ABELLA VS NLRC

G.R. No.71818 July 20, 1987

Ponente: Paras, J
.
FACTS:
On June 27, 1960 the petioner, Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land known as
HaciendaDanao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years. She opted to extend the
leased contract for another ten(10) years.
During the existence of the lease, she employed the private respondents Ricardo
Dionele, Sr.,and Romeo Quitco.
Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private
respondentsand turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981,
who continued the management,cultivation and operation of the farm.
On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at
theMinistry of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City District Office, for overtime pay,
illegal dismissal andreinstatement with backwages.
After the parties had presented their respective evidence, Labor ArbiterManuel M.
Lucas, Jr., in a Decision dated July 16, 1982, ruled that the dismissal is warranted by
thecessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation pay.
Petitioner appealed, theNational Labor Relations Commission, in a Resolution
affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal forlack of merit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, the presentpetition.
ISSUE:Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay?
HELD: YES
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130 is the lawapplicable in this case.
The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workerswhose
employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel.
Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the
benefits to whichthey are entitledfor the thirty three years of service in the case of
Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco.
Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the
absence ofany showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former
employer, they will beconsidered as new employees and the years of service behind
them would amount to nothing.It is well-settled that in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Codeand its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramountconsideration.
The instant petition is hereby dismissed and Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the
resolution of theministry of labor and employment are hereby affirmed
MENDOZA VS RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN
G.R. No.155421 July, 7, 2004
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc.,
issuedBoard Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, that in line with the policy of the bank
to familiarizebank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further
strengthen the existinginternal control system[,] all officers and employees are subject
to reshuffle of assignments.Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of
assignment of bank officers andemployees from the branch office to the head office
and vice-versa.
. Pursuant to Board Res.No. 95-52 the following branch employees; Joyce V. Zeta,
Clodualdo Zagala, Elmer M.Mendoza and Chona R. Mendoza are reshuffled to their
new assignments without changes intheir compensation and other benefits.
Petitioner Elmer Mendoza in an antedated letter expressed his opinion on the
reshuffledto the management.
Upon the reply of the Bank Chairman, Daya, it informed it informed that itwas never in
their intention to downgrade the position of the petitioner in the bank consideringthat
his due compensation as bank appraiser is maintained and no future reduction
wasintended.
Petitioner filed a leave of absence for 10 days due to ailment and then another 20days
leave of absence.
While on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a Complaint before
ArbitrationBranch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Complaint -- for illegaldismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages --
was filed against the Rural Bank ofLucban and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and its
Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V. Cada.
Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for constructive
dismissal,because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any
work to do, while histable had been placed near the toilet and eventually removed.
He adds that the reshuffling ofemployees was done in bad faith, because it was
designed primarily to force him to resign.
The Labor Arbiter rendered the decision in favor the petitioner, the respondent
Bankappealed and the NLRC reversed the Decision.
After the NLRC denied his Motion forReconsideration, petitioner brought before the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailingthe foregoing Resolution.
The Court of appeals Find that no grave abuse of discretion could beattributed to the
NLRC.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment?
HELD: No.
The petition has no merit. Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary
resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable orunlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or
when a clear discrimination,insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.
In the case at bar,the reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot
be made the basis of afinding of constructive dismissal
.In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the prerogative
totransfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another --
provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other
privileges; and the action is notmotivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or
effected as a form of punishment or demotionwithout sufficient cause.
This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their
enterprise effectively.
The right of employees to security of tenure does not givethem vested rights to their
positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative tochange their
assignments or to transfer them.
There appears no justification for denying an employer the right to transfer employees
toexpand their competence and maximize their full potential for the advancement of
theestablishment.
Petitioner was not singled out; other employees were also reassigned withouttheir
express consent.
Neither was there any demotion in the rank of petitioner; or anydiminution of his
salary, privileges and other benefits.
This fact is clear in respondent's BoardResolutions, the April 30, 1999 letter of Bank
President Daya to Branch Manager Cada, and theMay 10, 1999 letter of Daya to
petitioner.
The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of
management.Courts will not interfere with business judgments of employers, provided
they do not violate thelaw, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of
fair play and justice.
Thetransfer of personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a
managerialprerogative that shall be upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose
of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of
employees
Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 85668 August 10, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner
GelmartIndustries Phils., Inc. (GELMART) sometime in 1971.
As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and underchassis, as well as
trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles
.He is likewise entrusted with some tools and spare parts in furtherance of the work
assigned tohim.
On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of
GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces of "used'
motor oil,without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under
GELMART's rules andregulations which provides that theft and/or pilferage of
company property merits an outrighttermination from employment.
