ESTATE OF HEMADY v LUZON SURETY CO., INC.

PRIVATE
No. L-8437, 28 November 1956
100 Phil 388
Article 774 provides that by succession, the properties, rights and obligations of a deceased
person are transmitted through his death to his heirs either by his will or by operation of law.
Hemady holds that the contingent liabilities of the decedent are part of the obligations
transmitted by his death to his heirs. Accordingly, contingent claims against the estate of a
deceased person arising from the decedent's contractual undertakings under various
indemnity agreements executed in favor of various persons and entities are money claims
which may be proved against his estate and/or heirs. These contingent claims may be
proved during settlement proceedings by an indemnified surety even if in the meantime, no
actual liability on the part of an indemnified surety has arisen by reason of actual payment
made under the suretyship agreement. Accordingly, Hemady holds that the contingent
obligations of a deceased person arising from his personal guaranty are not extinguished
by his death.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counterbonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the
deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety (solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the
Luzon Surety Co.'s having guaranteed the various principals in favor of different creditors.
x x

x.
The Luzon Surety Co. prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the
twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for
judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12
per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady's estate, the
lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co. on
two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not
contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the
guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the
counterbonds; and (2) that "whatever losses may occur after Hemady's death are not
chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor."
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the reasoning
of the court below ran as follows:
"The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as
guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or
damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court
believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the
new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a
person to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out by the
Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon
the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors.
Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemady's death, are not chargeable to
his estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
x
x
x."
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311) as well as
under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that -
"Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except
in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law."
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of the
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle
remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the new Civil Code (and in Articles 659 and 661 of the
preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
"Art. 774. - Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law."
"Art. 776. - The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death."
In Mojica v Fernandez, 9 Phil 403, this Supreme Court ruled:
"Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are
subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and
cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the
deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios v Dolor, 2 Phil
44).
"The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the
new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a
deceased person cannot be held to be 'third persons' in relation to any contract
touching the real estate of their decedent which comes into their hands by right of
inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in
the hands of him from whom they derive their rights." (See also Galasinao v
Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman v Salak, 91 Phil 265.)
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and
paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The
reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by
the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces
the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco,
has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare
cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is
marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or
guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon
Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the
Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal
debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation
to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be
made by Hemady himself or by someone else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid
to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties.
Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be
easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from
the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere
indicate that they are non-transferable.
x
x
x
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to
have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly
stipulate to that effect; hence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to
terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co. did not require bondsman
Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the company's faith and
confidence in the financial stability of the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly
personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they
are "not transmissible by operation of law." The provision makes reference to those cases
where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as in the
case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603),
contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830), and agency (Article
1919). By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship
(Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the
death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower courts ought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that "one who
is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to
bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees." It
will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of
the perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has
become perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not
operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; and if that be true of his
capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned
in the article alongside the capacity.
The following concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057 that runs as follows:
"Art. 2057. - If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime
involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another
who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is
excepted where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person
should be guarantor."
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the
guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound)
does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement of
the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor: it is his right, not his duty; he
may waive it if he chooses, or hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the
present Civil Code is incompatible with the trial court's stand that the requirement of
integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latter's undertaking strictly personal, so linked
to his individuality that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
The contract of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not
being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations
of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder
necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to
contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed.,
p. 437; Gaskell & Co. v Tan Sit, 43 Phil 810, 814).
"The most common example of the contingent claim is that which arises when a
person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead.
Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against
his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the
obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the
surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety
has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the
secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody -
no claim that could be reduced to judgment." (Citations omitted.)
For defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the
surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor; and it is urged that the rule
does not apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal
debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between parties. If under
the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against
the estate of the principal debtors if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why
it could not file such a claim against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-
debtor of his principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal
debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing
solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the
principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix
against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the new Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death, and
that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co. had the right to file against the estate a contingent
claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate's liability for
premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon
Surety's claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to
the court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law. Cost against the
Administratrix-Appellee. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v ALMEIDA
G.R. No. 162784, 22 June 2007
525 SCRA 383
An affidavit made a certain disposition of property which is to take effect upon the
death of the affiant. This case holds that such an affidavit is in the nature of a will and that
therefore, the transmission of the property and/or rights pertaining thereto is not in the
nature of an assignment. The mode of acquisition is succession.
However, Chief Justice Puno also insisted that whatever property, rights and
obligations which a deceased person may leave behind, the same should go to his or her
estate for eventual distribution to the heirs, either by will or by intestacy. This statement is
prone to misinterpretation because in Article 777, the rights to succession are transmitted to
the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. Therefore, ownership of the
inheritance is automatically and immediately transferred to the heirs. Any proceeding to
settle the estate is in the nature of an administrative formality in order to ensure the
payment of liabilities, the proper identification of the heirs, and the correct allocation of
hereditary shares. Note that in Speed Distributing Corporation v Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
149351, 17 March 2004 (425 SCRA691)], Justice Calleja, speaking for the Court, ruled that
The general rule under the law on succession is that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are call upon to succeed
by operation of law to the inheritance without the need of further proceedings.
Note too, that in this case, Chief Justice Puno recognized explicitly that not only
property and rights are transmitted to the heirs under the law; it includes the obligations that
are not extinguished by the death of the decedent. Compare this statement to the ponencia
of Justice Brion in Reyes v RTC Branch 142 Makati where he said: This interest (referring
to the co-ownership of the heirs over the undivided corporate shares), at this point, is still
inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings; the right of the heirs to
specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the
estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains after
payment of the decedents debts; whether there will be residue remains to be seen.
The final outcome of this case is predictable. The Supreme Court considered the
affidavit as a will. As such, it should comply with the formal requisites prescribed in Articles
804, 805, and 806 of the Civil Code. With only 2 attesting witnesses and in the absence of
an attestation clause, the affidavit, most certainly, will be denied probate and the estate of
Margarita Herrera shall be distributed under the rules of intestacy.
Puno, C.J.:
x x x
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro,
Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. x x x
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita
Herrera, executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining
relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the
exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salsaysay dated
October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which
are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo,
kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San
Pedro, Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at kusang loob kong
isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR),
tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN
AT PITUMPUT ISANG (771) METRO PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang at
makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure
Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote at aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog
sa Land Tenure Administration, at noong ika-30 ng Julio 1959, ang Kasunduang sa
Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod
ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa
kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4, Libro No. IV, Serie
ng 1959.
3. Na dahilan sa akoy matanda na at walang ano mang hanapbuhay, ako
ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang
tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan at binayaran ng kaniyang sariling cuarta sa
Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling akoy bawian na
ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob
sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa katamtamang
gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng
sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga
tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay
bawian ng aking buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa
pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang loteng nasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa
ibaba nito at sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayon
ika 7 ng Octubre 1960.
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses
signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the document with the said document having 2
pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumb mark above her name in the second
page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the
Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in
Bian, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court Branch 25). x x x.
On December 29, 1980, a Decision x x x was rendered and the deed was
declared null and void.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots, submitting
therewith a copy of the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her mother. Private
respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by
Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we
gathered the following facts: the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and
sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure
Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who
was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late
Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46. 47,
48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area
of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots
in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the
Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee
left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan
Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in
question; he has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on
October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay whereby
she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor
of protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966
with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase
the lots in question.
x x x
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extra judicial
settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was
approved by the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of
Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca
Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of
the NHA, private respondents Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought cancellation of the titles
issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988 for
Nullification of Government Lots Award, with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of
the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herreras declaration of self-
adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The
defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and
that the decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory. They also
contended that the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same
was supported by a consideration and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the
use of her own money. Further, they argued that plaintiffs occupation of the property was
by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon.
The Regional Trial court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed
and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving
title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction. The case was then remanded
for further proceedings on the merits.
x x x
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision setting aside the
resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject
lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by the NHA in
favor of Herreras heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch,
was ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of title issued. x x.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not an
assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then
held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer
property.
On August 28, 20203, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was
awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims
that the Sinumpaang Salaysay is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and
interest over the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to
believe otherwise. After a perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita
Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings take in their ordinary and
grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take
effect after her death. Clearly, the Court finds that the Sinumpaang Salaysay is a
will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to
merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should
have given her Sinumpaang Salaysay to the defendant NHA or to Francisca
Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase
price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she
intended the Sinumpaang Salaysay to be her last will and not an assignment of
rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear. The intention
of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the
formers demise executed n August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming
that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in
court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herreras other daughter, Beatriz Mercado,
that Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and
presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that it is a deed of assignment of
rights.
x x x
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the Sinumpaang Salaysay is a
will, it could not bind the NHA. That insofar as the NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that
the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to
Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it.
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it
should have noted that the effectivity of said document commences at the time of death of
the author of the instrument; in her words sakaling akoy bawian na ng Dios ng aking
buhay. Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers
and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue
of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
x x x
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original
applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.
The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the
application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicants death
would transfer all her property rights and obligations to the estate including whatever
interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest
that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita
Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs in accordance with a
will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with the NHA as the seller. Upon
Margarita Herreras demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This
Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties Margarita Herrera and NHA.
Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herreras obligation to pay became transmissible
at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the
interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of
a resolution of the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other
parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act
contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the
decedent as the next person likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the
purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera
should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the
said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the
deed therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the
interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or
intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the
lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to
determine, We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it
has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property;
(2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No, B-2780 dated
March 9, 2998 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur,
NAZARENO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000
343 SCRA 637
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its
own. It therefore has a right to recover property belonging to it that were improperly
disposed.
Mendoza, J.:
x x x
The facts are as follows:
Maximino Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on
April 15, 1970 while Maximino Sr. died on December 8, 1980. They had five children,
namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico and Maximino Jr. Natividad and Maximino Jr.
are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino Sr., Romeo and his wife Eliza
Nazareno are the respondents.
During their marriage, Maximino Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in
Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these properties
that is in question in this case.
It appears that after the death of Maximino Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite x x x. Romeo was appointed administrator of his
fathers estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had
executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister
Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by
Maximino Sr. with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total
amount of P47,800.00.
x x x
Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registered
under TCT No. 140946. This lot has been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by
Maximino Jr. since 1969. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to
Maximino Jr. for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. 293701 x x x.
When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino Jr., he and his wife Eliza locked
Maximino out of the house. On August 4, 1983, Maximino Jr. brought an action for recovery
of possession and damages x x x. On December 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in
favor of Maximino Jr. x x x The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed, on behalf of the estate of Maximino Sr. the
present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino Jr. x
x x Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to
Natividad and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales
were void for lack of consideration.
On March 1, 1990, Natividad and Maximino Jr. filed a third party complaint against
the spouses Romeo and Eliza. They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of
Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to Natividad, had been surreptitiously appropriated by
Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No 277968) in his name. They alleged that
Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third persons. They therefore
sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title, the eviction
of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the payment of
damages.
The issues having been joined, the case was set for trial. Romeo presented
evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to
Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. He
presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962 executed by
Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then
abroad and represented by their mother Aurea. By virtue of this deed, the nine lots subject
of this Deed of partition were assigned by raffle as follows:
Romeo Lot 25-L (642 sq. m.)
Natividad Lots 23 (312 sq.m.) and 24 (379 sq.m.)
Maximino Jr. Lots 6 (338 sq.m.) and 7 (338 sq.m.)
Pacifico Lots 13 (360 sq.m.) and 14 (360 sq. m.)
Jose Lots 10 (360 sq. m.) and 11 (360 sq. m.)
Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L under his name, while Maximino Jr. received
Lots 6 and 7 through a Deed of Sale dated August 16, 1966 for the amount of P9,500.
Pacifico and Joses shares were allegedly given to Natividad, who agreed to give Lots 10
and 11 to Jose, in the event the latter come back from abroad. Natividads share, on the
other hand, was sold to third persons because she allegedly did not like the location of the
two lots. But, Romeo said, the money realized from the sale was given to Natividad.
Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was bought for him by his father, while Lot 3 was
sold to him for P7,000.00 by his parents on July 4, 1969. However, he admitted that a
document was executed by his parents transferring six properties in Quezon City, i.e., Lots
3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and 14, to Natividad.
Romeo further testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in
their favor stated that the sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount
for the supposed sale. The transfer was made in this manner in order to avoid the payment
of inheritance taxes. Romeo denied stealing Lot 3 from his sister but instead claimed that
the title to said lot was given to him by Natividad in 1981 after their father died.
Natividad and Maximino Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution
executed in 1962 was not really carried out. Instead, in December of 1969, their parents
offered to sell to them the six lots in Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and 14.
However, it was only Natividad who bought the six properties because she was the only
one financially able to do so. Natividad admitted that Romeo and the latters wife were
occupying Lot 3-B at that time and that she did not tell the latter about the sale she had
made to Maximino Jr.
Natividad said that she had the title to Lot 3 but it somehow got lost. She could not
get an original copy of the said title because the records of the Registrar of Deeds had
been destroyed by fire. She claimed she was surprised to learn that Romeo was able to
obtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.
Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale x x
x. She alleged that their parents had sold these properties to their children instead of
merely giving the same to them in order to impose on them the value of hard work.
Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after Romeo lost in the
action for recovery of possession which had been brought against him by Maximino Jr. It
appears that before the case filed by Romeo could be decided, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming the trial courts decision in favor of Maximino Jr.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deed of
Sale dated January 29, 1970. Except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had
passed on to third persons, the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest of in trust for
Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. The Register of Deeds of
Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 162735 and 162736 as a lien in the titles of Natividad P. Nazareno.
x x x
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the
sense that titles to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of
Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored
to the estate of maximino Nazareno Sr.
x x x
Petitioners raised the following issues:
x x x
Second, Petitioners make capital of the fact that in CA. G.R. CV No. 12932, which
was declared final by this Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of Appeals upheld the right
of Maximino Jr. to recover possession of Lot 3-B. In that case, the Court of Appeals held:
x x x
To be sure, that case was for recovery of possession based on the ownership of Lot
3-B. The parties in that case were Maximino Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and
Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulment of
sale are the estate of Maximino Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino Jr., as
defendants. Spouses Romeo and Eliza were named third party defendants after a third
party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino Jr. As already stated, however, this
third party complaint concerned Lot 3 and not Lot 3-B.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its
own. Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino Sr., the latter has a
separate and distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No.
12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only,
and not the estate of Maximino Sr. which also has a right to recover properties which were
wrongfully disposed.
Furthermore, Natividads title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other
words, the title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in
that case. If the first case resolved anything, it was the ownership of Maximino Jr. over Lot
3-B alone.
x x x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, and de Leon, JJ., concur.
PACIO v BILLON
No. L-15088, 31 January 1961
1 SCRA 384
Properties not validly conveyed by a person during his lifetime will form part of his estate
upon his demise. Pacio holds that a parcel of land which was not validly donated (propter
nuptias) by the husband to the wife did not leave his patrimony, and therefore formed part
of his inheritance upon his demise.
Bengzon, J.:
In 1901, Flaviano Pacio married Severa Jucutan. Herein defendants were their children.
Severa died in 1930; and thereafter Flaviano married the plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla who
bore him the other four plaintiffs.
The dispute between the parties in the La Union court of first instance concerned two
parcels of land which defendants allegedly retained without any right thereto. The litigants
later agreed to a partition of the first parcel x x x.
As to the second parcel, a hearing was held, and it was awarded to the defendants on the
ground that it had been donated propter nuptias to Severa in 1901 by Flaviano Pacio, who
was then admittedly the owner.
According to the stipulation of facts:
"x x a donation propter nuptias was made in a private instrument by Flaviano
Pacio in favor of his first wife Severa Jucutan, before their marriage on June 4,
1901 x x x;
3. That the land continued to be declared in the name of Flaviano Pacio
notwithstanding this donation propter nuptias until 1956 when the same was
changed in the name of the defendants Brigida, Manuela and Dominga, all
surnamed Pacio;
4. That land taxes were paid in the name of Flaviano Pacio as shown by tax
receipts for the years 1931, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945,
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1955 and 1956;
5. That Flaviano Pacio died on November 2, 1951;
x
x
x
9. That while the plaintiffs and the defendants lived together during the said period,
they equally shared all the harvests reaped from the land in litigation;
10. That the land taxes were paid on both parcels (a) and (b) in the names of the
defendants staring with the year 1957 when the tax declarations were changed into
t h e i r n a m e s o n D e c e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 5 6 ;
x x x."
The plaintiffs-appellants contend that the donation was void, because it was not made in a
public instrument. They are right. Art. 633 of the Spanish Civil Code states that "in order
that a donation of real property be valid, it must be made in a public instrument in which the
property donated must be specifically described and the amount of the encumbrances to be
assumed by the donee expressed x x x."
And this Court had held that a donation propter nuptias of real property written on a private
instrument is not valid even between the parties.
The trial judge said "a donation propter nuptias in order to be valid between the donor and
the donee, need not be embodied in a public instrument as such formality is only necessary
for registration purposes in the office of the Register of Deeds" so as to bind third person.
He was obviously applying the new principles in the Philippine Civil Code effecting in the
year 1950. But in 1901 when the gift was made, the law was contained in the Spanish Civil
Code, according to which, even between the parties, the donation must be in a public
instrument.
Realizing the force of plaintiffs' point, defendants emphasized that the deed of donation
constituted a title on which to base acquisitive prescription, inasmuch as Severa possessed
the land from 1901 to March 1930 when she died. The stipulation of facts says nothing
about such possession. True, there was a witness, Monica Pacio, who testified; but she
stated that both husband and wife held possession of the land, and the stipulation says that
from 1933 the parties shared the harvests equally. At any rate, it is obvious that normally,
prescription by adverse possession cannot exist between husband and wife. (See Article
1109 Civil Code of the Philippines.)
Espique v Espique on which the appellees rely is not controlling because the prescription
there mentioned did not refer to possession by the wife as against her husband.
It follows that Flaviano Pacio continued to be the owner of the land as the donation had no
effect and there was no prescription. Upon his death, the land became the joint property of
his children by the first and second marriages, subject of course to the rights of his
surviving spouse, the plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla.
Reversing the decision in so far as this parcel is concerned, we hereby order the return of
the expediente to the court below for further proceedings on partition in accordance with
these views.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
USON v DEL ROSARIO, et al.
No. L-4693, 29 January 1953
92 Phil 530
Article 777 provides that the right to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. Accordingly, Uson holds that the inheritance pertains to the heirs
from the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to the heirs a deed for the same before his death. This transmission
takes place by operation of law.
Bautista Angelo, J.:
This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson
against Maria del Rosario and her four children named, Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador,
and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow, Maria
Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law
wife, Maria del Rosario, took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria
Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby
they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation,
Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her
right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of
the lands in dispute, without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interpose the
present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of land litigated in this present case. There is
likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a
common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate
children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that
when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time
passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657,
Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre v Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil 321). From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 124 6th ed;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio v Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil 531).
x
x
x
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children
for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother, and
Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she had done to them, this much can
be said: apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it
involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid, it shall be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one
(Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it
results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
BONILLA v BARCENA
No. L-41715, 18 June 1976
71 SCRA 491
The transmission of the hereditary estate from the decedent to the heirs takes place from
the moment of the death of the decedent. A prior judicial declaration of heirship is not
necessary to perfect the transmission. Bonilla holds that claims to or rights over property
which were initiated by the decedent during his lifetime by appropriate court proceedings
are not extinguished by his death. These claims or rights over property are transmitted to
his heirs upon his death.
Martin, J.:
x
x
x
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of
Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
x
x
x
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said
motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena and asked for the substitution by her minor
children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately
dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and
has no legal personality to sue.
x
x
x
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint
in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of
dismissal. While it is true that the person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case
show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the Court had acquired jurisdiction
over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribe the procedure whereby
a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "whenever a party to a pending case dies
x x x it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death x x
x and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff
when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9,
1975 and asked for the proper substitution of the parties in the case. The respondent Court,
however, instead of allowing the substitution dismissed the complaint on the ground that a
dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil
Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become
the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent,
and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to
the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the
property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs
in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim
or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her
death, but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired
interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.
x
x
x
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental; while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained
of is to the person, the property and rights to property affected being incidental. Following
the foregoing criterion, the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title
over the parcels of land in litigation, affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, and therefore, is one that survives even after her death. It is therefore the duty of the
respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to
be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint.
This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, it is even the duty of the Court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the
instant case, the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel
has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her, but also suggested that
their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in
Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for
substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is
another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the
same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian
ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to
act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely
abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in
dismissing the complaint x x x and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, and the motions for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent
Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who are the
petitioners therein, for the deceased plaintiff, and to appoint a qualified person as guardian
ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra, and Mu eq \O(n)oz-Palma, JJ., concur.
BUTTE v MANUEL UY & SONS, INC.
No. L-15499, 18 February 1962
4 SCRA 526
The right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code is property. Thus, where a
decedent dies without having exercised a right of redemption (and provided it has not
expired), the said right shall be transmitted to his heirs upon his death. In this event, the
right of redemption is part of the inheritance. However, where the right of redemption was
acquired after the death of the decedent, the same pertains to the heirs directly in their
individual capacities, and not derivatively from the decedent. Butte makes a clear distinction
as to when the right of redemption is part of the hereditary estate, and when it is not.
Accordingly, Butte clarifies the issue as to who may exercise the right of redemption.
While there is no dispute that the decision arrived at is correct, the matter of tender of the
redemption price and the fact of its judicial consignation invite further scrutiny. Was the
tender of PNB cashier's check to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. a valid and proper tender of
payment? Was Angela Butte required under the law to make a judicial consignation of the
redemption price when Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. refused to accept the same?
It would seem that the estate of Jose V. Ramirez was insolvent. If indeed it could be proved
that the claims of the creditors far exceed the value of the assets, then none of the heirs
would receive any part of the inheritance, as the same shall be liquidated to pay the
creditors. In this eventuality, can any of the Ramirez heirs claim the right of redemption?
The motives of Angela Butte might also be looked into. Why was she eager to redeem the
share sold by Garnier to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.? What is the immediate effect of her
having redeemed the share sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.?
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was co-owner of a house and lot
located at Sta. Cruz, Manila as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in
the name of the following co-owners: Marie Garnier vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez,
1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Belen T. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma.
Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently Special Proceeding No.
15026 was instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in
the aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he
bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been
admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending up to the present on account
of the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the
Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-
owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share
to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After
the execution by her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect
that formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale
was duly registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 was canceled in lieu of
which a new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the other co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of
the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez,
informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was
forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte c/o her counsel x x x and having received the same
on December 10, 1958, said law office delivered them to plaintiff-appellant's son, Mr. Miguel
Papa, who in turn personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs. Butte, on December 11
and 12, 1958. Aside from this letter of defendant-appellant, the vendor x x x wrote said
bank on December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's letter regarding the sale of her 1/6 share
in the Sta. Cruz property for the sum of P500,000.00. Said letter was received by the bank
on December 15, 1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's counsel, the latter received
the same on December 16, 1958. Appellant received the letter on December 19, 1958.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter
and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy
& Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier vda. de Ramirez.
This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court
and filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the
determination by the court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold
which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property,
and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
After the filing by the defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply
thereto, trial was held after which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959 dismissing
plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and that, if
ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal
redemption provided by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for damages was
likewise dismissed for not being sufficiently established. Both parties appealed directly to
this Court.
Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not
plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier vda. de Ramirez, despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the
distribution of her share in the testate proceedings; x x x.
The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1 and 1623
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:
"Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
"Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing
owned in common."
"Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by
the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is
clear. As testamentary heir of the estate of J. V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an
interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the
Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J. V.
Ramirez. By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his
heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights
and obligations that survive the decedent.
"Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death."
"Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.
"Art. 947. The legate or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies
and devises from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs."
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil
Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is
determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as
of the same moment (Art. 908); and so is the inofficiousness of the donations inter vivos
(Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due
and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that
instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez
acquired his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and
from that instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the
original surviving co-owners of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share
is necessarily a co-owner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such
co-owner, became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros)
as soon as another co-owner (Marie Garnier vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided
share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of redemption vested exclusively in
consideration of the redemptioner's share which the law nowhere takes into account.
The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of
Jose V. Ramirez. While under the Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the
possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the
payment of the decedent's debts and the expenses of administration (Sec. 3, Rule 85), and
the administrator may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property
or rights of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of possession and administration do
not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy & Company by
Mrs. Garnier Ramirez. The reason is obvious: this right of legal redemption only came into
existence when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was perfected eight (8) years after the death of
Jose V. Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate. The redemption right vested in the heirs
originally, in their individual capacity, they did not derivatively acquire it from their decedent,
for when Jose V. Ramirez died, none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property had
as yet sold his undivided share to a stranger. Hence there was nothing to redeem and no
right of redemption; and if the late Ramirez had no such right at his death, he could not
transmit it to his own heirs. Much less could Ramirez acquire such right of redemption eight
years after his death, when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made, because death
extinguishes civil personality, and therefore, all further juridical capacity to acquire or
transmit rights and obligations of any kind (Civil Code, Art. 42).
It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez
has not been specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation
of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided
portion in the Sta. Cruz property, in which event Mrs. Butte would have no interest in said
undivided portion. Even if it were true, the fact would remain that so long as that undivided
share remains in the estate, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it
before his demise, so that his heirs are now as much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property
as Jose V. Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his lifetime. As co-owners of the
property, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or any one of them, became personally vested with
the right of legal redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso interest to
Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the undivided share of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should
eventually be sold to satisfy the creditors of the estate, it would not destroy their ownership
of it before the sale, but would only convey or transfer it as in turn sold (if it actually is sold)
to pay his creditors. Hence, the right of any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem the Garnier
share will not be retroactively affected. All that the law requires is that the legal
redemptioner should be a co-owner at the time the undivided share of another co-owner is
sold to a stranger. Whether or not the redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after
exercising the legal redemption is irrelevant for the purposes of the law.
Nor can it be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his
heirs would stand in law as never having acquired that share. This would only be true if the
inheritance is repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the heirship is
undisputed, the purchaser of hereditary property is not deemed to have acquired the title
directly from the deceased Ramirez, because a dead man cannot convey title, nor from the
administrator who owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can only derive his title from
the Ramirez heirs, represented by the administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.
x
x
x
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside,
and another one entered:
(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000.00 made by appellant Angela Butte duly and
p r o p e r l y m a d e ;
x
x
x
(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to convey
to Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above-referred to within 30 days from the time our
decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals and fruits of the
redeemed share from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and x
x
x
Without findings as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ.,
concur. Paredes and de Leon, JJ. did not take part.
DE BORJA v VDA. DE BORJA
No. L-28040, 18 August 1972
46 SCRA 577
The right to the inheritance is transferred to the heirs precisely at the moment of the death
of the decedent. From such time, the heirs are deemed to be the owners of the same. De
Borja confirms that from the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs begin to enjoy all
the attributes of ownership, including the right to dispose (jus disponendi). De Borja holds
that the pendency of the probate proceeding is no bar to the exercise of such proprietary
rights, since ownership over the hereditary estate has vested in the heirs from the time of
the death of the testator.
De Borja must be distinguished from the prohibition against disposicion captatoria in Article
875 of the Civil Code. Likewise, it must be reconciled with the provision of Article 784 which
states that the making of a will is a strictly personal act of the testator.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6
October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was
probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator; in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of
his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower, Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself
a second wife, Tasiano Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, wherein in 1955 she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has
been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar,
some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. he testate estate of
Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to
put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October
1963 by and between "the heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja, personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and
"the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr." The terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
A G R E E M E N T
THAT, it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein to terminate and settle, with
finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc.
between them in connection with the administration, settlement, partition,
adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT, with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without
any reservations, to enter into and execute this agreement under the following
terms and conditions:
x
x
x
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco vda.
de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand (P800,000) Philippine
currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and
P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja, and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as
well as the Estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc.
No. 7866-Rizal respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her
favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon
the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala "Poblacion".
3. That Taciana Ongsingco vda. de Borja hereby assumes payment of that
particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share
of the estate and inheritance taxes on the estate of the late Francisco de Borja, or
the sum of P3,500 more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Taciana Ongsingco vda. de Borja
under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of
the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
x
x
x
5. In consideration of above payment to Taciana Ongsingco vda. de Borja, Jose de
Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Taciano Ongsingco vda. de Borja, for themselves and for the heirs, successors,
executors, administrators and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce,
withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or
actions, cause or causes of actions, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts,
damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever
had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proc. Nos.
7866 and 1955 CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No.
3033, CFI-Nueva Ecija, and Civil Case No. 7452 CFI-Rizal, as well as the case
filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the
intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs,
successors and assigns, from any and all liability arising wholly or partially, directly
or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as
well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco vda. de Borja
expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
x
x
x."
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for court approval the agreement of 12 October
1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal x x x; and again on 8 August 1966, to the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija x x x. Tasiana Ongsingo vda. de Borja opposed in
both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija
court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Taciana Ongsingo vda. de
Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval x x x, while administrator Jose de
Borja appealed the order of disapproval x x x by the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromise agreement of 12 October 1963 is
not disputed, but its validity is nevertheless attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground
that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage
between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has
ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the
Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara v Guevara, 74 Phil
479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is
mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy
when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out
by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly
conditions the validity of an extra judicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement
between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives . . ."
The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still
pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued,
bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja
stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision
was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extra
judicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or
not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara v Guevara, 74
Phil 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the estate
in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if
they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than
useless.
The doctrine of Guevara v Guevara, ante is not applicable to the case at bar. This is
apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco -
"x x x shall be considered as full - complete payment - settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa Tangco, x x x and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor
by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise."
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable
to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco
de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the
contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual
share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as
hereditary share in decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment
of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest x x x, there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until
the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be
deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the
coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties x x x are to be
considered settled and should be dismissed, although stipulations as noted by the Rizal
Court gives the contract such character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious
reasons, if only because it serves to avoid multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir x x x. Wherefore, barring unworthiness
or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de
Borja's last will and testament, and would exist even if such will were not probated at all.
Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and
analogous cases, cannot apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco vda. de Borja.
Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja,
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand,
and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco vda. de Borja," it is clear that the transaction was binding on
both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous
authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an extra judicial
compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be
enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
"Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise."
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal has no jurisdiction to
approve the compromise with Jose de Borja because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in
the estate of Josefa Tangco x x x, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja x x x. This
circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already
shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of
Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the
vendor."
If the sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori the sale thereof to
a co-heir could not be forbidden.
x
x
x
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal Court acted in accordance with law, and therefore,
its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected
her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has
diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in
receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to
her attempts to nullify the agreement she had formally entered into with the advice of her
counsel x x x. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon
Rivera v Dizon x x x "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate is
particularly opposite in the present case.
x
x
x
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611
are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco vda. de Borja
in all three (3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., did not take part.
GO ONG v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-75884, 24 September 1987
154 SCRA 270
Go Ong adds another dimension to the transmission of the hereditary estate from the
decedent to the heirs. An heir may encumber his share in the estate during settlement
proceedings, even without prior approval of the court. Go Ong holds that the substantive
rights of the heir cannot be impaired by the provisions of the Rules of Court. Also, Go Ong
holds that pending settlement proceeding, the half share of the surviving spouse in the
conjugal estate is freely alienable by said surviving spouse.
Paras, J.:
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows.
x x x Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City identified as Lot No. 12, Block
407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1,960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd 15021, with an
area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the
name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong, married to Julita Go Ong". Alfredo Ong Bio Hong
died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was
registered on TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter Julita Go Ong sold
Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially canceled and TCT
No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12. On June 8,
1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo mortgaged Lot No. 1
to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK
Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No. 188705 on the same date
x x x. On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking
Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong. Hence, the complaint alleging
nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly
promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it
was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's approval, adding
that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was promised the sum of
P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of
the loan.
Concluding, the trial court ruled:
"Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the capital of the
deceased husband brought into the marriage, said property should be presumed
as acquired during the marriage, and therefore, conjugal property.
"After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's husband, the
plaintiff acquired by law, her conjugal share, together with the hereditary rights
thereon. (Margate v Rabacal, L-14302, April 30, 1963) Consequently, the
mortgage constituted on said property, upon express authority of plaintiff,
notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her conjugal
share thereon, together with her hereditary rights."
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, the
appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extra judicial foreclosure
proceedings instituted by defendant against plaintiff shall be held in abeyance to
await the final result of Civil Case No. 107089 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, 6th Judicial District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG,
ADMINISTRATRIX". In pursuance with which the restraining order of the lower
court in this case restraining the sale of the properties levied upon is hereby
ordered to continue in full force and effect coterminous with the final result of Civil
Case No. 107089, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Cost against
plaintiff-appellant."
On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision, but in a
Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
x
x
x
The sole issue in this case is - whether or not the mortgage constituted over the parcel of
land under petitioner's administration is null and void for want of judicial approval.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
x
x
x
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner -
the wife of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate property of the
latter; (2) that the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in her
capacity as administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage affects the wife's share in the
community property and her inheritance in the estate of her husband.
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7
of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court ruled that the
regulations provided in the said section are mandatory.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her husband
is concerned, the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her hereditary rights
in the estate. The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily mortgaged the
property in question because she was promised by JK Exports, Inc. the sum of
P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan; and that at the time she executed the real
estate mortgage, there was no court order authorizing the mortgage, so she took it upon
herself to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence,
the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al v Lladas (21 SCRA 1483) and
Fernandez, et al. v Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement
proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property
of the marriage is under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone
is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the
petitioner. An apposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances, this
Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners
shall each have full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National
Bank v Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 (1980).
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by
authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect
to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged
was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in
the property is concerned, for after all, she was the absolute owner thereof. This ownership
by hers is not disputed, nor is there any claim that the rights of the government (with
reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or anybody else, have been prejudiced or
impaired. As stated by Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Manuel Moran in Jakosalem v
Rafols, et al., 73 Phil 618
"The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to
Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of his estate was
commenced in 1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924 only. During the
pendency of the said administration, that is on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar,
daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to
Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she
would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. On December
12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made,
and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she
conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of
defendant-appellee Nicolas Rafols, who entered upon the portion thus conveyed
and has been in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui
brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other
half from the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August
4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the
herein plaintiff-appellant. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision absolving
Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar,
and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half by express acknowledgment of
the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the judgment which is
favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
"The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar
could not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia
legis, that is, under judicial administration. This is error. That the land could not
ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the
heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in
the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis
is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the
sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration."
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely
affect the substantive rights of private respondents to dispose of her ideal [not inchoate, for
the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued
from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code)] share in the co-
heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art.
493, Civil Code, supra). Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court applies in a case where
judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of
property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the
conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval
for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused
to others, including the government.
Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may
arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended
that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to
enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud, or would result in another
injustice. (Gonzalo Sy Trading v Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby denied and the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
LEE v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BR. 85
G. R. No. 146006, 23 February 2004
423 SCRA 497
Lee gives another dimension to the right of an heir to dispose properties forming part of the
inheritance, pending judicial settlement proceedings. In this case, the dispositions made by
the two heirs relate to specific properties which have not been finally adjudicated by the
intestate court. There were also claims made by 5 illegitimate children which have not been
acted upon. But more importantly, in this case the legitimate family executed a deed of
extra judicial partition, to the exclusion of the illegitimate children, pursuant to which they
divided the estate of the decedent amongst themselves. And this deed of extra judicial
partition was executed while the intestate proceedings remain pending in court.
The decision in Lee is consistent with the law. However, Court omitted to state a very
important reason why no heir can sell any specific property of the estate prior to the final
settlement of the estate without court approval. The reason is that prior to the partition of
the estate among the heirs, all of the heirs are co-owners of the inheritance, each having an
ideal or pro indiviso share therein. This co-ownership prevents any heir from alienating a
specific property without court approval, because all other co-heirs have an interest in each
of the specific property of the estate. It is only upon the partition of the estate that each of
the heirs may probably acquire absolute title to specific properties.
One wonders if the Court could have allowed the sale in Lee, but subject to the outcome of
partition. After all, the hereditary estate is transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the
death of the decedent. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the transmission of the
estate to the heirs prior to partition is a transmission of aliquot shares, not a transmission of
specific property. Thus, where an heir disposes a specific property for his own benefit, such
disposition unjustly deprives the other co-heirs of their undivided interest in the thing
alienated.
Note too the tactical move of Jose Ortaez in seeking the removal of the Special
Administratrix Enderes, his illegitimate half-sister. By disposing the shares over which
Enderes as administration, he claimed that the appointment has become moot and
academic. But the precise reason why such administration became irrelevant was his own
unauthorized and surreptitious act of disposing the property subject of administration
without court approval. Such machination constitutes a contemptuous act as it sought to
indirectly frustrate the courts directive to put Special Administratrix Enderes in charge of the
Philinterlife shares.
Corona, J.:
x
x
x
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety
percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado-Ortaez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by
Legaya Novicio (herein private respondents Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings
Jose, Romeo, Enrico, Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez, docketed as Sp. Proc. Q-30884 (which
petition to date remains pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the
petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the
intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85,
appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators of their fathers estate.
Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular administrator (up to now no regular
administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez
submitted an inventory of the estate of their father, which included, among other properties,
2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter
Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she owned 1,014
Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right
to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG),
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to
repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was
consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his personal capacity
and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stock as his
inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of
herein petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After
one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares
of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings at the Regional Trial court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and
her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extra judicial settlement of the
estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of
stock) among themselves. This was the basis for the number of shares separately sold by
Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on October 30, 1991
(1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondents Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings
(hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes, et al.) filed a motion for appointment
of special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents
Enderes, et. al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare
void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996,
she filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extra judicial settlement of the
decedents estate. These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void
ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed
by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the
deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock, and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-
Enderes as Special Administratris of the shares of stock on the ground that there were no
longer any shares of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator
Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
x
x
x
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special
Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement
or extra judicial partition of estate.
x
x
x
x x x Jose Ortaez filed x x x a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal justification
whatsoever for the extra judicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortaez, his brother Rafael
Ortaez and mother Juliana Ortaez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of
Dr. Ortaez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that
there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the
sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock
they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without the approval of the intestate court, was
void.
x
x
x
He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the
Supreme Court dismissed x x x. His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality x
x x. On February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the petition of
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez became final and was subsequently recorded in the
book of entries of judgment.
x
x
x
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a
motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
1997 because the orders of the intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court) had long became (sic) final. Respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao as president and secretary respectively, of Philinterlife, but petitioners ignored the
same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution x x x.
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari x x x. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion in
(1) declaring the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock was null and void;
(2) ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity; and (3) depriving petitioners of
their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright.
x
x
x
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively of
Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise the following errors for our consideration:
x
x
x
In failing to declare null and void the orders of the intestate court which nullified the
sale of shares of stock between the legitimate heir Jos S. Ortaez and petitioner
FLAG because of settled law and jurisprudence; i.e., that an heir has the right to
dispose of the decedents property even if the same is under administration
pursuant to Civil Code provision that possession of hereditary property is
transmitted to the heir the moment of death of the decedent (Acebedo v Abesamis,
217 SCRA 194).
The petition has no merit.
x
x
x
It is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extra judicially partitioning the
intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or
claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since
the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael
and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a
third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
Art. 553 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in
the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is,
after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given
their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the
estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would
cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court
approval. It is well settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition
of the decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy v Orellano, we laid down the rule that
the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate
court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena v Court of
Appeals, we ruled that:
x
x
x
On November 1, 1978, the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed
between petitioner and private respondent without notice and approval of the
probate court. Even after the sale, the administratrix Aurora Carreon still included
the three fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in her inventory
submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner,
at the time of the sale of the fishponds in question, knew that the same were part of
the estate under administration.
x
x
x
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which
according to our settled jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition
regarding properties under administration More emphatic is the declaration We
made in Estate of Olave v Reyes (123 SCRA 767) where We stated that when the
estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. v Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a
special proceedings, needs court approval This pronouncement finds support
in the previous case of Dolores vda. de Gil c Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797)
wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before
final adjudication. x x x.
x
x
x
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval; and (2)
any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and
affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial
c o u r t s ) Au g u s t 11 a n d 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 o r d e r s , i s h e r e b y AFFI RMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., no part.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS AND
ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. v LINA
G.R. No. 141634, 5 February 2001
351 SCRA 183
In this case, Justice Panganiban correctly classified the transaction between Buyer and
Seller as a conditional sale, thereby correcting the CAs findings that the transaction was a
contract to sell. Justice Panganiban correctly distinguished between a contract to sell
(wherein the transaction is subject to the positive suspensive condition that the buyer will
deliver the purchase price) from a conditional sale (wherein the obligation of the seller to
execute the deed of sale is conditioned upon the procurement of the approval of the
intestate court). Thus, when the intestate court approved the sale of the property, the
condition of the sale was fulfilled and the Seller and the Buyer are obligated to perform their
respective obligations under the contract.
As to the scope of the property that must be sold, Justice Panganiban correctly ruled that
the sale can only cover the undivided interest of Eliodoro to the extent of his ! conjugal
share, and his 1/10 share as an intestate heir of Remedios. Therefore, the obligation of the
Administrator is to sell to Alex A. Lina ! + 1/10 of the property or 3/5 thereof undivided
share.
The Court reiterates the basic rule that an heir may sell his ideal share of the inheritance.
Court approval is not necessary before the heir could sell. Judicial approval cannot
adversely affect the substantive right of the heir to dispose his own pro indiviso share in the
co-heirship or co-ownership.
As to the sale of the entire property to the buyer, Justice Panganiban correctly ruled that the
pro-indiviso shares of the non-selling heirs should be excluded from the sale. Hence the
transaction between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and Alex Lina cannot extend beyond Eliodoros
undivided interest in the property.
Panganiban, J.:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval.
The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not
given their consent to it. x x x.
The Case
x
x
x
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby MODIFY the [O]rder of the lower
court dated January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of Earnest Money with
Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7, 1982, only to the three-fifth (3/5) portion of
the disputed lots covering the share of Administrator Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. in the
property. The intervenor is hereby directed to pay appellant the balance of the
purchase price of the three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this Order and x x x the administrator is directed to execute the
necessary and proper deeds of conveyance in favor of appellee within thirty (30)
days thereafter.
x
x
x
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA) are as follows:
x x x Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas
x x x.
On November 19, 1981, the 4
th
floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the
records burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. x x x As a result, Administrator Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. filed a Motion for
Reconstitution of the records of the case x x x.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-
intervention was filed by Movant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7,
1982, movant and Administrator Eliodoro Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound
and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators and assigns, to sell forever and
absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the
estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
x
x
x
The Receipt of the Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy is hereunder
quoted to wit:
Received today from MR. ALEX A LINA, the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, per Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Check No.
319913 dated today for P100,000.00 x x x as additional earnest
money for the following:
x
x
x
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
(Makati Branch Office) in the name of SELLER ELIODORO
SANDEJAS, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Remedios
Reyes de Sandejas, and which undersigned, as SELLER, binds
forever and absolutely in their entirety (all of the four (4) parcels of
land above described, which are contiguous to each other as to
form one big lot) to said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has agreed to buy all
of them, also binding on his heirs, administrators and assigns, for
the consideration of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, upon such reasonable terms of payment as
may be agreed upon by them. The parties have however, agreed
on the following terms and conditions:
x
x
x
3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already
deceased and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for the
settlement of her estate x x x, wherein SELLER was appointed
as administrator of said Estate, has informed BUYER that he
(SELLER) already filed a Motion with the Court for authority to sell
the above parcels of land to herein BUYER, but which has been
delayed due to the burning of the records of said Spec. Pro No.
138398, which records are presently under reconstitution, the
parties shall have at least ninety (90) days from receipt of the order
authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as administrator, to sell all
THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND TO HEREIN
BUYER (but extendible for another period of ninety (90) days upon
the request of either of the parties upon the other), within which to
execute the deed of absolute sale covering all above parcels of
land;
x
x
x
5. Whether indicated or not, all of the above terms and conditions
shall be binding on the heirs, administrators and assigns of both
SELLER (undersigned MR. ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR.) and
BUYER (MR. ALEX A. LINA).
On January 7, 1985, counsel for Administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a
Manifestation alleging among others that the administrator, Eliodoro P. Sandejas,
died sometime in November 1984 in Canada x x x. He also alleged, among others
that the matter of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be
filed in the estate of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas x x x. On February 15, the
lower court issued an Order directing, among others, that the counsel for the four (4)
heirs and other heirs of Teresita R. Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new
administrator within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order x x x.
On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for letters of administration and (2) to
consolidate instant case with Sp. Proc. No. R-83-15601 RTC Branch XI-Manila x x
x entitled IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR., ALEX A
LINA, PETITIONER, for letters of administration x x x. On November 29, 1985,
Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an Order consolidating
Sp. Proc No. 85-33707 with SP. Proc No. R-83-15601 x x x. Likewise, on
December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, issued an Order
stating that this court has no objection to the consolidation of Special Proceedings
No. 85-331707, now pending before Branch XXXVI of this Court, with the present
proceedings now pending before this Branch.
x
x
x
x
x
x
Administrator Sixto Sandejas on January 16, 1989 took his oath as administrator of
the estate of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas. x x x
On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to approve the deed
of conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. on June 7, 1982; (b) to compel the heirs of Remedios
Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. thru their administrator, to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Intervenor Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of
sale x x x to which the administrator filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition
to said omnibus motion x x x.
On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned Order granting
Intervenors Motion for the Approval of the Receipt of Earnest Money with promise
to buy between Plaintiff-in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. dated
June 7, 1982 x x x.
The Order of the intestate court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, Intervenors motion for the approval of the Receipt
of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy dated June 7,
1982, is granted. The Intervenor is directed to pay the balance of
the purchase price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this Order and Administrator is directed to
execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the necessary and proper
deeds of conveyancing.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr.
and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that
the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas
until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. That approval was a
positive suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which was not tantamount to a breach.
It was simply an event that prevented the obligation from maturing or becoming effective. If
the condition did not happen, the obligation would not arise or come into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the
lack of written notice to the other heirs showed the lack of consent of those heirs other than
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed
to enjoy a claim arising from ones own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a
matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual commitments as an owner
and heir. When he entered into the agreement with respondent, he bound his conjugal and
successional shares in the property.
Hence this petition.
Issues
x
x
x
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred in modifying the trial
courts Decision and in obligating petitioner to sell 3/5 of the disputed properties to
respondent, even if the suspensive condition had not been fulfilled. It also raises the
following collateral issues: (1) the settlement courts jurisdiction; (2) respondent-intervenors
standing to file an application for the approval of the sale of realty in the settlement case,
(3) the decedents bad faith, and (4) the computation of the decedents share in the realty
under administration.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is partially meritorious.
Main Issues:
Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the
parcels of land, despite the non-fulfillment of the suspensive condition court approval of
the sale as contained in the Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and To Buy
(also referred to as the Receipt). Instead, they assert that because this condition had not
been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted into a
money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased Eliodoro
Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to sell. Not exactly. In a contract to sell, the
payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. The vendors obligation to
convey title does not become effective in case of failure to pay.
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a
suspensive condition the procurement of a lower court approval, not full payment. There
was no reservation of ownership in the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the
Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they
could do upon the courts approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a
conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place
only if and when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate courts grant of the
Motion for Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners obligation to
execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The condition having been
satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what they
had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedents estate per Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the
substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or
co-ownership. In other words, they can sell their rights, interest or participation in the
property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the
validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the
property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the courts permission. It would
seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed only for
this reason.
Thus we are not persuaded by petitioners argument that the obligation was converted into
a mere monetary claim. Paragraph 4 of the Receipt, which petitioners rely on, refers to a
situation wherein the sale has not materialized. In such a case, the seller is bound to return
to the buyer the earnest money paid plus interest at fourteen percent per annum. But the
sale was approved by the intestate court; hence, the proviso does not apply.
Because the petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the disputed lots,
the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr.
Thus, it correctly modified the intestate courts ruling by excluding their shares from the
ambit of the transaction.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a
pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 of the disputed lots.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
REGANON v IMPERIAL
No. L-24434, 17 January 1968
22 SCRA 80
The undivided share of an heir in the inheritance may be levied upon and/or garnished by
an unpaid creditor in order to satisfy a judgment debt of the said heir. The fact that the
hereditary estate has not been divided among the heirs is of no consequence, particularly if
heirship is not disputed and the estate is not burdened by any debt. This is a necessary
consequence of the automatic transmission of ownership under Article 777.
It was argued that the property comprising the hereditary estate was in custodia legis and
therefore could not be levied upon, garnished, or be subject to execution. It must be noted
that since the guardianship proceeding terminated ipso facto upon the demise of the ward,
and that the ownership of the same transferred to the heirs from the moment of such death,
the argument was devoid of merit.
It must be borne in mind, however, that prior to the final distribution of the hereditary estate
among the heirs, an unpaid creditor may not attach or garnish a specific property forming
part of the estate. The attachment or garnishment must refer to the hereditary share of the
debtor-heir. And in any event, the attachment or garnishment will be effective as regards
the properties which may eventually be allocated to the debtor-heir pursuant to partition.
Bengzon, J.P., J.:
x x x the heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of about one hectare portion of a parcel of land (Lot No. 1 or Lot No. 4952,
Situated at Miasi, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, covered by O.C.T. No. 1447, with an
area of 7.9954 hectares), with damages against Rufino Imperial.
The court a quo x x x rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs lawful owners of the land
in question and entitled to its peaceful possession and enjoyment; ordering defendant
immediately to vacate the portion occupied by him and to restore the peaceful possession
thereof to plaintiffs; and sentencing defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,929.20 and
the costs.
On November 29, 1963, the plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This
was granted by the trial court in its order of December 9, 1963.
The Deputy Provincial Sheriff submitted x x x a sheriff's return of proceedings reporting
the garnishment and sale of a carabao and goat belonging to defendant for P153.00, and
the attachment and sale of defendant's parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4694,
situated in Sicet, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, for P500.00 - both sales having been
made to the only bidder, plaintiff's counsel Atty. Vic T. Lacaya.
On March 15, 1964, the Philippine National Bank deposited in the Philippine National Bank-
Dipolog Branch the residuary estate of its former ward, Eulogio Imperial, in the sum of
P10,303.80, pursuant to an order of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte in Sp. Proc. No. R-145.
On May 25, 1964, the heirs of said Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is defendant, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the residuary estate, wherein was apportioned P1,471.97
as defendant Rufino Imperial's share.
Informed of this development, the plaintiffs filed x x x an ex parte motion for issuance of an
alias writ of execution and of an order directing the manager, or the representative, of the
Philippine National Bank, Dipolog Branch, to hold the share of defendant and deliver the
same to the provincial sheriff of the province to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance
of the money judgment. This was granted by the trial court (Branch II) in its order dated
June 9, 1964.
x x x the Deputy Provincial Sheriff issued a sheriff's notification for levy addressed to
defendant, giving notice of the garnishment of the rights, interests, shares and participation
that defendant may have over the residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial, consisting of
the money deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch.
Defendant, through counsel, appearing for the first time before the trial court, x x x filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order x x x and to quash the alias writ of execution
issued pursuant to it, to which plaintiffs filed their opposition x x x. On July 14, 1964, the
trial court denied defendant's aforesaid motion.
Defendant's second motion for reconsideration likewise having been denied by the trial
court x x x, defendant appealed to us, raising the following issues:
(1) Upon the death of a ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship proceedings
and deposited in a bank, still considered in custodia legis and therefore cannot be
attached?
x
x
x
Defendant-appellant argues that the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in
custodia legis and therefore cannot be attached.
It is true that in a former case it was held that property under custodia legis cannot be
attached. But this was under the old Rules of Court. The new Rules of Court now
specifically provides for the procedure to be followed in case what is attached is in custodia
legis. The clear import of this new provision is that property under custodia legis is now
attachable, subject to the mode set for in said rule.
Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer subsist:
"The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and thereupon all
powers and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which remains, to make
a proper accounting and settlement in the probate court."
As a matter of fact, the guardianship proceedings was ordered conditionally closed by x x
x the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte x x x in its order of February 8,
1964, where it stated -
"In the meantime, the guardian Philippine National Bank is directed to deposit the
residuary estate of the said ward with its bank agency in Dipolog, this province, in
the name of the estate of the deceased ward Eulogio Imperial, preparatory to the
eventual distribution of the same to the heirs when the latter shall be known, and
upon proof of deposit of said residuary estate, the guardian Philippine National
Bank shall forthwith be relieved from any responsibility as such, and this
proceedings shall be considered closed and terminated."
And the condition has long been fulfilled, because on March 13, 1964 the Philippine
National Bank-Manila deposited the residuary estate of the ward with the Philippine
National Bank, Dipolog Branch x x x.
When Eulogio Imperial died x x x the rights to his succession x x x were transmitted to
his heirs, one of whom is his son and heir, defendant-appellant herein. This automatic
transmission cannot but proceed with greater ease and certainty that in this case where the
parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt. For,
"The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
death, and where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not
burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds by force of law, to the
dominion, ownership and possession of the properties of his predecessor and
consequently, stands legally in the shoes of the latter."
That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for
purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts, is
already a settled matter in this jurisdiction.
It is admitted that the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including herein defendant-appellant, have
on May 25, 1964 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. x x x Therefore, the estate for
all practical purposes has been settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw the residuary
estate from the Philippine National Bank Dipolog Branch and divide it among themselves.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against
defendant-appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, J.J., concur.
SALVADOR v STA. MARIA
No. L-25952, 30 June 1967
20 SCRA 603
While the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent,
Salvador holds that the right of an heir to his distributive share thereto is not determinable
until all the estate liabilities have been paid. Until then, the right of an heir to his share is
not demandable, and is subject to the existence of a residue after the payment of debts.
Salvador further holds that the proceeds of the sale of a property forming part of the estate,
likewise forms part of the estate.
It must be noted that the reconveyance court had jurisdiction over the determination of
ownership of the parcels of land subject matter of the case. Issues of ownership are
beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. However, the probate court has exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to the disposition of any property pertaining to the estate, as well as
the distribution of the shares of the instituted heirs.
In this case, three things are interesting as they are puzzling. First, of the twenty-three (23)
instituted heirs in the will, nine (9) were not among the so-called heirs of Salvador who were
substituted in the reconveyance case. Of the twenty-one (21) heirs substituted for Salvador,
seven (7) were not instituted in the will. Therefore, there were fourteen (14) instituted heirs
who were also named as substitutes in the reconveyance case. It would therefore seem
that everyone knew what was going on. Second, the reconveyance case as well as the
probate proceedings were then being heard in two different branches of the same court.
The reconveyance court must have known that probate proceedings involving the same
properties were pending before another branch of the same court. Third, what led the Court
of Appeals to order the reconveyance of the properties to the substituted heirs? The Court
of Appeals virtually pre-empted the probate court in the task of determining who the heirs of
Celestino Salvador were. In addition, the judgment of the Court of Appeals could result in a
situation were the properties of the deceased would be transferred to the heirs even before
the debts of the estate are paid, or before tax obligations are fully settled.
Bengzon, J.P., J.:
Seven parcels of titled land and two parcels of untitled land situated in Bigaa, Bulacan,
were owned by Celestino Salvador. In 1941, he executed a deed of sale over them in favor
of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void for lack
of consideration, he filed x x x against said vendees, a suit for reconveyance of said
parcels of land (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I, Civil Case No. 1082).
On April 27, 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, twenty-one
persons were on May 18, 1956 substituted as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance. And
meanwhile, special proceedings for the probate of his will and for letters testamentary was
instituted (CFI of Bulacan, Br. II, Sp. Proceedings No. 940).
On September 4, 1956 the administrator filed in Sp. Proceedings No. 940 an inventory of
properties of the estate, covering the same parcels of land subject matter of the
reconveyance action. On September 7, 1956, Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to
probate and Dominador Cardenas was appointed executor of said will.
Twenty-three (23) persons were instituted heirs in this will. Of these, nine (9) were not
among the twenty-one (21) alleged relatives substituted in the reconveyance case; and of
the twenty-one (21) substituted alleged heirs, seven (7) were not instituted in the will.
In the suit for reconveyance, x x x the Court (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I) rendered judgment,
ordering the defendants therein (the spouses Alfonso and Anatolia) to reconvey the parcels
of land to the estate of Celestino Salvador. Appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals was
interposed by said defendants.
On August 12, 1961, the Court of Appeals affirmed the reconveyance judgment, with the
correction that reconveyance be in favor of the twenty-one (21) heirs substituted as
plaintiffs therein.
About three years later, pursuant to an order of the CFI of Bulacan, Br. II, in the testacy
proceedings, x x x one of the parcels of land involved, Lot 6, was sold so that with its
proceeds debtors who filed claims may be paid. The Philippine National Bank bought it at
P41,184.00. Said amount was then deposited in the same bank by the administrator,
subject to court order.
On December 18, 1964, defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of
reconveyance over the subject parcels of land, in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate.
Revoking the same as not in accordance with the final judgment therein, the CFI of
Bulacan, Br. I x x x ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed in favor of the
twenty-one persons substituted as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, on September 30,
1965, a new deed of reconveyance was made in favor of twenty-one persons as heirs of
Celestino.
Following this, x x x said Br. I ordered the corresponding title certificate (TCT No. 54639)
in the administrator's name canceled; new title certificate to be issued in the names of the
same twenty-one persons. Said order was carried out, and TCT No. 63734 was issued in
the names of the twenty-one persons.
On December 7, 1965, Br. I (reconveyance court) ordered the Philippine National Bank to
release the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to the twenty-one (21) plaintiffs in the
reconveyance case. Apparently, although the passbook was given by the administrator to
said twenty-one persons, no release was made, as the Philippine National Bank awaited
Br. II's order.
Br. II, on March 1, 1966, approved the following claims against the estate:
x
x
x
On March 30, 1966, said Br. II (probate court) ordered return of passbook to the
administrator; and release to the administrator by the PNB of the P41,184.00, or so much
thereof as needed to pay the aforestated debts of the estate.
After failing to get reconsideration of said order, the twenty-one (21) substituted heirs, on
April 25, 1966, filed with Us the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction to assail the order to pay the debts of the estate with the P41,184.00 proceeds of
the sale of Lot 6; and to question Br. II's (probate court) power to dispose of the parcels of
land involved in the reconveyance suit in Br. I.
Raised are these issues: (1) Are the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of
them, properties of the estate or not? (2) Does final judgment in the reconveyance suit in
favor of the twenty-one so-called heirs who substituted Celestino Salvador, bar the
disposition of the reconveyed properties by the settlement court?
It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific distributive shares of the
inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid.
Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and
subject to the existence of a residue after payment of the debts. (Castellvi de Raquiza v
Castellvi, L-17630, 31 October 1963; Jimoga-on v Belmonte, 84 Phil 545; Sec. 1, Rule 90,
Rules of Court)
Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts above mentioned. They only contend
that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to them, not
to the estate, the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for
debts of the estate.
Said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as
heirs of Celestino; as such they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the
reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows
that the properties they claim are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate.
The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the
estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having received the same, therefore, in the
reconveyance action, was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its obligations. They
cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts
of the estate being first satisfied.
At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone (P41,184.00) appeared more than sufficient to pay
the debt (P38,872.58); and there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the
question of who will receive, how much as heirs, the same is properly determinable by the
settlement court, after payment of the debts (Pimentel v Palanca, 5 Phil 436; Maningat v
Castillo, 75 Phil 532; Jimoga-on v Belmonte, supra)
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied, with costs. So ordered.
CONCEPCION, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, J.J.,
concur.
RAMIREZ v BALTAZAR
No. L-25049, 30 August 1968
24 SCRA 918
While it is true that heirs inherit from the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
are, pending judicial confirmation of heirship, precluded from commencing an action arising
out of the rights belonging to the deceased. The rule is necessary for an orderly
administration of the estate of the deceased person. Therefore, as a rule the power to
commence suit in behalf of the estate is generally given only to the administrator. However,
where the administrator fails or refuses to act, or cannot be expected to act in a particular
circumstance, then by way of an exception to the rule, the heirs may commence the
necessary action even if in the meantime, their heirship has not been judicially confirmed.
In general, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. The right to commence suit is not, however, one of those rights granted to the
heirs, pending judicial confirmation of heirship. What is the justification for denying an heir
the right to commence legal action before judicial confirmation of heirship?
The very patent conflict of interest demonstrated in this case must be noted.
Angeles, J.:
x
x
x
It appears that on 6 January 1959, Victoriana Eguaras, single, made and executed a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land owned by her in fee simple, as security for a loan of
P2,170.00 in favor of the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores.
Upon the demise of the mortgagor, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, on 16
September 1960 filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of her estate, in the court of
First Instance of Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-99 wherein said mortgagees, as
petitioners, alleged that Filemon Ramirez and Monica Ramirez are the heirs of the
deceased. Filemon Ramirez was appointed administrator of the estate; however, having
failed to qualify, on 16 January 1961 the court appointed Artemio Diawan, then deputy clerk
of court, administrator of the estate who, in due time, qualified for the office.
On 19 April 1961, the mortgagees Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, filed a complaint for
foreclosure of the aforesaid mortgage, against Artemio Diawan, in his capacity as
administrator of the estate, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-292 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. The defendant-administrator was duly served with summons but he
failed to answer, whereupon, on petition of the plaintiffs said defendant was declared in
default. The case was referred to a commissioner to receive the evidence for the plaintiffs,
and defendant-administrator, as deputy clerk of court, acted as such hearing commissioner.
On 16 August 1961, decision was rendered decreeing the foreclosure of the mortgaged
property and the sale thereof, if within ninety days from finality of the decision, the
obligation was not fully paid. The judgment not having been satisfied, a writ of execution
was issued for the sale of the mortgaged property, and after compliance with the
requirements of the law regarding the sending, posting and publication of the notice of sale,
the sheriff sold the property at public auction to the highest bidder, who happened to be the
plaintiffs themselves x x x. On petition of the plaintiffs, the sale was confirmed by the
court on 26 January 1962.
On 6 February 1962, Filemon Ramirez, Monica Ramirez and Jose Eguaras, the first two
being the heirs named in the petition for intestate proceedings, filed a complaint designated
"For the Annulment of all Proceedings in said Civil Case No. SC-292 for the Foreclosure of
the Mortgage", against the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, and Artemio
Diawan, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Victoriana Eguaras, deceased, and
Silverio Talabis, in his capacity as deputy provincial sheriff of Laguna, docketed as Civil
Case No SC-319 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
The facts hereinabove narrated are succinctly contained in the complaint in said Civil Case
No. SC-319, with the additional averments that the defendant Diawan, the deputy clerk of
court appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased, acted in collusion
with the other defendants Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, deliberately and in fraud of
the plaintiffs: (a) in allowing the elementary period within which to file an answer to lapse
without notifying and/or informing the said plaintiffs of the complaint for foreclosure, as a
result of which he was declared in default to the prejudice of the estate which he
represents; (b) that had the plaintiffs (Monica and Filemon) been notified of the pendency of
the case, the defendant-administrator could have interposed a counterclaim because
payment in the sum of P1,548.52 had been made and received by the mortgagees on
account of the debt; (c) in presiding as hearing officer in the ex parte hearing in Civil Case
No. 292, to receive evidence for plaintiffs therein, notwithstanding the fact that there was
another deputy clerk of court available who could have acted in his stead, as a result of
which an anomalous situation was created whereby he was a defendant and at the same
time a commissioner receiving evidence against himself as administrator; (d) in allowing
judgment to become final without notifying the plaintiffs; (e) in deliberately allowing the 90-
day period within which to make payment to expire without notifying the heirs, as a result of
which the said heirs were not afforded an opportunity to make payments ordered by the
court in its decision; and (f) in refusing to help the heirs seek postponement of the auction
sale. It is also alleged that it was only when the property foreclosed was published for sale
at public auction that the heirs came to know about the foreclosure proceedings.
The defendant spouses, Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; defendant Diawan
likewise moved to dismiss on two grounds: that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and
that the complaint states no cause of action.
x
x
x
Reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, the plaintiffs took the present
appeal where they assigned the following errors: (1) in holding that plaintiff-appellants have
no legal capacity to sue until their status as legal heirs of the deceased is determined in
Special Proceeding No. SC-99; (2) in ruling that there was no collusion or connivance
among the defendants-appellees, despite the fact that the issue in the motion to dismiss is
purely legal, not factual; and (3) in denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
At the outset, let it be remembered that the defendants-appellees, in availing themselves of
the defense that the plaintiffs-appellants had not been declared to be the heirs of the
deceased Victoriana Eguaras, have overlooked the fact that they (defendants-appellees)
themselves in their petition for intestate proceedings (Case SC-99) have alleged that
Filemon Ramirez and Monica Ramirez, two of the herein plaintiffs-appellants, are the heirs
of the deceased. Insofar as defendants-appellees are concerned, it is our opinion that they
are estopped from questioning the heirship of these two named persons to the estate of the
deceased.
There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs
from the moment of death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this court has, under
special circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted
before the judicial declaration. In Pascual v Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have
no legal standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this
rule admits of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act, in which event
the heirs may act in his place."
A similar situation obtains in the case at bar. The administrator is being charged to have
been in collusion and connivance with the mortgagees of a property of the deceased,
allowing its foreclosure without notifying the heirs, to the prejudice of the latter. Since the
ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud
resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has
allegedly participated, it would be farfetched to expect the said administrator himself to file
the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs, who have an interest to assert
and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception,
rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the
heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the
deceased.
x
x
x
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby set aside insofar as it
dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-319, and the records are remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. Cost against defendants-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Fernando, J.J., concur.
PUNO v PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 177066, 11 September 2009
599 SCRA 585
Notwithstanding Article 777, an alleged heir of a deceased stockholder does not,
upon the demise of the stockholder, automatically become a stockholder of the corporation.
Nachura, J.:
x x x
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent
Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be
an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent.
Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife,
Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late
father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow
petitioner to inspect its corporate books, render an accounting of all the transactions it
entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends or income
pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the
legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as Joselito Musni Muno.
Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that Joselito Musni Puno and
Joselito Musni Muno were one and the same.
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that
petitioners certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L.
Puno.
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name Joselito M. Puno,
certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To
hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth
certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen
days from the order and set the case for pretrial.
On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or
Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of
the company from 1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the
corporation.
The cost of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred
by the defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be the subject of a bill of
costs.
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its decision dated
October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of
and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the
intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno.
Accordingly, the CA said that petition had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine
respondents books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was
merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His
action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be
taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the latter.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its resolution dated
March 6, 2007.
x x x
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect
respondent corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L.
Puno.
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder.
However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove
satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder, thus, the former cannot claim to be an
heir of the latter.
x x x
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity
of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. As correctly observed by the CA,
only petitioners mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There
was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons
who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus-
Sec. 74. Books to be kept, stock transfer agent. - x x x
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any
meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or
member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may
demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records of minutes, at his
expense.
x x x
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. Within ten (10) days from receipt of a
written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its
most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of
the last taxable year and a profit and loss of statement for said taxable year,
showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its
operations.
The stockholders right of inspection of the corporations books and records is
based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection.
After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs.
Such right rests upon the stockholders underlying ownership of the corporations assets
and property.
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by
the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as
shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate
proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.
During such interim period, the heir stands as the equitable owner of the stocks, the
executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent
are held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the
administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as
stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in his case to establish that he
is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books
and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer
book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would
only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ.,
concur.
REYES v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI BR. 142
G.R. No. 165744, 11 August 2008
561 SCRA 593
Further to Puno v Puno Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court in this case clarified
the relationship between the corporation, on the one hand, and the heirs of a deceased
stockholder, on the other. While the ruling in relation to Section 63 of the Corporation Code
seems to be correct, the dictum of the court in relation to the opening of succession under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, and the consequences thereof, appear to be debatable. In
addition, the ruling of the Supreme Court in relation to the acquisition or vesting of title to
the estate of the deceased person in favor of the latters heirs is clearly in conflict with the
statutory definition of the term inheritance in Article 776 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the statement of the Court to the effect that the undivided interest of the co-
heirs, in relation to the shares forming part of the estate of the deceased person, is still
inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings is rather disturbing as it
clearly runs against the explicit dictum of Article 777. See the ruling in Santos v Lumbao,
519 SCRA 408, supra.
Brion, J.:
x x x
Application of the Relationship Test
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize
the case as an intra-corporate dispute?
We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he
holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in
his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares
registered in her name. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the
allegations of the complaint is Rodrigos interest as an heir since the subject matter of the
present controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on
Rodrigos personally-owned shares. In this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this
case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and the parties in
interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacias death, her
children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith),
and they are, prior to the estates partition, deemed co-owners thereof. This status as co-
owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the
corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code
on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of
the corporation. Section 63 provides:
Section 63, Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. The capital stock
of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by
the president or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant
secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation, shall be issued in
accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and
may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the
owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the
transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the parties, until
the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation so as to show the names of
the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate
or certificates, and the number of shares transferred.
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claims shall be
transferable in the books of the corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and
valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedents estate and her heirs), does
not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of
the corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as such
both by the corporation and by third parties.
We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v de la Cruz, and TCL
Sales Corporation v Court of Appeals we did not require the registration of the transfer
before considering the transferee a stockholder of the corporation (in effect upholding the
existence of an intra-corporate relation between the parties and bringing the case within the
jurisdiction of the SEC as an intra-corporate controversy). A marked difference, however,
exists between these cases and the present one.
In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and uncontested titles to a
specific number of shares of the corporation; after the transferee had established prima
facie ownership over the shares of stock in question, registration became a mere formality
in confirming their status as stockholders. In the present case, each of Anastacias heirs
holds only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate
and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings; the right of the heirs to specific,
distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of
the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains after payment of
the decedents debts; whether there will be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado
aptly puts it as follows:
No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the assets
and debts left the decedent shall have been made and all his creditors are fully paid.
Until a final liquidation is made and all the debts are paid, the right of the heirs to
inherit remains inchoate. This is so because under our rules of procedure,
liquidation is necessary in order to determine whether or not the decedent has left
any liquid assets which may be transmitted to his heirs.
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a
stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia.
First, he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs,
and this can be determined only in a settlement of the decedents estate. No such
proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the
shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that
this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima facie
ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacias estate, there can be no
definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and
distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we
cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-
corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of
a special commercial court.
In sum, we find that insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacias
shares) are concerned Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith.
Consequently, we cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would
serve as basis to bring this case within the special commercial courts jurisdiction under
Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended. Rodrigos complaint, therefore, fails the relationship
test.
x x x
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Corona, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, JJ., concur.
SANTOS v LUMBAO
G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007
519 SCRA 408
Santos explains in very specific terms the rights of the co-heirs, as co-owners of the
estate of a deceased person. The decision specifically refers to a parcel of land which,
upon the death of the decedent, passed in co-ownership to her children.
The dictum in this case should be compared to the ponencia of Justice Brion in
Reyes v Regional Trial Court of Makati, infra, where he stated: In the present case, each of
Anastacias heirs holds only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point,
is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceedings; the right of the
heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts
of the estate of the decedent are paid. You will note that Rita, in this case, validly sold to
the Spouses Lumbao a portion (107 square meters) of her undivided share in the property
(467 square meters in the aggregate) even while the property still stood in the name of her
mother Maria from whom She (Rita) inherited the same. This ruling contradicts Justice
Brions opinion that pending the settlement proceedings, the undivided rights of co-heirs to
the inheritance is at best inchoate; for if such rights were inchoate, Rita would not have
been able to sell a portion of her undivided share to the Spouses Lumbao. At best, Rita
would have been able to sell a mere expectancy. The question now is: which decision is
correct?
Chico-Nazario, J.:
x x x
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorio, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are
the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20
October 1985. The other petitioners, Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the
daughter-n-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged
owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from
Rita during her lifetime.
The facts of the present case are as follows:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondent Spouses
Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased
mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the first
occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through
a document denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979. Respondents
Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second
occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a
document also denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 9 January 1981.
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as
exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property,
respondent Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime,
and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to
effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Lumbao insofar as the subject
property is concerned. Respondent Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita
informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject
property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs form Maria had not
yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently
and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by
Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondent Spouses Lumbao
and now covered by TCT No. 81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondent Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal
demand letter to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed
and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Consequently, the latter filed a complaint for Reconveyance with Damages before the RTC
of Pasig City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had
been sold to the respondent Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly
published as required by law. x x x.
Respondent Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their complaint
because they discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of
P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No.
PT-817729 on 26 April 1991.
x x x
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their
interest, [respondent spouses Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to
wit: 1) the amount of P30,000 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and 2) cost
of suit.
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8
June, the appellate court rendered a Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107
square meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses
Lumbao] the sum of P30,000,00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
x x x
Hence, this Petition.
x x x
Petitioners allege that are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement because even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness, Carolina Morales,
testified that neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the execution
of the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm that
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation to
give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the same within the
period prescribed by law. Since no claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period
allowed by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in favor of petitioners; hence
they are considered as holders in good faith and therefore cannot be barred from entering
into any subsequent transactions involving the property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as
Bilihan ng Lupa because the same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for
being falsified documents because one of those documents made it appear that petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally before
the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in
the Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject
property in litigation were not established by the evidence presented by the respondents
Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over
the subject property had already been barred through estoppel by laches; and 4) the
respondent Spouses Lumbaos claim over the subject property had already prescribed.
x x x
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the
Bilihan ng Lupa x x x in relation to the subject property were not established by
respondents Spouses Lumbaos evidence is likewise not acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as
Bilihan ng Lupa, the entire property owned by Maria, the mother or Rita, was not yet
divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only
description that can be placed in the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to
respondents Spouses Lumbao cold not be possibly determined at the time. Nevertheless,
that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao
invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an
estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquot
or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-owner,
however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in
common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion
without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer
a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with
respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the
results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May
1986 by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107-square meter lot sold by
the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from
the total lot inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this
case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondent
Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no
longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
x x x Hence, the Bilihan ng Lupa documents dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply
with their provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely valid between and among
the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis
of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the
decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a
mode of acquiring property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequences of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they
have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being
heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only
succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance
of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass
to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused
by the death of a party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
the contact.
x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005,
respectively are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorneys fees
and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo Sr. and Nachura, J.
concur.
BLAS v SANTOS
No. L-14070, 29 March 1961
1 SCRA 899
Article 776 of the Civil Code defines the inheritance of a person. Article 1347 of the same
Code prohibits any contract involving future inheritance. Blas interprets the meaning of
Article 1347 in connection with Article 776.
Labrador, J.:
x x x Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898.
They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio
Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro
Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died in 1953 and is survived by three legitimate children who are
plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio
Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second
marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the
properties acquired by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made.

