DEL ROSARIO v COMELEC

Facts:
- del Rosario claims to be an employee of the DFA, but he is not a prospective c
andidate or political party, etc. Still, he assails certain sections of RA 6132
as an oppressive use of taxpayers' money. He claims that because of the amount t
o be used, and the lack of time limit for the ConCon, he fears that money may be
wasted as the ConCon devolves into a 'debating club.'
Issues:
(taken as one)
1. Whether or not the creation of a ConAss is a justicable issue.
2. Whether or not RA 6132, which provided for the ConAss and ConCon, is unconsti
tutional for violating the one subject rule by not providing for the
phrase "TO PROPOSE AMENDEMNTS..." in its title.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Court cannot rule on the validity of RA 6132 and the validity of any
ConAss/ConCon created by Congress. It is a political question outside the ambit
of judicial review.
- The power to create a ConAss is one given to Congress by the constitution. Thi
s is alongside its power to propose amendments. Congress' act in enacting a law
for the purpose of commencing a ConAss is an act of congress which cannot be inq
uired into yet by the Court, as it is a political question.
- What the ConAss/ConCon decides on is of no matter of the courts-- it is to be
submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified, the Court cannot doubt
the validity of the Constitution. This is regardless of the scope of the amendme
nt/revision-- the law provides for this possibility.
- Stare decisis: Imbong v COMELEC
2. NO. The title of the law reasonably covered the subject and provisions so as
not to mislead Congress or the people.
- The title of the law referred to the implementation of the ConAss resolutions
that would lay out the framework of the ConCon. Both resolutions aimed to 'propo
se amendments to the Constitutions.' It is clear, therefore, that the purpose of
the law was really to propose amendments by implementing the resolutions therei
n.
- Further, the power to propose is inherent in the call for a convention. With t
his in mind, there is no fraud or surprise to be perpetrated assuming there is a
'questionable' title (accdg. to the petitioner).
- At any rate, titles of the bill need only fairly cover the general subject and
provisions so as not to mislead Congress or the people.
--
IMBONG v COMELEC
Facts:
- Imbong and Gonzales are candidates for delegates to the ConCon. They impugn th
e constitutionality of RA 6132 as it prejudices their rights as candidates.
- RA 6132 was a law passed by Congress (acting as a legislative body) that imple
mented several resolutions of the Congress (acting as Constituent Assembly): the
se resolutions include (1) Resol. 2, which called for the ConCon (composition: 2
delegates/district, same qualifications as Congressmen), and (2) Resol. 4, whic
h amended Resol. 2 by providing for a limit on the total number of delegates (32
0, although the 2 delegate rule/district still applies), and by also providing t
he details on election in separate legislation. (Theory: These roles are incompa
tible, and that the amendment will prejudice their right as candidates.)
- Assailed here are several sections of the law. Imbong assails Sec. 8(a) para.
1, while Gonzales assails Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a) para. 1. In addition, they ass
ail the passage of the law itself because of a perceived incompatibility between
the law-making and ConAss powers.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Congress' enactment of RA 6132 (as a law-making authority) was
unconstitutional.
(unnecessary)
2. Whether or not Sec. 4 of RA 6132, on the rule on automatic resignation, is un
constitutional for violating due process and equal protection.
3. Whether or not Sec. 2 of RA 6132, on the apportionment of candidates, is unco
nstitutional for violating the guarantee on proportional representation.
4. Whether or not Sec. 5 of RA 6132, on the disqualification of delegates from r
unning for election or holding any appointive position while the ConCon is still
taking place, is unconstitutional for violating due process and equal protectio
n..
5. Whether or not Sec. 8(a) para 1 of RA 6132, on the rule preventing candidates
from joining/representing political parties and similar organizations, and prev
enting political parties from intervening or giving aid to delegates, is unconst
itutional for violating due process, equal protection, and freedom of expression
/association.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, it is not. The doctrine of necessary implication gives the Congress, as l
egislative body, full legislative power that is only tempered by the Constitutio
n, and as ConAss, secondary powers incidental to the primary power of being a pl
enary authority for the creation of a ConCon. These roles are not incompatible w
ith each other.
- RA 6132 was meant to implement two resolutions of Congress. The resolutions we
re passed by Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly following the 3/4 rule (3
/4 vote in joint session, but voting separately), leading to the call for a ConC
on.
- The authority to call a ConCon includes, by virtue of necessary implication, a
ll other powers essential to the exercise of the principal power granted, such a
s power to fix the qualifications of the delegates. The resolutions included the
required qualifications and composition, but not for allocation (an implementat
ion detail included in RA 6132).
- However, while Congress acting as ConAss can call for a ConCon and recommend d
etails on implementation, it is the legislative power that gives Congress the ab
ility to implement the details themselves through a LAW. It is a power that nece
ssarily encompasses all matters not removed or withdrawn by the Constitution.
