G.R. No.

L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.
Facts:
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
The contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be
cleared in advance for mailing.
This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated
October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest
rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the The
Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request
stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision
and ultimately, declined Caltexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in
part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery.
However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as Gift
Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.
Issues:
1. Whether there is a question of construction of the subject provision
2. Whether the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD:
1. Yes.
SC cannot hospitably entertain the Postmaster Generals pretense that there is here
no question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear
provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest",
hence, there is no room for declaratory relief.
The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if
the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be
divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest.
This is not feasible.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. (Note)
This is precisely the case here.
Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein.
To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
2. No.
Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, e.g. policy
playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of
gambling.
ThreeEssential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. Chance
The contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous
distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid,
any merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever
be given for the privilege to participate.
Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the
entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for
the drawing of the winner.
Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which
would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving
the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a
prize.
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a
consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common
applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but
by way of inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since
there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement
to the purchaser.
The contest is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy
the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every
case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable
statutory provision.
It is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the
Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the
use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

G.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.
Facts: PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised schedule for its
Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP)-provisionally approved but this was SET ASIDE by SC
(ruling that "there was necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted
on the application of the PLDT so that the public could air its opposition, particularly the
herein petitioner and the Solicitor General, representing the government. They should be
given the opportunity to substantiate their objection that the rates under the subscriber
investment plan are excessive and unreasonable and, as a consequence, the low income and
middle class group cannot afford to have telephone connections; and, that there is no need to
increase the rate because the applicant is financially sound.")
On November 22, 1982, NTC permanently approved PLDT's new and increased SIP rates.
Petitioners MR was denied.
Petitioner claims that the SIP schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore,
illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and
regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217 which
provides: t.hqw
Section 2. The Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate
agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone
industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules
and regulations may be promulgated ... (Emphasis supplied).
ISSUE: WON respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the Revised
Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and
regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217?
HELD: YES.
Respondent NTC admits the absence of rules and regulations referred to in PD 217. However,
it contends that nowhere in said decree is there any legal provision making the promulgation
of rules a mandatory pre-requisite to the establishment of SIP and the determination of its
schedules; that since respondent NTC is enjoined to implement the declared policies of the
decree, for its immediate implementation, it may rely on existing Rules of Practice; that under
the same Rules of Practice all existing subscriber investment plans were presented, considered
and approved by the NTC; that the promulgation of the rules is inherently an internal and
administrative matter and therefore, is not a proper subject of litigation, much less a duty of
the NTC to accomplish; and, that public respondent may or may not promulgate the rules in
the immediate implementation of said decree as the word used there is "may."
We are not persuaded.
Presidential Decree No. 217 was promulgated on June 16, 1973 and paragraph 4 of Section 1
thereof provides: t.hqw
4. In line with the objective of spreading ownership among a wide base of
the people, the concept of telephone subscriber self-financing is hereby
adopted whereby a telephone subscriber finances part of the capital
investments in telephone installations through the purchase of stocks,
whether common or preferred stock, of the telephone company. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to
promulgate rules and regulations because:
1. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that
existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the
Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) was so set up precisely to ensure the
financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn
assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a
telephone facility.
The SIP has never been contemplated prior to P.D. 217.
NTC is also estopped from claiming that there is no need to promulgate such rules and
regulations. In the case of PCFI vs. NTC, G.R. No. 61892, now pending resolution before this
Honorable Tribunal, NTC totally refused to act on a petition filed by PLDT precisely for the
promulgation of such rules and regulations.
G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY
EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO,
COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and
ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
Facts:

On March 5, 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for
direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood).
On April 17, 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for
underpayment of monthly living allowances.
On May 3, 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal
termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair
labor practice; non-payment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive
alien management personnel without proper permit.
The strike began on May 23, 1982.
On July 9, 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the
officers and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.
The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining
order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter pursuant to B.P. 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the
CFI.
The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: NO.

The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law.
Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not
admit of doubt.
Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the
statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in
force.
Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdiction; since (2) P.D. 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money
claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations
to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the
ordinary courts, and since (3) B.P. 130 made no change with respect to the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers
or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to
be applied the way it is worded.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly.
It can only mean that a CFI judge then, an RTC judge now, certainly acts beyond the
scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for
damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional
Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private
respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao,
Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito
Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) confiscated
the truck.
DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the
truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277. Respondents MR DENIED. Respondent appealed to Secretary of DENR
Pending resolution however of the appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case against
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan

with the RTC -ordered the return of the
truck to respondents.

Petitioner filed a MTD claiming that respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. - DENIED
CA Affirmed RTC
ISSUE: WON DENR have power to confiscate the truck under the law?
HELD: YES.
Respondent insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of
Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,implements and
tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents'
thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor
include "conveyances" that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a
large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject
provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other
provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation
of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the
same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government.
The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
or policies on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as
to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.