x
x
x.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon
Blas executed a last will and testament. In the said testament, Simeon Blas makes the
f o l l o w i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s :
x
x
x
I.
2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and
acquired wealth and properties, consisting of lands, fishponds and other kinds of
properties, the total assessed value of which reached the amount of P678,880.00.
II.
1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness, all
these properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal properties),
constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas, according to law.
x
x
x
The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was because the
properties that the testator had acquired during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not
been liquidated and were not separated from those acquired during the second marriage.
The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit "A" reads in
Ta g a l o g , x

x x: and which translated into English, reads as follows:
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, MAXIMA SANTOS de BLAS, of legal age, married to SIMEON BLAS,
resident of Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, voluntarily state:
That I have read the know the contents of the will signed by my husband, SIMEON
BLAS, (2) and I promise on my word of honor in the presence of my husband that I
will respect and obey all and every disposition of said will, (3) and furthermore, I
promise in this document that all the properties my husband and I will leave, the
portion and share corresponding to me when I make my will, I will give one-half
(1/2) to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiaries named in the will of my
husband, (4) and that I can select or choose any of them, to whom I will give,
depending upon the respect, service and treatment accorded to me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this 26th day of December 1936
at San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines.
Sgd. MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS"
The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs
which can serve as a basis for the complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid
and enforceable contract for lack of consideration and because it deals with future
inheritance. The court also declared that Exhibit "A" is not a will because it does not comply
with the requisites for the execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue
vehemently that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any
claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage, because
the same were already included in the mass of properties constituting the estate of the
deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the
action to recover the same has prescribed. This contention is correct. The descendants of
Marta Cruz can no longer claim the conjugal properties that she and her husband may
have acquired during their marriage although no liquidation of such properties and delivery
thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been made, no action to recover the said properties
having been presented in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas.
But the principal basis for the plaintiff's action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit "A".
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the
reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated; that it was
prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at the
instance of the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by
Maxima Santos x x x.
Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust agreement and a
contract in the nature of a compromise to avoid litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer,
claim that it is neither a trust agreement nor a compromise agreement. Considering that the
properties of the first marriage of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated when Simeon Blas
executed his will x x x, and the further fact that such properties were actually included as
conjugal properties acquired during the second marriage, we find, as contended by
plaintiffs-appellants, that the preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was ordered by
Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by his first marriage from contesting his will and
demanding liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage, and an
accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A" therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as
follows:
"Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving,
promising, or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suit or terminates
one which has already been instituted."
x x

x The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is to hold one-half of
her said share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in
her will, with the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she
may choose in her last will and testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal properties
referred to are those that were actually existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon
Blas died on January 9, 1937. x x x Under Exhibit "A" therefore, Maxima Santos
contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of the above indicated properties to
the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas.
Counsel for the defendants-appellees claims Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper
because it is not a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have indicated
above, it is a compromise and at the same time a contract with a sufficient cause or
consideration. It is also contended that it deals with future inheritance. It is an obligation or
promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties
acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal
properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time
of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima Santos
included these properties in her inventory of her husband's estate x x x. The promise
does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her
husband. The document refers to existing properties which she will receive by operation of
law on the death of her husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That the
kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the
old Civil Code, has been decided by the Supreme Court of Spain x

x x.
The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar are concluded by the
judgment rendered in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for
the reason that the properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife Maxima Santos;
that the project of partition in the said case, adjudicating to Maxima Santos one-half as her
share in the conjugal properties, is a bar to another action on the same subject matter,
Maxima Santos having become absolute owner of the said properties adjudicated in her
favor. As already adverted to above, these contentions would be correct if applied to the
claim of the plaintiffs-appellants that said properties were acquired with the first wife of
Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz. But the main ground upon which plaintiffs base their present
action is the document Exhibit "A", already fully considered above. As this private document
contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey in her testament, upon
her death, one-half of the conjugal properties she would receive as her share in the
conjugal properties, the action to enforce the said promise did not arise until and after her
death when it was found that she did not comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art,
1969, old Civil Code) The argument that the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to
oppose the project of partition in the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas, especially that
portion of the project which assigned to Maxima Santos one-half of all the conjugal
properties, bars their present action, is therefore, devoid of merit. It may be added that
plaintiffs-appellants did not question the validity of the project of partition precisely because
of the promise made by Maxima Santos in Exhibit "A"; they acquiesced in the approval of
said project of partition because they were relying on the promise made by Maxima Santos
in Exhibit "A", that she would transmit one-half of the conjugal properties that she was
going to receive as her share in the conjugal partnership, upon her death and in her will, to
the heirs and legatees of her husband, Simeon Blas.
x
x
x
It is evident x x x that Maxima Santos did not comply with her obligation to devise
one-half of her conjugal properties to the heirs and legatees of her husband. x x x If
she intended to comply therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the properties
mentioned above, the most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct the value of
said properties from the total amount of properties which she had undertaken to convey
upon her death.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver
one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon
Blas, Maxima Santos vda. de Blas, Administradora," to the heirs and the legatees of her
husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all said heirs and legatees designated in the will of
Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not
appeared in these proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to the court below, with
instructions that after the conveyance of the properties hereinabove ordered had been
effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file adversary pleadings to determine
the participation of each and every one of them in said properties. Cost against the
defendant-appellee Rosalina Santos.
Padilla, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in a
separate opinion. Bengzon, C.J., reserves his vote. Concepcion, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., concurring:
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Labrador, and would only add that the doctrine in the
decision of 8 October 1915 of the Supreme Court of Spain, applied in the main opinion, is
not a mere accident nor an isolated instance, but one of a series of decisions reaffirming
t h e l e g a l p r o p o s i t i o n t h e r e i n l a i d d o w n . x
x
x.
And in a later decision of 25 April 1951, the Supreme Court of Spain once more insisted on
the rule that a successional agreement concerning property already owned by the grantor
at the time the contract was perfected is not banned by Article 1271 of the Spanish Civil
Code (corresponding to Article 1347 of the Civil Code of the Philippines): x x
x.
It has been contended that the doctrine thus stated confuses future inheritance (herencia
futura) with future property (bienes futuros). This is a misapprehension. In construing the
term "future inheritance" as the contingent universality or complex of property rights and
obligations that are passed to the heirs upon the death of the grantor, the rule advocated
merely correlates the prohibition against contracts over "future inheritance" with the
definition of "inheritance" given in Article 659 of the Spanish Civil Code, which is now Article
776 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
"Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death."

The inheritance of a person may, and usually does, include not only property that he
already owns at a given time, but also his future property, that is to say, the property that he
may subsequently acquire. But it may include only future property whenever he should
dispose of the present property before he dies. And future inheritance may include only
property he already owns at any given moment, if he should thereafter acquire no other
property until his death. In any case, the inheritance or estate consists of the totality of
assets and liabilities he holds at the time of his demise, and not what he possesses at any
other time. If the questioned contract envisages all or a fraction of that contingent mass,
then it is a contract over herencia futura, otherwise it is not. The statutory prohibition, in
other words, is not so much concerned with the process of transfer as with the subject
matter of the bargain. It is addressed to "future inheritance" not "future succession."
Of course, it can be said that every single item of property that a man should hold at any
given instant of his life may become a part of his inheritance if he keeps it long enough. But
is that mere possibility (or even probability) sufficient to stamp upon a contract over an
individualized item of existing property the outlaw brand of "contract over future
inheritance?" If it should ever be, then no agreement concerning present property can
escape the legal ban. No donation inter vivos, no reversionary clause, no borrowing of
money, and no alienation, not even a contract of sale (or other contract in praesenti for that
matter), with or without deferred delivery, will avoid the reproach that it concerns or affects
the grantor's "future inheritance." It is permissible to doubt whether the law ever
contemplated the sweeping away of the entire contractual system so carefully regulated in
the Code.
The restrictive interpretation given by the Spanish Supreme Court to the codal prohibition of
agreements involving future inheritance is justified not only by the fact that the prohibition
limits contractual freedom (and therefore, should not be given extensive interpretation), but
also because there is no real or substantial difference between (1) an agreement whereby
a person, for a valuable consideration, agrees to bequeath some of the property he already
owns, and (2) a contract whereby he disposes of that property, subject to the condition that
he will be entitled to its usufruct until the time he dies. The court has repeatedly sanctioned
even donations inter vivos wherein the donor has reserved to himself the right to enjoy the
donated property for the remainder of his days, and defers the actual transfer of possession
to the time of his death. (Guzman v Ibea, 67 Phil 633; Balagui v Dongso, 53 Phil 673;
Laureta v Mata, 44 Phil 668) Whatever objection is raised against the effects of the first kind
of contracts can be made to apply to the second.
Mature reflection will show that where present (existing) property is the object of the
bargain, all arguments brandished against conventions over future succession (post
mortem) are just as applicable to other contracts de praesenti with deferred execution, the
validity of which has never been questioned. Thus the loss of the power to bequeath the
bargained property to persons of the grantor's choice, and the awakening of the grantee's
desire for the early death of the grantor (the Roman votum mortis captandae) in order to
obtain prompt control of the contracted goods, occur in both cases. In truth, the latter
ground would bar even a contract of life insurance in favor of a stated beneficiary. It may
also be noted that since the later part of the nineteenth century, the civilists have
recognized that the progress in social relations has rendered such objections obsolete.
(Puig Pena, Derecho Civil, Vol. V, Part I, 613 et seq.)
But where the contract involves the universality of the estate that will be left at a person's
death (the herencia futura as understood by the Spanish Tribunal Supremo), there is
another reason which I believe to be the true justification for the legal interdiction, and it is
this: that if a man were to be allowed to bargain away all the property he expects to leave
behind (i.e., his estate as a whole), he would practically remain without any incentive to
practice thrift and frugality, or to conserve and invest his earnings and property. He would
then be irresistibly drawn to be a wasteful spendthrift, a social parasite, without any regard
for his future, because whatever he leaves will belong to another by virtue of his contract.
The disastrous effects upon family and society if such agreements were to be held binding
can be readily imagined. Hence, the interpretation given to Article 1271 (now Art. 1347) by
the Supreme Court of Spain appears amply supported by practical reasons, and there is no
ground to deny its application.
Much emphasis has been placed on the provisions of the contract Exhibit "A" that the
widow, Maxima Santos de Blas, would execute a testament in favor of the appellees. To
me, this is purely secondary, since it is merely the method selected by the parties for
carrying out the widow's agreement to convey to the appellees the property in question
without her losing its enjoyment during her natural life, and does not affect the substance or
the validity of the transaction. To ensure the widow's possession of the property and the
perception of its fruits while she was alive, the means logically selected was to return it by
will, since such a conveyance could only be operative after death. There might be a doubt
as to the validity of this arrangement if the widow's promise had been purely gratuitous,
because then it could be argued that the promise involved a hybrid donation mortis causa
yet irrevocable; but here the obligation to return is concededly irrevocable and supported by
adequate consideration duly received in advance.
Since the agreement in the instant case did not refer to the future estate of the widow of
Blas, but only to part of her present property at the time the contract was made; since the
promise to retransfer one-half of her conjugal share was supported by adequate
consideration as shown in the main decision; since the contract obviated protracted
litigation and complicated accounting in settling the conjugal partnership of Blas and his first
(deceased) wife; and since the testament that the widow promised to make was merely the
mode chosen to perform the contract and carry out the promised devolution of the property,
being thus of secondary importance, I can see no reason for declaring the entire
arrangement violative of the legal interdiction of contracts over future inheritance, and
disappoint the legitimate expectation held by the heirs of the first wife during all these years.
Barrera, J., concurring:
It seems to me clear that the document Exhibit "A", basis of the action of the plaintiffs-
appellants, refers specifically to and affects solely the share of the grantor Maxima Santos
in the conjugal properties as determined and specified in the will of her husband Simeon
Blas, whose provisions, which she expressly acknowledged to have read and understood,
constitute the raison d'etre of her promise to deliver or convey, by will, one-half of that
specific share to the heirs and legatees named in her husband's will (who are his heirs by
his first marriage). Nowhere in the document Exhibit "A" is there reference to her hereditary
estate that she herself would leave behind at the time of her own demise which legally
would be her "future inheritance." For this reason, I believe the contractual obligation
assumed by Maxima Santos in virtue of Exhibit "A" does not come within the prohibition of
Article 1271 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 1347 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
I, therefore, concur in the opinions of Justices Labrador and Reyes.
DIZON-RIVERA v DIZONPRIVATE
No. L-24561, 30 June 1970
33 SCRA 554
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two
projects of partition submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give the
greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix
enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix
repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by
an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as
devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to
each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a
distribution in the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886
which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory
heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will
under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a
beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that
portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article
1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
Teehankee, J.:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-
appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia
Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a predeceased legitimate
son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert
D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano
Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household
furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced and x x x the last will and
testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee
Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix's estate x x x.
x x x Dr. Adelaido Bernardo x x x was appointed commissioner to appraise the
properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal, and the same was
approved in toto by the lower court x x x.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total
appraised value of P1,811,695.6, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs
amounted to P129,362.11. (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of
legitimate children and descendants.) In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her
property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate
among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties
thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as
follows:
1 . E s t e l l a D i z o n
98,474.80
2 .
A n g e l i n a D i z o n

106,307.06
3 . B e r n a r d i t a D i z o n

51,968.17
4 .
J o s e f i n a D i z o n

52,056.39
5 . To m a s D i z o n

131,987.41
6 .
L i l i a D i z o n
72,182.47
7 .
M a r i n a D i z o n

1,148,063.71
8 .
P a b l o R i v e r a , J r .
69,280.00
9 .
G r a n d c h i l d r e n G i l b e r t G a r c i a , e t a l .
72,540.00

P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating
the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (executrix-appellee) and
Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their
respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angela and
Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the
will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96;
(3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received
in the will, less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime
mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remained untouched.
On the other hand, oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated
February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following
basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the
value of one/half (1/2) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half
(1/2) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appelants
should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally
reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire
estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the
Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren
who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively
devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia et al., of the
sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary dispositions made by
the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were
proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs
and devisees totaling one-half thereof as follows:
1 .
E s t e l a D i z o n
49,485.56
2 .
A n g e l i n a D i z o n
53,421.42
3 .
B e r n a r d i t a D i z o n
26,115.04
4 .
J o s e f i n a D i z o n

26,159.38
5 .
To m a s V. D i z o n
65,874.04
6 .
L i l i a D i z o n
36,273.13
7 .
M a r i n a D i z o n


576,938.82
8 .
P a b l o R i v e r a , J r .
34,814.50
9 .
G r a n d c h i l d r e n G i l b e r t G a r c i a e t a l

