2008 The authors.

Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Nursing Inquiry 2008; 15(1): 5766
F e a t u r e
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
How do we close the hermeneutic circle?
A Gadamerian approach to justication in
interpretation in qualitative studies
Jonas Debesay, Dagnn Nden and shild Sletteb
Oslo University College, Oslo, Norway
Accepted for publication 29 October 2007
DEBESAY J, NDEN D, SLETTEB . Nursing Inquiry 2008; 15: 5766
How do we close the hermeneutic circle?
In this article, an attempt is made to analyse important implications of the hermeneutic approach in qualitative studies. The
article discusses the hermeneutic circle with regard to reasoning contexts, on which the researchers interpretation is based.
Problems in connection with achievement of proper understanding in an interpretative process are discussed in light of
Gadamers hermeneutic philosophy. Some features of qualitative studies are addressed. This is concerned with arguments in
the presentation of ndings in qualitative studies using the hermeneutic approach. The essence of the article is there are
grounds for reasonable understanding, even though it cannot be absolute in the hermeneutic.
Key words: Gadamer, hermeneutic circle, interpretation, nursing research, qualitative.
Research studies using a phenomenological or hermeneutic
approach are central within nursing research (Draper 1996;
Geanellos 1998; Fleming, Glaidys and Robb 2003). Many
of the reasons for this are likely to include researchers
epistemological concerns when viewing the distinctive
nature of nursing as a relational science. This is, in our
opinion, also one of the reasons why the work of humanists,
1
such as Hans-Georg Gadamer (Vattimo 2000) in the eld of
hermeneutics are applicable in nursing research.
2
This article focuses on the insights that may be derived
from the hermeneutic circle, as described in Gadamers
philosophical hermeneutic, and discussion will therefore be
centred on the contexts we reason within and how we can
draw conclusions from these in practical research.
However, rst we shall provide a brief explanation of
the relationship between hermeneutic and qualitative
methodology followed by an explanation of the most
important features of the hermeneutic circle. We will then
discuss important problems connected with how we arrive at
the right understanding in an interpretative process, and
nally we will examine some methodological consequences
this has in respect of presentation of ndings in studies using
a hermeneutic approach.
QUALITATIVE METHOD AND
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS
There is a prevailing belief that the various qualitative
methods are epistemologically different and are connected
only insomuch as studies using qualitative methodology
present their ndings in the form of texts, in contrast to
quantitative methodology, whereby explanations can be
given using gures (Guba and Lincoln 1998; Cresswell 2003;
Rolfe 2006). The various methods range from positivist
and constructivist, to phenomenological and hermeneutic
Correspondence: Jonas Debesay, Oslo University College, Faculty of Nursing,
P.O. Box 4, St Olavs plass, 0130 Oslo, Norway
Email: <jonas.debesay@su.hio.no>
1
In this instance, the term humanist is used to designate the humanities.
2
The dissociation from a positivistic tradition is, however, also an implicit
reason.
J Debesay, D Nden and Sletteb
58 2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
methodology. There is no consensus, either in respect of use
of common criteria or the need for such between these
epistemological approaches (Rolfe 2006).
Many nurses have based their research on techniques
created by phenomenologists such as Colaizzi, Giorgi and
van Manen. These formulae for qualitative research have been
criticized over recent years for their weaknesses in respect of
congruence between the philosophical theories and use in
practical research (Paley 1997; Fleming, Glaidys and Robb
2003; Rolfe 2006). Consequently, greater concordance has
been called for between these approaches and their
implications on practical/empirical research activity (Paley
1997, 1998, 2005; Geanellos 2000; Fleming, Glaidys and
Robb 2003).
In this article we shall take our starting point in Hans-
Georg Gadamers hermeneutics. Guba and Lincoln (1998)
classify hermeneutics within the interpretative tradition,
under qualitative methods. Gadamer, however, prefers to
view hermeneutics as an approach; and not as a method
providing specic guidelines for the acquisition of new
knowledge. His primary intention is to reveal conditions that
facilitate understanding; an aim not intended to be subject to
scientic examination, but as being-in-the-world (Dasein).
His hermeneutic approach may also therefore be viewed as
an ontological philosophy. Consequently, the process of
understanding he describes is not limited to any method in
principle, be that qualitatively or quantitatively (Gadamer
2004).
THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE
Research into human activity requires our being able to
interpret the players intentions (Gilje and Grimen 1993).
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor denes the
human as a self-interpreting animal, and all understanding
with regard to social interactions must of necessity take its
starting point in the individuals understanding of himself/
herself (Fossland and Grimen 2001); consequently, all
understanding will also involve self-understanding.
Understanding is achieved by our interpreting within a
circular process, in which we move from a whole to the
individual parts and from the individual parts to the whole
through the hermeneutic circle. When we examine a body
of work, for example the Bible, the Koran or the Torah, we
must interpret the individual parts of the text, as determined
by the whole; whilst the whole is determined by the individual
elements of the work.
Our prejudices or preunderstanding are necessary condi-
tions for our understanding of the present. This recognition
stems from the fact that we never meet the world without
prejudice, but with preconceived expectations of it based on
prior experience. Consequently, understanding takes place
when a fusion of horizons of past and present occurs (Grondin
2003; Gadamer 2004). The dialogue of the text leads to
common formation of opinion about die Sache which is
always up for discussion. In this process, implicit prejudices
over which we have no conscious control appear to have
an inuence on our interpretations without our being aware
of it. This requires that we thematize our prejudices in order
to arrive at a proper understanding based on the actual issue
(Gadamer 1977).
This interrelationship between the whole and its
individual parts must not however, be seen as a circulus
vitiosus (vicious cycle), from which one cannot escape. In
the hermeneutic circle one does not remain in the same
place but constantly acquires new knowledge. As such, the
circle is a positive opportunity for gaining new knowledge
(Gadamer 1977). Hence, it has been argued that the
hermeneutic circle should rather be associated with a spiral
in order to avoid deterministic assumptions (dman 1979;
Gilje and Grimen 1993).
The distance in time (temporal distance) enables us to
reassess our prejudices in order to arrive at this understand-
ing. The temporal distance mediates as such between the
traditions that fuse into a new one. The prejudices may then
be viewed as being parts or elements of a tradition; while the
tradition in turn can be seen as a comprehensive system of
prejudices.
In this way, understanding takes place when the pre-
judices that lead to misunderstanding are ltered out through
the interplay of the whole and the parts in the hermeneutic circle. It
is not, however, the case that we understand better, but rather
that we understand in a different way, if we understand at
all (Gadamer 2004, 296). Neither is it the case that we are
moving towards a nal objective solution (Tate 1998).
Hermeneutics is therefore a process where, according to
Taylor, we attempt to render clear something that appears
unclear. Hence, we can understand the hermeneutic circle
as the context within which we must interpret and reason
(Gilje and Grimen 1993).
HOW DO WE ARRIVE AT
THE RIGHT INTERPRETATION?
When we interpret we need to know whether our inter-
pretation is sound, even though it cannot be nal. This is
even more important when we are required to pass this
information on to others. A researcher who has interpreted
players actions must also, according to Anthony Giddens,
be able to put this within a context and language which is
How do we close the hermeneutic circle?
2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 59
transparent to others; usually a research community (Gilje
and Grimen 1993).
To bring together the parts into one whole is a criterion
which Gadamer (1977) refers to as proper understanding.
This whole may be dened as that which is perceived to be
an adequate framework within which one interprets. But this
overall criterion can, according to Gilje and Grimen (1993),
be too strictly interpreted. In order to achieve a whole one
can be led to include something which does not actually
belong under the whole. There is also a risk that the
researchers leave a work one interprets too quickly without
several thorough examinations when an apparent whole
is achieved. Consequently, these risks may lead us to think of
these interpretations as arbitrary.
Interpretations occur within a process whereby a predraft
is continually revised as one gains a greater grasp of the text,
whereby mutually inconsistent terms or meanings are com-
pared and where only those which are relevant to die sache
are selected (Gadamer 1977). Consequently, there is always
an interplay, and tension, between the whole and its elements
in interpretation. This is therefore an issue of optimization,
where one shall nd a whole which is optimal in terms of the
prevailing circumstances (Larsson 1993). In connection
with this we can perhaps refer to the act of judging, which
Gadamer himself uses in several analogies. When a judge
interprets a statutory provision we will not usually say
that the interpretation is random, but that he is searching
for an accurate understanding/application of the law. Con-
sequently, understanding occurs when something absorbs us
or interests us (Gadamer 2004). The point here is not that
there is no interpretation which is more plausible than
another, but in order to make a judgement we, of necessity,
have to have a yardstick. Here Gadamer places the tradition
within which we always nd ourselves as such a yardstick.
