Aff Notes

Drug trafficking impact scenarios from the Classic GT lab have been
integrated into this file

Many of the energy / relations impacts from the Venezuela starter
packet file can be utilized for this aff. A few of the cards have already
been integrated into the 1ac.

1ac Plan

The United States federal government should offer to increase trade
with The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela if it complies with the
standards of the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Program code set by International Maritime Organization.
1ac Terrorism Advantage

Weak port security in Venezuela allows terror networks to thrive ---
the U.S. must create an explicit incentive to implement effective
standards
Edwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at the
University of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professor
at the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: United
States-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,
http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf, Daehyun)

Improving national security in the United States requires increasing our efforts in
some of the countrys most inherently vulnerable areasits ports. The primary
port activities, loading and unloading, are subject to minimal governmental
regulation, and much of the security burden subsequently falls to corporations and
industry. Where government regulations exist, they are often undermined by
business interests seeking to prevent delays by avoiding shipment screening.
Furthermore, the sheer number of physical components involved in trade make
regulation complex. It is estimated that over 46,000 ships and almost 4000 ports are
engaged in some form of international trade. In effect, the governments ability to monitor
what enters and exits the country is limited, drastically reducing its ability to
protect the country. To address this gap in national security and the private sector-
dominated paradigm, the United States must engage and utilize the private sector
to secure American ports from small arms trading, drug cartels, and potential
terrorist threats, especially nuclear ones . The International Maritime Organization
(IMO) passed the new International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) code in 2004 to
address the issue of port security and vulnerability. Previously, the IMO had passed the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1965. SOLAS was designed to
address safety of ships and ship-port interaction. The agreement regulated building and
shipping standards to ensure safe sailing from unintentional hazards. Because
SOLAS failed to address intentional activity, the IMO created the ISPS code. The IMO, which
actively oversees the conversion of ports to meet the new regulatory standards of the ISPS code,
reported in 2004 that fewer than 20 percent of the worlds ships and 10 percent of
global ports had certified that they have made the changes called for by the new
rules within a week of their July 1 deadline. Official U.S. policy requires turning away
ships that do not meet the regulations, a mandate that is unlikely to be fulfilled by
port administrators because of its negative affect on trade, further compounding
the issue of port security. Schoen, a senior producer at MSN, reports that the largest
obstacle is a lack of financial resources. For example, the United States spends only a nickel on
maritime security for every dollar spent on aviation security, with only $500 million having
been utilized to counter maritime terrorism since September 11, 2001, compared to $11.7 billion
for aviation terrorism. For less developed nations, an even smaller amount of money
is available to enforce port regulations. A 2003 Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development report estimates the initial cost to ship operators of complying with the ISPS
code at $730 million to $1.3 billion. Many less developed nations lack the financial
means to comply with the ISPS code, preventing even well-intendin governments
from meeting IMO security standards. It is therefore imperative that countries are
given the means and the incentive for meeting the security standards set by the
IMO. Moreover, American private port facilities are burdened with renovations, which have not
been made a high priority, and necessary safety renovations have gone unchecked in favor of
more affordable and more lucrative renovations, such as scales or aesthetics. It is imperative
that businesses, like states, be rewarded to meet security goals.vi In the absence of
incentives, many states and businesses will be unable to comply with the ISPS
code. Therefore, without some form of incentives, ports worldwide will be without
necessary security measuresradiation detection technology, adequate
manpower, secure fencing, and so onto comply with ISPS regulations. States
that, with or without incentives, fail to meet the ISPS code will otherwise be
negatively coerced to comply. Many ports may be forced or choose to turn away
entering ships that do not comply with the ISPS code. According to Stephen Flynn of the
Council on Foreign Relations, if all ships are barred from entering ports when they fail
to meet regulations, some states might experience upwards of 50 percent
unemployment throughout the entire economy. Unemployed populations are
prone to migrate or become involved in crime or terrorism, especially in
Caribbean states. Such effects are sure to spread from the Caribbean to Latin
America, where many prominent U.S. trading partners are located, namely
Venezuela. A decline in employment that leads to increased crime or terrorism has
widespread implications. Terrorism not only directly affects nations through its human
and physical costs (buildings, boats, etc), it also effects also economic systems. Terrorism
that affects private businesses will disrupt their market participation. Private actors
are inclined to trade through the most secure channelsbusinesses or states perceived as being
exempt from terrorist threatsespecially if a business feels its own ships or personnel are
threatened. Potentially, terrorism could cripple developing economies beginning to
globalize. A study conducted by the World Bank suggests that economic deterrence is
heightened even more if an attack is performed by an organization from within a
trading partners state. A trading partner viewed as a security concern is quickly
relegated to a position of lesser importance. The larger the trading partner, the greater
the potential for trade displacement following a terrorist attack. Trade data indicates
that Venezuela ranks within the top fifteen nations in dollars of U.S. imports. Additionally, it is
the fourth largest provider of crude oil to the United States, supplying 1.221 million barrels every
day. Venezuela also supplies the United States with 1.4 million barrels of petroleum daily.
Lapper notes that although America is dependent on Venezuelan oil, Venezuela is more
acutely dependent on American oil consumption. However, as China invests
heavily in Venezuelan oil, this dependency safeguard will erode. A news report
indicates that Chinese investment in oil and gas fields in Venezuela will reach five billon dollars.
That same news report quotes Venezuelan Energy Minister Ramirez explaining the growth of
exported oil to China, rising from zero in 2004 to 200,000 barrels a day in 2006, with a
projection of 500,000 barrels in 2009 or 2010. Venezuelan dependence on U.S. oil consumption
is expected to continue in the immediate future as long as the United States has the ability to
refine large quantities of Venezuelan crude oil and China does not. Additionally, transportation
costs and technological symmetries make U.S.-Venezuelan trade, rather than China- Venezuelan
trade, the most beneficial for Venezuela. Trade disruptions with Venezuela would have
significant economic and political implications for the United States. Despite their
important trade relationship, the diplomatic relationship between Venezuela and
the United States has grown tenuous since the 1998 election of President Hugo Chavez
and his accompanying socialist agenda. Consequently, American policy must be
equipped to provide greater security between itself and its trading partners, especially
when those partners are aggressive. Again, Venezuela is of particular concern because of its
high level of exports to America and the deteriorating relationship between the two nations.
President Chavezs foreign policy aims to make connections and develop
relationships with nations who share similar values, especially anti-imperialist
sentiment, or who are viable trading partners and major oil consumers. For the most
part, oil has been the strongest connection between Venezuela and other states with which it has
forged positive relationships. Venezuelas attempts to expand its trading partners, establish
international relationships, and develop a stronger, better-equipped military are part of a
greater movement to modernize the country. President Chavez has increased trade with
North Korea, Iran and Cuba, forging controversial arms deals with these U.S.
adversaries. In July of 2007, President Chavez launched the construction of a joint
petrochemical plant with Irans Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; the two also signed a series of trade
deals designed for economic expansion in an axis of unity. Both nations are hostile towards the
United States but are also prominent members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). President Chavez told reporters the two countries will united defeat the
imperialism of North America. A week before the conference the President forced two major
U.S. oil companies out of VenezuelaExxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips. He has also initiated
an anti-American socialist agenda, which allegedly heightens the chance of
harming trade relations with United States, mostly indirectly by shipping small
arms and drugs into the United States or by allowing other states to use
Venezuelan shipping to carry in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). A World
Bank study found that most states from which incidents of terrorism or sabotage
originate are developing states specializing in natural resources and
manufacturing those resources, such as oil and oil related products. Such products
are the major exports of Venezuela, and the major American imports from
Venezuela.

Venezuela is a critical nexus for narco-trafficking leads to Iranian
influence and undermines the global war on terror
Neumann 11 Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and is co-chair of
FPRIs Manhattan Initiative (Vanessa, THE NEW NEXUS OF NARCOTERRORISM:
HEZBOLLAH AND VENEZUELA, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Dec, 2011,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.neumann.narcoterrorism.html, Daehyun)

Press stories, as well as a television documentary, over the past two months have detailed the
growing cooperation between South American drug traffickers and Middle Eastern terrorists,
proving that the United States continues to ignore the mounting terrorist threat in
its own backyard of Latin America at its own peril. A greater portion of financing
for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, is coming
from Latin America, while they are also setting up training camps and recruiting
centers throughout our continent, endangering American lives and interests globally. Some
Latin American countries that were traditional allies for the U.S. (including Venezuela)
have now forged significant political and economic alliances with regimes whose
interests are at odds with those of the U.S., particularly China, Russia and Iran. In
fact Iran and Irans Lebanese asset, the Party of God, Hezbollah, have now become the
main terror sponsors in the region and are increasingly funded by South American
cocaine. Venezuela and Iran are strong allies: Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly call each other brothers, and last year
signed 11 memoranda of understanding for, among other initiatives, joint oil and gas
exploration, as well as the construction of tanker ships and petrochemical plants. Chvezs
assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N. sanctions has got the attention of the
new Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, resulting in the May 23rd,
2011 announcement by the US State Department that it was imposing sanctions on the
Venezuelan government-owned oil company Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) as a punishment
for circumventing UN sanctions against Iran and assisting in the development of the Irans
nuclear program. Besides its sponsored terrorist groups, Iran also has a growing direct
influence in Latin America, spurred by three principal motivations: 1) a quest for
uranium, 2) a quest for gasoline, 3) a quest for a base of operations that is close to
the US territory, in order to position itself to resist diplomatic and possible military pressure,
possibly by setting up a missile base within striking distance of the mainland US, as
the Soviets did in the Cuban Missile Crisis. FARC, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda all have
training camps, recruiting bases and networks of mutual assistance in Venezuela
as well as throughout the continent. I have long argued that Latin America is an increasing
source of funding for Middle Eastern terrorism and to overlook the political changes and
security threats in the region with such geographic proximity to the US and its greatest source of
immigrants is a huge strategic mistake. It was inevitable that South American cocaine
traffickers and narcoterrorists would become of increasing importance to
Hezbollah and other groups. While intelligence officials believe that Hezbollah used to
receive as much as $200 million annually from its primary patron, Iran, and additional money
from Syria, both these sources have largely dried up due to the onerous sanctions imposed on
the former and the turmoil in the latter. A recent New York Times front-page article (December
14, 2011) revealed the extensive and intricate connections between Hezbollah and South
American cocaine trafficking. Far from being the passive beneficiaries of drug-trafficking expats
and sympathizers, Hezbollah has high-level officials directly involved in the South American
cocaine trade and its most violent cartels, including the Mexican gang Los Zetas. The Party of
Gods increasing foothold in the cocaine trade is facilitated by an enormous Lebanese diaspora.
As I wrote in my May 2011 e-note, in 2005, six million Muslims were estimated to inhabit Latin
American cities. However, ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon regions of Suriname,
Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present easily exploitable
terrain over which to move people and material. The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile;
Maicao, Colombia; and Coln, Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical support
for terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. In
addition, Cuba and Venezuela have cooperative agreements with Syria, Libya, and
Iran. Some shocking revelations into the global interconnectedness of Latin American
governments and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have come from Walid Makled, Venezuelas
latter-day Pablo Escobar, who was arrested on August 19, 2010 in Ccuta, a town on the
Venezuelan-Colombian border. A Venezuelan of Syrian descent known variously as El Turco
(The Turk) or El Arabe (The Arab), he is allegedly responsible for smuggling 10 tons of
cocaine a month into the US and Europea full 10 percent of the worlds supply and 60 percent
of Europes supply. His massive infrastructure and distribution network make this entirely
plausible, as well as entirely implausible the Venezuelan government did not know. Makled
owned Venezuelas biggest airline, Aeropostal, huge warehouses in Venezuelas biggest port,
Puerto Cabello, and bought enormous quantities of urea (used in cocaine processing) from a
government-owned chemical company. After his arrest and incarceration in the Colombian
prison La Picota, Makled gave numerous interviews to various media outlets. When asked on
camera by a Univisin television reporter whether he had any relation to the FARC, he
answered: That is what I would say to the American prosecutor. Asked directly whether he
knew of Hezbollah operations in Venezuela, he answered: "In Venezuela? Of course! That
which I understand is that they work in Venezuela. [Hezbollah] make money and all of that
money they send to the Middle East." A prime example of the importance of the Lebanese
diaspora in triangulating amongst South American cocaine and Middle Eastern terrorists, is
Ayman Joumaa, a Sunni Muslim of the Medelln cartel with deep ties with Shiites in the
Hezbollah strongholds of southern Lebanon. His indictment made public on Tuesday charges
him with coordinating shipments of Colombian cocaine to Los Zetas in Mexico for sale in the
United States, and laundering the proceeds (NY Times, Dec. 14, 2011). The growing routes
linking South American cocaine to Middle Eastern terrorists are primarily from Colombia
through Venezuela. According to an April 2011 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the most prominent country of
origin for direct cocaine shipments to Europe, with the cocaine coming mainly from
Colombia, primarily the FARC and ELN terrorist groups. Shipments to Africa, mostly West
Africa, gained in importance between 2004 and 2007, resulting in the emergence of a new key
trans-shipment hub: centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, stretching to Cape Verde, The
Gambia and Senegal, thus complementing the already existing trafficking hub of the Bight of
Benin, which spans from Ghana to Nigeria. As the cocaine is transported through Africa and
into Europe, its safe passage is guaranteed (much as it was in Latin America) by terrorist
groupsmost prominently, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The cocaine can also travel from Latin
America's TriBorder Area (TBA)bounded by Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este,
Paraguay; and Foz do Iguau, Brazilto West Africa (particularly Benin, Gambia and Guinea-
Bissau, with its poor governance and vast archipelagos) and then north into Europe through
Portugal and Spain or east via Syria and Lebanon. Hezbollahs traditional continental home has
been the TBA, where a large, active Arab and Muslim community consisting of a Shia majority,
a Sunni minority, and a small population of Christians who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria,
Egypt and the Palestinian territories about 50 years ago. The TBA, South Americas busiest
contraband and smuggling center, has long been an ideal breeding ground for terrorist groups,
including Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al Qaedathe latter since 1995 when Osama bin Laden
and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad first visited. Hezbollah is still active in the TBA, according to
Argentine officials. They maintain that with Iran's assistance, Hezbollah carried out a carbomb
attack on the main building of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires on July
18, 1994, protesting the IsraeliJordanian peace agreement that year. Today, one of the
masterminds of those attacks, the Iranian citizen and Shia Muslim teacher, Mohsen Rabbani,
remains not only at large, but extremely active in recruiting young Brazilians, according to
reports in Brazilian magazine Veja. This region, the third in the world for cash transactions
(behind Hong Kong and Miami), continues to be an epicenter for the conversion and
recruitment of a new generation of terrorists who then train in the Middle East and pursue their
activities both there and in the Americas. According to Lebanons drug enforcement chief, Col.
Adel Mashmoushi, as cited in The New York Times, a main transportation route for terrorists,
cash and drugs was aboard a flight commonly referred to as Aeroterror, about which I wrote in
my May 2011 e-note for FPRI. According to my own secret sources within the Venezuelan
government, the flight had the route Tehran-Damascus-Caracas-Madrid, where it would wait for
15 days, and flew under the direct orders of the Venezuelan Vice-President, according to the
captain. The flight would leave Caracas seemingly empty (though now it appears it carried a
cargo of cocaine) and returned full of Iranians, who boarded the flight in Damascus, where they
arrived by bus from Tehran. The Iranian ambassador in Caracas would then distribute the new
arrivals all over Venezuela. I wrote in my May 2011 e-note that reports that Venezuela has
provided Hezbollah operatives with Venezuelan national identity cards are so rife,
they were raised in the July 27, 2010, Senate hearing for the recently nominated U.S.
ambassador to Venezuela, Larry Palmer. When Palmer answered that he believed the reports,
Chvez refused to accept him as ambassador in Venezuela. Thousands of foreign terrorists
have in fact been given national identity cards that identify them as Venezuelan
citizens and give them full access to the benefits of citizenship. In 2003, Gen. Marcos
Ferreira, who had been in charge of Venezuelas Department of Immigration and Foreigners
(DIEX) until he decided to support the 2002 coup against Chvez, said that he had been
personally asked by Ramn Rodrguez Chacn (who served as both deputy head of DISIP
Venezuelas intelligence service, now renamed SEBINand Interior Minister under Chvez) to
allow the illegal entry Colombians into Venezuela thirty-five times and that the DISIP itself
regularly fast-tracked insurgents including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The newly-minted
Venezuelan citizens during Ferreiras tenure include 2,520 Colombians and 279 Syrians. And
that was only during three of the past twelve years of an increasingly radicalized Chvez regime.
While Chvez has done more than anyone to strengthen these relationships with Middle Eastern
terrorists, in an attempt to use what he calls the International Rebellion (including Hezbollah,
Hamas and ETA) in order to negotiate with the US for power in Latin America, the coziness of
the seemingly strange bedfellows dates back to the fall of the Soviet Union, when the USSR
abandoned Cuba. At the Sao Paulo Forum of 1990, prominent Venezuelans and international
terrorists were all in attendance, including: then-Venezuelan President Carlos Andrs Prez
(against whom Chvez attempted a coup in 1992); Al Rodrguez, then-President of PDVSA
(Petrleos de Venezuela, the government-owned oil company); Pablo Medina, a left-wing
Venezuelan politician who initially supported Chvez, but has now moved to the opposition; as
well as Fidel Castro, Moammar Qaddafi and leaders of the FARC, Tupamaros and Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path). The extent to which these alliances have deepened and become
institutionalized is exemplified by the Continental Bolivarian Coordinator, the office that
coordinates all the Latin American terrorists. According to a well-placed Venezuelan military
source of mine, they are headquartered in the Venezuelan state of Barinasthe same state that
is effectively a Chvez family fiefdom, with their sprawling family estate, La Chavera, and their
total control of local politics. Their extreme anti-Semitism is not ideological, but simply out of
convenience: to court and maintain Iranian support. According to the Congressional Research
Service, with enactment of the sixth FY2011 Continuing Resolution through March 18, 2011,
(H.J.Res. 48/P.L. 112-6) Congress has approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military operations,
base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans health care for the three
operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and
other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at
military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Yet for all this massive spending on fighting
terrorists and insurgents in the Middle East, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to them
here, on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the United States is under territorial threat
through its Mexican border. Hezbollah operatives have already been smuggled, along with drugs
and weapons, in tunnels dug under the border with the US by Mexican drug cartels. Only a week
after my October 5th interview by KT McFarland on Fox, where I specifically warned of a
possibility of this resulting in a terrorist attack carried out inside the US with the complicity of
South American drug traffickers, the global press revealed a plot by the elite Iranian Quds Force
to utilize the Mexican gang Los Zetas to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in a
bombing that would have murdered many Americans on their lunch hour. Second, American
assets in Latin America are under threat. Embassies, consulates, corporate headquarters, energy
pipelines and American- or Jewish-sponsored community centers and American citizens have
already been targeted by terrorist groups all over Latin America for decades: FARC in Colombia,
Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru and Hezbollah in Argentina. Al Qaeda is also
rumored to have a strong presence in Brazil. Third, while American soldiers give their lives
trying to defeat terrorists and violent insurgents in the Middle East, these same groups are
being supported and strengthened increasingly by Latin America, where they
receive training, weapons and cash. This makes American military engagement far
more costly by any metric: loss of life and financial cost. Indeed over the last decade,
Latin America is a region spiraling ever more out of American control. It is a region with which
the United States has a growing asymmetry of power: it has more importance to the United
States, while the United States is losing influence over Latin America, which remains the largest
source of oil, drugs and immigrants, both documented and not. Latinos now account for 15
percent of the US population and nearly 50 percent of recent US population growth, as well as a
growing portion of the electorate, as seen in the last presidential elections. The discovery of huge
new oil reserves in Brazil and Argentina, that might even challenge Saudi Arabia, and the 2012
presidential elections in Venezuela, make Latin America of increasing strategic importance to
the U.S., particularly as the future political landscape of the Middle East becomes ever more
uncertain, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in
previously secular Arab governments. The growth of transnational gangs and the resurgence of
previously waning terrorist organizations pose complicated new challenges, as violence and
murder cross the U.S. border, costing American lives and taking a huge toll on U.S. law
enforcement. The United States needs to develop a smart policy to deal with these challenges. So
while the US is expending vast resources on the GWOT, the terrorists are being
armed and reinforced by Americas southern neighbors, making the GWOT far
more costly for the US and directly threatening American security. Even though
Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez may be removed from the presidency either through an
electoral loss in the October 7, 2012 presidential elections or through his battle with cancer,
certain sectors of the Venezuelan government will continue to support international
terrorism, whose activities, bases and training camps have now spread throughout
this region. By understanding the dynamics of the increasingly entrenched narcoterrorist
network, the U.S. can develop an effective policy to contend with these, whether or
not President Chvez remains in power.

Venezuela plays a make or break role --- its participation is critical to
end the growing narco alliance
Farah 11 - Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center Adjunct Fellow,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Douglas, The U.S.Caribbean Shared Security
Partnership: Responding to the Growth of Trafficking and Narcotics in the Caribbean, Dec 15,
2011, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111216_Farah_CaribbeanNarcotics_1215.pdf,
Daehyun)
*ALBA= Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America

In 2004, presidents Hugo Chvez of Venezuela and Fidel Castro of Cuba announced the
formation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para
los Pueblos deNuestraAmrica-ALBA), an alliance aimed at creating a political, economic, and
military structure that explicitly excludes the United States, but allies with Iran and other
regimes hostile to the United States. The two authoritarian governments were soon joined by
the leaders of Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, all espousing 21st Century Socialism. The leaders
have other commonalities: they all offering material support to the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FuerzasArmadasRevolucionarias de Colombia-FARC), a
designated terrorist organization by both the United States and European Union; and, there are
senior leaders in all the countries who are deeply corrupted and involved in the drug trade. In
2008, the nation of Dominica joined ALBA and, in 2009, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Antigua and Barbuda joined Alliance. The political intent of the union was made clear in a
statement when the Caribbean nations joined, where the final declaration stated that "[We
recognize]the strengthening of the ALBA and its consolidation as a political, economic, and
social alliance in defense of the independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and identity of
member countries and the interests and aspirations of the peoples of the South, in the face of
attempts at political and economic domination.2 This is worrisome on multiple fronts. If
these were simply democracies seeking a different democratic path, it would not be
troublesome. But when the most authoritarian governments in the region form an
alliance that consistently utilizes the drug trade as an instrument of statecraft;
allies itself with and facilitates the expansion of the influence of nations hostile to
both the United States and its democratic allies; and, systematically reduces
freedom of expression, political freedom, and the rule of law, the alliance cannot
by viewed as benign. Most of the Caribbean nations that have joined ALBA, or are
considering joining, are in it for the cheap oil subsidies provided by Venezuela, a very
real economic boon, particularly in a time when except for the small amount of money for
each country in the CBSI, and the humanitarian aid to Haiti , U.S. aid in the region is
shrinking, as is its regional diplomatic presence. The reality is that the relationships
with Venezuela in the region are dangerous and facilitate drug trafficking . As the
most recent State Department report on drug trafficking patterns noted
Venezuela is a major drug-transit country . A porous western border with
Colombia, a weak judicial system, inconsistent international counternarcotics
cooperation, and a generally permissive and corrupt environment have made
Venezuela one of the preferred trafficking routes out of South America to the
Eastern Caribbean, CentralAmerica, the United States, Europe and western Africa.
3 The Congressional Research Service also found that As U.S. counter-narcotics cooperation
with Venezuela has diminished since 2005, Venezuela has become a major transit point
for drug flights through the Caribbeanparticularly Haiti and the Dominican
Republicinto the United States as well asto Europe. Elsewhere in the Caribbean,the
Bahamas continues to serve as a major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and South
American cocaine.4 Declassified U.S. and Colombian reports on drug movements from the
traditional drug producing countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia show that the
Caribbean is becoming a more important transport route, especially for those drugs that pass
through the region to West Africa and then northward to Europe. The transshipment of drugs
through West Africa is now several years established, but as U.S., UN, and West African drug
experts can attest, the vast majority of the cocaine reaching those shores arrives on
flights that originate in Venezuela. In addition to the sealanes to the Caribbean islands
and the west bound flights over the Eastern Caribbean, significant drug traffic transits the
Caribbean through the airspace between the VenezuelaColombia corridor and the eastern
Atlantic/Caribbean coast of Central America. Particularly hard hit are Honduras, Belize and
Nicaragua. As demonstrated by the extensive connectivity among the producing and transit
regions, the concept of initiating a productive Caribbean Basin security initiative without having
some strategy for closing the main door through which the drugs enter the region (Venezuela),
is likely to be untenable. While the Caribbean is also a transit zone for cocaine leaving
Colombia, there is a fundamental difference. The Colombia government, at great cost in life and
national treasure, actively works to combat the trafficking and to drive it from its national
territory. The Chvez government in Venezuela, in contrast, aids and protects drug
traffickers at the highest level. Perhaps the strongest public evidence of the importance of
Venezuela to the FARC, which produces some 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the
United States, is the public designations of three of Chvez's closest advisers and senior
government officials by the U.S Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC). OFAC said the threeHugo Armando Carvajl, director of Venezuelan Military
Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangl, director of the Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and
Prevention Services; and, Ramn Emilio Rodriguez Chacn, former minister of justice and
former minister of interior were responsible for "materially supporting the FARC, a
narcoterrorist organization." OFAC specifically accused Carvajl and Rangel of protecting
FARC cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacn, who resigned
his government position just a few days before the designations, was the "Venezuelan
government's main weapons contact for the FARC."5 In November 2010, Rangel was promoted
to the overall commander of the Venezuelan armed forces. 6 As legendary Manhattan district
attorney Robert M. Morgenthau warned, as he left public service in 2009 after decades of
prosecuting financial fraud cases, And let there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not only
a corrupt government but one staffed by terrorist sympathizers. The government
has strong ties to narco-trafficking and money laundering, and reportedly plays an
active role in the transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of narcotics
proceeds in exchange for payments to corrupt government officials.7

These narco terror groups will strike the U.S. --- the military
establishment has already identified it as a top threat
Shinkman, 13 --- national security reporter at U.S. News and World Report (4/24/2013,
Paul D., Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond? New
Venezuelan president at a crossroads for major threat to U.S.,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-
venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond, JMP)

At a conference earlier this month, top U.S. military officers identified what they
thought would be the top threats to the U.S. as it draws down from protracted
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Gen. James Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, was unequivocal about a
largely unreported danger:
"Narco-terrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is going to
play out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going to have
to deal with."
"Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," Amos continued.
"They have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world."
The commandant's remarks came a week before the April 14 election where Venezuelans chose a
successor to the wildly popular and charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died March 5. Amos
indicated the outcome of this election would define much of future relations between the U.S.
and Venezuela, located on a continent that has rarely appeared on America's foreign policy radar
in the last decade.
Experts, analysts and pundits could not have predicted the election outcome: The
establishment's Nicolas Maduro beat reformer Henrique Capriles by a margin of roughly 1
percent. Chavez's hand-picked successor inherited the presidency, but he would not enjoy a
broad public mandate to get a teetering Venezuela back on track.
The situation in the South American nation remains dire amid skyrocketing
inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize private industry and
increase social benefits.
Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to remedying
widespread blackouts and food shortages.
One expert on the region says the new leader may need to tap into a shadow world
of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen expect.
"Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybody
else," says Doug Farah, an expert on narco-terrorism and Latin American crime.
He compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find solutions
to a problem. Anti-American groups can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example,
or potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC, the Colombian
guerilla organization, he says.
"Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-
night stand," says Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior
fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center.
Under Chavez, Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigated
treacherous financial waters and desperate economic straits, all while dodging U.S. influence.
But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere.
Farah produced a research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the
"growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents and other anti-
American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba.
This alliance with Iran uses established drug trade routes from countries in South
and Central America to penetrate North American borders , all under a banner of
mutual malevolence toward the U.S.
The results of this access are largely secret, though security experts who spoke with U.S. News
believe the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, D.C.'s
Georgetown neighborhood was carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives.
"Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing
any public record of the Iranian citizens that come and go to these countries," wrote Farah of
countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama.
He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press
conference in Tehran in 2010, "We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the
threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism."
These relationships are controlled by a group of military elites within Venezuela, Farah tells U.S.
News. He wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote Maduro won in the April 14 election
gives him enough support to keep the country and its shadow commerce stable enough to
continue its usual business.
"[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular
macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took,"
Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the
elites] for money."
"Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power
because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" as
they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez.

Results in WMD terrorist attacks on the U.S.
NTA 8 (National Terror Alert, U.S. Officials Worry Terrorists Could Align With Drug Cartels,
10-9, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2008/10/09/us-officials-worry-terrorists-could-
align-with-drug-cartels/)

There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah could
form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new
terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already been
identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding
logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security
Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring
people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S. The presence of these people in the
region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the United States, said Allen,
a veteran CIA analyst. The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them. Much
as the Taliban tapped Afghanistans heroin for money, U.S. officials say the vast profits available
from Latin American cocaine could provide al-Qaida and others with a ready source of income.
The rebel group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, has long
used drug money to pay for weapons, supplies and operations and is also designated as a
terrorist organization by the U.S. Weve got a hybrid that has developed right before our eyes,
Braun said. Latin Americas drug kingpins already have well-established methods of smuggling,
laundering money, obtaining false documents, providing safe havens and obtaining illicit
weapons, all of which would be attractive to terrorists who are facing new pressures in the
Middle East and elsewhere.

Escalates to global nuclear war
Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies:
New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington
(Robert, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld)//BB

But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate
nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist
attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of
events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more
of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups
might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of
small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between
the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and
early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may
require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation
where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For
example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be
wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least
because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers
of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that
sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities,
however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States
react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of
nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow
denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material
to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael
May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be
spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,
identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from
its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most
important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and
American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible
(or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling
out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and
India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of
North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage
would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In
particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when
threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials
and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances
of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already
involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if
they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as
these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a
nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or
even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures
that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or
encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack
on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear
aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and
confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the
U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including
its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment,
when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible
that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation,
the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that
any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

The plan solves --- provides the critical incentive for Venezuela to
adopt the ISPS standards
Edwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at the
University of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professor
at the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: United
States-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,
http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf, Daehyun)

It is widely believed that increased security at a countrys borders facilitates an increase in
international trade. However, current research indicates that increased trade also increases
security for the participating nations. As each nation increases its engagement in
international trade, the level and types of security measures that can be demanded
and met increase. Furthermore, contributing to a states development contributes to
its general prosperity, including economic and political reform. A study conducted by
the University of Kentucky Center for Business and Economic Research argues that even in
bilateral trading systems, where there is a high likelihood of conflict, increasing trade
does not increase its vulnerability or the likelihood of armed conflict. Establishing
a security cooperative1 with Venezuela would provide the vehicle by which to
increase trade security between the two nations with a low risk of conflict
escalation. A cooperative would be preferable between the United States and
Venezuela in that it does not demand formal agreements or obligations between each state but
still contains some structure and provides benefits for maintaining the
relationship, similar to informal multilateral arrangements such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement. To increase security within a secure bilateral framework, the United States
should offer to increase trade as an incentive with Venezuela if they comply with
the standards of the ISPS code set by IMO. Specifically, the United States should
require Venezuela to meet security benchmarks such as installing advanced
generation radiological material detectors in order to increase American trade
with Venezuela. Implementing a system of security for trade between trading
partners is an effective way to increase security in an openly hostile nation. The
agreement should apply equally to both parties, so that for every benchmark an
American shipping company meets, more Venezuelan business is offered. The
system would require a government-private relationship structured through
contracts that obligate businesses to conduct trade in Venezuela or with
Venezuelan 1 Security cooperative: a bilateral informal arrangement using economic
incentives to produce political and governmental effects businesses. Optimally, each state can
strategically establish contracts in order to open particular industries in each others state. For
example, State A assembles a group of private businesses expressing interest in trade with State
B. State B assembles a group of private businesses expressing interest in trading with State A.
The government and the business groups work together as a state cooperative. As Cooperative B
meets a level of security standards, Cooperative B is offered a particular level of trade from the
businesses in Cooperative A. The security standards met may be achieved through
actions by government mandate or private sector initiative. If the state funds the
security upgrades, then trade offered may be granted to the businesses at the states discretion.
If a private company complies with the security upgrades, then only that company is offered
increased trade from businesses within the other cooperative. As the level of security increases,
the cost of compliance also increases, and higher costs tend to inhibit trade. The dollar amount
increase in trade offered as an incentive must be more than the cost of providing a certain level
of security, but it must also be less than the cost of providing the next level of security. In this
way, access to trade can serve as an incentive for countries to continue upgrading
their security measures until they reach the highest possible level based on IMO
standards. The ISPS code requires the security or risk assessment of each ship
and port to be performed by the contracting governmentin this case the United
States and Venezuela. The levels of security that each nation can obtain correspond with the
three levels of risk detailed in the ISPS code. The goal is to upgrade all ports so that they
achieve level three security and are capable of responding effectively to a high-risk
incident. The risk assessment has three main components. First, the contracting
government must identify and evaluate critical assets and infrastructure in the
port facility that could suffer significant damage or casualties. Second, the
contracting government must identify and enumerate the actual threats to those
critical assets and infrastructures and prioritize them. Third, the contracting
government must identify vulnerability by noting weaknesses in physical security,
structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, communications
systems, transportation infrastructure, utilities and other likely targets. Based on
this assessment and cost estimates, the amount of trade per security improvement can be
determined and converted into dollar amount estimates. It is imperative that there is
consistent interaction between the private and public sectors. Most threat
information is known first, if not only, by the contracting government; the public
sector must share this information and provide the means to make this
information easily accessible. Relying on private volunteering to investigate
threats and secure them ignores the security threat. And because costs are so high,
financially or physically, many businesses are unlikely to voluntarily secure all but
immediate threats. By establishing a program that is beneficial for the security and
financial status of the private sector, businesses are more likely to become secure,
even those who may be exempt from IMOs ISPS code.

Venezuela will say yes --- it prioritizes trade relations
Jamison 13 writer, studying international politics at Georgetown (Anne, Maduro
Venezuela: He Won't Usher in a New Era Of U.S.-Venezuela Relations, and That's OK, April,
Policy Mic Network)//DLG

The April 19 inauguration of Nicols Maduro, vice president of Venezuela under the recently
deceased Hugo Chvez, has the world debating whether or not the self-proclaimed "son of
Chvez" could lead to improved relations with the United States. However, the
question isn't as relevant as we are making it out to be. The U.S. and Venezuela have for
years managed to cooperate economically, despite all the heated political rhetoric you
read about in the media, and they'll likely continue to do so. Before we tackle the future of
diplomatic relations, allow me to offer a brief history of the tumultuous relationship shared by
Venezuela and the U.S. in the past 14 years. Let's begin with the nasty break-up that occurred
when Hugo Chvez assumed office in 1999. Prior to Chvez, the U.S. and Venezuela enjoyed a
rather blissful diplomatic and economic relationship, complemented by the shared ambition to
curb illegal drug production and distribution. This strong relationship between the two
countries existed under the government of conservative neoliberal Rafael Caldera (President of
Venezuela 1969-1974; 1994-1999). In 1999 things began to go downhill, and were hardly helped
by the controversy over the Bush administrations support for the failed coup attempt against
Chvez. In 2005 the two countries stopped working together to fight illegal drugs. Then, in
2006, there was Chvez's infamous speech to the United Nations in which he referred to George
W. Bush as the devil. In 2008 Venezuela broke off diplomatic ties with the U.S. altogether out of
solidarity with its ally Bolivia, but President Obama managed to patch things up to an extent in
June 2009. Ties between the two countries have been strained (to the extent that neither
country had an ambassador in the others capital since June 2010), until now, when the
opportunity for an improved relationship has accompanied a new leader to the table. It is worth
nothing that throughout diplomatic problems OPEC member Venezuela never stopped
supplying oil, its biggest export, to the U.S., its biggest customer. Optimists
cringed as Maduro employed a strong anti-American sentiment in his campaign to
be Chvez. To be fair, it would have been hard to try and embody the spirit of Chvez without
aggressively opposing the United States. Maduro even went so far as to suggest that the CIA was
responsible for the cancer that killed Chvez on March 5. Albeit unsurprisingly, none of
Maduro's rhetoric looked particularly promising. However, just before securing
the election, Maduro contacted the former governor of New Mexico, Bill
Richardson, who was in Caracas on behalf of the Organization of American S tates.
Maduro said, according to an interview with Richardson, that "we want to improve the
relationship with the U.S., regularize the relationship." Apparently the U.S. did not
respond favorably to this, and subsequently supported a recount of the close election that
declared Maduro the winner. Maduro hardly found this amusing in the aftermath of the 2000
Bush vs. Gore election, and referred to the actions of the U.S. as "brutal" and "vulgar."
However, during a live television address on Tuesday, Maduro seemed to offer a conciliatory
message. "We want to have the best ties with all the world's governments, and the U.S.
government, but on the basis of respect. There can be no threats." He also named Calixto Ortega
the new charge d'affaires in Washington, doing so in hope of opening up a dialogue with the U.S.
in the absence of an ambassador. Maduro proceeded to proclaim that Venezuela "[hopes] one
day to have respectful relations with the United States, a dialogue between equals, state-to-
state." These are, without question, steps in the right direction. They are not, however, reason
to assume that diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Venezuela will get their happy ever after.
Ultimately, if the 14 years of Chvez proved anything about relations between the two nations,
they proved that their economic co-dependent relationship is not dependent on
having a stable diplomatic relationship or any diplomatic relationship at all. Keeping that
in mind, while both sides would prefer amicable diplomatic relations, they are not a
matter of life or death. Their trade relationship is intact, and that is their priority .

The ISPS is successful --- fosters international cooperation and
provides regional flexibility
Timien 7 - Head of the Baltic and International Maritime Councils (BIMCO) Security and
International Affairs Department(Thomas, The ISPS Code: Where are we now?, Apr, 2007,
http://www.fswg.org/files/DDF/ISPS%20Code%20-%20Where%20are%20we%20now%20-
%20Cargo%20Security%20International%20CSIA%20%204-5%2007%20(article).pdf,
Daehyun)

Beginning with the former, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is mandated by the US
Maritime Transport Security Act (MTSA) to assess security arrangements at non-US ports. This
is being conducted under the auspices of the US International Port Security Program (IPSP).
The result of these visits and assessments made by teams of USCG staff is seen in the port
security advisories issued by the USCG. The advisories list countries for which there are
concerns regarding ISPS Code compliance at all or some port facilities. Using these reports as
a yardstick, one could conclude that as there are currently only seven countries mentioned out
of all the worlds coastal states then global compliance appears to be going very well
indeed! The second source of information which is based on reports from SSOs can be
found on the BIMCO website (www. bimco.dk). Again, conclusions drawn from the information
here is favourable, as only 10% of the reports received indicate problems relating to
ISPS Code compliance. When difficulties do arise they often involve a lack of pre-arrival
security-related information or restrictions placed on shore leave. There was a time when many
feared that trading to a non-compliant ISPS port would result with serious consequences for
ships, including potentially drastic actions such as blacklisting and draconian measures taken
at subsequent ports. What has been interesting is the fact that no such consequences have been
experienced. The recommended steps described by the USCG for ships to follow
when calling at facilities belonging to the countries listed in its latest port security
advisory are essentially steps that would be implemented in any situation
involving security concerns. Here it is also worth noting that the USCG is only considering
the five subsequent port calls ships that have called at such places make, only half the number
of calls stipulated in the ISPS Code. And should such ships arrive at US ports within that
period, they are not banned but rather boarded for a preberthing inspection. What other
countries are taking such actions, reasonable as they may be? None that we are aware of. So
while we have seen a welcome reduction in the frequency of some threats to ships
since the implementation of the ISPS Code, there have been few, if any
detrimental consequences. Even the occasional difficulties relating to shore leave can be
addressed with reference to the provisions found within the ISPS Code stating that port facility
security plans should include measures to facilitate, not prohibit, shore leave. Today, this
international maritime security regime is working well, and few, if any, of the
problems predicted have materialised. Granted some have recently commented that
there is an absence of consistency regarding implementation of the Code. However, it is
important to remember that there are different risks in different regions. The
flexibility currently built into the Code, allowing for measures to be taken in
relation to the vulnerabilities identified in risk assessments, is an effective way to
ensure that resources are used to fit the situation rather than to meet a
requirement that serves little purpose. Such flexibility allows for risk-specific
arrangements, and ensures that both developed and developing countries will
realise the most efficient use of their resources. What lies ahead? One would hope that
the benefits gained from the ISPS Code will broaden, and that seafarers in particular
will realise further improvements regarding the safety and security in their workplaces. The
ISPS Code has helped to protect a key link in the international supply chain, and
many valuable lessons have been learned which could be applied to other links
which, in comparison, still have quite some catching up to do.
Boosting counter narcotics cooperation is feasible --- would put the
ball in Venezuelas court
Mannes 9 American writer, former Director of Research at the Middle East Media
Research Institute(Aaron, Mind the Gap: Reinstituting Counternarcotics Cooperation with
Venezuela, Jul 22, 2009, http://terrorwonk.blogspot.com/2009/07/mind-gap-reinstituting-
counternarcotics.html, Daehyun)

The GAOs recent report U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined
provides a nuts and bolts breakdown of how U.S. counternarcotics programs operate abroad
and how the Venezuelan government is refusing to cooperate on many of these crucial
programs. Because of its strategic location next to Colombia, which has long been at the heart of
the international drug trade, and because of the extensive connections between drugs and
terrorism, improving counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela is a small but
important issue. The report primarily blames Venezuelan corruption for the drug trafficking,
which combined with the reduced U.S. role has led to Venezuela becoming a major hub for
narco-trafficking. Despite the cooling U.S.-Venezuelan relationship, the counternarcotics
cooperation was strong between 2002 and 2005. But in July 2005 Chavez accused the DEA of
spying and cooperation began falling apart. In September of that year, for the first time, the U.S.
President designated Venezuela as failing to meet its counternarcotics obligations. The
programs that have suffered are items such as intelligence gathering and sharing
initiatives, logistical support for an elite task force of three-dozen Venezuelan prosecutors
and investigators, and port and border control programs. Accurate measures of illicit
activity like drug trafficking are not possible, but there is little question that that Venezuela
has become a major transit point for drugs particularly the burgeoning drug traffic
heading towards Europe. The growth of Venezuelas role in drug trafficking is very bad in its
own right, but it has also thrown a lifeline to the FARC, which has been devastated by the
Colombian military next door. Finally, illicit activity is a highway for terrorists and
other trans-national malefactors. Improved U.S.-Venezuelan counternarcotics
cooperation would be an important step to reducing some of these problems.
President Obama has explicitly stated that he hopes to improve Americas image in the world
and to that end he publicly shook hands with his predecessors hemispheric nemesis,
Venezuelas Hugo Chavez. Translating good feelings into pragmatic benefits is another matter
entirely, but an excellent objective would be to restore as much as possible U.S.-
Venezuelan counternarcotics cooperation. None of this is too ignore the multiple
other issues in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, particularly the deteriorating human rights
situation in Venezuela (although Chavez's bid for regional power may go into remission if oil
prices remain relatively low), but counter-narcotics cooperation is a low-level security
issue that can have big consequences. In Hugos Court Venezuelas President derives
tremendous political capital from kicking the United States. Wisely, the U.S. generally chooses
not to rise to his bait. Even the very sober GAO report (commissioned by the Sen. Richard
Lugar, a well-respected voice on foreign affairs) was quickly denounced by Chavez, who stated,
The U.S. is the biggest drug trafficking country on the planet. The Chavez regimes relationship
with narcotics trafficking and the FARC is not completely clear. Much of it is shaped not by a
grand plan but by corruption and by Chavezs own erratic behavior (such as threatening to kick
out the DEA for spying.) According to the GAO, Venezuelan officials would be interested
in resuming cooperation with the United States, and on some issues cooperation
has continued. However, persuading Chavez to sign on, when he derives so much benefit from
bashing the U.S., will not be easy. Obviously the general improvement in international
feelings towards the United States under President Obama is helpful but it will
not be enough. The U.S. can also approach European allies who have begun to suffer from
increased drug trafficking originating in Venezuela. Spain, whos prime minister has a friendly
relationship with Chavez, would be a particularly useful go-between. A bit of public
diplomacy would also be helpful. During Chavezs presidency, Venezuelas crime rate has
skyrocketed. Chavezs home province of Barinas has become the kidnapping capital of the
hemisphere. Publicizing the American desire to cooperate with Venezuela against
crime would force the issue on Chavez. The American pitch would have to be tailored just
right more in sadness than in anger. A humble America that recognizes its role in
fueling narcotics trafficking around the world only seeks to aid the countries that
suffer from it. This appeal would put the ball in Hugos court. Shouting matches only
play to Chavezs strengths as a charismatic speaker. A self-effacing approach might leave
him speechless, and fill a real gap in hemispheric security.

