NextGen Air Traffic Control: ADS-B

Flaws and Fixes

M Nishant
Submitted in partial fulfilment of dual degree (B.Tech Aerospace & M.Tech Avionics)
Amity Institute of Space Science and Technology, A4717210012
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Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the most important components of
FAAs NextGen national airspace transformation. It is a cooperative surveillance technology for
tracking aircraft. This technology will radically change the tracking of aircrafts by air traffic
control.
Replacing the current radar based
ground stations, ADS-B system
depends upon the aircraft to
broadcast its position using an
internal GPS receiver. The system
relies on two avionics components- a
GPS navigation source and a data
link. The planned data links operate
at 1090 MHz or 978 MHz (General
Aviation).
Requirement for ADS-B
Firstly, there is a requirement for accurate positioning of aircraft. ADS-B satisfies this requirement
as GPS derived location is much more accurate than current radar equipment. Improved accuracy
will allow a decrease in separation minimums between aircrafts thereby increasing the airspace
capacity. Secondly, ADS-B systems are cheaper to install, operate and maintain than conventional
radar systems. Thirdly, ADS-B is a broadcast service that can be received by other aircraft as well
as ATC on the ground. This allows an aircraft to have accurate traffic awareness of nearby
airspace.

ADS-B System
At is essence ADS-B is an air traffic management surveillance network where aircraft broadcast
the position via on-board transmitters. The ADS-B system receives position data from an internal
GPS unit. The GPS signal allows the aircraft to determine its exact location on the earth surface as
well as its altitude. Once the system has determined its exact position, it broadcasts the
information in a 112-bit unencrypted digital data stream. This data can be accessed by all ground
stations and aircrafts that are equipped with ADS-B receivers. The whole system is programmed
to broadcast its position every one second compared to the refresh time of 4.7 seconds in radar.
Since ADS-B is always broadcasting pilots will have increased situational awareness not only in
the air but on the ground as well.
ADS-B Standards
There are two types of ADS-B data link standards available: ADS-B OUT and ADS-B IN. ADS-B
OUT periodically broadcasts information about each aircraft, such as identification, current
position, altitude, and velocity, through an on-board transmitter. ADS-B OUT provides air traffic
controllers with accurate real-time position information. ADS-B IN allows for reception of
weather and traffic data through the ADS-B channel. It is a value-add capability and is not a
requirement for traffic control purposes.
Benefits of ADS-B
ADS-B provides many benefits to both pilots and air traffic control that improve both the safety
and efficiency of flight. When using ADS-B IN system, a pilot is able to view traffic information
surrounding the aircraft which includes altitude, speed and distance to aircraft. This provides the
pilot with improved situational awareness. ADS-B also provides better surveillance in fringe areas
of radar coverage. Apart from these benefits, ADS-B aids in reduced aircraft separations as
position tolerances associated to radar are eliminated.




ADS-B Data Block

The preamble of the Mode S downlink allows a synchronisation to a clock for decoding the Data
Block which is coded with the Pulse-Position-Modulation (PPM). The Data format of an ADS-B
message is the format number DF17. The content of the data field DF is here the decimal number
17, in binary code 10001. The three following bits (called Capability or CA) is the number of
sub-type of the ADS-B message. The length 3 bit gives eight different kinds of reports. The next
24 bits are the individual Aircraft Address. The next Data field of 56 bits is the carrier of the ADS-
B report, depending on the content of the CA field.
This report can include:
Aircraft type and aircraft ID
Altitude,
Encoded latitude,
Encoded longitude (both coarse), and
Airborne velocity.
The last 24 bits are the error detection code (Parity Information, PI).
GPS Vulnerabilities
ADS-B relies exclusively on the satellite based GPS constellation to derive aircraft position data.
GPS satellites and the signal they produce are susceptible to a host of vulnerabilities including
environmental anomalies and terrestrial based signal jamming.
On the environmental side solar storms are one of the biggest concerns. When a solar storm occurs
on the surface of the sun a large electromagnetic disturbance is created from a coronal mass
ejection (CME aka solar flare) that eventually impacts the earth. These events are termed
geomagnetic disturbances or GMDs. The GPS orbital array of satellites is vulnerable to spikes of
ground current that can result from GMDs interacting with the Earths magnetosphere. The GMD
can distort the GPS signals while they move through the ionosphere which can lead to position
accuracy errors.
Hacking and Spoofing of ADS-B Signal
The most important concern with ADS-B is its susceptibility to being hacked or spoofed. ADS-B
data streams broadcast by transmitters are unencrypted meaning anyone with a receiver can
capture the data and decode it. In addition anyone with a transmitter can create an ADS-B data
stream and broadcast it. There is also no authentication procedure in the current ADS-B
transmit/receive cycle. Without authentication every broadcast is assumed to be legitimate.
Spoofing can be done by transmitting data which resembles ADS-B data in same format. This
creation of ghost planes can be very dangerous for those real aircraft navigating the skies. Ghost
planes can cause aircraft collision avoidance systems to prompt the pilot to take evasive action.
ATC may be forced to provide avoidance vectors to real aircraft moving them off their optimal
flight paths and causing increased fuel burn and cost. An imaginary airplane can lead to very real
consequences for real airplanes.
Another concern with ADS-B systems is that there is no time stamp record. Hence legal ADS-B
data can be recorder and sent sometime later. This is called Data replay attack. This also creates an
illusion of an aircraft that is non-existent.
Conclusion and Recommendations
ADS-B is vastly superior to todays current technology and is clearly moving the NAS in the right
direction to ensure safety while simultaneously increasing capacity. The current ADS-B system is
not without flaws and weaknesses. The major concerns deal with reliance on satellite navigation
sources; signal jamming; and the unprotected data stream and transmission. Fortunately the long-
term implementation timeline has given time to address to these issues and make the system
better.
Adding encryption and authentication procedures would most likely go beyond just a software or
firmware update and require substantial hardware modification thereby increasing the
implementation cost taking into account that many manufacturers have equipment in production.
One possible solution is a second generation ADS-B standard that implements message
authentication and encryption into the data stream.
Another weakness in the ADS-B system is its sole reliance on GPS satellites. The unprotected
constellation is vulnerable to attack both physically and electronically in addition to environmental
disruptions. The design of compact and affordable INS solutions for aircraft could serve as an
aircraft based backup to mitigate the severity of a loss of GPS signal.
A secure and redundant ADS-B will allow users to confidently move forward with NextGen
implementation knowing that the system will continue to perform regardless of what challenges
await in the future.