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Putnam's paradox
David Lewis
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To cite this article: David Lewis (1984): Putnam's paradox, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 62:3, 221-236
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 62, No. 3; September 1984
P UT NAM' S P AR ADOX
Da vi d Lewi s
Introduction. Hi l a r y P u t n a m has devi sed a b o mb t ha t t hr eat ens t o devas t at e
t he real i st p h i l o s o p h y we k n o w a n d l ove. 1 He expl ai ns h o w he has l ear ned
t o s t op wor r yi ng a nd l ove t he b o mb . He wel comes t he new or der t ha t it woul d
br i ng. ( RT&H, Pr e f a c e ) But we wh o still live i n t he t a r ge t ar ea do not agr ee.
The b o mb mus t be b a n n e d .
P u t n a m' s t hesi s ( t he b o mb ) is t hat , i n vi r t ue o f c ons i de r a t i ons f r o m t he
t he or y o f r ef er ence, it ma ke s n o sense t o s uppos e t ha t an empi r i cal l y i deal
t heor y, as veri fi ed as c a n be, mi ght never t hel ess be f al se becaus e t he wor l d
is not t he wa y t he t h e o r y says it is. Th e r e a s on gi ven is, r oughl y, t ha t t her e
is no s e ma nt i c gl ue t o st i ck o u r wo r d s o n t o t hei r r ef er ent s , a n d so r ef er ence
is ver y mu c h u p f or gr a bs ; b u t t her e is o n e f or c e c ons t r a i ni ng r ef er ence, a nd
t hat is o u r i nt e nt i on t o r ef er i n s uch a wa y t ha t we c o me out r i ght ; a nd t her e
is no c ount e r va i l i ng f or ce; a n d t he wor l d, n o ma t t e r wh a t it is l i ke ( al most ) ,
will a f f or d s ome s c he me o f r ef er ence t h a t ma ke s us c o me o u t r i ght ; so h o w
can we fai l t o c o me out r i ght ? 2
P u t n a m' s t hesi s is i ncr edi bl e. We ar e i n t he pr es ence o f p a r a d o x , as sur el y
as whe n we me e t t he ma n wh o of f er s us a p r o o f t ha t t her e ar e n o peopl e,
and i n pa r t i c ul a r t ha t he hi ms el f does n o t exist. 3 I t is o u t o f t he que s t i on
t o f ol l ow t he a r gume nt wher e it l eads. We k n o w i n advance t hat t her e is some-
t hi ng wr o n g , a n d t he chal l enge is t o f i nd o u t wher e. I f t he p a r a d o x - mo n g e r
is g o o d at hi s wo r k , we s t and t o l ear n s ome t hi ng; a n d i ndeed, I t hi nk t ha t
Pu t n a m' s p a r a d o x af f or ds a n i mp o r t a n t l esson.
I n t he first h a l f o f t he pa pe r I shal l gi ve my a c c o u n t o f wh a t I t a ke t o be
t he cor e o f P u t n a m' s a r gume nt , a nd I shal l s ay h o w I t hi nk it fai l s. I n t he
second ha l f o f t he pa pe r , I shal l r ai se s ome ques t i ons a b o u t aspect s o f
Pu t n a m' s pr e s e nt a t i on t ha t puzzl e me.
t HiaryPutnam`ReaismandReasnPreedingsftheAmericanhilsphicalAssciation
50 (1977) pp. 483-498, reprinted in Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences (Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1978), henceforth 'R&R', cited with page numbers from Meaning and the
Moral Sciences; 'Models and Reality', Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (1980) pp. 464-482,
henceforth 'M&R'; and Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, 1981),
henceforth 'RT&H'.
2 Compare the malicious joke: 'Mr. Z claims to have found a counterexample to my theory.
But he has misunderstood me, he has not interpreted my words as I intended. For I intended
that there be no counterexamples.'
3 Peter Unger, 'Why There Are No People', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), pp. 177-222;
and ' I Do Not Exist', in G. F. Macdonald, ed., Perception andldentity (Macmillan, 1979).
221
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222 Putnam's Paradox
Thr ee caveat s. (1) I war n t he r eader t hat I a m not sure how well I under -
st and Put na m. 4 Somet i mes, different t hi ngs he says seem t o poi nt in different
di rect i ons. Wha t is mor e, I shall st at e what I t ake t o be his ar gument in my
own way. I hope t he line of ar gument I discuss is Put na m' s , even i f r at her
freel y par aphr ased. But whet her it is his or not , I t hi nk it wor t hy of at t ent i on.
(2) I shal l acqui esce in Put na m' s linguistic t ur n: I shall discuss t he semant i c
i nt er pr et at i on of l anguage r at her t han t he assi sgnment of cont ent t o attitudes,
t hus i gnori ng t he possi bi l i t y t hat t he l at t er settles t he f or mer . I t woul d be
bet t er , I t hi nk, t o st ar t wi t h t he at t i t udes and go on t o l anguage. But I t hi nk
t hat woul d rel ocat e, r at her t han avoi d, t he pr obl em; wher ef or e I ma y as well
discuss it on Put na m' s own t e r ms : (3) I shall i gnor e t he compl ex det ai l s of
model - t heor et i c semant i cs f or nat ur al l anguage. I suppose t hat a pr oper treat-
ment woul d requi re i nt erpret at i ons in which t he semant i c val ues are el aborat e
set - t heor et i c const r uct i ons. 6 But I shall acqui esce in Put na m' s supposi t i on
t hat we can get by wi t h model t heor y in its ' basi c f or m' (R&R, p. 124): we
have a doma i n of ' par t s of t he wor l d' , t hi ngs whi ch ma y serve as referent s
f or si ngul ar t er ms, and classes o f whi ch ma y serve as r ef er ent s f or general
t er ms. Such a supposi t i on mi ght mat t er , i f model - t heor et i c resul t s were as
i mpor t a nt t o Pu t n a m' s ar gument as he suggest s. But I l oad t he dice in
Put na m' s f avour , i f at all; so I pl ay fai r.
Global Descriptivism Refuted. We are fami l i ar with t he i dea of a description
t heor y of r e f e r e n c e - f o r shor t , descri pt i vi sm-and, especi al l y, wi t h a local
f o r m t her eof . Suppose, pace Put na m, t hat s ome how we al r eady have an
ext ensi ve l anguage wi t h fai rl y det er mi nat e r ef er ence. Then we ma y add new
l anguage t o t he ol d, a little at a t i me, by i nt r oduci ng undefi ned t er ms in our
t heori si ng. The r e by we associ at e cl ust ers of ol d- l anguage descr i pt i ons with
our new t er ms; and t her eby, i f t he wor l d cooper at es, we best ow reference
on t he new t er ms. ' J a c k t he Ri pper di d t hi s, t hat , and t he ot her ' says the
det ect i ve; his poi nt is in par t t o hypot hesi se t hat t here is s omeone who did
t hi s, t hat , and t he ot her , and in par t t o st i pul at e t hat t he one who did, if
such t her e be, is t o be c ome t he r ef er ent of ' J a c k t he Ri pper ' . The new t erm
' J a c k t he Ri pper ' is t o acqui r e t he r ef er ent , i f any, of t he ol d-l anguage
descr i pt i on ' t he one who di d t hi s, t hat , and t he ot her ' . The i nt ended inter-
pr et at i on of t he augment ed l anguage is t o be an ext ensi on of t he old interpret-
at i on of t he ol d l anguage, i f such t her e be, t hat makes t he new Jack-t he-
Ri pper t heor y come t rue.
