of Lombard used by the Quaracchi Editors, for the sake of the
readers facility and comprehension.]
p. 15
toto agit, cum sit omnino simplex: ergo producit
totum.
according to His whole / self [se toto agit], since He is
entirely simple: therefore He produces the whole (of a
creature).
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte rei conditae sic:
quod non est ab alio, est a se ipso; nihil autem tale
quod a se ipso est, indiget alio, ut sit;
1
sed omne
intrinsecum principium rei indiget alio, ut sit, nam
forma indiget materia, et e converso: ergo etc.
4. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown on the part of
the thing founded in this manner: what is not from
another, is from its very self [a se ipso]; but nothing
such which is from its very self, needs another, to be;
1
but every intrinsic principle of a thing needs another, to
be, for form needs matter, and vice versa: ergo etc..
5. Item, efficiens et finis sunt causae correlativae,
2
ergo
quod non est ab alio, non est ad aliud; sed omnia sunt
ad aliud secundum omne quod sunt, quia secundum
omne quod sunt, appetunt bonum; et status non est nisi
in summo bono. Et quod ista ratio sit bona, ostenditur.
Si enim bonum et ens convertuntur
3
, ergo quod est se
ipso ens se ipso est bonum; sed quod se ipso est
bonum, non est propter aliquid aliud: ergo quod non est
ab alio, non est propter aliud. Si ergo omnia mundana
secundum se tota sunt propter aliud, ergo sunt ab alio.
5. Likewise, the one effecting (the thing) and the end
(of the end) are correlative causes (of the thing),
2
therefore what is not from another [ab alio], is not for
another [ad aliud]; but all are for another according to
everything which they are, because according to
everything which they are, they seek after [appetunt]
the good; and there is no standing still but in the Most
High Good. And that this reason is a good one, is
shown (thus): For if the good and being are convertible
[convertuntur],
3
therefore what is by its very self a
being, is by itself very self good; but what by its very
self is good, is not for the sake of anything else
[propter aliquid aliud]: therefore what is not from
another, is not for the sake of another. If therefore all
mundane (beings) according to their whole selves
[secundum se tota] are for the sake of another,
therefore they are from another.
6. Item, si res non est totaliter ab alio, aut hoc est
ratione formae, aut ratione materiae. Constat quod non
formae,
4
quia videmus, formas produci, et si formae
non producerentur, omnino nihil produceretur. Si
ratione materiae; sed contra: ut dicit Philosophus in
Prima Philosophia,
5
actus est ante potentiam ;
constat, quod non loquitur de potentia activa, sed
passiva: ergo cum actus rei sit ab alio, similiter et
materia. Si tu dicas, quod intelligitur non de actu, qui
est forma, sed efficiens; idem concluditur. Et
6. Likewise, if a thing is not entirely from another,
either this is by reason of (its) form, or by reason of
(its) matter. It is established that (it is) not (by reason)
of (its) form,
4
because we see, that forms are produced,
and if forms were not produced, nothing entirely would
be produced. If by reason of (its) matter; but on the
contrary: as the Philosopher says in (his) First
Philosophy,
5
act is before potency [potentia] ; it is
established, that he is not speaking of active power
[potentia activa], but passive (power): therefore since
iterum, ego quaero, quare materia non sit ab alio. Si
quia est principium, ex quo fiunt cetera, nec habet unde
fiat;
6
tunc ego quaero de forma, utrum fiat ex aliquo,
vel ex nihilo. Si ex nihilo, pari ratione et materia ex
nihilo. Si ex aliquo, quaero, quid sit illud. Non
essentia materiae; constat, quia forma simplex est:
ergo forma non fit ex materia, ita quod materia sit eius
principium constitutivum. Nec fit ex materia, ita quod
materia fiat forma: fit ergo ex aliquo, quod est in
materia.
7
Tunc ego quaero: de quo est illud? Et
constat, quod non est ex materia, pari ratione: ergo vel
erit abire in infinitum in causando,
8
vel necesse est
ponere, essentias formarum a primo opifice productas
ex nihilo: ergo pari ratione et materiam.
the act of a thing is from another, similarly too the
matter (of a thing). If you say, that (his saying) is not
understood of the act, which is a form, but (of the act
which is) the one effecting, the same is concluded.
And again, I ask, For what reason is matter not from
another? If because it is a principle, out of which all
others are made, and (because) it does not have whence
it is made;
6
then I ask concerning form, whether it is
made out of something, and/or out of nothing. If out of
nothing, for an equal reason matter too (is made) out of
nothing. If out of something, I ask, what that is. Not
the essence of matter; (that) is established, because a
form is simple: therefore a form is not made out of
matter, so that matter be its constitutive principle.
Neither is it made out of matter, so that matter be made
a form: therefore it is made out of something, which is
in matter.
7
Then I ask: Of what is it? And it is
established, that it has not (been made) out of matter,
for an equal reason: therefore either there will be an
regress unto infinity [abire in infinitum] in causing,
8
and/or it is necessary to posit, that the essences of
forms (have) been produced by the First Worker out of
nothing: therefore for an equal reason matter also.
1. Ad oppositum sunt rationes primo a parte efficientis.
Prima haec est: omnis effectus aliquo modo
assimilatur causae;
9
sed principium primum est actus
purus, nihil habens de possibili, materia autem rerum
est possibile purum per sui essentiam, nihil habens de
actu: ergo cum materia in nullo assimiletur opifici, non
est ab ipso.
1. For the opposite (side) the reasons are first on the
part of the one effecting. The first is: every effect is in
some manner assimilated to a cause;
9
but the First
Principle is a pure act, having nothing of the possible,
but the matter of things is a pure possible through its
own essence, having nothing of act: therefore since
matter is assimilated in nothing to the Worker, it is not
from Him.
2. Item, ab agente pulcherrimo et luminosissimo non
procedit turpe et tenebrosum; sed Deus est ipsa
pulcritudo et ipsa lux,
10
materiale principium est turpe
et tenebrosum: ergo etc.
2. Likewise, from a most beautiful and most luminous
agent there does not proceed (anything) ugly [turpe]
and shadowy [tenebrosum]; but God is Beauty Itself
and Light Itself,
10
(and) the material principle is ugly
and shadowy: ergo etc.
3. A parte rerum ostenditur de formali principio:
Omne enim quod producitur et fit, fit a sibi simili
nomine et specie, ut homo ab homine , secundum
quod dicit Philosophus septimo Philosophiae primae.
11
Si ergo formae rerum sunt principia producendi, et
principium producendi praecedit rerum productionem;
ergo res non sunt productae quoad principium formale.
3. On the part of things it is shown concerning (their)
formal principle: For everything which is produced
and is made, is made by (something) similar to itself in
name and species, such as a man (is produced) by a
man , according to what the Philosopher says in the
seventh (book) of (his) First Philosophy.
11
If,
therefore, the forms of things are the principles of
producing, and the principle of producing precedes the
production of things; therefore things have not been
produced in regard to (their) formal principle.
1
Cfr. Anselm., Monol. c. 3. seqq. De minori vide tom. I. pag.
169, nota 4. Pro a se ipso, quod bis occurit, plurimi codd. cum
1
Cf. (St.) Anselm, Monologion., ch. 3 ff. On the minor see
Sent, Bk. I, d, 8, p. II, a. sole, q. 2, p. 169, footnote 4. For from
ed. 1 secundo loco habent se ipso, quod etiam a paucioribus mss.
primo loco ponitur (cod. bb et ed. 1 in se ipso).
2
Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.) ostendit, tres causas, scil.
efficientem, formalem, et finalem, esse connexas inter se, immo
multoties in unam concurrere. De maiori eiusque addita ratione cfr.
Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11. Simili argumento S. Doctor,
libr. I. d. 2. q. 1. fundam 3. probat, unum tantum esse Deum.
Paulo inferius non pauci codd. in summe bonum pro in summo bono,
incongrue.
3
Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5; cfr. tom. I. pag. 32, nota 2. Mox
plures codd. se ipso est ens bonum pro primo se ipso est bonum, ubi
Vat. cum paucis mss. adiungit et e converso.
4
Cod. Q ratione formae.
5
Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.), ubi probat, actum
potentia priorem esse ratione (definitione), substantia (perfectione)
et quandoque tempore; ac XII. text. 30. (XI. c. 6.), ubi eadem
ratione monstrat, praeter substantias naturales unam esse, quae
sempiterna sit et actus. Verba, quae sequuntur: constat, quod
non loquitur etc. intellige secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 2. a.
3: et loquitur de potentia, quae perficitur per actum . Paulo
inferius multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt similiter.