36,452.78

P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the
legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appelants, to be divided among them in
seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix's project of partition,
ruling that Articles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the
legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is
true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is
observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the
portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The
proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy,
which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has
chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is
legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the
payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest
beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas
Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled "(T)he payment in cash
so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to
legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order
to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's order of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and
raised anew the following issues:
1 .
whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix's will are in the
nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore, subject
to reduction;
2 .
whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article
1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code; and
3 .
whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of
their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix
which is "the life and soul of a will." In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the
new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to
be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v Juico for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 124, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and
stressed that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and
literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees
and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own
criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the
Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix's testamentary disposition was
in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after
commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last
illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that
"it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven
other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos
or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the
right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for
the right of such compulsory heirs:
Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than
the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
Art. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the
five oppositors-appellants namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in
her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were
taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-
oppositors-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in
the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056
of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil
Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person
(not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. This was
intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an
act inter vivos he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative
commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment but the question does not here concern
us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must
be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above
quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as
approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by
oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition
made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the
other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto
nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run
counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana v Imbo, the court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased
testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion,
as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which
should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in
accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion
to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was
being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by
operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'a partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from
the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. Concepcion Teves
could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of
the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs x x x."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor
are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix's repeated use of the words
"I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the
legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator
can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the
legitime of the compulsory heirs x x x and all testamentary dispositions, either in the
nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder
of the testator's estate constituting the free portion."
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will
of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole
estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The
repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquired no legal
significance such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-
half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not
as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective
legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this
testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the
time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
Oppositors conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from
the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the
Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second
paragraph of Article 912 of the Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-
appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in
providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,
provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." Fundamentally,
of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate
of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the
primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not
prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not
deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, by the legitime shall
in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some
authorities that "not deemed subject to collation in this article really means not imputable to
or chargeable against the legitime," while it may have some plausibility in an appropriate
case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of distribution and
partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous
donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each
heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Article 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is
here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appelants, the secondary
issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the
approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the
remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to
the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition.
The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned
and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible, to
comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by
implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the
estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon
joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question - and none
is presented - as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms
of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the
Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix death in January 1961 provides no
legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The
transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise,
estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in
the record that prior to November 25, 1964 one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the
sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation,
"does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either
party, as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she would receive in both projects of
partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet
the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the
last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. That her co-
oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency
has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the
time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was
higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
VDA. DE VILLAFLOR v JUICO
No. L-15737, 28 February 1962
4 SCRA 550
The following decision illustrates the application of the rule that the language of a will must
be interpreted in such a way that every expression therein must be given some effect.
Therefore, an interpretation which suppresses a provision cannot be adopted if there is
another way of construing the said dispositions.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908 Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy
man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and
personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows:
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mis hermano
D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos
mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo
hago en la forma siguiente:
SEPTIMO: Lego para despues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno
en prueba de mi amor y cari eq \O(n)o, los bienes, alajas y muebles que a
continuacion se expresan;
OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias,
de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dischos legados de mi sobrina nieta
Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be
deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said
Clause 12th reads as follows:
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que
tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi
muerta a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar
con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis
herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceedings
No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's
estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of
administration, she submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of
November 24, 1924, now Exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of partition
and declared the proceedings closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E" now shows
Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of real and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause
7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exhibit "C"), however, expressly
provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de los dispuesto en al clausula 8.0 del
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor."
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second
marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her
estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the
defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor."
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate
of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's
death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties
bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor in clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eighth (8th)
clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties
aforesaid become absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact
that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in
clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the
properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the
appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her
own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those
properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the
deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first
half of the phrase ("uso y possession" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the
second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of
these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment)
during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's bother (clause 6).
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mis hermano
D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos
mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo
hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee,
could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event
that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva", and
considered the words "uso y possession" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so
doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as
section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy.
SEC. 59 Instruments construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars,
such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause
7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of
his plain words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to
note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his
widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the
widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Civil Code of 1889), expressly enjoins
the following:
ART 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical
sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and
that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context
clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will
was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical
sense.
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed
in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,
relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following
the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS
Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1912; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Octubre 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su
ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y
cumplir fieldemente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que
esa voluntad patente, que no has manester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la
menor duda, pueda sustituirse pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse
por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial.
(Tribunal Supremo de Espa eq \O(n)a, Sentencia 20 Marzo 1918).
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief are inapplicable, because they
involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain
a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably
provided that this widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive
and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of
his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrina nieta", appellant herein, upon the
widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow
had not right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable
to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous
event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant
Leonor Villaflor vda. de Villanueva is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the
properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for
liquidation, accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against
the Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and de
Leon, JJ., concur. Labrador, J., did not take part.
BELLIS v BELLIS
No. L-23678, 6 June 1967
20 SCRA 358
The formal validity of a will depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time of
execution. On the other hand, the substantive validity of the dispositions therein is
governed by the laws in force at the time of the death of the testator.
Bengzon, J.P., J.:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the Unites
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who predeceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each, and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares.
On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila x x x.
The People's Bank & Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
x x x.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein
it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy to Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her
of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor - pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of
the testator's Last Will and Testament -divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 7, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitime
as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon
Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
Texas law, which did not provide for legitime.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June
11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must
apply - Texas Law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, revoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on
the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par.2 and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order
of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, stating that -
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object, public order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Article 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of this and
the next preceding article" when they incorporated Article 11 of the old Civil Code as Article
17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Article 10 of the old Civil Code as Article 16 of the new. It must have been
their purpose to make the second paragraph of Article 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Article 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills - one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate - arguing from this that the intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in Miciano v Brimo, 50 Phil 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 - now Article 16 - of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitime. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitime cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
DE GUZMAN v INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ
G.R. Nos. 61167-68, 20 January 1989
169 SCRA 284
De Guzman does not definitively settle the issue of testamentary capacity insofar as it
involves soundness of mind. However, the medical record of the testator should be noted
as it influenced to a great extent the factual findings of the probate court and the affirmance
of such findings by the Court of Appeals.
Grio-Aquino, J.:
On December 10, 1970, Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother Melquiades Valenzuela, first
cousins of the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch IV, x x x a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of
letters of administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime of the deceased, had been
administering the said estate as judicial guardian of his person and property duly x x x.
Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child of the spouses Tiu Cuaco, alias Pascual
Benitez, and Camila Valenzuela whose brother was the father of private respondents,
Dionisia Valenzuela and Melquiades Valenzuela. He died single at the age of 61 years on
November 6, 1970, without descendants, nor ascendants nor brothers and sisters.
x
x
x.
The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the
deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him (de Guzman) and that a petition for
its probate was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 352 in Branch II of the same court. The two
cases were later consolidated and jointly heard in branch IV of the court.
Emiterio de Guzman died on April 20, 1973 and was substituted by his heirs, Fidel,
Cresencia and Rosalia, all surnamed de Guzman, in both proceedings.
In support of the petition for probate (SC-352), the petitioner Fidel de Guzman and two
attesting witnesses of the will, Pelagio Lacena and Judge Damaso Tengco who prepared
the will, gave evidence.
The oppositors (petitioners for administration in SC-347) presented six (6) witnesses,
namely, Marcial Mendoza, Pedro Cabela, Porfirio Reyes, Dionisia Valenzuela, Honoria
Recalde Leonardo and Prudencio Leonardo, who identified the transcript of the testimony
given on January 22, 1957 by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez (since deceased) in the proceedings
(SC-29) for the guardianship of Francisco Benitez for incompetence on account of insanity.
Various documentary exhibits were presented by both sides.
On April 4, 1975, Judge Maximo Maceren rendered judgment disallowing the will and
appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The
pertinent findings of the trial court are quoted hereunder:
The pivotal issue hinges on the mental capacity of the supposed testator,
Francisco Benitez on August 18, 1945 when he allegedly executed his last will and
testament. Did Francisco Benitez possess a sound and disposing mind on August
18, 1957?
x
x
x
The evidence (Exhibit I and Exhibit H) shows that from January 18, 1929 up to
March 12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital for
varying periods of time as follows:
D a t e o f A d m i s s i o n
Date of Discharge
( a ) J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 2 9
March 12, 1929
( b )
M a r c h 7 , 1 9 3 1
June 6, 1931
( c )
N o v e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 3 6
November 29, 1937
( d )
F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1 9 3 9
August 16, 1939
( e )
J u l y 9 , 1 9 4 0
March 12, 1941
The foregoing premises leads this Court to the conclusion that [at] the time
Francisco Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was not
possessed of a sound and disposing mind. Wherefore the same is not allowed
probate.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed x x x.
The petitioner de Guzman assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that:
The finding that the deceased Francisco Benitez "was not possessed of a sound
and disposing mind" when he executed his will on August 18, 1945, is grounded
merely on speculation, surmises and conjectures, as well as on hearsay and
contradictory, biased, and obviously incredible testimony.
Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to review
because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of court, only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court
of Appeals reveals that Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the
testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no
compelling reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of
that question hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that point is
that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally
binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct
and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincing credible evidence, shall not
be disturbed on appeal. (People v Dava, 149 SCRA 582)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners Fidel, Cresencia and Rosalia de Guzman.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
LEE v TAMBAGO
A.C. No. 5281, 12 February 2008
544 SCRA 393
Lee explains the reason for the stringent formalities prescribed by law in the making of a
notarial will. It is disturbing that in this decision, the court ruled that the non-notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses and/or the use of the testators expired
residence certificate are sufficient to invalidate a will.
Corona, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged
respondent Atty. Regino B. Tanbago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the
legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father x x x never executed the
contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano
Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife
Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena
Lee, half siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June
30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator
noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the
signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation
(containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of
his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely
and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s].
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of
the purported witnesses x x x. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged
and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the
archives division of the Records Management and Archives office of the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the
chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated x x x.
Respondent in his comment x x x claimed that the complaint against him
contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee Sr.
and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was
not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee Sr. and that the last will and testament was validly
executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit of Gloria Nebato, common-law
wife of Vicente Lee Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit of the children of Vicente Lee
Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee.
x x x
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of
pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code.
The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics x x x. Thus, x x x
recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
x x x
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law,
to control to a certain degree, the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. A
will may be either notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of
wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments, and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is consonance with the rule that
acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted
by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
embodied in a distinct and separate provision.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same
is his or her own free act and deed. Thus acknowledgment in a notarial will has two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise, and (2) to assure that
his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this
particular requirement was neither strictly or substantially complied with. For one, there was
the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old
residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidate the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v
Rafanan:
The Notarial law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax)
and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree
of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. A notary public,
especially a lawyer, is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
x x x
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and
correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence
taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence
certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of the old Notarial Law and
the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the
residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
x x x
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
SUROZA v HONRADO
Adm. Matter No. 2026-CFI, 19 December 1981
110 SCRA 388
Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. In
this case, the testatrix was proved to be illiterate. However, her alleged notarial will was
written in English, which in the opening paragraph of the will, was supposedly a language
known to her. The contradiction in the concluding paragraph of the will clearly indicated the
nullity of the purported will.
The procedural lapses of the counsel for oppositor must likewise be noted.
Considering that the Supreme Court confirmed the nullity of the will, did such fact entitle the
intestate heirs of the testatrix to the property devised under the void will?
Aquino, J.:
x
x
x
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort
McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in 1923. They were childless. They reared a boy
named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as
shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera.
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal
Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated some cash in two
banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went
abroad. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed
as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special Proceedings No.
1807 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I.
x
x
x
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot
a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz
(apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador
Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. She stayed with Marcelina
but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at
7666 J. B. Roxas Street, Makati, apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668
J. B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73
years old. That will, which is in English, was thumb marked by her. She was illiterate. Her
letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also thumb marked by her. In that will,
Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time
of her death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She
owned a 150 square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966.
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundry woman of Marcelina and the
executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar,
Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of first Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition
for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P.
Honrado.
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court,
Evangeline S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the stenographic notes taken
at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On
the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the Merchants
Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of
P10,000.00 from the savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and
requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975,
instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom
was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceedings for the
settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed
on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11 ejecting them.
They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he
has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not
Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter. Later they questioned the probate
court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already appraised that persons, other than
Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her
supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings,
admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction." Nenita
in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will
was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence
employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumb marks of the testatrix was procured by
fraud or trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition
of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix.
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Pe eq \O(n)aojas, the housemaid of
Marcelina, who swore that the alleged will was falsified.
Not content with her motion to set aside the judgment order and her omnibus motion to set
aside the proceedings, Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of
the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration. In that opposition, Nenita
assailed the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's
intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews. Nenita was not aware of the decree of probate
dated April 23, 1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's
niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed a will.
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn
was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la
Cruz, and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was not
legally adopted.
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the
issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the
hearing. She moved for the reconsideration of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita
V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not
appear before the notary public and because it was written in English which is not known to
her.
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976, "denied" the various incidents "raised" by
Nenita.
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the will, Nenita "filed a case to
annul" the probate proceedings. That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza v Paje and
Honrado, was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of February 16,
1977.
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had
delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the
testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint x x x filed in this Court, Nenita charged
Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complaint
reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed
her thumb mark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the will
was written. (In the decree of probate, Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will
was written in a language known to the testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a
son named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory heir and legal heir), who was
preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that
the testatrix did not know the executrix, Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real name is
Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her
cohorts to withdraw from various banks the deposits of Marcelina.
x
x
x
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the
complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of
probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty-day period within
which to vacate the house of the testatrix.
x
x
x
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honrado was brought to the attention of this Court in the
Court Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The case was referred to
Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
He submitted a report dated October 7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a
petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate
and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He
swore that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that
he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said
lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never
complied with his commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and
her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari.
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss
the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice
because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void will should
have inherited the decedent's estate.
x
x
x
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English
and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that
the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood
and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was
read to the testatrix "and translated into Pilipino language." That could only mean that the
will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and therefore, it is void
because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English,
which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop v Piraso, 52
Phil 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
"testator" instead of "testatrix."
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting
the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed
father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent
judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally
conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether
the will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine
equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his compulsory
retirement falls on December 25, 1981). x x x.
Barredo (Chairman), de Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., J., on
leave; Abad Santos, J. took no part.
REYES v VDA. DE VIDAL
No. L-2867, 21 April 1952
2 SCUD 53
Every will must be executed in a language known to the testator. While this requirement is
mandatory and, as a rule, must be proved during probate proceedings, a failure to
introduce evidence in this respect does not necessarily justify the denial of probate. Under
certain conditions, knowledge of the language in which the will was written may be
presumed.
In this case, the probative value of the testimony of the instrumental witnesses must be
noted, particularly when such testimony is sought to be controverted by the testimony of an
expert witness.
Bautista-Angelo, J.:
This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and
testament of Maria Zu eq \O(n)iga vda. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October
29, 1945.
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of the said will was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuiga vda de Vidal, sister of the
deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at
which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision
disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are
not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which
it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the
deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner
appealed to this Court.
While petitioner imputes nine errors to the lower court, we believe, however, that for
purposes of this appeal a decision of some would be sufficient. Thus, the issues may be
boiled down as follows: 1) whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the
will are genuine; 2) whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the
language in which the will was written; and 3) whether or not the testatrix was of sound and
disposing mind when she signed the will.
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner
presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These
witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de
Catindig. The first used to provide the deceased with ice every day, and in one of those
occasions she went to her house to bring ice. She was requested to act as witness to the
execution of the will. The second was a laborer whose job was to fix bed made of rattan,
and in one of those days he went to the house of the deceased to work, he was asked also
to witness the signing of the will. And the third was a neighbor of the deceased for many
years who was also requested to act as an instrumental witness. These witnesses testified
in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on her bed but
over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had signed it in the
place where her signatures appear, they in turn signed the will in her presence and in the
presence of one another. This is the substance of what they have testified and from an
examination of their testimony the court entertains no doubt that they had told the truth.
There is nothing in their testimony which may in any way reflect against their credibility nor
has the oppositor proven any fact of circumstance which may give rise to the suspicion that
they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary consideration. They have impressed the
court as simple p[ersons who had intervened in the execution of the will out merely of
deference to the testatrix whom they had served for sometime and had known to be a good
and respectable woman.
What evidence has the oppositor presented to contradict the testimony of these
instrumental witnesses? Only one expert witness, Jose G. Villanueva, who made a
comparative analysis of the signatures appearing in the will in relation to some genuine
signatures of the deceased, and in fact testified on the analysis and study he had made of
said signatures and submitted a memorandum on the study and comparison he has made.
And in his testimony as well as in his memorandum, this witness has reached the
conclusion that the hand that wrote the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will is
not the same hand that wrote the genuine signatures he had examined and which he used
as basis of his analytical study, thereby concluding that said signatures are not genuine.
The lower court gave full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert witness, and declared
as a result that the will cannot be admitted to probate.
There are, however, certain important facts and circumstances which make us differ from
this opinion of the lower court. In the first place, we find the opinion of this expert witness
has been rebutted by another expert witness, Jose C. Espinosa, whose opinion, to our
mind, deserves more weight and credence. And our reason for reaching this conclusion is
the fact that the standards of comparison used by Espinosa are more reliable than those
used by Villanueva. Thus, the standards used by Villanueva in the comparison are two
signatures appearing in two documents executed on November 10, 1941, one signature in
an identification card affixed on April 1940, a half signature appearing in a letter written on
October 8, 1943, one signature appearing in a letter written on July 16, 1945, and one
signature appearing in a letter written in January 1945, whereas, the disputed signatures
appearing in the will were affixed on October 29, 1945. On the other hand, the standards
used by Espinosa in making his comparative study bears dates much closer to that of the
disputed signatures. Thus he examined four genuine signatures that were affixed on
October 16, 1945, other four signatures affixed on October 1945, one on January 2, 1945,
one on January 24, 1945, and one on September 24, 1945. He also examined one affixed
on March 12, 1941, only for emphasis. The closeness or proximity of the time in which the
standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature or document is very
important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion. The selection of the proper
standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age and
state of health of the author of the questioned signatures. A signature affixed in 1941 may
involve characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And this is
because the passing of time and the increase in age may have a decisive influence in the
writing characteristics of a person. It is for these reasons that the authorities are of the
opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of
comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such
was not followed in the study made by Villanueva. But such was observed by the study
made by Espinosa. It is for this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion deserved more
weight and consideration.
x
x
x
2. Another ground on which the lower court based the disallowance of the will is the failure
of the petitioner to prove that the testator (sic) knew and spoke the language in which the
will in question appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires
that the will should be written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact
not having been proven, the probate of the will must fail. And so the will was disallowed.
There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which
would indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the
preparation of the will in question. But, in our opinion, this failure alone does not in itself
suffice to conclude that this important requirement of the law has not been complied with, it
appearing that there is enough evidence on record which supplies this technical omission.
In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza espa eq
\O(n)ola, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to Spain. In
the second place, we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor written
in Spanish by the deceased in her own handwriting. Having proven by her very own
evidence that the deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be
allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testator
knew the language in which the testament has been written, which presumption stands
unless the contrary is proved. And this presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we
have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and
possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in
the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses
wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will was
written. There is therefore no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this ground.
3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the
fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and
it reached this conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply
because the deceased signed the will in somewhat varied form. On this point, the lower
court said:
El juzgado es de opinion que aunque se admita que las firmas arriba indicadas
fueran de Maria Zu eq \O(n)iga vda. de Pando, las misma revelan que ella no
estaba en el pleno goce de sus facultades mentales cuando la hicieron firmar el
documento, Exhibit "C", pues el hecho de que en una sola ocasion la repetida
Maria Zu eq \O(n)iga vda. de Pando firmo dos veces, sin escribir su verdadero
nombre, demuestra que ella no se daba cuenta de sus actos por no hallarse
mentalmente sano. Si esto es asi, no se debe legalizar como testamento y ultima
voluntad de la finada Maria Zuiga vda. de Pando el documento, Exhibit "C",
porque el Articulo 614 de la Ley 190 y el Articulo 12, Reglamentos de los
Tribunales, disponen que solamente puede otogar testamento las personas que el
tiempo de su otorgemiento estaban en el pleno goce de sus facultades mentales.
The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental witnesses have said on this
point. Cornelia Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased before the
signing of the will, and judging from the way she spoke she was of the impression that the
deceased was of sound mind at that time. To the same effect is the testimony of Consuelo
B. de Catindig. She said that her impression when the deceased signed the will was that
she could still talk and read, only that she was weak. In fact she read the will before signing
it. These statements had not been contradicted. They give an idea of the mental condition
of the deceased. While the signatures affixed by the deceased in the will differ from each
other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state of health rather than to a
defective mental condition. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of
genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in writings of old people and,
far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness or weak condition
of the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this
impression.
Abbreviated, distorted and illegible forms, which are sufficiently free and rapid,
often actually indicate genuineness rather than forgery even though they are very
unusual and not exactly like those in the standard writing. Those who write with
difficulty or hesitation through some physical infirmity may sometime produce
broken and unfinished signatures and these results, which in themselves are
distinctly divergent as compared with signatures produced under conditions of
strength and health, may forcefully indicate genuineness. Under conditions of
weakness due to disease or age, parts of a genuine signature may be clumsily
written over a second time not at just the same place and in a way which clearly
shows that the writer either could not see or was so weak and inattentive as not to
case what the result might be. This careless, perfectly evident repetition (figure
184), unlike the painstaking and delicate retouching of the former, often indicates
genuineness. [Page 365, Questioned Documents by Osborne, 2nd Edition 1927.]
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower court erred in disallowing the will Exhibit "C".
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The court admits the will,
Exhibit "C" to probate, and remands this case to the lower court for further proceedings,
with cost against the appellee.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur. Pablo and
Jugo, JJ., took no part.
BALONAN v ABELLANA, ET AL.
No. L-15153, 31 August 1960
109 Phil 359
Article 805 of the Civil Code prescribes the manner in which the will must be signed by the
testator; i.e., "subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself, or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Balonan
confirms that this requirement is mandatory, and that a failure to comply therewith is a fatal
defect. It is not important that the person to whom the function of writing the testator's
name indicates or writes his own name. But it is imperative that this individual should write
the name of the testator. Balonan gives two alternate ways of complying with the statutory
requirement.
Labrador, J.:
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit "A"), which is sought
to be probated, is written in the Spanish language and consists of two (2)
typewritten pages double space. The first page is signed by Juan Bello and under
his name appears typewritten "Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence
certificate A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga," and on the second
page appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian,
Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature
of T. de los Santos and below his signature is his official designation as the notary
public who notarized the said testament. On the first page on the left margin of the
said instrument also appears the signatures of the instrumental witnesses. On the
second page, which is the last page of the said last Will and Testament, also
appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second
page on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name
appears handwritten the following phrase "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana."
The will is duly acknowledged before Notary Public, Attorney Timoteo de los
Santos.
The appeal squarely presents the following issue: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello
above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana x x x, Ciudad de
Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a
will shall be executed?
The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator himself sign the will, or if
he cannot do so, the testator's name must be written by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction. Applying this provision this Court said in the case of Ex Parte
Pedro Arcenas, et al., 4 Phil 700:
It will be noticed from the above-quoted section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
that where the testator does not know how, or is unable, to sign, it will not be
sufficient that one of the attesting witnesses signs the will at the testator's request,
the notary certifying thereto as provided in article 695 of the Civil Code, which, in
this respect, was modified by section 618 above referred to, but it is necessary that
the testator's name be written by the person signing in his stead in the place where
he would have signed if he knew how or was able so to do, and this in the
testator's presence and by his express direction; so that a will signed in a manner
different than that prescribed by law shall not be valid and will not be allowed to be
probated.
Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will
himself, it shall be signed in the following manner: "John Doe by the testator,
Richard Roe"; or in this form: "By the testator, John Doe, Richard Roe." All this
must be written by the witness signing at the request of the testator.
Therefore, under the law in force, the witness Naval A. Vidal should have written at
the bottom of the will the full name of the testator and his own name in one of the
forms given above. He did not do so, however, and this failure to comply with the
law is a substantial defect which affects the validity of the will and precludes its
allowance, notwithstanding the fact that no one appeared to oppose it.
The same ruling was laid down in the case of Cuison v Concepcion, 5 Phil 552. In the case
of Barut v Cabacungan, 21 Phil 461, we held that the important thing is that it clearly
appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is unimportant
whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. Cases of the
same import are as follows: Ex Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13 Phil 479; Caluya v Domingo, 27
Phil 330; Garcia v Lacuesta, 90 Phil 489.
In the case at bar, the name of the testatrix Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written
under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to
comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will,
or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction.
It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are
constrained to declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be
admitted to probate.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
GARCIA v LACUESTA
No. L-4067, 29 November 1951
90 Phil 489
Where it appears that the testator caused another person to write his name in the will, such
fact must be stated in the attestation clause. A failure to make such a recital is a fatal
defect. That the testator affixed the sign of the cross after his name written by another
person is not sufficient indication that the testator in fact signed the will, absent a clear
showing that the sign of the cross is the customary signature of the testator, or at the very
least, one of the ways by which the testator signed his name.
Paras, C.J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero
Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the
following attestation clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents do declare that the foregoing testament of
Antero Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this
attestation clause and that of the left margin on the three pages thereof. Page
three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect
which is spoken and understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding
number in letter which compose of three pages and all of them were signed in the
presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and all and each and everyone of us witnesses.
In testimony whereof, we sign this testament, this the third day of January one
thousand nine hundred forty-three (1943) A.D.
S g d . N u m e r i a n o E v a n g e l i s t a
Sgd. Rosendo Cortes
Sgd. Bibiana Illegible
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of
Antero Mercado, following below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino
Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The
Court of Appeals, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled
that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins
of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request
of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2)
to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Florentino Javier at the
former's request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left
margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that
the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator
and of each other.
In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero
Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner
(who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals) argues,
however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross written by the testator
after his name is sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a
surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumb mark,
the latter having been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of de Gala v Gonzales and
Ona, 53 Phil 104; Dolar v Diancin, 55 Phil 479; Payad v Tolentino, 62 Phil 848; Neyra v
Neyra, 76 Phil 296; and Lopez v Liboro, 81 Phil 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero
Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we
are not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumb mark, and the reason is
obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether there is sufficient
recital in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of
the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
NERA v RIMANDO
No. 5971, 27 February 1911
18 Phil 450
Article 805 requires that the will must be signed by the testator and the witnesses in the
presence of one another. Nera provides the test of presence. It is not essential that the
testator and the witnesses should look at the paper purporting to be the will of the testator
at the time each of them affix their signatures. It is sufficient that each of them be physically
present at the place where execution will take place and that they be in such position with
respect to each one, that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction, they would
have been able to see each one affix his signature on the will without any physical
obstruction.
Is it enough, therefore, that the testator and each of the witnesses be able to see each of
them sign the will without physical obstruction - even if there is lack of understanding as to
the nature of the document being executed?
Carson, J.:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the
instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing
witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that
time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the
smaller room by a doorway across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for
one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of
attaching their signatures to the instrument.
A majority of the members of this court is of the opinion that this subscribing witness was in
the same room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they
attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding of course, disposes of the
appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as
the last will and testament of the deceased.
The Trial Judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question of
fact of vital importance in the determination of this case, as he was of the opinion that under
the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta v Gustilo (5 Phil 541) the alleged fact that
one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the other
describing (sic) witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven,
would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of the will. But we are
unanimously of the opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in
the outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached
their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the
attaching of those signatures under such circumstances not being done "in the presence"
of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision from this witness to the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the
curtain separating the inner room from the outer room "at the moment of inscription of each
signature."
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will
is not whether they actually saw each other, but whether they might have seen
each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical
condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of
each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at
the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each
other sign if they chose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the
subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of
each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that
moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The evidence in the
case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness
Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position
with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his
eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so."
And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and
the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the
paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting
the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the
doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution,
and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed
in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to
probate as the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with cost in
this instance against appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
TABOADA v ROSAL
No. L-35033, 5 November 1982
118 SCRA 195
Article 805 requires that the testator should sign at the end of the will. This requirement
does not apply to the subscribing witnesses, who may sign in any other part of each page
of the will. The duty of the witnesses to subscribe is substantially complied with by any such
signature. The failure of the attestation clause to indicate the number of pages upon which
the will is written is, as a rule, a fatal defect. However, where the notarial acknowledgement
does indicate the number of pages of the will, and the same conforms to an actual count of
the pages, the deficiency is cured. A reference to Article 809, in this regard, is appropriate.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern
Leyte, Branch III, in Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled In the Matter of the Petition
for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner, which
denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and the motion for
appointment of a special administrator.
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged
last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect,
the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions
and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand
margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by
the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand by the testatrix.
Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of
publication, the trial court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's
evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence and presented Vicente
Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its genuineness and
due execution.
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamantian issued the questioned
order denying the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its
execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to submit the names of the
intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly notified
and could intervene in the settlement of the estate.
Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/
or motion, ex parte, praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to
be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period
required by the court to submit the names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in
abeyance.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying probate of the will.
However, the motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be
acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C. Pamintuan due to his transfer to his new station at
Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending resolution when respondent
Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the respondent court.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator.
Subsequently, the new judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the
manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the
appointment of special administrator was likewise denied because of the petitioner's failure
to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of the intestate heirs and their
addresses.
The petitioner decided to file the present petition.
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the
testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and
in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
x
x
x
The respondent Judge interprets the above quoted provision of law to require that, for a
notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but all the
three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence
of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will attest not
merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to
sign the page where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make
it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the will
that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of
the will after the signature of the testatrix. He contends that it would be absurd that the
legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or particular location where
the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the
signature are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.
We find the petition meritorious.
Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at
the end by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the term attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that
those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the
signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of
the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper
as the will which was executed by the testator.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the
will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of
identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix, but also the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the
usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
(Gonzales v Gonzales, 90 Phil 444, 449)
The law is to be liberally construed, the "underlying and fundamental objective permeating
the provisions of the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of
their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his
last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will." x x x
Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were it not
for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the
testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present
case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which
contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly
identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the
testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state
the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not
for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually
composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.
As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions
is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina Dos" comprises the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This
Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page."
In Singson v Florentino, et al. (92 Phil 161, 164) this Court made the following observations
with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the
number of pages used:
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of
pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to
be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or
omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
property is intended to be bequeathed. x x x. The ratio decidendi of these
cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is
omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be
supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will
itself. But here, the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state
the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, the last part of the
body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which
circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and
places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has
been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely
technical considerations.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court
which denied probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and
the motion for appointment of special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is
ordered to allow the probate of the will and to conduct further proceedings in accordance
with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Acting Chairman), Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
ICASIANO v ICASIANO
No. L-18979, 30 June 1964
11 SCRA 422
Article 805 requires that each of the subscribing witnesses should sign each and every
page of the will on the left margin. This requirement is, as a rule, mandatory and a failure to
comply therewith is a fatal defect. Icasiano holds that the failure of a witness to sign one of
the pages of the will through inadvertence or oversight (there being no bad faith or
fraudulent intent) can be cured by the presentation of a carbon duplicate of the will which
contains all the required signatures. This ruling is based on the principle of liberal
interpretation of the statutory requirements for the formal validity of the will, provided that
the need to safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the will is not compromised. It is
important, for the proper understanding of this case, to differentiate a duplicate copy of a
document from a duplicate-original thereof.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the
City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte
executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa
Icasiano at Pedro Guevarra Street, Manila, published before and attested by three
instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and
Mr. Vinicio D. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three
instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary
Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney
Fermin Samson who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's
last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge
Ramon Icasiano, and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution
of the decedent's last will and testament, attorney Torres and Natividad were in the
Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and
authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was
acknowledged by the testatrix and the attesting witnesses, and also attorney Fermin
Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also testified upon cross
examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte's last will and
testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one
signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with
the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed
at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy
attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed
by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original copy
of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three
mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and that of one another as witnesses
(except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original);
that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation
clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by
the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to and
spoken by the testatrix; that the attestation clause is in the language also known to and
spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate
copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before
Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date - June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits
that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed
that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of
the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit"A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed
on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents
were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure
because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes
of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and
dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by
them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will,
and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their shares in the portion of free
disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix
signed both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same occasion,
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged, the
will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate
were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator (sic) and
the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Samson, together, before they
were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken
by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion of experts for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan,
that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not written by the
same hand which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not
merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but
principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion
that the differences between the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the
writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert has, in fact, used as standards only
three other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the testament;
and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the
duplicate could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is
particularly so since the comparison charts nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that there
are radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the
advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and the effect of
writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right (sic) the original. These factors were not
discussed by the expert.
x
x
x
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are
more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason
for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The
testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they
should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in
the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the
desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results
in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non-heirs and
speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another
occasion. It is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco v
Sideco, 45 O.G. 168, fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each
other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence
against the validity of the will.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his
signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the
course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of
substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the
seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by the testatrix and all
three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no
control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and
the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise,
as stated in vda. de Gil v Murciano, 49 O.G. 1459, 1479 (decision on reconsideration),
"witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause."
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which
bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the
defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of
the statutory requirements, where the purpose of the law is otherwise satisfied. Thus,
despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page
signed at its foot by the testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could
nevertheless be probated (Abangan v Abangan, 41 Phil 476); and that despite the
requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first
page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez v Liboro, 81 Phil 429). These
precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
the testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed the probate of original because it
lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run
here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in the law there is no other
will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid
and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered,
being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit "A-1", serves to prove
that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was
inadvertent and not intentional.
x
x
x
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
CAGRO v CAGRO
No. L-5826, 29 April 1953
92 Phil 1032
The attestation clause must be signed by the witnesses at the bottom thereof. If the
signatures of the attesting witnesses are affixed on the left margin, or in any other place,
the attestation clause would be fatally defective, resulting in the nullity of the will. The
opinion of the majority of the Court in this case is diametrically opposed to its opinion in the
case of Abangan v Abangan. The technical difference between the factual bases of the two
cases should be examined. In any event, Cagro is not a unanimous decision.
Paras, C.J.:
The main objection insisted upon by the appellants is that the will is fatally defective,
because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question
that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will to not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on
the left hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellants is correct. The attestation
clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to
be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An
unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contents that the signatures of the three witnesses on the left-
hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the
attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the
legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an
attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof be admitted as
sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the
absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the probate of the will in question denied.
So ordered, with costs against the petitioner and appellee.
Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Tuazon, J., with whom concurs Feria, Jr., dissenting:
I concur with Mr. Justice Bautista's dissenting opinion and may add that the majority
decision erroneously sets down a fact that the attestation clause was not signed, when the
witnesses' signatures appear on the left margin and the real and only question is whether
such signatures are legally sufficient.
The only answer in our humble opinion, is yes. The law on wills does not provide that the
attesting witness should sign the clause at the bottom. In the absence of such provision,
there is no reason why signatures on the margin are not good. A letter is not any less the
writer's simply because it was signed, not at the conventional place but on the side or on
the top.
Bautista Angelo, J., with whom concurs Feria, J., dissenting:
I dissent. In my opinion the will in question has substantially complied with the formalities of
the law and, therefore, should be admitted to probate. It appears that the will was signed by
the testator and was attested by three instrumental witnesses, not only at the bottom, but
also on the left hand margin. The witnesses testified not only that the will was signed by the
testator in their presence and in the presence of each other but also that when they did so,
the attestation clause was already written thereon. Their testimony has not been
contradicted. The only objection set up by the oppositors to the validity of the will is the fact
that the signatures of the instrumental witnesses do not appear immediately after the
attestation clause.
This objection is too technical to be entertained. In the case of Abangan v Abangan, (40
Phil 476), this court said that when the testamentary dispositions "are wholly written on only
one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and the three witnesses (as the instant
case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless."
In such a case, the court said, the requirement of the signatures on the left hand margin
was not necessary because the purpose of the law - which is to avoid the substitution of
any of the sheets of the will, thereby changing the testator's dispositions - has already been
accomplished. We may say the same in connection with the will under consideration
because while the three instrumental witnesses did not sign immediately after the
attestation clause, the fear entertained by the majority that it may have been only added on
a subsequent occasion and not at the signing of the will, has been obviated by the
uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses to the effect that such attestation clause was
already written in the will when the same was signed.
The following observation made by this court in the Abangan case is very fitting:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the law
on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
We should not also overlook the liberal trend of the New Civil Code in the matter of
interpretation of wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt, is to give such interpretation
that would have the effect of preventing intestacy (articles 788 and 791, New Civil Code).
I am therefore of the opinion that the will in question should be admitted to probate.
LOPEZ v LIBOROPRIVATE
No. L-1787, 27 August 1948
81 Phil 429
Article 805 requires that every page of the will be numbered correlatively in letters. The
failure to affix the page number on the first page is not necessarily a fatal defect. The
pagination requirement admits of a liberal interpretation, particularly if the purpose of the
law has been satisfied.
In addition, the will need not state that the language used therein is known to the testator.
Knowledge by the testator of the language used in the will may be proved by extrinsic
evidence, and, may, under certain conditions, even be inferred by the probate court.
Tuazon, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate
of what purports to be the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age
of 83 in Balayan, Batangas on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in
question was executed. In the court below, the present appellant specified five grounds for
his opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his
signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will
he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if
he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one
of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured
by duress, influence of fear or threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia
Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud or trick.
In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That
the court a quo erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "A", was executed in all
particulars as required by law." To this object is added the alleged error of the court "in
allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was written in a language
known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and over the vigorous objection of
the oppositor."
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a
separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the
appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to
afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss of any of its pages.
(Abangan v Abangan, 40 Phil 476) In the present case, the omission to put a page number
on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other form of identification more
trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is
clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation
to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second
lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO", the invocation
of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, - all
of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the
maker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the
attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other
sheet cannot by any possibility be taken for other than page one. Abangan v Abangan,
supra, and Fernandez v Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil 922 are decisive of this issue.
x
x
x
The testator affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The
reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in
testator's place might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends
should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator
chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or
preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied is the
signature is made by the testator's mark. (de Gala v Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil 108; 28
R.C.L. 117.)
x
x
x
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its
silence on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament. There is no
statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter
that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales v
Laurel, 46 Phil 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it
did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof
on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which
the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect."
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto
Lopez is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, Acting C.J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.
SAMANIEGO-CELADA v ABENA
G. R. No. 145545, 30 June 2008
556 SCRA 569
Samaniego holds that an error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the will.
Quisumbing, J.:
x x x
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending or descending heirs as
her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first
cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego-Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego,
and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on February 2, 1987
where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at
Singalong x x x to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal
shares or one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share
of a real property located at San Antonio Village, Makati x x x to respondent, Isabelo M.
Abena and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left
all her personal properties to respondent who she likewise designated as sole executor of
her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letter of administration of the estate of
M a r g a r i t a b e f o r e t h e R T C o f M a k a t i . x
x