4 1 fi nd it especi al l y h a r d t o ma k e RT&H me s h wi t h R&R a n d M&R, but I do t hi nk t hey are
s upppos e d t o me s h. The t hi r d ful l p a r a g r a p h o f RT&H, p. 7, i ndi cat es a connect i on. Al so,
RT&H was in dr af t bef or e P u t n a m r ead Go o d ma n ' s Ways of Worldmaking (see RT&H, p. xii);
t he l at t er was publ i shed i n 1978, a nd mi ght have been avai l abl e in ma nus c r i pt t o a sympat het i c
col l eague ear l i er t h a n t hat ; s o RT&H is mo r e near l y s i mul t a ne ous wi t h R&R a n d M&R t han
t hei r publ i cat i on dat es woul d s ugges t .
5 For a di s cus s i on o f t he ' r el ocat ed' pr obl e m a nd i t s s ol ut i on, see t he fi nal s ect i on o f my ' New
Wor k f or a The or y of Uni ver sal s' , Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983), pp. 343-377.
6 Mor e or l ess as i n my ' Ge ne r a l Semant i cs ' , Synthese 22 (1970), pp. 18-67.
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David Lewis 223
Seven poi nt s shoul d be not ed. (1) Ther e ma y or ma y not be rigidification.
I f t her e is, t hat will avoi d conf us i on bet ween peopl e who have at t ached t he
same t er m t o t he same referent by means of different descriptions. For not hi ng
will be t r ue as one per s on means it but fal se as t he ot her means it, not even
when t he t er m appear s in modal cont ext s. 7 (2) The t er m- i nt r oduci ng descri p-
tive t heor y ma y be egocent ri c ( f or i nst ance, it mi ght i ncl ude ' Wat er is
abundant on this pl anet ' ); (3) it ma y make reference (in ol d l anguage) t o wor d
t okens or t hought t okens; and (4) it ma y i nvol ve rel at i ons of causal acquai nt -
ance. Taki ng poi nt s (2)-(4) t oget her , we not e f or i nst ance t hat ' Beech t rees
are t he causal source in such- and- such way o f t okens in my speech and
t hought of "beech t r e e " ' mi ght be par t of t he bi t of descri pt i ve t heor y t hat ,
for me, at t aches a r ef er ent t o ' beech t ree' ; and so, mutatis mutandis, wi t h
' el m t ree' . (5) The descr i pt i on needn' t fit per f ect l y. ' J a c k t he Ri pper ' mi ght
t ake as r ef er ent t he one who comes cl osest t o doi ng this, t hat , and t he ot her ,
if no bet t er candi dat e is avai l abl e. The i nt ended i nt er pr et at i on of t he
augment ed l anguage, t hen, is t o be t hat ext ensi on of t he ol d i nt er pr et at i on
t hat comes as close as can be t o maki ng t he new Jack- t he- Ri pper t heor y come
true. (6) Ther e mi ght be t wo candi dat es t hat bot h fit per f ect l y; mor e likely,
there mi ght be t wo i mper f ect candi dat es wi t h little t o choose bet ween t hem
and no st r onger candi dat e t o beat t hem bot h. I f so, we end up wi t h i ndet er-
mi nat e r ef er ence (in addi t i on t o what ever resul t s f r om i ndet er mi nacy of t he
old i nt er pr et at i on of t he ol d l anguage): t he new t er m refers equal l y t o bot h
candi dat es. Ha r t r y Field' s exampl e of Newt oni an ' mas s ' illustrates this possi -
bility, s Not e well t hat this is mode r a t e i ndet er mi nacy, in whi ch t he ri val
i nt er pr et at i ons have muc h in c ommon; it is not t he radi cal i ndet er mi nacy
t hat leads t o Put na m' s par adox. I t ake it t hat t he exi st ence of moder at e
i ndet er mi nacy is not t o be deni ed. Fi nal l y, and mos t i mpor t ant f or what
follows, (7) it ma y ha ppe n t hat new t er ms acqui r e t hei r r ef er ent s by des-
cri pt i on not singly but in fami l i es. Suppose t hat our det ect i ve hypot hesi sed
t hat t he mur der s were t he j oi nt wor k of a coupl e: J ack t he Ri pper and Jill
the Sl asher, as he chose t o call t hem. ' J a c k di d t hi s, ' he says, ' Ji l l di d t hat
and t he ot her , and J ack and Jill are rel at ed t hus' . Then, i f t he wor l d provi des
suitable candi dat es, ' J ack' and ' Jill' gai n referent s t oget her. The i nt ended inter-
pr et at i on of t he doubl y augment ed l anguage is t o be an ext ensi on of t he ol d
i nt er pr et at i on of t he ol d l anguage, i f such t here be, t hat makes t he new
Jack- and- Ji l l t heor y come t rue.
Descr i pt i on t heori es of r ef er ence are s uppos ed t o have been well and t r ul y
refut ed. I t hi nk not : we have l ear nt enough f r om our at t acker s t o wi t hst and
their at t acks. I t hi nk t hat a descr i pt i vi sm t hat t akes t o hear t t he seven poi nt s
just listed is still t enabl e, and is i ndeed a subst ant i al par t of t he t r ut h about
reference.
Be t hat as it may, a l ocal descr i pt i vi sm is di sappoi nt i ngl y modest . I t tells
7 I owe the point to H. W. Noonan, 'Rigid Designation', Analysis 39 (1979). pp. 174-182.
8 Hartry Field, 'Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference', Journal of Philosophy
70 (1973), pp. 462-481.
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224 Putnam's Paradox
us how t o get mor e r ef er ence i f we have s ome al r eady. But where di d the
ol d l anguage get its r ef er ence?
I t is t her ef or e t empt i ng t o t r y t he s ame me t hod on a gr ander scale. We
can i nt r oduce t er ms in little fami l i es. Ho w a bout bi gger fami l i es? Ho w about
t he bi ggest f ami l y of a l l - - t he ent i re vocabul ar y of t he l anguage? Then we
needn' t wor r y how t he old vocabul ar y got its r ef er ence. Because t her e isn' t
any ol d vocabul ar y. ( Or per haps t he ol d vocabul ar y is j ust t he fi rst -order
logical vocabul ar y. Pu t n a m seems t o assume t hi s, but wi t hout telling us why
t hat vocabul ar y is special, or how it got its reference. ) We go on j ust as before.
The i nt ended i nt er pr et at i on will be t he one, i f such t here be, t hat makes the
t er m- i nt r oduci ng t heor y come t rue. ( Or : . . . come near enough t o t rue. Or:
t he i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons will be t he ones, i f such t her e be . . . . wi t h in-
det er mi nacy i f t her e are mor e t han one. ) But t hi s t i me, t he t er m- i nt r oduci ng
t heor y is t ot al t heor y! Call t hi s account of reference: global descri pt i vi sm.