6
Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.): Si enim (materia) fiat, subiici
aliquid oportet primum, ex quo inexistente fiat. Hoc autem est
ipsius natura. Quare, erit antequam fiat. Dico enim, materiam
primum subiectum uniuscuiusque, ex quo fit aliquid, cum insit, non
secundum accidens.
7
Quod vocatur ratio seminalis, de qua infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, vel
secundum alios potentia materiae.
8
Quod est impossibile in omni genere causarum, ut ostendit
Aristot., II: Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brevior. c. 2.). Cod. aa
inquirendo pro in causando).
9
Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 2. 8. et c. 9. 6. Quod materia sit
pura potentia, docet Aristot., I. Phys. text. 69. (c. 7.) et VII. Metaph.
text. 8. (VI. c. 3.), de quo tom. I. pag. 358, nota 11, et infra d. 12. a.
1. Paulo inferius plures codd. ut B C I O P R T de materia
possibili pro de possibili; dein Vat. potentiale pro possibile.
10
Epist. I. Ioan. 1, 5. De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text.
81. (c. 9.), ubi docet, materiam appetere forma, sicut turpe
pulchrum. Aliquanto superius cod. W lucidissimo pro
luminosissimo. Cod. F conclusionem argumenti supplet ergo nullo
modo est ab ipso.
11
Text. 28. (VI. c. 8.): In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum
est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur, non tamen idem
nec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut in naturalibus; homo
namque hominem generat . Et text. 30. (VI. c. 9.) iuxta
translationem Arabico-latinam: Manifestum est igitur ex dictis,
quod quoquo modo omne quod fit, fit a conveniente in nomine (ex
omwnumou), sicut illud quod est per naturam . Averroes in hunc
textum: Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis, quod omne quod
generatur, generatur a conveniente in nomine et ratione, ut illud
quod est per naturam, i. e. homo ab homine. De seq. prop. cfr.
Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. seqq. (VI. c. 7), ubi contra Platonem
ostendit, formas existentes in rebus corporalibus esse a formis, quae
sunt in materia.
its very self [a se ipso], which occurs twice, very many codices,
together with edition 1, have in the second position by its very self
[se ipso], which is even the reading of a few manuscripts in the first
position (cod. bb and edition 1 read in its very self [in se ipso].
2
Aristotle in Physics, Bk. II, text 70 (ch. 7), shows, that the three
causes, namely the efficient, formal and final, have been conjoined
among themselves, indeed very often to concur in one (thing). On
the major and its added reason, cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the
Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prosa 11. By a similar
argument the Seraphic Doctor, in Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 1, in 3rd
argument of the fundament, proves that there is only one God. A
little below this not a few codices have incongruously in One most
highly good [in summe bono] for in the Most High Good [in summo
bono].
3
(St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 5; cf.
Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, p. 32, footnote 2. Next several
codices have is by its very self a good being [se ipso est ens bonum]
for the first is by its very self good [se ipso est bonum], where the
Vatican edition, together with a few manuscripts, adjoins and vice
versa [et e converso].
4
Codez Q reads by reason of (its) form [ratione formae] for not (by
reason) of (its) form [non formae].
5
Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 13 ff. (Bk. VII, ch. 8), where he proves,
that act is prior to potency according to reckoning (definition),
according to substance (perfection) and whenever according to time;
and in Bk. XII, text 30 (Bk. XI, ch. 6), where by the same reckoning
he shows, that besides the natural substances, there is one
(substance), which is sempiternal and an act. Understand the
words which follow: it is established, that he is not speaking etc.
[constat, quod non loquitur etc.] according to Alexander of Hales,
Summa, p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 3: and he is speaking of the potency,
which is perfected through act . A little below this many
codices, together with edition 1, omit similarly [similiter].
6
Aristotle (says) in Physics, Bk. I, text 82 (ch. 9): For if (matter) is
made, it is necessary that something first be subjected, out of which
non-existing (thing) it is made. But this is its nature. Wherefore it
will be before it is made. For I say, that matter (is) the first subject
of each (thing) [uniuscuiusque], out of which something is made,
since it is in (it), not according to accident.
7
Which is called the seminal reason [ratio seminalis], concerning
which see below d. 18, q. 1, q. 3, and/or, according to others, the
potency of matter [potential materia].
8
Which is impossible in every genera of cause, as Aristotle shows
in Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 5 ff (Bk. I, in the shorter version, ch. 2).
Codex aa has in inquiring [inquirendo] for in causing [in
causando].
9
(St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 2, 8
and ch. 9, 6. Aristotle teaches, that matter is pure potency, in
Physics, Bk. I, text 69, (ch. 7), and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8
(Bk. VI, ch. 3), concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, p. II, a.
sole, q. 2, p. 358, footnote 11, and below in d. 12, a. 1. A little
below this several codices, such as B C I O P R T, have of possible
matter [de material possibili] for of the possible [de possibili]; then
the Vatican edition has a pure potential [potentiale purum] for a
pure possible [possibile purum].
10
1 J n. 1:5. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle,
Physics, Bk. I, text 81 (ch. 9), where he teaches, that matter desires
form, as the ugly (desires) the beautiful. Somewhat above this
codex X has most lucid [lucidissimo] for most luminous
[luminossissimo]. Codex F supplies the conclusion of the argument:
therefore in no manner is it from Him [ergo nullo modo est ab ipso].
11
(That is, his Metaphysics): Text 28, (Bk. VI, ch. 8): For
indeed in certain (things) it is manifest, that as such is the one
generating, so that which is generated, yet not the same nor one in
number, but one in species, as in natural (things); for indeed a man
generates a man . And text. 30 (Bk. VI, ch. 9) according to the
Arabic-Latin translation: It is manifest, therefore, from (what has)
been said, that in whatever manner everything which is made, it is
made from one convening in name (ex omwnumou), just as that
which is (made) through nature . Averros on this text (says): It is
manifest, therefore, from the aforesaid, that everything which is
generated, is generated from one convening in name and reckoning,
such as that which is (generated) through nature, i. e. a man from a
man. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk.
VII, text 22 ff. (Bk. VI, ch. 7), where against Plato he shows, that
forms existing in corporal things are from the forms, which are in
matter.
p. 16
4. Item, artifex non potest producere, nisi
praecognoscat; non potest praecognoscere nisi per
formas;
1
non potest per formas cognoscere, quae nullo
modo sunt: ergo impossibile fuit, quod summus artifex
mundum formaret, nisi formae prius essent, per quas
cognosceret; et illae non potuerunt produci similiter
nisi per formas: ergo si non est in infinitum abire, est
ponere, formas rerum non esse productas.
4. Likewise, a craftsman cannot produce, unless he
cognizes (the thing) beforehand; he cannot cognize (it)
before hand except through forms;
1
he cannot cognize
through forms (those), which in no manner are:
therefore it was impossible, that the Most High
Craftsman form the world, unless there were forms
beforehand, through which He cognized (it); and those
could not be produced, similarly, except through
forms: therefore if there is not a regress unto infinity,
there is a positing, that the forms of things have not
been produced.
5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur quoad materiale
principium. Omne quod producitur, producitur ex
aliquo, vel ex nihilo; sed ex nihilo nihil: ergo omnia
ex aliquo ;
2
illud autem est materia: ergo si stare est
et non abire in infinitum, illud non est productum.
Quod autem ex nihilo nihil fiat, videtur. Productio
enim rei est actio; sed omnis actio requirit in quid
agat,
3
ergo et omnis productio: ergo omni productioni
subiicitur aliquid; non nisi materia: ergo etc.
5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown in regard to a
material principle. Everything which is produced, is
produced out of something, and/or out of nothing; but
out of nothing nothing (is produced): therefore all (are
produced) out of something ;
2
but that (something) is
matter: therefore, if there is a standing still and not an
regress unto infinity, that (something) has not been
produced. But it seems that out of nothing nothing is
made. For the production of a thing is an action; but
every action requires (that) upon which it acts,
3
therefore also every production: therefore to every
production there is subjected something; (and this
something is) not but matter: ergo etc..
6. Item, ego quaero de productione sive creatione
passiva,
4
utrum illa sit substantia, vel accidens; non
substantia, ergo accidens. Sed omne accidens fundatur
6. Likewise, I ask concerning production or passive
creation,
4
Whether that is a substance, and/or an
accident?; not a substance, therefore an accident. But
in aliquo; sed hoc non potest esse creatum, cum illud
sequatur naturaliter ipsam creationem: ergo necesse
est, quod sit increatum et aliud a Deo, quia creatio-
passio in alio est: ergo necesse est, omne quod
producitur, ex aliquo produci; et ideo Philosophus in
primo Physicorum
5
dicit, quod materia est ingenita.
every accident is founded in something; but this cannot
be a created (being), since that follows naturally
creation itself: therefore it is necessary, that it be
(something) created and other than God, because the
creation-passion (i.e. the act of creation, reckoned as a
passion) is in another: therefore it is necessary, that
everything which is produced, be produced out of
something; and for that reason the Philosopher in the
first (book) of (his) Physics
5
says, that matter is
unbegotten.
