A Program for Research and Instruction in the Philosophy of Sport: A Collingwoodian

Recommendation
Author(s): S. K. Wertz
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Source: Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 97-102
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A
Program
for Research and Instruction
in the
Philosophy
of
Sport:
A
Collingwoodian
Recommendation
S.K. WERTZ
The
philosophy
of
sport
is still in a
juvenile stage;
it lacks overall direction
and
focus,
consequently
it takes on
many
different
shapes
and forms. In this
paper
I shall outline a
program
of research and instruction for the field that
will assist in
correcting
its
delinquent ways.
Such an outline is now
possible
because a sufficient amount of
conceptual investigation
has been done in
various
areas,
that
is,
a critical mass has been achieved in the literature to
suggest
where the
philosophy
of
sport
needs to focus in the future for it to
emerge
as a
discipline comparable
to other areas of
applied philosophy.
I
propose
one such recommendation here.
How
important
is the demarcation
problem
for the
philosophy
of
sport?
I would
answer,
foremost. The reason
why
can be
appreciated by
an
analogy
with the
philosophy
of art. For
example,
let us look at R.G.
Collingwood's
The
Principles of
Art and how it is
organized.
Book I on "Art and Not Art"
intends to "clear
up
our minds as to the distinction between art
proper,
which
is what aesthetics is
about,
and certain other
things
which are different from
it but are often called
by
the same name."l He adds that
[m]any
false aesthetic theories are
fairly
accurate accounts of these
other
things,
and much bad artistic
practice
comes from
confusing
them with art
proper.
These errors in
theory
and
practice
should dis-
appear
when the distinctions in
question
are
properly apprehended
(PA, vi).
It seems to me that this method of
inquiry applies
to the
philosophy
of
sport.
We need to be clear as to the distinction between
sport proper
and
certain other
activities,
like
chess,
coaching,
and
fighting,
which are different
from it but are often called
by
the same name. For
example,
there are
people
who
say
that
fighting
is
just part
of the
sport
of
hockey
or that
synchronized
S.K. Wertz is Professor in the
Department
of
Philosophy
at Texas Christian Univer-
sity.
He has
recently
written two books, Between Hume's
Philosophy
and
History:
His-
torical
Theory
and Practice and
Talking
a Good Game:
Inquiries
into the
Principles of Sport,
as well articles in
journals including Informal Logic,
Hume
Studies,
and the International
Journal of Applied Philosophy.
Journal of
Aesthetic
Education,
Vol.
36,
No.
3,
Fall 2002
02002
Board of Trustees of the
University
of Illinois
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98 S.K. Wertz
swimming
is not
sport
because there is no
physical
confrontation or chal-
lenge
to it. Much bad
sport practice
comes from
confusing
these activities
with
sport proper.
Someone who
appreciated
the demarcation
problem
for
the
philosophy
of
sport
is Bernard
Jeu,
who
poses
these
questions
which
guided
his structuralist
study
in this fashion: "How do we circumscribe the
sphere
of what is in essence
sport?
When is
sport
no
longer properly
so
called? What is the threshold
beyond
which the notion of
sport
becomes
something
else? In other
words,
with what should it not be confused?"2 To
answer these
questions
he focuses on the nature of
sport
action
-
a
topic
which is
beginning
to receive
greater
attention. But
Jeu
set the
precedent
in
1972. We should now follow in his bold
footsteps.
Nevertheless,
let us
continue our
analogy
with
Collingwood's Principles.
Collingwood proceeds
to Book II which is "devoted to a
philosophical
exposition
of the terms used in this
preliminary
account of art" and those
terms are
"feeling," "thought,"
"sensation,"
"imagination,"
"conscious-
ness,"
and
"language" (PA, vii).
In fact, Book II is called "The
Theory
of
Imagination"
and such a
theory
is needed because art
proper
consists of
two cornerstones: the
expression
of emotion and the
imaginative experience.
"By creating
for ourselves an
imaginary experience
or
activity,
we
express
our
emotions;"
he
concludes,
"and this is what we call art"
(PA, 151).