x.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of
Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. x x x.
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in
a decision dated October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. x x x.
x
x
x
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will
invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law x x x.
After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.
x
x
x
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal
that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
x
x
x
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that
its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth
and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation clause is
not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the
will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as
stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be
noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C
which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the
pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is
the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause
and the acknowledgment. The position of the court is in consonance with the
doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which
reads:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and]
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render
the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.
x
x
x
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since,
petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the
Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed
and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedents estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tiga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA v ABAJA
G.R. No. 147145, 31 January 2005
450 SCRA 264
Carpio, J.:
x
x
x
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died sometime in
September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1969, Alipio C. Abaja (Alipio) filed with the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition, docketed as SP. No. 070 (313-8668),
for the probate of the last will and testament (will) of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja (Eulogio) and Rosario Cordova.
Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will
when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it,
should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as
required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries.
Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada,
namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada
(Joel Abada, et. al.), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco
(Levi Tronco, et al.), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces
and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-Kabankalan x x x for
the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al. and Levi
Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP. No. 070
(313-8668).
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed
as SP No. 069 (309), praying for the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Abada and Toray,
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of
Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing
the probate of Torays will became final and executory.
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-
Noble (Caponong-Noble) Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.
Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada.
The RTC-Kabankalan denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas
discovered that in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo
had already submitted the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a
resolution dated 22 June 1994 as follows:
There having been substantial notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is
substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the
petitioner through his testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to
establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and further, there being no
evidence of bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and
Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Notel Abbellar is appointed administrator of the estate of
Paulo Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration
shall have been issued in his favor and after taking his oath and filing a bond in the
amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall
continue discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motion to
dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause
as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to
raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan
properly admitted to probate the will of Abada.
Hence the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. what laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public;
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect
known to the testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause and if so, whether the
attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will
of Abada is written in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate
the will of Abada.
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of
1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed
the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, governs the form
of the attestation clause of Abadas will. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides:
SEC 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding section,
shall be valid to pass any estate, real or person, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by
him or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the
person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin,
and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or cause some other person to write his name, under his express direction
and in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other person in
his presence and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will must sign each and every page thereof on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the witnesses
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages of the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a
language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not
acknowledged before a notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 806 of the Old
Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known
to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses x x x.
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. Article 804 of
the Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an
absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 806 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code which provides:
Art. 685. The Notary and the two of the witnesses who authenticated with will must
be acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified
by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to
the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure
themselves that the testator has, to their judgment, the legal, capacity required to
make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling
under Articles 700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of
any will. Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the
Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance
of the will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the
motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with
Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings. In
addition, the language used in the will is part of the requisites under Art, 615 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Nobles contention must still fail. There is no statutory
requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in
the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble
further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada
knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will.
However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place.
In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
The Attestation Clause of Abadas Will
A scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of
Abadas will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y
testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en
nuestra presencia en el margen izquerdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del
mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada una de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de
nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el margen izqierdo de todas y
cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan
paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS en la parte superior de la
casilla.
Caponog-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-
Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will
is written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de
las dos hojas de que esto compuesto el mismo which means in the left margin of each
and every one of the two pages consisting of the same shows that the will consists of two
pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters ONE and TWO as can be
gleaned from the phrase las cuales estan paginadas correletivamente con las letras
UNO y DOS.
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the
testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of the three witnesses. She then
faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial
compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code.
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: Suscrito y declarado por el testador
Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo
tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izqueirdo de todas y cada
una de las hojas del mismo. The English translation is: Subscribed and professed by the
testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also
signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the
same. The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in
the presence of the witnesses,
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate
the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in
applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While
the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will
shows that three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v De Gorostiza, the Court recognized that there are
two divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the
other on liberal construction. In Dischoso, the Court noted that Abangan v Abangan, the
basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. de Leynez v Leynez, the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of
applicable law, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the
respondent, contending that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long
series of cases to support his view. The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the
parties, held:
x
x
x
It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which
would be applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and
circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If
the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the
instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of
bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from come imperfection of language, or other non-essential
defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose or preserving, in permanent form, a
record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A
will therefore should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose
of the law.
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will. Abadas will clearly
shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to
conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of
witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on
liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the
door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop;
they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a
void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will
itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite
formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish
any fear of dire results.
The phrase en presencia de nosotros or in our presence coupled with the signatures
appearing on the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada
subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will,
and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of
these three witnesses.
Finally Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However,
it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is
sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the
attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
The last part of the attestation clause states en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador. In English, this means in its witness,
every one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator. This clearly shows that the
attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness
signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 46744.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
AZUELA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006
487 SCRA 119
Of note is the decision of the RTC which admitted the will to probate notwithstanding the
defects thereof (no signature of witnesses at the bottom of the attestation clause, no
signature of the testator on the left margin of the second page of the will, the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages used upon which the will was written, and
the lack of acknowledgment). As to the missing signature of the witnesses at the bottom of
the attestation clause, the RTC ignore the ruling in Cagro v Cagro (although arguably the
ruling in Cagro has a very strong dissenting opinion). As regards the missing number of
pages in the attestation clause the RTC invoked the doctrine of liberal interpretation but
conveniently ignored the conditions laid down in the case of Rodelas. As regards the
missing acknowledgement, the RTC ignored the ruling in Carcia v Gatchalian. It can well be
said that the decision of the RTC is one for the books.
This case also highlights the fundamental difference between a jurat and an
acknowledgment, and based on the distinction, the Court held that a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary public.
Tiga, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia
E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give
legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the
opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-
evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain
an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is
sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive
catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance
with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to
the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another
safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two
codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probated filed x x x with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial
will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the
cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two(2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HILING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN.
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila,
pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pag-iisip, pag-unawa at memoria ay
nag-hahayad na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko
lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento.
Una Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-
ayon sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat
(Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin
ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking
pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon,
yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, block 24 at nakapangalan sa
Pechaten Kroporasyon, gayon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na
nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten
Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at
lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42. Block 24 Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix
Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito at walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
Pangatlo - Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang magpapatupad ng
huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng
piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO

(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na bunubuo ng __ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling
Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, at nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa
ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat isang dahon,
sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi at lumadga sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng
kasulatang ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
S a m p a l o c , M a n i l a , R e s . C e r t . N o . A - 7 7 1 7 - 3 7
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-int. 3,m Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
LAMBERTO C. LEANO
address: Avenue 2, Block 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.M.A, Cavite, Res.
Cert. No. A-7668277 issued at Carmona, Cavite
On Feb 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayon 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng
Maynila