The plan spills over and cements anti-terror and energy coop
Edwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at the
University of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professor
at the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: United
States-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,
http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf, Daehyun)

Implementing a security cooperative with Venezuela will bring auxiliary benefits
to United States industry and security. However, a number of likely challenges must be
overcome to ensure that such an arrangement can be implemented successfully. This security
cooperative can be reasonably established if the challenges and why they exist are fully
addressed. Economic globalization has both positive and negative effects on trade security.
Globalization will erode funding sources for dissident and terrorist organizations
by creating international pressure on countries in areas such as export controls
and transactional transparency, bolstering national security. Conversely, because
terrorist organizations often depend on smuggling or money laundering and private donations
as their main funding sources, globalization increases access to sources from which an
organization might potentially acquire funds. Strengthening the economic ties between
Venezuela and the United States causes Venezuela to become more invested in
preventing terrorist attacks on either trading partner. Although terrorism may seem to
thrive in a globalized economy, increased trade creates strong incentives for each state
to prevent attacksleading to the enactment of security measures that weaken
rogue organizations. The United States also benefits from strong, stable trade
relations with Venezuela in the area of energy cooperation. Energy cooperation
includes assistance in developing and modernizing the technology to efficiently extract and
utilize energy resources. Previous efforts to support modernization and bilateral investment,
especially throughout the 1990s, have failed as technology and information exchanges
have become less frequent with the deterioration of the political relationship between the
United States and Venezuela. Stabilizing the Venezuelan economy and establishing a
normalized trade relationship would help to reverse declining energy
cooperation. Bilateral energy cooperation translates into a stable energy
infrastructure for Venezuela and the United States . A historical example of a successful
trade expansion occurred between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
illustrating the level of stability and security that trade can achieve. During the Cold War, when
diplomatic tensions were at their highest levels, trade between the two states neither promoted
arms production nor detracted from each states national security. Rather, as each state
perceived itself to be threatened by the other, trade policy increased non-threatening trade and
decreased threatening trade of goods between them. The trade relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union provided an economic incentive to limit
aggression and promote cooperation as the states become increasingly
economically interdependent. In fact, Gift suggests that increased trade encouraged each
state to comprehensively examine its trade deals and consequently, to increase its security by
dictating what entered and exited each state. The U.S.-Soviet analogy provides an important
illustration of the potential security benefits of tying the Venezuelan economy to that of the
United States. In 2006, the United States and Russia signed a bilateral trade agreement. The
agreement details what measures the United States would require Russia to adopt before
supporting its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and serves as a model for a
Russian draft of a Protocol of Accession. If Russia meets these requirements and joins the WTO,
trade between the United States and Russia will be expanded greatly. Therefore, Russias entry
into the WTO would provide multiple economic and economic and security benefits for the
United States: expanded access to non-agricultural goods markets, new service markets (such as
banking, securities, insurance, telecommunications, energy, and audio-visual services),
transparent and predictable tariff treatments for agricultural products, reduced non-tariff
barriers, and improved Russian enforcement of intellectual property rights. Existing bilateral
trade between the United States and Russia has grown by 15 percent annually, valued at around
$19 billion in 2005. Establishing far-reaching economic relationships yields significant benefits.
Venezuela is already a member of the World Trade Organization and is thus primed
for significant trade growth with the United States, as far as prerequisites for that trade.
Trade with Venezuela may not return as large financial returns as trade with Russia, simply
because of less capital and material trade available, but it would provide similar benefits to
both the economy and national security. Nonetheless, increasing bilateral trade based on
security improvements faces several obstacles. Foremost, it cannot be guaranteed that President
Chavez and his socialist state will participate in a program based on a capitalist model and
necessitates cooperation with the United States. However, a study conducted by Biglaiser and
Brown, writing for the World Trade Organization, suggests that political institutions do
not pose significant constraints on particular economic aspects. Trade and
capital are relatively unaffected for the most part by existing political policy
structure. Therefore, if President Chavez were to act in accordance with the suggested policy,
an agreement could be settled upon, despite the political structure of the state.
Despite suggestions that the existing political system will not interfere with trade relations,
President Chavezs administration has additional reason to be hesitant to strengthen
Venezuelas relationship with the United States. In 2002, President Chavez believes that
Washington helped fund an unsuccessful coup to remove him from power. The United States
also provides financial aid through USAID to the International Republican Institute (IRI), the
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NSIIA), Freedom House, Development
Alternatives, and Pan-American Development, all agencies viewed with skepticism by the
Venezuelan government. USAID also recently increased direct funding to Venezuelan agencies
that promote political and human rights, as well as business associations. These organizations
work to promote democracy by undermining Chavezs administration, primarily through
propaganda campaigns. After the 2002 coup attempt, the United States founded the Office of
Transition Initiatives (OTI) in Caracas with the all but explicit intention of aiding efforts to oust
President Chavez.xxix United States support of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
private sector participants that oppose President Chavez leads the Chavez government to
question the sincerity of attempts by the United States to strengthen its relationship with
Venezuela. In light of Venezuelas difficulty joining the Common Market of the South
(MERCOSUR), the state may decide to participate in an economically-oriented
security cooperative in order to prove itself a reliable trading partner. Establishing
a secure trading network with the United States offers Venezuela a greater chance
at eventually joining MECOSUR. The private sector could also thwart the success of the
Cooperatives if the agreement is perceived as cost-inefficient or because it delays and limits the
open trading markets that many shipping companies now enjoy. United States and
Venezuelan business communities must be encouraged to participate with real
political enthusiasm the offer of a stable trading partner, and increased security
with as little inconvenience as possible. Participation in the security cooperative
also helps businessesshipping companies and private portsmitigate the costs of
funding security improvements, such as customs checkpoints that delay delivery of
products. As security systems are upgraded and streamlined, in accordance with the ISPC
code, all stakeholders stand to gain. This assertion is backed by a 2005 Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) policy brief, which found that governments
benefit from increased efficiency in processing and detecting fraud, which increases revenue.
Businesses benefit because they can deliver goods more quickly with less
likelihood of delay or obstruction, and consumers benefit because increased trade
and streamlined security mean that cheaper goods can be obtained faster.
According to the OECD study, benefits are experienced by both developed and developing
states; but especially in developing countries because replacing current systems that are
inefficient and unstable can reap large benefits. An incentive program can provide the
motivation and means to improve trade relations and meet security standards,
while mitigating many of the negative effects by providing immediate economic
gratification for making security upgrades .

Expanded energy cooperation ensures Venezuelan stability and
Maduros grip on power
Campbell, 13 (4/16/2013, Darren, A new leader could signal change for Venezuelas
troubled oil and gas sector; If Nicolas Maduro can reverse the industry's decline, it could siphon
off investment in Alberta's oil sands, http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2013/04/a-new-
leader-could-signal-change-for-venenzuelas-oil-and-gas-sector/, JMP)

Thats because Venezuelan heavy oil is a competitor to the bitumen and heavy oil Alberta
produces, and as long as the Venezuelan oil and gas industry is badly underperforming, some of
the investment that could be going to develop its reserves will flow to the oil sands.
But now that Maduro is the new boss in Venezuela, is he likely to reverse the decline?
Devon Energy Big Box
To gain some insight into that question, I contacted Roger Tissot a native of Colombia who is
now a British Columbia-based industry consultant who specializes in South America. Last June,
Tissot wrote an essay on Chavez and the future of the Venezuela oil and gas industry that
appeared in Alberta Oil.
Maduro was Chavezs hand-picked successor, and knowing that, Tissot says no one should
expect a drastic reversal of policies or a drastic turnaround in the industrys fortunes.
However, the status quo cant continue, either. Maduro needs oil and gas revenue to
fund the countrys social programs and keep the country from falling into chaos .
A better run, more free market-leaning oil and gas industry will help Maduro
accomplish this and keep him in power longer.
Therefore, Tissot thinks Maduro has little choice but to shake things up when it
comes to oil and gas matters.
One could expect a government more accessible to foreign investments, and
foreign investors concerns (rule of law, security of payments, stability of
contracts.) Although it is too early to say, one should expect the Venezuelan oil sectors after
years of stagnation and mismanagement to perhaps start showing some signs of life again, he
wrote in an email exchange. How soon and how deep is something that will depend on
how Mr. Maduros administration performs.

Triggers nuclear war and extinction
Manwaring 5 adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson
(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuelas Hugo Chvez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg.
PUB628.pdf, Wake Early Bird File)

President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term
security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state
status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and
terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil
networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or
some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things
people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These
means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty,
starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and
proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing,
warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill
over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls
violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels
operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these
activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about
the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping
to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at
progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its
national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin
American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption,
disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of
the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political,
economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such
a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such
an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability.
As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states,
narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured
that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity.
And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they
and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65
1ac U.S. Influence Advantage

The plan boosts trade relations and avoids political confrontation
with Venezuela
Edwards 8 Edwards: double-majoring in International Affairs and Political Science at the
University of Georgia, Dr. Christopher Allen was his faculty member, political science professor
at the University of Georgia(Nathaniel and Christopher, Increasing Trade Security: United
States-Venezuelan Trade Incentives, 2008,
http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf, Daehyun)

Abstract:
Trade with Venezuela has risen to the top 15 nations with which the United States conducts
trade; it has also become the fourth largest provider of American crude oil and
petroleum products, topping over a million barrels every day. While trade with
Venezuela has steadily increased, diplomatic relations have steadily declined due to
open antagonism and criticism by both sides. In juxtaposition, there is a significant
national security threat as Venezuela becomes a prime locale by which to load a weapon on a
boat intended for American ports and Venezuela offers little domestic protection of exports to
America. This risk is becoming even greater as Chavez continues to increase relations with
American adversaries and openly critiques American capitalism. As trade relations
increase, each state can demand a greater level of security be met and maintained
in order for trade to continue. Therefore, this paper proposes the creation of a system
of economic incentives in exchange for meeting and maintaining security
standards at ports. Because there is a risk of Venezuelan hesitance to participate, the
policy aims to appeal exclusively to the economic sector of Venezuela and avoid
political confrontation. Furthermore, it aims to avoid Chavez criticism of capitalism
by establishing a controlled economic system between the United States and
Venezuela. This policy will be rationalized by comparing similar case studies as well as noting
inherent benefits of trade systems.

Expanded economic ties with Venezuela allows the U.S. to secure
regional influence
Delahunt, 12 --- chairman of the Venezuela-US Friendship Group and retired U.S.
Representative (10/30/2012, William, A new role for the US and Venezuela,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/30/podium-
venezuela/EJ6Jd2yRKfaJ76HYrXb4WJ/story.html, JMP)

The recent election in Venezuela offers an opportunity to improve the US-
Venezuela bilateral relationship. On Oc. 7th, President Hugo Chavez was reelected to a
new six-year term by a nine point margin. I along with hundreds of other international
witnesses was duly impressed with the transparency of the electoral process and the
enthusiasm of Venezuelans for democracy. Eighty-one percent percent of registered voters went
to the polls! This turnout was remarkable when compared to the United States and other
mature democracies.
Whether or not one agrees with Chvezs policies, there can be no doubt that he won these
elections fairly. There are so many checks and balances in the electoral system in Venezuela that
there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballot
and the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the different
political parties and independent observers.
Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system the best in the
world. He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at to
verify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against
the electronic tally.
I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the voting
centers, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. In
contrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once the
election authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidly
conceded defeat, and he quickly scolded radical opposition supporters who insisted on alleging
that fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chvez also behaved
gracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together to
mitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans.
Most of Venezuelas political leadership following a tumultuous power struggle, during which
a coup dEtat and violent protests occurred appear to have accepted to follow the democratic
rulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United
States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than support
one group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years.
Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chvez. The
United States should respect this outcome and seek to improve relations in areas
where we can agree. Commercial relations between our two countries have
generally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries would
greatly benefit from their expansion.
Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the regions new
multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms , such as the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and
Caribbean States (CELAC). The United S tates, which has increasingly found itself
isolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these new
groups on important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation.
Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task.
Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela,
particularly in the area of international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as
we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelan
government is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative .

U.S.-Latin American ties key to deal with climate change,
proliferation, economy and democracy
ONeil, 7/16 --- Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at CFR (7/16/2013, Shannon K.,
Latin Americas Secret Success Story, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/07/16/latin-americas-
secret-success-story/, JMP)

For the start of the Biennial of the Americas conference, I wrote an article for the Daily Beast on
why Latin America is steadily growing in global importance. You can read the piece
here or below.
Latin America rarely looms large on the global scene, overshadowed by Europe, the Middle East,
and Asia on the agendas and in the imagination of policymakers, business leaders, and the
global chattering classes. But under cover of this benign neglect, the region has dramatically
changed, mostly for the better.
Its economies have flourished. Once known for hyperinflation and economic booms and busts,
Latin America is now a place of sound finances and financial systems. Exportsranging from
soy, flowers, copper, and iron ore to computers, appliances, and jetshave boomed. GDP
growth has doubled from 1980s levels to an annual average of 4 percent over the past two
decades, as has the regions share of global GDP, increasing from 5 percent in 2004 to nearly 8
percent in 2011.
Many of the countries have embraced globalization, opening up their economies and
searching for innovative ways to climb the value-added chain and diversify their production.
Trading relations too have changed: U.S. trade has expanded at a fast clip even as these nations
diversified their flows across the Atlantic and Pacific. These steps have lured some $170 billion
in foreign direct investment in 2012 alone (roughly 12 percent of global flows). Led by Brazil and
Mexico, much of this investment is going into manufacturing and services.
Already the second largest holder of oil reserves in the world (behind only the Middle East), the
hemisphere has become one of the most dynamic places for new energy finds and sources. From
the off shore pre-salt oil basins of Brazil to the immense shale gas fields of Argentina and
Mexico, from new hydrodams on South Americas plentiful rivers to wind farms in Brazil and
Mexico, the Americas diversified energy mix has the potential to reshape global energy
geopolitics.
Democracy, too, has spread, now embraced by almost all of the countries in the
region. And with this expanded representation has come greater social inclusion in many
nations. Latin America is by all accounts a crucible of innovative social policies, a global leader
in conditional cash transfers that provide stipends for families that keep kids in school and get
basic healthcare, as well as other programs to reduce extreme poverty. Combined with stable
economic growth, those in poverty fell from roughly two in five to one in four Latin Americans in
just a decade.
These and other changes have helped transform the basic nature of Latin American societies.
Alongside the many still poor is a growing middle class. Its ranks swelled by 75 million people
over the last 10 years, now reaching a third of the total population. The World Bank now
classifies the majority of Latin American countries as upper middle income, with Chile and
Uruguay now considered high income. Brazils and Mexicos household consumption levels
now outpace other global giants, including China and Russia, as today nearly every Latin
American has a cell phone and television, and many families own their cars and houses.
The region still has its serious problems. Latin America holds the bloody distinction of being the
worlds most violent region. Eight of the ten countries with the worlds highest homicide rates
are in Latin America or the Caribbean. And non-lethal crimes, such as assault, extortion, and
theft are also high. A 2012 study by the pollster Latino Barometro found that one in every four
Latin American citizens reported that they or a family member had been a victim of a crime
during the past year. Latin America also remains the most unequal region in the world, despite
some recent improvements. Studies show this uneven playing field affects everything from
economic growth to teenage pregnancy and crime rates.
These countries as a whole need to invest more in education, infrastructure, and basic rule of
law to better compete in a globalizing world. Of course, nations also differwhile some
countries have leaped ahead others have lagged, buffeted by everything from world markets to
internal divisions.
Nevertheless, with so much potential, and many countries on a promising path, it is
time to recognize and engage with these increasingly global players. And while
important for the world stage, the nations of the hemisphere are doubly so for the
United States. Tied by geographic proximity, commerce, communities, and security, the
Americas are indelibly linked. As the United States looks to increase exports, promote
democratic values, and find partners to address major issues, such as climate
change, financial stability, nuclear non-proliferation, global security, democracy,
and persistent poverty, it could do no better than to look toward its hemispheric
neighbors, who have much to impart .

Prolif causes extinction --- assumes every warrant
Kroenig, 12 [Matthew, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and
Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, May 26
th
The History of
Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30)

Proliferation Optimism: Proliferation optimism was revived in the academy in Kenneth
Waltzs 1979 book, Theory of International Politics.1[29] In this, and subsequent works, Waltz
argued that the spread of nuclear weapons has beneficial effects on international politics. He
maintained that states, fearing a catastrophic nuclear war, will be deterred from going to war
with other nuclear-armed states. As more and more states acquire nuclear weapons, therefore,
there are fewer states against which other states will be willing to wage war. The spread of
nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, leads to greater levels of international
stability. Looking to the empirical record, he argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons
in 1945 coincided with an unprecedented period of peace among the great powers. While the
United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in peripheral geographic
regions during the Cold War, they never engaged in direct combat. And, despite regional scuffles
involving nuclear-armed states in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, none of these
conflicts resulted in a major theater war. This lid on the intensity of conflict, according to Waltz,
was the direct result of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Following in the path blazed by
the strategic thinkers reviewed above, Waltz argued that the requirements for deterrence are not
high. He argued that, contrary to the behavior of the Cold War superpowers, a state need not
build a large arsenal with multiple survivable delivery vehicles in order to deter its adversaries.
Rather, he claimed that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient for deterrence. Indeed, he even
went further, asserting that any state will be deterred even if it merely suspects its opponent
might have a few nuclear weapons because the costs of getting it wrong are simply too high. Not
even nuclear accident is a concern according to Waltz because leaders in nuclear-armed states
understand that if they ever lost control of nuclear weapons, resulting in an accidental nuclear
exchange, the nuclear retaliation they would suffer in response would be catastrophic. Nuclear-
armed states, therefore, have strong incentives to maintain control of their nuclear weapons.
Not even new nuclear states, without experience in managing nuclear arsenals, would ever allow
nuclear weapons to be used or let them fall in the wrong hands. Following Waltz, many other
scholars have advanced arguments in the proliferation optimist school. For example, Bruce
Bueno de Mesquite and William Riker explore the merits of selective nuclear
proliferation.2[30] John Mearsheimer made the case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union.3[31] In the run up to the 2003 Gulf War, John






Mearsheimer and Steven Walt argued that we should not worry about a nuclear-armed Iraq
because a nuclear-armed Iraq can be deterred.4[32] And, in recent years, Barry Posen and many
other realists have argued that nuclear proliferation in Iran does not pose a threat, again arguing
that a nuclear-armed Iran can be deterred.5[33] Whats Wrong with Proliferation Optimism?
The proliferation optimist position, while having a distinguished pedigree, has several
major problems. Many of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant detail by Scott
Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists.6[34] Rather than repeat these
substantial efforts, I will use this section to offer some original critiques of the recent
incarnations of proliferation optimism. First and foremost, proliferation optimists do not
appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort
to marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due
caution and with complete sincerity. A careful review of the contemporary proliferation
optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the developments
in academic deterrence theory in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science
Review and International Organization over the past few decades.7[35] While early optimists
like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not knowing better, the writings of contemporary
proliferation optimists ignore the past fifty years of academic research on nuclear
deterrence theory. In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but
nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.8[36]
After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-
armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to
launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a
credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the
1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this
question.9[37] And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us
reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which
states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.10[38] He argued that leaders cannot credibly
threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a threat that leaves
something to chance.11[39] They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases
the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states
escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will
spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As


















long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of
nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear
brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before back down
will win the crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas
Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a competition in risk taking.12[40] This
does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching
decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by
ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an
attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945
there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been
twenty) in which rational states like the United States run a risk of nuclear war and inch very
close to the brink of nuclear war.13[41] By asking whether states can be deterred or not,
therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is:
what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given
crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that Iran will not intentionally
commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United
States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons,
however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at
some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not be
willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran
and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over say the internal
politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Irans client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian
Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would
immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing
nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that
proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war. An optimist might counter that nuclear
weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a
strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not
used. But, this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing
pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have very strong incentives to
convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used.
Historically we have seen that in crises, leaders purposely do things like put
nuclear weapons on high alert and delegate nuclear launch authority to low level
commanders, purposely increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt
to force less-resolved opponents to back down. Moreover, not even the optimists first principles
about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be
equally devastating.14[42] Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no
doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader
would rather be facing a country with five nuclear weapons than one with thirty-five thousand.
Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the
former state than against the latter. Indeed, systematic research has demonstrated that states
are willing to run greater risks and, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy
nuclear superiority over their opponent.15[43] Proliferation optimists miss this point,








however, because they are still mired in 1940s deterrence theory. It is true that no
rational leader would choose to launch a nuclear war, but, depending on the
context, she would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists
have proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders could instigate a nuclear
exchange: a limited nuclear war.16[44] By launching a single nuclear weapon against a small
city, for example, it was thought that a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to
escalate the crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary
from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between a nuclear-armed China
and the United States over Taiwan, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear attack
on Honolulu to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States
intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China that could result in
the destruction of many more American cities? Or would it back down? China might decide to
strike hoping that Washington will choose a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If
launching a limited nuclear war could be rational, it follows that the spread of
nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. Again, by ignoring contemporary
developments in scholarly discourse and relying exclusively on understandings of
nuclear deterrence theory that became obsolete decades ago, optimists reveal the
shortcomings of their analysis and fail to make a compelling case. The optimists
also error by confusing stability for the national interest. Even if the spread of
nuclear weapons contributes to greater levels of international stability (which
discussions above and below suggest it might not) it does not necessarily follow that the
spread of nuclear weapons is in the U.S. interest. There might be other national
goals that trump stability, such as reducing to zero the risk of nuclear war in an
important geopolitical region. Optimists might argue that South Asia is more stable when
India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, but certainly the risk of nuclear war is higher
than if there were no nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. In addition, it is wrong to
assume that stability is always in the national interest. Sometimes it is, but sometimes it is not.
If stability is obtained because Washington is deterred from using force against a nuclear-armed
adversary in a situation where using force could have advanced national goals, stability harms,
rather than advances, U.S. national interests. The final gaping weakness in the proliferation
optimist argument, however, is that it rests on a logical contradiction. This is
particularly ironic, given that many optimists like to portray themselves as hard-headed
thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the
heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the
probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the
probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no deterrent
effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and
states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale wars against nuclear-
armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread
of nuclear weapons is stabilizing. If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war
is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons
increases the probability of a catastrophic nuclear war. If this is true, then
proliferation optimists cannot be certain that nuclear weapons will never be used.
In sum, the spread of nuclear weapons can either raise the risk of nuclear war and
in so doing, deter large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that
nuclear weapons will be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase
international instability. But, despite the claims of the proliferation optimists, it is




nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to
simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability.
Proliferation Anti-obsessionists: Other scholars, who I label anti-obsessionists argue that the
spread of nuclear weapons has neither been good nor bad for international politics, but rather
irrelevant. They argue that academics and policymakers concerned about nuclear proliferation
spend too much time and energy obsessing over something, nuclear weapons, that, at the end of
the day, are not all that important. In Atomic Obsession, John Mueller argues that
widespread fears about the threat of nuclear weapons are overblown.17[45] He
acknowledges that policymakers and experts have often worried that the spread of nuclear
weapons could lead to nuclear war, nuclear terrorism and cascades of nuclear proliferation, but
he then sets about systematically dismantling each of these fears. Rather, he contends that
nuclear weapons have had little effect on the conduct of international diplomacy and that world
history would have been roughly the same had nuclear weapons never been invented. Finally,
Mueller concludes by arguing that the real problem is not nuclear proliferation, but nuclear
nonproliferation policy because states do harmful things in the name of nonproliferation, like
take military action and deny countries access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Similarly, Ward Wilson argues that, despite the belief held by optimists and pessimists alike,
nuclear weapons are not useful tools of deterrence.18[46] In his study of the end of World War
II, for example, Wilson argues that it was not the U.S. use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki that forced Japanese surrender, but a variety of other factors, including the Soviet
Unions decision to enter the war. If the actual use of nuclear weapons was not enough to
convince a country to capitulate to its opponent he argues, then there is little reason to think
that the mere threat of nuclear use has been important to keeping the peace over the past half
century. Leaders of nuclear-armed states justify nuclear possession by touting their deterrent
benefits, but if nuclear weapons have no deterrent value, there is no reason, Ward claims, not to
simply get rid of them. Finally, Anne Harrington de Santana argues that nuclear experts
fetishize nuclear weapons.19[47] Just like capitalists, according to Karl Marx, bestow magical
qualities on money, thus fetishizing it, she argues that leaders and national security experts do
the same thing to nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence as a critical component of national
security strategy, according to Harrington de Santana, is not inherent in the technology of
nuclear weapons themselves, but is rather the result of how leaders in countries around the
world think about them. In short, she argues, Nuclear weapons are powerful because we treat
them as powerful.20[48] But, she maintains, we could just as easily defetish them, treating
them as unimportant and, therefore, rendering them obsolete. She concludes that Perhaps
some day, the deactivated nuclear weapons on display in museums across the United States will
be nothing more than a reminder of how powerful nuclear weapons used to be.21[49] The anti-
obsessionists make some thought-provoking points and may help to reign in some of the most
hyperbolic accounts of the effect of nuclear proliferation. They remind us, for example, that our
worst fears have not been realized, at least not yet. Yet, by taking the next step and arguing
that nuclear weapons have been, and will continue to be, irrelevant, they go too











far. Their arguments call to mind the story about the man who jumps to his death
from the top of a New York City skyscraper and, when asked how things are going
as he passes the 15th story window, replies, so far so good. The idea that world
history would have been largely unchanged had nuclear weapons not been
invented is a provocative one, but it is also unfalsifiable. There is good reason to
believe that world history would have been different, and in many ways better, had
certain countries not acquired nuclear weapons. Lets take Pakistan as an example.
Pakistan officially joined the ranks of the nuclear powers in May 1998 when it followed India in
conducting a series of nuclear tests. Since then, Pakistan has been a poster child for the
possible negative consequences of nuclear proliferation. Pakistans nuclear
weapons have led to further nuclear proliferation as Pakistan, with the help of rogue
scientist A.Q. Khan, transferred uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and
North Korea.22[50] Indeed, part of the reason that North Korea and Iran are so far along with
their uranium enrichment programs is because they got help from Pakistan. Pakistan has also
become more aggressive since acquiring nuclear weapons, displaying an increased
willingness to sponsor cross-border incursions into India with terrorists and
irregular forces.23[51] In a number of high-stakes nuclear crises between India and
Pakistan, U.S. officials worried that the conflicts could escalate to a nuclear
exchange and intervened diplomatically to prevent Armageddon on the subcontinent. The U.S.
government also worries about the safety and security of Pakistans nuclear arsenal, fearing that
Pakistans nukes could fall into the hands of terrorists in the event of a state collapse or
a break down in nuclear security. And we still have not witnessed the full range of consequences
arising from Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Islamabad has only possessed the bomb for a little
over a decade, but they are likely to keep it for decades to come, meaning that we could still have
a nuclear war involving Pakistan. In short, Pakistans nuclear capability has already had
deleterious effects on U.S. national security and these threats are only likely to grow over time.
In addition, the anti-obsessionists are incorrect to argue that the cure of U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy is worse than the disease of proliferation. Many observers would agree
with Mueller that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a disaster, costing much in the way of
blood and treasure and offering little strategic benefit. But the Iraq War is hardly representative
of U.S. nonproliferation policy. For the most part, nonproliferation policy operates in the
mundane realm of legal frameworks, negotiations, inspections, sanctions, and a variety of other
tools. Even occasional preventive military strikes on nuclear facilities have been far less
calamitous than the Iraq War. Indeed, the Israeli strikes on nuclear reactors in Iraq and Syria in
1981 and 2007, respectively, produced no meaningful military retaliation and a muted
international response. Moreover, the idea that the Iraq War was primarily about nuclear
nonproliferation is a contestable one, with Saddam Husseins history of aggression, the
unsustainability of maintaining the pre-war containment regime indefinitely, Saddams ties to
terrorist groups, his past possession and use of chemical and biological weapons, and the
window of opportunity created by September 11th, all serving as possible prompts for U.S.
military action in the Spring of 2003. The claim that nonproliferation policy is dangerous
because it denies developing countries access to nuclear energy also rests on shaky ground. If
anything, the global nonproliferation regime has, on balance, increased access to nuclear
technology. Does anyone really believe that countries like Algeria, Congo, and Vietnam would
have nuclear reactors today were it not for Atoms for Peace, Article IV of the NPT, and other
appendages of the nonproliferation regime that have provided developing states with nuclear





technology in exchange for promises to forgo nuclear weapons development? Moreover, the
sensitive fuel-cycle technology denied by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other supply
control regimes is not even necessary to the development of a vibrant nuclear energy program as
the many countries that have fuel-cycle services provided by foreign nuclear suppliers clearly
demonstrate. Finally, the notion that nuclear energy is somehow the key to lifting developing
countries from third to first world status does not pass the laugh test. Given the large upfront
investments, the cost of back-end fuel management and storage, and the ever-present danger of
environmental catastrophe exemplified most recently by the Fukushima disaster in Japan, many
argue that nuclear energy is not a cost-effective source of energy (if all the externalities are taken
into account) for any country, not to mention those developing states least able to manage these
myriad challenges. Taken together, therefore, the argument that nuclear nonproliferation policy
is more dangerous than the consequences of nuclear proliferation, including possible nuclear
war, is untenable. Indeed, it would certainly come as a surprise to the mild mannered diplomats
and scientists who staff the International Atomic Energy Agency, the global focal point of the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, located in Vienna, Austria. The anti-obsessionsists, like the
optimists, also walk themselves into logical contradictions. In this case, their policy
recommendations do not necessarily follow from their analyses. Ward argues that nuclear
weapons are irrelevant and, therefore, we should eliminate them.24[52] But, if nuclear weapons
are really so irrelevant, why not just keep them lying around? They will not cause any problems
if they are as meaningless as anti-obsessionists claim and it is certainly more cost effective to do
nothing than to negotiate complicated international treaties and dismantle thousands of
warheads, delivery vehicles, and their associated facilities. Finally, the idea that nuclear
weapons are only important because we think they are powerful is arresting, but
false. There are properties inherent in nuclear weapons that can be used to create
military effects that simply cannot, at least not yet, be replicated with conventional
munitions. If a military planner wants to quickly destroy a city on the other side of
the planet, his only option today is a nuclear weapon mounted on an ICBM.
Therefore, if the collective we suddenly decided to defetishize nuclear weapons
by treating them as unimportant, it is implausible that some leader somewhere would not
independently come to the idea that nuclear weapons could advance his or her countrys
national security and thereby re-fetishize them. In short, the optimists and anti-obsessionists
have brought an important perspective to the nonproliferation debate. Their arguments are
provocative and they raise the bar for those who wish to argue that the spread of nuclear
weapons is indeed a problem. Nevertheless, their counterintuitive arguments are not enough to
wish away the enormous security challenges posed by the spread of the worlds most dangerous
weapons. These myriad threats will be considered in the next section. Why Nuclear
Proliferation Is a Problem The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe
threats to international peace and U.S. national security including: nuclear war,
nuclear terrorism, emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of action,
weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of
these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons
is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the
probability that somewhere, someday, there is a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear
exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in
human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as
India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of
economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date,
nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one



nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many
analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear
weapons are unusable, but it would be nave to think that nuclear weapons will never be used
again. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great
depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the
later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.25[53] This author, for one, would be
surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD,
new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-
second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has
an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear
weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure,
second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small
size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear
strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to
build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold,
Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there
are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the
nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis,
Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Irans nuclear
capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might
be further increased by Israels aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action.
Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran,
might feel use em or loose em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might
launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire
nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result
due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.26[54] If there are advantages to
striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable
and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian
crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike
first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD,
there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed
states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a
suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current
nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the
future. For example, Irans theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has
followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely
hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and
have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as
nuclear weapons continue to spread, one leader will choose to launch a nuclear
war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to
resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear
weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they
do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed
states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed
adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern
deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war?





Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated
above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.27[55] This strategy might be
especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an
incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use
nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATOs conventional
inferiority in continental Europe. As Russias conventional military power has
deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily
on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of
nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would
consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistans military
plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger
India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use
against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also
discussed above leaders can make a threat that leaves something to chance.28[56]
They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear
brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a
less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in
nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come
close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could
have led to war.29[57] When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as
India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that
existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future
Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.


Global Economic decline causes war studies prove
Royal 10 [Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,
in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and
Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external
conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact
of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research
in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable
contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and
Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy
are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from
one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could
usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about
power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a
rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996)







also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the
causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations
suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic
conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to
gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations.
However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items
such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use
force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent
states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed
conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between
internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They
write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and
mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns
the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9>
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg.
Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external
tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government.
"Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline,
sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a
'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker
(2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least
indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest
that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic
states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed
from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing
that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential
popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni
economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the
frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with
external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between
integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security
debate and deserves more attention.

Democracy statistically decreases war
Reiter 12 (Dan, Associate and Winship Research Professor Department of Political Science
,Emory University, Democratic Peace Theory, October 25th 2012,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-
9780199756223-0014.xml)//CS
Democratic peace is the proposition that democracies are more peaceful in their foreign
relations. This idea dates back centuries, at least to Immanuel Kant and other 18th-century
Enlightenment thinkers. In recent decades it has constituted a major research agenda,
competing with and arguably supplanting other research agendas such as neo-realism. The
democratic peace proposition has many possible empirical and theoretical forms. On the
empirical side, some propose that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with all other
states in the system (monadic democratic peace); some propose that democracies are more
peaceful only in their relations with other democracies (dyadic democratic peace); others
argue that the more democracies there are in a region or the international system, the more
peaceful the region or international system will be (systemic democratic peace); and still
others doubt the existence of any significant relationship between democracy and peace.
Notably, most although not all empirical research on the democratic peace has employed
quantitative methods of analysis. On the theoretical side, there are many different accounts of
the relationship between democracy and peace, with most focusing on domestic political
institutions, domestic political norms, and constructed identities. The democratic peace
proposition is connected to many other propositions linking domestic politics and international
relations, including that democracies are more likely to cooperate with each other, that
democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight, that escalating military casualties
degrade public support for war, that leaders initiate conflict to secure their domestic hold on
power (the diversionary hypothesis), that democracies fight shorter wars, that different kinds of
democracies experience different kinds of conflict behavior, that different kinds of authoritarian
systems experience different kinds of conflict behavior, and others. The democratic peace also
overlaps with related ideas such as the liberal peace and the commercial peace.

Engagement fosters better relations and crowds out hostile countrys
presence in Venezuela --- alternatives are unsustainable and create
instability
LeMaster 9 Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army (Dennis P., US POLICY OPTIONS
MITIGATING VENEZUELAN SPONSORED SECURITY CHALLENGES, Dec 3, 2009,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497699, Daehyun)

US Policy Alternatives The US could adopt three potential options for future relations
with Venezuela: Use restraint, patience, and persistence, to pursue the current
policy. Adopt as new policy to increase engagement with Venezuela. Finally adopt
a new policy to isolate Venezuela. The current policy could be pursued with
restraint, patience and persistence (RP2). It rests upon ongoing trade and refusal to
exchange barbs with Chavez. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Affairs Tom Shannon has
recently declared, we remain committed to a positive relationship with the people of Venezuela
and have the patience and the persistence necessary to manage our challenging relationship.
100 Maintaining the RP2 policy is understandable, perhaps viewed favorably among other
nations. But it is not in the best interests of the US, Venezuela, or other American states. This
option is feasible from the perspective of vision and value because it seeks to continue a positive
relationship with the Venezuelan people indefinitely while awaiting the collapse of the Chavez
administration. It suggests that the US Government is committed to promoting Venezuelan
democracy yet does not support the autocratic pursuits of Chavez. It is also feasible to
implement, since it is standing policy, so it requires no adjustments to programs or resources.
Confidence levels for success are high: the US will ultimately outlast Chavez. However, the US
must assure the Venezuelan people it does not seek to destabilize an administration they have
democratically elected. RP2s acceptability resonates, as it is the status quo. It does not signal
a major change in relationships. As long as there is no disruption in oil deliveries to US
refineries along the Gulf Coast, the status quo suffices. Once oil deliveries are threatened, there
will be a demand for a new policy. RP2s suitability is questionable because of concerns
regarding the effectiveness of the counterterrorism and counternarcotics cooperation by the
Chavez administration. Some US officials believe the Chavez administration is not cooperating
or is hindering these efforts. The ideal policy option would bring Chavez into the fold and
assure his support for US counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs. The risks of RP2
are numerous. If the status quo fails to deter Chavezs goals, there could be serious
implications for US interests. First, there is the possibility of regional destabilization
created by a powerful Venezuela disrupting the regional balance of power. Such an
event could spawn an arms race among Venezuelas neighbors. An increased
presence of China, Russia, or Iran in the Western Hemisphere could ensue. This
poses a direct threat to US interests in the hemisphere. If Chavez opens up new
markets for Venezuelan oil, the US risks losing oil imports from its fourth largest
supplier. If Iran is exporting terrorism to the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela
offers increased terrorist access through porous US borders.101 The same applies
for narcotics. Chavez can play a significant role in controlling the flow of narcotics north
through the Isthmus of Panama and Central America towards the US. Finally, increasingly
hostile relations between the two countries could exacerbate Chavezs anxieties
regarding a US military invasion. Greater hostility could also lead to further
revisions of the constitution concentrating power with the President. What the US
does not desire is an autocracy, or worse, a dictatorship in Venezuela. Chavez may react
indifferently to RP2 because it is not a significant change in US policy. The status quo
enables him to continue his Bolivarian Revolution and antiAmerican foreign
policies and continue to portray the US as an evil hegemonic bully. Thus a US status
quo invites a Venezuelan status quo, which is most convenient for Chavez as he doesnt have to
publically modify his philosophies and policies. Increased engagement is the second policy
option. An engagement policy seeks a cooperative relationship with Venezuela that achieve
interests vital to both nations. Its hallmark would be communication. The central themes would
be to reassure Venezuela that the US is not contemplating the assassination of Chavez. This
assurance encourages the respect to the Venezuelan people because it affirms US approval of
their democratic process, to include their choice of President. Ideally, this message would soften
the perception of Venezuelans that the US is a bullying nation whose dominant behavior on the
international arena is unilateral. Finally, engagement would include reestablishment of
economic programs and military relationships. The recent change in US administrations
makes engagement highly feasible. A new administration provides a logical juncture to usher in
a new era of cooperation. President Obama has stated that the US will operate from a
multilateral platform in the international system. This sends a clear message to
hemispheric countries that the US will abandon from unilateral methods. This
validates visions and values that promote security, economic growth, and
democratic processes. Implementation will require increased resources and
commitments across the spectrum of national power because there will be
heightened activity between the US and Venezuela, as well as other Latin American
nations. The confidence levels of both nations would be high as engagement builds
on rekindled relationships established long ago. Acceptability and suitability are as
alluring as feasibility. Healthy relations with Venezuela are desirable for US
businesses, particularly energy companies with their large investments in
Venezuela. Economic growth would benefit the entire hemisphere. Engagement
supports our interests as the prevailing nation in the Western Hemisphere. It is doubtful that
an engaged Chavez Administration will as aggressively court our competitors such
as China, Russia, and Iran. He also will probably abandon foreign policies designed
to block or diminish US influence in the region. Finally, the suitability of
engagement improves our counter-terrorism and illegal drug programs.
Engagement is a low-risk policy option. Reaching out and entering into dialogue
with the Chavez administration may alter the perception of a future US-led regime
change. Much of Chavezs posturing seeks to increase his power and to generate solidarity
among South American states to resist US influence. As these efforts subside, there is a
substantial reduction in risk for conflict and an increase in the possibility for
economic growth. Engagement promotes regional harmony and guarantees US
influence. It is difficult to predict Chavezs reaction to a policy of engagement. Ideally, he
would embrace the new policy and herald it as a new era of friendship and co-prosperity of the
two nations. It is doubtful that such change in attitude would occur because Chavez has been
vehemently anti-American. At the other end of the spectrum, Chavez could use an engagement
policy as a propaganda tool touting the successes of his Bolivarian Revolution, petrodiplomacy,
and his relations with Russia, China, and Iran. Chavez may sell these successes as mechanisms
to force the US to adjust its policies. He would proclaim that Venezuela has become a formidable
world player, which the US needs. The middling possibility is that Chavez would temper his
public anti-US rhetoric and opening up improved backchannel diplomatic relations. Finally,
Chavez may publically continue his anti-US rhetoric, but privately open up improved diplomatic
relations. Whatever the case, Chavez would shrewdly devise his response and not
damage economic relations with the US. The final policy option is to isolate
Venezuela. This policy attempts to sequester Venezuela, particularly Chavez, from the rest of
the world. It would be applied at both the global and regional levels. Regional leaders would be
encouraged to cease or minimize relations with Chavez. At the global level, the US would mount
diplomatic efforts to influence China and Russia - and as much as possible, Iran - to curb
relations with Chavez. A carrot and stick approach would be necessary to offer economic or
other incentives to curtail trade relations with Venezuela. Regime change is not the end state of
this policy. The US is a signatory of the 2001 Lima Treaty that defends and promotes
democracies in the Western Hemisphere. Since Venezuela is a democracy with a popularly
elected president, the US must endure the Chavezs bellicosity and behave in accordance with
the treaty. This options feasibility is limited. The overt act of isolating Venezuela
affirms the US image as an international bully. This most likely would concern
other hemispheric governments who may worry that the US could adopt similar
policies towards their governments. This region is historically suspicious of American
powerwith skepticism of US foreign policy. 102 Isolation could backfire if Chavez
successfully opens markets in China and Russia, thus affording an increased
presence of these nations in South America. This could stymie US influence. It
could also provide Chavez with badly needed international legitimacy as he faces
US pressure. Isolation is not acceptable on the world stage, especially in this era of
diminished US moral authority. The world looks to the US to provide leadership.
Advocating or creating exclusion and inequality in the international system are
negative, divisive policy options. International opinion towards the US would
worsen. US public opinion (as well as international public opinion) could perceive such a
policy as harmful towards the Venezuelan people, the majority of whom already live in poverty.
Such responses would possibly fuel hemispheric or even global anti-American sentiment,
thereby fostering terrorism and proliferation of narcotics trafficking to capture the rich US
market for illegal drugs. Suitability is equally as problematic: A policy of isolation would
cost considerable US diplomatic capital in the international arena. World opinion
would not support isolation and enhance the perception of US imperialism. Low marks in
feasibility, acceptability, and suitability confirm that isolation is a risky policy. The possible
costs in increased regional destabilization would hinder our counterterrorism and
anti-drug efforts. Isolation, like status quo, fosters the suspicions of regime change
and US regional hegemony. Our interest of spreading democracy would appear
duplicitous or insincere to the international community. The US needs regain its
status as a world leader working to create a better world order, rather than a
nation selfishly pursuing its own interests. Chavez would probably welcome isolation
because it best suits his propaganda needs in portraying the US as an international villain. He
could easily plead Venezuelas case in international forums with some degree of success. If he
could successfully galvanize international sympathies, he may be able to open up markets for his
heavy oil and other exports, eventually weaning Venezuela off US markets. Then Chavez would
have no reason to temper his policies that maintain economic relations with the US.
Recommendation The policy of increased engagement best serves the interests of the
US, the region, and the world. Engagement fully meets the criteria of feasibility,
acceptability, and suitability while presenting the least risk. Both Venezuela and the US
would benefit from increased economic growth through their energy and other
commercial markets. Engagement enhances regional stability and security through
renewal of military and diplomatic relations. This improves US counterterrorism
and anti-drug programs. The Venezuelan people will benefit from the increased
prosperity generated by engagement. Finally, engagement solidifies US regional
influence by keeping our competitors hemispheric presence to a manageable level.
Chavez would cunningly develop his response to engagement to retain or increase his power and
to reap maximum benefits for Venezuela. He may embrace engagement as a new era of
friendship and co-prosperity, while touting the successes of his Bolivarian Revolution. He may
portray Venezuelan resolve as successfully weakening the US so the US had to seek friendship as
a peer nation. It is probable he would improve backchannel diplomatic relations and cooperate
on issues in ways favorable to both nations while remaining publicly critical of the US. After all,
critical components to the Bolivarian Revolution are anti-US policies and rhetoric. The strength
of the Chavez government resides in a healthy Venezuelan economy that continues to fund social
programs. This is where the people see legitimacy in their government. These programs are
significant to Chavez power base. Chavez may respond encouragingly to engagement,
because he does not want to risk loss of US markets unless he has a viable
substitute. Conclusion President Hugo Chavez has used Venezuelas oil-powered economy to
drive his Bolivarian Revolution. The revolution seeks to strengthen Venezuela via prolific social
programs, to unify Latin America, and to counterbalance US influence not only in the
hemisphere, but also worldwide. Chavez embraced US adversaries - specifically Russia, China,
and Iran - while continuing his anti-US rhetoric and policies. The glue bonding the components
of Chavezs Bolivarian Revolution is oil revenue. The recent drop in oil prices from $147 to $40
per barrel threatens Venezuelan domestic stability. Chavez launched his pursuit of power twenty
years ago, during a similar reduction in oil prices. If current cheap oil forces Chavez to curtail
social spending, his popular support will inevitably dwindle. So too will Venezuelas stability.
The US should engage Venezuela in the international arena despite Chavez anti-
US bellicosity and policies. Engagement will ultimately foster regional economic
stability and security. Venezuela and the US share a rich history of friendly
relations that should continue despite Chavez posturing. He will ultimately lose
power. Engagement bridges the differences of the two nations and ultimately
strengthens the Western Hemisphere.




Terror Adv
AT: Squo Solves
U.S. has not been able to conduct any assessments
DOS 13 (2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 5, Bureau Of
International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204052.htm#Venezuela)//DLG

Better and more transparent cooperation with the United States could also improve
Venezuelas port security, and reduce Venezuelas role as a major drug transit
country. Port security programs could help Venezuela assess security at its major seaports
and develop best practices for enhanced maritime security. Since the last assessment in
2004, the Venezuelan government has denied permission for U.S. officials to
return to conduct an updated assessment.

Absent an improvement in relations, container security inevitably
fails the plan fosters global cooperation
Neely 12 Masters of Criminal Justice degree, emphasizing in Homeland Security at the
University of Missouri (William A., The perceived effectiveness of container security at seaports
along the Gulf Coast, May, 2012, Proquest, Daehyun)

A fourth suggestion would be for future research to concentrate on the complications associated
with interagency communications. If deputy directors and their designees fail in establishing an
amicable and cooperative relationship with CBP and USCG, there could be a decline in the
effectiveness of container security. This could possibly result in increased rates for the
transportation of containers and, therefore, consumers would end up bearing the costs. It is in
the authors opinion that the communication between the numerous authorities that operate
within the seaport, especially in regards to container security, could be more efficient. The
seaport security climate is constantly changing. Therefore, cohesive, dynamic and
immediate communication must be achieved in order to diminish threats targeting
the seaport environment. Additionally, it is the authors opinion that intelligence plays a
significant role in mitigating the challenges of acquiring a high rate of scan or
inspection. One of the six participants declared that the process of gathering and
disseminating actionable intelligence is critical to container security. Certainly, cooperation is
imperative when attempting to exploit the benefits of intelligence. Moreover,
cooperation must be attained on a global scale in order for this type of solution to function
properly. For the abovementioned reasons, it is the authors opinion that global cooperation is
the single most critical factor to consider when striving to improve container
security. With this in mind, a fifth suggestion would be to examine the reasoning behind the
reluctance in global cooperation. But as one participant put it, Now with Chavez down in
Venezuela rattling his sabers as much as he is against the U.S., are the containers
checked? No. So, a simple answer could be that some countries have an
unfavorable outlook on the U.S. With that being said, reconciling these relations
may be the only way to encourage global cooperation.