Collingwood promises
us that
"[w]hen
these two lines of
inquiry [Books
I
and
II]
are
complete, they
should
coincide;
and their union should
produce
a
theory
of
art,
to be stated in Book III"
(PA, 153).
The work of Book I he
labels as
"empirical
or
descriptive,"
which I would call
"conceptual"
since
he is
describing practices
in the
artworld,
and the work of Book II as
"analytical" (PA, 273).
Likewise with
sport.
After we
distinguish
bad
sport practice
from
sport
proper,
we can
proceed
to a
philosophical exposition
of the terms used in
the
preliminary
account of
sport,
and those terms are
"bodily
move-
ment(s)" (David Best),
"action"
(David Carr,
Hans
Lenk,
S.K.
Wertz),
"mo-
tor action"
(Jan
W.I.
Tamboer), "rhythmic
movement
pattern" (Sigmund
Loland),
"manner of
displacing" (Tamboer), "technique" (Loland),
"me-
chanics"
(Loland),
"skill"
(Carr), "phenomenological experience"
or other
terms to denote a
special
kind of
experience undergone
in the activities of
sport,
like "embodiment"
(for example,
Klaus V.
Meier).3
Where
art,
for
Collingwood,
needed a
theory
of
imagination
because he
thought
of the
work of art as an
imaginary object,
we need a
theory
of action for
sport (PA,
139ff).
The
sporting
event is
purposive, physical activity.
So
my
recommen-
dation for the
philosophy
of
sport
is that we do
precisely
that
-
to con-
struct a
theory
of action.
Fortunately,
there is a vast amount of literature in
twentieth
century philosophy, especially
that
stemming
from the
analytical
tradition,
so that will be of assistance in our
task,
such as the work of
Castafieda and Goldman.4 But also some
attempts
in the
philosophy
of
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Philosophy of Sport
99
sport
have been
made,
initially by
Best, Carr,
and
R.J. Paddick;
and later
by
Lenk, Wertz, Tamboer, Loland,
Scott
Kretchmar,
Robert
Osterhoudt,
and
Gunnar Breivik.5
After this work has been
completed,
then
-
and
only
then
-
can we
adequately
construct a
theory
of
sport.
Such a
theory
will consist of some of
the
practical consequences by suggesting
what kinds of
obligation
the ac-
ceptance
of the
theory
of
sport
would
impose upon
athletes and
spectators,
and in what kinds of
ways they
could be met.
And,
continuing
to follow
Collingwood,
the
preliminary
account of
sport
-
the demarcation
problem
-
will be converted into a
philosophy
of
sport.
If we are to make it into
more than a mere intellectual
exercise,
it will need to have the
practical
con-
sequences bearing
on the
way
in which we
ought
to
approach
the
practice
of
sport
(whether
as athletes or as
spectators)
and
hence,
because a
philoso-
phy
of
sport
is a
theory
as to the
place
of
sport
in life as a
whole,
the
practice
of life. So the
big questions
here are: Is
sport
a
language?
Is there communi-
cation
going
on in
sport?
Is there truth or truthfulness in
sport
and its
prac-
tices? What is the
relationship
between
sport
and the
community?
What is
the
relationship
between the athlete and the
community?
Why
is
Collingwood's
scheme
something
we should
pay
attention to?
Several
sport philosophers
and
many sport journalists begin
with the
theory
of
sport.
This situation is understandable because a
theory
of
sport
is what
they
and the
public
at
large
want. But as
Collingwood
warns,
they
will not
get
there unless
they
first work
through
the demarcation
problem
and the
theory
of action
(PA, 2).
Much has been written on the demarcation
prob-
lem and the
theory
of
sport,
but
precious
little work on the
theory
of action
in
sport
until
recently, although
Jeu
anticipated
the focus on
action,
so a fur-
ther recommendation is that we concentrate our efforts in this area so that
adequate ground
can be laid for a
theory
of
sport.
If we do not answer the
question
-
What is the nature of
sport
action?
-
we will never be in a
posi-
tion to construct an
adequate theory
of
sport.