Statutes should be construed in the
light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended.

In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is
significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to
present situations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the
remaining resources of the country," that the government opted to add
Section 68-A.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the
DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances," but forest products as well.
On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a
criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except
only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no
Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any
solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.




G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
The accused in this case was indicted for illegal possession of firearms in violation
of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Counsel for the accused presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment
"as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas,
dated June 2, 1962; another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also
addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City
on a confidential mission;

the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,

a
certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret
agent" of Gov. Leviste.
Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits
he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret
agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm."
The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.
Thereafter, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused.
Issue: Whether the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the
provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
Held: NO.
The law explicitly provides that, to wit:
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary,
guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties."
No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is
equally clear.
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." (Note)
The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection
of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent
even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879."
Such reliance is misplaced.
It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision.
To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in Peoplev.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988
PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C.
VASCO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION,respondents.

Facts: Plaintiff Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on
the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been
cancelled by the defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and maintains that
Contract C with the CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of
land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. On the other hand, defendants Leverizas'
(Petitioners who are the successor-in-interest of Rosario Leveriza ) claim that Contract A
which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and
subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be
declared void.
Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case. These three
contracts are as follows:
Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Defendant CAA and Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of
land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
defendant Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. over the same
parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant Civil Aeronautics
Administration and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of
land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.
RTC ruled that the first and second lease contract between the parties were validly cancelled
and the third lease contract is VALID and subsisting
On June 2, 1976, defendant Leveriza filed a motion for new trial DENIED; MR - DENIED
CA - affirmed RTC
ISSUE: WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CAA HAD THE STATUTORY
AUTHORITY TO LEASE, EVEN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE THEN SECRETARY
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, REAL PROPERTY BELONGING TO
THE RP?
HELD: NO.
The CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real property belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines under its administration even without the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law, more
particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall
have, among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the
Manila International Airport and all government aerodromes except those
controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including
such power and duties as: ... (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of
any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity;
(c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of
ways, and easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no
real property thus acquired and any other real property of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the
President of the Philippines. ...
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law
while Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property
subject of the lease in Contract "C" is real property belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed: (1)
by the President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an
officer expressly vested by law. It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the
government under the third category. Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration has the power to execute the deed or contract involving
leases of real properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not because it is an
entity duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is,
by law expressly vested in it.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director)
of the Civil Aeronautics Administration by reason of its creation and existence, administers
properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on these properties that the
Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and
execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity
and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and
easements which may be proper or necessary. The exception, however, is the sale of
properties acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the
approval of the President of the Philippines. The Court of appeals took cognizance of the
striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and
is convinced as we are, that the Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration does not
need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications in the execution of Contract "C."
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates
that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable
(Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),. that specific statute prevails over a general
statute (De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail
(Wil Wilhensen, Inc. v. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO
DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY
and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
Facts:
On March 23, 1971, the respondent spouses Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court seeking the adoption of 2 minors.
The minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang (grandchildren of respondent spouses),
assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an
opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses
Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, petitioners' mother,
who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to
adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The court granted the petition for adoption.
o In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondent judge
held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is
included would violate the legal maxim that what is expressly included
would naturally exclude what is not included".
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners.
Petitioners contention:
The adoption would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but
would result in the reduction of their legititimes.
It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is
contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the
offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and
renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
Issue: Whether the respondent spouses Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1),
Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
Held: NO.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction;
xxx xxx xxx

SC finds that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as
pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear
and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule
is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject
of statutory construction. (NOTE)
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines,
obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are
disqualified to adopt.
The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which
served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174,
disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting.
Under this article, the spouses Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they
have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein.
But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall,
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November
13,1995.(the recall election was reset for three times the last being set on January 13,
1996)

Petitioner filed a petition for injunction for the election recall before the RTC.

RTC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take
place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January
13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In
support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA
621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be
had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election.
ISSUE: WON the recall election should materialize?
HELD: YES.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election.
[Emphasis added]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his
term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A
No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview
of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government
Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.


It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
7
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of
the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a
local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanismof recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors.
That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit
that vivifieth". . .


The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May
1997.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall
election should be as it is hereby made permanent.

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA et. Al., petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of
Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts:

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex, who, while working at
its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as
a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine.
Petitioners were able to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission.
Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide
the miners with adequate safety protection.
Because of this supervening fact, they also filed an action for damages against Philex
before the RTC.
Philex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the causes of action of
petitioners are based on an industrial accident and are covered by the provisions of
the WCA and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed an opposition to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes
of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on
the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also
applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in
the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall
apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.
RTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case as the WCA has jurisdiction over
the same ultimately dismissing the case in favour of Philex.
Petitioners thus filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether petitioners can still go after Philex despite having claimed benefits under
WCA.