And it leads st rai ght t o Put na m' s i ncredi bl e thesis. For any wor l d (al most ),
what ever it is like, can sat i sfy any t heor y (al most ), what ever it says. We said:
' t he i nt ended i nt er pr et at i on will be t he one, i f such there be, . . . . ' Never
mi nd t he p r o v i s o - t here will be. It is (al most ) certain t hat the worl d will afford
t he maki ngs of an i nt er pr et at i on t hat will make t he t heor y come true. I n fact,
it will afford count l ess such i nt erpret at i ons. Ex hypothesi t hese i nt erpret at i ons
ar e i nt ended. So t here is (al most ) no way t hat t he t heor y can fai l t o come
t rue on its i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons. Whi ch is t o say: (al most ) no way t hat
t he t heor y can fai l t o come t r ue simpliciter. Thi s is Put na m' s so-called
' model - t heor et i c ar gument ' . 9
So gl obal descr i pt i vi sm is false; or Put na m' s i ncredi bl e thesis is t rue; or
t her e is somet hi ng wr ong wi t h t he pr esupposi t i ons of our whol e line of
t hought . Unl i ke Put na m, I resol ut el y el i mi nat e t he second and t hi r d alter-
nat i ves. The one t hat r emai ns mus t t her ef or e be t he t r ut h. Gl obal descri p-
tivism stands refut ed. It may be par t of t he t rut h about reference, but it cannot
be t he whol e st or y. Ther e mus t be s ome addi t i onal const r ai nt on reference:
s ome const r ai nt t hat mi gh L i f we ar e unl ucky in our t heori si ng, el i mi nat e
all t he al l egedl y i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons t hat make t he t heor y come true.
Further Constraints--Just More Theory? Pu t n a m has const r ai nt s t o offer:
he speaks of t en of ' oper at i onal and t heor et i cal const r ai nt s' ( f or i nst ance, see
R&R, p. 126; M&R, pp. 466, 469, 471, and 473). I t is har d t o tell f r om his
wor ds whet her t hese are supposed t o const r ai n reference or t heor y. Pr obabl y
he t hi nks t hey do bot h: t hey const r ai n ideal t heor y, ideal t heor y is t he t erm-
i nt r oduci ng descr i pt i ve t heor y t o whi ch gl obal descr i pt i vi sm appl i es, so in
t hi s i ndi rect way t hey const r ai n r ef er ence al so. So t hese const r ai nt s work
wi t hi n gl obal descri pt i vi sm. They are not an addi t i on or al t er nat i ve t o it.
9 The argument was anticipated (apart from mathematical detail having to do with the quali-
fication 'almost any world') in M. H. A. Newman, "Mr. Russell's 'Causal Theory of
Perception'", Mind 37 (1928), pp. 137-148. Newman's argument is discussed in William
Demopoulos and Michael Friedman, 'The Concept of Structure in Early Twentieth Century
Philosophy of Science', in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).
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Da v i d L e wi s 225
We must seek elsewhere f or salvation f r om i ndet ermi nacy and over-easy t rut h.
We need f ur t her const rai nt s.
Put na m t hi nks t here can be no such f ur t her const rai nt s. Gl obal descrip-
tivism is t he onl y possible account of r ef er ence ( apar t f r om account s t hat
rely on supernat ural aid). Const rai nt s t hat wor k within it are t he onl y possible
const rai nt s on reference. Hi s r eason is t hat gl obal descri pt i vi sm is imperial-
istic: it will annex any sat i sfact ory al t ernat i ve account of const rai nt s on
reference.
Suppose t hat we say it is const r ai nt C t hat saves t he d a y - a causal con-
straint, per haps, or what have you. We offer an account of how const rai nt
C works, a bit of t heor y in fact. I f this bit of t heor y l ooks good, it will deserve
to be i ncor por at ed i nt o t ot al t heor y. Suppose it is. Then an i nt ended inter-
pret at i on must make C- t heor y come t rue, al ong with t he rest of t ot al t heor y.
But it will still be t rue, as much as ever, t hat (almost) any worl d can sat i sfy
(almost) any t heor y. Addi ng C- t heor y t o t he rest of t ot al t heor y doesn' t help.
It is still trivially easy f or a wor l d t o make t ot al t heor y come t r ue, and in
fact t o do so in count l ess ways. And t he poi nt is general: it applies t o any
const rai nt (or, at least, t o any ot herwi se sat i sfact ory const rai nt ) t hat mi ght
be proposed. Const rai nt C is t o be i mposed by accepting C-t heory, accordi ng
to Put nam. But C- t heor y is j ust mor e t heor y, mor e grist f or t he mill; and
more t heor y will go t he way of all t heor y.
To whi ch I reply: C is n o t t o be i mposed j ust by accept i ng C-t heory. That
is a mi sunder st andi ng of what C is. The const r ai nt is n o t t hat an i nt ended
i nt er pr et at i on must somehow make our account of C come t rue. The con-
straint is t hat an i nt ended i nt er pr et at i on must c onf or m t o C itself.
That is why global descriptivism does not aut omat i cal l y annex its successful
rivals. That is why global descriptivism, unai ded by f ur t her const rai nt s, is
not t he onl y possible t heor y of reference. That is why some f ur t her const rai nt
on reference mi ght save t he day. Since Put nam' s paradoxi cal thesis is pat ent l y
false, we can be confident t hat t here is indeed some furt her constraint, whether
or not we can find out what it is.
Is t hat all? What I have j ust said (and ot hers bef or e me, e . g. Devi t t , 1 in
the course of advocat i ng par t i cul ar const rai nt s) may not car r y convi ct i on.
It may seem t hat Put na m is ont o somet hi ng deep and right. He is not j ust
missing an easy distinction: satisfying C- t heor y versus conf or mi ng t o C. Is
there real l y a di st i nct i on here?
I t hi nk t her e is. But t here are t wo reasons f or doubt i ng t he distinction.
One is simply misguided; t he ot her is i nst ruct i vel y wrong.
The mi sgui ded r eason comes f r om t he dialectic of phi l osophy. The rules
of disputation sometimes give t he wrong side a winning strategy. In particular,
they f avour t he sceptic. They f avour t he or di nar y sceptic about empi ri cal
knowledge; t hey f avour t he logical sceptic, Carrol l ' s t or t oi se or a present -
day doubt er of non- cont r adi ct i on; and t hey f avour t he sceptic about det er-
minate reference. It goes as follows. The Chal l enger asks how det er mi nat e
10 Michael Devitt, 'Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Meani ng and t he
Moral Sciences', Noas 17 (1983), pp. 291-301.
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226 Putnam's Paradox
r ef er ence is possi bl e. The Res pondent answers by gi vi ng an account of his
f avour i t e const r ai nt . The Chal l enger says: ' Unl ess t he wor ds of your answer
had det er mi nat e r ef er ence, you have not answer ed me unequi vocal l y. So I
chal l enge you now t o show how t he wor ds of your answer had det er mi nat e
r ef er ence. I f you cannot , I can onl y t ake you t o have pr opos ed an addi t i on
t o t ot al t h e o r y - t h a t I can under st and, but t hat is fut i l e. ' I f t he Respondent
answers j ust as bef or e, he begs t he quest i on and l oses. I f he answers
differently, he does not wi n, f or he gets anot her chal l enge j ust like t he one
bef or e. And so it goes. The Chal l enger is pl ayi ng by t he rul es, and the
Res pondent cannot win. And yet t he Res pondent ma y i ndeed have given a
cor r ect account o f t he const r ai nt t hat makes det er mi nat e r ef er ence possi bl e,
couched in l anguage t hat does i ndeed have det er mi nat e r ef er ence in vi rt ue
of t he very const r ai nt t hat it descri bes! ( Her e I f ol l ow Devi t t (op. cir.),
generalising his account of t he dialectical deadl ock in case a causal const rai nt
is pr opos ed. ) Mor al : t r ut h is one t hi ng, wi nni ng di sput at i ons is anot her .