In other
words,
we need to
know what the basic constituents of
sport
are to know what
sport
is. We
have not done this and it is time for this to be done. Kretchmar in articles
and in his new book has made some
headway
on these
methodological
priorities.6
It is
possible
for a
philosopher
who is trained in action
theory
to
bring
his or her talents to bear on this
program
and not to do a
preliminary
ac-
count of
sport
and
non-sport practices by focusing
on
paradigms
of
sport
proper.
The
only potential difficulty
with this
strategy
is that one cannot be
sure of the
range
of
interpretation
over activities and action. The
range
could be too narrow or too broad. As I remarked
earlier,
the former is far
more
damaging
than the latter
deficiency.7
The demarcation
problem
can be handled in two different
ways.
The
first is to attack the
problem globally
which would involve the search for
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100 S.K. Wertz
traits or characteristics in
sport practices
that would
apply
to all
sport
ac-
tions. Essentialists
usually
maintain this
position.
The other
way
is
by
taking
one issue or case at a time and
attempting
to resolve the demarcation
problem
and then
develop
a
theory
of
sport
action on the basis of it.
Prag-
matists
usually
maintain this
position.
This
piecemeal approach
is
perhaps
the best
way
for us to
proceed,
since the
philosophy
of
sport
is still a rela-
tively young
field.
(Its
main
organization,
the
Philosophic Society
for the
Study
of
Sport,
now called International Association for the
Philosophy
of
Sport,
was founded in 1972 and its
journal, Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport,
started in
1974.)
When
enough
case studies have been
done,
it
may put
us
into a
position
where the demarcation
problem
can be handled
holistically.
Loland's
study
of
Alpine skiing
is not
only important by
itself,
but it will
contribute in the end to the
global
solution.8
Besides the distinction between
sport
and
non-sport,
a distinction needs
to be drawn between
good sport practices,
and bad or weak
sport practices.
Ice
hockey
and basketball in an
Olympic
context are
examples
of
good sport
practices
whereas those
sports played
in a
professional
context which toler-
ates
fighting
are bad or weak
sport practices. Fraleigh's study
is
insightful
in
regard
to this evaluative
distinction,
because he insists on
talking
about
right
actions in
sport
and,
in
miniature,
why
the
good
foul is not
good.9
Such a distinction shows
us,
among
other
things,
that a
descriptive
defini-
tion of what
sport
is as that which is
accepted by
the
sport community
and
what athletes or others in the
sports
world do is
inadequate. Consequently
more is needed than
just
an institutional
theory
of
sport.
A
theory
of
sport
action will fill out and breathe life into institutional theories of
sport.
As the title of
my
recommendation
suggests,
the mandate here is not
only
for
research,
but for instruction in
philosophy
of
sport.
Courses at both
the
undergraduate
and
graduate
levels should be
developed along
the lines
I have outlined above.10 In a fifteen week semester
term,
the
beginning
five
weeks could be devoted to the demarcation
problem,
the middle five weeks
to the
theory
of human
action,
and the last five weeks to the
theory
of
sport.
In the last
segment,
William
Morgan's
recent book should be discussed.
Titled
Leftist
Theories
of Sport:
A
Critique
and
Reconstruction,
it studies a
group
of theories he calls "Leftist" because of "its
practical, emancipatory
intent" of "not
simply
to
comprehend
the world of
sport
but to
change
it."1l
Further, "[i]f,
as the radical critics
[for example,
Marx]
insist
above,
the
analysis
of
sport
must be based on an
analysis
of labor
(work),
then the
question
arises as to what sort of relation holds between work and
sport";
in other
words,
"sport
is
depicted
as a mere double of
work,
duplicating
its
techniques
and laws of
production,
its forms of
organization,
and its inner-
most mores and values."12 So whatever
unique
characteristics or functions
sport
has
drop
out in a Marxist
analysis. Sport
is reduced to its context or
environment which is looked at
historically
and
economically
determined.
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Philosophy of Sport
101
All this becomes
very unsatisfying
for those
philosophically
interested in
sport. Morgan carefully analyzes
these
concepts
in the
pages
that
follow,
which makes for
exciting study.
Due to the
deficiency
of an
adequate theory
of
sport
actions,
the focus of
sport philosophy
courses should be in this area
-
the middle
segment.