CONCLUSIO.

Mundus de nihilo est productus et secundum se totum
et secundum sua principia intrinseca.
CONCLUSION

The world was produced from nothing both according
to its whole self and according to its intrinsic
principles.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod haec veritas est:
mundus in esse productus est, et non solum secundum
se totum, sed etiam secundum sua intrinseca princpia,
quae non ex aliis, sed de nihilo sunt producta.
Haec autem veritas, etsi nunc cuilibet fideli
6
sit aperta
et lucida, latuit tamen prudentiam philosophicam, quae
in huius quaestionis inquistione longo tempore
ambulavit per devia. Fuerunt enim quidam antiqui
philosophi,
7
qui dixerunt, mundum factum esse a Deo
et de sui essentia, quia non videbant, quomodo aliquid
posset fieri ex nihilo; et solus Deus fuit in principio, et
ideo dixerunt, quod fecit omnia de se ipso. Sed
haec positio non solum fidelibus, sed etiam sequentibus
philosophis apparuit improbabilis, quod Dei essentia
8
omnino invariabilis et nobilissima fieret corporalium et
variabilium materia, quae de se est imperfecta, nisi
perficiatur per formam.
I RESPOND: It must be said, that this is true: The
world has been led forth into being [in esse
productus est], and not only according to its whole
self, but even according to its intrinsic principles,
which have been produced not out of others, but from
nothing. But this truth, even if it is now open and
lucid to any of the faithful [cuilibet fideli],
6
it belied
[latuit], however, the prudence of the philosopher,
which in the inquisition of this question walked for a
long time through devious (paths). For there were
indeed certain, ancient philosophers,
7
who said, that the
world had been made by God and from His own
Essence, because they did not seen, in what manner
something could be made out of nothing; and in the
beginning there was God alone, and for that reason they
said, that He made all (things) from His very self.
But this position appeared improbable not only to the
faithful, but even to subsequent [sequentibus]
philosophers, that Gods entirely invariable and most
noble Essence
8
would become the matter of (things)
corporal and variable, which (matter) is imperfect, if it
is not perfected through form.
Fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, mundum factum esse ex
principiis praeexistentibus, scilicet ex materia et forma;
sed formae latebant in materia, antequam intellectus
illas distingueret. Et hoc posuit Anaxagoras.
9
Sed
quia formas esse omnes simul in materia, non capit
ratio recta, ideo per sequentes philosophos ista positio
improbata est.
There were also others, who said, that the world was
made out of pre-existing principles, namely out of
matter and form; but forms lay hidden in matter, before
an intellect distinguished them. And this did
Anaxagoras
9
posit. But because right reason does
not grasp that all forms are together in matter, for that
reason this position of theirs was disproved by
subsequent philosophers.
Fuerunt et tertii, qui mundum ex principibus
praeexistentibus factum posuerunt, scilicet materia et
forma; sed materiam per se posuerunt, formas
There were also (those) third, who posited that the
world (had) been made out of pre-existing principles,
namely matter and form; but the posited that matter
separatas et postmodum ex tempore ab opifice summo
esse coniunctas. Et hi fuerunt Platonici.
10
Sed quia
illud irrationabile videtur, quod materia ab aeterno
fuerit imperfecta, et quod eadem forma sit separata
pariter et coniuncta; et absurdum videtur triplicem
hominem ponere, scilicet naturalem, mathematicum et
divinum: ideo etiam per sequentes philosophos haec
positio reprobata est.
(existed) through itself, (and) that separated forms were
after a while conjoined in time by the Most High
Worker. And these were the Platonists.
10
But
because it seems irrational, that matter was imperfect
from eternity, and that the same form is equally
separate and conjoined; (because) it seems absurd to
posit a threefold man, namely the natural (man), the
mathematical (man) and the divine (man): for that
reason this position was also reproved through
subsequent philosophers.
1
Plato, Gorg. (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 465) ait: Ego autem artis
nomine dignam minime eam rem esse existimo, quae careat ratione
. Et X. de Republ. (tom. II. pag. 596): Nonne solemus etiam
dicere supellectilis utriusque artificem sic opus suum absolvere, ut
in formulam illam [ideam] intueatur . . .? Non enim ullus artifex
ideam ipsam fabricat. Qui enim posset ? Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 4:
Ars igitur, sicut dictum est, habitus quidam est cum ratione vera
effectivus ; et VII. Metaph. text. 23. (VI. c. 7.): Ab arte autem
fiunt quorum forma in anima . Cfr. tom. I. pag. 600, nota 7.
Paulo post Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. praecognoscere pro
cognoscere, et est pro fuit. Deinde aliqui codd. ut H bb poterant
pro potuerunt. Hoc argumentum est Platonis dicentis in Timaeo
(tom. III. pag. 28.): Quidquid autem gignitur, ex aliqua causa gigni
necesse est; fieri enim nullo modo potest, ut quidquam sine causa
gignatur aut fiat. Quocirca, si is qui aliquod opus efficere molitur,
eam speciem, quae semper est eadem, intuetur atque eam sibi
proponit exemplar, et quidem illam cogitationisque suae vim educit
in opus, ita omnino necesse est, rem totam praeclare absolvi; sin
autem in illam, quae gignitur, inspicit, genitum exemplar sibi
proponens, non praeclarum certe opus perficiet . . . Atqui si pulcher
est hic mundus, si bonus est eius opifex, perspicuum est, ipsum ad
sempiternum illud exemplar respexisse etc.
2
Vide Aristot., I. Phys. text. 34. et 71. (c. 4. et 8.), ubi hoc
argumentum antiquis philosophis, praecipue Anaxagorae, tribuitur.
Ibid. text. 82. (c. 9.) insinuatur minor seq. de materia. Vat.
primam minorem exhibet sic: Si ex nihilo; ex nihilo nihil fit.
3
Gilbert. Porret. in libro Sex princip. c. 2 ait: Actio vero est,
secundum quam in id quod subiicitur, agere dicimur, ut secans quis,
in eo quod secet, secans dicitur . Quare etiam cod. P hic addit in
Sex principiorum. Paulo inferius cod. F et hoc est, non pauci
alii codd. falso non igitur pro non nisi.
4
De qua vide infra a. 3. q. 2. in corp.
5
Text. 82. (c. 9.). Cod. O aliquanto superius creatio passiva
pro creatio-passio, et dein Vat. post ex aliquo addit in producto.
6
Vat. etsi cuilibet fides, quae etiam cum uno alteroque cod. post
latuit tamen subiungit providentiam vel.
7
Eleatae, qui docebant monismum, quorum dux fuit Xenophanes
(versus a. 569 ante Chr.). Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), I.
Metaph. c. 9. (c. 5.).
8
Cod. P quod Dei natura, quae est.
9
Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. seqq. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. c. 4-7. (c.
3. seq.); et August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. seqq; ubi placita
antiquorum philosophorum breviter enumerantur.
10
1
Plato in his Gorgias (in the edition of Serrano, tome I, p. 465)
says: But I judge that this thing, which lacks a reckoning, is least
of all worthy of the name of art . And in The Republic, Bk. X
(tome II; p. 596): Are we not accustomed to even say that the
craftsman of each (piece) of household furniture absolves his work
thus, that he intuits that (idea) upon (its) design [in formulam]? For
no craftsman fabricates that idea itself. For who could ? Aristotle
in (his) Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 4 (says): Art, therefore, just as has
been said, is a certain habit, effective with a true reckoning ; and in
(he says) in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 23 (Bk. VI, ch. 7):
Moreover from art there are made (those) whose form (is) in the
soul . Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 35, a. sole, q. 1, p. 600, footnote 7. A
little after this the Vatican edition, together with one or the other
codex, has precognize [praecognoscere] for cognize [cognoscere],
and it is [est] for it was [fuit]. Then some codices, such as H and
bb, have could not have been [potuerant] for could not be
[potuerunt]. This is Platos argument in the Timaeus (tome III,
p. 28): But whatever is begotten, it is necessary that it be begotten
out of some cause; for it can in no manner come to be, that anything
be begotten or come to be without a cause. On which account, if he
who contrives to work any work, intuits that species, which always
is the same, and proposes it to himself as (his) exemplar, and indeed
also leads that and the force of his own thought upon the work, it is
thus entirely necessary, that the whole thing be completed in an
outstanding manner; but if, however, he looks upon that, which is
begotten, proposing the begotten to himself as (his) exemplar, he
will certainly not perfect an outstanding work . . . Nevertheless, if
this world is beautiful, if its Worker is good, it is obvious, that He
has looked back to that sempiternal Exemplar etc..