Venezuelan ports at risk now --- Cuban corruption and
mismanagement
Miami Herald 12 (Venezuelan state governor: Cuba inefficient at managing ports, food
distribution, Sep 19, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/19/2959486/venezuelan-
state-governor-cuba.html#storylink=cpy, Daehyun)

Hugo Chvezs government has granted Cuba key concessions in Venezuelas food
distribution system by making the island its purchasing agent abroad as well as its seaport
manager activities that represent a fabulous business for the Castro brothers
while generating more scarcity and huge losses for Venezuela. The governor of the
state of Carabobo, Henrique Salas Feo, said that a great part of the problems of scarcity
and cost of living increases in Venezuela could be attributed to the corruption of
people close to its government and Cubas inefficiency managing the facilities at
Puerto Cabello. Puerto Cabello is the entry gate to Venezuela; it handles 80
percent of everything that enters or leaves the country, but since the Cubans took
over, things are getting worse by the day, which is affecting Venezuelans daily
life, Salas said in a telephone interview with El Nuevo Herald. The economic reality of all
Venezuelans depends on the good management of the port, but imported goods
are incurring in enormous delays that create scarcity and increase costs that end
up transferred to the consumer, he said. According to the governors estimates, poor
port management and corruption are provoking a 30-day delay in containers
entering the country, which contrasts with the 72 hours it took before Cubans took
control. The port terminal is of particular importance due to the severe
deterioration of the Venezuelan productivity as a result of government policies,
which has increased the dependence on imports, he said. The situation created by
expropriations, the strict currency exchange control and the system that controls
pricing is leading Venezuela to go abroad to acquire basic consumer products. The
Chvez administration has also granted concessions to Cuban enterprises to
acquire products abroad, a situation that lends itself to corruption. [The Cubans]
control everything that comes in and goes out. We are importing meat from Nicaragua.
Yet often that container does not come from Nicaragua and it is subject to a triangulation
whereby a Cuban food enterprise buys the meat at a certain price and later sells it to Venezuela
at a higher price, Salas said. The governor said there are no practical reasons for
Venezuela to grant Cuba the business of purchasing its food abroad. They are bleeding
the country dry, he said. Puerto Cabello was transferred to Cuban hands in 2009 after Chvez
took away the management of the port facilities from the regional government to hand it to
Puertos del Alba, a joint company that is 51 percent owned by Venezuela and 49 percent by the
Castro regime. Salas said the measure was taken after Carabobos government went to the
opposition and that the decision had little to do with centralizing port operations, as the
government argued. The reason was to protect the huge agreements that the previous governor
of Carabobo, affiliated with the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, had established, he said.
Yet all that the transfer of management accomplished was increasing corruption
inside the port, besides creating new business opportunities for Ral Castros
government. The result is that now containers take longer to enter the country, partly
due to the inept Cuban management and also due to internal corruption. Any port is
composed by a number of so-called patios that were given to friends of ministers, admirals and
generals, he said. The owners of these patios, which are large spaces to station containers,
charge the Venezuelan government a significant amount of money for each day a container is
delayed getting out of these areas, the governor said. The governors statement matches a report
issued by the private intelligence firm Stratfor, released by WikiLeaks, describing how the
systematic destruction of Venezuelan productivity, replacing it with a model based
on the import of goods, generates a corruption spiral that worsens the scarcity
problems in order to obtain bigger contracts. The report revealed that government
officials involved in food imports hoard the goods to justify new transactions, and it partially
attributed the huge losses from rotten food at Venezuelan ports to corrupt officials.

Venezuelan ports do not meet security standards
USCG 12 US Coast Guard (Port Security Advisory (2-12), Dec 3, 2012,
https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2012/12/~/media/Security/US_Port_Security_Advisories/U
SGC_Port_Security_Advisory_02_12.ashx, Daehyun)

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) has mandated that the United
States Coast Guard evaluate the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in
foreign ports and provides for the imposition of conditions of entry on vessels
arriving to the United States from countries that do not maintain effective anti-
terrorism measures (MTSA, 46 USC 70108). The Coast Guard has determined that the
Republic of Indonesia is now maintaining effective antiterrorism measures in their ports. The
Republic of Indonesia is removed from the list of the Countries Affected in paragraph B of this
Port Security Advisory. Therefore, actions required in paragraphs C and D of this Port Security
Advisory are no longer required for vessels that arrive in the United States after visiting ports in
the Republic of Indonesia. B. Countries Affected: The Coast Guard has determined that
ports in the following countries are not maintaining effective antiterrorism
measures: Cambodia (with the exception of Phnom Penh Autonomous Port IMO number
not listed; and Sihanoukville Autonomous Port IMO number not listed) Cameroon (with the
exception of Ebome Marine Terminal CM394-0001; Quai GETMA (LAMNALCO Base)
Facility CMDLA-0005; Socit Nationale de Raffinage (SONARA) Terminal IMO number
not listed; and Kome-Kribi 1 CM234-0001) Comoros Cote dIvoire Cuba Equatorial Guinea
(with the exception of Ceiba GQ362-0001/0002; K-5 Oil Center IMO number not listed;
Luba - GQLUB-0001; Punta Europa Terminal GQ368-0001; and Zafiro Marine Terminal
GQ370-0001) Guinea-Bissau Iran Liberia (with the exception of the Firestone Facility IMO
number not listed; and Port of Monrovia IMO Number LRMLW-0001) Madagascar (the
exception of Toamasina (also known as Tamatave) - MGTMM-0001) Sao Tome and Principe
Syria Timor-Leste Venezuela Yemen (with the exception of Ash Shihr Terminal YEASR-
0001; Balhaf LNG Terminal IMO number not listed; and the Port of Hodeidah YEHOD-
0001)

The private sectors on board but Venezuela refuses the ISPS now due
to a lack of incentive the plan solves
Embassy of Caracas 8 (VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG WARNING
ON PORT SECURITY, Wikileaks, Nov 7, 2008,
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08CARACAS1546.html, Daehyun)

(C) Summary: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) has not responded to
two diplomatic notes and multiple Embassy requests for a meeting to discuss U.S.
Coast Guard efforts dating back to 2006 to arrange port visits. Embassy maritime
contacts believe that Venezuelan ports would not pass inspection. The Venezuelan
government does not appear to be concerned with the latest warning from the USG on
security-related matters as it seems to believe that, similar to its experience with the TSA Public
Notice, the consequences for ignoring the USG warning will be minimal. End Summary. (C)
After trying through its own channels since 2006 to try to arrange a port assessment
under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Program (ISPS), the U.S.
Coast Guard contacted the Embassy and asked that it formally request an ISPS
visit. The Embassy sent the request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) via diplomatic
note in May 2008 with a copy to the Institute of Aquatic Spaces (INEA). Post has followed up
on the note with the MFA twice a week since. Following receipt of reftel A instructions, the
Embassy delivered a second diplomatic note on October 7, informing the GBRV that the U.S.
Coast Guard had decided to give the GBRV 30 days to schedule an ISPS visit or it would impose
"conditions of entry" which will require that "vessels which called at Venezuelan ports take
additional security measures.." which could "subject them to considerable delay, additional
expense and possible denial of entry into the United States." As of November 6, the GBRV has
not responded. (C) On October 31, Econoffs met with Nelson Maldonado, former
Venezuelan Merchant Marine Captain and President of the powerful Venezuelan trade
association Consecomercio. Maldonado stated he doubts Venezuelan ports would pass a Coast
Guard inspection as they are currently run by "mafias." He described INEA as one of the mafias
and added that the Venezuelan National Guard cannot be trusted either. Maldonado said the
new head of INEA is a young Air Force Major who has "no idea what he is doing." He noted that
Venezuelan petroleum company PDVSA does not send its tankers to U.S. ports as they do not
meet U.S. standards. (C) On November 5, Econoffs met with the General Manager of
Intermarine South America Fernando Maruri (strictly protect throughout). Intermarine is a
U.S. company that handles up to 90 percent of all oil industry cargo destined for Venezuela. In
a back-of-the envelope calculation, Maruri estimated that the additional security measures
might cost his company USD 25,000 per day of delay in entering Houston/Galveston.
Intermarine sails to Houston approximately 20 times a month. Maruri added, however, that
the GBRV would not care in the least about this extra expense as it is "not organized enough to
even think to analyze such a cost increase." He added that Venezuelan ship owners and
operators would not be concerned about the Coast Guard "conditions of entry" either as they
would simply pass the additional cost on to their major client, the Venezuelan government, or
to consumers. (C) Maruri speculated that the GBRV would never allow the ISPS visit as it is
"scared the U.S. government will find out what is going on at the ports." He added that he
knows the ports are deficient on security as the GBRV has not maintained security
measures that were in place during the 2004 Coast Guard inspections. He added
that it used to be difficult to access the ports, but now anyone can wander into most
ports. Maruri suggested that INEA had no voice in the GBRV's decision not to respond to the
Embassy and any decision on the ISPS visit will be made at the highest levels of the
government without consulting INEA. Nevertheless, Maruri committed to call his government
contacts in support of the ISPS visit as he is concerned that if the Coast Guard decides to delay
his ships, it would cost his company a great deal of money. (C) COMMENT: The GBRV is
aware of the consequences of refusing an ISPS visit but seems to have decided they
do not warrant the alteration of the BRV stance against the "extraterritorial
application" of U.S. law which was spelled out so strongly in its response to the TSA Public
Notice (ref B). Based on reports from industry contacts, post believes the GBRV is under the
impression that any Coast Guard action would have a negligible impact on its
interests and it has little to no concern about the potential impact on the private
sector. It is unlikely that the "conditions of entry" will encourage the GBRV to
allow an ISPS visit unless the conditions are implemented in such a way as to
seriously impede the flow of dollars to the Venezuelan government. In the absence
of any contact with the GBRV on this issue, Post will continue its outreach to the
private sector on port security. END COMMENT.

Even if there is some implementation the plan is key to ensure a
comprehensive follow-through
Fischer and Halibozek 13 Fischer: President of Assets Protection Associates, Inc., a
security consulting firm established in 1986. He earned his Ph.D. in education administration
from Southern Illinois University in 1981. Dr. Fischer has served as a consultant to many
organizations, including publishers, private security firms, retailers, and school districts. Dr.
Fischer is a member of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, the American Society for
industrial Security, The Academy if Security Educators and Trainers, and the International
Police Association. He recently retired from his positions as the Director of Illinois Law
Enforcement Executive Institute, a project of the Illinois Law Enforcement and Standards
Board, and as a professor of law enforcement and justice administration at Western Illinois
University.
Halibozek: currently a corporate vice president of security for a Fortune 100 company
headquartered in Los Angeles, California. He holds a Master of Science in Criminal Justice and
an MBA in business. Mr. Halibozek is an experienced lecturer and has written and published
many articles, papers, plans, policies and procedures related to corporate security.
Mr. Halibozek is the former Chairperson for the Aerospace Industries Association, Industrial
Security Committee and is a member of the Board of Directors for the Chief Special Agents
Association in Los Angeles California. Mr. Halibozek served for four years as an Industry
member to the National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee
(NISPPAC)(Robert and Edward, Introduction to Security, Mar 13, 2013,
http://lamontwatson.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Introduction-to-Security-8th-
Edition.pdf, Daehyun)

Still, the International Maritime Organization, composed of more than 100 governments, agreed
to a security plan that would impose signicant regulations on ports and seagoing vessels. The
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code took effect in July 2004. The code will
eventually require ship operators to develop security plans, appoint ship and
company security ofcers, and maintain a minimum level of on-board security.
Port ofcials will be required to develop similar plans and hire a port facility security ofcer.
The code allows the state controlling ports to deny access to ships that do not meet security
standards. This code is certainly a paper victory, but the reality of cooperation often
has a blanketing effect on agreements. In recent testimony from the GAO before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the House
Committee on Government Reform, the Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues testied that
U.S. efforts to widen security to exporting countries is often slowed by lack of
follow-through by foreign governments. In one case, Estonia delayed installing detection
equipment for seven months while nalizing an agreement, and monitors sat for two years
while Lithuanians argued over the correct power supply.

Venezuela fails at counter-narcotics lack of cooperation
Executive Office of the President 06, Presidential Determination on Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2007, Federal Register,
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2006/09/29/06-8302/presidential-determination-
on-major-drug-transit-or-major-illicit-drug-producing-countries-for#table_of_contents //CO

Venezuela failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last 12 months
to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and U.S.
domestic counternarcotics requirements as set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.This determination comes as the result
of Venezuela's lack of effective response to specific United States Government
requests for counternarcotics cooperation as well as the country's continued lack
of action against drug trafficking within and through its borders commensurate
with its responsibilities to the international community.Venezuela's importance as
a transshipment point for drugs bound for the United States and Europe has
continued to increase in the past 12 months, a situation both enabled and exploited
by corrupt Venezuelan officials. The Venezuelan media provided an example of this
corruption when they reported that Venezuelan police re-sold the vast majority of a
9,400 kilogram cocaine seizure to drug traffickers in July of this year (Venezuela does
not allow independent verification of seizure amounts). Seizures of illegal drugs transiting
the country have fallen, according to DEA estimates. The volume of cocaine transiting
the country is expected to continue to rise substantially in 2006. The most dramatic
increase in cocaine departing Venezuela was to non-U.S. destinations, primarily Europe. The
vast majority of cocaine going to the United States of Europe goes by sea. However, an
increasing proportion is being moved by non-commercial air through the
Caribbean toward the United States. The number of suspected drug flights departing
Venezuela and going to Hispaniola and the Caribbean more than doubled in 2005 and has
continued that rising trend in the first half of 2006.Venezuela has not used available tools
to counter the growing drug threat. It has not strengthened inspections or security
along its border with Colombia; it has not utilized judicial wiretap orders to
investigate drug cases; it has not attempted meaningful prosecution of corrupt
officials; and it has not renewed formal counternarcotics cooperation agreements
with the United States Government. The role and status of the DEA in Venezuela
remains in limbo since the host country refuses to sign a memorandum of
understanding authorizing Drug Enforcement Administration presence, even after
successfully concluding a lengthy process of negotiation with U.S. officials.
Venezuela also has not signed a letter of agreement that would make nearly $3
million from FY 2005 available for United States Government cooperative
counternarcotics efforts.Last year Venezuela was found to have ``failed
demonstrably'' as a partner in the war on drugs, in part because it ended most air
interdiction cooperation, refused to grant U.S. counternarcotics overflights of
Venezuela, curtailed most military and law enforcement counternarcotics
cooperation, replaced its most effective counternarcotics officials, and failed to
effectively implement its own money laundering and organized crime legislation.
all of these issues remain outstanding in 2006.The United States is very concerned about
the continued deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela as reflected in the increased
executive control over the other branches of government, threats to judicial independence and
human rights, and attacks on press freedoms and freedom of expression.A vital national
interests certification will allow the United States Government to provide funds that support
programs to aid Venezuela's democratic institutions, establish selected community development
projects, and strengthen Venezuela's political party system.

XT: Port Security Key
Improving port security solves Venezuelan drug cooperation
DOS 12 Embassy of the United States in Caracas (International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report 2012, 2012, http://caracas.usembassy.gov/news-events/reports/international-
narcotics-control-strategy/2012.html, Daehyun)

Cooperation could also improve Venezuelas port security and reduce Venezuelas
role as a major maritime drug transit country. Such cooperation could involve the
activation of the Container Inspection Facility at Puerto Cabello, which was
partially funded by the United States in 2004, and the Venezuelan governments
participation in the USCG's International Port Security Program. This program
would help Venezuela assess its major seaports and develop best practices for
enhanced maritime security. Since the last assessment in 2004, the Venezuelan
government has denied requests by the United States to return to conduct an updated
assessment. These cooperative activities would increase the exchange of information
that could lead to arrests, help dismantle organized criminal networks, aid in the
prosecution of criminals engaged in narcotrafficking, and stem the flow of illicit
drugs transiting Venezuelan airspace, land, and sea.



XT: Venezuela Key
Its reverse causal absent cooperation with Venezuela, counter-
narcotics operations will fail
Weschler and Rubio 11 Weschler: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC, Rubio: US Senator(William and Marco, A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY:
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND CITIZEN SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS, Mar 31, 2011,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67800/html/CHRG-112shrg67800.htm,
Daehyun)

It is my opinion that the same networks that move illicit product, narcotics, from
Colombia through Venezuela and out to market are precisely the same networks
by which the FARC is able to acquire supplies, weapons, munitions, and so forth. It
is my opinion, which I believe has been expressed by a number of senior U.S. Government
officials over the last 2 or 3 years, that a substantial amount of the senior FARC
leadership, three members of its seven-member Secretariat, do in fact have near-
permanent presence on the Venezuelan side of the border. How this all ties together in
terms of the narcotics question I submit to you is--it's a matter of common sense. But I do
believe it is part of the larger question of how to address the flow of cocaine and illicit drugs
from the Andean Ridge to markets either in North America or in Europe. Senator Rubio. So to
summarize your testimony in your capacity as a former Ambassador to Colombia and Venezuela
and just what we've gathered here today, would it be accurate to say that the Government of
Venezuela does not cooperate with us on counternarcotics efforts, in fact
potentially undermines us on it; that for some reason, which I'm sure we'll know the
answer to shortly, they in fact allow these organizations to operate within their
country almost with impunity; and to top it all off, they provide safe harbor to the
leaders of insurgent terrorist groups who, in addition to terrorizing the
neighborhood, the region, also are heavily involved with narcotics trafficking. Is
that an accurate assessment of Venezuela's role in all of this? Ambassador Brownfield. Senator,
I've learned never to challenge the observations of a Member of the U.S. Senate. Senator Rubio.
I've only been here 12 weeks. I'm not that smart yet.

Stopping the source, Venezuela is key alternative methods fail
Farah 11 - Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center and Adjunct Fellow,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Douglas, The U.S.Caribbean Shared Security
Partnership: Responding to the Growth of Trafficking and Narcotics in the Caribbean, Dec 15,
2011, http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111216_Farah_CaribbeanNarcotics_1215.pdf,
Daehyun)
*CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative

The CBSI could be a useful tool in helping Caribbean partners combat drug trafficking and
the endemic corruption, violence and erosion of the rule of law that inevitably accompanies the
emergence of TOC groups. However, the Initiative, in my view, will have little impact as
long as Venezuela and the ALBA nations in Latin America and the Caribbean
continue to criminalize, and use TOC and drug trafficking as part of their
statecraft, giving support and protection to drug trafficking, and designated
terrorist organizations such as the FARC. With Venezuela and its allies opening
key corridors for drug trafficking to the United States and Europe (via West Africa), as
well providing sophisticated aid in laundering the hundreds of millions of dollars
in illicit proceeds, any program especially one this comparatively small which does
not deal with the source of the drug flow will likely do little to mitigate the
problem. Thank you.

Cocaine is rampant and growing in Venezuela major trafficking
route to the U.S.
NYT 12 (Cocaines Flow Is Unchecked in Venezuela, Jul 26, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/world/americas/venezuela-is-cocaine-hub-despite-its-
claims.html?_r=2&&pagewanted=print, Daehyun)

LA MACANILLA, Venezuela The Venezuelan government has trumpeted one major blow after
another against drug traffickers, showing off barrels of liquid cocaine seized, drug planes
recovered, cocaine labs raided and airstrips destroyed. But a visit this month to a remote region
of Venezuelas vast western plains, which a Colombian guerrilla group has turned into one
of the worlds busiest transit hubs for the movement of cocaine to the United
States, has shown that the governments triumphant claims are vastly overstated.
Deep in the broad savanna, one remote airstrip the government said it had disabled in a recent
army raid appeared to be back in business. The remains of two small aircraft set on fire by the
army had been cleared away. Traffickers working with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, which operates with surprising latitude on this side of the border, appeared to have
reclaimed the strip to continue their secret drug flights shuttling Colombian cocaine toward
users in the United States. There were no signs that soldiers had blasted holes in the runway or
taken other steps to prevent it from being used again. For years, the United States has been
working with friendly governments in Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and other
countries in Latin America, spending billions of dollars to disrupt the flow of drugs
northward. But because of antagonistic relations with President Hugo Chvez of
Venezuela, the reach of American drug agents, and the aid that comes with them,
does not extend here. Our airspace has been taken over, said Luis Lippa, a former governor
of Apure State who plans to run again as an opposition candidate in elections in December.
Referring to the grip of traffickers on the border region, he said, Our national territory has been
reduced. A map of flight tracks made by a United States government task force using data from
long-range radar makes the point vividly: a thick tangle of squiggly lines, representing drug
flights, originates in Apure, on Venezuelas border with Colombia; heads north to the Caribbean;
and then takes a sharp left toward Central America. From there, the drugs are moved north by
Mexicos well-established traffickers. President Obama signed a memorandum in September
that designated Venezuela, for the seventh time, as a country that failed to meet international
obligations to fight drug trafficking. He cited a federal report that concluded that the country
was one of the preferred trafficking routes out of South America and had a
generally permissive and corrupt environment. Venezuela says that it is caught in
the middle Colombia produces the drugs and the United States consumes them
and that it is doing all it can to fight back. In May, the government announced that the
number of illicit flights it detected had been cut in half this year, although it declined to provide
data to back up the claim. We are hitting drug trafficking hard all the time, said Ramn
Carrizalez, the governor of Apure, the border state where the drug flights originate, speaking in
May at a news conference to announce the destruction of 36 hidden airfields. Very few
countries are carrying out a policy like ours. But the United States says Venezuelas efforts
are deeply hobbled by corruption, particularly by ties between the government and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC, which controls much of
the cocaine traffic in the region. Since 2008, the Treasury Department has accused at least
seven high-level military officers and current and former officials in Mr. Chvezs government of
aiding the FARC, and sometimes exchanging weapons for drugs. Defense Minister Henry Rangel
Silva was one of those singled out by Treasury officials. Venezuela dismissed the accusations as
imperialist meddling. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that as
much as 24 percent of the cocaine shipped out of South America in 2010 passed
through Venezuela, accounting for more than 200 tons. More than half of that left from
the hidden airfields in Apure, analysts say. They say that Venezuelas central role as a
transit point for drug shipments began after Mr. Chvez halted cooperation with
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration in 2005, accusing its agents of
spying. Around the same time, Colombia, with assistance from the United States, began to
tighten control of its airspace. As a result, the traffickers jumped across the border to Apure,
where an airstrip can be fashioned on the flat prairie in a few hours by dragging a log behind a
pickup truck to smooth the ground. You can blow up an airfield here and it doesnt matter,
said one resident, standing beside an eight-foot-deep hole that soldiers had blown in a runway
near the Cinaruco River, the plains stretching out for miles. They can make another one right
next to it. But perhaps the main attraction for traffickers is that the federal
governments hold on large parts of Apure, the poorest state in the country, is tentative at
best. In many areas, residents say, the real power is held by the FARC, which they describe
as moving around the state with alarming impunity. One resident living in Santos Luzardo
National Park, a picturesque preserve abounding in wildlife, said that last month two FARC
members patrolled the remote area on motorcycles, asking farmers if they had heard any
airplanes, apparently concerned that traffickers were using a nearby airstrip without paying. The
guerrillas also collect protection money from local businesses, ranchers and
fishing camps along some parts of Venezuelas long border with Colombia. One resident said
that a small group of FARC members showed up at a homestead in December and set up camp
for a week, using it as a base to patrol the area and possibly protecting drug flights. He said
the owner had no choice about whether to accept, although the guerrillas brought their own
food. The residents also expressed fear and mistrust of government authorities.
Most said they believed that local officials and soldiers were in league with the traffickers and
that passing along information about the traffickers activities would result in reprisals.
Residents said they had learned to coexist with the traffickers just as they had gotten used to the
frequent sound of low-flying aircraft at night. But many said they were fearful and felt
intimidated. We all knew what was going on, but no one said anything, a man said of the
smugglers who used a local airstrip. What were we going to do about it? The one that should be
doing something is the government. They should be constantly patrolling the area.

Venezuela is the hub for Colombian cocaine its already taking
action on aviation and borders
CFR 8 Council on Foreign Relations(Caracas, Colombia, and Cocaine, Apr 28, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/colombia/caracas-colombia-cocaine/p16099, Daehyun)

When Colombian drug traffickers need to move cocaine out of the country, their
first stop is often Venezuela, say U.S. officials (AP) . Short flights connecting remote jungle
air strips in northern Colombia with Venezuelan destinations just miles across the border tripled
between 2003 and 2006, according to the International Crisis Group. Now U.S. and Colombian
officials say that over a third of Colombias total cocaine output is thought to exit
the country via Venezuela. U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Andean region have focused
on Plan Colombia, a multibillion dollar initiative to eradicate crops and cripple drug cartels. But
the rise in trafficking through Venezuela threatens to derail what progress has
been achieved in Colombia and calls into question the efficacy of U.S.
counternarcotics policy in the region. Unlike Colombia, Venezuela refuses to
cooperate with the United States to combat narcotics trafficking. The countrys
attorney general admits the National Guard and the intelligence service both have ties to drug
traffickers, along with civilian airport employees (NPR) . The border area, which Colombian
officials have trouble monitoring due to its difficult terrain, is a breeding ground for crime and
violence , according to an International Crisis Group report on drug trafficking in Latin
America. The U.S. State Department blames Venezuela for not doing its part to fight corruption
and trafficking in the region. Caracas suspended cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration in 2005. Since then, drug seizures have dropped from thirty-five to forty metric
tons in 2005 to between twenty and twenty-five metric tons in 2006, according to the 2008
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. We remain open to working with Venezuela
on this issue, said David T. Johnson, assistant secretary for international narcotics and law
enforcement affairs, in February 2008. But we have thus far not had a willing partner.
Venezuela counters that it is making ample effort to control the drugs trade burgeoning within
its borders. It destroyed over one hundred air strips near the Colombian border this
year, and is installing radar stations that will allow Venezuelan authorities to track
unauthorized flights from Colombia (WashPost) . Experts say these efforts are designed to
counter U.S. accusations, but also address domestic concerns about growing crime rates.
According to Venezuelas El Universal, there were 710 murders in Caracas in the first three
months of 2008, compared to 621 during the same period last year. The Venezuelan government
stopped releasing official homicide rates in 2003, but security website Stratfor suggests Caracas
is among the most dangerous cities in the world , with a homicide rate more than double that of
Detroit. Experts say much of this violence is drug related. The Venezuela-Colombia border,
meanwhile, is a haven for guerrilla groups such as FARC and the ELN.

Venezuela is the current hotspot for drug trafficking in Latin America
rekindling engagement there is key
Sullivan, Latin America Specialist at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS,
1-10-13 (Mark, Venezuela: Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf)//JAG

In its March 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), the State
Department contended that Venezuela was one of the preferred trafficking routes
for the transit of cocaine out of South America because of a porous border with
Colombia, a weak judicial system, inconsistent international counternarcotics
cooperation, generally permissive law enforcement, and a corrupt political
environment. The illicit drugs transiting Venezuela are destined for the Eastern
Caribbean, Central America, United States, Western Africa, and Europe. The report
maintained that U.S. government estimates of cocaine transiting through Venezuela were 161-
212 metric tons (compared to 250 metric tons noted in the 2011 INCSR). According to the 2012
INCSR, Venezuelas National Anti-Drug Office (ONA), Venezuela seized 42 metric tons in 2011
(down from 63 metric tons in 2010), with 62% cocaine and 37% marijuana. In 2011, Venezuela
also deported three fugitives wanted on drug charges to the United States: in March, Gloria
Rojas Valencia, allegedly working for Los Zetas (a violent Mexican drug trafficking organization)
in Venezuela; in September, Lionel Scott Harris, a U.S. citizen; and in December, Maximiliano
Bonilla Orozco, also known as Valenciano, one of Colombias top drug traffickers. The State
Department maintained in the INCSR that that the United States remains prepared to
deepen cooperation with Venezuela to help counter the increasing flow of cocaine
and other illegal drugs. As in the past, the State Department reiterated that cooperation
could be improved through formal reengagement between Venezuelan and U.S.
law enforcement agencies and the signing of the outstanding addendum to the
1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics MOU that was negotiated in 2005, which would
provide funds for joint counternarcotics projects and demand reduction
programs. The INCSR proffered that bilateral cooperation could also include
counternarcotics and anti-money laundering training programs for law
enforcement and other officials; Venezuelan participation in the U.S. Coast Guards
International Port Security Program; and activation of the Container Inspection
Facility at Puerto Cabello that was partially funded by the United States in 2004. According
to the INCSR, these cooperative activities would increase the exchange of
information that could lead to arrests, help dismantle organized criminal
networks, aid in the prosecution of criminals engaged in narcotrafficking, and
stem the flow of illicit drugs transiting Venezuelan airspace, land, and sea.


XT: FARC
The FARC depends on Venezuelan drug trafficking
McDermott 11 director at Insight Organized Crime in the Americas, which provides
research, analysis, and investigation of the criminal world throughout the region(Jeremy, Why
Venezuela is key to quashing the FARC, Christian Science Monitor, Dec 13, 2011,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1213/Why-
Venezuela-is-key-to-quashing-the-FARC, Daehyun)

The defeat of the FARC, and the capture or killing of its new commander-in-chief, alias
"Timochenko," will be extremely difficult without the active collaboration of Venezuela.
Both the rebel group's commander-in-chief Rodrigo Londoo, alias "Timochenko ," and
his second-in-command, Luciano Marin Arango, alias "Ivan Marquez ," often reside in
Venezuela. The two men are known to move in and out of the country; in Timochenko's case
from the Colombian province of Norte De Santander, and for Ivan Marquez, from La Guajira
and Cesar. They are probably the last two commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC ), who can hold together the rebel group, preventing its fragmentation
and the criminalization of some sections that would likely result. For three of the FARC's
seven fighting divisions or "blocs," Venezuela is essential for logistics, weapons,
munitions, medical support, and as a rest and recuperation area. Ivan Marquez's
Caribbean Bloc, with some 250 fighters, has almost all its presence along the border, or actually
in Venezuelan territory. Timochenko's Magdalena Medio Bloc, which has around 800 fighters,
depends on a lifeline into Venezuela for its survival. The Eastern Bloc, with up to 4,000 fighters,
relies heavily on Venezuela for its finances and for direct supplies. Both the Magdalena Medio
and Eastern Blocs rely on drug trafficking as a principal source of income . While part
of this comes from selling coca base to the new generation paramilitary groups within Colombia,
much of their foreign currency comes from moving cocaine into Venezuela. It is no
coincidence that Timochenko, and his second-in-command, Felix Antonio Muoz, alias "Pastor
Alape," are both wanted by the US on drug-trafficking charges. Without this pipeline into
Venezuela, it is unlikely that the three FARC blocs along the frontier would be able
to finance themselves.
Taking the FARC down resolves Colombia-Venezuela relations its
key to Colombian stability
Stratfor 10 - global intelligence company (ANALYSIS FOR EDIT - COLOMBIA/US - Snag
in defense relationship, Wikileaks, Aug 18, 2010,
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1781463_analysis-for-edit-colombia-us-snag-in-defense-
relationship-.html, Daehyun)

The second big sticking point concerns Colombia's troubled relationship with its
neighbor, Venezuela, with whom Colombia is in a very delicate diplomatic spot. Since
Santos took office Aug. 7, he worked rapidly to restore diplomatic relations with Venezuela,
allowing Colombian businessmen on the border with Venezuela to breathe a sigh of relief after
months of frozen trade. The Santos outreach to Caracas came in spite of Colombia, in the last
days of the Uribe administration, having presented what the Uribe government referred to as
irrefutable evidence of Venezuela harboring FARC rebels
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100729_colombia_venezuela_another_round_diplomatic
_furor, spreading fear in Caracas that such evidence could be used as a smoking gun to justify
preemptive raids or hot pursuit operations by US-backed Colombian forces into Venezuela.
Though Venezuela and Colombia are now acting like long-lost friends, there is little hiding the
fact that Venezuela has done little to alter its policy on FARC. Venezuela continues
to deny Colombian allegations of its support for FARC, while quietly preserving a
militant proxy tool with which to keep Bogotas hands tied down. Now that the
Colombia is revisiting the very defense agreement that keeps the Venezuelan government up at
night, Caracas could be eyeing an opportunity to hold its newly-established cooperation with
Colombia hostage to the renegotiation of the US-Colombia basing agreement. In other words, if
Santos wants to continue cooperation with Venezuela and improve the lives of Colombian
traders on the border, then Venezuela will also insist on Colombia readjusting its defense
relationship with the United States in the interest of improving the security atmosphere between
the two countries. This is a message that could gain traction in the region and apply further
pressure on Colombia to rethink the basing agreement. As Colombia learned following its recent
presentation of evidence that exposed FARC camps in Venezuelan territory, it lacks the regional
support to fend against Venezuela. Only Paraguay came strongly in Bogotas defense, while
Brazil referred to the matter as Colombias internal affair. Though Colombias defense
relationship with the United States and tumultuous relationship with Venezuela has long
alienated Bogota from much of the region, the US-Colombian defense pact is not something that
Santos is likely compromise on, especially when the issue of Venezuelan support for
FARC remains at large. The longer Santos tries to normalize relations with
Venezuela without getting real results on FARC, the weaker he will appear on the
security front at home and the more politically vulnerable he will be if and when
FARC manages to pull off a significant attack in urban Colombia. Between Venezuelas
continued support for FARC and Colombias need to uphold and strengthen its
defense relationship with the United States, the foundation of Colombias recent
rapprochement with Venezuela is resting on very thin ice.

FARC is still a threat negotiations dont matter
Ortiz and Vargas 13 Ortiz: Director Decisive Point Bogot, Colombia. Vargas: Analyst
Decisive Point Bogot, Colombia(Romn and Janneth, Government Negotiations with the
FARC and the Future of Security in Colombia, The New Colombia Task Force, May 15, 2013,
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task_Force_Papers/Ortiz%20-
%20Colombia%20Task%20Force%20Paper.pdf, Daehyun)

Colombia, however, will continue facing serious security threats whether the peace
process is successful or not. In the case of failure, a politically weakened FARC will
have to be subdued by military force. On the other hand, even if there is an
agreement, it will be partial and the hardliners of the organization will continue
confronting the State and threatening the civilian population. In any of these cases,
Colombia will continue to face ongoing security challenges such as fighting
criminal gangs, dismantling the illegal drug industry and securing very volatile
border regions.

Colombia / Panama Canal Module
Venezuelan drugs funds Colombian armed rebellion
GAO, 9 (Government Accountability Office, July, DRUG CONTROL U.S. Counternarcotics
Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/292722.pdf) //JAG

According to U.S. and Colombian officials, Venezuela has extended a lifeline to
Colombian illegal armed groups by providing them with significant support and
safe haven along the border. As a result, these groups remain viable threats to
Colombian security and U.S.-Colombian counternarcotics efforts. According to U.S.
officials, a high level of corruption within the Venezuelan government, military, and other law
enforcement and security forces contributes to the permissive environment. According to U.S.
officials, Venezuelan government officials have provided material support,
primarily to FARC, which has helped to sustain the Colombian insurgency and
threaten security gains achieved in Colombia. One of the primary sources of evidence for
high-level Venezuelan support of FARC appeared on computers captured by the Colombian
National Army in a March 2008 raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador. During the raid, Luis Edgar
Devia Silva (alias Raul Reyes), a member of FARCs Secretariat,17 was killed. Since then, data
from the computers (commonly referred to as the Reyes files) has been analyzed by the
Colombian government and shared with the United States.18 Although U.S. officials suspected
high levels of Venezuelan government support for FARC, they told us that evidence in the Reyes
files not only confirmed their suspicions but indicated that FARC relationships with
Venezuelan government officials were well established and had been in place
longer than suspected. Based on Colombian government analyses of the Reyes files,
Venezuelan government officials may have provided FARC with as much as $300
million and other support such as medical care and weapons. State reports that some weapons
and ammunition found with illegal armed groups in Colombia came from official Venezuelan
stocks and facilities.19 Information from the Reyes files released by the Colombian government
indicates that Venezuelan officials also facilitated arms sales for FARC including the
purchase of Russian and Chinese rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns, and
missiles. Furthermore, according to Colombian government officials, information obtained
from the Reyes rifles detailed FARC and ELN officials cooperating and conducting meetings
with Venezuelan officials to discuss assistance. U.S. officials told us that Venezuelan documents
such as passports and identification cards have also been provided to illegal armed groups. For
instance, a senior FARC member captured in 2004 had Venezuelan citizenship and
identification papers. Based on evidence obtained from the Reyes files and other corroborating
information, in September 2008, the U.S. Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
designated three high ranking Venezuelan government officials as drug kingpins for providing
material support to FARC.21 Those designated were the Director of Venezuelas Military
Intelligence Directorate, Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios; the Director of Venezuelas
Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services, Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva; and the
former Venezuelan Minister of Interior and Justice, Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin. According
to OFAC, these officials protected drug shipments, provided weapons and funding, conducted
meetings with senior FARC members. In spite of OFACs designations, Venezuelan President
Chvez publicly defended these officials in a speech, and Carvajal and Rangel remain in office.
U.S. government officials told us that Venezuela has condoned a permissive
environment or safe haven along the Colombian border for FARC, ELN, and
Colombian criminal gangs. State reports that members of these groups regularly cross into
Venezuela to traffic drugs, rest and regroup, and evade Colombian security forces. Statements of
former FARC members, obtained through interviews with Colombian officials, indicate that
Venezuelan military and law enforcement officials, including those in the National
Guard, provide support and weapons and do little to prevent illegal armed groups
from crossing the border. By allowing illegal armed groups to elude capture and by
providing material support, Venezuela has extended a lifeline to Colombian illegal
armed groups, and their continued existence endangers Colombian security gains
achieved with U.S. assistance, according to U.S. and Colombian government officials.
Colombian officials cautioned that FARC remains a national security threat because it
exercises control over large areas of Colombia, including along the border with
Venezuela. Reducing FARCs membership, finances, and operating capabilities so that it no
longer poses a national security threat remains a goal of the Colombian government.
That causes shutdown of the Panama Canal
Richard Millett, October 2. Senior fellow at North-South Center, emeritus prof of history at
Southern Illinois Univ, and foreign policy expert. "Colombias Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of
a Wider War," Strategic Studies Institute,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB14.pdf

In the view of those in the United States, concerned about issues of Panama Canal security in the
wake of the U.S. military withdrawal, the spillover of Colombias conflicts into Panama
represents a particularly serious threat. Panamanians have tended to downplay this,
noting that the border with Colombia is remote from any installations related to the Canal and
pointing out that it was clearly in the guerrillas interest to abstain from any actions which might
provide an excuse for direct U.S. military actions against them. Rand analysts Rabasa and Chalk
largely concur, pointing out that the constraints against a guerrilla move against
Panama or the Canal are largely political, but adding that if the Colombian
government succeeded in putting real pressure on the guerrillas, this might
change their calculations. 58 Of all the bordering nations, Panama is the most
vulnerable, having neither regular armed forces nor direct land connections with
the border region, a long history of the usage of Panamanian territory by Colombian
narcotraffickers, and a lack of any real capacity to control its land, sea, or air frontiers. Panamas
problems have three distinct, but interrelated aspects. The first are the actions of armed
Colombians, insurgents, and/or paramilitaries in its national territory. The second encompasses
the wide range of criminal activities, notably, but by no means exclusively, narcotics trafficking,
linked to Colombian organized crime. Finally, problems are caused by refugees moving into the
Darien, representing a threat both to local inhabitants and to the regions fragile ecological
balance. All of this not only undermines Panamas control over its remote Darien Province, it
also contains the potential seriously to disrupt relations with the United States.
Panama shutdown collapses US naval power instantly
Dannels, Professor American Military University, 5 (Ruff, February, Security of the Panama
Canal: One decade after US departure http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-
s/2010/2010-2/2010_2_05_dannelsruff_eng_wats.pdf)//JAG

The U.S. still has vital national security and economic interests in Panama. An
important part of this interest is our use of the Canal to support trade, thus supporting our
economy. While we might not immediately think of the economy when we think of security, the
US National Defense Strategy emphasizes that our safety and security are intrinsically linked
with economic well-being. The strategy states in part: For more than sixty years, the United
States has secured the global commons for the benefit of all. Global prosperity is contingent on
the free flow of ideas, goods, and services. The enormous growth in trade has lifted millions of
people out of poverty by making locally produced goods available on the global market None
of this is possible without a basic belief that goods shipped through air or by sea, or information
transmitted under the ocean or through space, will arrive at their destination safely.12
International trade is inextricably intertwined with our human security. For this reason, the US
assumes a certain amount of responsibility for maintaining the smooth flow of trade. The
Canal carries approximately 5% of world trade and links over one hundred trade routes
throughout the world.14According to Stratfor: If the only waterway in the Western
Hemisphere that connects the Atlantic and Pacific were to be closed down for any
length of time, the impact likely would be felt on stock and commodities exchanges
worldwide, given the high degree of economic interdependence that now exists. 15 The ACP
estimates that with the Canal expansion, Canal traffic will increase from 72-106 % over 2005
numbers by 2025. 16 There is a scarcely a nation untouched by trade in some way. Any closure
of the Canal would be damaging worldwide; it would certainly harm the US both in economic
and strategic terms. Economically, the U.S. relies on the Canal more than any other country for
commerce. In 2008, the US shipped 1,408,779 long tons of cargo through the Canal.17
Approximately 12% of U.S. trade transported by waterways goes through the Canal.18 According
to the Progressive Policy Institute, 19 one seventh of US exports are shipped through the Canal,
or about 72 million tons in 2008. It is estimated that 65% of the cargo transiting the Canal is
either going to or from US facilities.20 Many US ports have been developing infrastructure or
enlarging ports in anticipation of the Canal expansion.21This economic interdependence makes
the Canal a soft target. Because the Canal is critical to the economic well-being of the
US, it is at risk for attack. One has only to consider the economic impact of the terrorist
attacks of September 11th on container shipping to gain an understanding of the economic
fallout that would result in the event the Panama Canal closed, even if only for a few days. When
the U.S. shut down its own sea and airports for one week following the 9/11 attacks, container
shipping lost a billion dollars a day for months as they disentangled freight traffic. The
economic impact of even the briefest Canal closure is undeniable. While US forces
have withdrawn from Panama, our strategic interests remain. According to a SOUTHCOM
analyst, It is vital, imperative, that the Canal remain open to shipping. It is a critical Line of
Communication (LOC) for the USG, its allies and the world. The Canal is critical to US and
world commerce and defense of the United States.Canal security is paramount to both the
USG [U.S. government] and GOP [government of Panama]. Were there to be an interruption in
shipping for any length of time, e.g., a WMD explosion that effectively shut down the Canal, the
repercussions would be extraordinary and devastating The sudden closure of the Canal would
amount to commercial losses in the many millions or even billions of US dollars daily. Any
permanent shutdown of the Canal would most likely result in Panama failing as a State. The
economic and strategic interests of the USG would also be gravely jeopardized.23 The Canal
still plays a crucial role for US military planning. The Progressive Policy Institute (2009)
estimates that US naval vessels utilize the Canal about once a week. 24 John Keller,
editor of Military & Aerospace Electronics, notes The Panama Canal is of the utmost
strategic importance to the United States, as it enables the U.S. Navy to transfer its
forces rapidly between the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. The potential for Canal
disruption is of dire concern to U.S. military authorities.25 While military analysts
would not reveal specific US military use of the Canal due to security concerns, Anthony
Rainone, an intelligence analyst with the Department of the Army 1st Information Operations
Command, noted that the Canal is critical to U.S. defense planning.26
Rapidly declining naval power causes Chinese aggression and triggers
wars in every major hotspot
Eaglen, Research Fellow National Security at Heritage, 11 (Mackenzie, May 16, Thinking
About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/thinking-about-a-day-without-sea-power-
implications-for-us-defense-policy)//JAG

Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the
United States would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is
reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the
lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases
would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained
at todays levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea,
although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into
theater. Chinas claims on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations
in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait
accompli, effectively turning the region into a Chinese lake. China establishes
expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and
secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of
the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan is
increasingly isolated and in 20202025 executes long-rumored plans to create an
indigenous nuclear weapons capability.[11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-
armed missiles ostensibly targeting China, toward which Japans historical animus
remains strong. Chinas entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass
dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a
sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the others
sphere. Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the
Middle East increase pressure on their governments, which are already stressed as
the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. Piracy
increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the Arctic, Russia
aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with
legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russias
claims. India, recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with
the retrenchment of the Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In
exchange, China agrees to exercise increased influence on its client state Pakistan. The great
typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000 more die in
the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little humanitarian
relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. Iran dominates the Persian Gulf and is a
nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary
Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries into Tehrans orbit. Russia supplies Iran with a steady flow
of military technology and nuclear industry expertise. Lacking a regional threat, the
Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the
protection provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in
participatory democracy ends with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent
seizure of power. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government,
and riots break out at the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because
the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation
when the government closes major airports. Led by Iran, a coalition of Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting that
includes a limited nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated,
and the State of Palestine is declared in its place. Massive refugee camps are created to
house the internally displaced Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability
of conquering forces to support them. The NATO alliance is shattered. The security of
European nations depends increasingly on the lack of external threats and the
nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany, which overcame its reticence to
military capability in light of Americas retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy security on
Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe. Major
European nations stand down their militaries and instead make limited contributions to a new
EU military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant
out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity. Implications for
Americas Economy. If the United States slashed its Navy and ended its mission as a
guarantor of the free flow of transoceanic goods and trade, globalized world trade
would decrease substantially. As early as 1890, noted U.S. naval officer and historian Alfred
Thayer Mahan described the worlds oceans as a great highwaya wide common,
underscoring the long-running importance of the seas to trade.[12] Geographically
organized trading blocs develop as the maritime highways suffer from insecurity
and rising fuel prices. Asia prospers thanks to internal trade and Middle Eastern oil, Europe
muddles along on the largesse of Russia and Iran, and the Western Hemisphere declines to a
new normal with the exception of energy-independent Brazil. For America, Venezuelan oil
grows in importance as other supplies decline. Mexico runs out of oilas predictedwhen it
fails to take advantage of Western oil technology and investment. Nigerian output, which for five
years had been secured through a partnership of the U.S. Navy and Nigerian maritime forces, is
decimated by the bloody civil war of 2021. Canadian exports, which a decade earlier had been
strong as a result of the oil shale industry, decline as a result of environmental concerns in
Canada and elsewhere about the fracking (hydraulic fracturing) process used to free oil from
shale. State and non-state actors increase the hazards to seaborne shipping, which
are compounded by the necessity of traversing key chokepoints that are easily
targeted by those who wish to restrict trade. These chokepoints include the Strait of
Hormuz, which Iran could quickly close to trade if it wishes. More than half of the worlds oil is
transported by sea. From 1970 to 2006, the amount of goods transported via the oceans of the
worldincreased from 2.6 billion tons to 7.4 billion tons, an increase of over 284%.[13] In
2010, $40 billion dollars [sic] worth of oil passes through the worlds geographic chokepoints
on a daily basisnot to mention $3.2 trillionannually in commerce that moves underwater on
transoceanic cables.[14] These quantities of goods simply cannot be moved by any other means.
Thus, a reduction of sea trade reduces overall international trade. U.S. consumers face a
greatly diminished selection of goods because domestic production largely
disappeared in the decades before the global depression. As countries increasingly
focus on regional rather than global trade, costs rise and Americans are forced to
accept a much lower standard of living. Some domestic manufacturing improves, but at
significant cost. In addition, shippers avoid U.S. ports due to the onerous container inspection
regime implemented after investigators discover that the second dirty bomb was smuggled into
the U.S. in a shipping container on an innocuous Panamanian-flagged freighter. As a result,
American consumers bear higher shipping costs. The market also constrains the variety of goods
available to the U.S. consumer and increases their cost. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
report makes this abundantly clear. A one-week shutdown of the Los Angeles and Long Beach
ports would lead to production losses of $65 million to $150 million (in 2006 dollars) per day. A
three-year closure would cost $45 billion to $70 billion per year ($125 million to $200 million
per day). Perhaps even more shocking, the simulation estimated that employment would shrink
by approximately 1 million jobs.[15] These estimates demonstrate the effects of closing only the
Los Angeles and Long Beach ports. On a national scale, such a shutdown would be catastrophic.
The Government Accountability Office notes that: [O]ver 95 percent of U.S. international
trade is transported by water[;] thus, the safety and economic security of the
United States depends in large part on the secure use of the worlds seaports and
waterways. A successful attack on a major seaport could potentially result in a dramatic
slowdown in the international supply chain with impacts in the billions of dollars.[16] As of
2008, U.S. ports move 99 percent of the nations overseas cargo, handle more than 2.5 billion
tons of trade annually, and move $5.5 billion worth of goods in and out every day. Further,
approximately 95 percent of U.S. military forces and supplies that are sent overseas, including
those for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, pass through U.S. ports.[17]
General Conclusions. This simple thought experiment is designed to highlight the
impact of the loss of preponderant American sea power. Because this is a scenario-
based excursion, it is important to retain perspective. In order to create this absence of sea
power, a Hobbesian nightmare had to be imposed, although a slow erosion of naval power
in the next decade could leave the country dramatically unprepared for something
less than Hobbes might conjure. Certainly, America would have many important needs if
such a scenario became reality. Yet the scenarios description shows the extent to which
Americas power as a maritime nation depends on its ability to field and operate a
global fleet that aggressively protects its interests even as it provides a benign
security environment for other nations to enjoy. Put another way, the cost of
maintaining a fleet that can project power and presence around the globeeven if it
encourages others to underinvest in their naval forcesproduces substantial national
security and economic benefits for the American people, and these benefits far
outweigh the costs of maintaining it.