Tradition inuences our attitudes in important areas,
and it must be taken as a legacy which does not necessarily
need to be analysed in advance, but just is. But never-
theless, there is nothing irrational or random about it, and
in agreement with Quentin Skinner we can say We accept
such beliefs on trust, on the grounds that we know no better,
that they look inherently plausible, and that most other
people feel the same (Skinner 1988b, 93).
The criteria of the whole, therefore presupposes the
tradition that we should be able to arrive at an adequate
understanding, but there are no grounds to believe the
tradition to be in stasis. We humans have created the
tradition and can and do change it on a regular basis. It is
not therefore a question of a xed internal content in the
tradition, but rather a content which changes meaning over
generations (Grondin 2003; Gadamer 2004).
One should view the hermeneutic circle as a heuristic
state (Tate 1998). It gives us a miniaturized view of the
understanding process in reality. Consequently, our inter-
pretations should be viewed in light of the fact that Gadamer
provides a philosophical description of how we understand,
not a method in its narrowest sense. Consequently, the
hermeneutical circle can in principle be interpreted too
strictly in practice despite traditional perceptions of
alternative methods of understanding.
So saying, the holism in Gadamers thinking can, as
we see it, prot signicantly from a coherent denition, as
proposed by the Norwegian philosopher and professor of
medical ethics Knut Erik Trany. Trany (1986) suggests
that in the research process one must be able to differentiate
between the signicant and the insignicant; seek freedom
to contradict and to come to logical-deductive conclusions
in order to achieve coherence.
We have now seen that hermeneutics proposes that the
search for knowledge is process orientated, and that the
search is not for complete knowledge (Ruth 1991). As such,
the understanding can be revised constantly, but in practical
research, resource-related factors limit our potential to rene
our understanding indenitely through the hermeneutic
circle (Fleming, Glaidys and Robb 2003). Consequently,
practical research must of necessity nd a plausible endpoint.
TEXT AND MEANING
In order to establish the meaning in a text we must interpret.
Two important questions arising in this context are: What
meaning? Meaning for whom?
The philosopher Paul Ricoeur attributes the text with an
autonomic status, and the intention of the interpretation is,
in his opinion, to understand the meaning of the text on its
own terms. This is interpreted as the text being disconnected
from the author and that his/her opinions are not what the
interpreter should look for in a text (Ricoeur 1981; Grimen
1995; Geanellos 2000; Shklar 2004). This reminds us of
Martin Luthers credo of sola scriptura, but we shall now
see that this theory is scarcely applicable under all circum-
stances where a text is to be interpreted.
The historian of ideas Quentin Skinner has maintained
the position that the researcher must endeavour to nd the
authors intentions, in other words, the thoughts the author
wished to impart through his composition or description of
actions, if it is to be correctly understood (Skinner 1988a).
Both standpoints can lead to unreasonable results in an
interpretative process and if we are to attempt to understand
a text on the basis of the authors intention, as Skinner
proposes, we must understand this intention beforehand.
J Debesay, D Nden and Sletteb
60 2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
However, this does not seem to be fruitful as a norm for all
text interpretation. Not only must we interpret the authors
intentions, but neither is it always possible to trace sources
which can reveal the authors intentions. Therefore, we will
often only have access to the text, and not the author.
Neither is Ricoeurs proposal unproblematic. It can hardly
be reasonable in practice to always give the text an auto-
nomic position vis--vis the author. One thing is that it is not
always possible to establish the authors intentions due to
poor/lack of sources; quite a different matter is that texts are
always interpretations, and that consequently the inter-
preter need not be concerned with the authors intention.
Skinner, rightly enough, asserts that the authors meaning
alone is not the most crucial factor in the interpretation of
a work (Skinner 1988a). This does not, however, weigh up
against the view that Skinner assumes an interpretive per-
spective which undervalues the plurality of interpretations,
insomuch as these are not viewed as a construction between
the text and the interpreter.