By reason thereof, petitioner was placed under preventivesuspension pending
investigation for violation of company rules and regulations on April 13,1987.
After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987, private respondent was found guilty of
theft of company property. As a consequence, his services were severed.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
In adecision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that
privaterespondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latter's
reinstatement with fullbackwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual
reinstatement
.From this decision, GELMART interposed an appeal with the NLRC.
In its decision datedOctober 21, 1988, the NLRC affirmed with modification the ruling
of Labor Arbiter Diosana.
On December 12, 1988, GELMART filed before this Court a special civil action for
certiorari witha prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
On January 18, 1989, this Court, without necessarily giving due course to the petition,
issued atemporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion for rendering a decision
that is contrary to law and existing jurisprudence in ordering the reinstatement of private
respondent tohis former position with payment of backwages.
Held: NO
We find no merit in this petition
Consistent with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the
underprivilegedworkingmen and the more affluent employers, the NLRC rightfully tilted
the balance in favor of the workingmen and this was done without being blind to the
concomitant right of theemployer to the protection of his property.
On the other hand, without being too harsh to the employer, and naively liberal to
labor, on theother, the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot
totally escape liability for what is patently a violation of company rules and regulations.
To reiterate, be it of big or small commercial value, intended to be re-used or
altogether disposed of or wasted, the "used" motor oil still remains, in legal
contemplation, the property of GELMART.
As such, to take the same out of GELMART's premises without the correspondinggate
pass is a violation of the company rule on theft and/or pilferage of company
property.In this score, it is very difficult for this Court to discern grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in modifying the appealed decision.
The suspension imposed upon privaterespondent is a sufficient penalty for the
misdemeanor committed.Considering that private respondent herein has no previous
derogatory record in his fifteen (15)years of service with petitioner GELMART the
value of the property pilfered (16 ounces of usedmotor oil) is very minimal, plus the
fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non-dismissal of private
respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently
inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the policy of theState,
as embodied in the Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of labor.
Thus, the penalty of preventive suspension was sufficient punishment for the violation
under thecircumstance and that complainant-appellees dismissal unwarranted
Pampanga Bus Company, INC., vs. PAMBUSCO Employees' Union, Inc
.G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939
MORAN, J.:
Facts:
On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the
petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent,
Pambusco Employees'Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace
members of the union who maybe dismissed from the service of the company, with
the proviso that, if the union fails to provideemployees possessing the necessary
qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire.
This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against itswill, to employ
preferentially, in its service, the members of the union.
Issue: Whether or not the said order issued by the CIR valid and not violative of the right of the
employer to select employees.
Held: NO
We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order.
The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part
of theliberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution.
The right of thelaborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its
essence, the same as theright of an employer to purchase labor from any person
whom it chooses.
The employer and theemployee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the
Constitution.Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations
the right "to collectivebargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better
working and living conditions, fair wages, and shorter working hours for laborers, and,
in general, to promote the material, socialand moral well-being of their members."
This provision in granting to labor unions merely theright of collective bargaining,
impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or not intocollective agreements
with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling suchagreements.
Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon groundsof
public policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt.
Thesupreme mandates of the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. As
held by theSupreme Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Co. vs. Mitchell
(245 U. S., 229; 62Law. ed., 260, 276):
Decision:Thus considered, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs
against the respondentPambusco Employees' Union, Inc

CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION VS. CLAVE
141 SCRA 9. January 7, 1986
FACTS:
Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union lodged a complaint with
theDepartment of Labor, against Commercial trust Bank for non-payment of the
holiday pay benefitsprovided for under Art 95 of the Labor Code in relation to Rule X,
Book III of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Labor Code.
Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, theparties opted to
submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.
The issue presented was: "Whether thepermanent employees of the Bank within the
collective bargaining unit paid on a monthly basisareentitled to holiday pay effective
November 1, 1974, pursuant to Article 94 of the Labor Code.In addition, the disputants
signed a Submission Agreement stipulating as final, unappealable andexecutory the
decision of the Arbitrator, including subsequent issuances for clarificatory and/or relief
purposes, notwithstanding Article 262 of the Labor Code.
The Union filed a Manifestation stating that in the event that said Interpretative
Bulletinregarding holiday pay would be adverse to the present claim union respectfully
reserves the right totake such action as may be appropriate to protect its interests, a
question of law being involved.