LA Terror Module
Venezuela is a hub for drug smuggling to the Americas
Chris Carlson, November 16, 12- a master's degree in Latin American studies from the
University of Wisconsin, (Venezuela Extradites Six Alleged Drug Lords to
Colombia,Venezuelanalysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7488)//NG

Venezuelan authorities extradited six suspected drug-traffickers to Colombia on
Wednesday, including the notorious Daniel El Loco Barrera and one U.S. citizen.
All of the men were wanted on drug charges in Colombia, including two who are
also wanted in the United States. Barrera, who is considered to be one of Colombias most
wanted drug lords, will await extradition to the United States upon reaching Bogota. The
Colombian was captured in the Venezuelan city of San Cristobal last September after
Colombian officials notified Venezuela that Barrera was making a call from a public payphone.
Barrera had allegedly been hiding in Venezuela since 2008, and had amassed a
considerable empire of at least 127 properties, including farms, apartments,
hotels, an airplane and a hangar. Barrera is suspected of having trafficked as much
as 400 tons of cocaine a year through Colombia and Venezuela to the United
States, Europe and Africa, allowing him to accumulate a fortune that is estimated
at 33 million dollars. Also extradited was the U.S. citizen Eduardo Acosta Mejia
who was arrested on the border earlier this year while entering Venezuela from
Colombia.
Drug trade causes Latin American instability
Chalk, Researcher US Air Force, 11 (Peter, The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope,
Dimensions, Impact, and Response, RAND Corporation, USAF)
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1076.html\\BS

The Latin American drug trade has had a pervasive and insidious impact that has
affected a wide spectrum of national, regional, and even international security
interests. In Colombia, revenue from the production and trafficking of heroin and cocaine
has provided FARC with sufficient operational capital to maintain an active war
footing in its ongoing conflict against Bogot. Although the organization does not pose a
strategic threat to the central government, its activities have undermined popular confidence
in the administrations ability to project a concerted territorial presence, guarantee
public security, and maintain a (legitimate) monopoly of violenceall key
components of sovereign statehood. There is little question that, without access to the
enormous profits availed by the drug trade, FARCs ability to achieve these
debilitating effects would have been greatly curtailed.
Results instate failure and great power wars
Grygiel 9, Jakub, George H.W. Bush Assoc Prof, IR, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Intl
Studies, Johns Hopkins U (Vacuum Wars: The Coming Competition Over Failed States,
American Interest, Jul/Aug 2009, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622)//JAG

Mention failed states in an academic seminar or a policy meeting and you will hear a laundry
list of tragic problems: poverty, disease, famine, refugees flowing across borders and more. If it
is a really gloomy day, you will hear that failed states are associated with terrorism, ethnic
cleansing and genocide. This is the conventional wisdom that has developed over the past two
decades, and rightly so given the scale of the human tragedies in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda,
just to mention the most egregious cases of the 1990s. This prevailing view of failed states,
however, though true, is also incomplete. Failed states are not only a source of domestic
calamities; they are also potentially a source of great power competition that in the
past has often led to confrontation, crisis and war. The failure of a state creates a
vacuum that, especially in strategically important regions, draws in competitive great-
power intervention. This more traditional view of state failure is less prevalent these days, for
only recently has the prospect of great power competition over failed vacuum states returned.
But, clearly, recent events in Georgiaas well as possible future scenarios in Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, as well as southeastern Europe, Asia and parts of Africasuggest that it might be
a good time to adjust, really to expand, the way we think about failed states and the kinds of
problems they can cause. The difference between the prevailing and the traditional view on
state failure is not merely one of accent or nuance; it has important policy implications. Intense
great power conflict over the spoils of a failed state will demand a fundamentally different set of
strategies and skills from the United States. Whereas the response to the humanitarian disasters
following state failure tends to consist of peacekeeping and state-building missions, large-scale
military operations and swift unilateral action are the most likely strategies great powers will
adopt when competing over a power vacuum. On the political level, multilateral cooperation,
often within the setting of international institutions, is feasible as well as desirable in case of
humanitarian disasters. But it is considerably more difficult, perhaps impossible, when a failed
state becomes an arena of great power competition. The prevailing view of failed states is an
obvious product of the past two decadesa period in which an entirely new generation of
scholars and policymakers has entered their respective professions. A combination of events
the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the prostration of states such as
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia, and most importantly the terrorist attacks of September
11created two interlocked impressions concerning the sources of state failure that are today
largely accepted uncritically. The first of these is that weak states have unraveled because of the
great powers disinterest in them, which has allowed serious domestic problems, ranging from
poverty to ethnic and social strife, to degenerate into chaos and systemic governance failure.1
The basic idea here is that the Cold War had a stabilizing effect in several strategic regions where
either the United States or the Soviet Union supported recently fashioned states with little
domestic legitimacy and cohesion for fear that, if they did not, the rival superpower might gain
advantage. Some fortunate Third World neutrals even managed a kind of foreign aid arbitrage,
attracting help from both sides. When support from the superpowers ended, many of these
states, such as Somalia and Yugoslavia, were torn apart by internal factionalism. The state
lacked the money to bribe compliance or to generate a larger economic pie, degenerating rapidly
into corruption and violence. The key conclusion: The most egregious and tragic
examples of failed states in the 1990s occurred because of great power neglect
rather than meddling. The related second impression that post-Cold War events have
created is that the main threat posed by failed states starts from within them and
subsequently spills over to others. Failed states export threats ranging from crime
to drugs to refugees to, most dramatically, global terrorism.2 The lawlessness and
violence of such states often spills across borders in the form of waves of refugees,
the creation of asylums for criminals and more besides. As the number and severity of failed
state cases rose, Western powers reacted much of the time by hoping that the problems arising
from the failure of states, even those geographically close to the United States or Europe like
Haiti and Bosnia, would remain essentially limited so that internal chaos could simply be waited
out. Interventions such as in Somalia, Bosnia or Haiti were driven by a Western public shocked
by vivid images of suffering and slaughter rather than by a sense that these collapsed states
directly threatened U.S. national security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States
changed the perception that failed states could be safely ignored. The Hobbesian world of a
failed state could be distant, but it was also a breeding ground for terrorist networks
that could train their foot soldiers, establish logistical bases and plan attacks against
distant countries. Failed states suddenly were not only humanitarian disasters but
security threats. As Francis Fukuyama observed in 2004, radical Islamist terrorism
combined with the availability of weapons of mass destruction added a major security
dimension to the burden of problems created by weak governance.3 However, 9/11 did not
alter the conviction that the main threat posed by failed states stems from endogenous problems
and not from a great power competition to fill the vacuum created by their demise. At least in
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, there was a naive feeling that the Islamist
threat festering in failed or weak states such as Afghanistan was a menace to the international
community writ large, and certainly to great powers like Russia and China, as well as the United
States. It was therefore assumed that the great powers would cooperate to combat terrorism and
not compete with each other for control over failing or failed states. As Stephen David pointed
out in these pages, Instead of living in a world of international anarchy and domestic order, we
have international order and domestic anarchy.4 The solution stemming from such a view of
failed states falls under the broad category of nation-building. If the main challenge of failed
states is internally generated and caused by a collapse of domestic order, then the solution must
be to rebuild state institutions and restore authority and order, preferably under some sort of
multilateral arrangement that would enhance the legitimacy of what is necessarily an intrusive
endeavor. Great powers are expected to cooperate, not compete, to fix failed states. U.S. foreign
policy continues to reflect this prevailing view. Then-Director of the Policy Planning staff,
Stephen Krasner, and Carlos Pascual, then-Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at
the State Department, wrote in 2005 that, when chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics
trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish.
Moreover, modern conflicts are far more likely to be internal, civil matters than to
be clashes between opposing countries.5 The prevailing view of failed states is, to
repeat, not wrong, just incompletefor it ignores the competitive nature of great
power interactions. The traditional understanding of power vacuums is still very relevant.
Sudan, Central Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin America and many other areas are
characterized by weak and often collapsing states that are increasingly arenas for
great power competition. The interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state
or to engage in nation-building for humanitarian purposes but to establish a foothold in
the region, to obtain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector, and to
weaken the presence of other great powers. Lets look at just three possible future
scenarios. In the first, imagine that parts of Indonesia become increasingly difficult to govern
and are wracked by riots. Chinese minorities are attacked, while pirates prowl sealanes in ever
greater numbers. Bejing, pressured by domestic opinion to help the Chinese diaspora, as well as
by fears that its seaborne commerce will be interrupted, intervenes in the region. Chinas action
is then perceived as a threat by Japan, which projects its own power into the region. The United
States, India and others then intervene to protect their interests, as well. In the second scenario,
imagine that Uzbekistan collapses after years of chronic mismanagement and continued
Islamist agitation. Uzbekistans natural resources and its strategic value as a route to the
Caspian or Middle East are suddenly up for grabs, and Russia and China begin to compete for
control over it, possibly followed by other states like Iran and Turkey. In a third scenario,
imagine that the repressive government of Sudan loses the ability to maintain control over the
state, and that chaos spreads from Darfur outward to Chad and other neighbors. Powers distant
and nearby decide to extend their control over the threatened oil fields. China, though still at
least a decade away from having serious power projection capabilities, already has men on the
ground in Sudan protecting some of the fields and uses them to control the countrys natural
resources. These scenarios are not at all outlandish, as recent events have shown. Kosovo, which
formally declared independence on February 17, 2008, continues to strain relationships between
the United States and Europe, on the one hand, and Serbia and Russia, on the other. The
resulting tension may degenerate into violence as Serbian nationalists and perhaps even the
Serbian army intervene in Kosovo. It is conceivable then that Russia would support Belgrade,
leading to a serious confrontation with the European Union and the United States. A similar
conflict, pitting Russia against NATO or the United States alone, or some other alliance of
European states, could develop in several post-Soviet regions, from Georgia to the Baltics. Last
summers war in Georgia, for instance, showed incipient signs of a great power confrontation
between Russia and the United States over the fate of a weak state, further destabilized by a rash
local leadership and aggressive meddling by Moscow. The future of Ukraine may follow a
parallel pattern: Russian citizens (or, to be precise, ethnic Russians who are given passports by
Moscow) may claim to be harassed by Ukrainian authorities, who are weak and divided. A
refugee problem could then arise, giving Moscow a ready justification to intervene militarily.
The question would then be whether NATO, or the United States, or some alliance of Poland and
other states would feel the need and have the ability to prevent Ukraine from falling under
Russian control. Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the
situation and withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one
outcome could be the collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum
would be filled by militias and other groups, who would engage in violent conflict for oil,
political control and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and
Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the
fray more directly than they have so far. In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in
which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry, which
is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main
features as well as its array of consequences. The traditional view starts from a widely shared
assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system. As Richard Nixon
once said to Mao Zedong, In international relations there are no good choices. One thing is
surewe can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.6 The power vacuums created by
failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an easy way to expand their
spheres of influence while weakening their opponents or forestalling their intervention. A state
that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby
potentially decreasing its own relative power. This simple, inescapable logic is based on the
view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your loss. A failed
state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a
strategically pivotal location. The power that controls it first necessarily increases its own
standing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915, the anarchy of the world is
due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and
collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America
there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and
corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for
them is to the knife.7 The threat posed by failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly
from within. After all, by definition a failed state is no longer an actor capable of conducting a
foreign policy. It is a politically inert geographic area whose fate is dependent on the actions of
others. The main menace to international security stems from competition between these
others. As Arnold Wolfers put it in 1951, because of the competitive nature of international
relations, expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum existed.8 The
challenge is that the incentive to extend control over a vacuum or a failed state is similar for
many states. In fact, even if one state has a stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of
its geographic proximity, natural resources or strategic location, this very interest spurs other
states to seek command over the same territory simply because doing so weakens that state. The
ability to deprive a state of something that will give it a substantial advantage is itself a source of
power. Hence a failed state suddenly becomes a strategic prize, because it either adds to ones
own power or subtracts from anothers. The prevailing and traditional views of failed states
reflect two separate realities. Therefore, we should not restrict ourselves to one view or the other
when studying our options. The difference is not just academic; it has very practical
consequences. First and foremost, if we take the traditional view, failed states may pose an even
greater danger to international security than policymakers and academics currently predict.
Humanitarian disasters are certainly tragedies that deserve serious attention; yet they do not
pose the worst threats to U.S. security or world stability. That honor still belongs to the
possibility of a great power confrontation. While the past decade or so has allowed us to
ignore great power rivalries as the main feature of international relations, there is no
guarantee that this happy circumstance will continue long into the future.

Middle Eastern Terror Module
Venezuelan drugs fuel terrorist groups --- including Hezbollah
Ehrenfeld 3/31 - Director of the New York-based American Center for Democracy and the
Economic Warfare Institute (Rachael, Latin Americas Narco-Terrorism Nexus & The Obama
Administration, American Center for Democracy, Mar 31, 2013, http://acdemocracy.org/latin-
americas-narco-terrorism-nexus-the-obama-administration/#sthash.2E9QQ3nk.dpuf,
Daehyun)

Terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit acts of murder, said President
George W. Bush, on December 14, 2001. Its so important for Americans to know that the traffic
in drugs finances the work of terror, sustaining terrorists. On March 19, 2002, Attorney
General John Ashcroft went on to say: Terrorism and drugs go together like rats and the
bubonic plague. They thrive in the same conditions, support each other, and feed
off each other. Alas, the water flowing through the Potomac seems to have swept this
acknowledgement down to Chesapeake Bay, off to the Atlantic Ocean. Incredibly, twenty-one
years later, on March 20, 2013, Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern
Command, gave a press conference at the Pentagonto voice his concern about A potential
connection between crime syndicates and terrorists in Latin America. (Emphasis added.)
Contradicting himself, Kelly added, We do know that some terrorist organizations are able to
skim off fairly substantial sums of money from the drug profits. And so there has to be kind of
a network for that to happen. Kelly explained, Drugs are the basis for this wealth and the drug-
related money coming out of the United States. A criminal network (which one?) transports
tons of drugs into the United States and Europe and moves bales of money back out. The sums
are astronomical. I mean palettes of money, he said. For a buck, anything can get on the
[drug transport] network. Kelly concluded, The point of it all is the network is a very
dangerous thing to have working as effectively as it does, because anything can get on it.
Already in 2002, twelve of the thirty-six groups on the U.S. Department of States
ForeignTerrorist Organizations List were identified as being involved in drug
trafficking. In October 2002, a Colombian courier for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia (FARC), which is funded mostly by drug trafficking, was arrested in the U.S. for
having attempted to transport 182,000 (Euros) into the country. The money was confiscated.
In another case, U.S. law enforcement derailed an al-Qaeda plot to exchange 9,000 assault
weapons, such as AK-47 rifles, submachine guns and sniper rifles; 300 pistols; rocket-propelled
grenade launchers; 300,000 grenades; shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and 60 million
rounds of ammunition,for $25 million dollars in cash and cocaine. Since then, the
cooperation between international drug trafficking has been cemented to share
the astronomical amounts of money generated by drug trafficking, arms and
people smuggling the worldover. If Kellys worry about such a potential link strikes you
as odd, it should. At the same press conference Kelly was arguing that The reality on the ground
[Latin America] is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts
to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are
waning. He went on to explain that Iran have increased its attempt to evade international
sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment, Iran succeeded in establishing relations with
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. However, he noted, This outreach has only been
marginally successfuland the region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts. Kelly
seemed oblivious to Iranian proxy Hezbollahs longstanding involvement in drug trafficking and
many other criminal activities criminal fundraising efforts in Latin America. What to think of
this? It was surely an example of both the current administrations humoring of Iran (Kelly
paraphrased: Im not saying that Iran is sponsoring terrorism in Latin America. Im only talking
about potential) and an expression of just how far behind the curve the U.S. military will be
when it comes to handling future events. The fact that Hezbollah is Irans principal agent both in
Latin America and a good number of other places worldwide was established decades ago. Since
9/11 Hezbollahs activities and partnership with drug cartels in pursuing criminal activity of all
sorts in the tri-border region have been documented in Funding Evil ; How terrorism is
Financed and How to Stop it, and in many congressional hearings , by the Congressional
Research Service, reports by the Drug Enforcement Administration, and many studies, reports
and media accounts. On March 17, 2009,a former commander of U.S. Southern Command,
Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis testified before the House Armed Services Committee He
noted the direct link between the illicit drug trade and the terrorist groups it
bankrolls, noting the threat posed by Islamic radical terrorism, and emphasized
that Identifying, monitoring and dismantling the financial, logistical and
communication linkages between illicit trafficking groups and terrorist sponsors
are critical to not only ensuring early indications and warnings of potential
terrorist attacks directed at the United States and our partners, but also in
generating a global appreciation and acceptance of this tremendous threat to
security. Strangely, Gen. Kelly knows nothing about this. Former assistant secretary of state
for Western Hemisphere affairs Roger Noriega recently testified before Congress on the
Iran/Hezbollah/ Venezuela nexus. Noriega noted the Iran has laundered billions of dollars
through the Venezuelan financial sector and is currently stashing hundreds of millions in
virtually every Venezuelan bank, some of which have corresponding branches in the U.S. In
addition to Venezuela , where Hezbollah has close ties to Chavezs likely successor, Vice
President Nicolas Maduro, there are credible reports of Hezbollahs presence in Nicaragua,
Belize and Mexico. In April 2010, U.S. defense officials were cited by the U.S. Boarder Control
website, saying that Hezbollah is working with Mexican narcotics syndicates that control access
to transit routes into the U.S, [and] to smuggle drugs and people into the United States.
Moreover, he warned that al Qaeda also could use trafficking routes to infiltrate operatives into
the U.S. ( see the map above). One can only wonder why the Administration is
considering Irans penetration of Latin America, as well as Hezbollahs and other
terrorist groups involvement in the narco-terrorism nexus, a matter of potential.
It has long been a fait accompli .

Venezuela becomes an Iranian terror route
Powell 12 Reporter for the Houston Chronicle (Stewart, Border as Terror route worries
the U.S., Houston Chronicle, 8/11/13, www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Border-as-
terror-route-worries-U-S-3781740.php)//BZ

WASHINGTON - Ever since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck a deal with
Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez for weekly air service between the nations' capitals,
American officials have worried that Iranian-backed terrorists could reach to the
rim of Latin America, pick up fake Venezuelan passports and sneak into the United
States. Now, with growing talk of a pre-emptive Israeli attack to slow Iran's suspected
nuclear arms program, Iran has threatened that it would retaliate across the globe.
And its easy access to the Western Hemisphere has the U.S. particularly concerned.
The commercial service between Tehran and Caracas by Iran Air and Conviasa Air
Venezuela, including a stop in Damascus, Syria, is so secretive that there's confusion
among intelligence agencies about whether the flights are continuing. Israel
believes they are; the U.S. isn't so sure. Nevertheless, American fears are elevated. "Some
Iranian officials - probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - have changed their
calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in
response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime," James Clapper, director
of National Intelligence, warned the Senate Intelligence Committee in his latest threat
assessment. If that attack comes, experts see it being staged by Iranian operatives
who have entered the U.S. through Latin America.
Leads to Iran bioterror attacks
Ledeen 13 Foreign policy analyst/writer and former consultant to the U.S. National
Security Council, State Department, and Department of Defense (Michael, Irans Biological
Weapons, PJ Media, 1/1/13, http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2013/01/01/irans-biological-
weapons/)//BZ

My friend Reza Kahlili reports that the Iranians have developed some new biological
weapons they plan to use against us at the appropriate moment. Youll recall that Reza
was an officer in the Revolutionary Guards Corps, where he worked as a CIA agent. I always take
his work seriously, and you should too. No form of WMD frightens me as much as
biologicals. Germs exist, epidemics can kill a lot of people, and there are ways to spread them.
The Soviets worked very hard on such weapons, especially on anthrax, and according to Rezas
source, the Russians, along with those ghoulish North Koreans, have been helping Iran prepare
its biological arsenal. Yes, I think there should be hearings. And yes, if the information is
accurate, I believe that action should be taken against the labs and stockpiles. I have only one
quibble with the story as Rezas source tells it. He talks about various high-tech ways of
spreading plague, etcetera. Those methods range from infecting insects to spraying
the stuff on us from the air. Maybe they are preparing those things. But theres an easier
way: infect a few people, and let them wander around crowded areas like airports,
movie theaters, subway stations and trains, and the like. A few coughs and sneezes, and voila!
Its a proven method. The Spaniards did it to the Neapolitans in the 17th century and wiped out
half the population of Naples. You can read about it here. Damn right its serious. Deadly
serious.
Bioweapons lead to extinction
Ochs, 2 MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at
Grand Teton National Park (Richard, Biological Weapons Must be Abolished Immediately,
Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many
without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life
on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk
these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting
from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on
earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to
control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily,
as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security
of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or
accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The
Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage
bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they
can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than
nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser
effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the
Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and
biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens
of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially
worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could
wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation.
AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known
cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW
POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to
allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine
allowed such use only as a last resort when our nations survival was at stake. Will the new policy
also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be
posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction,
"patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanitys survival primary and
absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our
Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is
extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example,
for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass
destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by
design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our
generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands
the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored
custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen?
Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe
that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is
possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic
system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival.
The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind
us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of
all crimes.
Bioterror attacks lead to nuclear retaliation
Apatow 12 Founder and director of research & development at the Humanitarian
Resource Institute, an NGO at the U.N. (Stephen, Syria - CBRNE Weapons - Nuclear
Retaliation Scenario, humanitarian.net, 11/14/12,
http://www.humanitarian.net/idin/ref/11142012IDIN.html)//BZ

Every day the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria [1] is allowed to spiral out of control, risks
increase for a direct CBRNE attack [2] by the failed state and/or transfer of weapons of
mass destruction to transnational terrorists. This threat has prompted a review of global
infrastructure analysis, contingency plans and response to a WMD 911. It is well understood
that a nuclear retaliatory strike would be the anticipated response to a CBRNE
WMD attack, as emphasized in the 1999 Applied Science and Analysis Newsletter "The
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Challenge for Decision Makers." Conclusions
outlined in this report are the focus of assessment and progress made to date: The risk of
exposure to the effects of WMD is real. Weapons from each of the categories have been
produced and tested. They are somewhere at someone's disposal. They have already been used
in the recent past. Proliferation will augment the number of possessors and thus further increase
the risk of these weapons being used. The question is not whether, but when and where
they will be used next. We must first work to ensure that these weapons are not
used. However, we must also enhance readiness for NBC defense. In many countries, the
public is not aware of these facts. Many decision makers have yet to fully perceive the risks
involved and to take appropriatfe action. The elimination of obvious shortcomings in biodefense
capabilities, including medical biological defense, must be given high priority: means for
intercepting and destroying biological weapons, aerosol detection and warning systems,
procedures for detecting biological agents, preventing, diagnosing and treating BW diseases.
However, from a medical perspective, it would be ill advised to perform these remedies at the
expense of nuclear and chemical medical defense. It remains, therefore, necessary to take
preventive measures against weapons from each of the categories. Furthermore,
retaliation with nuclear weapons may be the only viable option, especially where
BWs are used. In the event of a nuclear strike, the medical services will have to deal with
casualties arising from possible collateral effects. In addition to the NBC risks arising from
hostile action, medical services must be able to cope with other dangers, which may have effects
similar to NBC weapons. In their deployment area, armed forces may face risks in the civilian
sector resulting from the worldwide spread of nuclear technology (nuclear energy, technical and
medical radiation sources, depleted uranium) and the chemical industry (production facilities
and stocks of, for example, phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, chlorine gas or insecticides). There are
likely to be fewer and fewer clean, conventional scenarios even where NBC weapons are not
used. Many countries have NBC defense experts and have equipped their forces with basic
protective equipment, such as NBC protective masks. However, the forces of most countries do
not have the capability to sustain operations in an NBC environment for more than a few hours
and preserve their combat strength. This NBC defense capability, though, is precisely what is
needed, not just tomorrow but today. It must be guaranteed throughout the entire operational
spectrum by a balanced system of NBC defense measures. As a rule, combat troops have the
best NBC defense capabilities. Nevertheless, they rely on medical services that have some of the
worst deficits in NBC defense capability. Most medical services are capable of protecting neither
medical personnel at work, nor patients during treatment and evacuation, nor sophisticated
medical material against NBC exposure. This inability presents a major obstacle for military
operations in an NBC environment and may seriously limit the options available to political and
military decision-makers. The only options may be to do nothing or to retaliate with
nuclear weapons.

Specifically, U.S. strikes on Iran escalates to WWIII and extinction
Karimi-Hakak 12 - Artistic Director of Mahak International Artists (MIA) (Mahmood,
An attack on Iran will lead to WWIII, 3/27/12, Times of Israel, blogs.timesofisrael.com/an-
attack-on-iran-will-lead-to-world-war-3/)//BZ

Let me state here, for the record, and for future students of history, the results of an attack
on Iran, by Israel and/or the US. In the short term, an attack will: 1. Strengthen the present
regime in Tehran. That is why they are doing everything they can to promote such a war. 2.
Result in the death of thousands, perhaps millions, of Iranians, Israelis and Americans, as
well as others. 3. Destroy regional stability the little that exist now. 4. Drive the price of
oil sky-high. But it will make the richest half percent in the US richer, and it will bring
warmongers like Bush back into the office. In the long term, an attack will: 1. Crush for good
any opposition to the Iranian regime inside and outside the country. 2. Raise the number of
terrorist attacks against targets in the US, Israel, and around the world. 3. Bring
hardline theocratic regimes into power all over the Middle East. 4. Destroy Israel,
causing a Jewish massacre far worse than any in history thus far. 5. Reduce American
dominance in the region and around the world. 6. Help China become the next global
empire. But worst of all, it will cause a much-feared third world war, which none of our
children will survive.

West Africa Module
Venezuela increases drug trafficking to West Africa guarantees
political and economic instability
Guzman 6-1-13 (Timothy Guzman is a widely published writer specializing in politics. The
Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/a-new-war-on-drugs-in-west-africa-think-tank-report-says-west-
africa-is-a-drug-trafficking-hub/5337192)//MG

In a report recently conducted by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies by Senior Diplomatic
Advisor David E. Brown called The Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic
Governance and Human Security in West Africa wrote that West Africa is under attack
from international criminal networks that are using the sub-region as a key global
hub for the distribution, wholesale, and increased production of illicit drugs. Is
the United States Government expanding the so called War on Drugs to West Africa? Is it a
convenient excuse to further penetrate the African continent with US government agencies such
as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)? Brown further wrote that Brown further wrote
that While West African states have made remarkable progress in democratic and
economic development over the past decade, the insidious effects of narcotics
trafficking have the potential to reverse many of these gains , said the report. The
proceeds of drug trafficking, by far the most lucrative transnational criminal activity in
illicit economies, are fueling a dramatic increase in narco-corruption in the region,
allowing drug traffickers to stage coups dtat, hijack elections, and co-opt or buy
political power. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) claims that drug dealers are
staging coup dtats and are stealing elections. According to www.africom.mil newsroom report,
the Western African nation of Guinea-Bissau will be the main center of operation for the DEA
with the possibility of re-opening the U.S. Embassy that was closed on June 14th, 1998 due to a
civil war between former President Joo Bernardo Nino Vieira and his supporters and the
military-led junta: In order to address this challenge, Brown argues that the U.S. government
should expand its partnerships and physical presence in the sub-region. Specifically, the report
recommends re-opening the U.S. Embassy in Guinea-Bissau and enhancing the presence of the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in key countries throughout the region. David E. Brown outlines
the key actors in relation to West Africas drug trafficking network: The most
important of these international criminal networks are from Latin Americaprimarily
from Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexicopartnering with West African criminals. These
criminals, particularly Nigerians and Ghanaians, have been involved in the global drug trade for
several decades, first with cannabis and later with heroin. There is also increasingly strong
evidence linking terrorist organizations or state sponsors of terrorism to the
West Africa drug trade, including Colombias Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
( FARC), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah (allied with elements in the
Lebanese diaspora), Venezuela, and Iran. These criminal and terrorist groups are
also a threat to U.S. national security , because the illicit profits earned by Latin
American drug cartels operating in West Africa strengthen the same criminal
elements that traffic drugs to North America, and the same North African and
Middle Eastern terrorist groups and nations that target the United States.
Funds from West African drug trafficking are key to terrorist
operations in the region
Brice 09 (Arthur Brice is a CNN staff writer specializing in Latin America. Latin American
drug cartels find home in West Africa, 9/21/09,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/09/21/africa.drug.cartels/)

Though Europe is highly attractive to traffickers, it can have tight, Western-style security. So the
Colombian and Mexican cartels have discovered that it's much easier to smuggle large
loads into West Africa and then break that up into smaller shipments to the continent --
mostly Spain, the United Kingdom and France. West Africa is a smuggler's dream,
suffering from a combination of factors that make the area particularly
vulnerable. It is among the poorest and least stable regions in the world.
Governments are weak and ineffective and, as a top DEA chief testified to the U.S. Senate
this summer, officials are often corrupt. Law enforcement also is largely riddled with
corruption. Criminal gangs are rampant. Foot soldiers can be recruited from a large pool of poor
and desperate youth. "It's a point of least resistance," Benson said. West Africa refers to Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. "This area of the world is ripe,"
Bagley said. "There has been very little attention paid to it. The United States is loath to give aid
to these countries because they are corrupt." U.S. authorities find themselves at a great
disadvantage fighting cartels that have much more money and guns. The DEA has four offices --
in Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa -- to cover a continent that spans 11.7 million square
miles and has nearly 1 billion people. "It's a big place," Benson acknowledges, noting that there
are 54 countries on the continent. Local police also are vastly outgunned. Guinea-Bissau offers
an alarming example. "The Judicial Police ... have 60 agents, one vehicle and often no fuel,"
analyst Bybee wrote in a journal called New Voices in Public Policy, published by the George
Mason University School of Public Policy. "As a result, when culprits are apprehended, they are
driven in a taxi to the police station. They just recently received six sets of handcuffs from the
U.K., which were badly needed. In the military, one rusty ship patrols the 350-kilometer (217-
mile) coastline and 88 islands." Even when criminals are caught, Bybee said, "the near
absence of a judicial system allows traffickers to operate unimpeded." For example,
she said, "because the police are so impotent, the culprits are often held for just a few hours
before senior military personnel suddenly attain extraordinary judicial powers to demand their
release." The few officials who stand up to the traffickers receive death threats or are killed.
West Africa also is particularly attractive to traffickers because it is near "the soft underbelly of
Europe," said retired four-star Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who was drug policy director for
President Clinton. Geography plays another role because West Africa is fairly close to
the three South American nations that produce nearly all of the world's cocaine --
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Many of the shipments depart from Venezuela, which
shares a 1,273-mile (2,050-kilometer) porous border with Colombia and is even closer to
Africa. "They go right dead-ass across the shortest route," McCaffrey said. Most of the cocaine
shipments cross the Atlantic in large "mother ships" and then are off-loaded to small vessels
near the coastline, the United Nations said. Small planes modified for overseas flight that can
carry a 1-ton cargo also have been used. Most of those come from Venezuela, the United Nations
reported. A report issued in July by the Government Accountability Office said traffickers use
go-fast boats, fishing vessels and commercial shipping containers as the primary means of
smuggling cocaine out of Venezuela. McCaffrey also noted the use of go-fast boats and special
planes. DEA Assistant Administrator Thomas Harrigan testified before the Senate in June that
authorities in Sierra Leone seized a cocaine shipment last year from a twin-engine aircraft
marked with a Red Cross insignia. The flight originated in Venezuela, he said. The GAO report
noted that "U.S. government officials have observed an increase in suspicious air traffic
originating in Venezuela." In 2004, the report said, authorities tracked 109 suspect flights out of
Venezuela. In 2007, officials tracked 178 suspicious flights. Then there's the crime connection in
West Africa. "Colombian and Venezuelan traffickers are entrenched in West Africa
and have cultivated long-standing relationships with African criminal networks to
facilitate their activities in the region," Harrigan told a Senate subcommittee on African
affairs. "These organizations don't operate in a vacuum," Benson said. "They have to align
themselves with West African criminal groups." The cartels also have aligned
themselves with terrorists, Harrigan said. "The threat of narco-terrorism in Africa is a
real concern, including the presence of international terrorist organizations
operating or based in Africa, such as the regional threat presented by al Qaeda in
the Lands of Maghreb," he said, referring to al Qaeda activists in North Africa. "In addition,
DEA investigations have identified elements of Colombia's Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC] as being involved in cocaine trafficking in West
Africa."
Terrorists operating in Africa will deploy nuclear weapons against the
U.S.
Dempsey, Director of African Studies at Army War College, 6 (Thomas, Director of African
Studies @ U.S. Army War College and served as a strategic intelligence analyst for Africa at the
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and as Chief of Africa Branch for the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential
Solutions, April, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub649.pdf)

Raising the Stakes:The Nuclear Dimension of the Terrorist Threat. The threat that terrorist
hubs based in failed states pose to the United States and to its allies escalates
dramatically if those hubs can obtain access to nuclear weapons. The risk that such
weapons will find their way into terrorist hands is increasing significantly as a
result of three interrelated factors. The end of the Cold War has witnessed an alarming
erosion of control and security of Russian nuclear technology and weaponry. It
has also witnessed increasing nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear states. The
circumstances surrounding that proliferationprimarily its clandestine and covert nature
make it far more likely for nuclear weapons to find their way from state
proliferators into the hands of terrorist groups. The problematic issue of accounting for
and controlling Sovietera nuclear weapons and technology has been explored thoroughly by
Jessica Stern in her 1999 study of terrorism and WMD. Stern described a Soviet-era military
that was melting down, unpaid, and rife with corruption. Loss of accountability for
fissionable materials, poor controls on the technology of nuclear weapons
production, and poor supervision of Russias militarized scientific
community characterized the post-Cold War Russian nuclear sector. Lapses
may have even included loss of operational nuclear devices.46 More recent reporting
on the situation is hardly more encouraging. A survey in 2002 of 602 Russian scientists working
in the Russian WMD sector revealed that roughly 20 percent of the Russian
scientists interviewed expressed a willingness to work for nations identified as WMD
proliferators: Iran, North Korea or Syria.47 Most recently, Busch and Holmes have catalogued
the efforts of rogue states and of Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons capability from
the inadequately controlled Russian nuclear sector, and have identified the human element of
that sector as being especially vulnerable.48 When viewed in combination with the growing
influence and reach of Russian organized crime, the lack of security in the Russian weaponized
nuclear technology sector represents a significant risk of nuclear capability finding its way into
the hands of terrorist hubs. Exacerbating this risk are the efforts of non-nuclear states that
are seeking to develop a nuclear strike capability. While North Korea frequently is cited as the
best example of this sort of nuclear proliferation, in the context of terrorist access to WMD, Iran
may prove to be far more dangerous. The clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program is
reportedly well-advanced. A recent study of the Iranian nuclear program published by the U.S.
Army War College considers Iranian fielding of operational nuclear weapons to be inevitable
and estimates the time frame for such a fielding to be 12 to 48 months.49 Given Irans well-
established relationship with Hezballah in Lebanon and its increasingly problematic, even
hostile, relationship with the United States, the Iranian nuclear weapons program would seem
to offer a tempting opportunity to Al Qaeda elements seeking clandestine access to nuclear
technology. Even if the Iranian leadership does not regard sharing nuclear secrets with terrorist
groups as a wise policy, elements within the Iranian government or participants in its nuclear
weapons program may be willing to do so for their own reasons. The nature of
clandestine nuclear weapons programs makes them especially vulnerable to compromise, as the
Pakistani experience has demonstrated. The clandestine nuclear weapons program directed by
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan on behalf of the Pakistani government exemplifies the risks inherent in
such secret undertakings. As the details of Khans nuclear weapons operation have emerged, it
has become increasingly evident that he exercised little control over the elements of his network
operating outside of Pakistan. His non-Pakistani partners in acquiring nuclear technology
appear to have been motivated almost entirely by money, and Khan himself seems to have
operated with minimal oversight from the Pakistani government.50 Under such circumstances,
the risk that critical nuclear technology will be diverted to groups like Al Qaeda is particularly
high, especially when those groups have access to significant financial resources, and program
participants are able to profit from diversion with little chance of detection by either the
proliferating state or by opponents of that proliferation. While both hubs and nodes exist
in failed state terrorist networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, only the hubs present a
threat of genuinely serious proportions to U.S. interests. Escalating nuclear
proliferation offers terrorist hubs sheltering in failed states the opportunity
to translate funding into weapons access. If those hubs are successful in
maintaining even a tenuous connection through their virtual network to terrorist
nodes existing within the United States or the territory of its allies, or in other
areas of vital U.S. interest, then the risk posed by terrorist groups operating from
failed states becomes real and immediate. The recent attacks by terrorist nodes in
London, Cairo, and Madrid suggest that such is the case. Developing the nexus between nuclear
weapons acquisition, delivery to a local terrorist node, and employment in a terrorist
attack probably will require significant resources and considerable time. Evolved terrorist hubs
operating in failed states like Sierra Leone, Liberia, or Somalia may have both. Identifying those
hubs, locating their members, and entering the failed state in which they are located to
apprehend or destroy them will be a complex and difficult task.
West African terrorism targets oil pipelines shuts down the global
economy
Obi, Programme Coordinator for the Post-Conflict Transition in Africa: The State and Civil
Society at the Nordic Africa Institute, PhD in Political Science from the University of Lagos,
Visiting Fellow at St Antonys College Oxford, Associate Research Professor at the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, and Claude Ake Visiting Professor at the Department of Peace
and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, 6 (Cyril, October, Terrorism in West Africa: Real,
Emerging, or Imagined Threats? African Security Review, Vol 15 No 3)//JAG

West Africa and global energy security A critical consideration underlining counter-
terrorism measures in West Africa is the existence of substantial US and Western
oil interests and investments in the region. The region accounts for 15 per cent of
all US oil imports and it is projected that this will increase to 25 per cent by
2020.10 Leading US policymakers, energy and strategic analysts have emphasised the
centrality of oil from West and Central Africa, dubbed the New Gulf States in the media, to US
efforts to diversify oil supplies from the Middle East and secure steady supplies of oil and gas
against a background of declining domestic oil production in the US. The reasons for this lie
in the proximity of Africa to US oil markets and the fact that most of the oil Africa
produces is of the light, sweet variety, with a low sulphur content that is favoured by US
refineries. Also, more oil is being discovered and produced off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea and
Western oil companies have vast investments in the region that guarantee jobs and profits to
shareholders. With growing domestic demand in the US and dependence on imported
oil to satisfy about half of domestic demand it has become important to secure new
sources of oil from across the world. Part of the calculus is also to diversify US
dependence on oil supplies from the volatile Middle East and to pre-empt the likely
strategic implications of growing Chinese demand for oil imports from African and other
international producers.11 Another important consideration is the protection of
offshore oil installations and international sea-lanes in West Africa from the
activities of international criminal and terrorist networks. This much was confirmed
recently by Admiral Henry G Ulrich, commander of the US Naval Forces in Europe and Africa,
in response to reporters questions at a symposium in Abuja, Nigeria.12 Thus, an unfettered
access to West African oil is critical to Western energy security and global power.
Western oil interests are also locked into major oil-producing countries such as
Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and the new oil boom states Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and
So Tome and Principe. Since most of the oil being discovered is off-shore, it has the
added advantage of being beyond the reach of protesting oil communities on land
who are capable of disrupting the oil flow, as has been the case in the restive oil-rich
Niger Delta in Nigeria since the early 1990s. According to the African Oil Policy Initiative Group
(AOPIG) Report, quoting the US Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Kansteiner III: African
oil is critical to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go
forward.13 Apart from guaranteeing stable supplies of oil to the expanding oil-
guzzling US market, it gives the US the leeway to promote its values of free
markets, regional economic growth, good governance and democracy, which
would influence regional stability and peace in ways that broadly favour US
hegemonic interests and security. US oil corporations have been in the vanguard
of the new scramble for West Africas oil. They recognise the need to compete more
against their European counterparts, such as Royal Dutch Shell, Total, BP and ENI (Agip), as
well as Chinese oil companies that are aggressively seeking a foothold in the region. US oil
multinationals such as Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco have been the visible frontrunners in
the quest for new oil finds in West Africa. Gary and Karl note that: Chevron Texaco announced
in 2002 that it had invested $5 billion in the past five years in African oil and would spend $20
billion more in the next five years, and Exxon Mobil signified its intention to spend $15 billion
in Angola in the next four years, and $25 billion across Africa in the next decade.14 In
addition, both Exxon Mobil and Chevron Texaco were investing billions of dollars in Nigeria, the
fifth largest exporter of oil to the US, accounting in 2002 for 600,000 barrels per day of US oil
imports.15 Chevron Texaco was also involved in developing the oil and gas fields in Equatorial
Guinea, while Exxon Mobil had cornered the So Tome and Principe oil and gas fields. The
1,070 km Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, carrying oil from the Doba oilfields in Chad for export
through the Cameroon port of Kribi, is reportedly the largest single US private investment in
Africa by Exxon Mobil, valued at US$3.7 billion.16 Other sources, however, put the investments
by Exxon Mobil (which owns 40 per cent of the equity, followed by Petronas of Malaysia with 35
per cent and Chevron Texaco with 25 per cent) at US$2.2 billion.17 Whatever the real figures
are, it shows a pronounced US oil multinational presence in Chad. Other US oil interests
include the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP), valued at US$500 million, to
transport an estimated 120 million cubic feet per day of gas to Ghana, Benin and Togo from
Nigerias Niger Delta by 2005, over a distance of 1,033 km.18 According to the Energy
Information Association, the oil consortium that has invested in the WAGP is led by Chevron
Texaco (36.7 per cent), and includes Shell (18 per cent), the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) (25 per cent), Ghanas National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and Volta
River Authority (VRA) (16.3 per cent), Benins Socit Bninoise de Gaz SA (SoBeGaz)(2 per
cent) and Togos Socit Togolaise de Gaz SA (SoToGaz)(2 per cent). The WAGP is central to
plans for power generation and industrialisation along the West African coastal
corridor and could be extended further, possibly as far as Senegal, given the right security
and economic conditions. The US, other Western countries and China also have interests in
Senegal, Mauritania, Ghana, Cte dIvoire, Togo and Cameroon, where their oil companies are
involved in the search for oil. What flows from the foregoing is the reality that the
security stakes of the US and the West are very high in West Africa. The possibility
that terrorists can infiltrate oil-rich but unstable or weak states impels the urge to
intervene to promote US security interests in the region. The US Navy has established
a presence in the Gulf of Guinea, largely to protect international sea-lanes for transporting oil
and gas, and keep a watchful eye on oil interests along the coast, particularly in the Niger Delta
where ethnic minority militants have periodically attacked oil company installations and
workers and disrupted the flow of oil.
Economic decline causes nuclear war
Harris and Burrows, 2009 counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the
principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit
Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis, Washington Quarterly,
http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics
and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and
interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample
opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so,
history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great
Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the
harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in
1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations
in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as
much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for
greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile
economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those
risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain
priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will
decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.
For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and
scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their
reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long
established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and
training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections
of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of
economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most
dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military
presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of
nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states
in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire
additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear
that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of
the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low
intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an
unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are
not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with
underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also
will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending
nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning
and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus
on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types
of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could
reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-
mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries
to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this
could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy
resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of
their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications.
Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval
capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most
obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to
increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create
opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also
becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources
is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog
world.

Drug trafficking from Latin America Causes a Laundry List of
Problems in West Africa
Kofi Annan Foundation et al. 12 (This card was cut from a summary of proceedings
from an expert meeting including several government agencies from around the world)
Kofiannanfoundation.org
http://kofiannanfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Final%20Report%20of%20WADW%208%2
0Juin%202012.pdf

In less than one and a half decades West Africa has become a major transit and
repackaging hub for cocaine and heroine flowing from the Latin American and
Asian producing areas to European markets.2 While organized crime and drug
trafficking already existed in the region, the phenomenon rapidly expanded in the
mid-2000s as a result of a strategic shift of Latin American drug syndicates
towards the rapidly growing European market in part due to the operational
successes of U.S. law enforcement agencies in mitigating the flow of drugs into
the United States.3 West Africa presented an ideal choice as a logistical transit
center: its geography makes detection difficult and facilitates transit; the region
boasts well-established networks of West African smugglers and crime syndicates;
and a vulnerable political environment. The latter has its roots in the regions
colonial history and includes endemic poverty as well as a combination of weak
institutions and systems, instability, and ill-equipped and corruptible political
party representatives, law enforcement and intelligence officers, and judicial
authorities. In some countries, the legacy of civil wars led to diminished human capital,
social infrastructure and productive national development assets. They also gave way to a rise
in the number of armed groups operating in the region and the circulation of small arms and
light weapons (SALW). Many of these challenges are slowly being overcome, with countries
across the region enjoying transitions to, and consolidation of democratic rule in addition to
positive economic growth. Yet, at the same time, new threats have emerged,
compounding existing political and security challenges in West Africa. These
threats include drug trafficking, and increasingly, drug consumption, broader
organized criminal activity such as human trafficking, illicit logging, illicit capture
of resources, piracy, money laundering, and terrorism. Combined with intense
urbanization and youth unemployment, these threats and challenges are having a
corrosive effect on democratic institutions and processes, security and economic
development across the region and driving violence and reemergence of conflict.
Conversely, research shows that the evidentiary base underpinning perceptions of challenges
remains weak, as do mechanisms to assess and respond to vulnerabilities, threats and
challenges that enable organized crime and drug trafficking. Indeed, despite several positive
developments, there is still limited evidence of effective, strategic responses to the multi-faceted
challenges posed by organized crime and drug trafficking in the region. While declarations and
action plans from within and beyond the region abound, many continue to lament the absence
of a comprehensive strategic framework that goes beyond mere technical assistance to more
effectively encompass the underlying global, regional and national political economy factors
that enable organized crime and drug trafficking in the region. Operational level strategies are
also said to be weak, not least because they are developed on the basis of weak and siloed
analysis. Existing strategies tend to omit the importance of ensuring that security centered
efforts are accompanied by efforts aimed at strengthening political institutions and processes,
justice and health institutions, and responding to widespread youth unemployment. Even less
focus and investment is being placed on developing the capacity of civil society and academia to
monitor and analyze trends and effects of organized crime and trafficking across the region.
Meanwhile, the private sector remains largely removed from current debates on the issues.
Huge amounts of money are flowing through West Africa in the form
of Narcotics
Shehu 09 Director General of GIABA in West Africa. giaba.org
<http://www.giaba.org/media/f/231_09-8-4-
EFFECTS_OF_DRUG_TRAFFICKING_FOR__PARLIAMENTARIANS,_09-comrs.pdf>.