But there is a deeper and bet t er r eason t o say t hat any pr oposed const rai nt is
j ust mor e t heor y. Ta ke your f avour i t e t heor y of reference. Let us gr ant t hat
it is t rue. But let us ask: what makes it t r ue? And t he t empt i ng answer is:
we ma ke it t r ue, by our r ef er ent i al i nt ent i ons. We can refer however we
l i k e - l anguage is a cr eat ur e of huma n c o n v e n t i o n - and we have seen fit to
est abl i sh a l anguage in whi ch r ef er ence wor ks thus. Somehow, i mpl i ci t l y or
explicitly, i ndi vi dual l y or collectively, we have made this t heor y of reference
t r ue by st i pul at i on. ' We i nt er pr et our l anguages or not hi ng does' (M&R,
p. 482).
The mai n l esson of Put na m' s Pa r a dox, I t ake it, is t hat t hi s pur el y vol un-
t ari st i c view of r ef er ence leads t o di sast er. I f it were ri ght , any pr opos ed
const rai nt woul d be j ust mor e t heor y. Because t he st i pul at i on t hat establishes
t he const r ai nt woul d be somet hi ng we say or t hi nk, s omet hi ng we t her eby
add t o t ot al t heor y.
Ref er r i ng i sn' t j ust s omet hi ng we do. What we say and t hi nk not onl y
doesn' t settle what we r ef er t o; it doesn' t even settle t he pr i or quest i on of
how it is t o be set t l ed what we r ef er t o. Me a n i n g s - a s t he sayi ng g o e s - j u s t
ai n' t in t he head.
What Mi ght the Saving Constraint Be? Ma ny phi l osopher s woul d suggest
at once t hat t he savi ng const r ai nt has t o do wi t h t he causal chai ns t hat lead
i nt o t he r ef er r er ' s head f r o m t he ext ernal t hi ngs t hat he r ef er s t o. At a mini-
mum, s ome i nt er pr et at i ons woul d be di squal i fi ed on causal gr ounds, and
gl obal descr i pt i vi sm woul d select f r o m t hose r emai ni ng. Or per haps a causal
account o f r ef er ence ought t o over t hr ow gl obal descr i pt i vi sm al t oget her.
I f we subj ect a causal t heor y of r ef er ence (or a mor e modes t causal con-
st rai nt ) t o t he ' j ust mor e t he or y' t r eat ment , we get what I call causal descrip-
t i vi sm. That is: descr i pt i vi sm, gl obal or l ocal , in whi ch t he descr i pt i ons are
l argel y couched in causal t er ms. The l esson of Pu t n a m' s Pa r a dox f or causal
t heori st s of r ef er ence is" don' t t r ade in your genui ne causal t heor y f or causal
descri pt i vi sm. But I mys el f woul d pr ef er causal descr i pt i vi sm over a genui ne
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Davi d Lewi s 227
causal theory. The causal t heory often works, but not as invariably as philo-
sophers nowadays tend to think. Sometimes an old-fashioned descriptivism
works better; sometimes there are puzzling intermediate cases in which causal
and descriptive considerations seem to tug in opposite directions, tt When
causal theories work, causal descriptivism works too.12 When not, we need
mixed theories, halfway houses between the ' new theory of reference' and
the old. Causal descriptions seem ideally suited to mix into clusters with
noncausal descriptions.
Given my preference for causal descri pt i vi sm-whi ch indeed is just more
description, just more t heory--I must seek elsewhere for my saving constraint.
I am inclined to favour a different kind of constraint proposed by
G. H. Merrill. t3 (More precisely, he advises realists to propose it, but notes
that he himself is no realist.) This constraint looks not to the speech and
thought of those who refer, and not to their causal connections to the world,
but rather to the referents themselves. Among all the countless things and
classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, gerrymandered, ill-demarcated.
Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so that their boundaries are
established by objective sameness and difference in nature. Only these elite
things and classes are eligible to serve as referents. The wor l d- a ny
worl d--has the makings of many interpretations that satisfy many theories;
but most of these interpretations are disqualified because they employ ineli-
gible referents. When we limit ourselves to the eligible interpretations, the
ones that respect the objective joints in nature, there is no longer any guaran-
tee that (almost) any world can satisfy (almost) any theory. It becomes once
again a wort hy goal to discover a theory that will come true on an eligible
interpretation, and it becomes a daring and risky hope that we are well on
the way t oward accomplishing this.
Merrill makes eligibility an all-or-nothing matter; I would prefer to make
it a matter of degree. The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink
in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess
of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints in
nature. It is an eligible referent, but less eligible t han some others. (I have
just referred to it.) Likewise the metal things are less of an elite, eligible class
than the silver things, and the green things are worse, and the grue things
are worse st i l l - but all these classes belong to the elite compared to the count-
less utterly miscellaneous classes of thing that there are. Cet er i s par i bus , an
eligible interpretation is one that maximises the eligibility of referents overall.
Yet it may assign some fairly poor referents if there is good reason to. After
all, ' grue' is a word of our language! Cet eri s aren' t par i bus , of course; overall
H Such cases are presented in Peter Unger, 'The Causal Theory of Reference', Philosophical
Studies 43 (1983), pp. 1-45.
12 Even Saul Kripke grudgingly admits this: see footnote 38 to 'Naming and Necessity' in
D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Reidel, 1972). However,
he doubts that a non-circular theory of either sort exists.
13 G. H. Merrill, 'The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism', Philosophy of Science 47
( 1 9 8 0 ) , p p , 6 9 - 8 1 . Fo r f ur t he r d i s c u s s i o n o f Merri l l ' s s o l u t i o n , see the final section o f my
'New Work for a Theory of Universals'.
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228 Pu t n a m' s Par adox
eligibility of r ef er ent s is a mat t er o f degree, ma ki ng t ot al t heor y come t r ue
is a mat t er of degree, t he t wo desi der at a t r ade off. The cor r ect , ' i nt ended'
i nt er pr et at i ons ar e t he ones t hat st ri ke t he best bal ance. The t er ms o f t r ade
ar e vague; t hat will ma ke f or mode r a t e i ndet er mi nacy of r ef er ence; but t he
sensi bl e realist won' t de ma nd per f ect det er mi nacy, x4
Ther e seems t o be a pr obl em. To a physicalist like mysel f, t he mos t plausible
i negal i t ar i ani sm seems t o be one t hat give a special elite st at us t o t he ' f unda-
ment al physi cal pr oper t i es' : mass, charge, quar k col our and f l avour . . . . (It
is up t o physi cs t o di scover t hese pr oper t i es, and name t hem; physi cal i st s
will t hi nk t hat pr esent - day physics at least comes close t o pr ovi di ng a correct
and compl et e list.) But t hese elite pr oper t i es don' t seem t o be t he ones we
want . Onl y in recent t i mes have we had wor ds f or quar k col our and fl avour,
but we have l ong had wor ds f or st i cks and st ones, cat s, books , st ars . . . .
The sol ut i on, I suggest , is t hat we used t o l ack wor ds f or s ome ver y eligible
r ef er ent s because t he cor r ect i nt er pr et at i ons of our l anguage were t he ones
t hat di d best on bal ance, not t he ones t hat di d best at best . I ndeed, physics
di scovers whi ch t hi ngs and classes are t he mos t elite of all; but ot her s are
elite al so, t hough t o a lesser degree. The less elite are so because t hey are
connect ed t o t he mos t elite by chai ns of defi nabi l i t y. Long chai ns, by the
t i me we r each t he moder at el y elite classes o f cat s and penci l s and puddl es;
but t he chai ns requi red t o reach t he ut t erl y ineligible woul d be f ar l onger still.