Ricoeurs perspective is closer to interpretations of works
of ction such as poetry, where the authors views are often
less important. This would be reasonable in the sense that
some people may experience the work as having a meaning
for himself/herself, without the author necessarily having
considered this (the works independent role). However,
even in poetry the authors intention need not be completely
unimportant, together with the fact that it runs contrary to
what researchers actually do when they interpret in practice
(Shklar 2004).
Gadamers views in the area may perhaps vary the
image. He proposes that when one wishes to understand,
one is not normally engaged in nding the objective truth in
what the text says as such: the interpretation takes place
based on prior-understanding and expectations of the
text to be interpreted. Moreover, interpretation is always
application; we interpret and try to understand when we
rst shall render something concrete for use (application)
(Gadamer 2004).
However, there is nothing wrong with trying to retrieve
the perspectives of others. Gadamers analogy of the work of
the judge or priest is often evident when one attempts to give
examples of the notion of application. In this case one may
consider a situation where a judge is presented with a case
and has to pass a judgement. The judge acts in accordance
with a statutory provision and must interpret it in light of
previous legal practice, in other words, how similar cases
were resolved previously (what is the norm for such cases?).
Where the law is unclear the judge must also establish the
legislators intentions with the law in practice this occurs
by interpretation of the preliminary work of the law. So-
called equitable considerations can also be crucial in certain
cases. These give an opinion of the reasonableness of any
decision weighed up against concrete individual or societal
interests.
This involves application of the law in a specic situation
which governs our interpretation in order to arrive at a
proper understanding whether that be the letter of the law
(where the law is unequivocal), the legislators intention or
other equitable considerations (where the law alone is too
equivocal such as it is).
What is crucial in determining whether one shall retrieve
the authors intention or the texts alone depends therefore
on what the purpose of the study is? It is also this continued
need for application which gives understanding (Grondin
2003).
Interpretation of intentions and actions are, in other
words, closely interconnected (Gilje and Grimen 1993).
Neither is there any principle difference in the historians
and the poets interpretive work, but the application can be
different.
3
It is also important to note here that in principle
we do not differentiate between texts and actions in our
account.
4
We have now asserted that Gadamers notion of applica-
tion can be helpful while determining whether to retrieve
the authors intention or not. Attempting to sort out which
studies in the eld of nursing coincide with one (Ricoeurs)
or the other (Skinners) assumption would, though, be
missing the point. It is rather, in our reading of Gadamer, the
different phases of the research process that will establish
what is most signicant at each time.
The application term in the hermeneutics inclines us to
reect upon the theoretical and practical implications of
our study. When presented with a clinical phenomenon, in
order to appropriate an understanding of it, we need to take
the context it is appearing within into account (Lindholm
2003).
Thus we strive to listen and take informants accounts
seriously while in the interviewing phase. This is also the case
for non-verbal language in hermeneutic observation studies
(Nden 2007; Bergbom 2007). Approaching the informants
expressions in this manner, with an openness and curiosity,
gives us an opportunity of gaining valuable insight in their
erlebnisse (experiences). However, we ought not to take
all informants or their accounts at face value in all cir-
cumstances. Some accounts may be, given the researchers
3
See also dmans (1992) Interpreting the past, a hermeneutic illustration in
interpretation of historic sources.
4
Hermeneutics have often been associated with the interpretation of text
alone, such an interpretation is scarcely reasonable.
How do we close the hermeneutic circle?
2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 61
preunderstanding and common knowledge, unclear or
misconceived. In this case the researcher should try to put
the retrieved information in a clearer light for her/his
audience, possibly by engaging in a subsequent dialogue
with the informant. The patients expressions of symptom
experiences can thus be put in a wider context using nursing
care and medical terminology.
Clearly this would entail some ethical considerations,
especially in dealing with vulnerable informants, which
should be duly addressed. The framework of this article
does, however, not permit a further discussion on this
theme.
UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN TRADITIONS
Alasdair Macintyre has proposed an expansion of the
hermeneutic circle in order to make it possible to be able to
consider foreign cultures on their own terms. He feels that
it should, so saying, be possible to acquire a new cultures
traditions, without ones own culture inuencing this under-
standing. In this way one should be in a position to assess the
other culture in a manner which does not presuppose biased
inuence of the rst. This has been rejected by Gadamer
(Tate 1998). Understanding is always coloured by ones
earlier culture/tradition and it is naive to think that one
can enter into another culture without drawing on ones
own previous experiences. It is also quite feasible to use
hermeneutic terms in order to include understanding of
other cultures. There is a polarized relationship between
familiarity and foreignness in hermeneutics, according to
Gadamer, but it is precisely this polarization on which the
hermeneutics are based namely, acknowledging this
temporal distance (Gadamer 1977). An analogy for such
understanding is that ones own preunderstanding is the old
horizon, and that this is the horizon with which one meets a
new strange horizon in new cultures. Consequently, these
two horizons meet each other in what we call the fusion of
horizons and result in a new understanding (Gadamer 2004).
Such understanding requires that the parties are curious
and have a wish to understand the foreign (Spence 2001).
These theories are also supported by Charles Taylor
(Fossland and Grimen 2001).
The hermeneutic framework of ideas can therefore be a
useful approach to studies whose eld of research is foreign
cultures. Thus far, however, interest has been low, a fact
which Niekerk (2004) is surprised at given the insight
which could have been acquired by such an approach.
The Australian nursing researcher Deborah G. Spence
(2001) has in this way used hermeneutics in order to
conceptualize how two different cultural backgrounds can
exceed their limitations and be able to conduct a dialogue
with each other.
THE RELATIVITY TRAP
In an attempt to distance oneself, not only from a xed
objective truth, but also from a Kantian idealism, with
setting of criteria for attainment of truth, hermeneutics
inclines undeniably towards relativism (Rose 2002). This can
create an unacceptable situation when an interpretation is
only required to be true, either for me (subjectivism) as
a single individual, or us (relativism) as a particular group,
something Rose (2002) has referred to as the twin horns
of irrationality. Such assumptions, however, are usually
connected to postmodern or constructivist epistemologies.
Since the constructivist perspective is part of the interpretive
tradition, it is necessary that we trace the different views that
are at odds with Gadamers philosophical hermeneutic
regarding the relativity discussion. Various constructivist
approaches exist but we can already discard some of those
with the most doubtful assumptions. The Norwegian
professor in theory of science, Harald Grimen, describes
one of the extreme variations, and demonstrates the fallacy
in the assumption that all social phenomena are social
constructions much less natural phenomena in fact this
is not always the case (Grimen 2006). Gadamers response to
this is No one doubts that the world can exist without
man and perhaps will do (Gadamer 2004, 444). At the same
time he avoids simultaneous subjectivism by placing the
interpreter into a historic tradition independent of himself
(Rose 2002).
The philosopher Paul Boghossian is of the opinion
that postmodern or constructivist approaches are self-
undermining. If the assumption anything goes is correct, why
then should we not believe the opposite also to be the case;
something which of necessity results from the assumption.
Boghossian doubts, however, that the constructivist is pre-
pared to accept such reasoning why then should relativism
be recommended ahead of other approaches? (Boghossian
2002). Gadamer also sees the unacceptable in the postmodern
approach, and feels almost that it proposes a monopoly
on the method of the truth. In this way, supporters of this
position are themselves in the claws of the Age of Enlighten-
ments rhetoric (Grondin 2003).
A more conciliatory form of constructivism is that the
constructivist can feel that social phenomena exist because
the players themselves acknowledge them. But this need not
obligate the constructivist to have the same belief, or equally
to believe that all social phenomena are social constructions
(Grimen 2006).
J Debesay, D Nden and Sletteb
62 2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
In the opposite situation we would end up running in
circles, insomuch as there is no basis for assessment,
and all interpretations would be equally random, which
can be a hopeless position to take in empirical research.
All interpretations in fact are rarely equally plausible, even
though they can be subjective.
HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION
Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are often cited as examples of
how the hermeneutics of suspicion operate. These have
revealed the agents false consciousness and urges such as
the will to power and sexual instinct, as properties the
agents themselves have not openly acknowledged
(Skjervheim 1992). Skepticism towards the meanings
which agents themselves attribute to their own actions has
therefore long been considered as a means of arriving at a
proper understanding. This, however, conicts with another
principle termed the infallibility thesis. This thesis will, in
short, assert that the agents interpretations ought not to be
corrected, with the consequence that the researchers
disclosures must correspond with the agents own inter-
pretation. Charles Taylor, however, explains that the agents
interpretations require theorizing, which places the
phenomenon one focuses on in a clearer light since the
agents own accounts are often not comprehensively
articulated (Fossland and Grimen 2001). Consequently, this
is not quite the same as saying that the agents may have made
an error, as Bourdieu is understood in Grimen (2006).