Let me be clear: we are talking of major cash transactions here, huge amounts of
money! A few years ago, it was estimated that the worldwide illegal trades were
worth some 800 billion dollars a year! Of that amount, illegal drugs accounted for
around 250 billion, of which only some 5 to 7% transited this region. Today, that
global amount is probably over one trillion dollars a year and the West African
portion, even at a slightly increased rate of 10 to 12%, still amounts to between $30
and 40 billion a year in trade. These are huge amounts for such vulnerable and
inadequately prepared societies to deal with and to manage. 9. The trafficking
routes through West Africa are well known by now. The goal is to reach European
shores as quickly and efficiently as possible which means Iberia, Italy, the Balkans and
the Mediterranean coast. However, direct flights and container shipments to
major ports of entry make the control of traffickers much more complex. The
methods are also very well known: mules, shipping 78 containers, mixed in with
petroleum products (like plastics), hidden in live animals, flown in small aircraft,
to name but a few. Furthermore, the disruption caused by the numerous natural
disasters over the past few years has also facilitated the traffickers job, since law
enforcement has been otherwise occupied. All West African countries are
increasingly being used as transit routes, particularly those closest to the goal,
those most defenceless security-wise and those most unstable internally.
African poverty and limited exports cause civil wars that escalate
outside the continent
Bone Assoc. Editor The Age 3 (Pamela-, , July 12, At last, America discovers Africa,
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/11/ 1057783349674.html)//JAG

Africa's wars are often dismissed as "ethnic" conflicts. But a recent World Bank
study of 52 major civil wars found most were caused not by ethnic tensions but by
entrenched poverty and heavy dependence on natural resource exports. The report
concluded that because the effects of these wars often spill over into neighbouring
countries - and even to faraway rich countries - the international community has
"compelling" reasons to try to prevent them, even apart from the humanitarian reasons.
State failure leads to proliferation, terrorism, and rogue nations
culminating in nuclear war
The African Studies Centre et al 3 (The Transnational Institute, The Center of
Social Studies, Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center CIP-FUHEM, Failed and
Collapsed States in the International System, December, found at:
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2003/12failedcollapsedstates.pdf)//JAG

In the malign scenario of global developments the number of collapsed states would
grow significantly. This would mean that several more countries in the world
could not be held to account for respecting international agreements in various
fields, be it commercial transactions, debt repayment, the possession and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the use of the national territory for criminal or terrorist
activities. The increase in failed states would immediately lead to an increase in
international migration, which could have a knock-on effect, first in neighbouring
countries which, having similar politico-economic structures, could suffer
increased destabilization and collapse as well. Developments in West Africa during the
last decade may serve as an example. Increased international migration would, secondly,
have serious implications for the Western world. In Europe it would put social
relations between the population and immigrant communities under further
pressure, polarizing politics. An increase in collapsed states would also endanger
the security of Western states and societies. Health conditions could deteriorate as
contagious diseases like Ebola or Sars would spread because of a lack of measures
taken in collapsed areas. Weapons of mass destruction could come into the hands
of various sorts of political entities, be they terrorist groups, political factions in
control of part of a collapsed state or an aggressive political elite still in control of
a national territory and intent on expansion. Not only North Korea springs to mind;
one could very well imagine such states in (North) Africa. Since the multilateral system of
control of such weapons would have ended in part because of the decision of the
United States to try and check their spread through unilateral action - a system that
would inherently be more unstable than a multilateral, negotiated regime - one could be
faced with an arms race that would sooner or later result in the actual use of these
weapons. In the malign scenario, relations between the US and Europe would also
further deteriorate, in questions of a military nature as well as trade relations,
thus undercutting any possible consensus on stemming the growth of collapsed
states and the introduction of stable multilateral regimes towards matters like
terrorism, nuclear weapons and international migration. Disagreement is already
rife on a host of issues in these fields. At worst, even the Western members of the
Westphalian system - especially those bordering on countries in the former Third World, i.e.
the European states - could be faced with direct attacks on their national security.
Poverty in West Africa causes desertification
Tran, Voice of America News, 6 (Phuong, December 27, Experts ask What now? for
desertification US Fed News, lexis)//JAG

Only days away from the end of the United Nations' Year of Deserts and Desertification, four
experts discuss the challenges of translating a decade's worth of research about
the degradation of land in arid areas of the world. Phuong Tran reports from VOA's Dakar
bureau, located in the arid Saharan region of West Africa. In the decade since the United
Nations adopted the convention against desertification, people understand more about the
scope of the problem and what needs to be done. What is unclear is how this will all be put into
action in the future. David Mouat, the chair of a U.N. group of 25 experts who came together in
2002 to study desertification, said, "The danger of this is that it raises attention, but then we
might feel that we have had all these meetings, that we have addressed this issue and can move
on to something else and the problem will go away." Most recently, Mouat and his colleagues
met in Algeria last week to review the challenges ahead. One of the main challenges is
coordinating the different organizations involved in the issue. Pam Chasek, an editor for the
Canadian non-profit International Institute for Sustainable Development, said, "The
desertification convention has been hampered by the fact that you have got various different
ministries responsible for different issues that all affect desertification." "It is hard to break
down those barriers between them, to realize that gosh, if you address some of these
environmental issues, it will have an impact on development and vice versa," she added.
Desertification affects almost half of the earth's surface, home to more than a billion
people, says Rattan Lal, a professor of soil science at Ohio State University in the United States.
He estimates that about six million hectares of land each year is lost to desertification.
He points out that the problem is not only environmental. "The desert-land
degradation issue is a human issue. It is poverty driven. My general feeling is that
when pepole are poor, hungry and miserable, they pass their suffering on to the
land," he said. "It is the desperate people who drive the process of land degradation
and desertification." There are several factors that contribute to desertification: Harsh dry
climates, for example, can ruin soil. Harmful farming and grazing practices can also deplete the
soil's nutrients. Inappropriate irrigation and overgrazing of animals also contribute by
decreasing food production. He says that this problem is most serious in arid regions
that also have a level of political and economic instability. "West Africa is really a
tragedy. It is a tragedy of poverty. It is a tragedy of harsh climate, of poor soil," he
said. "And above all, resource poor farmers who cannot invest and then the political
instability component. When there is political instability, then the support that
farmers need does not exist." The U.N.'s Mouat says fast action is needed. "The race to
affect the future is the race to make decisions when there is still an opportunity," he said. "We
can project changes in landscape and develop very clear, relatively simple models
that show that the trajectory of degradation will have such and such consequences."
"As we wait to make decisions along this trajectory, our opportunities to make a positive
impact will become less and less," he continued. Wafa Essahili is a director of rural
development at the Libyan-based non-profit Community of Saharan and Sahelian
Countries, which represents 21 African countries. She says the link between
desertification and poverty cannot be ignored. "The convention's recommendations
need to be placed at the heart of countries' development plans and poverty reduction strategies,"
she said. "The fight against desertification cannot take place apart from economic
development." She says farmers can play a key role, if they are provided the tools. "If we want
this evidently poor population to decrease their pressure on the natural resources, we have to
create alternative revenue generating activities. It is certain that they are not destroying the land
because they want to, but rather because they have no other means," she said. One idea
circulating in the anti-desertification community is carbon credits. Ohio University's Rattan Lal
believes that everyone will benefit from this plan. "To break this vicious cycle, we have to
replace the destroyed soil and ecosystem by encouraging farmers to adopt recommended
agricultural policies," he said. "If the farmers can restore the carbon soil, the world community
pays these farmers for carbon credits, which will offset fossil fuel emission, which mitigates
climate change. It is a win-win-win situation," he added. Experts estimate that more than 100
million people are at risk of becoming what they call environmental refugees, or
people who are forced to move in search of land that can sustain and feed them.
Desertification undermines agriculture causing food insecurity and
causes conflict. Hundreds of thousands die
Koohafkan, Senior Officer of Environment & Sustainable Development at the Environment
& Natural Resources Service, 96 (AP, Desertification, drought and their consequences, May,
http://www.fao.org/sd/EPdirect/EPan0005.htm)//JAG

By impoverishing the natural potential of the ecosystems, desertification also
reduces agricultural yields, making them more unpredictable. It therefore affects the
food security of the people living in the affected areas. The people develop a survival strategy
in order to attend to their most urgent requirements, and this in turn helps to aggravate
desertification and hold up development. The most immediate and frequent consequence
of these survival attitudes is the increased over-exploitation of accessible natural
resources. This strategy is often accompanied by a breakdown in solidarity within the
community and within households, and encourages individualism and exclusion. It leads to
conflict between different ethnic groups, families and individuals. Lastly,
desertification considerably heightens the effects of climatic crises (droughts) and
political crises (wars), generally leading to migration, causing suffering and even
death to hundreds of thousands of people worldwide. These consequences, in turn,
weaken the economies of the developing countries affected by desertification, particularly when
they have no other resources than their agriculture. This is particularly true in the African
countries in the dry zones: their economy is unable to offset the increasingly serious
effects of desertification, and they have to deal with emergency situations created by
drought and desertification despite the increasing debt burden that is reducing their possibility
of making productive investment in order to break the spiral of underdevelopment.
Solving poverty in West Africa is the key catalyst for democracy and
myriad scenarios for continental instability
States News Service, 6 (December 8, Remarks To Conference On Elections And
Democratization In West Africa lexis)//JAG

The following information was released by the U.S. Department of State: LINDA THOMAS-
GREENFIELD: Good Morning. I'd like to thank Ambassador Walker and the National
Intelligence Council for asking me to speak today on elections and democratization in West
Africa, a topic which I believe is of exceptional importance to our global agenda. West
Africa is a fascinating place where Islam and Christianity come face to face, where
the West has historical influence, but where the dominant culture is decidedly
non-Western. It was not too long ago that it was fashionable among certain political
science scholars to posit that democracy could only survive in relatively wealthy countries with
a history of Western values. The extension of that theory was that the United States was
misguided in its efforts to promote democracy in the developing world, and that
such efforts were doomed to failure. In particular, many have questioned whether democracy
can thrive in Islamic countries, or poor countries, or any country whose philosophy did not
descend from the Greeks. The recent experience of West Africa has revealed that
theory to be seriously flawed. Democracy has taken hold and begun to thrive in the
region, showing that the fundamental human right of a people to choose its own government
has near universal appeal. For example, the country rated last on the U.N.'s Human
Development Index, Niger, is a young democracy. In fact, most of the countries of West Africa
have democratically elected governments now, and those that do not are increasingly becoming
the exception, not the rule. While democracy is young and fragile in many of these countries, it
is showing surprising strength and resilience in places like Senegal, Ghana, Benin and Mali.
Even strife-torn nations like Sierra Leone and Liberia are turning to democracy to heal the
wounds from their long conflicts. In Mauritania this spring, it appears that another nation
stands ready to join the community of democracies. Many of these nations are predominantly
Islamic, offering living proof that Islam and democracy can coexist. These Islamic democracies
offer a strong example for the rest of the Islamic world and their very existence is a defense
against radical Islamists who denounce democracy as un-Islamic and a product of the decadent
West. That is not to say that democracy is secure in West Africa or that democracy
alone will solve all of the problems of the region. Democracy is a never-ending process,
rather than a single event. After more than 200 years, we are still tinkering with our democracy,
seeking ways to improve it and adapt it to changing conditions. Free and fair elections are an
important component of a successful democracy, but there are many other components. The
challenge facing most of the young democracies of West Africa is the development of these other
components, the democratic institutions that deepen and widen democracy, giving it the
strength to withstand inevitable challenges. The nations of the region need to take action to
strengthen their judicial systems and improve respect for the rule of law. They need to address
persistent official corruption in many cases, and assure not only democratic governance, but
also good governance. They need to decentralize power and enhance the role of local
governments, moving power over many of the decisions that affect people's lives closer to the
people themselves. They need to develop a press corps that is both free and responsible,
providing perhaps the single greatest defense against tyranny and oppression. And they need to
develop civil society to provide non-governmental actors in everyday political life that will act to
defend the interests of the people. Democracy in West Africa will continue to face significant
challenges, of course. The fear of military coups and authoritarian governments is ever present,
and the solution can only be found in the thorough professionalization and depoliticization of
the region's militaries. Ethnic and religious strife threaten some nations, and governments need
to be seen as representative of all their people, not just the factions currently in power. External
actors such as international terrorist groups or extremists of various stripes threaten stability in
many places, and their influence needs to be countered. Perhaps the single most significant
challenge democracy faces in West Africa, however, is development. Throughout the
world, governments are expected to meet the legitimate needs of their people, not
just for freedom, but also for prosperity -- the ability to not just make ends meet, but to
have the opportunity to advance through their own efforts. It is by how well they
accomplish this difficult task that the young democracies of the region will be
judged by their own people. At times, we may have been guilty of overselling the benefits of
democracy and free market reforms, so that some came to view them as a cure-all for whatever
ailed a country. Some seemed to think that development would automatically follow from
elections and democracy, looking at the American and European experience, in which political
and economic freedoms created a powerful profit incentive that drove rapid development, and
still does drive an impressively resilient economic engine. However, hard experience has shown
that democracy may be necessary for long-term economic growth and prosperity, but it is not
sufficient. For example, there has been a backlash in some parts of Latin America against
democratically elected governments and free market economic reforms, because they did not
produce significant and broad-based prosperity immediately. Polls now show that many people
would sacrifice their political freedoms in favor of an authoritarian government, if they thought
it would lead to more economic security. If the young democracies of West Africa cannot
find a way to spur development, they could experience a similar backlash. Therefore,
it is strongly in the interest of the United States government and other Western
governments to help the young democracies of West Africa prosper economically.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was created with just that purpose in mind, on a
global scale, and roughly half of the compacts signed thus far have been with West African
democracies, including some of the largest ones. Other nations are coming closer to qualifying.
We must also not neglect our traditional assistance programs, which, though smaller than MCC
compacts, enable us to address specific areas of great need such as mother and child health,
education, infectious diseases and hunger. Attention to these issues is a necessary prerequisite
for economic development, for a healthy and educated workforce is necessary for long-term
economic prosperity and for the growth of democratic institutions. We also need to work with
our regional partners to promote peace and stability in the region, for nothing endangers both
political freedoms and economic prosperity as much as war and civil strife. The international
community needs to continue using its influence to help resolve remaining areas of instability
like Cote d'Ivoire. Stability is an absolute prerequisite for both economic prosperity and healthy
democracy, while conflict spreads famine, disease and economic disaster in its wake as surely as
day follows night. 2007 will be an important year for the spread of democracy in West Africa. At
one end of West Africa, the most populous nation in Africa, Nigeria, will be holding
historic presidential elections that will lead to an unprecedented transfer of power
from one civilian administration to another. At the other end, in Mauritania, a
nation with one foot in the African Union and the other in the Arab League, stands
poised to enter the community of democracies after many years of military coups
and authoritarian rule. Both of these elections are highly significant for the United States.
Both are oil producing nations with significant Muslim populations, and both face
threats such as ethnic strife, corruption, hunger and disease. Our stake lies not
just in the successful execution of the elections themselves, but in the successful
development of democratic institutions in Nigeria and Mauritania, and in all the
countries in between. In the coming year and in the foreseeable future, our task will be to
support not just these vital elections, important as they may be, but also to support the
growth of democratic institutions, to promote economic prosperity, and to
reinforce peace and stability through judicious use of our diplomatic leverage and
assistance programs. It is a formidable task, and one that we cannot hope to succeed in
without the active engagement of the rest of the donor community. Even more important,
however, for democracy to succeed and economies to grow, the governments and peoples of the
region must work steadfastly toward those goals. In the end we can only assist. Political
freedoms and economic prosperity can never be given as an external gift, they must be seized by
the people themselves and never relinquished.

Europe Module
Al Qaeda handling of Venezuelan drug cargo makes EU terror easy
James 9 Reporter for Associated Press (Ian, U.S. report charges drug flow rising in
Venezuela, Associate Press, 7/20/2009, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2009/jul/20/lt-
venezuela-us-drugs-072009/all/?print)//BZ

According to one U.S. State Department document issued in 2008, David Luna, the Director for
Anticrime Programs of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, predicted that drug traffic to the United States and Europe would continue
to grow, using established routes through Venezuela and West Africa to arrive in
Europe. Furthermore, in early 2008, an official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
wrote a report warning of a growing fleet of rogue jet aircraft that was regularly crisscrossing the
Atlantic Ocean. He surmised that the planes departed from the cocaine-producing areas in
the Andes (largely controlled by the FARC) and were being flown to West Africa, where their
cargo was handled by groups aligned with Al Qaeda. On the incoming end of the drug
shipments, Interpol, the world's largest international police organization, maintains that it has
received a number of local reports about illicit flights from South America to Guinea- Bissau.
Due to a lack of resources, however, Interpol has not yet been able to seize any of the aircraft
allegedly involved to confirm the validity of these claims. Finally, these possible alliances touch
upon long-existing concerns over alleged illicit activities that are occurring in the tri-border
region in South America. The key aspect is the effectiveness of the local border control, which is
severely limited due to surveillance difficulties and lack of communication and communications
infrastructure between reporting posts. Of special concern is the porous nature of the borders,
and the characteristically lax controls in place. The ease of border penetration for the
immigrants who supposedly participate in such terrorist organizations poses and
additional problem. Many of these individuals have passports from South
American countries (as the last big wave of Arab immigration took place in 1985), speak
Spanish, and purportedly may appear Hispanic, making their detection a laborious and
disputative process.
Europes economy is on the brink Eurozone crisis has made it
fragile
Reguly 5/15 European business correspondent and columnist for The Globe and Mail
(Eric, Pain Spreads to the Heart of Europe, The Globe and Mail, 5/15/13,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/european-
business/pain-spreads-to-the-heart-of-europe/article11935205/)//BZ

Europes powerhouse economies are faltering, erasing the dividing line between north
and south and raising troubling questions about the outlook for the troubled region.
The euro zone remained stuck in recession in the first quarter of the year, according
to figures released Wednesday that showed the economy of the 17-country monetary union
contracted by 0.2 per cent from the previous quarter. The contraction marked the sixth in a row
for the euro zone. But for a change, the wealthy countries of the north shared the pain with their
poorer neighbours. France slipped back into recession, and Germanys growth was so anemic
that it is in danger of a double-dip slump. The two are Europes biggest economies, and their
enduring health was supposed to keep the euro zone, and the wider 27-member European
Union, from a protracted slowdown. Now, Europe cannot count on France and Germany
for relief, at least in the short term, a troubling development given the severe recessions in
some of the weaker nations and high unemployment, currently running at 12.1 per cent in the
euro zone and as high as about 27 per cent in the crippled economies of Greece and Spain.
That means a new terrorist attack causes complete collapse
COT 8 COT institute for safety and crisis management INI, financed by the European
Commission (COT, The negative economic impact of terrorism and means of consequence
minimization, Transitional Terrorism, Security, & the Rule of Law, 9/3/2008,
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP5%20Del%209.pdf)//BZ

Although economic loss can be the result of the consequences of concrete significant
attacks of the mere threat of terrorism. The scope of this study is limited to economic
consequences caused by terrorist attacks. However, unanswered is the question: what is
terrorism exactly? The definition of terrorism is one of the most contested concepts. For the
purpose of this study the relevance of this discussion is limited. The definition used may
influence the total numbers of attacks. However, measuring the vulnerability of macroeconomic
and sectorial economic structures largely depends on the possibility of future attacks and, thus,
depends on scenario thinking (See e.g. Hellstrm, 2007: 416). Nonetheless, it is important to
state that this study is not only based on, for instance, religion-related terrorism, but includes all
forms of terrorist behavior that may negatively affect the European economy. The
European definition of terrorism is in this regard the most appropriate and describes terrorist
acts as intentional acts.
European economic decline leads to power vacuums and global
instability
Kappel 11 President of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Robert, The
Decline of Europe and the US: Shifts in the World Economy and in Global Politics, GIGA,
2011, http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1101.pdf)//BZ

The world is facing a dangerous power vacuum which may last for decades. This
vacuum is developing because Europe and the US are currently in a phase of relative decline
while China, India and Brazil are claiming international standing without being able to fill this
role. Analysis A close look reveals several significant changes in global politics and the
world economy: China, India and Brazil are becoming global actors and are
gaining relative strength. Together with other regional powers (e.g. Turkey, South Africa,
Indonesia), they are influencing global energy, climate, security, trade, currency, and
development policies. At the same time, however, the aforementioned nations are too weak
because they despite strong economic growth are unable to eradicate poverty in
their own countries, and an extremely imbalanced distribution of income and
wealth prevails, resulting in massive social problems. The weak infrastructure,
technological under development, and low levels of education of the majority of the population
are characteristic of their economic and social situations. Their ability to effectively lead on
a global level is limited as they do not yet provide enough global public goods (security,
monetary arrangements, development aid). Furthermore, they are often not recognised as
leading powers in their own regions. Their alliances, such as IBSA (India, Brazil, South
Africa), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, soon South Africa as full member) and BRICSAM
(BRICS plus Mexico), show a low degree of institutionalisation and a large gap between rhetoric
and reality. Additionally, the new regional powers disagree on many issues and thus do
not constitute a counterpole to the West. There is a growing normative disconnect
between the regional powers, Europe and the US.
Terrorists are likely to target France
Ridel, Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 7 (Bruce,
June 14, Al Qaeda Targets France Los Angeles Times,
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0614france_riedel.aspx)//JAG

June 14, 2007 France's recently elected President Nicolas Sarkozy faces a new challenge
to the security of his nation from some old foes: Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda
movement. One of Al Qaeda's top priorities in the last year has been to create a franchise in
Algeria to serve as a node for jihad in North Africa and throughout the Maghrebi diaspora in
Western Europe. Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, negotiated with the
Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat for two years or more on the terms
and conditions for having the group join the movement. Late last year, Bin Laden ordered
that the group be renamed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and it began
conducting attacks in that name soon thereafter, starting with a series of strikes at
police stations and Western oil targets. On April 12, the new group carried out multiple
suicide car bombings, previously unknown in Algeria, targeting the prime minister's offices and
police headquarters in Algiers, killing almost three dozen people. A truck bomb was apparently
defused. But Zawahiri has made clear that it is France that's the major target. In
announcing Al Qaeda's new Maghrebi franchise on Sept. 11, 2006, Zawahiri declared that it
would be "a source of chagrin, frustration and sadness for the apostates [of the
regime in Algeria], the treacherous sons of France," and he urged the group to
become "a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders." French
intelligence officials anticipate attacks on French targets in North Africa and
probably in France itself sooner or later. Indeed, jihadist websites in Europe have
predicted an attack on French interests since Sarkozy's victory. Threats against France are
not new for the old Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. According to media
reports, in February 2005, for example, the French domestic intelligence agency
estimated that the group had about 5,000 sympathizers and militants in France,
centered on 500 hard-core individuals. Many in France's Algerian community are already angry
at Sarkozy for his tough words during the 2005 riots in their urban ghettos, and he is considered
to be much more sympathetic to Israel than his predecessor. Zawahiri's warning should be
taken very seriously in Europe and by the United States. Al Qaeda has struck in London,
Istanbul and Madrid. There have been past reports of plans by Algerian terrorist
groups to attack American and Israeli targets in France and Belgium, as well as
NATO or European Union installations. Finally, one should recall that the first-ever plan
to fly a hijacked airliner into a target on the ground was a thwarted 1994 plot by
Algerian jihadists to crash an Air France jet into the Eiffel Tower, which the 9/11
commission rightly said may have been the model for the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
France will retaliate with nuclear weapons
Moore, Washington Post Foreign Service, 6 (Molly, January 20, Chirac: Nuclear Response
to Terrorism is Possible http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/19/AR2006011903311.html)//JAG

PARIS, Jan. 19 -- President Jacques Chirac said Thursday that France was prepared to
launch a nuclear strike against any country that sponsors a terrorist attack against
French interests. He said his country's nuclear arsenal had been reconfigured to
include the ability to make a tactical strike in retaliation for terrorism. "The
leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who
would envision using . . . weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they
would lay themselves open to a firm and fitting response on our part," Chirac said
during a visit to a nuclear submarine base in Brittany. "This response could be a
conventional one. It could also be of a different kind." The French president said his
country had reduced the number of nuclear warheads on some missiles deployed on France's
four nuclear submarines in order to target specific points rather than risk wide-scale
destruction. "Against a regional power, our choice is not between inaction and
destruction," Chirac said, according to the text of his speech posted on the presidential Web
site. "The flexibility and reaction of our strategic forces allow us to respond directly
against the centers of power. . . . All of our nuclear forces have been configured in
this spirit."
Venezuelan cocaine also goes to Europe
GAO, 9 (Government Accountability Office, July, DRUG CONTROL U.S. Counternarcotics
Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/292722.pdf) //JAG

While the final destination of the cocaine transiting Venezuela is primarily the United States,
U.S. and foreign government officials confirmed an increase in cocaine flowing
directly toward Europe and to West Africa en route to Europe. Cocaine destined for the
United States from Venezuela transits through Central America, Mexico, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti, and other Caribbean islands.13 See figure 3 for a depiction of the primary routes
drug traffickers take when departing Venezuela. The European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction reports that the Iberian Peninsula, primarily Spain, is
considered the main entry point for cocaine entering Europe. In 2006, Spanish
authorities seized about 50 metric tons of cocaine, much of it at sea, representing about 41
percent of the total quantity seized in Europe.14 According to UNODC, for 2006 and 2007,
much of the cocaine interdicted in Europe could be traced back to Venezuela.15
Spanish officials confirmed that the amount of cocaine flowing to Europe from
Venezuela has increased. They cited a recent seizure of five metric tons of cocaine aboard a
Venezuelan-flagged fishing vessel off the coast of Spain. U.S. and European government
officials also reported an increase over the past few years of cocaine flowing to
West Africa en route to Europe. Prior to 2005, the total amount of cocaine seized in Africa
was about one metric ton. According to the United Nations International Narcotics Control
Board, between 2005 and 2007, at least 33 metric tons of cocaine was seized in West Africa.16


Trade Adv

Port Security Inefficiencies Hurting Trade
Delays caused by a lack of security efficiency at ports are hampering
trade
The Economist 12 (Cancelling Christmas, Dec 1, 2012, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21567381-inefficiency-promoting-autarky-
perhaps-design-cancelling-christmas, Daehyun)

THOSE who claim to deplore the commercialisation of Christmas should move to Venezuela.
Seasonal products, from Christmas trees to toys, trinkets and delicacies, are piled up in the
countrys ports, thanks to inefficient, congested wharves and a dramatic increase in
imports. Retailers have no idea when they will take delivery of their goods.
Importers and customs agents complain that a government emergency plan has so
far failed to ease the delays much. Nearly four years ago Hugo Chvez, Venezuelas leftist
president, took over control of the ports from regional governments. Private handling
companies were nationalised, so far without compensation. The ports are now jointly run
by a state company, Bolipuertos (with a 51% stake), and an outfit called Asport, owned by the
Cuban government, a close ally of Mr Chavez. Curiously, Cubahardly the Singapore of the
Americasis also paid to advise Venezuela on port operations. At the time of the government
takeover, Venezuelas economy was entering a two-year recession, which cut the flow of imports.
But this year saw a binge in public spending ahead of an election in October in which Mr Chvez
won another six-year term. In the first nine months of the year, imports totalled more than
$40 billion, up from $27.4 billion in the same period of 2010. Most come as bulk
cargoes and containers that arrive by sea. Business people say that port infrastructure
has deteriorated since the nationalisation, thanks to poor maintenance and
inexperienced management, adding to the time that ships must wait offshore. Last
week ten ships were anchored off La Guaira and 18 off the countrys main port, Puerto Cabello.
Since then, the Bolipuertos web page that gives such figures has been off-line for maintenance.
To add to the problem, La Guaira is operating at only two-thirds of its normal capacity
while the port builds a new container terminal, intended to handle trade with Mercosur, the
trade bloc which Venezuela recently joined. Red tape has proliferated. In addition to
customs and sanitary inspections, cargoes must be separately checked for
adherence to foreign-exchange and other controls and examined for drugs by the
national guard. It can be weeks before a container is released. In all, goods can
take longer to get from the port of La Guaira to Caracas, 25 kilometres (16 miles)
away, than from China. The import boom is partly a result of a big overvaluation of the
currency, the bolvar. At 4.3 bolvares to the American dollar, the official exchange rate is now
just a quarter of the free-market equivalent (whose very mention is illegal). Mr Chvez uses a
large chunk of Venezuelas oil revenues to import food at the official rate, in a bid to keep
inflation down. Jorge Giordani, the monkish planning and finance minister, is both the architect
of this policy and a critic of it. He recently complained to the National Assembly that Venezuela
imports junk food, and that is associated with the [oil-] rent culture. The solutions, he argued,
are to restrict imports to essential materials and goods, such as machinery, and changing our
eating habits. He has made it hard for the private sector to obtain dollars anywhere but on the
black market. Christmas containers packed with Italian panettone and fir trees from Canada
may not just be late: they may not arrive at all.


Solvency/Say Yes

US key
US coordination is key to enforce ISPS and it doesnt hurt trade
Caribbean proves
GAO 7 Government Accountability Office (Information on Port Security in the Caribbean
Basin, Jun 29, 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07804r.pdf, Daehyun)

Several U.S. agencies reported being involved in activities in the Caribbean Basin that could help
enhance port security in the region. Through its embassies, the Department of State
serves as the lead coordinator of the activities of other U.S. federal agencies in the
Caribbean nations. The State Department has also been involved through the
Organization of American States to coordinate and fund projects to improve
maritime security. The Coast Guard is involved in the region through its
International Port Security Program to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism
measures in place in other countries. The Coast Guard monitors the
implementation of ISPS Code requirements in these countries and provides them
with best practices to help them improve port security. The Coast Guard also has a Port
State Control (PSC) program in which officials board and inspect foreign vessels arriving at U.S.
ports to ensure that the vessels are complying with security standards. To address a potential
mass migration event from a Caribbean nation such as Haiti or Cuba, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has developed a plan that involves dozens of federal, state, and local
agencies. Customs and Border Protection, another DHS component, has provided training
assistance to a number of Caribbean nations and is also operating its Container Security
Initiative in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Jamaica. Under this
initiative, Customs and Border Protection staff are placed at foreign seaports to screen
containers for weapons of mass destruction. Related to the security of containers in the ports,
the Department of Energy (DOE) also has efforts under way in the Caribbean Basin related to its
Megaports Initiative, which provides equipment to scan containers for nuclear and radiological
materials. This initiative is currently operational in the Bahamas and is expected to eventually
operate in other countries as well. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), already active throughout the Caribbean because of its role in
administering assistance programs, also has directly contributed funds toward a
project to help Haiti comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code. The
Department of Defense (DOD), through its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is active in the
Caribbean through its Enduring Friendship program, which seeks to achieve regional security
cooperation and build maritime security capabilities. Finally, there are several interagency
efforts under way in the region to help secure cargo and counter illicit trafficking, migration, and
narcoterrorism operations. For example, one effort involves coordinating the efforts of Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S.
Attorneys Office to target illegal migration and narcotrafficking near Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. Although the potential economic impact of port security (or lack thereof) in the
Caribbean Basin is difficult to determine, our review of analyses performed by a government
agency and nongovernmental researchers identified a number of factors that could influence the
economic impact of port security and a terrorist attack in the maritime domain. These factors
include (1) the target of the attack, (2) the tactics employed and objectives of the attack, (3) the
amount of destruction caused by the attack, and (4) the ability to recover from the disruption or
loss of facilities resulting from the attack. As part of an effective risk management approacha
framework that can aid in determining which vulnerabilities should be addressed
in ways within available resourcesgovernment officials and port stakeholders
must determine which security measures to implement by considering their
benefits and costs with these factors in mind. To address the risk posed by vessels
seeking entry into the United States from foreign ports that do not maintain effective
antiterrorism measures as determined through the country visits completed under the
International Port Security Program, the U.S. Coast Guard is authorized to take certain
actions such as boarding vessels or conducting inspections of vessels. These actions
can result, for example, in costs to shippers and others because of time lost while the vessel is
boarded or being inspected. From July 10, 2006, when the Coast Guard began data
measurements of its activities with these vessels, to April 2007, only two vessels have been
subjected to a boarding offshore by Coast Guard officials prior to gaining entry to a U.S. port
solely because they arrived from a Caribbean Basin port facility deemed by the Coast Guard as
not maintaining effective antiterrorism measures. To determine the potential costs of
such boardings, we talked with a variety of maritime stakeholders in the region,
such as facility operators and a shipping association, who indicated that such
boardings have not been a significant source of delay or financial loss for their
businesses. Thus the economic impact on the maritime industryof actions taken
to date by the Coast Guard in response to security problems at Caribbean Ports
appears to be insignificant.

The US is key leverage and empirics
Cox 13 United States Coast Guard International Port Security Program; LL.M - Admiralty,
Tulane University School of Law; J.D., Loyola University New Orleans School of Law; M.A.,
University of South Florida; B.A., University of South Florida(Stephen, THE ADVENT AND
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL PORT SECURITY LAW, Mar 27, 2013,
http://www.nslj.org/pdfs/NSLJ_Vol1_Iss1_Spring2013_Cox_77-123.pdf, Daehyun)

Whether implemented by international agreement or through
unilateral assertion of legislative jurisdiction, the efficacy of port security
standards abroad ultimately rests on the enforcing nations power to
punish non-compliance, typically through the influence or manipulation
of market forces. In fact, the U.N.s IMO takes the general position that
while it has no direct power to enforce the ISPS Code, it anticipates that
market forces and economic factors will either drive compliance or
quickly force non-cooperative shippers and facilities out of the market.99
In U.S. ports, conditions of entry designed to safeguard against terrorist
attacks also tend to subject non-compliant vessels to increased scrutiny,
delay, and additional costs.100 PSAs serve to deter passenger traffic to
non-compliant countries. 101 Given the commercial strength of the
United States, the issuance of conditions of entry and public security
warnings ultimately has the potential to affect shipping rates, increase
insurance premiums, deter tourism, and cause the diversion of cargo to more
security-conscious countries. In theory, the threat of such business
losses should be incentive to promote port security measures sufficient to
the higher standards of more security-conscious nations. The willingness
of most maritime states to cooperate with the U.S. Coast Guard in
ensuring the efficacy of those measures seems to bear out this theory.102




Say Yes --- Economic / Trade Specific

Maduros rhetoric is political rhetoric --- he still values increasing
economic relations
Hootsen 13 - freelance journalist based in Mexico City (Jan-Albert, After Chavez, U.S. Ties
Less Present in Venezuela Election, April 12, World Politics Review,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12865/after-chavez-u-s-ties-less-present-in-
venezuela-election)//DLG

Venezuelas stance toward the U.S. was complicated throughout the 14 years
Chavez ruled the country. His fiery anti-American rhetoric, culminating in a 2006 speech
at the U.N. General Assembly in which he famously called then-U.S. President George W. Bush
the devil, caused its share of bilateral tensions. Even more infuriating to Washington were
Venezuelas warm relations with countries hostile to the U.S., such as Cuba, Iran and Syria, as
well as suspected aid to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a guerrilla group
deemed a terrorist organization by both the U.S. and the European Union.
At the same time, however, economic ties between the U.S. and Venezuela have
remained close. Venezuela, which has the worlds largest proven oil reserves, still sends
half of its crude exports to the U.S., providing revenues that finance nearly a
quarter of the governments yearly budget.
Still, as the campaign progressed, only Maduro made a point of including the U.S. in his talking
points, mainly to entertain the crowds with outlandish conspiracy theories. Hours before the
March 5 announcement of Chavezs death, Maduro accused a U.S. diplomat of spying on the
Venezuelan military and insisted the Venezuelan government had evidence that Chavezs cancer
was caused by the U.S. and Israeli governments. Several weeks later, he publicly asked U.S.
President Barack Obama to call off an alleged plot to kill Capriles, a plan, Maduro said,
masterminded by Pentagon officials to create chaos in Venezuela.
Why the sudden wave of absurd allegations, when only months ago Maduro
seemed to be looking to explore the possibility of improved relations with the U.S.?
To many analysts, the aggressive anti-American stance serves an electoral purpose: to
divert attention from formidable domestic troubles, such as high inflation, an exploding
crime rate and scarcity of products caused by dollar clamps and restrictions on imports --
problems which many believe Maduro is incapable of solving.
As a former exterior minister, Maduro knows more than anyone just how dependent
his government is on the U.S. economy , says Remi Lehmann, a Dutch political scientist
and author of Chavez, the Venezuelan Petro State and Foreign Policy. Lehmann adds, He
depicts the U.S. as an evil empire and an enemy of the Bolivarian revolution, making it the
perfect common adversary to unite his slightly fractured following.

Venezuela will say yes --- views trade and commercial relations as
critical
ONeil 13 --- Senior Fellow of Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations
(Shannon, Viewpoint: New era for US-Venezuela relations?, March 6, BBC News,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21680885)//DLG

But in the longer term, trade, commercial relations and personal ties could shift US-
Venezuelan relations for the better.
First and foremost are the economic ties between the two nations. Despite the rhetorical
animosity of the last decade, trade continued.
The US remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil - some 40% percent of
Venezuelan oil exports (and oil makes up over 90% of the country's total exports).
In turn, the US has continued to send machinery and cars, and even increased exports of
natural gas and petroleum products to the South American nation.
The hard currency and goods are vital to the functioning of Venezuela's economy ,
government and society, and may become even more so through the anticipated
tough economic times ahead.
Despite the increased government management of the economy through price controls and the
nationalisation of hundreds of private companies over the last decade, many well- and lesser-
known US companies still work in Venezuela, providing not just goods but ongoing
links with the United States.
In addition to these commercial links, the more than 200,000 Venezuelans living in the
US and the hundreds of thousands more that have ties through family, friends and
colleagues, could also bring the two countries together.
Finally, as subsequent Venezuelan governments look to adjust their economic
policies in the coming months and years, the experience of their neighbours
provide incentives to forge a more amicable bilateral relationship.

Even if other relations are bad, economic ties are still vital to
Venezuela
Romero 6 - Brazil bureau chief for NYT, BA from Harvard, writes from Caracas (Simon, For
Venezuela, as Distaste for U.S. Grows, So Does Trade, August 16, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/world/americas/16venezuela.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=2&)//DLG

Yet even as the talk from Caracas and Washington grows more hostile and the
countries seem to be growing ever farther apart, trade between Venezuela and the
United States is surging.
Venezuelas oil exports, of course, account for the bulk of that trade, as the country
remains the fourth largest oil supplier to the United States. Pulled largely by those
rising oil revenues, trade climbed 36 percent in 2005, to $40.4 billion, the fastest
growth in cargo value among Americas top 20 trading partners, according to WorldCity, a
Miami company that closely tracks American trade.
But American companies are also benefiting, as Venezuelas thirst for American products
like cars, construction machinery and computers has steadily grown, rising to $6.4 billion
last year, from $4.8 billion a year earlier.
The new growth comes even as Mr. Chvez has done his best to try to redirect his nations
trade toward what he considers more likeminded nations. He has formed a new socialist
trade agreement with Cuba and Bolivia. A few Chinese cars can now be glimpsed in showrooms
here. Iranian tractors are rolling off a new assembly line. And a Russian company plans to open
a Kalashnikov rifle factory soon.
Washington has moved to halt American weapons sales to Venezuela, for what it says is a lack of
cooperation in combating terrorism, as Mr. Chvez deepens ties with countries like Iran.
But while the leaders in Washington and Caracas may regard each other with
distaste, there is little getting around the fact that the appetite for trade in both
nations belies those differences. Especially when it comes to oil, the economies remain
mutually dependent.
Some say the ties have left the two nations entangled to a degree that political or
ideological disputes would have a hard time undoing. The U.S. has been Venezuelas
principal trading partner for a century, said Robert Bottome, editor and publisher of
Veneconoma, the countrys leading business newsletter. Its not easy to dismantle such a
relationship, though that is probably Chvezs ultimate desire.
Venezuela moved in that direction on Tuesday, with its national oil company saying it had
agreed to sell its stake in a Houston refinery for more than $1.3 billion in cash.
Still, the trade numbers illustrate a widening gulf between Mr. Chvezs increasingly
anti-American speeches, aimed at revving his political base, and the needs of
Venezuelas otherwise freewheeling economy.
For instance, non-oil exports to the United States climbed 116 percent in the first three
months of the year, according to the National Statistics Institute. Venezuela also maintains
close ties to Wall Street banks, with Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse advising the
governments of Venezuela and Argentina on their coming sale of $2 billion of bonds.
The growth in economic ties has touched several sectors, even if political tensions have left
American companies generally hesitant to call attention to their good fortune or to offer detailed
comments on their operations.
Regulatory filings show that Venezuelas economy, which grew 9.6 percent in the first half of the
year, is lifting profits for many American companies.
Most delicately, oil services companies like Halliburton, an emblem of the
Venezuelan governments distaste with American foreign policy, are at the
forefront of the deepening interdependence.
Theres rhetoric and theres business, said an official with the United States Commerce
Department who closely follows trade with Venezuela, and asked not to be identified because of
the sensitivity of relations between the countries. The Venezuelans cant produce their oil
without our equipment. Its as simple as that.
With 10 offices and 1,000 employees in Venezuela, Halliburton recently won a contract to assist
Petrozuata, a venture between Venezuelas national oil company and ConocoPhillips, in
extracting oil from fields in eastern Venezuela.
Melissa Norcross, a Halliburton spokeswoman in Houston, declined to comment specifically on
activities in Venezuela, but noted that the company had operated in the country for more than
50 years.
In its July filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Halliburton reported that its
energy services group, which helps companies drill for oil, hit double-digit sales growth in
Venezuela in the first six months of 2006, offsetting a decline in Mexico.
At the same time, Venezuelas government often speaks out against the strength of American
multinationals, and recently has exerted greater control over the oil industry, with the largest
American oil company, Exxon Mobil, publicly chafing at its treatment.
Chevron, the second-largest American oil company, said last month that Venezuelas
reorganization of its oil industry would cut Chevrons output by 90,000 barrels a day later this
year.
Mr. Chvez has also been critical of American software companies like Microsoft, and has issued
a decree ordering the countrys government offices to move toward open-source alternatives like
Linux. Government-financed cooperatives in urban barrios and the countryside, meanwhile,
churn out everything from shoes to organic cocoa.
Still, demand for American products remains strong. General Motors, Ford and other
car manufacturers are trying to meet soaring demand, with sales up 28 percent in July
from last year. G.M., Venezuelas largest car manufacturer, said this month that it would invest
$20 million to expand output by 30 percent, adding 600 new workers.
Here in Venezuelas frenetic capital, the pervasive presence of American brands and advertising
for American products stands in contrast to the colorful murals heroically depicting Mr. Chvez
and Simn Bolvar, and billboards emblazoned with slogans taunting President Bush. (One
reads: Mister Danger, Let Us Make Love and Not War.)
The resilient ties with the United States are too much for some of Mr. Chvezs critics on the left,
including Douglas Bravo, a former Marxist guerrilla commander who was once close to Mr.
Chvez, but who has broken with him over Venezuelas heavy reliance on energy companies
from rich industrial countries.
If you look at its speech and discourse, this is a revolutionary government, Mr.
Bravo said in a recent interview with the newspaper El Nacional. But if you look at what it
has accomplished, it is a neoliberal government.
Some government policies have unexpectedly benefited American companies. For instance, after
Venezuela restricted access to foreign currency for trips abroad to prevent capital flight during a
sharp downturn in the economy in 2003, MasterCard profited because travelers were still
allowed to spend up to $2,500 on their credit cards outside Venezuela.
Though MasterCard has recently stopped breaking out figures for Venezuela, it credited the
exchange controls with helping to raise its gross dollar volume in the country by 82 percent, to
$460 million, in the third quarter of 2005.
Were going to have to pass on this one, Janet Rivera, a MasterCard spokeswoman, replied
when asked about operations in Venezuela.
Other American companies continue betting on Venezuela, even as Washington
looks at tightening trade ties. Susan Schwab, the United States trade
representative, placed Venezuela last week on a list of 11 developing countries with
relatively high income levels that could lose preferential trade benefits, a move that
drew criticism in Brazil and Argentina but barely a shrug here.
The agricultural giant Cargill spent $10 million in July to acquire a Venezuelan flour-milling
concern, though it has also expressed concern over delays in being able to send dividends to its
Minnesota owners.
The AES Corporation of Arlington, Va., owner of the utility that provides electricity to Caracas,
is enjoying growth of 5 percent a year here, said Andrs Gluski, a Venezuelan who heads AESs
operations in the region. There is no question that the stronger economic system in Venezuela
has helped our business, Mr. Gluski said.
But the biggest beneficiary of Venezuelas commercially robust relationship with
the United States is, paradoxically, the government itself, which directly controls
the oil producer Petrleos de Venezuela.

US-Venezuelan economies are mutually dependent
Alvarez and Hanson 9 (*Cesar J, writer,** Stephanie, associate director and
coordinating editor and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America
for the Council of Foreign Relations, Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy, February 9, Council on
Foreign Relations, Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy)//DLG

U.S.-Venezuela Oil Ties
Though Venezuela has repeatedly threatened to cut off its oil exports to the United
States, analysts say the two countries are mutually dependent. Venezuela supplies
about 1.5 million barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products to the U.S. market every
day, according to the EIA. Venezuelan oil comprises about 11 percent of U.S. crude oil imports,
which amounts to 60 percent of Venezuelas total exports. PDVSA also wholly owns five
refineries in the United States and partly owns four refineries, either through partnerships with
U.S. companies or through PDVSAs U.S. subsidiary, CITGO. A U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report (PDF) says Venezuelas exports of crude oil and refined petroleum products
to the United States have been relatively stable with the exception of the strike period.
The World Bank's Frepes-Cibils says Venezuela will continue to be a key player in the
U.S. market. He argues that in the short term it will be very difficult for Venezuela to
make a significant shift in supply from the United States. Nevertheless, Chavez has
increasingly made efforts to diversify his oil clients in order to lessen the countrys dependence
on the United States. The GAO report says the sudden loss of Venezuelan oil in the world
market would raise world oil prices and slow the economic growth of the United
States.