I t is not t o be sai d t hat our t heor i si ng makes t he j oi nt s at whi ch t he worl d
is t o be car ved. Tha t way lies t he ' j ust mor e t he or y' t r ap. Pu t n a m woul d say:
"ver y well, f or mul at e your t heor y of ' obj ect i ve j oi nt s in nat ur e' , what t hey
ar e and where t hey are; and st i pul at e i f you will t hat your r ef er ent s are to
be ' el i gi bl e' . But t ot al t he or y wi t h this addi t i on goes t he way of all t heor y:
it is satisfiable wi t h t he great est of ease in count l ess ways. And t hese countless
ways, of course, assi gn count l ess di fferent ext ensi ons t o ' j oi nt in nat ur e' ,
' el i gi bl e' , and t he r est . " No: t he pr opos ed const r ai nt is t hat r ef er ent s are t o
be eligible, not j ust t hat el i gi bi l i t y-t heory is t o be satisfied s omehow, not j ust
t hat t he r ef er ent s of ' cat ' etc. ar e t o be i ncl uded a mong t he r ef er ent s of
' el i gi bl e' .
I f I a m l ooki ng in t he ri ght pl ace f or a savi ng const rai nt , t hen real i sm needs
real i sm. Tha t is: t he r eal i sm t hat recogni ses a nont r i vi al ent er pr i se o f dis-
coveri ng t he t rut h about t he worl d needs t he t radi t i onal real i sm t hat recognises
obj ect i ve sameness and di fference, j oi nt s in t he wor l d, di scr i mi nat or y
cl assi fi cat i ons not of our own maki ng. I do not qui t e say t hat we need
t r adi t i onal r eal i sm a bout universals.15 For per haps a nomi nal i s m t hat t akes
obj ect i ve r esembl ance as pr i mi t i ve coul d do t he j ob i nst ead. But we need
somet hi ng of t hat sort. What it t akes t o solve Put nam' s par adox is an objective
i negal i t ar i ani sm of cl assi fi cat i ons, in whi ch gr ue t hi ngs (or worse) ar e not
14 It is not clear how much indeterminacy might be expected to remain. For instance, what of
Quine's famous example? His rabbit-stages, undetached rabbit-parts, and rabbit-fusion seem
only a little, if any, less eligible than rabbits themselves.
~5 As it might be, the theory of D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge
University Press, 1978), discussed in my 'New Work for a Theory of Universals'.
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David Lewis 229
all of a ki nd in t he s ame way t hat bosons, or spheres, or bi t s of gol d, o f
books are all of a ki nd.
I t ake it t hat Pu t n a m classes t he sol ut i on I advocat e wi t h sol ut i ons t hat
rely on super nat ur al graspi ngs or i nt ui t i ngs. He assi mi l at es t he view t hat ' t he
wo r l d . . , sort s t hi ngs i nt o ki nds' t o t he pr epos t er ous vi ew t hat t he worl d
gives t hi ngs t hei r names ( RT&H, p. 53)! Recent l y, he has cal l ed my t al k of
elite classes ' s pooky' and ' medi eval - soundi ng' . 16 Wel l , sticks and st ones ma y
br eak my bones . . . . Anyway, what ' s wr ong wi t h soundi ng medi eval ? I f t he
medi eval s r ecogni sed obj ect i ve j oi nt s in t he wo r l d - a s I t ake it t hey did,
realists and nomi nal i st s al i ke- - mor e power t o t hem. But I don' t suppose t hat
i negal i t ari ani sm of cl assi fi cat i ons is an especi al l y medi eval n o t i o n - r a t h e r ,
egal i t ar i ani sm is a pecul i ar i t y of our own cent ur y.
Pu t n a m has al so sai d t hat i negal i t ar i ani sm of cl assi fi cat i ons is cont r ar y
to physi cal i sm. That woul d bot her me, i f t rue. But what ' s t rue is t he opposi t e:
egalitarianism is cont r ar y t o physi cal i sm. For physi cal i st s t ake phys i cs - - as
it now is, or as it will b e - a t face val ue. And physi cs pr of esses t o di scover
the elite pr oper t i es. Wha t is t he cont ent of this par t of physi cal science,
accor di ng t o an egal i t ari an? 17
That compl et es t he first par t of t he paper . Now I shall t ake up five quest i ons
about why Pu t n a m pr oceeds as he d o e s - q u e s t i o n s t hat l eave me uncer t ai n
how well I have under s t ood what he is up t o.
Why 'Model-Theoretic'? The pr emi se t hat j oi ns wi t h gl obal descr i pt i vi sm
to yield di sast er is not any bi g t heor em o f model t heor y. I n par t i cul ar , it
is not t he t he or e m t hat get s st ar billing in M&R, t he Skol em- L6wenhei m
Theor em. I n f act , what ' s needed is pr et t y t ri vi al . As I put it bef or e: (al most )
any wor l d can sat i sfy ( al most ) any t heor y. The first ' al mos t ' means ' unl ess
the wor l d has t oo few t hi ngs' ; t he second means ' unl ess t he t heor y is i ncon-
sistent' . Thi s pr emi se is obt ai ned as fol l ows. A consi st ent t heor y is, by
definition, one satisfied by s ome model ; an i s omor phi c i mage of a model
satisfies t he same t heori es as t he ori gi nal model ; t o pr ovi de t he maki ngs f or
an i somor phi c i mage of any given model , a domai n need onl y be large enough.
The real model t heor y adds onl y a coupl e of f oot not es t hat are not real l y
crucial t o t he ar gument . Fi rst , by t he Compl et eness Theor em, we coul d i f
we wi shed redefi ne ' consi st ent ' in synt act i c t er ms. Second, by t he Skol em-
L6wenhei m Theor em, our ' unl ess t he wor l d has t oo few t hi ngs' is less of
a qualification t han mi ght have been supposed: any infinite size is big enough.
But t he qual i fi cat i on wasn' t ver y i mpor t a nt in t he first pl ace. I f Put na m' s
thesis had been t hat an ideal t heor y can mi sdescri be t he worl d onl y by getting
16 In remarks presented at the annual conference of the American Philosophical Association,
Eastern Division, Baltimore, 1982.
17 See the discussion of formulations of materialism in my 'New Work for a Theory of Univerals',
in which I argue that inegalitarianism of classifications must be presupposed in stating
materialism.
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230 Putnam's Paradox
its size wr ong, t hat woul d have been i ncredi bl e enough. And in fact t h a t / s
Put nam' s thesis: f or all he has said, it is still possible f or ideal t heor y t o mis-
describe a finite worl d as infinite. Who cares whet her t he possibility of similar
mi st akes among t he infinite sizes also is gr ant ed? We t hought it was possible
t o mi sdescri be t he wor l d in ways havi ng not hi ng t o do with its size.
Anyway, t he appl i cabi l i t y of t he model t heor y depends on t reat i ng exactly
t he fi rst -order logical vocabul ar y as ' ol d' l anguage, wi t h ant ecedent l y deter-
mi nat e r ef er ence. As Rober t Farrel118 has emphasi sed, Put na m has no ri ght
t o give this vocabul ar y special t r eat ment . Per haps he onl y di d it f or t he sake
of t he ar gument , giving away poi nt s j ust because he woul d not need t hem.
