o Statutory Construction is the process by which courts interpret an
apply legislation. It is the art of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. 2. When do you apply the principles of Statutory Construction? o As a general rule, when statutes are clear and unambiguous, it needs not to be interpreted. Only when statutes are doubtful and ambiguous can they be subject to statutory construction. 3. Which branch of Government interprets the law? o According to the Constitution, the udiciary is the sole institution vested with judicial power that can settle judicial controversies within the State. 4. Requirement of Publication of Statutes o As a general rule, the necessity for the publication in the O!cial "a#ette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application was a!rmed by the Court. It is necessary to provide the general public ade$uate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citi#ens. %ithout this, there would be no basis for Article & of the Civil Code of the 'hilippines saying, Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith." 5. Judicial Leislation o Article ( of the Civil Code provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufciency of the laws. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court)s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into e*ect. 6. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis o As a general rule, every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context and it must be considered together and +ept subservient to its general intent. ,hus, the spirit, rather than the letter of the law, determines its construction. 7. Legis Interpretatio Legis Vim Obtinet o -ecisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means. According to Article . of the /ew Civil Code, judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system. ,he settled legal maxim here is legs interpretation legs im obtinet or the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of the law. 8. !"ecutive Construction Given Great Weiht o ,he court still and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive o!cers whose duty is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby, 9. When !"ecutive Construction #ot Given Weiht o As a general rule, so long as the regulations relate solely to carrying into e*ect the provisions of the law, they are valid. %hen an administrative interpretation diminishes the bene0ts or the e*ects of the statute, the mandate of the statute must prevail and must be followed. 10. $dministrative Rule v $dministrative %pinion o %hen an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it ma+es a new law with the force and e*ect of a valid law, while when it renders and opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets pre1existing law. 11. Constitutional Construction o ,he fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give e*ect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. ,he intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. o A constitutional provision is self1executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are 0xed by the constitution itself2 so that they can be determined by an examination and contraction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. o In self1executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination or place reasonable safeguard around the exercise of the right. 12. Labor Laws o As a general rule, labor law should be resolved in favour of the wor+er and should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective2 to give relief to the labourer. ,hus, the presumption of compensability subsists in favour of the claimant. 13. &a" Laws o 3or tax exemptions, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favour of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in favour of the State and against the taxpayer. 14. Penal Laws o 'enal laws are to be construed in favour of the accused and against the State. 15. !lection Laws o In elections, the will of the electorate should be respected and that it should not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. ,he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality as stated in law. 16. 'nsurance o Insurance laws, by the reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favour of the insured, especially to avoid forfeiture. 17. #aturali(ation Laws o ,he provisions of the /aturali#ation 4aw should be strictly construed against the applicant in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully ful0lled. 18. !"propriation Laws o ,he right of expropriation if not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power to it. 19. Wills o Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with statutory re$uirements2 otherwise, it is entirely void. 20. Rules of Court o ,he construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is the essence of judicial city to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity. ,herefore, a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. ,hus, in the construction of its own 5ules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness. 21. Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum (From the words of the statute, there should be no departure o ,he legislature is presumed to +now the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. !erba legs non set recedendum or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 22. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis (!he reason of the law is the soul of the law o It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be it. Otherwise, the basis purpose discernible in such coral provision would not be attained. 23. "ura Le# $ed Le# (!he law is harsh but it is the law o ,he principle re$uires that the statute should be applied regardless whether it is unwise, hard or harsh. If the law is clear and free from doubt, it is the sworn duty of the court to apply it without fear or favour, to follow its mandate, and not to tamper with it. 24. E#pressio %nius Est E#clusio Alterius (!he e#press mention of one thing in a law means the e#clusion of others not e#pressl& mentioned o Any other matter not mentioned in the express mention of a provision therein is deemed excluded. %here a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. ,he rule proceeds from the premise that Congress would not have made speci0c enumerations in a statute had the intention not to restrict its meaning and to con0ne its terms to those expressly mentioned. 25. E'usdem (eneris o 6nder this maxim, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same +ind or class as those speci0cally referred to. 7jusdem generis could be expansive, however, because the list is not exclusive2 it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another item. 26. )asus Omissus *ro Omisu +abendus Est (A thing omitted must ha,e been omitted intentionall& o As a rule, if a person, object, or thing is omitted from being enumerated in a statute, it must be held considered have been omitted intentionally. %hen two statutes are compared and one statute has omitted a certain provision that is present in the other statute, the higher statute shall apply. 27. Noscitur A $ociis o %ords must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the text. 4egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. ,he particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and very part of the statute must be considering in 0xing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. %here a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is e$ually susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be clear and speci0c by considering the company in which it is found or which it is associated. 28. %bi Le# Non "istinguit Nec Nos "istinguire "ebemos o %here the law ma+es no distinctions, one does not distinguish. %here the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.