Say Yes --- Port Specific
The private sectors on board but Venezuela refuses the ISPS now due
to a lack of incentive the plan solves
Embassy of Caracas 8 (VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG WARNING
ON PORT SECURITY, Wikileaks, Nov 7, 2008,
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08CARACAS1546.html, Daehyun)

(C) Summary: The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) has not responded to
two diplomatic notes and multiple Embassy requests for a meeting to discuss U.S.
Coast Guard efforts dating back to 2006 to arrange port visits. Embassy maritime
contacts believe that Venezuelan ports would not pass inspection. The Venezuelan
government does not appear to be concerned with the latest warning from the USG on
security-related matters as it seems to believe that, similar to its experience with the TSA Public
Notice, the consequences for ignoring the USG warning will be minimal. End Summary. (C)
After trying through its own channels since 2006 to try to arrange a port assessment
under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Program (ISPS), the U.S.
Coast Guard contacted the Embassy and asked that it formally request an ISPS
visit. The Embassy sent the request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) via diplomatic
note in May 2008 with a copy to the Institute of Aquatic Spaces (INEA). Post has followed up
on the note with the MFA twice a week since. Following receipt of reftel A instructions, the
Embassy delivered a second diplomatic note on October 7, informing the GBRV that the U.S.
Coast Guard had decided to give the GBRV 30 days to schedule an ISPS visit or it would impose
"conditions of entry" which will require that "vessels which called at Venezuelan ports take
additional security measures.." which could "subject them to considerable delay, additional
expense and possible denial of entry into the United States." As of November 6, the GBRV has
not responded. (C) On October 31, Econoffs met with Nelson Maldonado, former
Venezuelan Merchant Marine Captain and President of the powerful Venezuelan trade
association Consecomercio. Maldonado stated he doubts Venezuelan ports would pass a Coast
Guard inspection as they are currently run by "mafias." He described INEA as one of the mafias
and added that the Venezuelan National Guard cannot be trusted either. Maldonado said the
new head of INEA is a young Air Force Major who has "no idea what he is doing." He noted that
Venezuelan petroleum company PDVSA does not send its tankers to U.S. ports as they do not
meet U.S. standards. (C) On November 5, Econoffs met with the General Manager of
Intermarine South America Fernando Maruri (strictly protect throughout). Intermarine is a
U.S. company that handles up to 90 percent of all oil industry cargo destined for Venezuela. In
a back-of-the envelope calculation, Maruri estimated that the additional security measures
might cost his company USD 25,000 per day of delay in entering Houston/Galveston.
Intermarine sails to Houston approximately 20 times a month. Maruri added, however, that
the GBRV would not care in the least about this extra expense as it is "not organized enough to
even think to analyze such a cost increase." He added that Venezuelan ship owners and
operators would not be concerned about the Coast Guard "conditions of entry" either as they
would simply pass the additional cost on to their major client, the Venezuelan government, or
to consumers. (C) Maruri speculated that the GBRV would never allow the ISPS visit as it is
"scared the U.S. government will find out what is going on at the ports." He added that he
knows the ports are deficient on security as the GBRV has not maintained security
measures that were in place during the 2004 Coast Guard inspections. He added
that it used to be difficult to access the ports, but now anyone can wander into most
ports. Maruri suggested that INEA had no voice in the GBRV's decision not to respond to the
Embassy and any decision on the ISPS visit will be made at the highest levels of the
government without consulting INEA. Nevertheless, Maruri committed to call his government
contacts in support of the ISPS visit as he is concerned that if the Coast Guard decides to delay
his ships, it would cost his company a great deal of money. (C) COMMENT: The GBRV is
aware of the consequences of refusing an ISPS visit but seems to have decided they
do not warrant the alteration of the BRV stance against the "extraterritorial
application" of U.S. law which was spelled out so strongly in its response to the TSA Public
Notice (ref B). Based on reports from industry contacts, post believes the GBRV is under the
impression that any Coast Guard action would have a negligible impact on its
interests and it has little to no concern about the potential impact on the private
sector. It is unlikely that the "conditions of entry" will encourage the GBRV to
allow an ISPS visit unless the conditions are implemented in such a way as to
seriously impede the flow of dollars to the Venezuelan government. In the absence
of any contact with the GBRV on this issue, Post will continue its outreach to the
private sector on port security. END COMMENT.

Say Yes --- Drug Cooperation Specific
Venezuela open to joint drug interdiction efforts
Wallis 13 Senior Correspondent (Daniel, Envoy says Venezuela open to better ties with
U.S., January 20, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/20/us-venezuela-chavez-
idUSBRE90I0H920130120)//DLG

CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuela's government is open to improving troubled ties
with Washington and is considering a U.S. proposal for the return of anti-drug
agents kicked out of the country eight years ago by President Hugo Chavez, a senior
official said. There has been no word from Chavez since he had cancer surgery in Cuba five
weeks ago, so every move the government makes in his absence is being picked over for clues to
what the OPEC nation might look like in a post-Chavez era. Speaking to Telesur, a TV network
set up by Chavez to counter Western media influence, Venezuela's ambassador to the
Organization of American States (OAS), Roy Chaderton, said U.S.-Venezuela relations were "not
hot, not cold. Zero degrees." But he said there were efforts to find common ground.
"There are things that are being done with a great deal of seriousness and a lot of caution,"
Chaderton said late on Saturday. "We are not obliged to have bad ties with governments which
have different visions to ours ... I hope pragmatism prevails in this initiative and we reach a fair
place of mutual interest." Officials say Chavez's condition is improving but delicate after the
58-year-old suffered complications from his surgery in Havana on December 11, his fourth
operation in just 18 months. His heir apparent, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, said on Sunday
that Chavez was coming out of the complex post-operative period and beginning a "new phase"
of his treatment. Maduro said more details would be given in official bulletins. "We're always
optimistic. Sooner rather than later we are going to have the president here with us," the former
bus driver and union leader told another Venezuelan TV network. "His mood remains the same
as always ... the spirit of victory, a special wish to see how the fatherland that he has dedicated
all his force to, his whole life, continues to grow." Many Venezuelans suspect, however, that the
socialist's 14 years in power - during which his fiery criticism of the United States helped turn
him into one of the world's most recognizable and polarizing leaders - may be coming to an
end. TARGETING DRUGLORDS In one typically headline-grabbing move, Chavez halted
cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 2005 after accusing its
agents of spying. Venezuela, which shares a long, largely unpoliced border with Colombia, has
become a transshipment point for Colombian cocaine on its way to consumer nations. Asked
about the possible return of DEA agents to Venezuela, Chaderton confirmed it was being
discussed. "It is one of the many hopes of the United States and it is a proposal," he said. "Our
government will decide, the competent national authorities, the justice minister, the director of
the O.N.A. (anti-drug agency)," he said. "It is a matter which has to be studied by the politicians
and the experts." The government says it has invested heavily in fighting narcotics
and points to the extradition to Colombia and the United States of high profile
accused druglords as evidence of its efforts. It has also taken part in joint
operations.
Recent indicators suggest improving relations and potential for
cooperation over drugs
Ackerman 13 freelance journalist (McCarton, Will Chavez Death Improve Drug War
Relations?, March 16, The Fix, http://www.thefix.com/content/hugo-chavez-death-venezuela-
cocaine-trade1364)//DLG
After the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, some are optimistic about the
country improving cooperation with the US in the fight against drug trafficking.
Despite the infamous photo of Chavez and President Barack Obama smiling and shaking hands
at the 2009 Summit of the Americas, US officials say that relations with Venezuela are at a
low point since each country rejected the others' ambassador in 2010. Last October, Obama
also accused Venezuela of "failing to meet its obligation" on combatting drug trafficking. The
nation has become a major drug hub since Chavez took power, and analysts believe as much as
25% of the cocaine that enters the US comes from Venezuela. The US Treasury Department has
blacklisted seven current and former Venezuelan officials, including former Defense Minister
Henry Rangel Silva, because of suspected ties to drug-dealing Colombian insurgents. And
although several senior officials in the country say drug corruption is weakening the
government, other high level officials are suspected of making millions off the trade. "People in
very important positions in government are getting rich, so if change comes, it's probably going
to be very, very gradual," says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue think
tank in Washington. But although progress on tackling the country's drug trade is
slow, there are some indicators of change. Venezuelan vice president Nicolas Maduro,
Chavez's designated heir, began talks last November with Roberta Jacobson, assistant
secretary of State for Latin America. The country has also cooperated with the US on
several drug-related issues, including the extradition to Colombia of several drug kingpins.
However, the tension between the two countries remains palpable; Maduro implied yesterday
on national television that the US was at fault for Chavez's illness. He intends to set up a
scientific commission to investigate the issue.

AT: Powers/Snowden
Recent failures of bilateral relations are not a setback --- Maduro is
open to engagement
El Universal 7/25, El Universal is a major Venezuelan newspaper that is based in Caracas,
distributing news via an online website and printed copies. It covers news, politics, sports, and
economics. El Universal is part of the Latin American Newspaper Association, an organization
of leading newspapers in Latin America(El Universal, "Venezuela willing to have friendly
relations with the United States" 7/25/13, http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
politica/130725/venezuela-willing-to-have-friendly-relations-with-the-united-states)//AD

From Caracas, Charg d'Affaires Calixto Ortega explained that Venezuelan President Nicols
Maduro and Foreign Minister Elas Jaua "have made it clear" that they are willing
to establish "friendly relations on the basis of mutual respect between the
administrations of (Barack) Obama and Nicols Maduro as two sovereign States" Venezuelan
Charg d'Affaires to the United States Calixto Ortega stated on Thursday that a
bilateral rapprochement launched in June to restore relations between the US and
Venezuela has been "suspended," but stressed that Nicols Maduro's Administration
is willing to have "friendly" bilateral relations with Washington. The Venezuelan
Government discontinued talks with the US last week upon a statement issued by the US
ambassador nominee to the United Nations, Samantha Power. From Caracas, Ortega explained
that Venezuelan President Nicols Maduro and Foreign Minister Elas Jaua "have made it clear"
that they are willing to establish "friendly relations on the basis of mutual respect between the
administrations of (Barack) Obama and Nicols Maduro as two sovereign States." Back on
Tuesday, President Maduro pointed out that restoration of bilateral dialogue would
depend on Washington's "rectification."
Maduro will say yes--recent events are an outlier, Venezuela is
committed to bilateral engagement
Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 7/26, An official press report released
by the Venezuelan Embassy/Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs(Venezuelan
Embassy, "Venezuela Willing to Have a Friendly Relationship with the U.S." 7/26/13,
http://venezuela-us.org/2013/07/26/venezuela-willing-to-have-a-
%E2%80%98friendly%E2%80%99-relationship-with-the-u-s/)//AD

Calixto Ortega Ros, charg daffaires of the Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela in the United States, said yesterday that the Maduro administration is
willing to have a friendly bilateral relationship with the United States, although
efforts made last month to improve ties are currently interrupted, according to a
statement made to the news agency EFE and published in the Venezuelan newspaper El
Universal, a Venezuelan newspaper. The goals expressed in Guatemala in the meeting
between foreign ministers are currently suspended the path was interrupted in the
conversation which began in Guatemala, Ortega told EFE. Several days ago the Ministry of
Peoples Power for Foreign Affairs categorically rejected statements made by Samantha Power,
nominated to become the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in her confirmation hearing
at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Power declared that part of her job would be
contesting the crackdown on civil society in several countries, including Venezuela. A
Statement sent by the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry read in part: [Powers] disrespectful
opinions have been lauded and backed by the Department of State, contradicting the tone and
content of what Secretary of State John Kerry expressed in a meeting with the Foreign Minister
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Elas Jaua Milano, in the city of Antigua, Guatemala,
last June. Ortega, who is currently in Caracas for meetings in the Foreign
Ministry, indicated that President Maduro and Foreign Minister Jaua have been
very clear in saying that they are willing to have friendly relations based on
mutual respect between the governments of President Obama and Nicols Maduro, as two
sovereign States, El Universal reported. The diplomat said that his office, which he has
held since last April, is currently in touch with the contacts that are necessary
[for] operations, which we have with some officials from the State Department.
Finally, El Universal reported that Maduro said Tuesday that if the U.S. Government
corrects its attitude, a bilateral dialogue could be restarted.
Venezuela still open to relations, despite Power comments
El Universal 7-25-13(Venezuela willing to have friendly relations with the United States,
El Universal, http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130725/venezuela-willing-to-
have-friendly-relations-with-the-united-states)//DLG
Venezuelan Charg d'Affaires to the United States Calixto Ortega stated on Thursday that a
bilateral rapprochement launched in June to restore relations between the US and
Venezuela has been "suspended," but stressed that Nicols Maduro's Administration is
willing to have "friendly" bilateral relations with Washington. The Venezuelan
Government discontinued talks with the US last week upon a statement issued by the US
ambassador nominee to the United Nations, Samantha Power. From Caracas, Ortega
explained that Venezuelan President Nicols Maduro and Foreign Minister Elas Jaua
"have made it clear" that they are willing to establish "friendly relations on the basis
of mutual respect between the administrations of (Barack) Obama and Nicols Maduro as
two sovereign States." Back on Tuesday, President Maduro pointed out that restoration
of bilateral dialogue would depend on Washington's "rectification."

AT: Raymond
Raymond concludes aff the ISPS is a necessary first step
Raymond 4- Associate Research Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the Institute
of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Catherine, IDSS
Commentaries, The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security An assessment of the
implementation of the ISPS Code and initial responses as to its Effectiveness, 2004,
mercury.ethz.ch/.../IDSS+C+62+-+2004+Catherine+Zara+Raymond_.pdf )

The ISPS Code clearly has a number of limitations and it will therefore not significantly reduce
the vulnerability of the maritime sector to attack from terrorists or pirates. However, as Captain
Mukundan, of the IMB states: The ISPS code is a necessary first step in establishing a
global maritime security framework. In other words it forms a 4 baseline standard
which can be built upon in the future. Alone, it cannot defeat the challenges facing
maritime security.



AT: McNaught
McNaught concludes aff
McNaught 5 Lieutenant Commander, RAN (Fiona, USFG, Effectiveness of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in addressing the maritime security
threat, 2005,
http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/publications2010/publcnsgeddes2005_310310_effective
ness.pdf)


Where the ISPS Code has been successful is in the raising of the awareness level of
the maritime community on issues of maritime security. This is a step in the right
direction, noting that the goal of the IMO is to create the necessary security
culture and raise our defences so high that the shipping industry does not become
a target for terrorist activities.55 With the security culture in place and strengthening, it is
now time to focus on the raising of those defences.

Disad Answers
2ac Engagement Thumper
DA non-unique --- U.S. has been vocally pushing for greater relations
in the status quo
AFP 13 (Agence France Presse, US still up for warming Venezuela ties after fresh row, July
24, Global Post, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130724/us-still-warming-
venezuela-ties-after-fresh-row)//DLG

The United States said Wednesday it is still open to improving ties with Venezuela
after Caracas called off the rapprochement, accusing Washington of meddling in its
internal affairs. The two nations -- which were often at odds during the 14-year rule of the
recently deceased Hugo Chavez -- had hinted at warmer ties after a meeting of top
diplomats last month. But then Venezuela reacted angrily to a statement by Samantha
Power -- tapped to be the next US ambassador to the United Nations -- who vowed to stand up
to "repressive regimes" and challenge the "crackdown on civil society being carried out in
countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela." President Nicolas Maduro -- the handpicked
successor to the leftist Chavez -- then accused Washington of meddling in Venezuela's affairs,
condemning its "imperialist attitude." Washington has yet to recognize Maduro's victory in a
disputed April election to replace Chavez. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said
Wednesday she was not aware of Maduro's comments, and she insisted the United States
was still committed to improving ties. "We obviously have not interjected into any
election," she said. "We are open to having a positive relationship with Venezuela
moving forward. That's what our focus is on, and we still are leaving the door open
for that."

--- XT: Engagement Thumper
Port security and counternarcotics assistance to Latin America now
Meyer and Sullivan 12 Meyer: Analyst in Latin American Affairs. Sullivan: Specialist
in Latin American Affairs(Peter and Mark, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations, Jun 26, 2012,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, Daehyun)

Background. Taking into account obligations from all U.S. agencies, the United States
provided Brazil and the countries of the Southern Cone of South America
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguaywith foreign assistance worth $1.6
billion in constant 2010 U.S. dollars ($1.3 billion in current, or non-inflation adjusted,
dollars) between FY1980 and FY2010.33 Over 82% of the assistance provided was in the form
of economic aid with the remainder in military aid. Brazil accounted for 36% of the assistance
provided between FY1980 and FY2010, followed by Paraguay (29%), Chile (17%), Argentina
(11%), and Uruguay (7%). U.S. assistance to Brazil and the Southern Cone has
increased in each decade since 1980. Aid was relatively limited during the 1980s as all five
countries in the sub-region were ruled by dictatorships that engaged in varying levels of
repression. Total assistance for the decade amounted to $254 million in 2010 U.S. dollars,
nearly 99% of which was economic aid. U.S. assistance more than doubled to $523 million in
2010 U.S. dollars during the 1990s as each of the countries reestablished democratic
governance. U.S. assistance to the sub-region increased again to $741 million in 2010 dollars
between FY2000 and FY2009, and in FY2010, Brazil and the countries of the Southern cone
received $109 million in U.S. aid. FY2013 Appropriations Request. Through annual State
Department and Foreign Operations appropriations legislation funding for the State
Department and USAID, the United States provided Brazil and the countries of the Southern
Cone with $33.3 million in current U.S. dollars in FY2011 and an estimated $23.9 million in
FY2012. The Administrations FY2013 request for the sub-region is $14.4 million, a $9.4 million
(40%) decrease from the FY2012 estimate. Brazil accounted for over 70% of the combined
appropriations for the sub-region in FY2011 and FY2012. Although assistance to the country
would decline by $11 million (65%) under the FY2013 request, it would still account for 43% of
the sub-region total (see Table 6). Under the FY2013 request, Brazil would receive $6.2 million
in U.S. assistance. Since Brazil is now the sixth largest economy in the world and is making
major strides in reducing poverty, U.S. assistance to the country is transitioning from
supporting development programs in Brazil to providing assistance designed to promote
development in third countries. About one-third of FY2013 aid would be funded through the
DA account and would be used to strengthen the Brazilian governments development agency
(the Brazilian Cooperation Agency) and implement jointly-funded projects in other developing
countries. Such projects would likely build on Brazils expertise in agriculture, food security,
and school feeding programs and focus on priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the
Western Hemisphere. About 21% of the FY2013 request for Brazil would provide a final year of
support for HIV/AIDS programs in the country. The balance of U.S. aid to Brazil (about 47% of
the total) would support counternarcotics and other security efforts in the country, and increase
cooperation and interoperability between Brazilian and U.S. military forces and law
enforcement agencies.34 As the poorest nation in the Southern Cone, Paraguay would receive
$5.9 million under the FY2013 request. Over 85% of the assistance for Paraguay would be
funded through the DA account. This assistance is designed to improve justice sector and civil
service transparency, strengthen the oversight capacity of civil society organizations, and help
small farmers improve their productivity and obtain better access to markets. The remainder of
U.S. assistance to Paraguay would be provided through the IMET, FMF and INCLE accounts to
support security efforts. Training and equipment would be provided to the
Paraguayan military to support its professional development and expeditionary
capacity, and aid for Paraguays counternarcotics unit would support demand
reduction and drug detection operations. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which are
considered upper-middle-income economies and have per capita incomes that are over three
times higher than that of Paraguay, would continue to receive small amounts of U.S. assistance
in FY2013. The three countries would receive a combined $2.3 million in U.S. aid. About $1.8
million in IMET would support efforts to modernize the three countries military forces,
increase their interoperability with U.S. forces, and improve their capacities to participate in
international peacekeeping missions. Additionally, Argentina and Chile would each
receive $270,000 in NADR funds to improve port security and export controls,
and support other anti-terrorism and non-proliferation initiatives.35

Links are non-unique counter narcotics funding
GAO 12 Government Accountability Office (COUNTERNARCOTICS ASSISTANCE U.S.
Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting
of Results, Jul, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a565573.pdf, Daehyun)

Venezuela: Counternarcotics Assistance State State allotted about $4 million for
counternarcotics and related security assistance in Venezuela in fiscal years 2006
through 2011 (see fig. 17). This assistance has provided port security measures and
law enforcement training. USAID USAID did not provide counternarcotics assistance to
Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. DOD DOD allotted about $3 million for
counternarcotics and related security assistance in Venezuela in fiscal years 2006
through 2011 (see fig. 17). Through 2009, this assistance was used in part to provide tactically
actionable intelligence to both US and select Venezuelan law enforcement agencies. DEA DEA
did not maintain a Sensitive Investigative Unit in Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011.
However, during this time period, the agency reported disrupting eight, and dismantling two,
Venezuelan priority target organizations through efforts in other countries.

AT: Obama Good
Congress supports efforts to ensure Venezuelan cooperation
Sullivan 13 - Specialist in Latin American Affairs (Mark, Hugo Chvezs Death:
Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, Apr 9, 2013,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf, Daehyun)

The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of populist
rule, has implications not only for Venezuelas political future, but potentially for the future of
U.S.-Venezuelan relations. This report provides a brief discussion of those implications. For
additional background on President Chvezs rule and U.S. policy, see CRS Report R40938,
Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. Congress has had a strong interest in
Venezuela and U.S. relations with Venezuela under the Chvez government. Among the
concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of human rights and
democratic conditions, Venezuelas significant military arms purchases, lack of
cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and
Venezuelas relations with Cuba and Iran. The United States traditionally enjoyed close
relations with Venezuela, but there has been considerable friction in relations under the Chvez
government. U.S. policymakers have expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-
Venezuelan relations in the post-Chvez era. While this might not be possible while
Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an opportunity in the
aftermath of the election.


AT: Maduro DA

Venezuelan public supports better ties with U.S.
Simmons 13 research associate at PRC, PhD in political science, minored in advanced
statistics and research design at UMich (Katie, Many Venezuelans want better relations with
the U.S., July 9, Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/07/09/many-venezuelans-want-better-relations-with-the-u-s/)//DLG

Edward Snowden, who revealed classified details about the American National Security
Agencys surveillance program, has reportedly been stranded in the transit zone of Russias
Sheremetyevo airport for the past two weeks. While Snowden applied to multiple countries for
refuge, Venezuela is one of the few nations that have offered him political asylum.
If Snowden accepts asylum in Venezuela, it is likely to further strain relations between the U.S.
and that host country. According to a new Pew Research Center poll, worsening ties with
America is something the Venezuelan public wants to avoid. A plurality of
Venezuelans (44%) prefer to have a closer relationship with the U.S. than existed during
the presidency of Hugo Chavez. About two-in-ten (21%) want to maintain a similar
relationship with their northern neighbor as they have had in the past, and 23% want the
relationship to be less close.
There are wide partisan differences on this issue. A plurality of Venezuelans (42%) who
identify with Chavezs party the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) want an
even more distant relationship between their country and the U.S., 23% want it to be the
same as it was under Chavez and 26% want it to be closer. Meanwhile, a broad majority
(78%) of those who identify with one of the many opposition parties want a closer
relationship with the U.S., as do a plurality of those who do not identify with any party
(45%).

AT: China DA

U.S. ties comparatively stronger than China
Dyer, 7/18 (Zachary, 7/18/2013, U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America,
http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-
Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013, JMP)

The United S tates' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last
year, and many surveyed said that U.S. ties were still more important than those
with China .
Recent allegations that the United States National Security Agency may have been spying on
several Latin American countries has done little to improve the U.S.s image abroad, but a new
report from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that Uncle Sam has
retained a favorable public image across the region.
U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68
percent) and Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in
their favorable view of the United States.
Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at
41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentines surveyed did not have
a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent
approval rating recorded in 2007.
Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report.
Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina,
for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32
percent approval for people older than 50.
Latin America is no longer the United States backyard, but the U.S. remains more
influential than China in the region. All countries surveyed except Venezuela
opined that the United S tates had a great deal or fair amount of influence over
their country and their economy compared to China.
While the U.S. may have more impact, respondents said that Chinas influence was seen more
positively than the United States. Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia were among those
that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light.
During Chinese President Xi Jingpings visit to Costa Rica in June, both countries leaders
signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled Mon refinery
expansion project.
Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the worlds
second-largest economy has gifted the country a new $100 million stadium and $25 million
towards the construction of a National Police academy.
Popularity contests aside, most Latin Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was
the more important country to have strong ties with.
Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey was based on telephone and face-to-
face interviews under the supervision of the Princeton Survey Research Associates International.
Click here for a full breakdown of method by country.

AT: Diplomatic Capital DA
Kerry already using capital on Venezuela
Noriega 13 - former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, former U.S.
ambassador to the OAS, coordinates and writes for AEI's program on Latin America (Roger,
Kerry pledges to press for democracy and anti-drug cooperation from Venezuela, February 5,
American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/02/kerry-pledges-to-press-for-
democracy-and-anti-drug-cooperation-from-venezuela/)//DLG

Kerry has also committed to make counternarcotics and counterterrorism
cooperation a priority in any future bilateral relationship with Venezuela, along
with the traditional issues of commerce and energy.
The new secretary of state has his work cut out for him in promoting democracy, human rights,
and anti-drug efforts in Venezuela. The State Departments recent annual human rights report
included a blunt critique of Venezuela under the Chavista regime:
The principal human rights abuses [] included government actions to impede freedom of
expression and criminalize dissent. The government harassed and intimidated privately owned
television stations, other media outlets, and journalists throughout the year, using threats, fines,
property seizures, targeted regulations, and criminal investigations and prosecutions. The
government did not respect judicial independence or permit judges to act according to the law
without fear of retaliation. The government used the judiciary to intimidate and selectively
prosecute political, union, business, and civil society leaders who were critical of government
policies or actions.
There is ample evidence that Venezuela has become a narcostate under Chvez, with the most
senior military officers and political leaders of the regime implicated in narcotrafficking.
US officials have fresh, compelling information implicating Chvez, his head of the National
Assembly (Diosdado Cabello Rondn), his former defense minister (Henry de Jess Rangel
Silva), his army chief (Cliver Alcal Cordones), and his newly appointed deputy interior minister
(Hugo Carvajal), and dozens of other senior military officials in cocaine trafficking.
In addition, Venezuela has provided weapons, safe haven, and logistical, financial, and political
support to Hezbollah and Colombian terrorist groups. The Chvez regime also continues to
violate international sanctions by providing substantial material assistance to the rogue
governments of Iran and Syria.
Secretary of State Kerry assumes his duties just as career US foreign service officers were
opening back-channel talks to the Chvez regime in an effort to normalize relations by
exchanging ambassadors. Only after the matter was made public did the State
Department mention drug cooperation as one objective of these talks. Any
unconditional restoration of bilateral ties now would wade into the middle of a
succession struggle, legitimize a hostile and despotic regime, interfere with ongoing
US law enforcement investigations, and undercut democratic demands being made by
the internal opposition.


AT: International CPs
U.S. market is key --- Venezuela depends heavily on the U.S.
Duddy, 13 --- served as the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2007 until 2010 (May 2013,
Ambassador (ret.) Patrick Duddy, Venezuela after Chavez,
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2013/0105/ca/duddy_venezuela.html, JMP)

So, where do things stand? Relations between the governments of the U.S. and Venezuela are
toxic but we continue to have a very robust trade relationship. The importance of that trade
relationship to the two countries, however, is very different. Although Venezuela is still the
fourth largest foreign supplier of crude to the U.S., Venezuelas importance to the United
S tates has been declining as U.S. production has increased and other suppliers,
especially Canada, have increased production. Venezuela, on the other hand,
continues to depend heavily on sales to the U.S. notwithstanding on-going efforts
to develop other markets, especially China. Estimates of Venezuelas reserves have been
periodically revised upward in recent years and OPEC now says that Venezuela has the largest
proven conventional reserves in the world. Venezuelan production, however, has never
recovered from a general strike early in the new century. Overall, the economy is a mess.
Inflation has been over 20% annually for most of the last four years. Blackouts and brownouts
are common and electricity rationing is periodically imposed to relieve stress on a neglected
national power grid. Shortages of basic staples are widespread. And the country has become a
net importer of food. Violent crime is rampant.

T Economic Engagement
Security cooperation is economic engagement
Raphael and Stokes 11 Raphael: Senior Lecturer in International Relations at
Kingston University, London. Stokes: Doug Stokes is a Professor in International Security and
Strategy in the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter(Sam and Doug, Globalizing
West African oil: US energy security and the global Economy, International Affairs, 2011,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/87_4stokesraphael.pdf, Daehyun)

This priority of developing access to the regions oil continues to act as a key driver of US policy
in the Obama administration. Indeed, the administrations first budget request for foreign
assistance to the region, submitted in early 2009, continued to frame the Gulf of Guinea off the
coast of West Africa as oil-rich and strategically significant, and used this characterization as
a rationale for urging increased attention by US planners.14 Angola and Nigeria are two of
only three African countries that have been granted access to enhanced US political
and economic engagement, through a Strategic Partnership Dialogue (SPD).15 The
security of the regions energy sector remains the primary interest of the US in this context.
Indeed, in practice the SPD consists of two working groups, one based on security
cooperation and one based on energy cooperation, both of which involve high-level
representatives from both governments, alongside representatives from the private sector.16 As
Bruce Wharton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated in January 2011,
it is pretty clear that oil and petroleum dominates African exports to the United States, and
establishing such agreements with major oil producers on the continent is a strategy
designed to unpack, unbundle, a very large and complicated relationship that
includes economics, that includes trade issues, that includes energy issues.17
Alongside increasing diplomatic and economic ties with the region, the US has been working
steadily to enhance its strategic position in the region, with an eye to buttressing its oil
interests. It is to the question of American strategic positioning in the region that we now turn.

Incentives are economic engagement
Haass and OSullivan, 2k - *Vice President andDirector of Foreign Policy Studies at the
Brookings Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy StudiesProgram at the Brookings
Institution (Richard and Meghan, Terms of Engagement:Alternatives to PunitivePolicies
Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000s
urvival.pdf

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives.
Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits,
investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic
aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such
as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic
relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the
economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most
potent incentives in todays global market. Similarly, political engagement can
involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international
institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders or the termination of these
benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military
educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human
rights among a countrys armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between
Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are
likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society
engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental
organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of
students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just
some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

Neg
Venezuela CP
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela should:
sign the outstanding Bilateral Counternarcotics MOU addendum
activate the Container Inspection Facility at Puerto Cabello
That solves cooperation and drug trafficking
DOS 12 Embassy of the United States in Caracas(International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report 2012, 2012, http://caracas.usembassy.gov/news-events/reports/international-
narcotics-control-strategy/2012.html, Daehyun)

D. Conclusion During the year, Venezuela increased counternarcotics cooperation with
Colombia and continued to deport fugitives to the United States, Colombia, and other countries.
The United States remains prepared to deepen cooperation with Venezuela to help counter the
increasing flow of cocaine and other illegal drugs transiting Venezuelan territory. Cooperation
could be improved through a formal re-engagement between Venezuelan and U.S.
law enforcement agencies on counternarcotics issues and the signing of the
outstanding Bilateral Counternarcotics MOU addendum, which would provide
funds for joint counternarcotics projects and demand reduction programs.
Cooperation could include counternarcotics and anti-money laundering training
programs for law enforcement and other officials to build institutional capacity to fight
narcotics trafficking. Such training would require the Venezuelan government to permit law
enforcement officials to participate in capacity-building programs hosted by other countries.
Cooperation could also improve Venezuelas port security and reduce Venezuelas
role as a major maritime drug transit country. Such cooperation could involve the
activation of the Container Inspection Facility at Puerto Cabello, which was
partially funded by the United States in 2004, and the Venezuelan governments
participation in the USCG's International Port Security Program. This program
would help Venezuela assess its major seaports and develop best practices for
enhanced maritime security. Since the last assessment in 2004, the Venezuelan
government has denied requests by the United States to return to conduct an updated
assessment. These cooperative activities would increase the exchange of information
that could lead to arrests, help dismantle organized criminal networks, aid in the
prosecution of criminals engaged in narcotrafficking, and stem the flow of illicit
drugs transiting Venezuelan airspace, land, and sea.
The aff fails absent Venezuelan engagement
GAO 9 Government Accountability Office(U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with
Venezuela Has Declined, GAO, Jul, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09806.pdf,
Daehyun)

While Venezuela has its own counternarcotics initiatives and says it does not need U.S.
assistance, available data indicate that drug trafficking through Venezuela is increasing. At a
minimum, the lack of Venezuelan counternarcotics cooperation with the United
States is a significant impediment to the U.S. capacity to interdict drugs en route
to the United States. Moreover, if illegal armed groups continue to find safe haven in
Venezuela and receive support from Venezuela, the permissive atmosphere and lack of
cooperation will likely adversely affect the security gains made in Colombia since 2000.
However, as Venezuelan officials have repeatedly stated, Venezuela is caught between the
worlds largest producer of cocaineColombiaand largest consumer of cocaine
the United States. Nevertheless, absent greater initiative by the Venezuelan
government to resume counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, U.S. efforts to
address the increasing flow of cocaine through Venezuela will continue to be
problematic.

AT: GAO report --- Venezuela Cant Act
The GAO report is wrong flawed methodology and incorrect data
VenezuelaAnalysis.com 9 an independent website produced by individuals who are
dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the current political situation in
Venezuela(The GAO Report on U.S.-Venezuela Drug Cooperation: Revisiting the Bush Policy of
Politicization, Aug 26, 2009, https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/4745, Daehyun)

It is not true however, that Venezuela has lacked the ability to carry out
counternarcotics operations or to cooperate with other nations on this important
issue. In fact, Venezuela has demonstrated its clear intention to dismantle drug
operations and work together with all interested parties, as long as they respect
Venezuelan sovereignty. This is demonstrated most obviously by the 20 extradition
orders, this year alone, that Venezuela has honored with Colombia, the United States and
other countries.[1] Venezuela has also had successful counter-narcotic partnerships
with 37 countries, among them members of the European Union, and has increased its own
activities in the fight against drugs. United Nations figures show that Venezuela has the second
highest cocaine seizure rates in South America.[2] Moreover, as the GAO itself points out,
Venezuela has shown an increase in the destruction of drug laboratories, drug seizures, and the
destruction of clandestine airstrips. On many occasions, Venezuela has also tried to work with
the U.S., as was the case last year when the two nations were on the verge of reestablishing
cooperation, thanks in large part to the initiative of U.S. congressmen. Unfortunately, at the very
moment that these talks were taking place, the U.S. Drug Czar publicly attacked Venezuela,
halting any possible rapprochement on the issue. Myth: Venezuelan interdiction efforts have
drastically fallen since U.S. drug officials (DEA) were asked to leave the country for spying in
2005, and the bulk of Venezuela-U.S. drug cooperation came to a close. Fact: False. The GAO
report, based on a flawed methodology, relies on no new research and primarily
on sources from the Executive branch previously released under the openly hostile
administration of George W. Bush. The few times that alternative sources are mentioned
such as the United Nations, their statistics and findings are not actually included as part of the
data in the report. According to the United Nations, Venezuela holds the world's 4th
highest interdiction rate [3] and the GAO itself notes that Venezuela intercepts about
29% of the drugs (mostly cocaine) passing through its territory.[4] According to US
government statistics, the United States intercepts roughly the same amount of cocaine in its
own territory. Moreover, in UNODC's 2008 World Report on Drug Seizures, it notes that during
the last two years of Venezuela's cooperative agreement with the US on drugs, between 2003
and 2004, a total of 63,498.32 kg of cocaine were seized in Venezuela. In the two year
period directly following that, beginning in 2005 when Venezuela asked the DEA to leave the
country and chose not to renew a variety of joint cooperation programs, statistics show that
Venezuelan cocaine seizures actually increased by 35%.[5] Myth: The Venezuelan
government has extended a "lifeline" to Colombian illegal armed groups and provided them with
support and safe haven along the Colombian border. Fact: The statements cited to back these
incendiary claims up come from U.S. officials under the Bush administration and
Colombian officials that both have a political interest in linking the government of
Venezuela with the FARC. Moreover, the "primary sources" of evidence for these
claims, as defined by the GAO, come from the infamous computer laptops
"captured" by the Colombian National Army in March of 2008. The problem of course,
is that the GAO regurgitates the highly politicized statements made by the
Colombian government as if they are fact, when in all actuality the contents of the
laptops were never authenticated by any independent party. Interpol said as much
during their investigation of the events when they stated that they had never analyzed "the
content of documents, folders or other material on the eight seized FARC computer exhibits.
The accuracy and source of the user files contained in the eight seized FARC computer exhibits
are and always have been outside the scope of Interpol's computer forensic examination."[6]
Therefore, the claims made as to what exists on these files are left solely up to the Colombian
government to decide. Myth: Corruption linked to drug-trafficking is rampant at the highest
levels of the Venezuelan government, including the ministerial level. Fact: Corruption is still a
problem in Venezuela, as in many developing nations throughout the world. However, using
outdated and politicized US government reports to reiterate this claim provides no
real sense of the situation and is just poor investigation. Moreover, the only other
sources referred to are entities that are openly hostile to the government of Venezuela such as
Transparency International who ranks Colombia, where more than 60 legislators have been
labeled official suspects in that country's para-politics scandal, as less corrupt than Venezuela.
Finally, given the Colombian government's relationship with the FARC, whom they consider a
domestic terrorist group, the alleged testimony extracted from FARC prisoners during closed
interrogation sessions should at a minimum be looked upon with some measure of doubt.
Conclusion This report was leaked to the press before its formal publication, in an
obvious attempt by certain right wing sectors of the previous administration, to set
the parameters of the debate before Venezuela had the opportunity to review it. According to the
Venezuelan embassy, the GAO was made aware of the situation but still refused
Venezuela the right to access the report before its official release date set for
Monday, July 20th. Although the GAO did not make any official recommendations, after
receiving the report, Republican Senator Lugar stated that the findings reflect "corruption in
that country's government" and "require at a minimum a comprehensive review of U.S. policy
towards Venezuela."[7] The government of George W. Bush politicized all possible areas
of cooperation between Venezuela and the United States. As the Financial Times points
out, while paraphrasing Venezuelan Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez, "the main sources for
the study - which describes corruption at the highest levels of government as well as being
widespread in the national guard - were from within the former US administration,
which enjoyed notoriously poor relations with Mr. Chvez and even backed a failed
coup against him in 2002."[8] By using a mediocre methodology that relies solely on
old information and lacks a variety of credible sources, the GAO has done nothing
but replicate this politicized modus operandi. It is unfortunate that during a time when
many saw improved relations between the Chavez and Obama administrations within reach, the
GAO has allowed itself to be used to put forward a poor report that will only serve to sow more
seeds of mistrust.

EU CP
EU solves the aff
Wigell and Romero 13 Wigell: Researcher The Finnish Institute of International
Affairs. Romero: Associate Professor Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia(Mikael and
Mauricio, Transatlantic drug trade, Jun, 2013, www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp132.pdf ,
Daehyun)

This paper argues that in light of this growing Latin America-Europe narco nexus,
there is a need to strengthen inter-regional anti-narcotics cooperation. Security
issues have so far received scant attention on the EU-Latin American agenda. The penultimate
section of this paper gives a general overview of the main tools in current anti-narcotics
cooperation between the two continents. It argues that in order to effectively combat the
illicit drug flows, fight corruption and break up the transatlantic criminal
networks, inter-regional intelligence sharing and collaboration between port
authorities and judicial systems needs to be strengthened. More EU funding is also
required, as current funding for projects to prevent transatlantic drug trafficking
and other illegal flows remains feeble. The paper concludes with more specific
recommendations on how to strengthen anti-narcotics cooperation between the EU and Latin
America.

OAS CP

Text: The OAS member states should:
- Substantially improve hemispheric seaport security to
implement compliance with the IMOs ISPS Code
- Develop sufficient port security capacity
- Strengthen cooperation amongst each other

The OAS solves better its key to creating a wider hemispheric
framework
ICP 5 Inter-American Committee on Ports(STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR INTER-
AMERICAN PORT SECURITY COOPERATION, Sep 13, 2005,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&ved=0CEM
QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oas.org%2Fcip%2Fenglish%2Fdocs%2Fthe_committee%2F
past_meetings%2Fordinary_meetings%2F4_meeting_maracaibo_venezuela_2005%2F7_strat
egic_framew_1.doc&ei=BQ30Uf-oM8frqQG-
pIC4Cg&usg=AFQjCNEvrMF6zJ5QgP8mM1prHmhw6PhOXw&sig2=tlfj5TyMzZ2mqRpedBMa
PA&bvm=bv.49784469,d.dmg, Daehyun)

I. Preamble 1. Port security is crucial to the economic viability of the American regional marine
transportation system and to its international competitiveness. It contributes to overall crime-
prevention programs, to fighting terrorism and other threats, such as illegal trafficking of drugs,
arms and people and other forms of organized crime, as well as other offenses affecting cargo
security and maritime traffic (theft, stowaways, and smuggling), that threaten criminal port
exploitation. 2. The Department of Multidimensional Security of the OAS through
the Inter- American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) and the Inter
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) -- and the Department of
Integral Development of the OAS through the Technical Advisory Group on Port
Security-- play relevant hemispheric roles in efforts to assist countries to improve
port security systems. 3. Effective regional port security requires an
interdependent network relationship among trade partner ports and associate
countries, as well as adherence to a common international standard of security, to
protect the flow of international trade and transshipment cargoes, as well as
passenger transportation. 4. Consequently, a strategic framework could guide OAS
Member States in developing the institutional readiness and technical capacity to implement
necessary port security improvements. 5. Higher international security standards as
established now or in the future necessarily involve a fostering of stronger
hemispheric cooperation so that the higher costs involved (improvement of physical and
administrative infrastructures, equipment, training and improvement of capabilities, etc.) can
be met by all the States as a means to guarantee the harmonized implementation of new port
security standards. 6. In considering the appropriate mechanisms and procedures to begin the
development of a strategic regional port security framework that strengthens hemispheric
cooperation, States should examine existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives
that have compatible purposes and structures, and evaluate how they may be used
to foster this process. The language and intent of this framework are based on
existing accomplishments of the OAS and other international security plans,
strategies, and initiatives. II. Elements of the Strategic Port Security Framework: guidelines
and objectives 7. A strategic framework is specifically designed to deter, disrupt, and dismantle
terrorist and transnational criminal organizations jeopardizing international maritime
commerce in the Western Hemisphere. A strategic and systemic approach is essential to the
planning and policy making process of mobilizing, coordinating, and calibrating means and
resources. Such an approach must include certain basic elements so that deployment of
common tools and interoperable techniques can be synchronized. 8. An effective strategic
framework requires a recurring assessment process for identifying and reducing
the vulnerabilities to security exploitation faced by the region's ports, and the
development of effective countermeasures to deter and defeat the threats posed by
terrorism and organized crime. 9. The elements of the strategic framework are intended to:
a) Increase the priority and resources devoted to enhancing and maintaining port security in the
hemisphere and trade partner seaports. b) Achieve greater effectiveness and synergy by
improving internal and external coordination of national and regional agencies that deal with
seaport security and the threats posed by terrorist and organized crime groups, and other
malevolent non-state actors. c) Improve and expand the multilateral mechanisms and work with
other governments to implement a hemispheric port security framework. d) Employ
affirmatively and creatively all legal means available to combat the full range of criminal and
corruptive activities affecting the seaports and maritime commerce of the hemisphere. 10. The
strategic port security framework should include achievable and measurable goals.
Implementation should involve setting and accomplishing objectives that are reasonably
attainable and which will contribute to these goals, while adhering to basic principles consistent
with the intent of this framework. 11. In order to undertake an Strategic Port Security
Framework, the OAS Member States should: a) Substantially improve hemispheric
seaport security and its related components to implement and sustain compliance
with the IMOs ISPS Code. b) Develop port security capacity sufficient to reduce
the vulnerability of ports to terrorists and local and transnational criminal
activities, thereby protecting the operations of hemispheric maritime commerce
from foreseeable security threats. c) Strengthen cooperation amongst States to
achieve the aforementioned goals. 12. The strategic framework has the following principal
objectives: a) Objective 1: Facilitate the flow of hemispheric maritime commerce unimpeded by
the direct or indirect consequences of terrorism and transnational criminal activity in any of its
variations, through: i. Integrated and comprehensive security plans, procedures and operations
(e.g., IMO/ISPS) which ensure the integrity of legitimate movements and transactions in the
commercial shipping cycle, while denying access to the system to individuals or organizations
that could exploit and corrupt this process for illegal purposes. ii. Standards and practices
adaptable by OAS member States compatible with the hemispheric trading community. iii. Risk
management processes including identification and analysis of threats and vulnerabilities. iv.
Improving transparency by the use of modernized and automated freight transport systems,
processes, and trade data information flows; v. Standardized customs regimes assisted by the
trading community's informed compliance as contributing factor. vi. Promoting business
community cooperation in government enforcement efforts and the penalization of violators.
vii. Securely protected and expeditious port facility operations in all its elements facilitating
improved system efficiency. b) Objective 2: Maximize the engagement of the commercial
maritime industry in a hemispheric cooperative effort with government, through: i. Planning,
developing, and implementing operational strategic and tactical solutions to maritime and port
security problems to counter threats. ii. Producing and exchanging information and intelligence
of actionable and foreseeable quality. iii. Conducting national and regional maritime and port
security training to improve the coordinated effectiveness of port and ship security programs. iv.
Developing alternatives to governmental financing to increase private industry stakeholder
participation in the funding of and involvement in port security programs. c) Objective 3:
Protect hemispheric borders by addressing vulnerabilities susceptible to exploitation by
transnational crime and terrorism: i. Enhancing the effectiveness of maritime and port security
controls pertaining to inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities at seaports and at
related land borders, through a greater resource commitment, further coordination of national
and private sector programs, and increased cooperation among OAS member States and
appropriate international organizations. ii. Encouraging full enforcement of existing regulations
and non compliance penalties for private sector non-compliance that facilitates transnational
criminal activity and corruption in ports and maritime commerce. iii. Targeting regulatory,
enforcement, and prosecutorial resources more effectively against individuals, groups and
organizations that penetrate commercial maritime activities for illegal purposes. d) Objective 4:
Prevent criminal exploitation of seaports and hemispheric maritime trade for purposes of
committing terrorist acts, illicit drug, weapon, and people trafficking, cargo theft, and financial
and commercial crimes: i. Denying criminals access to seaports and the legitimate commercial
maritime shipping cycle. ii. Strengthening enforcement efforts to reduce inbound and outbound
movement of criminal proceeds or the assets of criminal enterprises. iii. Assisting the customs
services and other law enforcement agencies of OAS Member States to seize the assets of
terrorists or criminals exploiting maritime commerce, through aggressive use of forfeiture laws.
iv. Enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation among OAS member States against all
financial crimes exploiting maritime commerce by establishing or updating enforcement tools
and implementing multilateral anti-money laundering standards. e) Objective 5: Respond to
current threats to hemispheric port security with existing resources, but also assess and identify
further resource requirements and their potential financing sources to counter existing threats:
i. Disrupting new activities or developing trends by transnational criminals that exploit ports
and maritime commerce. ii. Enhancing intelligence efforts to protect seaports and maritime
commerce, and to provide timely warning of emerging threats and criminal methods. iii.
Assessing the condition of protective security at ports of OAS member States by identifying
deficiencies in specific elements of port security, determining specific solutions to all port
security deficiencies, and specifying the policy, planning, and operational requirements that
must be satisfied to improve upon or eliminate the deficiencies. iv. Assessing port security
manpower capabilities and proficiencies to identify training and capacity building initiatives
prerequisite to, for example, improving port security processes, procedures, communications,
coordination, systems, planning, technology and physical infrastructure. v. Assessing financial
resources needed for improving port security, identifying specific operational requirements and
related funding figures. vi. Investigating and identifying how requisite port security solutions
may be funded, firstly, through existing financial resources and mechanisms (e.g., local,
partners, regional, national, international funding sources), as well as through alternative
funding sources. vii. Developing financing alternatives to increase private industry stakeholder
participation in the funding of port security programs. f) Objective 6: Enhance hemispheric
cooperation in the field of port security through: i. Combating the criminal exploitation of
seaports and maritime commerce through bilateral, multilateral, and regional mechanisms and
actively encouraging implementation and compliance. ii. Facilitating efforts to reduce the
vulnerability of maritime commerce and ports to corruption and criminal exploitation. iii.
Negotiating hemispheric agreements that create a seamless and efficient system for securely
protected and competitive operations of seaports and the hemisphere's maritime trade
corridors. iv. Improving bilateral cooperation among governments and law enforcement
authorities through increased collaboration, training, and technical assistance to strengthen
security, and combat crimes related to the exploitation of seaports and maritime commerce. v.
Promoting increased judicial cooperation with regional and international law enforcement
authorities to provide rapid, mutual access to witnesses, information, and other evidence
pertinent to the full range of maritime and seaport related crimes. III. Implementation
Implementation of a strategic framework requires the coordination of a wide
variety of governmental agencies and private sector organizations, to effectively
secure ports against terrorism and transnational crime. The resources and
cooperative mechanisms for managing these efforts must be developed and
supported by government and private industry at national, regional, and global
levels. 14. Implementation of the strategic framework has two basic approaches: a)
Government (regulatory/law enforcement) -- Dependent upon governmental enforcement
capabilities and mechanisms implemented through various national, bilateral, and multilateral
instrumentation. b) Government - Private Sector Cooperation (non-regulatory) -- Emphasizes
facilitation of the normal flow of trade, in harmony with efforts to deter the opportunities for
terrorist and criminal exploitation of the ports and the international maritime transportation
system they serve. This approach promotes government/private industry cooperation in
commercial sectors or geographic regions where, for various reasons, it is not otherwise easily
achieved. 15. Implementation of this strategic framework will be achieved through
the cooperative collaboration of all OAS member States in the development and
execution of an Action Plan. The Department of Multidimensional Security
through CICTE and CICAD- will have an instrumental role in this process in
coordination with other OAS bodies including, but not limited to the Department of
Integral Development through the Technical Advisory Group on Port Security. 16.
Implementation of projects under these proposed objectives will be subject to the availability of
resources of the OAS.