Why Just Ideal Theories? You shoul d have spot t ed a shi ft in my f or mu-
l at i ons of Put nam' s i ncredi bl e thesis. The official f or mul at i on was this: it
makes no sense t o suppose t hat an empirically ideal t heor y mi ght nevertheless
be false. But t he concl usi on of t he model - t heor et i c ar gument applies t o any
consistent t erm-i nt roduci ng t ot al t heor y t o which global descriptivism applies.
It makes no sense (small worlds aside) t o suppose t hat any such t heor y might
be false, whet her or not it is ideal. Idealness of t he t heor y doesn' t figure in
t he pr oof .
Per haps Put na m has chosen t o under pl ay his hand. Per haps he does t hi nk
of t he model - t heor et i c ar gument as showi ng t hat our t ot al accept ed t heor y
cannot be false, whet her or not it is ideal (unless it is i nconsi st ent , or the
wor l d is t oo small). But t he special case of an ideal t heor y is t he case t hat
distinguishes realists f r om Pei rceans, so t hat is t he case he chooses t o discuss.
Thi s hypot hesi s nicely fits t he t ext of R&R, pp. 125-126. Even so, I t hi nk
it is most likely a mi sunder st andi ng.
For one t hi ng, why does he pass up t he oppor t uni t y t o say t hat the
' i ncoher ent pi ct ur e' hel d by his realist opponent s commi t s t hem t o t he
absur di t y t hat even non-i deal t heori es are t r ue on t hei r i nt ended i nt erpre-
t at i ons, i f t hat is what he t hi nks?
Mor e likely, t he model - t heor et i c ar gument is supposed t o wor k onl y for
ideal t heori es. But how coul d t hat be? A t heor y does not need t o be ideal,
mer el y consi st ent , in or der t o be satisfiable in any (big enough) worl d. So
maybe t he first premi se of t he ar gument , gl obal descriptivism, is onl y
supposed t o wor k f or ideal t heori es. But t hen how coul d it say anyt hi ng about
t he vocabul ar y of our act ual , present t ot al t heor y, which doubt l ess isn' t quite
ideal? Per haps as follows.
Descri pt i vi sm, l ocal or gl obal , mi ght be f ut uri st i c. That is, t he t erm-
i nt r oduci ng t heor y whi ch is supposed t o come t r ue on i nt ended i nt erpre-
t at i ons, i f such t her e be, mi ght be not t he t heor y by whi ch t he t er ms actually
were i nt r oduced, but r at her some i mpr oved descendant t hat is expect ed to
exist in t he f ut ur e. It mi ght even be some i deal l y i mpr oved descendant t hat
is never expect ed t o act ual l y exist, but t hat woul d resul t i f t he process of
i mpr ovement went on f or ever . Imagi ne t hat our det ect i ve says: " My present
~g Robert Farrell, 'Blanket Skolemism', presented at the annual conference of the Australasian
Association of Philosophy, Sydney, 1980.
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David Lewis 231
hypot hesi s is t hat Jack t he Ri ppe r - - a s I pr opos e t o call hi m- - di d this, t hat ,
and t he ot her . Of course, I realise t hat most likely t hat ' s not qui t e right. But
if we st art with this hypot hesi s, and i mpr ove it bit by bi t in accor dance with
the evi dence and t he canons of scientific det ect i on, event ual l y we may have
a Jack- t he- Ri pper t heor y t hat can be i mpr oved no f ur t her . Maybe we will
have it; maybe we never will, but I can speak of it even so. By ' Jack t he
Ripper' I intend t o refer t o t he one described by t hat ultimate Jack-t he-Ri pper
t heor y t hat we ma y never see. " Likewise t her e coul d be a fut uri st i c global
descriptivism. Per haps t hat is what Put na m has in mi nd. (I don' t see any
explicit f ut ur i sm in R&R; I do in RT&H, pp. 30-32, but not in t he cont ext
of t he model - t heor et i c ar gument ; in M&R, p. 475, t here is explicit consi der-
ation of futuristic and non-fut uri st i c alternatives.) I t hi nk it is what he should
have in mi nd, f or a r eason t o be st at ed short l y.
Why Anti-Realist? Why does t he model -t heoret i c argument at t ack realism?
By definition, of course: ' It is this feat ure [that an ideal t heor y mi ght be false]
t hat distinguishes met aphysi cal realism, as I am using t he t er m, f r om t he
mere bel i ef t hat t her e is an ideal t h e o r y . . . ' (R&R, p. 125). But what makes
that a defi ni t i on of any f or m of realism?
My poi nt is emphat i cal l y not t hat ' Int ernal real i sm is all t he realism we
want or need' (R&R, p. 130). I nt er nal real i sm, I t ake it, is real i sm feigned.
The pl an is t o speak exact l y as t he realists do (except in t he phi l osophy
r o o m- I have no idea how t hat lapse can be justified); and t o do so in good
conscience, in t he hope t hat one' s words are destined t o j oi n t he ideal t heor y,
and so are ' epistemically true' ; but to do so wi t hout any i nt ent i on of describing
the worl d by saying somet hi ng t hat will be t r ue onl y i f t he worl d is one way
rather t han t he ot her . (But of course t he Int ernal i st will say t hat he intends
to be ' describing t he wo r l d . . . ' . Hi s pl an is t o speak exactly as t he realists do! )
My poi nt is r at her t hat even i f t he model - t heor et i c ar gument wor ked, it
would not bl ow away t he whol e of t he realist' s pi ct ure of t he worl d and its
relation t o t heor y. Somet hi ng vital woul d be dest r oyed, but a l ot woul d be
left st andi ng. Ther e woul d still be a worl d, and it woul d not be a fi gment
of our i magi nat i on. It woul d still have many part s, and t hese part s woul d
fall into classes and r e l a t i o n s - t o o many f or comf or t , perhaps, but t oo many
is scarcely t he same as none. Ther e woul d still be i nt erpret at i ons, assignments
of reference, i nt ended and ot herwi se. Tr ut h of a t heor y on a given i nt erpre-
t at i on woul d still make sense, and in a non-epi st emi c way. Tr ut h on all
intended i nt erpret at i ons woul d still make sense. Despi t e Put nam' s t al k of
the ' collapse' of an ' i ncoher ent pi ct ure' , he has given us no r eason t o rej ect
any of t hese part s of t he pi ct ure. The onl y t r oubl e he offers is t hat t here are
t oo many i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons, so t hat t r ut h on t he i nt ended i nt erpre-
tations is t oo easily achi eved. That is t r oubl e, sure enough. But is it anti-
realist t r oubl e, except by t endent i ous defi ni t i on? It seems t o me exact l y
opposite t o t r adi t i onal ant i -real i sm.
The t r adi t i onal anti-realist doubt s or denies t hat t here is any wor l d save
a figment of our i magi nat i on. Or he doubt s or denies t hat t he worl d divides
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232 Putnam's Paradox
i nt o part s except i nsofar as we divide it, or t hat t hose part s fall i nt o any classes
or r el at i ons except such as are s omehow o f our own maki ng. Or he doubt s
or denies t hat we can achi eve r ef er ence t o par t s o f t he wor l d, he quest i ons
t hat t her e can be even once i nt ended r ef er ent i al i nt er pr et at i on. Or he doubt s
or deni es t hat we can ever achi eve t r ut h on i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons, or t hat
we can ever have r eas on t o bel i eve t hat we have done so.