2
See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, texts 34 and 71 (chs. 4 and 8), where
this argument is attributed to the ancient philosophers, chiefly to
Anaxagoras. Ibid., text 82 (ch. 9), he insinuates the following
minor, concerning matter. The Vatican edition exhibits the first
minor thus: If out of nothing; (then) nothing comes to be out of
nothing [Si ex nihilo; ex nihilo nihil fit] for but out of nothing
nothing (is produced) [sed ex nihilo nihil].
3
Gilbert of Porretain in (his) book Of Six Principles, ch. 2, says:
However an action is, (that) according to which we say (there is) an
acting upon that which is subjected, so that anyone cutting, in this
that he is cutting, is said (to be) one (who is) cutting . Wherefore
codex P also here adds in Of Six Principles [in Sex principiorum].
A little below this codex F reads and this is [et hoc est], but not
a few other codices falsely not therefore [non igitur], for (and this
something is) not but [non nisi].
4
Concerning which, see below a. 3, q. 2, in the body of the
Question.
Plato in Timaeo, ex quo iam (nota 1.), aliqua retulimus. Cfr.
etiam Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (c.
6.), VII. text. 51. seqq. (VI. c. 14.) et XIII. c. 4. usque in finem libri
(XII. c. 4. seqq.), ubi inter cetera argumenta etiam illa afferuntur,
quorum S. Doctor mentionem facit. Paulo inferius cod. aa
generalius, sed minus conformiter dictis Aristotelis loc. cit.,
mundum pro hominem.
5
Text 82, (ch. 9). Codex O somewhat above this has passive
creation [creation passiva] for creation-passion, and then the
Vatican edition after out of something [ex aliquo] adds in the one
produced [in producto].
6
The Vatican edition reads even if the Faith is revealed and lucid
to anyone [etsi cuilibet fides sit aperta et lucida] for even if it is now
open and lucid to any of the faithful [etsi nunc cuilibet fideli sit
aperta et lucida], which (edition) also, together with one or the other
codex, after it belied, however [latui tamen] subjoins the foresight
and/or [providentiam vel].
7
The Eleatics, who taught Monism, whose leader was Xenophanes
of Colophon (born c. 569 B.C.; died c. 499 B.C.). Cf. Aristotle,
Physics., Bk. I, text. 32 (ch. 4), Metaphysics Bk. I, ch. 9 (ch. 5).
8
Codex P has Gods Nature, which is entirely invariable and most
noble, [Dei natura, quae est omnino invariabilis et nobilissima] for
Gods entirely invariable and most noble Essence [Dei essentia
omnino invariabilis et nobilissima].
9
Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 32 ff (ch. 4), Metaphysics, Bk. I,
chs. 4-7 (ch. 3 f.); and (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk.
VIII. ch. 2 ff.; where the opinions of the ancient philosophers are
briefly enumerated.
10
Plato in the Timaeus, from which (book) we have already cited a
few things (in footnote 1). Cf. also Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 32
(ch. 4), Metaphysics, Bk. I, text 5 ff., (ch. 6), Bk. VII, text 51 ff.,
(Bk. VI, ch. 14) and Bk. XIII, ch. 4, unto the end of the book (Bk.
XII, ch. 4 ff.), where among all the other arguments there are also
cited those, of which the Seraphic Doctor makes mention. A
little below this codex aa more generally, but in a manner less
conformed to the sayings of Aristotle, loc. cit., has world [mundum]
for man [hominem].
p. 17
Fuerunt etiam quarti, scilicet Peripatetici, quorum
princeps et dux fuit Aristoteles, qui veritati magis
appropinquantes dixerunt mundum factum, sicut legitur
in secundo Metereorum:
1
Dico igitur, quod mare
factum est , et in principio de Caelo et mundo; et de
pluribus aliis locis potest elici. Sed dixerunt, non esse
factum ex principiis praeexistentibus. Sicut enim vult
in primo Vegetabilium,
2
mundus semper fuit plantis et
animalibus plenus, ubi loquitur contra Abrucalem.
Utrum autem posuerit materiam et formam factam de
nihilo, hoc nescio; credo tamen, quod non pervenit ad
hoc, sicut melius videbitur in problemate secundo:
ideo et ipse etiam defecit, licet minus quam alii.
There were also (those) fourth, namely the Peripatetics,
whose prince and leader was Aristotle, who,
approaching the truth more, said that the world (was)
made, just as is read in the second (book) Of
Meteorology:
1
I say, therefore, that the see has been
made , and in the beginning of On Heaven and the
World; and (as) can be elicited from many other
passages. But they said, that it was not made out of
pre-existing principles. For just as he would have it in
the first (book) Of Vegetables,
2
the world was always
full of plants and animal, where he speaks against
Empedocles [Abrucalem]. But whether he posited that
matter and form (was) made from nothing, this I do not
know; yet I believe, that he did not come to this, just as
will be better seen in the second Question [problemate
secundo]: for that reason he was also deficient, though
less than the others.
Ubi autem deficit philosophorum peritia, subvenit nobis Moreover, where the expertise of philosophers fails,
sacrosancta Scriptura, quae dicit,
3
omnia esse creata et
secundum omne quod sunt in esse producta. Et ratio
etiam a fide non discordat, sicut supra in opponendo
ostensum est.
there comes to our aid the Sacrosanct Scripture, which
says,
3
that all have been created and produced in
being according to everything which they are. And
reason too does not discord from the Faith, just as has
been shown in the opposing (side) above.
1. Quod ergo obiicitur de similitudine, quod materia est
ens omnino in potentia; dicendum, quod materia non
propter se facta est, sed propter sustentationem formae,
quae eius est actus; quamvis ergo materia non sit Deo
actu similis, tamen assimilabilis est per formam. Unde
Augustinus
4
dicit, quod ispa materia, etsi non habeat de
se et in se actum formae, ipsa tamen capacitas formae
est ei pro forma. Ideo patet illud.
1. What, therefore, is objected concerning a similitude,
that matter is a being entirely in potency; it must be
said, that matter has not been made for its own sake,
but for the sake of the sustenance of the form, which is
its act; therefore, although matter is not similar to God
in act, yet it is able to be assimilated [assimilabilis]
through form. Wherefore (St.) Augustine says,
4
that
matter itself, even if it does not have the act of form of
itself and in itself, yet the very capacity for form is its
own in virtue of form [est ei pro forma]. For that
reason that (objection) is clear.
2. Quod obiicitur, quod turpis etc.; dicendum, quod nec
turpis nec tenebrosa dicitur nisi comparative. Nam
materia non est privatio pura, immo ratione suae
essentiae habet aliquid de pulchritudine et aliquid de
luce. Unde Augustinus
5
dicit, quod habet modum,
speciem et ordinem, quamvis imperfecte. Non opportet
autem, quod Deus omnes res producat sibi aequaliter
similes, immo secundum gradum. Et ideo ad hoc, quod
gradus sint perfecti, necesse est ponere aliquid prope
Deum, et hoc simillimum; et aliquid prope nihil, et hoc
aliquo modo simile, licet non omnino nec perfecte,
quod quamvis in se minimum habeat de bono, tamen
optime ordinatum est.
6
2. What is objected, that what is ugly etc.; it must be
said, that (matter) is said (to be) neither ugly nor
shadowy, except in a comparative manner. For
matter is not a pure privation, nay by reason of its own
essence it has something of beauty and something of
light. Wherefore (St.) Augustine
5
says, that it has a
standard of measure, a beauty and an order [modum,
speciem et ordinem], though imperfectly. It is not
necessary, moreover, that God produces all things
equally similar to Himself, nay according to a
gradation [secundum gradum]. And for that reason, for
this, that the grades be perfect, it is necessary that one
posit something near God, and that this (belongs) to
(those) most similar (to Him); and something near
nothing, and that this (is) in some manner similar (to
Him9, though not entirely nor perfectly, because,
though it has in itself a minimum of the good, yet it has
been ordered in an optimum manner.
6
3. 4. Quod obiicitur, quod omne quod producitur,
producitur per simile in forma, et cognoscitur similiter;
dicendum, quod est agens secundum naturam, et
secundum intellectum.
7
Agens secundum naturam
producit per formas, quae sunt vere naturae, sicut
homo homine, et asinus asinum; agens per intellectum
producit per formas, quae non sunt aliquid rei, sed
ideae in mente, sicut artifex producit arcam; et sic
productae sunt res, et hoc modo sunt formae rerum
aeternae, quia sunt Deus. Et si sic posuit Plato,
commendandus est, et sic imponit ei Augustinus.