AnInterpretative Bulletin which was inexistent at the time they said commitment was
made and which maybe contrary to the law itself should not bar the right of the union
to claim for its holiday pay benefits.Voluntary Arbitrator stated that, there is more
reason to believe that, if the Bank has nevermade any deduction from its monthly-paid
employees for unworked Saturdays, Sundays, legal andspecial holidays, it is because
there is really nothing to deduct properly since the monthly salary neverreally included
pay for such unworked days-and which give credence to the conclusion that the
divisor'250' is the proper one to use in computing the equivalent daily rate of the
monthly-paid employees;that both the decree itself and the Rulesmentioned
enumerated the excepted workers.
It is a basic ruleof statutory construction that putting an exception limits or modifies the
enumeration or meaning madein the law. It is thus easy to see that a mere reading of
the Decree and of the Rules would show that themonthly-paid employees of the Bank
are
not expressly included in the enumeration of the exception.
Voluntary Arbitrator directed the bank to pay its monthly paid
employees their legal holidaypay.
The next day, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. 9 which
clarifiescontroversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new
determining rule is this: If themonthly paid employee is receiving not less than P 240,
the maximum monthly minimum wage, and hismonthly pay is uniform from January to
December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paidlegal holidays.
However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays
inmonths where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
ISSUE: whether or not the permanent employees of the bank are entitled to holiday pay
HELD: Yes.
They are entitled to holiday pay. In excluding the union members of herein petitioner
fromthe benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicated his ruling on
Section 2, Rule IV, Book IIIof the Rules to implement Article 94 of the labor Code
promulgated by the then Secretary of labor andPolicy Instructions No. 9.
The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the
Secretary's Policy InstructionNo. 9 add another excluded group, namely, 'employees
who are uniformly paid by the month'.
While theadditional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid
employees have alreadybeen paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a
deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid.
An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what
thestatute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires.
The questioned decision set aside and the awardof the arbitrator reinstated.
National Service Corp. v. NLRC,
168 SCRA 125 (1988)
FACTS:
.F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation.
She claims she was illegally dismissed.
NLRC ruled orderingher reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no
jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation byvirtue
of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank
which is in turn a GOCC, the terms andconditions of employment of its employees
are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.
ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil
Service Law.
HELD: NO.
The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases
that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985.
To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated
because under the 1973 Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court
recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms
andconditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.In the matter of
coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973
consti where NHC v Juco wasbased.
It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,including government owned or
controlled corporation with original charter."
Therefore by clear implication, the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are
organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.
The civil service does not include Government owned or controlledcorporations
(GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation
law
SSS V CA
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers
refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary
or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.
Issue :Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held: NO
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides
that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding
the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the
right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
.2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870
& 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis
GR No. L5867477, July 11, 1990
FACTS:
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio
Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by
charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to
four separate individuals.
Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for illegal
recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there
would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner
promised or offered any employment for a fee.
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in
its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981.
In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment
and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two
or more persons as an indispensable requirement.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons
is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise
of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the
private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed
against private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and
not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or
more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed
to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement.
The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b)
'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting,
transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule
nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption.
The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers
seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even
borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a
cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
The specification of two or more persons is not to create a condition prior to filing but
rather itstates a presumption that the individual is engaged in recruitment in
consideration of a fee, however thenumber of persons is not an essential ingredient to
the act of recruitment or placement, and it will stillqualify even if only one person has
been involved
People vs Goce
GR No 113161August 29, 1995
Regalado, J
Facts:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicateand in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code as
amended bySection 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses
Dan and Loma Goceand herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 5.
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but
notone of them was arrested. Hence, on February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the
case archivedbut it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the accused.
Thereafter, on learning of thewhereabouts of the accused, at around midday of
February 26, 1993, Nelly Agustin wasapprehended by the Paraaque police
.On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant
guilty as aprincipal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her
to serve thepenalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00
.In her appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments:
1. her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within
themeaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to
Article 34of the Labor Code;
2. there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and
theGoce spouses; and(
3. 3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to
thecomplainants
Appellant counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized
torecruit applicants for overseas employment. Appellant, however, denies that she
was in any wayguilty of illegal recruitment
.It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to
theGoce spouses.
Being a neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's overseas job
application was processed and facilitated by them, the complainants asked her to
introducethem to said spouses.
Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she complied with their request.
Issues: Whether or not appellant Agustin actions in relation with the Goce couple constitute
illegalrecruitment
Held: YES
Appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any
recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said
Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39thereof.
The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an
offenseinvolving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist,
namely,(a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate,i.e., if it is carried out
by a groupof three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another;
or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed
againstthree or more persons individually or as a group.
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting,utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not; provided, that anyperson or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or morepersons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
On the other hand, referral isthe act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for
employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a
selected employer, placement officer or bureau.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send
a worker abroad." It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that she hadthe power or ability to send people abroad for work such that
the latter were convinced to giveher the money she demanded in order to be so
employed
.Decision:WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, withcosts against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin
Darvin v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998
Facts:
Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the
RTC.
It stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the
petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the
necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her
P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.
Held: NO
Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
.b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor
Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two
elements need to be shown:
1. the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities:
and
2. the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.
In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant
offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression
that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is
established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant
P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another
individual, without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the
testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that appellant engaged in
recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a
suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone
is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable
doubt. When the Peoples evidence fail to indubitably prove the accuseds authorship
of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Courts duty, and the accuseds
right, to proclaim his innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of
reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released from her
confinement.
Chavez V BONTO PEREZ
FACTS:
Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions
Corporation to perform in Japan for 6 months.
The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by POEA.
After the approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her
salary with her Japanese employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents
Promotion).
The salary was reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents.
In February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her contract), Chavez sued
Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for underpayment of wages before the POEA.
The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by
Chavez with her Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract;
that POEA had no knowledge of such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez
is barred by laches for sleeping on her right for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.
HELD: Yes.
The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to
authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our
existing laws, morals and public policy.
It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved by the POEA with
the following stipulation appended thereto: It is understood that the terms and
conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard
Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum
Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this
contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavezs basic wage is null and void for violating
the POEAs minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by
the POEA.
Here, both Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.
Laches does not apply in the case at bar.
In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period for
the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code.
For this reason, laches is not applicable.
JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos
G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as
amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA.
It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II,
Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a
cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000.
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the
Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same
Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of
recruitment violations or money claims.
The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and commented that appeals from
decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
POEA Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal
from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD:YES.
Petitioners contention has no merit.
Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat that the thing
may rather have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as
in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions.
Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it
has posted.
The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no such
redundancy.
On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Manuela S. Catan/M.S. Catan Placement Agency v. The NLRC and Francisco Reyes
G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988
Ponente: Cortes. J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Catan, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and
FahdShabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm recruited private respondent Francisco D.
Reyes towork in Saudi Arabia.
The term of contract is for one (1) year, however, the contract provided for automatic
renewal.Said contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not
repatriatedby hi Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant
operator.
On March 30, 1983 while he was working as a crusher plant operator, his ankle
wascrushed under the machine he was operating
.On May 15, 1983 after expiration of renewed term, private respondent returned to
thePhilippines.
His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which
heincurred expenses.
On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi and resume to his work and on May
15,1984, he was repatriated. And upon his return, he had ankle treated for which he
incurredfurther expenses.
Private respondent filed a claim against Catan placement agency on the basis of
theprovision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the
employee if he isinjured or permanently disabled in the course of employment.POEA
rendered judgment in favor of the complainant.
Ordering the respondent placementagency to pay SEVEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE and 60/100 (P7, 985.60),TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND
NINTY SIX 20/100 (P29, 096.20) and 10% for attorneys fees.On appeal, respondent
NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA.
ISSUE Whether or not the Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to
privaterespondent, since the time he was injured his original contract had already expired?
HELD:Yes
Catan Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private respondent.
Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May
14, 1982as it was automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given
by either or bothparties at a month before its termination.
As stipulated in their contract.M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of complainant's
accident resulting in his permanent partialdisability was (sic) no longer the accredited
agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondentherein, yet its responsibility over the
proper implementation of complainant'semployment/service contract and the welfare
of complainant himself in the foreign job site, stillexisted, the contract of employment
in question not having expired yet.
This must be so,because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and betweenthe local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus
with the term of such agreement sothat if either or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees
under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.
Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the
employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.
Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 78085
October 16, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private
respondent Virgilio for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi
Arabia.
Service agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the
former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance
for a period of one year commencing from the date of his arrival in Saudi Arabia.
However, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground
that his performance was below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was
detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers
were ready.
On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines
. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal termination against Petitioner
Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the POEA.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an
employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement
performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for
purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of anemployment
agreement.
Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agencymay be held jointly and
severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with
the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed
abroad.
HELD: Yes,
Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary
liability under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of
Employment Services.
In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas
recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a
document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper
use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment with the
workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment.
It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract
executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for
the former, which contained a provisionempowering it to sue and be sued jointly and
solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment
agreement and the contracts of employment.
Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined by
the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment
procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as
appropriate.
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and
other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its
principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or
employment contracts.
Facilities Management Corporation vs. de la Osa
[GR L-38649, March 26, 1979]
Facts:
Facilities Management Corporation and J. S. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island
while J. V. Catuira is an employee of FMC stationed in Manila. Leonardo dela Osa
was employed by FMC in Manila, but rendered work in Wake Island, with the approval
of the Department of Labor of the Philippines.