It may, in light of this, be important to have an open view
of thoughtlessness or apparently good actions, something
which several nursing researchers have shown examples of
in their research. Cortis (2004) studied nurses who in their
own opinion felt that they gave holistic nursing care to
patients from a different cultural background. He revealed
that this was not in agreement with his subsequent ndings
from interviews with the patients in question. The agents
descriptions of their own actions were, in this case, in
conict with the researchers description of the situation.
The same applies to all criticism of transcultural nursing,
partly because of the categorization created by this approach
to patients from ethnic minorities, and how this leads to an
unanticipated increase in stigmatization of the group one
wishes to help (Molassiotis 2004; Jeffreys 2005; Narayana-
samy 2005). In respect of this, Mulholland (1995) asserted
that transcultural nursings humanistic credo conceals
underlying power relationships.
Gadamer appears to be certain that individuals do not
always come to the same conclusion over the statement of the
facts disagreement arises! It is not the case that consensus
always exists, but neither is understanding completely
dependent on their being subsequent agreement over the
explanation of the case. The core to hermeneutic thinking
is being able to ask questions. Hence, understanding in
Gadamerian reasoning is not only a question of accepting
everything said by others uncritically. The fact that one
actually attempts to understand means that one in principle
must believe that he can be wrong. In this way, the differences
are the beginning of the hermeneutic dialogue and not as
deconstructivists such as Derrida might think; that this is
the end of the hermeneutic. Criticism is also a part of the
tradition. Traditions survive for as long as they serve the
needs of individuals, and are not immutable (Di Cesare
2004; Gadamer 2004). Taylor too is of the opinion that the
hermeneutic does not run contrary to the fact that the
researcher need not take the authors version as given, as
some have asserted (Taylor 1988). Much of the insight from
both Foucault and Derrida has also been raised by Gadamer,
and earlier than both authors, according to Niekerk.
Nonetheless, neither does Niekerk view this as being more
difcult to incorporate than the critical impulses within
hermeneutics (Niekerk 2004).
It is, however, clear that Gadamer does not problematize
asymmetrical power relationships and hidden agendas any
further in his discussion of the conditions for understanding.
This is also an element of the criticism levelled at him by
his former pupil, the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo
(Rose 2002).
THE PRINCIPLE OF MERCY
We cannot always be sure that our understanding is in agree-
ment with the persons with whom we converse. There will
always be potential for our interpretation to be awed, whilst
the texts author or the agents interpretation is sounder
(Gilje and Grimen 1993). One important precondition in
Gadamers hermeneutic is therefore to accept that one is in
error (Gadamer 2004). This brings us to another principle
under discussion; the principle of mercy. The principle is
based on getting the words and actions of those being
researched to appear sound. In order to understand the
agents opinions at all, this must be taken on its word, as long
as the opinions are reliable. Understanding is in fact made
possible by the researcher being in a position to conceptualize
the agents own opinions. A researcher who has understood
the informants opinion should therefore, in principle,
give a description of these opinions in a manner which is
acceptable to the informant. This is the case even where the
description uses other forms of expression and arrives at
conclusions other than those imagined by the informant.
How do we close the hermeneutic circle?
2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 63
Consequently, there is nothing wrong, in Gadamerian
thinking, with the view that informants can make errors, but
this cannot always be the case. This would in fact be a case of
making the so-called genetic fallacy, in other words the
metaphysical understanding that the respondents largely
have erroneous beliefs about social phenomena (Grimen
2006). Gadamer makes an analogy in this context to the
person who receives a letter. The letter is read with specic
expectations, depending on the extent to which the person
knows the letters author. In the rst instance this is not
simply the letter being read in a skeptical or suspicious
manner and it is only in the moment that parts of the letter
do not accord with the whole or other expectations of the
letters content, that there are reasonable grounds for
suspicion (Gadamer 1977).