A
generation
of scholars
pursuing
the
development
of such a
theory
will en-
able the
philosophy
of
sport
to make
significant
advancement toward a
comprehensive integration
of
philosophical
ideals.13
NOTES
1. R.G.
Collingwood,
The
Principles of
Art
(1938; reprint,
New York: Oxford Univer-
sity
Press, 1958),
vi. This book will be cited as PA in the text for all
subsequent
references.
2. Bernard
Jeu,
"What Is
Sport?" Diogenes:
An International Review
of Philosophy
and
Humanistic Studies 80
(Winter 1972):
154.
3. This literature includes: David
Best,
Philosophy
and Human Movement
(London:
George
Allen and
Unwin,
1978);
David
Carr,
"Practical
Reasoning
and
Knowing
How," Journal of
Human Movement Studies 4
(1978): 3-20;
David
Carr,
"The Lan-
guage
of
Action,
Ability,
and Skill: Part I
-
The
Language
of
Action," Journal of
Human Movement Studies 6
(1980): 75-94;
David
Carr,
"The
Language
of
Action,
Ability,
and Skill: Part II- The
Language
of
Ability
and
Skill," Journal of
Human
Movement Studies 6
(1980):
111-26;
Hans
Lenk,
"Action
Theory
and the Social Sci-
entific
Analysis
of
Sport
Actions,"
in
Sport
Inside Out:
Readings
in Literature and
Philosophy,
ed. David L. Vanderwerken and S.K. Wertz
(Fort
Worth: Texas
Christian
University
Press,
1985),
480-86;
Hans
Lenk,
"Prolegomena
Toward an
Analytic Philosophy
of
Sport,"
in
Sport
Inside
Out, 474-80;
S.K.
Wertz,
Talking
a
Good Game:
Inquiries
into the
Principles of Sport (Dallas:
Southern Methodist Uni-
versity
Press, 1991), chap.
6; Jan
W.I.
Tamboer,
"Sport
and Motor
Actions," Jour-
nal
of
the
Philosophy of Sport
19
(1992):
31-45; Jan
W.I.
Tamboer,
"On the Contin-
gent
Relation between Motor Actions and
Sport:
A Reaction to
Kretchmar,"
Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
20-21
(1993-1994):
82-90;
Sigmund
Loland,
"The
Mechanics and
Meaning
of
Alpine Skiing: Methodological
and
Epistemological
Notes on the
Study
of
Sport Technique,"
Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
19
(1992): 55-77;
Klaus V.
Meier,
"Cartesian and
Phenomenological Anthropology:
The Radical Shift and Its
Meaning
for
Sport," Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
2
(1975): 51-73;
and Klaus V.
Meier, "Embodiment,
Sport,
and
Meaning,"
in Philo-
sophic Inquiry
in
Sport,
ed. William
J.
Morgan
and Klaus V. Meier
(Champaign,
Ill.: Human Kinetics
Publishers, 1988),
93-101.
4. Hector-Neri
Castaneda,
"Intensionality
and
Identity
in Human Action and
Philosophical
Method,"
Nous 13
(1979): 235-60;
Alvin I.
Goldman, "Action,
Cau-
sation,
and
Unity,"
Nous 13
(1979): 261-70; also,
for
starters,
see Robert
Audi,
Ac-
tion, Intention,
and Reason
(Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press, 1993);
Annette C.
Baier,
"The Search for Basic
Actions,"
American
Philosophical Quarterly
13,
no. 2
(April 1971): 161-70;
Lewis White
Beck,
The Actor and the
Spectator (New
Haven:
Yale
University
Press, 1975);
Michael
Brenner, ed., The Structure
of
Action
(New
York: St. Martin's
Press, 1980);
Eric
D'Arcy,
Human Acts: An
Essay
in Their Moral
Evaluation
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press, 1963);
Arthur C.
Danto,
Analytical
Philoso-
phy of
Action
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973);
Donald
Davidson,
Essays
on Actions and Events
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,
1980);
Lawrence H.
Davis,
Theory of
Action
(Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1979); Jennifer
Horsby,
Actions
(London: Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul, 1980);
Laurence D.