(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Notario Publico
Until Dec. 31, 1981
PTR-152041 1/2/81, Manila
TAN # 1437-977-8
Doc. No. 1232;
Page No. 86;
Book No. 43;
Series of 1981.
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of
both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent,
namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided
abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to
the designated executor Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented
herself as the attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent. Geralda Castillo
claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could
be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner,
particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners
right to occupy the properties of the decedent. It also asserted that contrary to the
representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs,
namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was
subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,
and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by
three (3) months.
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the
second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments
are among the central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1982. The
RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino
Agrava, Lamberto Leano and Juanito Estrera. The RTC also called to fore the modern
tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view
of giving the testator more freedom of expressing his last wishes; and from this perspective,
rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in
accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the
subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in
respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the
interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is
persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the
testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgment, this Court has noted that at the end of the
will after the signature of the testatrix, the following is made under the sub-title
Patunay Ng Mga Saksi:
x
x
x
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with
the requirements of the law.
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the
subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing
by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom
thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state
the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only
two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions,
and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and
acknowledgment. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to
invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her
signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion
of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a
forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing
enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due
execution of the will.
x
x
x
In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. The Court of Appeals noted that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will
void and undeserving of probate.
Hence the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number
of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather
than mandatory, and this susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance
rule.
x
x
x
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation
clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals
several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages
of the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, as space having
been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank
was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left incomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the
process Uy Coque v Navas L. Sioca and In re: Will of Andrada. In Uy Coque, the Court
noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause
to state the number of pages contained in the will. In ruling that the will could not be
admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly
relevant to this day: The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the
attestation clause is obvious: the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of
a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by
taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages.
If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the
falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the
signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater
difficulty.
The case of In Re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to
state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the
Court to declare unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting
clause is fatal. It was further observed that it cannot be belied that the x x x requirement
affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the
Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material.
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v Florentino and Taboada v Hon. Rosal,
wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself
considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which
petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the will (Exhibit D), will readily show that the
attestation clause does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. Hence the Will is void and undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme court in Manuel Singson
vesus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon.
Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195, to the effect that a will may still be valid even if
the attestation clause does not contain the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in
the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of Manuel
Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et a., supra, although the attestation in the
subject will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same
was found in the last part of the body of the will:
x
x
x
The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if
this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the
deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or
examination of the will itself. But here, the situation is different. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed
of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes thus case out of the rigid
rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad
and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by pure technical considerations.
In Apolonio Taboada versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., supra, the notarial
acknowledgment in the Will states the number of pages used in the:
x
x
x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. x x x The acknowledgment itself states that this
Last Will and Testament consists of two pates, including this page,
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated
in any part of the will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment
wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated.
`
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950,
at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirements of wills was
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance on these cases remains apropos,
considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is
extant from Section 618. However, the enactment of the Civil code in 1950 did put in force a
rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of
the Civil Code states: x x x.
Caneda v Court of Appeals features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado,
speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills. x x x However, the
Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the substantial
compliance rule under Artifle 809. A cautionary note was struck though Justice J.B.L.
Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself; whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the
will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the
formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of
the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact
remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as
enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these
remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.
Compliance with these requirements, however, picayune in impression, affords the
public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to
convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will. The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the
Code Commission, if for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not
for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an
examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that
should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses.
While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin
of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all
consists of their averments before the notary public.
x
x
x
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. x x x The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses
are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the
attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signature cannot demonstrate these witnesses
undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed
the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing
such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses
signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation
clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary
witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required
under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written;
the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
x
x
x
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition
should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses has also
not been complied with. x x x.
In lien of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayon 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod
ng Maynila. By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby by the signor actually declares
to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the
same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not
hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by
the executor. x x x.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement in Article 806 is that
the will be acknowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does
not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed.
The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal
safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the
testator. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses
to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons to participate in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the
testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a
certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she
had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is
under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public.
x
x
x
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes
the probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio and Carpio-Morales, concur.
VDA. DE RAMOS v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-40804, 31 January 1978
81 SCRA 393
The law requires at least three attesting witnesses to a notarial will. The witnesses shall be
called upon, during probate, to recount the incidents which occurred thereat. To a large
extent, admission to or denial of probate depends on the testimony of these instrumental
witnesses. However, if contrary to expectation, these witnesses, or some of them, should
testify against the formal validity of the will, the proponent of the will may use other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to establish compliance with the formalities prescribed by
law. A will is not necessarily void because the witnesses declared against its validity.
Guerrero, J.:
The main point in controversy here is whether or not the last testament and its
accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of the law,
considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified
against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.
Petitioners argue that the attestation clause of the will and codicil which were signed by the
instrumental witnesses are admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the
said witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying against due execution. Petitioners
further maintain that it is error for respondent court to give credence to the testimony of the
biased witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the
testimonial account of the Notary Public who was also present during the execution and
before whom, right after, the deeds were acknowledged.
Private respondents, on the other hand, reiterate in their contention the declaration of the
two surviving witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the will was not signed by
the testatrix before their presence, which is strengthened by two photographic evidence
showing only the two witnesses in the act of signing, there being no picture of the same
occasion showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the view that where
there was an opportunity to take pictures, it is not understandable why pictures were taken
of the witnesses and not of the testatrix. It concludes that the absence of the latter's picture
to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the testatrix and the
witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in the presence of each other.
The oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to
convince Us that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities
required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared
by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero. The execution of the same was evidently supervised by
his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also
acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some
intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament,
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. If there should be any stress on the
participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other than an interested party, it cannot be
less than the exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty
purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named lawyers had been remiss in
their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of
regularity in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to
the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged
fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is
no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures
of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation clauses,
far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it
disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of
each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a notary
public who was all the time present during the execution.
The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary, but not easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon
Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. A negative
testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and faced with the
convincing appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra
care. For in this regard -
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or
forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know,
saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead
the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the others. This cannot be said of
the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document. Both, albeit
silent, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and
exaggerating nothing.
Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause
which, significantly, is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it affirms that compliance
with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. This Court had previously held
that the attestation clause basically contradicts the pretense of undue execution which later
on may be made by the attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witness do not
merely attest to the signatures of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will,
and their signatures following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact attested not
only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution of the will
as embodied in the attestation clause. By signing the will, the witness impliedly certified to
the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the
capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like.
In this jurisdiction, all attesting witnesses to a will, if available, must be called to prove the
will. Under this circumstance, they become "forced witnesses" and their declaration
derogatory to the probate of the will need not bind the proponent, hence, the latter may
present other proof of due execution even if contrary to the testimony of some or all of the
attesting witnesses. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the
due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of
doubtful credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed
and attested in the manner required by law. Accordingly, although the subscribing
witnesses to a contested will are the best witnesses in connection with its due execution, to
deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable and unbiased; if otherwise, it may be
overcome by any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In the case at bar, the records bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of Odon
Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz on one hand, and the Notary Public Atty. Ricardo A.
Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was contradicted by his own
admission. Though his admission to the effect that "when Eugenia Danila signed the
testament (he) and the two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and Calixto Azusada
were present" was made extrajudicially, it was not squarely refuted when inquired during
the trial.
With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the declaration of
Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas. The records show that this attesting witness was fetched by
Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as witness to a will. Rosendo Paz did not
know what the document he signed was all about. Although he performed his function as
an attesting witness, his participation was rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that
his testimony, "half-hearted" as that of Odon Sarmiento, to be as candid and complete as
one proceeding from a keen mind fully attentive to the details of the execution of the deeds.
Quite differently, Atty. Rosendo A. Barcenas, more than a direct witness himself, was
purposely there to oversee the accomplishment of the will and codicil. His testimony is an
account of what he actually heard and saw during the conduct of his profession. There is no
evidence to show that this lawyer was motivated by any material interest to take sides or
that his statement is truth perverted.
It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of a will. In the absence of any
showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped his judgment and twisted his
declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution
of a will deserves grave consideration. An appraisal of a lawyer's participation has been
succinctly stated by the Court in Fernandez v Tantoco, supra, this wise:
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a
competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the
proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony
of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course, that no
motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is
that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the instrument, is more likely to
become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those
incidents in his memory.
One final point, the absence of a photograph of the testatrix Eugenia Danila in the act of
signing her will. The fact that the only pictures available are those which show the
witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other does not belie
the probability that the testatrix also signed the will before the presence of the witnesses.
We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and not of
what they did not speak of, including the events they failed to capture. The probate of the
will is a special proceeding not imbued with adversary character, wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence "to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which
the matter is susceptible" should be presented to the court before a purported will may be
probated or denied probate.
We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the
will does not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one
vital and indispensable requisite has not been acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any
ordinary or special reason, the presentation of other competent evidence intended to
confirm a fact otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The
probate court having satisfied itself that the will and codicil were executed in accordance
with the formalities required by law, and there being no indication of abuse of discretion on
its part, We find no error committed or any exceptional circumstance warranting the
subsequent reversal of its decision allowing the probate of the deeds in question.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed insofar
as it disallowed the probate of the will and codicil. with costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (chairman), Makasiar, Muoz-Palma and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
GARCIA v GATCHALIAN
No. L-20357, 25 November 1967
21 SCRA 1056
Dizon, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Pedro Reyes Garcia from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 2623 denying the allowance of the will of the
late Gregorio Gatchalian, on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not acknowledge it
before a notary public as required by law.
On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in the
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2, of the same
year, appellant filed a petition with the above-named court for the probate of said alleged
will wherein he was instituted as sole heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G.
Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein,
opposed the petition on the ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud; that
the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will; and that the
deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged
execution of said will.
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document Exhibit "C" to
be the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the New Civil Code - that the will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
An examination of the document shows that the same was acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.
x
x
x
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal
provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of
Alberto, G.R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As the document under consideration does not
comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Reyes, J.B.L., are on official leave of absence.
CRUZ v VILLASOR
No. L-32213, 26 November 1973
54 SCRA 31
Article 806 requires that the testator and the three witnesses must acknowledge the will
before a notary public. Cruz involves a situation where one of the three witnesses to the will
was the same person who notarized the same. By reason thereof, the Supreme Court
disallowed the will for the reasons stated hereunder. While the proponent of the will relied
on American decisions which permit a notary public to be a witness to an instrument
notarized by him, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the foregoing decisions to
the case at bar. It would seem that the strongest argument against the proponent is the fact
that the witnesses themselves are required by law to acknowledge the document. For
which reason, it is obvious that a witness cannot simultaneously be the notary public before
whom the will shall be acknowledged. A different result may be expected if the witnesses
were not required by law to acknowledge the document.
It is equally important to note the ethical problem which may arise if the acknowledging
witness were the same person who would notarize the document.
Esguerra, J.:
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the case hinges, is
whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Article 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first
requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the
second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
public.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely, Deogracias T. Jamoas, Jr., Dr.
Francisco Pa eq \O(n)ares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at
the same time the notary public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms, the question was (sic) attested and subscribed
by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other,
considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues
that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge
the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the
supposed executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there
is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three attesting
witnesses, even if the notary public acted as one of them, bolstering up his stand with 57
American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:
It is said that there are practical reasons for upholding a will as against the purely
technical reason that one of the witnesses required by law as certifying to an
acknowledgment of the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting the
execution of the instrument.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We are inclined to sustain
that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed in
accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself
his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v Ledesma,
97 Phil 258, 262; Castro c Castro, 100 Phil 239, 247); to own as genuine, to assent, to
admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. (The New Webster
Encyclopedic Dictionary of the english Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard
Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252; Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d., p.
245) Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow, assent, or admit as his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements. (Balinon v de Leon, 50 O.G. 583) That function would be defeated
if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For then he would
be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the
validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of
the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of the Code Commission, p.
106-107), would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that a notary public may, in addition, act
as a witness to the execution of the document he has notarized. (Mahilum v Court of
Appeals, 64 O.G. 4017; 17 SCRA 482; Sawyer v Cox, 43 Ill 130) There are others holding
that his signing merely as a notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereunder
(Ferguson v Ferguson, 47 S.E. 2d 346; In re Douglas' Will, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 641; Ragsdal v
Hill, 269 S.W. 2d 911; Tyson v Utterback, 122 So 496; In re Baybee's Estate, 160 N.W. 900;
Merill v Boal, 132 A. 721; See also Trenwith v Smallwood, 15 So. 1030). But these
authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the
issue herein, because the notaries public and witnesses referred to in the aforecited cases
merely acted as instrumental, subscribing or attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging
witnesses. Here the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also as
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisage by Article 805 of the Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will or file another with the office of the clerk of court.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which
would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at least three credible
witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required
number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The
result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary
public for that purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be duly observed.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
probate of the last will and testament of Valence Z. Cruz is declared not valid and hereby
set aside. Cost against the appellee.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Mu eq \O(n)oz-Palma, JJ., concur.
GUERRERO V BIHIS
G.R. No. 174144, 17 April 2007
521 SCRA 394
Guerrero defines acknowledgment and the competent officer before whom it should be
made in the execution of a notarial will. The case further explains the reason for the
requirement of Art. 806 and the function of the acknowledgment. Guerrero holds that a
notarial will acknowledged before a notary public outside of the latters territorial jurisdiction
is void. Effectively, the will is not acknowledged as required by Art. 806.
Corona, J.:
x
x
x
x x x Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and
respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died x x x in Tondo, Manila.
x x x Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the
decedent in x x x the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City x x x.
x
x
x
Respondent opposed her elder sisters petition on the following grounds: the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgement did
not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by
fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper
pressure and influence.
In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court appointed petitioner as special
administratrix of the decedents estate. x x x.
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer
thereto alleging that petitioners evidence failed to establish that the decedents will
complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code.
In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was acknowledged
by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs residence at 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon
city before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in
Caloocan City. The dispositive portion of the resolution read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds, and so declares that it
cannot admit the last will and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura to
probate for the reasons hereinabove discussed and also in accordance with Article
839 [of the Civil Code] which provides that if the formalities required by law have not
been complied with, the will shall be disallowed. In view thereof, the Court shall
henceforth proceed with intestate succession in regard to the estate of the
deceased Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura in connection with Article 960 of the [Civil
Code], to wit: Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person
dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity,
x x x.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the
testatrixs residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo
was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the
fact that the notary public was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the
validity of the notarial will.
Did the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806
of the Civil Code? It did not.
Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
x
x
x
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is
that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This
formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other
words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the case of a notarial will, that
competent officer is the notary public.
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses
to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed
to the will as their own free act and deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participated in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making
the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees
or legatees in the will.
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly
commissioned as a notary public. In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial
Law provides:
x
x
x
SECTION 240. Territorial Jurisdiction.- The jurisdiction of a notary public in a
province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public
in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
A notary publics commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It
is issued within and for a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary publics authority is
co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts,
including the taking of acknowledgment, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the
place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary
public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this
Court categorically pronounced in Tecson v Tecson:
An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officers jurisdiction is
void as if the person taking it were wholly without official character.
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked
the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In
the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will
before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventuras last will and testament was, in effect, not
acknowledged as required by law.
Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The violation of a mandatory or prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless
the law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statutes were
transgressed in the execution of the alleged acknowledgment. The compulsory language
of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of
the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty.
Directo were all completely void.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Puno (C.J., Chairperson), No part.
GABUCAN v MANTA
No. L-51546, 28 January 1980
95 SCRA 752
Incompetence takes various forms. The foregoing case is classic in a very special way as it
resulted not only in a waste of time but also of taxpayers' money.
Aquino, J.:
This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of the notarial will on the
ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp.
The Court of First Instance of Camiguin in its "decision" of December 28, 1977 in Special
Proceedings No. 41 for the probate of the will of the late Rogaciano Gabucan, dismissed
the proceeding (erroneously characterized as an "action").
The proceeding was dismissed because the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed
to the notarial acknowledgment in the will, hence, according to respondent judge, it was not
admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code, now Section 250 of the 1977
Tax Code which reads:
x
x
x
The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the said will is subject to
the thirty-centavo documentary stamp tax fixed in section 225 of the Tax Code, now section
237 of the 1977 Tax Code.
Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioner's manifestation
that he had already attached the documentary stamp to the original of the will.
The case was brought to this Court by means of a petition for mandamus to compel the
lower court to allow petitioner's appeal from its decision. In this court's resolution of
January 21, 1980, the petition for mandamus was treated in the interest of substantial and
speedy justice as an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 as well as a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that because no documentary
stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to probate" and,
consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed."
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix
the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will
which is the taxable portion of the document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility
of the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until
the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and canceled."
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable
document is presented in evidence (del Castillo v Madrile eq \O(n)a, 49 Phil 749. Note the
holding in Azarraga v Rodriguez, 9 Phil 637, that the lack of documentary stamp on a
document does not invalidate such document. See Cia. General de Tabacos v Jeanjaquet,
12 Phil 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa v Amenabar, 16 Phil 403, 405-6)
WHEREFORE, the lower court's dismissal of the petition of probate is reversed and set
aside. It is directed to decide the case on the merits in the light of the parties' evidence. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
GARCIA v VASQUEZ
No. L-26884, 30 April 1970
32 SCRA 490
Article 808 of the Civil Code prescribes an additional formality in the case of a blind testator.
Garcia holds that if a testator's vision does not permit him to read the document, even if he
can see distant object, the testator is deemed blind for the purpose of requiring the
observance of the additional formality prescribed in Article 808.
Justice Reyes opined that if the testator is blind or incapable of reading the will (as when he
is illiterate) the requirement of reading must be complied with in order to enable the testator
to object to provisions which are not in accordance with his wishes. While the opinion
seems reasonable, Article 808 makes specific reference to a blind person. An illiterate
person with good vision was not mentioned in the law. There is serious doubt, therefore, if
the provision of Article 808 is applicable to an illiterate testator.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in the City of Manila on 2 September 1965,
leaving no descendants, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death, she was
said to be 90 years old more or less, and possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real
properties.
On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased,
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and
testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed on 29 December 1960, and for her
appointment as special administratrix of the latter's estate said to be valued at about
P100,000.00, pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof.
The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs: x x x. The
oppositions invariably charged that the instrument executed in 1960 was not intended by
the deceased to be her true will; that the signature of the deceased appearing in the will
was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the object of her bounty;
that the instrument itself reveals irregularities in its execution, and that the formalities
required by law for such execution have not been complied with.
x
x
x
On 25 August 1966, the Court issued an order admitting to probate the 1960 will of Gliceria
A. del Rosario. In declaring the due execution of the will, the probate court took note that
no evidence had been presented to establish that the testatrix was not of sound mind when
the will was executed; that the fact that she had prepared an earlier will did not prevent her
from executing another one thereafter; that the fact that the 1956 will consisted of 12 pages
whereas the 1960 testament was contained in one page does not render the latter invalid;
that the erasures and alterations in the instrument were insignificant to warrant rejection;
that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the instrumental witnesses which were noted
by the oppositors are even indicative of their truthfulness. The probate court, also
considering that petitioner had already shown capacity to administer the properties of the
estate and that from the provisions of the will she stands as the person most concerned
and interested therein, appointed the petitioner regular administratrix with a bond for
P50,000.00. From this order all oppositors appealed x x x.
x
x
x
Foremost of the questions to be determined here concerns the correctness of the order
allowing the probate of the 1960 will.
The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the fact that the testatrix, Gliceria A.
del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting of 12
pages and written in Spanish, a language that she knew and spoke, witnessed by Messrs.
Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Y. Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and acknowledged before notary
public Jose Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1 page and written
in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena, and Francisco
Lopez, and acknowledged before notary public Remigio M. Tividad.
Called to testify on the due execution of the 1960 will, instrumental witnesses Decena,
Lopez and Rosales uniformly declared that they were individually requested by Alfonso
Precilla (the late husband of petitioner special administratrix) to witness the execution of the
last will of Doa Gliceria A. del Rosario; that they arrived at the house of the old lady at No.
2074 Azcarraga, Manila, one after the other, in the afternoon of 29 December 1960; that the
testatrix at the time was apparently of clear and sound mind, although she was being aided
by Precilla when she walked; that the will, which was already prepared, was first read
"silently" by the testatrix herself before she signed it; that the three witnesses thereafter
signed the will in the presence of the testatrix and the notary public and of one another.
There is also testimony that after the testatrix and the witnesses to the will acknowledged
the instrument to be their voluntary act and deed, the notary asked for their respective
residence certificates which were handed to him by Alfonso Precilla, clipped together; that
after comparing them with the numbers already written on the will, the notary public filled in
the blanks in the instrument with the date 29 January 1960, before he affixed his signature
and seal thereto. They also testified that on that occasion no pressure or influence has
been exerted by any person upon the testatrix to execute the will.
Of course, the interest and active participation of Alfonso Precilla in the signing of the 1960
will are evident from the records. The will appeared to have been prepared by one who is
not conversant with the spelling of Tagalog words, and it has been shown that Alfonso
Precilla is a Cebuano who speaks Tagalog with a Visayan accent. The witnesses to the will,
two of whom are fellow Visayans, admitted their relationship or closeness to Precilla. It was
Precilla who instructed them to go to the house of Gliceria del Rosario on 29 December
1960 to witness an important document, and who took their residence certificates for them
a few days before the will was signed. Precilla had met the notary public and witnesses
Rosales and Lopez at the door of the residence of the old woman; he ushered them to the
room at the second floor where the signing of the document took place; then he fetched
witness Decena from the latter's haberdashery shop a few doors away and brought him to
the house of the testatrix. And when the will was actually executed Precilla was present.
The oppositors-appellants in the present case, however, challenging the correctness of the
probate court's ruling, maintain that on 29 December 1960 the eyesight of Gliceria del
Rosario was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will,
contrary to the testimonies of witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales.
On this point, we find the declaration in court of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis very material and
illuminating. Said ophthalmologist, whose expertise was admitted by both parties, testified,
among other things that when Doa Gliceria del Rosario saw him for consultation on 11
March 1960 he found her left eye to have cataract (opaque lens), and that it was "above
normal in pressure," denoting a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to blindness. x
x x.
The records also show that although Dr. Tamesis operated on the left eye of the decedent
at the Lourdes Hospital on 8 August 1960, as of 23 August 1960, in spite of the glasses her
vision was only "counting fingers," at five feet. x x x.
Then confronted with a medical certificate issued by him on 29 November 1965 certifying
that Gliceria del Rosario was provided with aphakic lenses and "had been under medical
supervision up to 1963 with apparently good vision," the doctor had this to say:
Q .
When you said that she had apparently good vision you mean that she
was able to read?
A .
No, not necessarily, only able to go around, take care of herself and see.
This I can tell you, this report was made on pure recollections and I recall
she was using her glasses although I recall also that we have to give her
medicines to improve her vision, some medicines to improve her
identification some more.
x
x
x
Q .
What about the vision in the right eye, was that corrected by the glasses?
A .
Yes, with the new prescription which I issued on 30 August 1960. It is in
the clinical record.
Q .
The vision in the right eye was corrected?
A .
Yes. That is the vision for distant objects.
The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased, and therefore,
has first hand knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from August 1960 up to
1963, fully establish the fact that notwithstanding the operation and removal of the cataract
in her left eye and her being fitted with aphakic lens (used by cataract patients), her vision
remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. Thus, the conclusion
is inescapable that with the condition of her eyesight in August 1960, and there is no
evidence that it had improved by 29 December 1960, Gliceria del Rosario was incapable of
reading, and could not have read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her on 29
December 1960. It is worth noting that the instrumental witnesses stated that she read the
instrument "silently" which is a conclusion and not a fact.
Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of the
will, Exhibit "D" acquires striking significance. Upon its face, the testamentary provisions,
the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of
paper, so much so that the words had to be written very close to the top, bottom and two
sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the words "and" had to be written by the
symbol "&", apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any
regard for the defective vision of Doa Gliceria. Further, typographical errors like "HULINH"
for "HULING" (last), "Alfonsa" for "Alfonso", "MERCRDRS" for "MERCEDES",
"instrumental" for "Instrumental" and "acknowledged" for "acknowledge", remain
uncorrected, thereby indicating that execution thereof must have been characterized by
haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final
disposition of one's worldly possessions should not be embodied in an informal and untidily
written instrument; or that the glaring spelling error should have escaped her notice if she
had actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so. The record is
thus convincing that the supposed testatrix could not have physically read or understood
the alleged testament, Exhibit "D", and that its admission to probate was erroneous and
should be reversed.
That Doa Gliceria should be able to greet her guests on her birthday, arrange flowers and
attend to kitchen tasks shortly prior to the alleged execution of the testament Exhibit "D", as
appears from the photographs, Exhibits "E" to "E-1", in no way proves that she was able to
read a closely typed page, since the acts shown do not require vision at close range. It
must be remembered that with the natural lenses removed, her eyes had lost the power of
adjustment to near vision, the substituted glass lenses being rigid and uncontrollable by
her. Neither is the signing of the checks by her indicative of ability to see at normal reading
distances. Writing or signing of one's own name, when sufficiently practiced, becomes
automatic, so that one need only to have a rough indication of the place where the
signature is to be affixed in order to be able to write it. Indeed a close examination of the
checks, amplified in the photograph Exhibit "O", et seq., reinforces the contention of
oppositors that the alleged testatrix could not see at normal reading distances: the
signatures in the checks are written far above the printed base lines, and the names of the
payees as well as the amounts written do not appear to be in the handwriting of the alleged
testatrix, being in a much firmer and more fluid hand than hers.
Thus, for all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del
Rosario was, as appellant-oppositors contend, not unlike a blind testator, and the due
execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 808. If the testator be blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once by one of
the subscribing witnesses, and again by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes. That the aim of the law is to ensure that the dispositions of the will are properly
communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly
reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the
latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act
within the range of his (the testator's) other senses.
In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that the
above requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as already stated above, the 1960 will
sought to be probated suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution.
x
x
x
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the court below allowing the probate of
the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. x x
x.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., took no part. Barredo, J., is on leave.
ALVARADO v GAVIOLA, JR.
G.R. No. 74695, 14 September 1993
226 SCRA 347
This is the second instance where the Court had occasion to discuss the meaning of the
term "blind testator." Alvarado confirms that a person unable to read the draft of his will,
either because of poor, defective or blurred eyesight must be considered blind for the
purpose of compliance with the additional formalities prescribed in Article 808. In addition,
the Court confirms that inability to read by reason of illiteracy is included within the broader
concept of "blindness" for the purpose of the same article. However, Alvarado makes a
landmark exception to the rule of strict compliance when it affirmed the probate order
despite non-compliance with the double reading requirement. How this decision will affect
the courts interpretation of the other formal requirements of the law remains to be seen.
Bellosillo, J.:
x
x
x
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled
"Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly
revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch
4 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private
respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the
will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged
document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own
respective copies, previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9
December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng
Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the
notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering
from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the
case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil.
Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of
the three instrumental witnesses (same as those in the notarial will) and the notary public
who followed the reading using their own copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death x
x x by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance of Siniloan,
Laguna. Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought
to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was
insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to
senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats;
that it was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the beneficiary who
stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made
to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within
the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto were
executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not
complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the
following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil
were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was
substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each
of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art.
808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of
making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of
Art. 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the
double-reading requirement of said article complied with?
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was
not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both
eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he
had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye
specialist on 14 December 1977.
The point of dispute is whether the following circumstances would qualify Brigido as a
"blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once by one of
the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil
were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the terms as it is used in Art.
808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate
issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Ophthalmology (Philippine
Eye Research Institute), the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr.
Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. Dr. Roasa explained
that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read
either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first
consultation.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the
testator could still read on the day the will and codicil were executed but chose not to do so
because of "poor eyesight." Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the
court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading
at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by
his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," "defective," or "blurred"
vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia v Vasquez provides an insight into the scope of the
term "blindness: as used in Art. 808, to wit:
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind
or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes x x x.
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those
who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido
Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be