8
Si
autem ultra processit, ut imponit ei Aristoteles, absque
dubio erravit, et ratio sua, quae praedicta est, omnino
nihil cogit. Nam sicut ostendit Philosophus,
9
formae
rerum extra Deum a singularibus separatae nihil
3. 4. What is objected, that everything which is
produced, is produced through (something) similar in
form, and is cognized similarly; it must be said, that
there is an agent according to nature, and according to
intellect.
7
An agent according to nature produces
through forms, which are truly of the nature, just as a
man (produces) a man, and a donkey a donkey; an
agent through intellect produces through forms, which
are not anything of a thing, but ideas in the mind, just
as a craftsman produces a chest; and thus have things
been produced, and in this manner there are eternal
forms of things, because they are God. And if Plato
posited (it) thus, he is to be commended, and thus does
(St.) Augustine interpret [imponit] him.
8
But if he
proceeded further, as Aristotle interprets him, without
omnino faciunt, nec ad operationem, nec ad
cognitionem.
doubt he erred, and his own reckoning, which is
aforesaid, compels entirely nothing (in this regard).
For just as the Philosopher says,
9
outside of God the
forms of things separated from singulars cause entirely
nothing, neither regarding operation, nor regarding
cognition.
5. Quod ultimo obiicitur de materia: materia . . . 5. What is objected last concerning matter. matter . . .
1
Cap. 3: Hoc igitur visi sunt omnes confiteri, quod [mare]
factum est, siquidem et omnis mundus . Textum sequentem ex
principio de Caelo et mundo S. Doctor secundum translationem
Arabico-latinam iam in libro I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4. in fine corp. (pag.
58) allegavit, in quo dicitur: Hoc [ternario] numero adhibuimus
nosmetipsos magnificare Deum unum, creatorem omnium,
eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata . Cfr. etiam I. de
Caelo et mundo, text. 102. seqq. (c. 10.), ubi recitat diversas
antiquorum opiniones de origine mundi ostenditque, impossibile
esse, ipsum fuisse ortum per generationem, sed esse sempiternum.
Sed I. Topic. c. 9. hanc quaestionem: utrum mundus sit aeternus
necne, inter ea recenset problemata, de quibus contrarii sunt
syllogismi . . . eo quod de utriusque sunt rationes suasibiles, et de
quibus rationem non habemus, cum sint magna, difficile arbitrantes
esse propter quid assignare .
2
Seu de Plantis, c. 1. in fine (c. 7.): Dixitque Empedocles, quod
plantae habent generationem in mundo, diminuto tamen et non suis
modis perfecto absolutoque, et quod eo completo animal non
generabitur; qui sermo aptus non est, quia mundus integer est ac
sempiternus et animalia generare cessavit nunquam ac plantas et
omnis generis species alias. Codd. cum Vat. Abrutalum pro
Abrucalem, quo nomine ex versione Arabica in hoc libro
Empedocles vocabatur. Aliquanto superius plures codd. ut F I Y Z
Sed non dixerunt, cod. aa Sed dixerunt pro Sed dixerunt, non.
3
Gen. 1, 1. Paulo inferius multi codd. habent esse producta pro
in esse producta, et in fine corp. aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 opposito pro
opponendo.
4
Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 6. ad 2: Ad aliud dicendum
secundum illud Augustini [de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq.]: Illud
quod in comparatione perfectorum informe dicitur, si habet aliquid
formae, quamvis exiguum [ed. Augus. addit: quamvis inchoatum],
nondum est nihil . . . nonnullum ergo bonum est et capacitas
formae; et ideo [bonorum omnium auctor], qui praestitit formam,
fecit etiam posse formari . Secundum ergo Augustinum dicitur
natura [materiae] capacitas formae, secundum quam dicimus, quod
materia est possibilis ad capiendas formas et ipsi materiae est pro
forma, secundum quam dicimus in materia esse speciem. Et hoc est
etiam quod dicit Augustinus [de Natura boni, c. 18.], quod materia
habet capacitatem formarum suarum; nam si capere impositam
formam ab artifice non posset, nec materies diceretur . Cfr. etiam
de Fide et symbolo, c. 2. n. 2; XII. Confess. c. 6. n. 6, et de Gen. ad
lit. (liber imperf.) c. 15. n. 51. Aliquanto superius Vat. post sed
propter inserit substrationem seu; deinde permulti codd. cum ed. 1
ponunt quae est actus pro quae eius est actus; tandem cod. U circa
finem solutionis et per se pro et in se, ac est ei forma pro est ei pro
forma.
5
De Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq. et de Natura boni, c. 18, ex
1
Chapter 3: This, therefore, it seems all confessed, that (the sea)
has been made, if indeed even all the world . The following text
from the beginning of On Heaven and the World, the Seraphic
Doctor has already cited according the Arabic-Latin translation, in
Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 4 at the end of the body of the Question (on p.
58), in which there is said: For we say everything perfect in
threes, and by this number we invite our very selves to magnify the
one God, the Creator of all things, eminent in the properties of those
things which have been created . Cf. Also On Heaven and the
World, Bk. I, text 102 ff. (ch. 19), where he recites the diverse
opinions of the ancients concerning the origin of the world and
shows, that it is impossible, that it had arisen through generation,
but that it is sempiternal. But in Topics, Bk. I, ch. 9, he cites among
these problems this question: Whether the world is eternal or not?
, concerning which there are contrary syllogisms . . . to this
(extent), that concerning each there are persuasive reasons [rationes
suasibiles], and concerning which we have no reckoning, since there
are great (arguments), that judge that it is difficult to assign (that) on
account of which (any one of them is truer) .
2
Or On Plants, ch. 1, at the end (ch. 7): And Empedocles said, that
plants have a generation in the world, yet in a diminished manner
and one not perfected and absolute according to their standards of
measures, because the entire world is also sempiternal and it has
never ceased to generate animals and plants and the other species of
every genus. The codices, together with the Vatican edition
have Abrutalem for Abrucalem, by which name Empedocles is
known in the Arabic version of this book. Somewhat above this,
several codices, such as F I Y and Z, have But they did not say, that
it was [Sed non dixerunt], and codex z But they said, that it was
[Sed dixerunt] for But they said, that it was not [Sed dixerunt, non].
3
Gen. 1:1. A little below this many codices have have been
produced [esse producta] for produced in being [in esse producta],
and at the end of the body of the Question in an opposite manner [in
opposito] for in the opposing (side) [in opponendo].
4
Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 18, m. 6, in reply to n. 2: To
the other it must be said, according to that (saying) of (St.)
Augustine (On the True Religion, ch. 18, n. 35 f.): That which is
said (to be) unformed in comparison to perfect (beings), if it has
anything of form, even though it requires (it) (in the edition of St.
Augustines works there is added: even though (it is) inchoate), it is
still nothing . . therefore there is some good and a capacity for form;
and for that reason (the Author of all goods), who proffers the form,
made also (its) being able to be formed . Therefore, according to
(St.) Augustine the nature (of matter) is said (to be) a capacity for
form, according to which we say, that matter is able [possibilis] to
grasp forms and (this) belongs to matter itself in virtue of form,
according to which we say that in matter there is a species. And this
is also what (St.) Augustine says (On the Nature of the Good, ch.
quibus locis iam in nota praecedente aliqua retulimus. Paulo
superius plures codd. cum edd. 1, 3 tenebra pro tenebrosa.
6
Cfr. August., XII. Confess. c. 7. n. 7. seq.
7
Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. seq. (VI. c. 7.). Paulo
inferius plures codd. agens secundum intellectum pro agens per
intellectum; deinde aliqui codd. verbis transpositis non quae sunt pro
quae non sunt, et cod. F aliquid in re pro aliquid rei.
8
Libr. 83. Qq. q. 46. n. 2, et VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 28. Cfr. I. Sent. d.
35.
9
Libr. I. Metaph. text. 32. seqq. (c. 9.), VII. text. 28. et 51. seqq.
(VI. c. 8. et 14.) et XIII. c. 3. (XII. c. 5.). Mox cod. I. formae
rerum quamdiu sint pro formae rerum extra Deum.
18), that matter has a capacity for its own forms; for if it were not
able to grasp the form imposed by a craftsman, neither would it be
said (to be) material [materies] . Cf. also On Faith and the
Creed, ch. 2, n. 2; Confessions., Bk. XII, ch. 6, n. 6, and On a
Literal Exposition of Genesis, the unfinished Book, ch. 15, n. 51.