HELD: Yes.

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on
the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages.
Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
entitle them to compensation thereunder.
In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from
accident arising out of and in the course of their employments.
The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate
failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence
of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working
underground.
Issue: Whether the remedies available to petitioners are selective.
Held: Yes.
SC holds that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after
receiving compensation under the Act.
Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and
regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress
under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser
amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
On the issue of judicial legislation:
The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social
justice and protection of labo secured by Constitution.
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be
resolved in favor of the workers and employees.
The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton
neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide
safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker.
Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an
exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates
of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of
the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the
deceased mining employees.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being.
The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot
legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code,
recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do
and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator,
like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to
which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate
all situations.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are
already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear
the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by
the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos,

is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.
Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares
form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. Respondent GSIS refused to accept.
Hence, petitioner filed prohibition and mandamus directly to SC
ISSUE: WON the Filipino First Policy is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement?
HELD: NO. IT IS SELF-EXECUTING
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, sincetheConstitution is thefundamental, paramount and supreme
law of thenation, it is deemed written in every statuteand contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers
who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.
The prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may
be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of
such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.


G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla
Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of
12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro.
The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna
participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting
insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner.
Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped
him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband,
Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew.
On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a
fine of P500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial courts decision was affirmed by the
appellate court.
Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974.
On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of
Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section
189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the
Insurance Act.

Held: NO.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole.
In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting
as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for
insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance
agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty
to be imposed for its violation.
The appellate courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second
paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the
definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of
Section 189, which is any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent
within the intent of this section.
Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any
person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of
authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the
solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no
offense.
In the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled
Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance
solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and
concluded insurance contracts for compensation.
It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was
one for compensation.
This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused
could not be sustained.
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the
crime must be alleged and proved.
After going over the records of this case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor
General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.


*** Halos Konti lang na-edit ko ditto kasi legislative intent to, kailangan ung
discussion

G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista
Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the
collection of a sum of money. Judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation.
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and
served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the
attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was
alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are
hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in
cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking
institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section
two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to
an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than
twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court
DENIED. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from
receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong
moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he
was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days
from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by
the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong
instituted the instant petition.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall
within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned
orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the
bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.
ISSUE: WON bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation
cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforequoted provisions of law?
HELD: NO, the said account can be garnished.
The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it,
so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill
No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not
the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to
satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman
of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an
individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the
deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has
pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the
primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring
about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry
is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code,
the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us
assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for
garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a
certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into
the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or
by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or
rather, the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability
already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government;
but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for
purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence
and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary
garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of
procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely
establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this
judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does
this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or
scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is
P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into
the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that
obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has
been made in evasion of taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for
the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties
of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the
judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot
attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from
Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it
could be reached by attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be
attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp.
3839-3840, July 27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the
two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit
is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive
that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their
just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into
cash and depositing the same in a bank.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.


G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETERANS
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI Manila,
Branch III, and CALIXTO V. GASILAO, respondents.
Facts:

Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took
active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military
service, he was rendered disabled.
The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans
Board,(now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government
charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of
veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents.
On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from
Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in the line of duty.
Due to Gasilaos failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to
establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board on
Dec. 18, 1955.
On Aug. 8, 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his supporting papers and, after due
investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his
disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9of R.A. No.
65.
Later on, R.A. No. 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969, providing for an increase in
the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried
minor children. Gasilaos monthly pension was, however, increased only on
January 15, 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact that
it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so
released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase.
On 15 January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully R.A. No. 5753
and allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.
In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he
claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for
pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved.
However, the Board contends that based on Section 15 of R.A. No. 65 since the
section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by
the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension,
therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from the date of
approval of the application.

Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.

Held: He is entitled to the pension from 1955, from the time of his application for
pension.

The stand of the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit and
intent of the law, considering that R.A. No. 65 is a veteran pension law which must
be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those
entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits granted thereunder, among which
are the right to resume old positions in the government, educational benefits, the
privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension for the incapacitated,
pensions for widow and children, hospitalization and medical care benefits.
As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to
compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured
and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become
incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line
of duty.
A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and
recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of
war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid.
For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to
pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension.
Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to
be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension
laws must depend on its own particular language.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaos pension effective 18 December 1955 at
the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried
minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June
1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said
Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the
period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject
to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.