China DA Link
China is investing in Venezuelan ports
UPI 12 United Press International (UPI) has been a leading provider of critical information
to media outlets, businesses, governments and researchers worldwide(Venezuela mulls revival
of neglected ports, Jan 11, 2012, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-
Industry/2012/01/11/Venezuela-mulls-revival-of-neglected-ports/UPI-16871326314012/,
Daehyun)

CARACAS, Venezuela, Jan. 11 (UPI) -- Venezuela is pushing for an early regeneration of
its maritime and defense port facilities, neglected over many years and found to be
lacking in basic infrastructural capacity. Moves for the development and refurbishment
of the country's ports so far have attracted a major Chinese investor, China Harbor
Engineering Co., which pledged an initial $600 million. More suitors are expected to follow
CHEC to gain access to a key part of the oil exporter's infrastructure. Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez also signed agreements with Russia that are likely to result in supply
and local assembly of a range of naval defense craft, including submarines,
defense and security data showed. Chavez launched a major military buildup as tensions
with Colombia over guerrilla activities worsened in 2009. In recent months, however, Colombia
has receded from Venezuelan populist rhetoric about "threats" facing the country but the United
States still ranks as a potential "threat." Several naval incidents brought the United
States -- called "the empire" -- in Venezuelan press reports and Chavez in one
incident claimed his forces chased off a nuclear powered submarine, without giving
any details. Most defense procurements have been geared toward equipping
Venezuelan military preparedness to protect its oil resources. In 2010 Venezuela
surpassed Saudi Arabia as the country with the largest reserves of oil and gas. Most of the
Chinese investment will likely go into building a new terminal at the Puerto
Cabello, Venezuela's major port on the Caribbean coast. The work undertaken will
include dredging and the construction of berths to enable the port to accommodate Post-
Panamax vessels, Business Monitor International said. Puerto Cabello declined after it was
nationalized by Chavez in March 2009, when Venezuela's National Assembly voted to hand over
control of the country's transport links, which were previously under state level control, to
federal authorities. As a result, Puerto Cabello, Maracaibo and Porlamar went under federal
control and suffered a heavy decline in their performance. CHEC's arrival on the scene is likely
to reverse those trends. The Chinese company has 31 overseas branches and is the
second-largest dredging company in the world. Although CHEC is capable of fixing many
of the efficiency and management problems at Puerto Cabello, analysts said political change was
also required to restore Venezuela's ports to their full potential.


Solvency
Counter-narcotics Fail
Venezuelan counter-narcotics efforts fail empirics prove
DOS 13 (2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 5, Bureau Of
International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204052.htm#Venezuela)//DLG

In 2012, Venezuela remained a major drug-transit country. Its easily permeated
western border with Colombia, weak judicial system, sporadic international
counternarcotics cooperation, generally permissive law enforcement, and a
corrupt political environment have made Venezuela one of the preferred
trafficking routes for cocaine from South America to the Eastern Caribbean, Central
America, the United States, western Africa, and Europe.
Limited coca cultivation occurs along Venezuelas border with Colombia. Low-grade marijuana
is grown in various parts of Venezuela but is not exported due to its poor quality. Some
precursor chemicals are trafficked through the country. According to a 2009 drug-consumption
study by the Venezuelan National Anti-Narcotics Office (ONA), illegal drug use remained a
problem, with marijuana being the most commonly consumed illicit drug, followed by crack
cocaine and basuco (cocaine paste). Effective prosecution of drug traffickers is
hindered by corruption and a lack of judicial independence.
The President of the United States determined in 2012 that Venezuela had failed
demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements, though a waiver allowing for continued assistance was granted in the
interests of national security. Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation between
Venezuela and the United States is limited. Although a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, Venezuela has not signed the addendum to the 1978 bilateral counternarcotics
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the United States that was negotiated in 2005.
Additionally, Venezuelan law enforcement lacks the equipment, training, and reach
to match the resources and scope of major drug trafficking organizations.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
In June, Venezuela introduced a security program, Mission Life for All, which
incorporated anti-drug efforts led by the ONA. The program calls for prevention efforts
that include sports, music, and educational activities.
Mission Life for All built upon ONAs National Anti-Drug Plan for 2009-2013 which promoted
the creation of state and municipal anti-drug offices to implement national policies. The Plan
originally proposed the creation of a counternarcotics judicial jurisdiction composed of
specially trained judges and personnel to expedite prosecution of drug-related offenses, but
no implementation of this proposal was apparent in 2012.
The 2010 Organic Law on Drugs replaced the previous Organic Law on Narcotic and
Psychotropic Substances and, among other things, increased potential penalties for drug
trafficking and gave ONA the authority to seize and use assets of individuals connected with
drug trafficking. In 2012, evidence of enforcement of this directive was not made
available.
The Venezuelan government has signed bilateral law enforcement agreements
with the United States, including a mutual legal assistance treaty that entered into force in
March 2004. The U.S. and the Venezuelan governments also signed a customs mutual
assistance agreement as well as a 1991 bilateral maritime counterdrug agreement, updated in
1997, that authorizes the United States to board suspect Venezuelan-flagged vessels in
international waters with Venezuelan permission. The U.S. and Venezuelan governments also
signed a bilateral MOU concerning counternarcotics cooperation in 1978 but, since 2005,
Venezuela has not signed an addendum that would extend the agreement.
Increasing security in Venezuela doesnt solve --- multiple reasons.
Smith,2k- Maj., USAF (Paul L., THE RELUCTANT HEGEMONCOUNTERDRUG EFFORTS
IN COLOMBIA, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE,
http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394934)//IB

The large international cocaine syndicates of yesteryear, such as the Medellin and Cali cartels,
have been basically destroyed. Today, the operations are mostly fragmented into a looser
association of smaller, more specialized trafficking groups which rarely number over 20. The
traffickers, according to General Serrano, Colombias national police chief, are not the flashy
criminals with Rolex watches and gold chains that people have come to expect. They are
mostly between 25-40 years in age, seldom have criminal records, and work
through legitimate small businesses.14 In short, they are much more difficult to
catch. Moreover, drug traffickers are extremely adaptable, reacting to interdiction
successes by shifting routes and changing modes of transportation. They have
access to sophisticated technology and resources to support their illegal
operations.15 Likewise, smuggling methods continue to develop and improve. One
way recently discovered is termed black cocaine a mixture of iron dust and charcoal that
fools both the sniffer dogs and chemical detection tests.16 Besides more acreage, officials have
also found a more potent coca variety being grown in parts9 of Colombia. This
variety produces greater quantity of alkaloids, which means it can produce more cocaine.17
Colombian drug traffickers are also diversifying and are becoming a main source of heroin for
Eastern United States. Reportedly, many drug abusers prefer Colombian heroin since it is
especially pure, and can be snorted or smoked rather than injected.
Stopping drug production doesnt solve, traffickers go back to crime
Skaperdas, 01 --- Professor of Economics and Interim Director (Stergios, The political
economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not, Department of
Economics, University of California
http://link.springer.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007%2FPL00011026.pdf)//IB

The long-term effects of organized crime rule could be even more devastating that
its immediate, static effects. The areas most able, entrepreneurial, and responsible youth can
choose to become maosi and gangbangers, as Jankowski (1991, Ch.4) argues to be the case in
American inner cities. Those are precisely the individuals who under different
circumstances would provide a very different type of community support and
leadership. Once human beings develop expertise comparative advantage, if you will in
one area, it is very difcult for them to change later in life. Former guerillas, demobilized
soldiers after wars, and gang members have difculties adapting to conventional lives
and occupations later in life. Many nd bringandage, robbery, or reversion to
organized crime a familiar and still more protable lifestyle than its alternatives.
Even after the destruction of organized crime in an area, it can take more than a generation
before normalcy prevails as the old warriors dont easily fade away.
Alt Cause - Corruption
Cant Solve --- too much corruption
US Embassy in Caracas 12
Official site of the US State Department in Venezuela (International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report 2012, US State Department) http://caracas.usembassy.gov/news-
events/reports/international-narcotics-control-strategy/2012.html\\BS

Public corruption continued to be a major issue in Venezuela and appears to have
contributed to drug trafficking organizations use of Venezuela to transit drugs in
2011. As a matter of stated government policy, the Venezuelan government does not encourage
or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, some senior
government officials are believed to have engaged in drug trafficking activity. On
September 8 2011 the U.S. Department of Treasury designated four senior government
officials pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for acting for
or on behalf of the FARC, often in direct support of its narcotics and arms
trafficking activities. The Venezuelan government did not take action against these or
other government and military officials known to be linked to the FARC. In 2010,
President Chavez promoted Henry Rangel Silva, Chief of the Armed Forces Strategic Operation
Command to the four-star equivalent rank of General in Chief; Rangel Silva was designated
under the Kingpin Act in 2008. The 2010 Organic Law on Drugs imposed additional penalties,
ranging from 8-18 years in prison, on military and security officials convicted of participating in
or facilitating narcotics trafficking. However, there was no public information available
on investigations of senior government officials allegedly involved in narcotics
trafficking.

Drug trafficking inevitable --- political support
Evan Brown and Dallas D. Owens- University of Pittsburgh, Strategic Studies Institute-
February 12, 2010, DRUG TRAFFICKING, VIOLENCE, AND INSTABILITY IN MEXICO,
COLOMBIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=968//JAG

Panelists noted that the Caribbean has been the victim of extremely imbalanced relationships
with the United States. One panelist pointed out that the islands were a minor consumer
of drugs but a major transit point to the United States; with the attendant increase
in corruption and violence, the Caribbean governments are ill-suited to combat it.
The second panelist described Caribbean government policies as being driven by
Cold War concerns for decades, leading to relative ignorance of the drug problem, or
the framing of it as a U.S. problem. Both agreed on the immense difficulty experienced
by the regional governments in navigating the powerful influences of both the U.S.
Government and drug organizations. The third panelist then discussed his work doing
network analysis on Jamaican and Brazilian gangs. He provided further evidence for the
recurring idea that the state plays a key role not only in combating criminal organizations, but
also in facilitating them. He described evidence of substantial political organization
support for criminal networks, concluding that governments need to understand these
complex networks of criminal and political support if they are to make progress in combating
the problem.
Alt cause - high corruption among government officials
DOS 13 (2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 5, Bureau Of
International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204052.htm#Venezuela)//DLG

Public corruption continued to be a major problem in Venezuela and likely bolstered
the use of Venezuela by drug trafficking organizations to move and smuggle illegal drugs. As a
matter of stated government policy, the Venezuelan government does not encourage or facilitate
illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. Senior government officials are, however,
believed to have engaged in drug trafficking activity. In 2008, the former Minister of Defense,
Henry Rangel Silva, the Vice Minister of Integrated Systems and Penal Investigations;
former Director of Military Intelligence, General Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios; and
the former Minister of Interior and Justice, Ramn Emilio Rodrguez Chacn, were
designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as having assisted the narcotics trafficking
activities of the FARC.
In 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department designated four other senior government
officials, including Major General Cliver Antonio Alcal Cordones and National Assembly
Deputy Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales for acting on behalf of the FARC. The Venezuelan
government did not take action against these or other government and military officials known
to be linked to the FARC.
The 2010 Organic Law on Drugs imposes penalties, ranging from eight to 18 years in
prison, on military and security officials convicted of participating in or facilitating
narcotics trafficking. In 2012, however, there was no public information available regarding
investigations of senior government officials involved in drug trafficking.
ISPS Bad
The ISPS fails ineffective, expensive and outdated
Kenney and Meyer 4 Council on Hemispheric Affairs research associates(Edward and
Lauren, ANTI-TERRORISM COSTS COULD BRING CARIBBEAN TO ITS KNEES, Aug 12,
2004, http://www.coha.org/anti-terrorism-costs-could-bring-caribbean-to-its-knees/,
Daehyun)

The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code deadline expired on July 1,
severely dimming trade prospects throughout the region. ISPS requires all ships and ports to
comply with a series of strict security measures. Vessels in non-compliance are refused entry
into U.S. territorial waters; countries that fail to comply are now subject to trade embargos.
Caribbean islands have had great difficulty adhering to the new regulations due to
their small size, limited economies and chronic shortage of funds. For some
Caribbean nations, the cost of compliance totals over 100 million dollars annually. In
October 2000, terrorists attacked USS Cole, a navy destroyer docked in Yemens territorial
waters. The bombing left seventeen sailors dead, revealing both the limited ability of the U.S. to
protect its own naval vessels even in a friendly port, and the ominous capability of terrorist
organizations to successfully attack units of the worlds most powerful navy. While sensitivity to
terrorist activity has increased dramatically since the Cole incident, (largely as a result of
September 11), the shipping industryparticularly the Caribbean segment of itremains
woefully unprepared for similar attacks in the future. In contrast to airport security, the Bush
administration, aside from some empty rhetoric and a few showcase programs, has not made
protecting Americas seaports a priority. Thus far, a modest 500 million dollars has been
allocated to fund U.S. maritime anti-terrorism measures, while 11.7 billion dollars have been
allocated to secure national and international airports. While funding to prevent maritime
terrorism has been wholly inadequate, security requirements have increased for both U.S. and
foreign ports and vessels. The new rules emerged from the UN International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) resolution requiring all ships and ports to adopt standard security
measures. Among other regulations, vessels must maintain a security expert on board, file a
written security analysis before embarking, include a detailed inventory of goods shipped and
radio the port of destination 96 hours prior to arrival. In addition, all ships must display an
identification code visible from the air. Port security measures under ISPS are even stricter. The
establishment of buffer zones denies access to unauthorized vessels, underwater cameras and
sonic sensors protect ports from submarine attacks and customs agents monitor the loading and
unloading of goods to prevent the smuggling of illegal weapons and drugs. Non-Compliance
Brings Fateful Consequences In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA), increasing penalties on vessels and ports that fail to comply with ISPS
standards. The measure mandates that the Coast Guard turn away or detain ships that are non-
compliant with ISPS. In addition, the MTSA blacklists ports that are not compliant. If a port
fails to comply, the act would deliver a crippling blow to islands that depend on revenue
generated by the steady influx of tourists and cruise ship passengers. Despite the potential
economic strain, Caribbean Central American Action (C-CAA), an organization that has helped
ports throughout the Caribbean comply with ISPS, considers the act a tough love approach
that encourages Caribbean ports to reform. For Caribbean shippers, failure to meet ISPS
security measures carries dire consequences. Since the majority of Caribbean exports are
agricultural and often perishable (coffee, sugar and bananas), any delays in shipping would be
particularly devastating. If a port fails to meet the codes guidelines, the consequences are even
greater due to the likelihood of severe U.S. sanctions. With restricted sea trade, many islands
that depend on imported fuel and food may suffer from an extreme shortage of these essential
commodities. According to C-CAA, non-compliance is not an option for Caribbean ports.
Fortunately, countries have rapidly recognized this potential crisis, and 89.5 percent of over
9,000 port security plans have been approved by the International Maritime Association.
Nonetheless, according to C-CAA, complications remain since compliance requires maintaining
[security standards] forever (just like dieting to keep a certain bodyweight), which may be
extremely difficult for poor Caribbean nations to achieve. The High Cost of Security While
maritime terrorism threats are real, so are the costs of the new security measures.
Neither Washington nor the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (a group
of developed nations) has spearheaded an initiative to help developing countries offset ISPSs
implementation costs. After already spending hundreds of millions of dollars on
implementing ISPS measures, Caribbean countries are now solely responsible for
continuing to finance the imposed regulations. Costs for particularly active trading
countries like the Bahamas are estimated to exceed 100 million dollars. If a
country elects to meet the ISPS requirements, funding for essential social
programs will be severely decreased. Nonetheless, most countries have concluded that the
consequences will be even greater if they fail to comply. As Professor Griffith, a highly regarded
Guyanese researcher at the Florida International University, has noted, The ISPS code is of
such that you have to ask yourself, can I afford to meet the requirements, to comply? The
answer of course is that you cant afford not to comply. Jennifer Gonzalez of the Trinidad and
Tobago Shipping Association agrees: There will be increasing demands on the ports for the
maintenance of minimum standards, but Trinidad must move beyond minimum standards if it
aims to maintain its status as one of the Caribbeans most important hubs. Ms. Gonzalez
believes that stakeholders in Trinidad shipping will support the security measures because in
the long run, its in their best interest. Besides being prohibitively costly, ISPS
illustrates the continued existence of a cold war mentality within the White House.
For example, the implementation of top-tier underwater sonar and cameras may
have been highly effective in countering possible Soviet submarine attacks, but
these measures do not cost-effectively prevent the spread of illegal drugs and
weapons. This advanced technology also fails to curb rampant corruption among
Caribbean officials, what C-CAA calls the root of seaport security vulnerabilities. By
blacklisting ports that fail to meet ISPS regulations and forcing islands with weak
economies to decrease funding for social programs, the U.S.-promoted security
code may have negative, destabilizing repercussions on the Caribbean, Americas
so-called third border. These new measures could further impoverish the islands and
motivate the newly unemployed to join the wave of illegal immigrants arriving in the U.S. This
increased immigration would provide the perfect cover for would-be terrorists, thus bringing a
potential crisis ever closer. Despite serious flaws in the ISPS code and the potentially
backbreaking costs involved, Washington has unflinchingly turned away a growing number of
Caribbean ships. Although initial results indicate that ISPS has been a model international
achievement due to the higher-than-expected compliance rates, the code may ultimately
lead to a security breakdown because poor countries are not compensated with
financial assistance to help weather the difficult transition. Furthermore, the ISPS
code represents an outdated concept of security that inadequately addresses
current terrorist threats. Funds allocated for low-risk dangers might instead be
devoted toward easing compliance costs for struggling Caribbean nations.

ISPS Code has failed in most ports- no warrant of why Venezuela
wont
Raymond 4 Associate Research Fellow in the Maritime Security
Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
University (Catherine, IDSS Commentaries, The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security
An assessment of the implementation of the ISPS Code and initial responses as to its
Effectiveness, 2004, mercury.ethz.ch/.../IDSS+C+62+-
+2004+Catherine+Zara+Raymond_.pdf )

Singapore was one of the success stories. Through close cooperation with the
port operators and ship owners, its port facilities and ships met the ISPS Code
requirements by the 1st July 2004 deadline. In fact Singapore s container ships
began to be certified as ISPS compliantten months before the deadline.
On the other hand, implementation of the Code in Africa has been less
successful. Only half of the countries in Africa to which the Code applies have had
their port facility plans approved. Former Soviet and Eastern European countries
are
also lagging far behind in their implementation.
Has the ISPS Code re duced maritime vulnerability?
In theory, compliance with the Code should reduce the vulnerability of port facilities
and ships to maritime attacks by terrorists and pirates. Reducing the vulnerability of ships
to
attack from pirates is particularly important in Southeast Asia, which is home to one
of the
worlds busiest and economically valuable shipping lanes - the Straits of Malacca, and
also
the worlds most pirate plagued nation - Indonesia. Pirate attacks in Indonesian waters, or
armed robbery as it is often referred to, account for a quarter of the global total. It has been
estimated that across the globe, pirate attacks result in losses of USD25 billion each year.
However, according to evidence gathered by the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB), from its Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, while there has
been a decrease in the number of pirate attacks reported worldwide in the first nine
months of 2004, it is still expected that attacks will spike towards the end of the year,
due to the delay in the reporting of attacks by some countries. Also, the number of
casualties from pirate attacks has remained high. Thirty crewmembers have been
killed so far in 2004, as opposed to only twenty at this point last year.


ISPS standards wont solve --- IMO is powerless, lack of resources,
and insufficient expertise
Raymond 4- Associate Research Fellow in the Maritime Security
Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
University (Catherine, IDSS Commentaries, The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security
An assessment of the implementation of the ISPS Code and initial responses as to its
Effectiveness, 2004, mercury.ethz.ch/.../IDSS+C+62+-
+2004+Catherine+Zara+Raymond_.pdf )

Are there flaws in the new security code?
A number of problems have started to come to light, which point to serious
deficiencies in the Code itself and in its implementation. One of the main problems
is that the IMO is powerless when it comes to enforcing its regulations. It can only
monitor compliance. When we combine the IMOs inability to enforce its
regulations with the simple fact that in may of the worlds poorer nations there is a
lack of resources and people with sufficient expertise to enforce the standards that
are acceptable to the shipping community at large, the result is only a veneer of
compliance with the new security standards. In order to address this problem the IMO
has developed a new train-the-trainer programme which is intended to aid ISPS Code
implementation. Under the programme qualified and approved instructors will train those
responsible for training and implementing the ISPS Code in the various countries.

ISPS Code kills Venezuelas economy
Raymond 4- Associate Research Fellow in the Maritime Security
Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
University (Catherine, IDSS Commentaries, The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security
An assessment of the implementation of the ISPS Code and initial responses as to its
Effectiveness, 2004, mercury.ethz.ch/.../IDSS+C+62+-
+2004+Catherine+Zara+Raymond_.pdf )

Meeting the ISPS Code requirements places substantial additional costs on ship
owners. Firstly, ship owners have in some cases had to increase their crew size.
Secondly, costs incurred by ports that have also had to introduce new security
measures under the Code are being passed onto the ship owners in the form of
extra charges for using the particular port. The most recent example is the Port of
Brisbane which will charge its port users an extra AUD1.4 million next year, in
order to cover charges it incurred mainly as a consequence of the implementation
of the ISPS Code. This will have repercussions throughout the global economy,
possibly leading to price increases on imported and exported goods. While
security is recognised as being one of the costs of doing business in the post 9/11
world, the ISPS Code has yet to prove itself a worthwhile weapon in the arsenal of
maritime security.

ISPS only applies to a small amount of ships- no solvency
Raymond 4- Associate Research Fellow in the Maritime Security
Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
University (Catherine, IDSS Commentaries, The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security
An assessment of the implementation of the ISPS Code and initial responses as to its
Effectiveness, 2004, mercury.ethz.ch/.../IDSS+C+62+-
+2004+Catherine+Zara+Raymond_.pdf )

A glaring flaw in the ISPS Code is that it only applies to ships over 500 gross
tonnes that are employed on international voyages. Therefore, it does not apply to
most fishing vessels and tugboats, which are usually under 500 gross tonnes. It
also does not apply to the many merchant ships engaged in domestic trade. As a
result, there will be a substantial number of ships operating in Southeast Asian
waterways that are not covered by the Code. This is a worrying situation given the recent
spate of attacks on tugboats in the Malacca Straits. In the latest attack which took place on 30
November, the captain and chief engineer of a Malaysian tugboat were kidnapped.

ISPS too arbitrary doesnt address vessels prone to real threat
McNaught 5 Lieutenant Commander, RAN (Fiona, USFG, Effectiveness of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in addressing the maritime security
threat, 2005,
http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/publications2010/publcnsgeddes2005_310310_effective
ness.pdf)

One major weakness of the Code is the inability of the IMO to enforce its
Regulationsit can only monitor compliance.45 Enforcement is the domain of
Contracting Governments, most often as a part of Port State Control regimes. As previously
mentioned, the USCG has been particularly active in this regard since the implementation of
the ISPS Code. As previously stated, the ISPS Code is based on the principles of risk
management. One aspect of ISPS implementation that attracts a great deal of
criticism relates to the differing risk profiles and standards applied between
nations. There are several dimensions to this problem. Firstly, as each Contracting
Government is responsible for determining and enforcing appropriate security
measures for its ships and ports, there are bound to be significant differences
between nations in the standards of those measures. This is mitigated to some extent
by initiatives such as the IMO Integrated Technical Co-operation Program and the US Coast
Guards International Port Security (IPS) Program.46 Secondly, some Contracting
Governments, particularly Flag of Convenience registries, have been identified as
either corrupt (and therefore vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups),47 or
as lacking the resources or expertise to enforce acceptable standards.48 While
governments may contract out some of their security responsibilities to RSOs (often
Classification Societies) the expertise of these organisations in the maritime security
field varies significantly.49 Applicability of the ISPS Code to vessel types is also a
weakness when it comes to addressing the terrorist threat. The ISPS Code does not
apply to many vessels that are either vulnerable to, or capable of, terrorist attack
or exploitation. These include fishing vessels, high speed container vessels built
prior to July 2001, vessels not engaged in international voyages (including inter-
island ferries similar to the ones attacked in recent years in Southeast Asian waters), and
cargo ships less than 500 ton. Part B of the ISPS Code advises Contracting Governments to
establish security measures for vessels not covered by Part A of the Code, however, this is not
mandatory, and is therefore unlikely to be heeded by some nations (particularly Flag of
Convenience registries).GEDDES PAPERS 2005 94

ISPS Code focus is too narrow, no initiatives to adopt, and PDVSA is
too corrupt
McNaught 5 Lieutenant Commander, RAN (Fiona, USFG, Effectiveness of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in addressing the maritime security
threat, 2005,
http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/publications2010/publcnsgeddes2005_310310_effective
ness.pdf)

Similarly, the ISPS Codes narrow focus on security measures to be taken in ships
and ports ignores the major issue of container security, and the vulnerability of
the supply chain to tampering by criminals (including terrorists). While the WCO is
working on this issue (with ILO input in accordance as previously mentioned), achieving an
industry standard internationally is thought by some to be almost unachievable51
and perhaps disproportionately expensive, raising the costs of international
trade.52 The United States has developed unilateral initiatives to address cargo security,
including the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the CustomsTrade
Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT). These initiatives target security
measures along the entire supply chain, thereby expanding the more narrow focus
of the ISPS. These initiatives may very well provide a model for the WCO in
developing internationally binding cargo security measures. The ISPS Code is
preventative in nature and therefore does not address the issue of response to
attacks or remediation issues following an attack.53 Contracting Governments are
expected to address this issue according to national legislation. In Australias case,
responses to maritime security incidents will be addressed through domestic measures such as
the National Counter-Terrorism Plan.

ISPS unlikely to mitigate risk of terror- not a stand- alone solution
McNaught 5 Lieutenant Commander, RAN (Fiona, USFG, Effectiveness of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in addressing the maritime security
threat, 2005,
http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/publications2010/publcnsgeddes2005_310310_effective
ness.pdf)

Taking into account these strengths and weaknesses, an assessment can be made on the ability
of the ISPS Code to address the maritime security risk areas of cargo, vessels, people and money.
The implementation of the ISPS Code is unlikely to adequately mitigate the risk
posed by containerised cargo, as it is focused on the narrow area of ship security
and the ship/port interface. The terrorist threat (for example the placement of a
weapon of mass destruction within a shipping container) is more likely to be
introduced during another phase of the supply chain. This said, complementary
initiatives within the broader maritime security framework (such as CSI and C TPAT) are
addressing this shortfall. While implementation of Part A of the Code has probably reduced the
vulnerability of individual ships to attack while in port (through more robust security practices),
the Code provides scant protection against acts of terrorism designed to use
vessels as weapons themselves. Many vessels that may be utilised in such a way by
terrorists are not subject to the provisions of the Code. The threat to maritime
security posed by personnel (for example use of seafarer status to insert terrorist
operatives) is not addressed by the ISPS Code, although the ILO/IMO Working Group
progressing work on this area is the result of a complementary initiative. Terrorist
organisations controlling their own vessels or fleets in order to finance their
operations are unlikely to be impacted by the implementation of the ISPS Code, as
these ships are often run as legitimate business concerns and true ownership of
ships is still difficult to assess. Conclusion The above assessment highlights the extremely
limited scope of the ISPS Code to address the main risk factors to maritime security in light of
the terrorist threat. This said, the ISPS is only one of an interrelated set of maritime
and other broader security measures designed to reduce the transport chains
vulnerability to security incidents, and specifically, terrorist attack. The ISPS must
therefore be viewed not as a stand-alone solution to the maritime security threat,
but rather as one component of a system in the fight against terrorism. What is clear
is that other key components of this system need to be addressed in order to fill the
gaps that currently exist. This is particularly the case with regard to the security of
containerised cargo and the issue of Seafarers Identity Documentation.

Say No
Snowden/Powers Means They Say No
Default to newest evidence --- Recent developments trump positive
signals originally sent by Maduro
Minaya 13 (Ezequiel, Venezuela Ends Attempt to Repair Diplomatic Relations With U.S.,
July 20, The Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323993804578618223346497776.html)//DL
G

CARACASThe Venezuelan government has ended fledgling efforts to repair
diplomatic relations with Washington in protest of comments made earlier in the
week by Samantha Power, the nominee for U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who
grouped the South American country among nations carrying out a "crackdown on civil
society." Venezuela's foreign ministry released a statement late Friday that
"categorically rejected" Ms. Power's statement and criticized the State Department for
backing U.S. President Barack Obama's choice for envoy to the U.N. amid the controversy.
The ministry statement said that steps that began last month to normalize diplomatic
ties between Washington and Caracas have been shelved. In June, Secretary of State John
Kerry met with his Venezuelan counterpart on the sidelines of the general assembly of the
Organization of American States held in Guatemala. The meeting brought together the most
senior officials from the estranged countries since Mr. Obama shook hands with Venezuela's
then-leader Hugo Chvez in 2009. After the meeting between the top diplomats, both sides
expressed hope that more talks would follow aimed at repairing relations. The countries have
not traded ambassadors since 2010. "With the backing of the state department for the
interventionist agenda presented by the candidate for ambassador, Samantha Power,
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela leaves for finished the processes initiated in the
conversations of Guatemala," Venezuela's foreign ministry statement said. During her
nomination hearing before the U.S. senate committee on foreign relations Wednesday, Ms.
Power said that as ambassador to the U.N., she would "stand up against repressive regimes,
fight corruption, and promote human rights and human dignity." Part of that battle meant
"contesting the crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia,
and Venezuela," she added, according to an official transcript. In a Friday briefing with reporters
in Washington, State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf called Ms. Power an "outstanding
nominee," and added that "we fully stand by her." Relations between Caracas and Washington
have been strained since Mr. Chavez assumed the presidency in 1999. The fiery socialist called
longtime U.S. foe Fidel Castro his mentor and was among the loudest opponents of U.S.
influence in the region, often referring to the U.S. as the "empire." Mr. Chavez routinely accused
the U.S. of plotting to overthrow his government and reserved some of his most scathing
comments for former U.S. President George W. Bush. Mr. Chavez died in March after a nearly
two-year battle with cancer. Mr. Chavez's political heir, recently elected President Nicols
Maduro, has followed in the footsteps of his predecessor and aimed harsh rhetoric at
Washington, which angered the new leader by backing calls for a recount of his slim election
victory in April. Despite the campaign-trail saber-rattling directed toward the U.S., Mr.
Maduro and his government sent signals hinting at hopes for better relations with the
U.S. that culminated in the June meeting with Mr. Kerry. Those hopes were seriously
jeopardized when Caracas stepped into the middle of the controversy surrounding
U.S. National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden and offered him asylum in early July.
Venezuela is widely seen as among Mr. Snowden's most likely destinations.

Relations and interactions are down the drain say no is the only
response
PTV 13 Press TV, (No dialogue unless US changes imperialistic stance: Venezuela, July 24,
2013, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/24/315416/us-must-end-imperialistic-stance-
maduro/)//sawyer

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro says Caracas-Washington ties could not be
normalized unless the US ends its imperialistic attitude towards Latin
America.Improved relations with the United States does not depend on just us, it depends on
them (US). If they can rectify (this) and are able to, which I doubt , there will be another
position; we will renew dialogue, Maduro told a cheering audience in the Caribbean state of
Monagas on Tuesday. On Friday, Venezuela said it was ending efforts to improve ties
with Washington that started in early June. The decision followed remarks by US
President Barack Obamas nominee for US ambassador to the United Nations. During her
confirmation hearing before a US Senate committee on July 17, Samantha Power pledged to
oppose what she called a crackdown on civil society in a number of countries, including
Venezuela. On July 18, Maduro denounced Powers remarks as outrageous and
demanded an immediate correction by the US government. Venezuela and the
United States have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010. But on the sidelines of a regional
summit in Guatemala in June, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Elias Jaua agreed that officials would soon meet for talks that could lead to an
exchange of envoys. But the strain in relations between the two nations have intensified
following the US support for Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who disputed the
results of the April presidential election, in which Maduro won the race with nearly 51 percent of
the vote against 49 percent for Capriles. In March, Caracas expelled two US military attaches on
charges of making attempts to foment instability in Venezuela. Recently, Venezuela has offered
asylum to Edward Snowden, a former technical contractor for the US National Security Agency
(NSA) who is wanted in the United States for leaking details of Washingtons secret surveillance
programs.

Maduro says no Power and Snowden
AP 13 Associated Press (maduro demands retraction, July 18, 2013,
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/07/18/5577833/maduro-demands-retraction.html)//sawyer

CARACAS, Venezuela -- Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has lashed out at Washington's
U.N. ambassador-designate for what he called her "despicable" criticism of his government's
human rights record.Maduro demanded Thursday evening that the United States retract
Samantha Power's statement that Venezuela, along with Cuban, Iran and Russia, is guilty of a
"crackdown on civil society."Power spoke Wednesday during confirmation hearings before a
U.S. Senate committee.Hopes were raised for improved U.S.-Venezuelan ties in June when U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua met on the sidelines
of a regional summit and agreed to fast-track talks for resuming ambassadorial-level ties absent
since 2010.But prospects dimmed after Maduro later offered asylum to U.S. leaker
Edward Snowden.
Venezuela will say no--recent controversy over Senate confirmation
hearings derail further bilateral engagement
BBC News 7/20, Section of the British Broadcasting Corporation responsible for gathering
and broadcasting news and current events. It is the world's largest broadcasting news
organization(BBC, "Venezuela 'ends' bid to restore full US ties" 7/20/13,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23387807)//AD

Venezuela says it has "ended" steps towards restoring diplomatic ties with the US,
after comments by the woman nominated as the next envoy to the UN. Samantha
Power said this week she would seek to combat what she called the "crackdown on
civil society" in countries including Venezuela. She was speaking at a US Senate
confirmation hearing on Wednesday. The remarks prompted an angry response
from Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro. "The Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela hereby ends the process... of finally normalising our diplomatic
relations," said Venezuela's foreign ministry in a statement. It objected to Ms
Power's "interventionist agenda", noting that her "disrespectful opinions" were
later endorsed by the state department, "contradicting in tone and in content" earlier
statements by Secretary of State John Kerry. Poor relations Relations between the US
and Venezuela have been strained in recent years. They last had ambassadors in
each other's capitals in 2010. Washington angered Caracas by backing the
Venezuelan opposition's demand for a full recount of the presidential election in
April to replace Hugo Chavez, who died in March. Mr Chavez's anointed successor, Nicolas
Maduro, won the vote by less than two percentage points. In June, the two countries had
tentatively agreed to work towards improving their strained relations, after
Venezuela freed and deported a US filmmaker who had been held on conspiracy charges.
During a regional summit in Guatemala, Mr Kerry said he had agreed with Foreign Minister
Elias Jaua on an "ongoing, continuing dialogue" in order to "establish a more constructive and
positive relationship". He said the US wanted to "begin to change the dialogue between our
countries and hopefully quickly move the appointments of ambassadors between our nations".
Mr Jaua said at the time that for Venezuela it was important to build a relationship based on the
principles of mutual respect and no interference in internal affairs.


Maduro Cant Say Yes
Maduro wont cooperate with US anti-Americanism key to
credibility as he assumes power
Labott 13 (Elise, U.S.-Venezuela relations likely to remain tense after Chavez, March 6,
CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/06/u-s-venezuela-relations-likely-to-remain-
tense-after-chavez/)//DLG

But in the words of one senior official, the outreach to Caracas has been a "rocky road."
Talks have been short on substance and never left U.S. officials with the feeling Venezuela was
interested in mending fences. Maduro's first news conference, a good portion of which
was devoted to railing against the United States, was not very encouraging. As he prepares
to stand in upcoming elections to replace Chavez, Maduro's anti-American rhetoric is
dismissed in the United States as political jockeying to shore up his political base.
This tried-and-true method of using America as straw man worked for Chavez,
which is why U.S. officials acknowledge that the campaign season not be the best
time to break new ground or expect tangible progress. Officials say they will continue to
speak out in favor of a more productive relationship between the two countries, but the ball,
officials say, is firmly in Venezuela's court. "The opportunities are not there yet for the U.S. to
engage" says Carl Meacham of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "For the
next month or so, Maduro has to show he is even more Chavez than Chavez was. That
means he is going to be more anti-American, more anti-capitalist, more anti-
systemic. As far as a rapprochement, I don't see it coming anytime soon." How
Venezuela conducts those elections will be a major test. For years Washington had accused
Chavez and his supporters of abusing the electoral system by intimidating opposition and
controlling the media during his 14-year rule. Now, the United States has made clear it expects a
free and fair election in accordance with Venezuela's Constitution and charters. While
Venezuela's relationship with the United States revolved around Chavez, it is unlikely his
death will dramatically affect ties in the near term. If, as expected, Maduro wins the
presidency, the new boss will likely be the same as the old one. "Chavez's supporters
and their Chavismo ideological movement were dealt a blow with the death of their charismatic
leader, but his ministers have been preparing for this transition, and the challenge to
all sides will be measured in weeks and months, not days" said Dan Restrepo, who
served as an adviser to Obama at the National Security Council during his first term. With
crime at an all-time high, continued drug-trafficking and a faltering oil sector, Meacham says
the new Venezuelan government will be looking inward for the foreseeable future.
"The U.S. doesn't want to be in a situation where it is viewed at all as getting involved in
domestic affairs of Venezuela," he says. "If Maduro wins, he will be trying to keep the
focus on domestic issues, and that could put the resolve of Chavismo to the test.
And that could mean the hardest days between the U.S. and Venezuela is not
behind us, but ahead of us ."

Maduro will say no to conditions zero tolerance for coercive policies
El Universal 13 (Maduro: Venezuela will have zero tolerance for aggressions of
Washington, july 20, El Universal, http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
politica/130720/maduro-venezuela-will-have-zero-tolerance-for-aggressions-of-
washingto)//DLG

Venezuelan President Nicols Maduro on Saturday described as "terminated" his
government-initiated talks with Barack Obama administration. He stressed he would
implement a "zero tolerance" policy for "aggressions" on Venezuela. "My policy as
president is zero tolerance for gringo aggression against Venezuela. I am not going to stand
any verbal aggression against Venezuela, neither political nor diplomatic. Enough
is enough! Stay away with your empire. Do not mess any more with Venezuela," said
Maduro during a ceremony of military promotions in Cojedes state, central Venezuela. The
Venezuelan president also reiterated his rejection and condemnation of the statements
issued by Samantha Power, the Washington ambassador nominee to the United Nations, on
Venezuela. "When she went to Congress, she went crazy and started to attack Venezuela just like
that. She started to say that she is going to the UN to monitor and make clear what the
repression on political and civil institutions in Venezuela is, and that she will address the lack of
democracy in Venezuela." Maduro mentioned a phone call US Secretary of State John Kerry
made to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elas Jaua. According to Maduro, the Venezuelan
foreign minister warned the US top diplomat that Venezuela will not accept any
pressures in connection with Caracas' offer to grant asylum to former CIA agent Edward
Snowden, who is charged with leaking classified information on espionage programs.

Ties to military elites necessitates a confrontational policy towards
the US
Shinkman, National Security Reporter for US News and World Report, 4-24-13 (Paul,
Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-
venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond) //JAG

He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press
conference in Tehran in 2010, "We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the
threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism." These relationships are
controlled by a group of military elites within Venezuela, Farah tells U.S. News. He
wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote Maduro won in the April 14 election
gives him enough support to keep the country and its shadow commerce stable
enough to continue its usual business. "[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take
all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took,"
Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the
elites] for money." "Most criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will
gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a
relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. U.S. officials might try to
engage the new Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties
between the two countries. But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in
his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational approach to the
United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites. "Maybe if he were
operating in different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't
think he can be a pragmatist right now."
AT: Economic Motivation
Venezuela will never cave to the US, not even for their economy
Snowden, Iran and Russia proves
Ogrady 13 - Mary O'Grady also frequently published as Mary Anastasia O'Grady is an
editor of the Wall Street Journal and member of the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board since
2005, (Why Venezuela Offers Asylum to Snowden, July 7, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324399404578590503856740838.html)//sa
wyer

His offer of refuge to Mr. Snowden is most easily explained as an attempt to distract
Venezuelans from the increasingly difficult daily economic grind and get them to
rally around the flag by putting a thumb in Uncle Sam's eye. Yet there is something
else.Venezuela has reason to fear increasing irrelevance as North America becomes more energy
independent. This makes Iran crucial. Mr. Maduro may be trying to establish himself as a leader
as committed to the anti-American cause as was his predecessor, Hugo Chvez, who had a
strong personal bond with former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He also needs to
establish his own place in South American politics.Reaching out to Mr. Snowden is a way
to send a message to the world that notwithstanding Secretary of State John
Kerry's feeble attempt at rapprochement with Caracas last month, post-Chvez
Venezuela has no intention of changing the course of the Bolivarian revolution. Rather, as the
economy of the once-wealthy oil nation deteriorates, Mr. Maduro is signaling that Venezuela
wants to become an even more loyal geopolitical ally and strategic partner of Russia and Iran.

China will fill in for Venezuelas economy no reason to say yes
AVN 11 (China has invested over $30 billion in Venezuelan economy, 16/9/11,
http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/china-has-invested-over-30-billion-venezuelan-
economy)//sawyer

Caracas, 16 Sep. AVN .- Through financial cooperation agreements with Venezuela, China has
invested over 30 billion dollars in conditions with high advantages for our
country, highlighted the Venezuelan Foreign Affairs minister, Nicolas Maduro.Maduro
underscored that strategic alliances between Caracas and Beijing do not put in risk our
economy and it is almost a miraculous financial relation. Main cooperation is managed
with two funds: the Heavy Fund and the Great Volume Fund.In addition, Maduro highlighted
that there is an energy plan for the next 10 to 15 years, including the construction of three
refineries in China to process the extra heavy oil extracted from the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil
Belt.Chinese companies are already working in the Belt and they have signed agreements for the
construction of drills and other kind of technologies.This is a very close relation, Maduro
said.China has also contributed to boost science and technology areas in Venezuela. For
example, Venezuela launched his first satellite in 2010 thanks to said alliance and it has been
already agreed to launch a second satellite and the construction of a small-scale satellite factory
in the South American country.

AT: Drug Cooperation
Venezuela will say no --- wont cooperate on drugs with the U.S.
DOS 13 (2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 5, Bureau Of
International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204052.htm#Venezuela)//DLG

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The Venezuelan government has maintained only limited, case-by-case
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States since the cessation of formal
cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2005. Since 2005,
the United States has proposed that the Venezuelan government sign an addendum to the 1978
U.S.-Venezuelan bilateral counternarcotics MOU that would allow for expanded cooperation.
Venezuelan officials regularly made clear that Venezuela would neither sign a
bilateral agreement nor cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics. The
Venezuelan government rarely shares information with the United States on money
laundering or drug trafficking. Since 2009, when former Interior and Justice Minister
El Aissami prohibited police officers from receiving training abroad without the
Ministry's prior approval, Venezuelan law enforcement authorities have not
participated in U.S.-sponsored counternarcotics training programs.
Bilateral cooperation with the United States in 2012 included of the deportation of Puerto Rican
Oscar Cali Martnez Hernndez to the United States. In 2012, Venezuela detained four
Colombian citizens who are wanted by the United States and deported all but one
of them to Colombia in November.

Ambassadors prerequisite to drug cooperation
Sullivan, Latin America Specialist at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS,
4-9-13 (Mark, Hugo Chvezs Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf) //JAG

In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-
Venezuelan relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be
restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral
issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy concerns, but on trade,
investment issues, and other commercial matters. With Chvezs death and an
upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on
the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism
concerns, including the extent of Venezuelas relations with Iran.
Venezuela has refused US efforts to cooperate over drugs
DOS 10 (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March, Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137411.pdf)//DLG

Venezuela has failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its
obligations under international counternarcotics measures set forth in Section
489(a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
This Determination takes into account actions taken by the Government of Venezuela during the
past 12 months. Venezuela has ignored, or refused, the majority of United States
Government offers to work towards greater cooperation on counternarcotics. An
official letter from the U.S. Ambassador on July 15, 2008, and a follow-up
diplomatic note of March 11, 2009, requesting facilitation of a meeting to discuss
counternarcotics were not answered. On May 13, 2009, Venezuelas National Anti-
Drug Office (ONA) Director declined to meet with the U.S. Charge dAffaires, informing
the U.S. Embassy that the meeting would require authorization from the Venezuelan President
or the Foreign Minister.
Venezuelas importance as a transshipment point for drugs bound for the United
States and Europe continues to increase. Corruption within the Venezuelan
Government and a weak and politicized judicial system contribute to the ease with
which illicit drugs transit Venezuela. Trafficking through Venezuela increased from an
estimated 50 metric tons of cocaine in 2004 to an estimated 300 metric tons in 2008.
The ONA periodically reports seizures of illicit drugs, but the Venezuelan Government does not
share the necessary data or evidence needed to verify seizures or the destruction of illicit
drugs. The U.S. Coast Guard generally has received permission from the Government of
Venezuela to board suspect Venezuelan flagged vessels operating in the Caribbean.
Venezuelan authorities, however, require the return of confiscated vessels, people,
and any contraband located during these operations. Upon return to Venezuela, crew
members are often released.