Somewhat above this the Vatican edition after but for the sake of
[sed propter] inserts the under-paving or [substrationem seu]; then
very many codices, together with edition 1, have which is (its) act
[quae est actus] for which is its act [quae eius est actus]; finally
codex U, near the end of the solution, has and through itself [et per
se] for and in itself [et in se], and is its own form [est ei forma] for
is its own in virtue of form [est ei pro forma].
5
On the True Religion, ch. 18, n. 35 ff. and On the Nature of the
Good, ch. 18, from which passages where have already, in the
preceding note, cites some (things). A little above this, several
codices, together with editions 1 and 3, have shadows [tenebra] for
shadowy [tenebrosa].
6
Cf. (St.) Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 7, n. 7 f..
7
See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 22 f. (Bk. VI, ch. 7).
A little below this several codices read an agent according to
intellect [agens secundum intellectum] for an agent through intellect
[agens per intellectum]; then some codices, having transposed the
words, have not (those) which are [non quae sunt] for which are not
[quae non sunt], and codex F has anything in a thing [aliquid in re]
for anything of the thing [aliquid rei].
8
In the book Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46, n. 2, and On the
City of God, Bk. VII, ch. 28. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 35.
9
Metaphysics., Bk. I, text 32 ff. (ch. 9), Bk. VII, texts 28 and 52 ff.
(Bk. VI, chs. 8 and 14) and Bk. XIII, ch. 3 (Bk. XII. ch. 5.).
Next codex I has the forms of things, so long as they are, [formae
rerum quamdiu sint] for outside of God the forms of things [formae
rerum extra Deum].
p. 18
non potest fieri, quia
1
vel ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo;
dicendum, quod ex nihilo, et hoc per creationem.
Quod obiicitur, quod actio est in quid;
2
dicendum,
quod creare non est agere, sed facere, et hoc refert
inter agere et facere; nam agere in quid, non quid agat
exigit; facere autem e converso.
cannot be made, because
1
either (it is made) out of
something, and/or out of nothing; it must be said, that
(it is made) out of nothing, and this through (an act of)
creation. What is objected, that there is an action
upon something;
2
it must be said, that to create is not
to act, but to make (is), and it refers (to an
operation) between acting and making; for to act upon
something, does not require something to act; but to
make on the other hand [e converso] (does).
6. Quod ulterius quaeritur, in quo sit creatio-passio;
dupliciter respondetur. Quidam dicunt, quod non est
substantia nec accidens, sed via ad utrumque; et tale
praecedit illud, ad quod est naturaliter, quamvis in eo
habeat esse. Aliter dicunt alii, quod aliquid creari
non est aliud quam nunc primo esse; nec creatio dicit
naturam aliquam mediam inter Deum et creaturam, sed
6. What is further asked, In what is the creation-
passion?; is responded to in a twofold manner.
Certain (authors) say, that it is not a substance nor an
accident, but a way to each; and such precedes that, to
which it is naturally, though it has (its) being in it.
Others say otherwise, that that something be
created is not other than to be now for the first
solum dicit esse rei, connotando ordinem ad primum
efficiens a quo, et ad non-esse, ita tamen quod ordo ille
totaliter est in re creata, et non in nihilo.
3
Unde cum
dicitur, ex nihilo aliquid fieri, potest intelligi tripliciter:
aut materialiter, ut ex ferro cultellus; aut causaliter, ut
ex patre filius; aut ordinaliter, ut de mane fit meridies.
Primis duobus modis verum est, ex nihilo nihil fieri;
tertio vero modo verum est secundum naturam, sed
falsum supra naturam. Per virtutem enim infinitam,
quae non indiget fulcimento materiae, ita faciliter
potest aliquid produci ex nihilo, sicut de aliquo;
alioquin non esset virtus primi principii infinita, sed
egeret materiae fundamento; et ideo illi virtuti soli hoc
attribuendum est necessario, quamvis non possit
consimile reperiri in aliquo creato. Hoc enim est eius
proprium, sicut et ipsa omnipotentia.
4
(time); nor does creation mean some natural
medium between God and the creature, but it only
means the to be of the thing, by connoting (its) order
to the First Efficient (Cause) from which (it comes to
be), and (its order) to non-being [non-esse], yet thus
that that order is entirely in the created thing, and not in
nothing.
3
Whence when it is said, that something is
made out of nothing, it can be understood in a
threefold manner: either materially, as a knife (comes
to be) out of iron, or causally, as a son (comes to be)
out of a father; or ordinally, as noon comes to be out of
morning. In the first two manners it is true, that
nothing is made out of nothing; but in the third manner
it is true according to nature, but false above nature.
For through infinite virtue, which does not need the
support [fulcimento] of matter, something can be as
easily produced out of nothing, as from something;
otherwise it would not be the Infinite Virtue of the
First Principle, but would be in want of a fundament of
matter; and for that reason to that Virtue alone this
must necessarily be attributed, though the completely
similar cannot be found in any created (being). For
this is proper to It, just as omnipotence itself.
4
SCHOLION. SCHOLIUM
I. In hac quaestione supponitur, mundum sive
aggregationem omnium rerum finitarum aliquomodo
productum esse ab aliqua causa; et pro hac
suppositione in principio quaestionis tanguntur quatuor
rationes, quas in quadam quaestione disputata inedita
diffuse exponit S. Doctoris discipulus et succesor in
ministerio generali Ordinis et cardinalitia dignitate,
Matth. ab Aquasparta (cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q.
1. m. 1. in princ.). Quaeritur autem de modo
productionis mundi. Triplex autem concipi potest
modus productionis: vel ex natura producentis, ut in
generatione; vel ex natura aliena rei iam existentis, ut
artifex novas formas accidentales rebus
praeexistentibus inducit; vel tertio, quando tota rei
substantia, nihil extra producentem supponendo,
producitur, qui modus productionis proprie est creatio.
Deum hoc tertio modo mundum produxisse hic
probatur, et confutantur quatuor errores antiquorum
philosophorum, qui hic in corp. recensentur et diffusius
infra dub. 2. (ubi dicitur etiam multiplex explicatio
verborum, Gen. 1, 1.: In principio etc.). De eisdem
erroribus multum disputat B. Albert., hic a. 3. seqq. et
S. Thom., de Potent. q. 3. a. 5. Pro intelligentia
sententiae Aristotelis observandum est, aliud ipse esse
principia praeexistentia, aliud principia non producta.
Negabant quidem Peripatetici, principia mundi, licet
sint aeterna, fuisse praeexistentia, cum etiam productio
I. In this Question it is supposed, that the world or the
aggregation of all finite things has been produced in
some manner by some cause; and in favor of this
supposition, at the beginning of the Question, there are
touched upon four reasons, which are expounded in a
certain, unpublished Question by (Friar) Matthew of
Aquasparta, the disciple and successor of Seraphic
Doctor, in the Minister Generalship of the Order and in
the dignity of the Cardinalate (cf. also Alexander of
Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 1, m. 1, at the beginning).
Moreover there is the question concerning the manner
of the production of the world. However, the manner
of (its) production can be conceived in a threefold
manner: either out of the nature of the One producing,
as in generation; and/or out of another nature of a thing
already existing, as a craftsman induces new accidental
forms upon pre-existing things; and/or third, when the
whole substance of a thing, by supposing nothing
outside of the one producing, is produced, which
manner of production is properly a creation. Here it is
proven that God produced the world in this third
manner, and there are confuted the four errors of the
ancient philosophers, which are cited here in the body
of the Question and more diffusely below, in Doubt 2
(where there is even given a manifold explication of
the words of Genesis 1:1: In the beginning etc.). On
the same errors Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here
mundi secundum eos sit aeque aeterna. Utrum autem
Aristoteles docuerit, ista principia fuisse ab aeterno,
quin sint producta, an ea esse ab aeterno a Deo
producta, secundum S. Bonaventuram est dubium.
in a. 3 ff., and St. Thomas, de Potentia, q. 3, a. 5,
dispute at length. For an understanding of the sentence
of Aristotle it must be observed, that it is one thing that
principles are pre-existing, another that principles (are)
not produced. Indeed the Peripatetics deny, that the
principles of the world, though they are eternal, had
been pre-existent, since even the production of the
world, according to them, is equally eternal.
Moreover, whether Aristotle taught, that these
principles, which were not produced, were from
eternity, or whether that these were produced by God
from eternity, is doubtful according to St. Bonaventure.