Across t he boar d, wherever t radi t i onal ant i -real i sm sees pri vat i on, Put na m
ar gues i nst ead f r om over abundance I t is onl y at t he end t hat t he opposi t es
meet . They agree t hat it is unr eas onabl e f or science t o ai m at accur at e des-
cr i pt i on of real i t y, as oppos e d t o t he ' epi st emi c t r ut h' of i deal t heor y. But
why is t hat ? Is it because accur at e descr i pt i on is so difficult t hat we coul d
not at t ai n it, or coul d not r eas onabl y expect t o, even i f we at t ai n ' epi st emi c
t r ut h' ? Or is it r at her because accur at e descr i pt i on is easy, aut omat i cal l y
at t ai ned al ong wi t h ' epi st emi c t r ut h' and addi ng not hi ng ext ra?
Pu t n a m shoul d say t he l at t er. He gives us no ar gument t hat discredits the
real i st ' s concept i on of t r ut h of a t heor y on an i nt er pr et at i on whi ch assigns
r ef er ent s in t he wor l d. Hi s st r at egy shoul d be t o co- opt t hat concept i on, not
t o oppos e it. He ought t o say: 'Contra real i st or t hodoxy, t r ut h simpliciter
is equi val ent t o, or si mpl y is, epi st emi c t r ut h. Tha t is not because t her e is
anyt hi ng epi st emi c a bout t r ut h- on- an- i nt er pr et at i on. Nor is it because t rut h
simpliciter is anyt hi ng else t han t r ut h on all i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons. Rat her
it is because i nt endedness of i nt er pr et at i ons is an epi st emi c ma t t e r . '
Ma ybe t hi s is Put na m' s st r at egy. Hi s pr esent at i ons of t he model - t heor et i c
ar gument in R&R and M&R can ver y well be r ead accor di ngl y. I f so, t hen
gl obal descri pt i vi sm needs t o be fut uri st i c, else t r ut h on all i nt ended i nt erpre-
t at i ons will coi nci de wi t h ' epi st emi c t r ut h' onl y in t he sweet by and by when
we have ideal t heor y. Thi s is my pos t poned r eas on why I t hi nk Put na m
shoul d have t he f ut ur i st i c ver si on o f gl obal descr i pt i vi sm in mi nd.
But i f Put na m' s st r at egy real l y is as I have j ust i magi ned, t hen t here is
a l ot of poet i c licence in s ome of what he says. I t is an exagger at i on t o say
t hat t he real i st pi ct ur e ' col l apses' (R&R, pp. 126 and 130). That suggests
dest r uct i on mor e t ot al t han has act ual l y been accompl i shed. And it is quite
uncal l ed f or t o say, however met aphor i cal l y, t hat ' t he mi nd and t he worl d
j oi nt l y ma ke up t he mi nd and t he wor l d' ( RT&H, p. xi). No; we make
t heori es, not wor l ds. The metaphysics o f r eal i sm survi ves unscat hed. What
does suffer, i f Pu t n a m has his way, is real i st semant i cs and epi st emol ogy. 19
Why are Supernatural Constraints Exempt ? Pu t n a m present s t he model -
t heor et i c ar gument as bad news f or moder at e, nat ur al i st i c real i st s: ' i t is,
unf or t unat el y, t he moderate realist posi t i on whi ch is put i nt o deep t roubl e
. . ' (M&R, p. 464). Verificationists who aspi re onl y t o ' epi st emi c t r ut h' have
not hi ng t o fear. But nei t her, he says, do t hose i mmoder at e realists who claim
t o achi eve det er mi nat e r ef er ence by s uper nat ur al me a n s - b y gr aspi ng, by
i nt ui t i ng, by di rect cont act , by magi c, by noet i c r ays, by sixth sense, call it
~9 In this section I am indebted to Devitt's insistence that it is really very peculiar to take realism as
an issue about semantic theory.
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David Lew~ 233
what you will. Their onl y pr obl em is t hat t hei r views are scientifically dis-
reput abl e.
Why is t hat ? Is it j ust t hat Put na m magnani mousl y declines t o fight t he
weak? Or woul d super nat ur al i nt ercourse bet ween t hi nker and r ef er ent
actually afford some way ar ound Put nam' s argument ? I do not see how super-
natural acquai nt ance with referent s coul d do any bet t er t han t he nat ural sort.
Why is it a bet t er way t o achi eve det er mi nat e reference i f we get cat Nana
into t he grasp of our noet i c rays t han i f we hol d her in our hands? Why is
it bet t er i f we i nt ui t her with our sixth sense t han i f we see her with our eyes
and hear her with our ears?
We know what Put na m says i f we t r y t o base det er mi nat e reference on
nat ural causal connect i on: t he t heor y of t he causal const r ai nt on reference
is j ust mor e t heor y, as subj ect as any t heor y t o over abundant , conflicting
i nt ended i nt er pr et at i ons. But why are super nat ur al const rai nt s exempt f r om
parellel t r eat ment ? What ' s t he good of hol di ng up yet anot her sign, t hus
or perhaps
DI RECTLY GRASPS [
I I NTUI TS [
if it is still open t o Put nam t o challenge t he det ermi nat e reference of the words
wri t t en on t he sign? (Cf. R&R, p. 127) What can t he pr oposed super nat ur al
constraint be, i f not the useless requi rement t hat grasping-theory, or whatever,
shall be made t o come t r ue al ong wi t h t he rest of (fut uri st i c?) t ot al t heor y?
I have argued, of course, t hat it is fai r t o rej ect t he ' just mor e t heor y' treat-
ment, what ever const r ai nt it may be appl i ed t o. Pr esumabl y Put na m dis-
agrees. But he has said not hi ng t o show why t he t r eat ment applies onl y t o
nat ural const rai nt s.
Per haps Put na m t hi nks t hat supernat ural i st s are i mmune f r om t he ' just
more t heor y' t r eat ment because t hey deny t he premi se t hat ' we i nt erpret our
languages or not hi ng does' , or in ot her words t hat const rai nt s on reference
obtain onl y because we st i pul at e t hat t hey do. That woul d be a good r eason
to grant t hem exempt i on. I repl y t hat a nat ural i st also can deny it on behal f
of nat ural const rai nt s, as I have done.
What is the Vat Argument ? In R&R, setting f or t h t he pi ct ure t o be r ef ut ed
by t he model - t heor et i c ar gument , Put na m ment i ons brains in a vat:
. . indeed, it is held [by t he met aphysi cal realist] t hat we mi ght be unable
t o represent THE WORLD cor r ect l y at all (e.g. we mi ght all be ' brai ns
in a vat ' , t he met aphysi cal realist tells us). (p. 125)
And a little later, still in connect i on with t he model - t heor et i c ar gument ,
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234 Put nam' s Paradox
Suppose we . . . are and al ways were ' br ai ns in a vat ' . Then how does
it come about t hat our wor d ' vat ' refers t o n o u me n a l vat s and not t o vat s
in t he i mage. (p. 127)
So when RT&H opens wi t h a di scussi on of br ai ns in a vat , we know what
t o expect. Brai ns in a vat are a st ock exampl e of radical decept i on. The model -
t heor et i c ar gument is meant t o show t hat r adi cal decept i on is i mpossi bl e.
( Mor e precisely: t hat radi cal decept i on is possi bl e onl y when t he decei ved
fal l radi cal l y shor t of ' epi st emi c t r ut h' , whi ch e x hy pot he s i t he brai ns do not . )
We expect Pu t n a m t o i nt r oduce t he model - t heor et i c ar gument in dr amat i c
f ashi on by using it t o ar gue t hat even a br ai n in a vat is not radi cal l y deceived;
and hence t hat it is nonsense t o f ear t hat we are r adi cal l y decei ved brai ns
in a vat .