Venezuela refuses to cooperate with US over drugs
DOS 10 (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March, Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137411.pdf)//DLG

In 2005, the GOV stated that a renewal of bilateral counternarcotics cooperation depended on
both parties signing an addendum to the 1978 U.S.-GOV Bilateral Counternarcotics
Memorandum of Understanding. While the United States did not agree that the addendum
was essential to ensuring appropriate counternarcotics cooperation, the United States reached
agreement with GOV officials on a mutually acceptable version in December 2005. Despite
repeated assurances from senior GOV authorities and agreement on two signing
dates, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has not yet authorized the signing of the
addendum to the MOU. The senior GOV officials who negotiated the addendum have
since left their positions, and their successors have publicly stated that the GOV
will neither sign a bilateral agreement nor cooperate with the United States on
counternarcotics. In March 2009, the GOV allowed representatives from the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to meet with the Venezuelan Attorney General. The
Attorney General asked for reciprocity in access for Venezuelan government representatives to
conduct a similar visit to the United States. However, the GOV did not respond to a
diplomatic note from the United States offering to facilitate such a visit.
Throughout 2009, the GOVs Vice President and Minister of Interior both routinely
accused DEA of running an international drug smuggling ring. President Chavez
repeated the erroneous claim and also suggested that the U.S. military was
involved. President Chavez also asserted that the United States permitted drug
smuggling to pacify its population. The lack of greater counternarcotics
cooperation reflects the general chilling of bilateral relations over the past few
years. Given the GOVs refusal to expand cooperation, the President determined in
2009, as in 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005, that Venezuela failed demonstrably to adhere
to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.

Empirics prove Venezuela rejected US drug assistance 5 years ago
and will do so again now.
AP 08 (Associated Press, Venezuela rejects U.S. bid for anti-drugs pact,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26487635/ns/world_news-venezuela/t/venezuela-rejects-us-bid-
anti-drugs-pact/#.UfFyfdI3vLM, 8/31/08)//MG

Venezuela on Sunday rejected U.S. requests to resume cooperation in the war on
drugs, saying it has made progress despite an alleged fourfold-gain in the amount of
Colombian cocaine now passing through its territory. In the latest barb-trading over the
issue, Venezuela dismissed U.S. attempts to renew talks on drugs as "useless and
inopportune, " saying U.S. officials should focus on slashing demand for drugs at home rather
than blaming setbacks on other nations' supposed lack of cooperation. "The anti-drug fight
in Venezuela has shown significant progress during recent years, especially since
the government ended official cooperation programs with the DEA," Venezuela's
foreign ministry said in a statement. President Hugo Chavez suspended cooperation with
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in August 2005, accusing its agents of espionage. Since
then, Venezuela has refused to help U.S. officials combat drug trafficking , White
House drug czar John Walters said.
Venezuela says no they fight drugs alone
Toothaker, Christopher 08
Freelance Writer for the Associated Press (Venezuela: No Anti-Drug Pact with the US, USA
Today, 8/31,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-08-31-3930126528_x.htm)

CARACAS, Venezuela Venezuela on Sunday rejected U.S. requests to resume
cooperation in the war on drugs, saying it has made progress despite an alleged
fourfold-gain in the amount of Colombian cocaine now passing through its
territory. In the latest barb-trading over the issue, Venezuela dismissed U.S. attempts to
renew talks on drugs as "useless and inopportune," saying U.S. officials should
focus on slashing demand for drugs at home rather than blaming setbacks on
other nations' supposed lack of cooperation. "The anti-drug fight in Venezuela has
shown significant progress during recent years, especially since the government
ended official cooperation programs with the DEA," Venezuela's foreign ministry
said in a statement. President Hugo Chavez suspended cooperation with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration in August 2005, accusing its agents of espionage. Since then,
Venezuela has refused to help U.S. officials combat drug trafficking, White House
drug czar John Walters said. U.S. law enforcement has detected a wave of flights that
depart Venezuela and drop large loads of cocaine off the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, while
other multi-ton loads are moved by boat and air to west Africa -- a way station for shipments to
Europe, Walters said. He said the flow of Colombian cocaine through Venezuela has quadrupled
since 2004, reaching an estimated 282 tons (256 metric tons) last year. On Sunday, Chavez
responded angrily to Walter's comments, calling him "stupid" for suggesting that
drug smuggling through Venezuela has increased. Chavez also took issue with recent
statements made by U.S. Ambassador Patrick Duddy, saying the diplomat is risking possible
expulsion from Venezuela and would soon be "packing his bags" if he's not careful. Duddy told
reporters on Saturday that deteriorating diplomatic relations between Caracas and Washington
are giving drug smugglers the upper hand.
US claims that Venezuela wants to cooperate over counternarcotics
has empirically been wrong
GAO, 9 (Government Accountability Office, July, DRUG CONTROL U.S. Counternarcotics
Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/292722.pdf) //JAG

In mid-July, the U.S. Special Coordinator for Venezuela37 traveled to Venezuela to meet with
Venezuelan officials in an attempt to re-start dialogue. The day prior to his trip, the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs stated in congressional
testimony that Venezuela had for the first time in many years, expressed a
willingness to explore improved relations with the United States[and] we have told
Venezuela that we would like to explore this diplomatic opening. When the Special
Coordinator arrived in Caracas, however, he was told that Venezuelan officials had
cancelled all of his appointments. In the end, he was only able to meet with one
Venezuelan legislator.

AT: Chavezs Death
Chavez death wont boost relations in the short-term theyll still say
no
Sullivan, Latin America Specialist at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS,
4-9-13 (Mark, Hugo Chvezs Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations
Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf) //JAG

While some observers contend that Chvezs passing and the beginning of a new political
era in Venezuela could ultimately lessen tensions in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, there is
no expectation that this will happen quickly. In fact, State Department officials have
cautioned that the upcoming electoral campaign could delay any forward movement
in improving bilateral relations.14 Just hours before Chvezs death on March 5, Vice
President Maduro announced that two U.S. military attachs were being expelled from
Venezuela for reportedly attempting to provoke dissent in the Venezuelan military and even
appeared to blame Chvezs sickness on the United States. State Department officials strongly
denied the Venezuelan charges regarding the attachs, and ultimately responded on March 11 by
expelling two Venezuelan diplomats (a consular official in New York and a second secretary at
the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington).15 Hostility toward the United States was often
used by the Chvez government as a way to shore up support during elections, and it
appears that this is being employed by the PSUV once again in the current
presidential campaign. On March 20, 2013, Foreign Minister Elias Jaua said that
Venezuelan officials would no longer be talking about improving U.S.-Venezuelan
relations with Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson because of comments that
Jacobson had made in a Spanish newspaper; Jacobson had said that Venezuelans
deserve open, fair and transparent elections. A senior U.S. official reportedly said that such
bizarre accusations and behavior raises doubts over whether bilateral relations
will be able to be improved with a Maduro government.16 Another strange accusation
by Maduro is that two former U.S. State Department officials were plotting to kill Capriles and
to blame it on the Maduro government; the State Department strongly rejected the allegations
of U.S. government involvement to harm anyone in Venezuela.17 Looking ahead, some
observers contend that anti-Americanism could also be a means for PSUV leaders to mask
internal problems within Chavismo, and even could be utilized as a potential new PSUV
government led by Maduro deals with a deteriorating economy.
AT: Relations Adv
Relations Fail
Diplomatic relations will be inevitably rocky --- Venezuela continually
cuts off ties
Neuman 13 Andes Region correspondent (William, Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve
U.S. Relations, July 20, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-us-
relations.html?_r=1&)//DLG

CARACAS, Venezuela Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest
round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve relations with the United States in
reaction to comments by the Obama administrations nominee for United Nations
ambassador. The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on
Wednesday, said part of her role as ambassador would be to challenge a crackdown on
civil society in several countries, including Venezuela. President Nicols Maduro had
already lashed out on Thursday at Ms. Power for her remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign
Ministry said it was terminating efforts to improve relations with the United
States. Those efforts had inched forward just last month after Secretary of State John Kerry
publicly shook hands with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elas Jaua, during an international
meeting in Guatemala one of the highest-level meetings between officials of the two countries
in years. Venezuela will never accept interference of any kind in its internal affairs, the
Foreign Ministry said in a statement, adding that it considered terminated the process begun in
the conversations in Guatemala that had as their goal the regularization of our diplomatic
relations. Relations with Venezuela have long been troubled , although the country
has remained a major supplier of oil to the United States. Under the previous president, Hugo
Chvez, a longtime nemesis of the United States, relations were bumpy, especially after the Bush
administration tacitly supported a coup that briefly ousted him. Mr. Maduro, Mr. Chvezs
handpicked successor, has given mixed messages about relations with the United States. In
March, when Mr. Maduro was vice president, he kicked out two American military attachs,
accusing them of seeking to undermine the government. After he was elected in April, he
ordered the arrest of an American documentary filmmaker whom officials accused of trying to
start a civil war. The filmmaker, Tim Tracy, was later expelled from the country. And in recent
days, in a sharp escalation of the war of words with Washington, Mr. Maduro has said he
would give asylum to Edward J. Snowden, the former American intelligence contractor
who leaked secrets about American intelligence programs and is staying at a Moscow airport.
The United States and Venezuela have not had ambassadors in each others
capitals since 2008, when Mr. Chvez expelled the American envoy, accusing the United
States of backing a group of military officers he said were plotting against him. The United
States responded at the time by expelling Venezuelas ambassador. In the Guatemala
meeting, Mr. Kerry said he hoped the two countries could rapidly move toward
exchanging ambassadors again. But those talks never had time to gain traction. On
July 12, Mr. Kerry telephoned Mr. Jaua to express concern over the asylum offer to Mr.
Snowden. This is not the first time that Venezuela has backed off the idea of
renewed relations with the United States. The two countries quietly began talks
late last year aimed at improving relations, although those ground to a halt after the
health of Mr. Chvez, who had cancer, deteriorated in December. After Mr. Chvezs death
in March, a State Department official said the United States hoped that the election
to replace him would meet democratic standards prompting Mr. Jaua to angrily
announce that Venezuela was halting the talks between the two countries.
Venezuelan officials have repeatedly said relations with the United States should
be conducted on a basis of respect.
Venezuelan relations cant move forward absent commitment to
mutually respectful relations
El Universal 7-24-13 (US leaves "door open" to Venezuela, says no apologies, El
Universal, http://english.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130724/us-leaves-door-open-to-
venezuela-says-no-apologies)//DLG

The US confirmed on Wednesday that the door was open to improve relations with
Venezuela, but avoided any sort of rectification as requested by President Nicol?s
Maduro, who announced the end of discussions to restore relations after the statements issued
recently by the US ambassador nominee to the United Nations, Samantha Power "We are
open to having a positive relationship with Venezuela moving forward. That's what
our focus is on, and we still are leaving the door open for that," the spokesperson of the US
Department of State, Jen Psaki, remarked. The spokesperson denied any sort of
"interference" in Venezuela's internal affairs by Washington as Venezuelan Foreign
Minister El?as Jaua claimed earlier this week.
Alt Causes to Relations
Alt causes to relations Snowden and Power
Reuters 13 (Power remarks cause Venezuela to end efforts to improve US ties, July 20, The
Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/20/venezuela-united-states-samantha-
power)//DLG

Venezuela said it was ending efforts to improve ties with Washington after the
Obama administration's nominee for envoy to the United Nations vowed to oppose
what she called a crackdown on civil society in the "repressive" OPEC nation. In an
echo of the many bust-ups between the two countries during the late Hugo Chvez's 14-
year rule, President Nicolas Maduro has demanded an apology and said the US has no
moral right to criticize his government. The foreign ministry said Samantha Power's
remarks had contradicted "in tone and content" what it said US secretary of state,
John Kerry, told his Venezuelan counterpart, Elias Jaua, at a rare meeting just last
month. "The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is terminating the process that was
started during the conversation in Guatemala, which was aimed at regularizing our
diplomatic relations," the ministry said late on Friday in a statement. Maduro has often
clashed with Washington since he narrowly won an election in April that was triggered
by the death of his mentor, Chvez, from cancer. At times, the former bus driver and union
negotiator has appeared to want better ties with the US, and both Jaua and Kerry had talked
positively about their meeting. But relations have frayed fast since then, with Maduro
becoming the world's first leader to offer asylum to Edward Snowden, the former US
intelligence contractor wanted by Washington for disclosing details of secret surveillance
programs. During a Senate conformation hearing this week, Power promised to stand up
against "repressive regimes" and said that meant "contesting the crackdown on civil society
being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela". The foreign ministry
in Caracas said her comments were "interventionist", and that the UN had often
recognized Venezuela's "solid system of constitutional guarantees" that ensured its citizens'
fundamental rights. "By contrast, the whole world is constantly expressing its concern over
repressive practices carried out by the United States," the ministry said.
Alt cause - Snowden undermined fragile relations with Venezuela and
killed global credibility
Munoz 13 - Fellow in the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy
School, Venezuelan journalist , Ph.D. in Hispanic American Literature and Culture at Rutgers
(Boris, VENEZUELAS VIEW OF THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR, July 23, The New Yorker,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/07/venezuelas-view-of-the-
snowden-affair.html)//DLG

In Venezuela, there was a brief, bright moment when Edward Snowden, the N.S.A. leaker,
was expected to land suddenly at Simn Bolvar International Airport, jet-lagged and
red-eyed but safe and sound and victorious. His slipping out of Moscow and crossing the
world would have been seen as a remarkable act of defiance against the power of the
American government. Venezuelan President Nicols Maduro had offered him asylum
after visiting Russia for the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, at the beginning of July. He
declared that Snowden had done nothing wrong and was being subjected to a crazy manhunt
by the United States authorities, and promised to protect him once he arrived in Caracas. It is
probably no accident that Maduro made the announcement on July 5th, Venezuelas
independence day. Domestic critics argued that Maduro should have given priority to
repairing the countrys relationship with the United States, damaged after long years
of quarreling under his predecessor, the late Hugo Chvez, particularly after both countries
withdrew their ambassadors in 2010. Others speculated that a heros welcome for
Snowden would give a much-needed boost to Maduros popularity. It was also
suggested that Snowden would be exchanged for Luis Posada Carriles, a terrorist of Cuban
extraction now living in Miami, who Venezuela has been seeking to extradite for blowing up a
Cubana Airlines plane in 1976, killing seventy-three people. Or that the Cubans would get their
hands on him, and then exchange him for the remaining four members of the Cuban Five
agents convicted in Florida for espionage. Laureano Mrquez, a prominent comedian and
opposition columnist, wrote that Maduro had expelled the filmmaker Tim Tracy, accusing him
without evidence of being a spy for the C.I.A., in order to bring in Snowden, a full-time, real
spy. The impact Snowdens presence might have on the relationship between the United States
and Venezuela was a constant topic of discussion for both Chavistas and the opposition.
Speculation about possible U.S. retaliations ran from cancelling the visas of high-level officials
to stopping purchases of Venezuelan oil. Theres no doubt that Snowden would have been a
valuable asset for the Venezuelan government, which is seeking to legitimize itself after elections
in April were questioned by the opposition, and which has lost much of the glow and potency
Chvez conferred to it. But after keeping Venezuela waiting for a formal reply, Snowden, who
has now been languishing for a month in Moscows Sheremetyevo Airport, made the surprise
announcement that he will stay in the land of Pussy Riotand Putinuntil the conditions for his
journey are more favorable. At that, the Snowden case disappeared almost instantaneously
from Venezuelan media, enveloped in the most rotund official silence. Several government
officials asked for comment said that the only people authorized to speak about the case were
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Elas Jaua, and Maduro himself. Last Thursday, the
newspaper ABC de Espaa disclosed that Secretary of State John Kerry had called Jaua on
Friday, July 12th, to talk about the Venezuelan offer. The newspaper described Kerrys tone as
intimidating, and said that the Secretary of State had threatened Jaua with bold actions against
Venezuela if the asylum materialized. Among other things, these steps would include stopping
the sale of gasoline and other oil derivatives from Venezuela and suspending U.S. visas for
diplomats, officials, and businessmen. On Friday, an unnamed State Department source
told the D.P.A. news agency that, indeed, there had been a call, but that it was
completely untrue that Kerry had bullied Jaua or given details about possible
sanctions. The Venezuelan governments silence was regarded as an implicit
acknowledgement that the issue is too delicate to risk any miscalculation that
might worsen the impasse. The fragile truce was broken when Obamas nominee for
United Nations ambassador, Samantha Power, promised before a Senate committee
last Wednesday that she would stand up against repressive regimes and the
crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and
Venezuela. The remarks infuriated Maduro, who, in a full bravado, responded, As
president, my policy is zero tolerance for any attacks the Gringos make on
Venezuela. Im not going to tolerate any sort of aggression against Venezuela
verbal, political, or diplomatic. Thats enough! You there with your empire. No more meddling
with Venezuela. Venezuela, he said, was suspending ongoing talks to improve relations with
the U.S. He also reaffirmed his willingness to give asylum to Snowden, since the
right to asylum is an international humanitarian right, and Venezuela has always
respected it. Maduro, that is to say, found it more convenient to step back to the
previous status quo than to move forward and regularize the relations. By doing so,
he can claim that he cares enough about the nationalistic values Chvez so firmly
defended. As of Friday night, a source close to the Maduro government said that it was highly
unlikely that Snowden would go to VenezuelaHes not coming here. Snowdens
uncertain fate, however, has serious implications for U.S. relations, not just with
Venezuela but with many other countries, especially Russia. Snowden might feel that Russias
strength would provide him with better security than Venezuela, as though he were protected by
one of the big boys. It might be a glaring paradox to be sheltered by a government that
suppresses freedom of the press and civil rights, but his options are constrained. And, of course,
Russias asylum would spare him from the prosecution and imprisonment that Bradley
Manning, for example, has faced. There is more than one set of contradictions. The
Snowden affair has made evident the U.S. disposition to twist arms. But will other
countries be eager to accede to an insistence that they help chase down Snowden
now that America is known to have conducted massive surveillance programs all
around the world? What is striking, in Venezuela and elsewhere, is how enmeshed
Snowdens fate is with the complexities of Americas relations with the rest of the
world. Asylum offers from Venezuela and a number of other Latin American countries were on
the table as a response to a clumsy effort to re-route the President of Bolivias planein the
belief that Snowden was on-boardbut also to the disclosure that a number of them, too, had
been subject to U.S. espionage. The Obama Administrations advantage is its ability to
pressure governments; Snowdens comes at the moment when those countries
start to mind.
Snowden kills relations
Negroponte, Senior Fellow Latin America at Brookings, 7-2-13 (Diana Villiers,
Consequences for Venezuela if Maduro Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/07/02-snowden-venezuela-asylum-
negroponte) //JAG
However, flying Snowden to Venezuela and granting him asylum will blow apart the
prospects for improved relations. The recently formed Continental Coalition of Social
Movements in support of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) may rejoice that Snowden can
operate and speak freely in Venezuela, but the prospects of dialogue with U.S.
economic, trade and energy sectors will fizzle out. Without U.S. support, few nations
will step in to help meet Venezuelas rising debt repayments and falling foreign
reserves. In deciding whether to give Snowden a way out of Moscow, Maduro must balance
the economic wellbeing of Venezuela against the short term notoriety of saving
Snowden.
AT: Terrorism Adv


AT: Port Security

US has provided Venezuela with port security assistance before
GAO 9 Government Accountability Office (U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with
Venezuela Has Declined, GAO, Jul, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09806.pdf,
Daehyun)

The United States supported Venezuelan port security through the provision of X-
ray machines and ion scanners to detect and interdict drugs at seaport, airport,
and land border points of entry and exit. As part of the seaport security program, INL
funded a modern Container Inspection Facility (CIF) at Puerto Cabello,
Venezuela's largest commercial seaport and a known embarkation point for multi-
ton cocaine shipments to the United States. The CIF included a high-tech X-ray
system, forklifts, tools, and safety equipment that would allow Venezuelan
authorities to examine high-threat shipping containers and their contents in a
secure environment.

Operations of PDVSA are in coordination with ISPS to combat drug
trafficking
PDVSA 12 Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A Government of Venezuela (PDVSA, It was detected
the presence of alleged drug in oil tanker,
1/3/12, http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/salaprensa/readnew.tpl.ht
ml&newsid_obj_id=9960&newsid_temas=1)

Barcelona. To maintain safety regulations and ensure the optimal development of
maritime operations at Terminal Storage and Shipping of Oil Jose Antonio Anzotegui
(TAECJAA), the Personal for Protection and Loss Control (PCP ) along with officials
of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) detected the presence of five packages of
suspected drug and two unauthorized persons on board (cops) on a ship registered
under the flag of the Bahamas. The alleged discovery of illicit substances was made
during the inspection that strictly holds for the unmooring of tankers in the
TAECJAA, adjusted to international ISPS code (International Ship and Port Facility
Security), which is subscribed Venezuela, which provides for preventive measures
to counter security vulnerabilities in shipping and port facilities in the world. This
action was carried out with the GNB on the boat Kareela Spirit loaded with 550 Mbls of Hamaca
crude, docked at the pier south of TAECJAA, and following the protocol of action was
immediately notified the news to the authorities with jurisdiction over drug that initiated the
investigation. Note that the inspection is performed on a mandatory basis in all
boats , by PCP staff of PDVSA and the Bolivarian National Guard, using drug dogs
and anti-explosives that cover all installations of tankers, as well as divers
underwater structure with highly trained for such operations. Early detection of
these crimes is due to the provision of a robust security and protection of facilities,
ensuring that operations of PDVSA Socialist are running attached to the
international agreements signed by Venezuela in the fight against drug trafficking.

AT: Drugs Internal Link

Weak foreign policy towards Venezuela worsens the drug war
hardline stance is needed
Walser 11 --- Ph.D., a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation (Ray, Weakness on
Chavez, Drugs and Terror Plague Obamas Latin America Policy, The Heritage Foundation,
5/10, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/10/weakness-on-chavez-drugs-and-terror-plague-
obamas-latin-america-policy/)//BJ

The record will show that the May 9 extradition by Colombia of Walid Makled
Garcia to Venezuela constitutes a major lost opportunity for the Obama
Administration to interrogate and prosecute a Venezuelan drug kingpin with close
ties to high-level Venezuelan officials and to expose the depth of narco-corruption within the
Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela. Makleds extradition follows the decision by Colombian
President Juan Manuel Santos and the Colombian courts to honor the Venezuelan request for
extradition over a similar request made by the U.S. In exchange for Makled, the Colombians are
banking on closer commercial and security ties, including reduced support for the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with the imperious and unpredictable Chavez. The
relationship between Chavez and the narco-terrorists of the FARC is again the subject of careful
international scrutiny following release of a detailed examination and analysis of links between
the FARC and Venezuela by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS). The study includes the most complete set of documents recovered from the laptop of
Raul Reyes, the FARCs chief of staff, who was killed during a daring military strike by
Colombian forces in March 2008 in his safe haven on Ecuadors soil. The study reviews the long
record of collaboration by Chvez and his top confidants with the FARC, which they viewed as
an ally that would keep U.S. and Colombian military strength in the region tied down in
counterinsurgency, helping to reduce perceived threats against Venezuela. The return of
Makled to Venezuela and the release of the IISS study are important reminders of
the serious regional security threat posed by the Chavez regime, a threat the
Obama Administration has routinely downplayed. The persistent Chavez threat
prompted the introduction for debate and passage on May 4 of H.R. 247, which reviews Chavezs
record of support for terrorism and (1) condemns the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela for its state-sponsored support of international terrorist groups; (2) calls on the
Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism; and (3) urges increased
and sustained cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives between the Government of the
United States and allies in the region. Placing Chavez on the list of state sponsors of
terrorism is a measure that is long overdue. Overall, the highly contentious nature of the
U.S.Chavez relationship is also being increasingly documented in further releases of cables
from the U.S. embassy in Caracas. Following President Obamas trip to Latin America, the
Administration has moved into reorganize mode as the State Departments Assistant Secretary
for Western Hemisphere Arturo Valenzuela recently announced that he is returning to academia
later this summer. During Valenzuelas nearly two-year tenure at State, improvements in
regional policy for the Western Hemisphere have been difficult to identify, as Chavez appeared
to run roughshod over the region with little reaction from the Administration. Former
Foreign Policy editor Moises Naim described U.S. policy for Latin America as
well-sounding, well-meaning, but clich-ridden and, ultimately, irrelevant.
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (RFL), chair of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, did not mince words. She argued that Valenzuelas time at State has
been marked by abject failure by the U.S. to stand up to the attacks against
democracy and fundamental freedoms. U.S. interests have suffered as a result.


AT: West Africa
Spare capacity solves oil shocks their authors hide numbers**
Gholz, Professor Public Affairs UT Austin, and Press, Professor Gov Dartmouth, 13
(Eugene and Daryl, February, Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions
Security Studies, Vol 22 Issue 1, p 139-147, T&F Online)//JAG

Cartels like OPEC create incentives for their members to keep untapped supply off
the market; cartel leaders in particular enforce discipline by keeping pumping capacity in
reserve and threatening to flood the market if cartel members greatly exceed their quotas. The
result, as history repeatedly shows, is that when oil disruptions occur, ample spare
capacity is available to fill the shortfall, and the lure of profit draws that spare
capacity onto the market. 2 In addition, many of the world's major oil-consuming
countries hold large government-controlled stockpiles, and private companies
keep large inventories that they can tap in a crisis (to make money). 3 The world is
not perched on an energy precipice; plenty of oil is available to rapidly respond to
disruptions. Levi argues that we overstate the flexibility of oil markets. Although he concedes
that OPEC has functioned as we claim for several decades, 4 he worries that the future will be
radically different, specifically that the cartel has recently discovered a way to restrain output
without maintaining spare capacity. Levi suggests that cartel members now restrict their output
by simply under-investing in pumping infrastructure rather than building capacity that they
plan not to use. Levi supports his contention by noting the drop in OPEC's spare capacity
starting in the middle of the past decade. Furthermore, he suggests three other factors that
might contribute to declining spare capacity: the rising cost of finding new oil fields (i.e., a
version of the peak oil argument), a decline in Saudi Arabia's desire to be seen as a
responsible contributor to the international economic order, and a fraying U.S.-Saudi
relationship. We disagree with Levi's critique for both theoretical and empirical reasons. First,
his claim that OPEC no longer needs spare capacity contradicts the fundamentals
of cartel mechanics. Cartels still face a collective action problem: members benefit if others
stick to their quotas, but each member can increase its own profits by cheating. Levi claims that
this perennial problem of cartel management is no longer a concern for OPEC, because most of
its members are already producing at maximum capacity and therefore physically cannot cheat.
But Levi is making a logical leap: even if many OPEC members are producing flat out,
one cannot assume that they are respecting their quotas. Cartel members do not
typically announce when they cheat, and publicly available production data are not a
good guide to cheating in the cartel. Furthermore, if cartel leaders do not maintain
sufficient spare capacity to punish cheating, why will members refrain from building extra
capacity to allow them to cheat in the future? The point is that cheating is a major concern
for OPEC's leaders, as it always has been. Cartel leaders therefore still need spare
capacity, just as they have in the past. 5 Nor does the empirical evidence support Levi's
claims that depletion, or some policy shift, has caused OPEC to abandon its long-term
policy of maintaining spare capacity. Spare capacity is difficult to measure, because
countries (and privately held companies) guard information about their reserves and
investments zealously. Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows two sets of estimates of spare capacity
held by OPEC countries since 1994, produced by the U.S. Department of Energy and by
the International Energy Agency. The figure reveals that spare capacity did not
gradually decline over the past decade as one might expect if the decline were the result of
gradual geological depletion (i.e., peak oil) or fraying of U.S.-Saudi relations. Rather, it
plummeted in 20022003 when two major disruptions caused OPEC producers to tap their
spare capacity: OPEC replaced the oil disrupted by Venezuela's oil strikes (20022003) and by
the invasion of Iraq (2003). The lesson of 20022003 is not that spare capacity is disappearing.
The lesson is that spare capacity was used to respond to supply disruptionsexactly
as our theory predicts. In the years that followed, the global economy grew rapidly, so
demand for oil soared in the United States, China, India, and other major economies. OPEC's
slack capacity stayed relatively low for several years because even as OPEC members developed
new capacity to recreate their normal buffer, economic growth kept shifting the goalposts. And
the fear among OPEC members that some of the rapid demand growth was actually a bubble
fear that turned out to be well-foundedconstrained the pace of OPEC members' oil
infrastructure investments. Naturally, when the bubble popped with the 2008 financial
crisis, spare capacity suddenly returned to the oil market. More disruptions have
occurred since 20022003, and each time oil markets responded as our theory
suggests: by tapping spare capacity to replace lost oil. The civil war in Libya denied
world markets roughly 1.5 million barrels of oil per day. OPEC responded rapidly
by turning spare capacity into actual production, replacing the Libyan oil almost
immediately . What is perhaps most striking about oil supplies and spare capacity over the
past decade is that despite the ongoing use of what would otherwise be millions of
barrels per day of spare capacityto make up for Iraq's depressed oil production and to
replace Libyan exportsthe United States and its oil allies are still sufficiently confident that
there is ample spare capacity to try to cut off Iran's oil exports. What of the future?
Neither the U.S. Department of Energy nor the International Energy Agency agree
with Levi that spare capacity is drying up. 6 In fact, some analysts hope that Iraq, infused
with new investment, will see its oil production soar, and Libyan production may soon rebound.
Today, without access to much Iraqi or Libyan oil, there is plenty of capacity; if their oil
industries recover, the world will truly be awash in spare oil capacity. The bottom line from the
data is that the fluctuation in spare capacity over the past decadewhich Levi uses to
refute our claimsactually provides the strongest possible support for our argument.
Spare capacity has dipped repeatedlybut not because of peak oil or because OPEC is no
longer concerned with cheating. Rather, spare capacity has repeatedly dipped in the past decade
because oil markets turned spare capacity into active capacity whenever
disruptions occurred. To be clear, we do not argue that spare capacity to pump oil will
always be high. It will vary according to economic conditions and the level of trust among cartel
members. Nor do we put too much stock in the exact estimates of spare capacity that Levi cites
or that we use in Figure 1because, as we noted above, oil-producing states and firms hide the
truth. But the data reveal the general pattern if not precise details. And Levi and we rely on the
same data, and they support our theory and undermine his critique. The broader point for U.S.
foreign policy is that given the 1.4 billion barrels of oil in U.S. and allied government-
controlled stockpiles, given the huge commercial stocks in storage tanks around the
world, and given OPEC's spare capacity, it is hard to justify a large forward military
presence in the Persian Gulf on the basis of the erroneous notion that the world's
energy supplies are balanced on a knife's edge.
AT: FARC Module
FARC is weak and have no political capital squo solves
Felbab-Brown 12 - senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence
in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings(Vanda, FIGHTING THE NEXUS OF ORGANIZED
CRIME AND VIOLENT CONFLICT WHILE ENHANCING HUMAN SECURITY, Apr 19, 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/4/19%20drugs%20instability
%20felbabbrown/0419_drugs_instability_felbabbrown.pdf, Daehyun)

Colombia today provides a clear example. Without doubt, the legitimacy of the leftist
guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia [FARC]) is, after decades of conflict, at an all-time low. The sources of
this decline of political capital are multiple. The political ideology of the group is
largely moribund both as a result of global changes and the decline of socialist
ideologies as well as the aging and isolation of the FARCs intellectual leadership.8
The FARC today is under severe pressure from the Colombian military. The
brutality of the guerrilla group toward the rural population has progressively increased in the
1990s and 2000s as it competed with rightist paramilitaries. At the same time, the group
systematically failed to protect the rural and urban populations against coercion and massacres
by the equally and perhaps even more brutal paramilitary groups. Finally, as a result of the
demise of the Medelln and Cali cartels in the mid-1990s and the growth in strength of the
FARC due to its progressive penetration of the drug trade, the leadership decided to
eliminate many traffickers from the territories it controlled and take over their
trafficking roles in those territories.9 By doing so, the group inadvertently
eliminated a key source of its political capital. Instead of bargaining on behalf of the
cocaleros (coca farmers) for better prices for coca paste and mitigating and regulating other
forms of the traffickers abuse against the cocaleros as it used to do in the 1980s and early 1990s
when independent traffickers were present,10 the FARC put itself in the position of the brutal
monopolist that sets prices, limits the customers to whom the population can sell coca paste
and base, and inflicts abuse on the rural population.11

FARC is not a threat no Middle East connections
Felbab-Brown 12 - senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence
in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings(Vanda, FIGHTING THE NEXUS OF ORGANIZED
CRIME AND VIOLENT CONFLICT WHILE ENHANCING HUMAN SECURITY, Apr 19, 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/4/19%20drugs%20instability
%20felbabbrown/0419_drugs_instability_felbabbrown.pdf, Daehyun)

Clearly, the United States has an interest in Colombias enhanced security, prosperity, and
human rights promotion. But that countrys violent armed groups have not greatly
threatened U.S. security interests beyond the FARCs shooting at spraying planes
and oil pipelines belonging to U.S. companies. The three U.S. contractors held by the
FARC went through a terrible ordeal, and their rescue in 2008 was a joyful moment. But
overall, neither the FARC nor the other leftist guerrilla group, the Ejrcito de Liberacin
Nacional (National Liberation Army [ELN]), have sought to conduct a terrorist
campaign against U.S. citizens and major U.S. assets or attack the U.S. homeland.
Allegations of al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah contacts with the FARC or these
groups penetration of the Latin American drug trade have not proven to be a
serious menace.26

AT: Europe
EU FTA solves economic growth
ICTSD, 2-6-13 (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Questions
Linger As EU, US Consider Launching Trade Talks Bridges Weekly, http://ictsd.org/i/trade-
and-sustainable-development-agenda/153479/)//JAG

Top officials from both the US and EU have been meeting over the past week to
discuss the possibility of launching bilateral trade talks, leaving observers and analysts to
speculate whether the long-awaited announcement might soon be on the horizon. However,
questions remain over whether the two sides will be able to resolve long-standing
differences that have blocked such negotiations in the past. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De
Gucht spent Wednesday in Washington meeting with his counterpart - US Trade Representative
Ron Kirk - with the goal of putting the finishing touches on a joint report by the EU-US High-
Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, which is expected to include recommendations
regarding the potential negotiations. However, these efforts ultimately did not succeed, leaving
the release date of the report up in the air. An interim report released in June had found that a
broad, comprehensive bilateral deal was the option with greatest potential for
supporting jobs and fostering economic growth in both trading partners. (See
Bridges Weekly, 27 June 2012) While the EU trade chief has said in recent weeks that the final
report - which was originally expected in December - is nearly ready, the repeated delays have
appeared to indicate that Washington might still have concerns. We only want to move
forward if we are confident that Europeans are as serious as we are about tackling
issues that have tripped us up before, Mike Froman - a trusted Obama adviser who serves
as US Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs - told the Financial
Times on Tuesday, adding that Washington does not want to end up mired in protracted
negotiations without an end in sight. The two sides have long sparred over issues such as
regulations and standards, which stymied efforts to deepen bilateral trade ties in the past. The
US and EU currently trade 700 billion annually in goods and services; while already having low
tariffs between them, experts note that the lowering of non-tariff barriers and
reconciliation of different regulatory regimes could have a significant impact on
the volume of bilateral trade. As part of Brussels efforts to show Washington that it has the
political will needed to address some of these tough topics, the EU decided on Monday to lift its
ban on imports of live pigs and of beef carcasses cleaned with lactic acid, while ultimately
leaving in place another agricultural barrier - restrictions on imports of a US animal fat known
as tallow - that Washington has taken issue with. Leaders from the EUs 27 member states,
meeting as the European Council, are slated to discuss the proposed negotiations on Thursday;
whether the joint working groups report would be ready in time for the gathering was unclear as
Bridges went to press on Wednesday evening. With US President Barack Obama set to deliver
the annual State of the Union address next Tuesday - the speech in which he outlines his
administrations policy goals for the rest of the year - trade observers are watching to see if a
decision might be made in time for the high-level event. Biden: Talks within our reach Despite
these questions, top political officials from both sides have continued to advocate for
the benefits that this type of trade deal might provide. During a five-day trip to Europe,
US Vice President Joe Biden said that such an initiative could have huge potential for
the worlds largest trading relationship, particularly given the recent economic and
financial struggles that both the EU and US are working to overcome. Now, just imagine what
we can do as we get our respective houses in order, Biden told a Munich audience on Friday.
Already, Europe is Americas largest economic partner, and the numbers are staggering - over
US$600 billion in annual trade that creates and sustains millions of jobs on the continent and at
home, and a US$5 trillion overall commercial relationship. Acknowledging the two sides long-
standing differences on issues such as regulations and standards - which continue to divide us
- Biden stressed that the remaining question is whether there is sufficient political will to resolve
these disagreements. If so, we should pursue a trans-Atlantic partnership. And if we go down
that road, we should try to do it on one tank of gas and avoid protracted rounds of negotiations.
This is within our reach, the US Vice President urged, noting that the rewards for
successfully reaching such an agreement are almost boundless. Speaking ahead of
her meeting with Biden, German Chancellor Angela Merkel also expressed her personal wish for
progress in the bilateral trade talks. There are positive signs, she said, in comments
reported by Reuters, adding that she was grateful that this has also been placed on the Obama
administrations agenda.
AT: Colombia
Instability is inevitable but wont escalatemilitary conflict is
empirically denied
Perez-Linan, prof @ Pitt, 7 [Anbal Prez-Lin is associate professor of political science at
the University of Pittsburgh, Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in
Latin America,
http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521178495&ss=fro]

The 1990s were an era of great hopes for Latin America. After the demise of
authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and the early 1990s, major economic reforms
were undertaken in most Latin American countries in order to reduce chronic inflation and
promote sustained growth. For many contemporary observers, the confluence of democracy
and free markets signaled a break with the past, the dawn of a new era of civil liberties,
prosperity, and political stability. More than a decade later, it is hard to look back at this
period without a mixture of nostalgia and sarcasm. The legacies of the 1990s varied from
country to country, but they can be generally described as notable achievements
overshadowed by missed opportunities. In the economic realm, hyperinflation was
eventually defeated, but economic growth remained elusive and poverty resilient. In the
political arena, the military eventually withdrew from politics (not a minor feat),
but elected governments, surprisingly, continued to collapse. Starting in the early
1990s, presidents were removed from office in Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia in some countries recurrently. This outcome
frequently represented the triumph of an indignant society over a corrupt or
abusive executive, but it seldom prevented the occurrence of new abuses in later
administrations. By the early years of the twenty-first century, it was clear that the particular
circumstances of each crisis represented only parts of a broader puzzle a new pattern of
political instability emerging in the region. This book explores the origins and the consequences
of this novel pattern of instability, emphasizing the critical events that defined the new trend
between 1992 and 2004. During this period, civilian elites realized that traditional
military coups had become for the most part unfeasible and experimented with the
use of constitutional instruments to remove unpopular presidents from office.
Presidential impeachment thus became a distinctive mark of the new political
landscape in Latin America. The recurrence of presidential crises without democratic
breakdown challenged many dominant views among political scientists. Latin
American democracies proved to be simultaneously enduring and unstable, willing
to punish presidential corruption but unable to prevent it, and responsive to popular demands
only in the context of massive protests and widespread frustration. My attempts to understand
these facts initially relied on well-delimited theoretical perspectives that proved rather
disappointing, and I was forced to embark on a long exploration across the disciplinary
boundaries of political sociology, communication, political behavior, institutional analysis,
democratization, and the study of social movements. Others who have studied these topics more
thoroughly than I may be reluctant to recognize their subject in the chapters that follow, but I
hope that they will forgive my intrusion. In the course of this exploration I have wandered
through the academic fields of many colleagues and collected a large number of intellectual
debts along the way.
FARC Declining Now
Valencia, research fellow @ the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 12
(Robert, July 3, pg. http://yalejournal.org/2012/07/colombia-and-farc-will-the-internal-
conflict-reach-an-end/)

Though FARC still poses some degree of threat to the Colombian population, the
revolutionary force no longer has the clout it possessed decades ago. The deaths of
its rank and file members, its dwindling military power, and mounting rejection
from Colombians leave little option for FARC but to reach a peaceful yet uneasy
end to the conflict. Otherwise, the Santos administrationand perhaps ensuing
administrationswill continue using cutting-edge weaponry that has so damaged
FARC while utilizing civilian means to encourage guerrilleros to leave the
organizations ranks and reintegrate into Colombian society.
Navy will never be challenged
Rubinovitz, Post-Doc Fellow Davis Institute for International Relations, 12 (Ziv, July, The
US vs. the East Asian rising powers: Can the US stay on top? 22nd IPSA World Congress,
http://rc41.ipsa.org/public/Madrid_2012/rubinovitz.pdf)//JAG

Moreover, the U.S. is still and will remain in the foreseeable future the naval
superpower with the most powerful navy that has the best power-projection
capabilities. It can afford to leave the continent and become an offshore balancer. True, it will
lose some of its influence, but it can preserve its power on the sea and project it
restrictedly whenever needed. So, very briefly, the U.S. has a much wider room for
maneuver than is presumed, and with the most powerful military with no parallel
in the foreseeable future, the U.S. still has a wide spectrum of policies it can use,
hence it is in the best position for the coming hegemonic competition.

Colombian instability has been on the rise since 2003 disproves the
impact
The Economist, 3 (Ripples of instability, 5/1/2003,
http://www.economist.com/node/1755158) // MS

FOR years, it has been claimed that Colombia's conflicts are spilling over its
borders, threatening the stability of its neighbours. But hitherto there has been little evidence of this
outside immediate frontier areas. These have seen a few refugees, and periodic incursions by leftist guerrillas from the FARC or ELN
or rightist paramilitaries from the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), seeking either plunder or rest and recreation. Is
the Colombian conflict now starting to cause wider ripples in South America?
There are three reasons for thinking so. One is that Plan Colombia, the American-
backed scheme to fight guerrillas by fighting the drug production from which they
derive income, is having an effect: coca cultivation is falling in Colombia, but
rising elsewhere. Second, lvaro Uribe, who took office as Colombia's president
last year, has been seekingbut not always gettingwider co-operation from
around the region. Staunchly pro-American, he has echoed George Bush in demanding that his neighbours be either with
him or against him in curbing terrorists, as he has dubbed all three of Colombia's irregular armies. Third, tension has
become acute between Colombia and Venezuela.
AT: Colombia --- Adv CP
The Government of Columbia should:
- prioritize state security and law enforcement
- pursue a joint security strategy with Brazil and Panama to block
illegal groups from crossing its border
- deny sanctuary to illegal armed groups
- request international institutions to aid in border enforcement
- review all international databases on trafficking
- prioritize community infrastructure projects
CP solves the biggest internal link to Columbian instability
International Crisis Group, 3 Colombia and its Neighbours: The Tentacles of
Instability, Latin American Report, 4/8/2003, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-
america-caribbean/andes/colombia/003-colombia-and-its-neighbours-the-tentacles-of-
instability.aspx)//MS

This report examines the armed conflict's impact on Colombia's neighbours.
Nothing has altered Colombia's basic responsibility to manage the conflict. It
needs to move toward a negotiated solution by pursuing a broad, integrated
security strategy that combines strengthening the security forces while respecting
human rights, extending the rule of law, and implementing credible political and
economic reforms. But more effective regional security cooperation, an end to mutual recriminations, and establishment
of a political consensus would do much to help the Uribe administration. Operationally, Colombia and its neighbours
should give priority to enhanced joint border control and development, more
effective intelligence sharing and judicial cooperation, confidence building
between the military and police and more concerted action against drugs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Colombia:
1. Give high priority to establishing or strengthening state security and law
enforcement, with full respect for human rights, new social and economic
development and environmental protection programs in the border provinces, as
part of a new comprehensive rural development strategy.
2. Pursue within the framework of the Andean community, but including Brazil
and Panama, a joint security strategy to block illegal armed groups and drug
traffickers from moving freely across the region's borders.
3. Deny sanctuary and refuge to illegal armed groups by developing real-time
systems for exchange of operational information with neighbours and joint
military and law enforcement planning.
4. Request the UN, OAS, and the international financial institutions to join the
Andean community, along with Panama and Brazil, in pursuing plans and projects
for both short and long term border protection, conservation and development,
depending on the characteristics of each border.
5. Review intelligence, planning, communications and transport with its
neighbours and international supporters, including the The United Nations Office
for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) and the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), to produce a more effective border
surveillance system, and conduct a new regional review of overall
counternarcotics policy, seeking common approaches where possible and mutual
understanding of differences on eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and
alternative development.
6. Give priority to re-establishing local government and courts with adequate
security in combination with local community infrastructure and economic
development projects, especially in border municipalities from which authorities
have fled.

AT: Latin America
No threat to the U.S. from Venezuela
BBC 8 (may 10, pg. http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3427)

Alejandro Snchez, an analyst with the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a U.S.
investigative organism, interprets the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet as a political
decision, more than a military one. For the last few years, the United States was
concentrated on Iraq and Afghanistan. Recently now it is trying to return to Latin America, he
told the BBC. With regard to the supposed U.S. military challenges in the region, Snchez
added: Lets be honest. Even if Venezuela acquires a Russian submarine, or Brazil
wants to develop a nuclear submarine, neither of these countries can present a
military threat to the United States.
Venezuela Wont Pose Global Threat
Carpenter 12 (Ted Galen, July 18, pg. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/obama-right-about-hugo-chavez-7211)

Hugo Chavez has been a catastrophe for his country and an annoyance to his
neighbors. But those offenses are quite different from posing a security threat
much less a serious security threatto the United States. Venezuela is a small
country with very limited military capabilities, while the United States is a large
country with vast military capabilities. Chavez is a gnat, not a rattlesnake.
Venezuela terrorist threat exaggerated
Golinger 12 (Eva, July 31, pg. http://sfbayview.com/2012/venezuela-a-threat-to-
washington/)

Is Venezuela a threat to Washington? In Venezuela, the only terrorists are the groups
trying to destabilize the country, the majority with political and financial support
from the U.S. The drug traffickers are in Colombia, where the production and transit of drugs
has increased during the U.S. invasion disguised as Plan Colombia. Relations with Iran,
Cuba, China, Russia and the rest of the world are normal bilateral and
multilateral ties between countries. There are no bombs, no attack plans, no
sinister secrets. No, Venezuela is not that kind of threat to Washington.