II. In hac quaestione (fundam. 6. et ad 1.) et alibi
passim termini actus et potentia usurpantur in sensu
Peripateticis et Scholasticis familiari, sed valde diverso
a significatione vulgari et in philosophia recentiore
recepta; quae diversa significatio facile confundare
poterit non versatos in philosophia scholastica. Iuvat
igitur haec notare:
II. In this Question (fundament 6, and in reply to n. 1)
and elsewhere passim, the terms actus (act) and
potentia (power in the active sense, or potency in
the passive sense) are used in the sense familiar to
Peripatetics and Scholastics, but in a very diverse
manner from the popular signification and (that)
received in recent philosophy; which diverse
signification could easily confound (those) not versed
in Scholastic Philosophy. Therefore, it will help to
note these (points):
1. In rerum phaenomenis distinguimus mutationes
secundum agere et pati; principium autem proximum
actionis, communiter vocamus potentiam activam
(activitatem), passionis autem proximum principium
dicimus potentiam passivam: illa active producit
actum ut suum effectum, haec autem ab alio agente
passionem in se recipit. In hoc sensu actio (actus) et
passio cum suis principiis proximis (potentia activa et
passiva) non spectant ad ordinem rerum substantialem,
sed accidentalem, nec faciunt compositionem
essentialem, sed accidentalem.
1. Among the phenomena of thins we distinguish
changes according to acting [agere] and suffering
[pati]; but the proximate principle of an action, we
commonly call the active power [potentiam activam]
(or activity), but the proximate principle of a passion
we call the passive power (or potency): the former
actively produces the act as its effect, but the latter
receives from another agent the passion in itself. In
this sense the action (or actus) et passion together with
their proximate principels (the active and passive
powers) do not pertain to the substantial order of
things, but the accidental one, nor do they cause an
essential composition, but an accidental one.
2. Duce Aristotele Scholastici terminos actus et
potentia secundum analogiam transferebant ad ordinem
substantialem et essentialem, et quidem dupliciter,
scilicet in sensu metaphysico et physico. In utroque
sensu mutatur significatio utriusque termini, ita ut tunc
actus non importet operationem, sed in ordine essendi
intrinsecum principium actuale; potentia non
activitatem, sed principium passivum, quod suscipit ab
actu suam actuationem. In sensu metaphysico duo
communiter distinguuntur actus, scil. substantia et
existentia, ad quos ipsa essentia comparatur ut
potentia, quae passive recipit illos actus. In specie de
existentia dicit S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 53.):
Ipsum igitur esse comparatur ad omnes substantias
creatas sicut actus earum; ex quo relinquitur, quod in
qualibet substantia creata sit compositio actus et
2. Following Aristotle, the Scholastics transferred the
terms actus and potentia according to analogy to the
substantial and essential order, and indeed in a twofold
manner, namely, in the metaphysical and physical
sense. In each sense the signification of each term is
changed, thus that actus no longer conveys an
operation, but the intrinsic actual principle in the order
of being; potentia not an activity, but a passive
principle, which takes up from act its own actuation.
In the metaphysical sense two acts [actus] are
commonly distinguished, namely substance and
existence, to which the essence itself is compared as a
potency, which passively receives those acts. In the
species of existence St. Thomas (Summa contra
Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 53) says: Therefore to be is
itself compared to all created substances just as their
potentiae . In sensu autem physico isti termini
transferuntur ad duo principia sive elementa
substantialia, scil. materiam et formam, ex quarum
unione substantiali resultat unum compositum, una
substantia completa (cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Scholion.). Unde in composito humano ipsa anima
rationalis, quae secundum decretum Concilii
Viennensis est forma corporis humani per se et
essentialiter , vocabatur actus corporis organici, iuxta
definitionem Aristotelis communiter receptam:
Anima est actus primus corporis physici, organici,
potentia vitam habentis . Manifestum autem est, quod
anima non est actus, quem elicit corpus, sed e contra- /
-rio . . .
act; from which it results, that in any created substance
there is a composition of act and potency . But in
the physical sense these terms are transferred to two
principles or substantial elements, namely, to matter
and form, out of the substantial union of which there
results one composite, one complete substance (cf.
below d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium). Wherefore
in the human composite the rational soul itself, which
according to the Decree of the Council of Vienne is,
per se and essentially, the form of the human body , is
called the act of the organic body, in accord with the
definition of Aristotle commonly received: The soul
is the first act of the physical, organic body, having the
power of life . Moreover it is manifest, that the soul
is not the act, which the body elicits, but on the
contrary . . .
1
Codd. I. cc cum ed. 1 nisi; cod. aa bis nec pro vel.
2
Cod. cc et ed. 1: Quod obiicitur de actione, quod requirit in quid
agat. Paulo inferius sola Vat. et in hoc differunt pro et hoc refert
inter. Solutio huius obiectionis fundatur in definitionibus
verborum agere et facere, prout a Gilberto Porretano in libro de Sex
principiis, c. de Actione dantur: Dico autem actionem non quid,
sed in quid agat exigere . . . Facere vero id, quod quale est ex se
gignit . Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 2. seqq. hanc differentiam inter agere
et facere assignat, quod agere fiat actione pertinente ad voluntatem
vel electionem, facere autem sit operari super alienam vel
extrinsecam materiam. Unde etiam artem definit habitum cum
ratione vera effectivum, prudentiam vero habitum cum ratione vera
activum circa ea quae bona et mala homini sunt. Cfr. etiam hic lit.
Magistri, c. 1.
3
Plura de hoc vide infra a. 3. q. 2, et de his quae sequuntur, cfr.
Anselm., Monol. c. 8. Paulo anterius plures codd. cum ed. 1,
perperam verbis transpositis, et non ad esse pro et ad non-esse.
Mox cod. aa post ut ex ferro adiicit fit. Aliquanto inferius nonnulli
codd. ut H Z cc et ed. 1 ponunt fundamento pro fulcimento.
4
Quod omnipotentia sit Dei proprium probat S. Doctor fusius libr.
III. Sent. d. 14. a. 3. q. 3. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 43.
1
Codices I and cc, together with edition 1, have unless [nisi];
codex aa has neither . . . nor [nec . . nec] for either . . . and/or [vel .
. . vel].
2
Codex cc and edition 1 read: What is objected concerning action,
that it requires (something) upon which it acts [Quod obiicitur de
actione, quod requirit in quid agat]. A little below this the Vatican
edition alone has and in this there differ [et in hoc differunt] for and
this refers (to an operation) between [et hoc refert inter]. The
solution of this objection is founded in the definition of the verbs to
act and to make, insofar as they are given by Gilbert of Porretain
in (his) book On Six Principles, in the ch. on Action: Moreover, I
say that action (is) not something, but requires (something) upon
which it acts . . . However, to make begets that, which is such, out
of itself . Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 2 ff, assigns this difference
between acting and making, that acting comes to be by an action
pertaining to the will and/or to choice [electionem], but making is an
operating upon the (matter) of another and/or (upon) extrinsic
matter. Wherefore he also defines art as a habit effective with a
true reckoning, but prudence as a habit active with a true
reckoning concerning those which are good and evil for a man. Cf.
also here the text of Master (Peter) ch. 1.
3
See more on this below in a. 3, q. 2, and concerning those which
follow, cf. (St.) Anselm, Monologion, ch. 8. A little before this,
several codices, together with edition 1, faultily having transposed
the words, read and not to being [et non ad esse] for and to non-
being [et ad non-esse]. Next codex aa reads as a knife comes to be
out of iron [ut ex ferro fit cultellus]. Somewhat below this not a few
codices, such as H Z and cc, and edition 1, put the fundament
[fundamento] for the support [fulcimento].
4
That omnipotence is proper to God, the Seraphic Doctor proves at
length in Sent, Bk. III, d. 14, a. 3. q. 3. Cf. also Sent., Bk. I, d. 43.
p. 19
contra- / -rio, quem anima habet in corpus , ut
dicitur infra p. II. a. 1.* q. 2, a. 3. q. 2. fundam. 4.
, (is the act) which the soul has upon the body , as is
said below in p. II, a. 1,* q. 2; a. 3, q. 2, in the 4th
Illam definitionem inter multos explicat socius
Alexandri Hal. Ioan. a Rupella. Ord. Min., in suo libro
de Anima, p. I. c. 5. (ed. P. Theophilo Domenichelli,
Prato 1882, pag. 110). Et generatim omnis forma
substantialis vocatur actus primus, et materia potentia,
non quidem activa, sed passiva, quae actuatur a forma
substantiali. De isto duplici sensu vocabulorum
actus et potentiae in ordine substantiali ita loquitur S.
Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 54.): In substantiis autem
compositis ex materia et forma est duplex compositio
actus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius substantiae,
quae componitur ex materia et forma; secunda vero ex
ipsa substantia iam composita et esse, quae etiam
potest dici ex eo quod est et esse, vel ex eo quod est et
quo est . Quod magis explicatur ab eodem, de Spirit.