The principle of mercy describes therefore a listening
approach, as laid down by hermeneutics. This assumption
appears to be more productive overall than constant
skepticism. Naturally, this will also depend on the theme
which is open to discussion in a research process. In such a
way, it would be more pressing to adopt a skeptical approach
in those cases where one believes that the informant has,
with a high degree of probability, something to hide. This
would, for example, not be a good approach when the
researcher has chosen good nurses to describe relevant
care actions towards patients. This does not, however,
exclude the possibility of the researcher being alert for
possible inconsistent responses or ulterior motives in their
responses. In principle a skeptical approach to the sources
need not therefore be in conict with the principle of
mercy. Nonetheless, in cases where inconsistency arises it
is not the case that the only benet is to discard our original
interpretation, but rather to have a conscious relationship
with this further along in the process. The discrepancy in
the informants answers can of course be due to a factor over
which the interpreter has no control; for example, ones own
incomplete understanding or ambiguity and inability to
clarify ones own intentions.
Consequently, the agents subjective opinions are neces-
sary, but are not sufcient conditions for arguments in
respect of the phenomenons validity. The researcher must
therefore constantly weight up when he/she shall undertake
a perspective analysis be able to see the case in a broader
context, and information analysis to be a participant in a
dialogue by behaving in accordance with the agents subjective
opinion (Gilje and Grimen 1993; Grimen 2006).
The hermeneutics of suspicion introduced hidden and
unacknowledged meanings as terms in research into human
behaviour. But these, according to the inuential Norwegian
philosopher who has written extensively on the issues of
hermeneutics and positivism Hans Skjervheim, are self-
immunizing theories, which cannot be disproved empirically.
Skjervheim feels therefore that there is more to gain from
reconstructing the classics phronesis notion of practical
wisdom (Skjervheim 1992). There is, of course, no Archime-
dean point for correct understanding. But this is hardly an
obstacle to decisions being taken on a discretionary basis
every single day. Understanding is, as such, probably easy in
everyday life, if one acts with goodwill. The problem rst
arises when we are required to explain how we do this
theoretically (Davidson 2004). For the sake of fairness it
should however, be mentioned that the requirement for
impartiality and lack of bias in everyday life is not often
required to be as strict as that in scientic research.
The principle of mercy demands therefore that one
strive after an intellectual openness which allows the
phenomenon to ... present itself in all its otherness and
thus assert its own truth against ones own fore-meanings
(Gadamer 2004, 272).
METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
FOR PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
In presenting ndings from research studies it is important
to have awareness about the philosophical preconditions in
the method used. Here we shall address some problems
relevant to how certain measures are applied in the research
process in studies inspired by Gadamers philosophical
hermeneutic.
Authors of articles in nursing journals frequently record
the criteria used in the various stages of the research process.
The disadvantage is that often no account is given of how
these criteria have been used in the situation in question.
Then, one may of course ask how useful this is, when one is
presented with a study which claims to have followed a
Gadamerian hermeneutic, and where the only feature of
this is the recorded criteria. This may often be for reasons of
space in some research journals. This may nonetheless not
be a favourable situation. The reasons are that the readers
cannot form an opinion if the method cited is used in an
appropriate manner, and in this way, unfortunately, quality
comments are withheld from the study.
A more passable method may be to give an account of
the grounds one has chosen for important decisions during
the research process. This can be achieved by referring to
apposite references or examples which can make clear the
premises of the arguments such that the reader is given
the opportunity to understand how interpretations may
have transpired (Geanellos 2000). Such a method is surely
more transparent and insightful.
J Debesay, D Nden and Sletteb
64 2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
A hermeneutist will often have to thematize his/her
preunderstanding in order to gain a better understanding of
the study object. Hence, on presentation of studys ndings
it is necessary to describe preconditions which are con-
sidered to be of relevance to ones interpretations. It will be
relevant to include some personal experiences in such a
description. It can often be difcult to determine what these
experiences are, and in which way they have affected the
study. Still, one should avoid the temptation to write a bio-
graphy (Larsson 1993). It is also important, in our opinion,
that the reader be informed of the theoretical framework for
interpretation. In such a way, the reader has the opportunity
to put the discussion of the ndings into a theoretical
context, something which must be particularly useful to the
reader who is not familiar with the framework within which
it is interpreted.