We mi ght al so expect t hat Pu t n a m woul d ant i ci pat e t he obj ect i on t hat the
model - t heor et i c ar gument i gnores causal const r ai nt s on r ef er ence; and t hat
he mi ght wi sh t o pos t pone his ' j ust mor e t heor y' r ej oi nder , since it is t ri cky
and he is obvi ousl y writing in par t f or nonspecialists; and t hat he mi ght there-
f or e offer an i nt er i m r epl y t o t he advocat e of causal const r ai nt s, a r epl y t hat
wor ks onl y in t hi s speci al case. And he does have such a repl y. Even i f a
causal t heor y is correct and r e l e v a n t - c o n t r a t he ' j ust mor e t heor y' rej oi nder
- - i t doesn' t hel p in this case. For it t ends t o show t hat we and t he brai ns
do not r ef er t o t he s ame t hi ngs when we use t he s ame wor ds, since t hey are
causal l y i sol at ed f r om our r ef er ent s. ( Her e I i magi ne Pu t n a m t o concede
t empor ar i l y t hat our own r ef er ence is gover ned at l east par t l y by causal con-
st rai nt s. ) So at l east s ome appar ent exampl es of decept i on are mi t i gat ed,
rat her t han worsened, by appl yi ng causal const rai nt s on reference. I f t he brain
says (in his i nner speech) ' I a m in Vi enna' , we mi ght carel essl y suppose t hat
he means what we do and is t her ef or e mi st aken. (The br ai n and his vat are
not in Vi enna. ) For he cannot t hi nk of Vi enna, f or he cannot r ef er t o it,
f or e x h y p o t h e s i he is causal l y i sol at ed f r om it.
All this, I repeat , is what we mi ght r easonabl y expect. It is not what Put nam
gives us. The ar gument in Ch a p t e r 1 of RT&H is not t he model - t heor et i c
ar gument . E The causal t heor y of r ef er ence is not used ad h o mi n e m agai nst
a hypot het i cal obj ect or who hopes t o use it t o def end det er mi nat e reference.
It is def ended vi gour ousl y, t hen it carri es t he whol e wei ght of t he ar gument
t hat t he br ai ns in t he vat ar e not decei ved.
Put na m' s defence o f t he causal t heor y of r ef er ence is fai r. Even i f he really
t hi nks it is j ust mor e t heor y, and couched in l anguage wi t h r adi cal l y indeter-
mi nat e r ef er ence, he ma y still t hi nk it is good t heor y, in all pr obabi l i t y
' epi st emi cal l y t r ue' . Surel y he does t hi nk so.
But how can t he causal t heor y of reference, unai ded, car r y t he whol e weight
of t he ar gument ? I see how it can be used t o exonerat e t he brai ns f r om various
specific accusat i ons of er r or . " The br ai n says t hat by ' Vi enna' he refers to
Vi enna and he d o e s n ' t . " - " No , he does r ef er t o what he calls ' Vi enna' , and
z0 For a genuine model-theoretic argument that brains in a vat are not deceived, see Paul Horwich,
'How to Choose Between Empirically Equivalent Theories', Journal of Philosophy 74 (1982),
pp. 61-77.
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David Lewis 235
so he speaks t he t r ut h. For what he calls ' Vi enna' i sn' t t he city t hat he is
i sol at ed f r om, but r at her is par t of t he c omput e r pr ogr a m t hat is t he source
of his ' Vi enna' - t okens and his ment al ' Vi enna' - dossi er . "
Or even, per haps, " He says t hat he i sn' t a br ai n in a vat , but he i s . " - " No ,
he' s ri ght ; f or by ' vat ' he means not t he sort of t hi ng he is in, but r at her t he
sort of t hi ng t hat is t he sour ce of t hi s ' vat ' - t okens and his ' vat ' - dossi er .
That sort of t hi ng is, agai n, a sor t of par t of t he comput er pr ogr a m, and
he i sn' t in one of t hos e. "
So far, so good. But it' s not good enough j ust t o show t hat the brai n doesn' t
make cer t ai n specific e r r o r s - - h e mi ght ma ke ever so ma n y ot her er r or s, and
be ver y r adi cal l y decei ved i ndeed.
I n f act , showi ng t hat t he br ai n avoi ds cert ai n specific errors is enough t o
meet Put na m' s st at ed goal s in Chapt er 1 of RT&H. He doesn' t pr omi se mor e
t han he delivers. But it isn' t enough t o cont ri but e t o Put nam' s overall strategy.
So what i f we have t o be a bi t car ef ul in sayi ng j ust what mi st akes a radi cal l y
deceived br ai n in a vat does and doesn' t make? No worri es f or real i sm t here!
Anybody can gr ant t he poi nt . I willingly do.
I suspect t hat Pu t n a m t hi nks t hat t he causal t heor y of r ef er ence can be
used over and over, in si mi l ar f ashi on t o t he exampl es j ust consi dered, t o
exonerat e t he br ai n f r om all accusat i ons of er r or what soever . (Except when
the br ai n falls shor t o f ' epi st emi c t r ut h' . ) I f t hat is what Pu t n a m means us
to t hi nk, t hen Chapt er 1 of RT&H fits ni cel y i nt o his pl an of bat t l e. The
causal -t heoret i c ar gument agai nst massi ve er r or t akes its pl ace as par t ner t o
the model - t heor et i c ar gument , at l east f or a cert ai n class of cases.
But I t hi nk we have been given no r eason what ever t o suppose t hat causal -
t heoret i c exoner at i ons can be pr oduced en masse. The requi si t e causal t heor y
of r ef er ence does not exist. We have a fai rl y well devel oped causal t heor y
of reference f or or di nar y pr oper names , e.g. of peopl e and places; 21 and we
have a sket chy causal t heor y o f r ef er ence f or names of chemi cal subst ances
and pl ant and ani mal species. The causal t heor y of r ef er ence f or t he whol e
of l anguage is not j ust over t he next hill. We don' t know whet her t here is
any such t heor y t o be had, still less how credi bl e it woul d seem or what it
would say.
Suppose I accuse t he br ai n of er r or when he says ' I a m in Vi enna' , not
because he i sn' t in t he ci t y t hat we call ' Vi enna' but because he isn' t in t hat
part of a c omput e r pr ogr a m t hat he calls ' Vi enna' . You appeal t o t he causal
t heory o f r ef er ence f or t he wor d ' i n' , sayi ng t hat he is in t he rel at i on t hat
he calls ' i n' t o t he appr opr i at e piece of pr ogr a m. I say it' s a f r aud. You ma y
hope s omeday t o possess a credi bl e causal t heor y of reference t hat yields t hat
result, but I do not believe you now possess even a gl i mmer i ng of how this
t heory will go.
(One r eason t o doubt t hat you will ever have it: what ever happens in special
cases, causal t heori es usual l y ma ke it easy t o be wr ong about t he t hi ngs we
refer t o. )
21 I have in mind the theory of Michael Devitt, Designation (Columbia University Press, 1981).
But I don't endorse even Devitt's theory; recall that I'm inclined to prefer causal descriptivism.
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236 Putnam' s Paradox
And so it will go, I t hi nk, t i me and agai n. The exoner at i ons o f er r or t o
be had f r om ext ant causal t heori es of r ef er ence will be few and f ar bet ween.
The model - t heor et i c ar gument agai nst massi ve er r or is fat al l y flawed, I think;
but t he causal - t heor et i c ar gument is bar el y a st art er.
Pri ncet on University Recei ved J une 1983
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