- Therefore, if Congress as ConAss is unable to provide for implementation in th
e resolution, Congress can still act as legislative body to fill in the gaps. In
fact, the ConAss resolutions specifically recognize this power.
- The president's veto power, if ever, does not take from the validity of the la
w. It simply means that the executive can exercise a power he is given by the Co
nstitution, but Congress can counter by overriding the veto or reconvening as Co
nAss.
Additional Issues (Brief Answers):
2. NO, the rule is a mere application of a constitutional provision: Art. XII, S
ec. 2.
3. NO, the rule on proportional representation applies to the representative dis
tricts for purposes of general government, but not for the ConAss. At any rate,
absolute proportional appointment is not a requirement-- it need only be substan
tially proportional, with the basis of which taken through reasonable means. Thi
s fact is recognized in Art. VI Sec. 5 of the Constitution. (Example: The Batane
s representation case)
4. NO, there is no right being violated, and even if there was, there is suffici
ent state interest that would allow for an overriding of that right. Due process
requires that there is a right to be affected by legislation. Public office is
not a right under the constitutional system-- it in fact is subject to State con
trol, as can be seen in the Constitutional requirements in order to become a pub
lic officer, as well as the natural disqualifications and prohibitions. This is
to ensure that the public officer would focus on the national interest. The proh
ibition in Sec. 5 is strikingly similar to that in Art. VI, Sec. 16 of the Const
itution. Even if there was a right involved, it is subject to police power, wher
e if there exists a strong enough state interest (depending on the right affecte
d), the right has to fall to the need of the state-- here, it is to ensure that
the convention could proceed smoothly. The distinction between members of the Co
nCon and other individuals is also proper for the same reason.
5. NO, by applying the clear and present danger test, there exists a clear and p
resent danger to the ConCon and electoral that would take root should the assail
ed prohibitions be removed. This is the doctrine in Gonzales v COMELEC, where it
was noted that the danger to be involved is a debasement of the electoral proce
ss, as support and assistance could lead to inequality of chances in the electio
n. Equal protection as considered more important than freedom of association in
these cases. There are, of course, exceptions to this prohibition, but still the
prohibition must stand.
--
LAMBINO v COMELEC
Facts:
- The petitioner group gathered signatures in a petition to change the 1987 Cons
titution (unicam/parliamentary); they then filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiave petition as per RA 6735. They
claim that they met the legal requirements: 12% of all registered voters must be
represented, with each legislative district represented by >3%.
- If accepted, they would submit the ff. proposition for the plebiscite: Do you
approve the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the Consti, changing the form of
govenment...
- The COMELEC denied their petition because (1) there was no enabling law govern
ing initiative petitions, citing the Santiago v COMELEC ruling that RA 6735 was
not enough to implement the initiative clause.
- The Lambino group assailed the resolution on the basis that COMELEC committed
GAD in denying the petition as Santiago was not binding. Further, Santiago only
bound the parties in that particular case, with their situation being an express
ion of the 'will of the sovereign people.'
- Other parties sided with and against the Lambino group. The additional opposit
ors cited the following issues with the Lambino petition: lack of standing, inva
lidity of the signatures and gathering process, failure to comply with Consti re
quirements, invalidity as such petitions were not allowed to make revisions (whi
ch is what the Lambino group was proposing), and non-compliance with the one sub
ject rule.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the process of securing the initiative was valid.
2. Assuming the initiative was valid, whether or not the proposed changes were a
mendments that could be made via a petition leading to a plebiscite.
3. Assuming the initiative as a whole was constitutionally sound, whether or not
it passed the requirements under RA 6735.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. There were manifest defects in the securing of signatures which seriously
contradict the Constitutional requirement of a direct proposal by the people.
- Sec. 2, Article XVII provides for the people's initiative as a means of amendi
ng the Constitution. It requires that amendments be directly proposed by the peo
ple through initiative upon a petition. In the deliberations of the 1987 ConComm
, this, in practice, would mean that if a person wants to amend the Constitution
, he may prepare a draft of the proposed changes, which should be shown to the p
eople before the proposal is signed. The proposal itself should be signed by the
people. In effect, this means that the proposal is on its face one of the peopl
e.
Basis: US Constitution on initiating petitions to amend; boils down to '
you should know what you're signing up for-- otherwise there may be that possibi
lity of deception'. (Capezzuto, Kerr)
- Note that although the Constitution did not require a full-text statement of t
he amendments, the deliberations of the ConCom show that what was intend was for
the people to fully see and understand the proposed amendments.
- This also carries a presumption that the people do not want the Constitution t
o be changed; this considers the fact that people who want to change the Constit
ution are likely to have vested interests in their proposed amendments. Hence, t
here shall be no relaxing of the rules-- there must be a showing that the Lambin
o group complied with the Constitutional requirement.