Creaturis, a. 1. in corp. Cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
argument of the fundament. Among many others, the
associate of Alexander of Hales, (Friar) J ohn of
Repella, O. F. M., explains that definition in his book
de Anima, p. I, ch. 5 (ed. P. Theophilo Domenichelli,
Prato 1882, p. 110). And in general every substantial
form is called the actus primus (first act), and matter
the potentia, not indeed active (that is not as the
power), but passive (as the potency), which is
actuated [actuatur] by a substantial form. On
this twofold sense of the words actus and potentia in
the substantial order St. Thomas speaks thus (Summa
contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 54): Moreover in
substances composed out of matter and form there is a
twofold composition of actus and potentia: the first
indeed of the substance itself, which is composed out
of matter and form; but the second out of the substance
itself already composed and (its) to be [esse], which
can also be said to be (composed) out of that which it
is [quod est] and that it is [esse], and/or out of that
which it is [quod est] and whereby it is [quo est] .
Which is explained more by the same in de Spirit.
Creaturis., a. 1, in the body. Cf. below d. 3, p. I, a. 1,
q. 1.
3. Communiter etiam recepta erat distinctio inter actum
primum et secundum: ille est in ordine substantiali ut
pars constitutiva essentiae; sed actus secundus est in
ordine accidentali et est actio sive operatio. In hoc
sensu dicit S. Bonaven. (I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1. ad 5.):
Alio modo dicitur vivere, secundum quod est actus
primus et est ab essentia animae ut in ratione formae,
non in ratione agentis etc. (cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a.
1. q. 3. ad 4; d. 26. q. 3. ad 4.). Scotus (in IX. Metaph.
c. 1. n. 27.) dicit: Prima divisio est, quod actus
quidam est primus, qui est forma rei; quidam secundus,
qui est operatio ; S. Thom. (de Potent. q. 1. a. 1.):
Actus autem est duplex, scilicet primus, qui est forma,
et secundus, qui est operatio . . . unde et similiter
duplex est potentia: una activa, cui respondet actus,
qui est operatio, et huic primo nomen potentia videtur
fuisse attributum; alia est passiva, cui respondet actus
primus, qui est forma, ad quam simliter videtur
secundario nomen potentia devolutum .
Notandum autem est, quod non raro actus primus in
alio sensu usurpatur; accipitur enim non in ordine
substantiali, sed pro potentia activa, vel habitu respectu
actus secundi, qui est ipsa actio.
3. There was also commonly received a distinction
between the first and second act (of a thing): the
former is in the substantial order as a constitutive part
of the essence; but the second act is in the accidental
order and is an action or operation. In this sense St.
Bonaventure says (Sent, Bk. I, d. 43, q. 1, in reply to n.
5): In another manner to live is said, according to
which it is a first act, and it is from the essence of the
soul as in the reckoning of a form, no in the reckoning
of an agent etc. (cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3
in reply to n. 4; d. 26, q. 3, in reply to n. 4). (Bl. J ohn
Duns) Scotus (commenting on Aristotles Metaphysics,
Bk. IX, ch. 1, n. 27) says: The first division is, that a
certain act is first, which is the form of the thing; a
certain one second, which is (its) operation ; St.
Thomas (de Potentia, q. 1, a. 1) says: Moreover
act is twofold, namely the first (act of a being),
which is (its) form, and the second (act of the being),
which is (its) operation . . . wherefore there is also a
twofold potential: the one active (the power), to
which there responds the act, which is an operation,
and to this the name potential seems to have been first
attributed; the other is passive (the potency), to
which there responds the first act, which is the form, to
which there similarly seems (to have) devolved the
name potentia in the secondary (sense) .
Moreover it must be noted, that not rarely the first
act is used in another sense; for it is accepted not in
the substantial order, but for an active power, and/or
habit in respect of the second act, which is itself an
action.
4. Denique alia omnino diversa distinctio potentiae est
in potentiam obiectivam et subiectivam: illa respicit
ordinem idealem et non est nisi intrinseca rei
possibilitas; sed subiectiva dicit in ordine reali
subiectum potentiae (cfr. Scot., IV. Metaph. c. 3. n.
64.).
4. Finally there is another entirely diverse distinction of
potentia into objective and subjective potentia: the
former respects the ideal order and is not but the
intrinsic possibility of the thing; but the subjective
(potentia) means, in the real order, the subject of the
potentia (cf. Scotus, In Metaphysica., Bk. IV, ch. 3, n.
64).
III. Argumentum 3. in fundam. nititur illo principio,
quod Scot. (de Rerum princip. q. 7. a. 2. n. 28.) ita
exprimit: Sicut forma est principium actionis, sic
materia passionis ; vel verbis negativis (ibid. infra):
Sicut in essentia materiae non fundatur potentia activa,
sic nec in essentia formae potentia passiva (cfr. infra
d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. praesertim ad 2.). Hoc
argumentum magis explicatur a S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2,
et de Potent. q. 3. a. 1. De verbis Augustini in
solut. ad 1, quod capacitas formae sit materiae pro
forma, cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 1. 2, et
d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3. Quoad solut. ad 5. de
creatione passiva cfr. hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. Quod autem
verba ex nihilo non accipienda sint nec materialiter nec
causaliter, sed ordinaliter, dicit etiam S. Thom., S. I. q.
45. a. 1. ad 3. et Scot., Report. hic q. 3. n. 2.
III. The 3rd argument of the fundament is supported
upon this principle, that (Bl. J ohn Duns) Scotus (On
the First Principle of Things., q. 7, a. 2, n. 28)
expresses thus: J ust as form is the principle of
action, so matter of passion ; and/or in negative terms
(ibid., below): J ust as in the essence of matter there
is not founded an active power, so neither in the
essence of form a passive power (cf. below d. 7, p. II,
a. 2, q. 1, chiefly in reply to n. 2). This argument is
explained more by St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2, and in
de Potentia, q. 3, a. 1. Concerning the words of
(St.) Augustine in the solution to n. 1, that the capacity
of form belongs to matter in virtue of form, cf. below
d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, in the body of the Question, and in
reply to nn. 1 and 2, and in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3.
In regard to the solution to n. 5, concerning the
passive creation, cf. here a. 3, qq. 1 and 2.
Moreover, that the words out of nothing [ex nihilo]
are not to be accepted either materially or causally, but
ordinally, St. Thomas also says, Summa, I, q. 45, a. 1,
in reply to n. 3, and (Bl.) Scotus, Reportatio, here in q.
3, n. 2.
IV. De tota quaestione: Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. Alex.
Hal., S. p. II. q. 6. m. 1, et m. 2. a. 1. Scot., hic q.
2; Report. hic q. 3; de Rerum princip. q. 5. S.
Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2, S. I. q. 45. a. 1. 2; de Potent. q. 3.
a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 15. 16. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr.
1. q. 1. 2; q. 4. m. 1. a. 1. partic. 1. 3.; m. 2. a. 1.
Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2, et q. 2. a . 1. Aegid.
R., hic p. I. q. 2. a. 1-4. Henr. Gand., S. a. 2. q. 23.
Durand., hic q. 1. Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. 3.
IV. On the entire question: Breviloquium., p. II, ch. 1.
Alexander of Hales., Summa., p. II, q. 6, m. 1, and
m. 2, a. 1. (Bl. J ohn Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2;
Reportatio., here in q. 3; de Rerum principio., q. 5.
St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2, Summa. , I, q. 45, aa. 1
and 2; de Potentia., q. 3, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles.,
II, chs. 15 and 16. Bl. (now St.) Albertus
(Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 1, qq. 1 and 2; q. 4, m. 1,
a. 1, partic. 1 and 3.; m. 2, a. 1. (Bl.) Peter of
Tarentaise., here in q. 1, aa. 1 and 2, and q. 2, a. 1.
Giles the Roman, here in p. I, q. 2, aa. 1-4. Henry
of Ghent, Summa., a. 2, q. 23. Durandus, here in q.
1. (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian., here in qq. 2
and 3.
* [Trans. nota: Hic Scholionis originale legivit p. II. q. 2. pro p. II.
a. 1. q. 2, dubiose, quia locutio immediate previa reperitur in p. II. a.
3. q. 2. fundam 4, et solummodo in a. 1. q. 2 reperitur explicatio
sententiae eaedem. Correctionem scholionis feci propter claritatem
necessariam.]
* [Trans. note: Here the Scholium originally read p. II. q. 2. for p.
II. a. 1. q. 2, in a dubious manner, because the expression just cited
is found in the second citation to a. 3. q, 2, not in the first, and
because the number of the article of the first citation was omitted,
carelessly. For the sake of the necessary clarity, I have corrected the
citation.]
This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text,
and all notes by the Translator, are 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on
the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the
Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin
terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

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COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1: S.

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