De la Osa was employed as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from March 1964
to November 1964, inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.26 from
December 1964 to November 1965, inclusive; (3) houseboy with an hourly rate of
$1.33 from December 1965 to August 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier with an hourly
rate of $1.40 from August 1966 to March 27 1967, inclusive.
He further averred that from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered
overtime services daily, and that this entire period was divided into swing and
graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both overtime and
night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from FMC, et al. In a petition filed
on 1 July 1967, dela Osa sought his reinstatement with full backwages, as well as the
recovery of his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials.
Subsequently on 3 May 1968, FMC, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the subject petition
on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, and on 24 May 1968,
de la Osa interposed an opposition thereto.
Said motion was denied by the Court in its Order issued on 12 July 1968.
Subsequently, after trial, the Court of Industrial Relations, in a decision dated 14
February 1972, ordered FMC, et al. to pay de la Osa his overtime compensation, as
well as his swing shift and graveyard shift premiums at the rate of 50% per cent of his
basic salary.
FMC, et al. filed the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether the mere act by a non-resident foreign corporation of recruiting Filipino
workers for its own use abroad, in law doing business in the Philippines.
2. Whether FMC has been "doing business in the Philippines" so that the service of
summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila
with jurisdiction.
Held:
1.
In its motion to dismiss, FMC admits that Mr. Catuira represented it in the Philippines
"for the purpose of making arrangements for the approval by the Department of Labor
of the employment of Filipinos who are recruited by the Company as its own
employees for assignment abroad."
In effect, Mr. Catuira was alleged to be a liaison officer representing FMC in the
Philippines. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments
which took effect 3 February 1969, implementing RA 5455, which took effect 30
September 1968, the phrase "doing business" has been exemplified with illustrations,
among them being as follows: ""(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service
contracts.
Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, not acting independently of the
foreign firm, amounting to negotiation or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or
service contracts, regardless of whether the contracts are actually reduced to writing,
shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of
business in the Philippines; (2) appointing a representative or distributor who is
domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an
independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and
not in the name or for the account of the principal; xxx (4) Opening offices, whether
called 'liaison' offices, agencies or branches, unless proved otherwise. xxx (10)
Any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements,
and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of
some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of,
commercial gain or of the purpose and objective of the business organization."
2.
FMC may be considered as "doing business in the Philippines" within the scope of
Section 14 (Service upon private foreign corporations), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "If the defendant is a foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint
stock company or association, doing business in the Philippines, service may be made
on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose or, if there be
no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of
its officers or agents within the Philippines."
Indeed, FMC, in compliance with Act 2486 as implemented by Department of Labor
Order IV dated 20 May 1968 had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, 1322 A. Mabini, Ermita,
Manila "as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and
receive, in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by processes
of the Philippine Courts of Justice, for as long as he remains an employee of FMC."
It is a fact that when the summons for FMC was served on Catuira he was still in the
employ of the FMC.
Hence, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not
barred from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines (such as in earlier cases of
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, vs. Pacific Star Line, etc. [GR L-26809], In
Mentholatum vs. Mangaliman, and Eastboard Navigation vs. Juan Ysmael & Co.), a
fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine
courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines
PATRICIA STO TOMAS V SALAC
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No.
152710, G.R. No. 167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
1. G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers
abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and
TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters.
Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant
Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be
deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter,
recruitment should be fully deregulated.
RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the
aforementioned government agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums
and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case
in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed
which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
2. G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned
the validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the
definition by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that
the penalties for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to
render report or obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6
years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues
that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option
to either file the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where
the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being
contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that criminal cases must be
prosecuted in the placed where the crime or any of its essential elements
were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a
company found to be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly
and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed
upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative of due
process.
b) RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declraed the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of
the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between
licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty
of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts
enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they
commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to
prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to
inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of
Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal
cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when
Congress provided an alternative venue for violations of a special penal law
like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic.
To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be
a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such
as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
3. G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead.
Her parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration).
But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines that
Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma)
filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and
placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,
Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since
Becmen was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( aviolation of
RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages.
The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors
and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to
intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No.
As earlier discussed, Section is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic.
However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and
jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they
ere personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins
case.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO
[183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment.
Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to
appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him.
On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner.
It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified
that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2)
Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said
Order.
The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to
petitioners residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let
them in.
The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter
requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior
notice and hearing.
The said Order violated due process.
She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were
confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code
Held: NO
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest.
The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code.
The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge,
may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.
To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional.
It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at
bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant.
The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically
the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED
to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.