- What the Lambino Group stated in their proposition (signature sheet) was a ver
y general statement of their proposal. People who signed the sheet were not awar
e of the full extent of the changes-- this was even admitted on oral argument.
- Lambino's defense was that during their signature-gathering from Feb to Aug 20
06, they circulated copies of the draft petition which they later filed on 25 Au
g. Lambino said that the draft petition was circulated alongside the signature s
heets. However, several events show that this was not really the case:
> They claimed that the petition was filed for and on behalf of ULAP, bu
t the resolution that supposedly gave them the right to represent ULAP was not p
resent. The resolution they tried to cite did not grant the Lambino group the ri
ght to represent them-- it only said that the would support the proposals of a p
eople's commission, not the Lambino group itself. (at any rate, the PC's recomme
ndations were vastly different from the Lambino group's)
> Further, it was found that the Lambino group's previous petitions did
not allege that printed copies of the draft petition were circulated together wi
th the signature sheets. This claim only arose in their Reply to Oppositions.
> These cast a shadow of doubt into the validity of their claim.
- Further, the Lambino group asserted that at any case, the signer cannot questi
on his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of an act,
citing a situation noted in Corpus Juris Secundum where a signatory impugned his
signature on a petition, although a key point here was that the full draft of t
he petition was included.
- Even then, the Lambino Group openly admitted their defect. Admissions made by
counsel can bind the group!
- Further, it would be unlikely that the people who made the signatures understo
od the full nature of the amendments proposed. There were even parts that did no
t match up (between what the Lambino group said to the signatories and what was
actually included, such as the issue on Sec.4.4 of the Transitory Provisions: La
mbino said that the section was surplusage, but it was actually a provision that
would authorize Parliament to make further changes to the Constitution).
- This was deception on the part of the Lambino group, and this was precisely th
e reason the 'full text' requirement was even included! Effect: The entire propo
sition is void!
2. NO. The scope of the proposed changes was so great and far-reaching that they
were effectively revisions, which are outside the ambit of a people's initiativ
e.
- The Constitution makes a distinction between amendments and revisions. Art. XV
II notes that a ConCon resulting from a people's initiative can only lead to ame
ndments, as opposed to the Congress 3/4 vote, which may result in either amendme
nts or revisions. ConCon deliberations show that this was intentional. It even n
oted what revisions amounted to-- total overhauls of the Constitution. Even the
US follows this principle (McFadden, Holmes).
- Revisions are total overhauls of basic principles of the Constitution-- if cha
nges affect the Constitution substantially, it would require the 3/4 Congress vo
te. If a change adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle,
it is merely an amendment.
- Cited here is a California two-part test: a quantitative test (numerical scope
of change) and a qualitative test (effect of changes). Under this test, the ini
tiative is a revision as it overhauls at least a hundred provisions and entire a
rticles. Such changes call for a great shift in the system of government. It alt
ers the separation of powers, a basic principle of government.
- Even then, it's obvious that the changes were radical indeed. As Fr. Bernas no
ted in the ConCom deliberations, a switch of systems would be a revision. This i
s also reflected in the US via Adam v Gunther.
- The Lambino group's defense is that the distinction merely refers to how the c
hanges were planned and made. Revisions are made by deliberative bodies that wor
k full-time, while amendments are made by ordinary individuals. No. The intentio
n of the framers and the language of the Constitution state otherwise.
- Why should a deliberative body deal with revisions? There are many conflicts t
hat may take place within the legal system as a result of the revision-- changes
that require careful study and sometimes outside the skill of common men.
3. NO. RA 6735 requires that the petition itself be signed, which was absent in
this case.
- RA 6735 requires that the petition itself be signed. What was only signed were
signature sheets that did not include the petition (which already made it const
itutionally infirm as what was stated in the sig sheets did not discuss the prop
osed changes).
--
SANTIAGO v COMELEC
Facts: Similar factual scenario as Lambino; proposition was to "amend the Consti
tution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people's initiative"
Re RA 6735: It must be noted that the Constitutional provision on amendments is
not self-executory. The intent of the ConCom was for legislation to create a mea
ns by which amendments by initiative could be made. Although it first appears th
at the law intended to include Constitutional amendments in its ambit, the law r
efers mostly to legislation and laws, which we distinguish from the Constitution
. Although there is mention of the Constitution, there is no section providing f
or a means of amending it.
The same law grants the COMELEC authority to provide a means of implementing the
system of initiatives. However, the rule is that what has been delegated, canno
t be delegated, except in certain cases, such as in this one-- administrative bo
dies. However, there is a qualification to that rule-- the delegation must be th
e valid; the law must be complete in what it intends to delegate, and that there
is a standard for the performance of the delegated powers. As RA 6735 is sorely
lacking with respect to Constitutional amendments, IRRs would be rendered inval
id as the law never gave the administrative body that power.
Even assuming RA 6735 is valid, the conduct and content of the petition are such
that the petition itself is unconstitutional. (no signatures, revision)