This content downloaded on Fri, 15 Feb 2013 15:40:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
102 S.. Wertz
Houlgate,
"Mistake in
Performance," Mind 75
(April 1966):
257-61;
Glenn
Langford,
Human Action
(Garden City,
N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1971);
A.R.
Louch,
Ex-
planation
and Human Action
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press,
1969);
Alfred R.
Mele,
"Recent Work on Intentional
Action,"
American
Philosophical
Quarterly
29,
no. 3
(July 1992): 199-217;
Thomas
Morawetz,
"The
Concept
of a
Practice,"
Philosophical
Studies 24
(1973): 209-26;
Paul K. Moser and Alfred R.
Mele,
"Intentional
Action,"
Nous
28,
no. 1
(March 1994):
39-68;
Irving Thalberg,
Enigmas of Agency:
Studies in the
Philosophy of
Human Action
(New
York: Humani-
ties
Press, 1972); Irving Thalberg, Perception,
Emotion,
and Action
(New
Haven:
Yale
University
Press, 1977);
Alan R.
White,
The
Philosophy of
Mind
(New
York:
Random
House, 1967);
and Alan R.
White, ed.,
The
Philosophy of
Action
(London:
Oxford
University
Press, 1968).
5. In addition to the literature cited in Note
4,
consult Gunnar
Breivick,
"'On the
Move,'
Some Reflections on
Epistemology
and
Movement,"
Discourse on
Sport:
Proceedings of
the 21st Annual
Conference of
the
PSSS,
ed. Simon Eassom
(Bedford,
England:
Centre for
Applied Sport Philosophy
and Ethics
Research,
1994),
19-
24;
Warren
Fraleigh, "Why
the Good Foul Is Not
Good,"
in
Sport
Inside
Out,
462-
66;
Warren
Fraleigh, Right
Actions in
Sport (Champaign,
Ill.: Human
Kinetics,
1984);
Gunter
Gebauer,
"Sport,
Theater,
and Ritual: Three
Ways
of World-
Making," Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
20-21
(1993-1994): 102-6;
R. Scott
Kretchmar,
"'Distancing':
An
Essay
on Abstract
Thinking
in
Sport
Perfor-
mances,"
in
Sport
Inside
Out, 87-103;
Scott
Kretchmar,
"Reactions to Tamboer's
'Sport
and Motor
Actions,"' Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
19
(1992): 47-53;
Scott
Kretchmar,
A Practical
Philosophy of Sport (Champaign:
Human
Kinetics,
1994);
Robert G.
Osterhoudt, "Tamboer, Kretchmar,
and Loland: Sacred Texts
for an
Unholy Critique," Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
20-21
(1993-1994):
91-
101; R.J. Paddick,
"What Makes
Physical Activity Physical?" Journal of
the Phi-
losophy of Sport
2
(1975): 12-22,
and S.K.
Wertz,
"Is
Sport Unique?
A
Question
of
Definability," Journal of
the
Philosophy of Sport
22
(1995):
83-93.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8.
Loland,
"Mechanics and
Meaning
of
Alpine
Skiing,"
55-77.
9.
Fraleigh, "Why
the Good Foul is Not
Good,"
462-66.
10. For
pedagogical
details that outline some course
possibilities,
see S.K.
Wertz,
"Teaching Sport Philosophy Analytically," Teaching Philosophy
9,
no. 2
(June
1986):
121-46 and S.K.
Wertz,
"'Time Out':
Teaching Sport
and
Philosophical
Analysis,"
in
Sport
in the Classroom:
Essays
on
Teaching Sport-Related
Courses in the
Humanities,
ed. David L. Vanderwerken
(Cranbury,
N.J.:
Associated
University
Presses, 1990),
86-103.
11. William
J.
Morgan, Leftist
Theories
of Sport:
A
Critique
and Reconstruction
(Urbana:
University
of Illinois
Press,
1994),
19.
12. Ibid., 22-23.
13. This
paper
was read at A
Comparative Approach
to
Sport,
The 29th Annual
Texas Tech
University Comparative
Literature
Symposium,
Lubbock, Texas,
January
1996. I want to thank those
present
for their comments and
suggestions,
especially my colleague
David L. Vanderwerken.
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