There seems furthermore to be an understanding that
hermeneutic studies should be satised with describing
the experiences of informants, without theorizing inter-
pretations. Such an interpretation must, however, build on
what John Paley (2005) has called phenomenological
rhetoric. His assertion is that researchers in the eld of
phenomenology uphold the view that one can keep their
biases outside of the result of the studies by giving a detailed
description of the informants assertions. In this way they
wish to bring forth the informants unique and pure voice,
such that the reader can judge themselves (Paley 2005).
In such a way, some hermeneutists have probably adapted
this to their studies uncritically. Several interpretations
are thought to occur in hermeneutics; the informants
interpretation of their surroundings, the researchers inter-
pretation of informants opinions and subsequent fusion of
horizons, and the readers interpretation of the researchers
descriptions. When one presupposes all these links in the
interpretation process it is therefore naive to think that the
result may be contaminated if the ndings are discussed
through adequate theory. Consequently it is not a case of
understanding that the researcher summarizes a value
neutral description. The researcher presents a co-created, or
constructed, version of the reality which he/she is responsible
for interpreting in the nal instance.
Another problem which often arises is the extent to
which one shall return descriptions collected to informants
for checking. In our understanding there cannot be anything
automatic in this. The crucial factor should be the extent to
which the researcher has gained a complete or adequate
understanding of the phenomenon being studied, based
on interpretation of the data gathered. Where there are
ambiguities in listening to tape recorded excerpts or on
transcribing, there are reasonable grounds for checking
with the informants, and with this in mind one should return
data collected (Fleming, Glaidys and Robb 2003). However,
in many cases ethical consideration will form the basis for
the decision to check with the informants, to the extent that
they can state whether they have been reported accurately.
When the hermeneutist attempts to understand the
agents actions, he/she makes a strategic selection which
can shed light on the issue studied. In this respect it is not
representative to make generalizations about what one is
looking for, but to have an in-depth understanding of a
phenomenon (Fossland and Grimen 2001). This has
implications in terms of how often one should interview
informants. In this context, Franklin, Trenestedt and Nor-
denfelt (2006), informs us of an informant who was removed
from the study as the subject was no longer available for second
round interviews. No reasons are given for the decision.
As such this reminds us of a report of missing values in
longitudinal quantitative studies. The most important factor
must be the centrality of the phenomenon: in other words,
the extent to which the researcher gains an accurate under-
standing of the case. It can hardly, therefore, be the cause
that one has an absolute need for several interviews with
informants. In the case of the study named, the researchers
could perhaps have used what they had already learned from
the informant in question, provided one is not of the opinion
that the phenomenon cannot be further elucidated. It may,
for example, be that this informant was a central supplier
of terms, and that it was no longer possible to re-establish
the phenomenons relevance.
All practical research is based on understanding and
judgement, and consequently is a reective process where
the researcher continually questions their own preunder-
standing and the plausibility of the ndings, which takes
place en route. It is therefore important to bear in mind
that Neither qualitative nor interpretive means impres-
sionistic. Along with procedural systematicity, the work
involves a philosophical rigor a rigor of logic and argu-
mentation rather than just a procedural rigor (Yanow
2003, 243). The ndings in a study should, thereby, be
considered based on the harmony of the parts in the whole,
rather than the extent to which specic techniques are
slavishly followed up in the study. The reasoning which
supports the ndings should be logically ordered, and at the
same time should convince the reader that the results are
adequate and stand up against alternative ways of under-
standing (Larsson 1993; Rolfe 2006). We must therefore in
this context, pin our trust in the assertion that ... what the
tool of method does not achieve must and really can be
achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a
discipline that guarantees truth. (Gadamer 2004, 484).
How do we close the hermeneutic circle?
2008 The authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 65
CONCLUSION
We achieve understanding through the hermeneutic circle.
This circle symbolizes the context within which we interpret.
We have now seen the need and necessity for being able to
acquire understanding in research activity, which in terms of
Gadamer presupposes a preunderstanding in a historically
impregnated tradition. Our grounds for adequate under-
standing must therefore be based on the fact that all
interpretation cannot be equally plausible, and that the
researcher can achieve a great deal by listening to their
informants and showing good judgement. At the same time
one should bear in mind the hermeneutic insight that the
understanding cannot be nal. But this closes the circle of
understanding, if only for now.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to Professor Ingegerd Bergbom, Institute of Health
and Care Sciences at the Gothenburg University, for helpful
and critical comments during the preparation of this article.
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