no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the
term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way
of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably
with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate,
it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read to
him twice; once by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public
before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the
incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an
opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an
instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged
will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only
once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the
single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that
the only valid compliance is a strict compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is
admitted that neither the notary nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will
and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily the petition must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud
and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take
place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time
that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contends of the draft. The
uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that
the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November
1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing
his conformity to the draft.
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November 1977 and 29
December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the
will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pea (the notary public) and Dr.
Cresente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician)
asked the testator whether the contents were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the
affirmative. With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it
can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to
him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms
actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we consider
the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one
being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to
him since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be
strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and
its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v
Abangan, to wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his
"Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside for
the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed
strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose
of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his
will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where
the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case
has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz (Chairman), Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
GIL v MURCIANO
No. L-3362, 1 March 1951
88 Phil 260
Article 809 enunciates the doctrine of liberal interpretation. Accordingly, in the absence of
bad faith, forgery, fraud or undue and improper influence and pressure, defects or
imperfections in the form of attestation clause or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid, if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with the requisites of law. Gil involves an attestation clause which
omitted to state that the testator signed the will in the presence of the witnesses. Such fact
was, however, stated by the testator in the body of the will. There is no question as to the
genuineness of the will, as even the opponents concede that issue.
It is most unfortunate that there was a sharp division in the court. In the original decision,
six voted for its nullity and five for its validity. In resolving the motion for reconsideration, six
members of the court voted for the validity of the will, five against it. Consequently, the
issue remained controversial and far from having been resolved. The text below is part of
the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. The text of the original decision (which has
been reversed) was omitted.
RESOLUTION
Tuason, J.:
This appeal is before us on a motion for reconsideration of this court's decision. Whereas
formerly six Justices voted for reversal and five for affirmance of the probate court's order
admitting the will to probate, the vote upon reconsideration was six for affirmance and five
for reversal, thereby making the dissenting opinion, which had been filed, the prevailing rule
of the case. Under the circumstances, this resolution will largely be confined to a
restatement of that dissenting opinion.
The will in question was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila in
1943 with Roberto Toledo y Gil, decedent's nephew, and Pilar Gil vda. de Murciano,
decedent's sister opposing the application. Toledo's legal right to intervene was questioned
by the proponent of the will, and the objection was sustained in an order which was
affirmed by this court x x x. As a result of the latter decision, Toledo was eliminated from
the case and did not appear when the trial was resumed.
The proceeding seems to have been held in abeyance pending final disposition of Toledo's
appeal, and early in 1945, before the application was heard on the merit, the record, along
with the will, was destroyed, necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. In the
reconstitution, a stipulation of facts was submitted on which, according to the appealed
order, "both parties x x x agreed that the will as transcribed in the record on appeal
in Case G.R. No. L-254 is true and a correct copy.
The will consisted of only two pages, and the attestation clause as thus copied reads:
NOSOTROS los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el
testamento que precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testador,
compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamento paginadas
correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como
todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra precencia y que cada uno de nosotros
hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
F d o . A l f r e d o T. R i v e r a
Fdo. Ramon Mendiola Fdo. Mariano Oma eq \O(n)a
It will be noted from the above copy that the last of the compound sentence is truncated
and meaningless. The defect is the main basis of the appellant's sole assignment of error.
Counsel for appellee contend that the phrase "han sido firmadas por el testator" or
equivalent expression between the words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra
presencia" should be inserted if the attestation clause is to be complete and have sense.
With this insertion the attestation clause would read x x x "asi como todas las hojas
del mismo han sido firmadas por el testador en nuestra presencia x x x." The point is
well taken.
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the copy. The probabilities of
error in the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the will was not in controversy in
Toledo's appeal. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or no
care was employed in transcribing the document in the agreement or record on appeal. The
absence of the signature of the testator on the first page of the copy is an additional proof
that little or no pain was taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The appearance of "la
testadora" in the copy instead of "el testador" is another indication of haste and
carelessness in the transcription.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as the trial court says.
Certainly, Attorney Mariano Osmea, who drew the instrument and signed it as an attesting
witness, knew the law and, by the context thereof, has shown familiarity with the rules of
grammar and ability to express his idea properly. In the light of these circumstances and of
the further fact that the clause was brief and, by its importance, must have been written with
utmost concern, so important an omission as to make the clause or sentence senseless
could not have been made, intentionally or otherwise, in the original.
x
x
x
The problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills which
requires certain formalities to be fulfilled in the execution, but by the rules of construction
applicable to statutes and documents in general. And this rule would obtain whether the
omission occurred in the original document or in the copy alone. In either case, the court
may and should correct the error by supplying the omitted word or words.
x
x
x
From 6 C.J.S. 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the court
whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the will; but not
where the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or
change the meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50 and 51, the
same work says: "To aid the court in ascertaining and giving effect to the testator's intention
in the case of an ambiguous will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the
construction or interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in general a will should be
construed according to these established rules of construction." And referring to
construction of statutes which, as has been said, is applicable to construction of
documents, C.J.S., in Vol. 59, p. 992, tells us that "Where it appears from the context that
certain words have been inadvertently omitted from a statute, the court may supply such
words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to express the legislative intent."
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is in accordance
with law. (2 Page on Will 849, 841; 57 Am. Jur. 720)
But let it be assumed, for the sake of this decision only, that the attestation clause was
drawn exactly as it was copied in Toledo's record on appeal, was the mistake fatal? Was it,
or was it not, cured by the testator's own declaration? "En testimonio de lo cual, firmo este
mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con la
clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quines a su vez firmaron cada
una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia [de los testigos,
quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en
mi presencia cada] uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy, en Porac, Pampanga, I.F., el dia
27 de marzo de mil novecientos treinta y nueve." The answer is in the negative.
As early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the will was sustained, found its way
into this court. (See Aldaba v Roque, 43 Phil 378) That case was more than foursquare
behind the case at bar. There the departure from the statutory formality was more radical, in
that the testator took charge of writing the entire attestation clause in the body of the will,
the witnesses limiting their role to signing the document below the testator's signature.
Here, at the most, the testator took away from the witnesses only a small part of their
assigned task, leaving to them the rest.
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this Court, in a unanimous
decision en banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said in the Aldaba-Roque case:
When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instrument, besides
the testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial
compliance with the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts
recited in said attestation clause appear to have been made by the testator himself.
That ruling should set the present case at rest unless we want to revert to the old, expressly
abandoned doctrine, in a long line of what we believe to be better-considered decisions.
This court noted in Dichoso de Ticson v de Gorostiza (1922), 57 Phil 437, "that there have
been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills - the one
being planted on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of
the former views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez v Alcala (1930), 55 Phil 150,
sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic rule in the other direction, predicated
on reason, is Abangan v Abangan (1919), 40 Phil 476, oft-cited approvingly in later
decisions."
In the Abangan case, a unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea later
Chief Justice, observed:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the law on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So, when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
x
x
x
It is objected that "If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to
stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line?"
These same questions might well have been asked by the opponents of the new trends in
the cases above cited. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty,
nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and
where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence
aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should
appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite
formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any
fear of dire results.
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus defined. If the witnesses here purposely
omitted or forgot to say that the testator signed the will in their presence, the testator said
that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No
extraneous proof was necessary and none was introduced or taken into consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind it was the thing
that led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the injustice of the old way
that impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn worship of form in
preference of substance. It has been said, and experience has shown, that the mechanical
system of construction has operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent
ones. That, it must be conceded, would be the effect of this case if the will under
consideration were rejected. For the adverse party now concedes the genuineness of the
document. At any rate, the genuineness is super obvious, and there is not the slightest
insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator, or fraud.
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the witnesses' presence
"would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile does not look to us quite
well placed. There is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own act unless
forbidden by rules of positive law. The rationale of this decision is that he is not. If we were
to make a metaphorical comparison, it would be more correct to say that a man can
generally does himself pull the bootstraps when he puts his boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate, practical reason for objecting to the
testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of the
latter. The will is of the testator's own making, the intervention of attesting witnesses being
designed merely to protect his interest. If the sole purpose of the statute in requiring this
intervention of witnesses is to make it certain that the testator has definite and complete
intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting
one instrument for another, what better guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be
than a certification by the testator himself in the body of the will, so long as the testator's
signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling and
bungling it or the attestation clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making a valid will,
to do so would be a contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an end and not the
end themselves, and that end is achieved by another method slightly different from the
prescribed manner, what has been done by the testator and the witnesses in the execution
of the instant will should satisfy both law and conscience.
x
x
x
Upon the foregoing consideration, the order of the probate court is affirmed with costs.
Paras, Feria, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Padilla and Reyes,
JJ., dissent.
Jugo, J., with whom concur Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., dissenting:
I disent on the ground set forth in my opinion rendered in this case.
CANEDA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103554, 28 May 1993
222 SCRA 781
Caneda affirms the ruling in Gil v Murciano. However, the results of these two cases are
divergent. Gil allowed the probate of the will, whereas Caneda disallowed the will. The
factual difference between these two cases should be noted.
Regalado, J.:
Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review on certiorari is the
issue of whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the
late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article
809, of the Civil Code.
The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any
children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his
residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca,
Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his
lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation
of that last will. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by
way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola,
Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa
Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The probate court set the petition for
hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were
postponed for one reason or another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before
his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. On February 25, 1981, Benoni
Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special
administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he
was so appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981.
Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted
a second petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" and
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965-R, before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of
First Instance of Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition for
intestate proceedings consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu and opposed thereat the probate of the testator's will and
the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known as Branch
XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator
on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an order for the return of the
records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate proceedings for
the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was
re-raffled and eventually assigned to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it
remained until the conclusion of the probate proceedings.
x
x
x
On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the
last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero, on the ratiocination that:
x x x The self-serving testimony of the two witnesses of the oppositors cannot
overcome the positive testimonies of Atty. Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca
who clearly told the Court that indeed Mateo Caballero executed his Last Will and
Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December 5, 1978. Moreover, the fact that it
was Mateo Caballero who initiated the probate of his Will during his lifetime when
he caused the filing of the original petition now marked as Exhibit "D" clearly
underscores the fact that this was indeed his Last Will. x x x.
All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit "C" is the Last Will and Testament
of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of
law.
Undaunted by said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19669. They asserted therein that the will in question is null
and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to
specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision affirming that of the trial
court, and ruling that the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially
complied with Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus:
The question therefore is whether the attestation clause in question may be
considered as having substantially complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of
the Civil Code. What appears in the attestation clause which the oppositors claim
to be defective is "we do certify that the testament was read by him and the
testator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of
THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively
in letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he
has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in
the presence of each and all of us.
To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and no evidence need be presented to
indicate the meaning that the said will was signed by the testator and by them (the
witnesses) in the presence of all of them and of one another. Or as the language of
the law would have it, that the testator signed the will "in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another." If not completely
or ideally perfect in accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic) the phrase as
formulated is in substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of said ruling of respondent court, but the same
was denied in the latter's resolution of January 14, 1992, hence this appeal now before us.
x
x
x
We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter explain, after
some prefatory observations which we feel should be made in aid of the rationale for our
resolution of the controversy.
1 .
x
x
x
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses
certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the
execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. It is made for
the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the
execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting
witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved.
x
x
x
The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the
will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription of
the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument
executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses.
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause,
therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the
authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be
signed only by them. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as
it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence
of the testator and the witnesses.
x
x
x
2. An examination of the will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised
of three sheets all of which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each
page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting
witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation
clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise
signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses thereto. Since it is the proverbial
bone of cont ent i on, we reproduce i t agai nst f or f aci l i t y of ref erence:
We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal
addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify
that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO, has
published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the
Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters on the upper part of
each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has signed the same and every
page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,
in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest and
subscribed to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and
"subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of the senses, while subscription is the
act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know
that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and
legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same
paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.
In Taboada v Rosal, we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done which
the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as
a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the
same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed
by the testator. As it involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of
ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed
in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially expressed in
the attestation.
It is contended by petitioner that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravention of the
express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation
clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator
sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. We
agree.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is
the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were
used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witness
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereon, on the spaces provided
for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the
instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and
Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in
the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likely signify and refer to
the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the
presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed
the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that
the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect
or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here
sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated
defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil
Code, to wit: x x x.
While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and
at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be
conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in
the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the
presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does
not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where
the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various
combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.
We believe that the following comment of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding Article 809,
wherein he urged caution in the application of the substantial compliance rule therein, is
correct and should be applied in the case under consideration, as well as to future cases
with similar questions:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied
by an examination of the will itself; whether all the pages are consecutively
numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that
the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury
in the probate proceedings.
3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be
with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects
or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner
of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an
examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.
The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact
that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defects is not only in the form or in the
language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by
Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the
defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can
read into the questioned attestation clause any statement, or an implication thereof, that the
attesting witnesses did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all
its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied
on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be
cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom
which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual
requirements were actually complied with in the execution of the will. In other words, the
defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the
attesting witnesses can be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall
appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from which such facts
may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his
witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the
instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic
evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by indirection what in law he
cannot do directly.
x
x
x
It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied
by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will
not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will
being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence
aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately of the will
itself.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of the
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly
directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate
of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceedings
No. 3965-R (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and
thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.
ROXAS v DE JESUS, JR.
No. L-38338, 28 January 1985
134 SCRA 245
Article 810 of the Civil Code requires, among others, that a holographic will be dated.
While a complete date is generally required, an incomplete date which sets forth only the
month and the year of execution, is not a fatal defect if it can be shown that there was no
bad faith, fraud, and undue and improper influence and pressure. Probate is further justified
if the genuineness of the handwriting of the testator is proved, or otherwise admitted by the
parties, and the only ground for opposing probate is the technicality resulting from an
incomplete date. Roxas explains the reason for requiring a holographic will to be dated.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special
Proceedings No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus
and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
x x x petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of
Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a
document purporting to be the holographic will of the deceased Bibiana de Jesus.
On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the
holographic will in July 21, 1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a
notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23
and 24 thereof, a letter-will addressed to her children entirely written and signed in the
handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus, was found. This will is dated "FEB./61"
and states: "this is my will which I want to be respected altho it is not written by a lawyer. x
x x."
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de
Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61" is
the holographic will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the
handwriting of their mother and positively identified her signature. They further testified that
their deceased mother understood English, the language in which the holographic will is
written, and that the date "FEB./61" was the date when the said will was executed by their
mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir, filed an "opposition to probate"
assailing the purported holographic will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because (a) it was not
executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or
under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by
mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended said will to be her last will and
testament at the time of its execution.
`
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the
probate of the holographic will which he found to have been executed in accordance with
law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that
the alleged holographic will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required
by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the will should
contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied
with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco reconsidered his earlier order
and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the ground that the word "dated" has
generally been held to include the month, day and year. The dispositive portion of the order
reads:
x
x
x
The only issue is whether of not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Code which
reads:
x
x
x
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of
the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic will the "year, month and
day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase "A eq \O(n)o. mes y dia"
and simply required that the holographic will should be dated. The petitioners submit that
the liberal construction of the holographic will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic will is
void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code in that the date must contain the
year, month and day of its execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil
Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the
Louisiana Code whose Supreme Court had consistently ruled that the required date
includes the year, month and day, and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic will is
invalid. The respondent further contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction
of Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed
in the execution of holographic wills are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements regarding the due execution of wills. We should not overlook the
liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of wills, the purpose of which, in
case of doubt, is to prevent intestacy -
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law on
wills in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution
with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator.
This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with respect to the formalities
in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103.)
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirement in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
testamentary privilege (Icasiano v Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and
fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said will should be admitted to probate (Rey v
Cartagena, 56 Phil 282).
x
x
x
If the testator, in executing his will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although
compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished
by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills has been expounded by
this Court in Abangan v Abangan, 40 Phil 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity.
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of
two competing wills executed on the same day, or if a testator becoming insane on the day
on which a will was executed (Velasco v Lopez, 1 Phil 720). There is no such contingency
in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and
fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of wills and testament. There is no
question that the holographic will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is
also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix
agree on the genuineness of the holographic will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said will. The objection interposed by
the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic will is fatally defective
because the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic will is not sufficient compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of
its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad
faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the
only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and de la Fuente, JJ., concur.
LABRADOR V COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-83843-44, 5 April 1990
184 SCRA 170
The required date which must be indicated in a holographic will is substantially complied
with if the date were incorporated as part of the body of the will.
Paras, J.:
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died
in the Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652,
and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina,
Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and
Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio
Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by
his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the
will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on
September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand
(P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring
and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a
matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been canceled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier,
however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold the said parcel of land to Navat for only Five
Thousand (P5,000) Pesos.
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and
Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land
which Sagrado alleged had (sic) already acquired by devise from their father Melecio
Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for
annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid
Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties have rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court
rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic
will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale. The court a quo had also
directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to the
petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption price for the property paid by
the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it
was paid to vendee a retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988
modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of
the will for being undated and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the
resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence this petition.
The alleged undated holographic will was written in Ilocano translated into English, is
quoted as follows:
English Interpretation of the Will of the Late Melecio Labrador
Written in Ilocano
By Atty. Fidencio L. Fernandez
I .
First Page
This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or
the partition in favor of Sagrado Labrador which is the fishpond located and known
place as Tagale.
And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or
less one hectare, and the boundary at the South is the property and assignment
share of Enrica Labrador, also their sister, and the boundary in the West is the sea,
known as the Sea as it is, and the boundary on the North is assignment belonging
to Cristobal Labrador, who likewise is also their brother. That because it is now the
time for me being now ninety three (93) years then I feel it is the right time for me to
partition the fishponds which were and had been bought or acquired by us, meaning
with their two mothers, hence there shall be no difference among themselves, those
among brothers and sisters, for it is I myself their father who am making the
apportionment and delivering to each and everyone of them the said portion and
assignment so that there shall not be any cause of troubles or differences among
the brothers and sisters.
I I .
Second Page
And this is the day in which we agree that we are making the partitioning and
assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the
month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of
mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other
than Melecio Labrador, their father.
Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should
be followed and complied with in order that any differences or troubles may be
forestalled and nothing will happen along these troubles among my children, and
that they will be in good relations among themselves, brothers and sisters.
And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all coconut
trees and all others like the other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog, it is their right
to get if they so need, in order that there shall be nothing that anyone of them shall
complain against the other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.
I I I .
Third Page
And that referring to the other places of property, where the said property is located,
the same being the fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of my children, there
shall be equal portion of each share among themselves, and or to be benefited with
all those property, which property we have been able to acquire.
That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (will) which I am here
hereof manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers,
I am signing my signature below hereof, and that this is what should be complied
with, by all the brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers - Juliana
Quintero Pilarisa and Casiana Aquino Villanueva. Your father who made this writing
(will), and he is Melecio Labrador y Ralutin.
The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the
date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article
810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic
will, viz:
And this day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning
the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of
March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is
the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
Melecio Labrador, their father.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will.
The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator. Those requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondent claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and
assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond," and was not the date of
execution of the holographic will; hence the will is more of an "agreement" between the
testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the
respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an
act whereby a person is permitted with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of execution of
the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of he paragraph. As aptly put by
petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who
plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the
declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed
reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be
disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the
disposition of his estate.
x
x
x
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is
hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and
ALLOWED probate. SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
GAN v YAP
No. L-12190, 30 August 1958
104 Phil 509
Article 811 prescribes the evidence required for the probate of a holographic will. Gan
stresses that if the holographic will sought to be probated is lost, or otherwise cannot be
presented in court, the same must be denied probate. This is so because the only
guarantee of authenticity (i.e., the handwriting of the testator) is not available for scrutiny. It
is equally important to take notice of footnote no. 8 of the decision, which is the basis of the
ruling in the subsequent case of Rodelas v Aranza.
Bengzon, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure x x x leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan instituted these proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased
x x x.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had
not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Honorable Ramon R. San
Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration
failed. Hence this appeal.
The will was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by
the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and
Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows.
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her first
cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She confided however that it would be
useless if her husband discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan,
nephew of Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter relied it
could be done without any witness, provided the document is entirely in her handwriting,
signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in transmitting the information, and
on the strength of it, in the morning of November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna
Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will substantially of the
tenor above transcribed in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra (daughter of
Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day, Felicidad was visited by a
distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read the will in the presence of
Felina Esguerra, who again read it.
Nine days later, he (sic) had other visitors: Socorro Olarte, a cousin, and Rosario Gan
Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the presence of Felina Esguerra,
who read it for the third time.
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital for her last
illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But
a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse; and being afraid
of him by reason of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the
same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the next day shortly
before the death of Felicidad. Again Felina handed it to him but not before she had taken
the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time.
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from heart
disease for several years before her death; that she had been treated by prominent
physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband and
wife journeyed to the United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the
disease; that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple returned
to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred, she suffered several attacks,
the most serious of which happened in the early morning of the first Monday of November
1951 (November 5). The whole household was surprised and alarmed, even the teachers
of the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and owned by the Yap spouses.
Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found
the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her husband. Injections and
oxygen were administered. Following the doctor's advise the patient stayed in bed, and did
nothing the whole day, her husband and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantigue, constantly
at her side. These two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and
c o u l d h a v e m a d e n o w i l l o n t h a t d a y .
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the most
important of which were these: (a) if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to
keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange that she
executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were
unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the decedent it
is hard to believe that the latter would allow the former to see and read the will several
times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario
Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its contents to
remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose being to
conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the hospital, in her
purse which could for one reason of another be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that
the husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was
there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without destroying the will, the theory of the
petitioner being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy
it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence
that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
x
x
x
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are
"entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as
its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be - or not to be - in the
hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil
Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be
required. In the absence of any such witnesses familiar with decedent's handwriting, and if
the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic will.
They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in
affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may present other witnesses
who also know the testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses who, after comparing
the will with other writings or letters of the deceased, have come to the conclusion that such
will has not been written by the hand of the deceased. And the court, in view of such
contradictory testimony, may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the
document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing
the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity - the testator's
handwriting - has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the
testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seem it and who declare that it was in the
handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in
the testator's handwriting? His witnesses who know the testator's handwriting have not
examined it. His experts cannot testify because there is no way to compare the alleged
testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the testator's hand. The
oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper millstone of his lack of knowledge of
the will or the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity. Again,
the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may have been shown a
fake document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof have taken no
pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the knowledge
that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could prove that they have not
"been shown" a document which they believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of
course, the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be
tested by exhibiting to them other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the
deceased; but what witness or lawyer would not foresee such a more and prepare for it?
His knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick
to his statement: he has seen and read a document which he believed was in the
deceased's handwriting. And the court and the oppositor would practically be at the mercy
of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also as to the contents of
the will. Does the law permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940, allow proof (and probate) of a lost or
destroyed will by secondary evidence - the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original
document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not
then be validly made here.
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic wills is
that it may be lost or stolen, an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless.
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to the
Judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by the
three witnesses who depose that they have no reasonably doubt that the will was written by
the testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been
proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of the will itself.
Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the surviving
spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may
make "any statement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of the will."
As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by
himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above
article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote
it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either
complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. Such
purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for their examination. If it be
argued that such choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the
answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct disadvantage, and they have the right and
privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right which they should not be denied by
withholding inspection thereof from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas - about exhibition of the document itself - in the decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization or probate to
a document containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but
apparently mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn from it. Even in the
face of allegations and testimonial evidence (which was controverted), ascribing the
mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance
with the provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
x
x
x
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in
accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature.
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the
holographic will to be fatal.
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
x
x
x
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of
authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing and
instrumental witnesses (and of the Notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the
loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are
available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the
notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their
whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the
testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of
the testator, they are not likely to lend themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his
wishes. Last but not the least, they cannot receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible, only one man
could engineer the whole fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the
handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible
witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it,
and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will
having been lost - the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" - the
oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not
at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and
only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the
most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature -
feasibility of forgery - would be added to the several objections of this kind of wills listed by
Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish commentators and
teachers of Civil Law.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely, the act of the testator of subscribing
the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in
court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at
hand.
Turning now to the evidence by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the trial judge's
disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the appealed decision, we
find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who had
received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into
amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband
Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will
from her husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was
not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged
execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic
will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities
and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by
Rule 76, sec. 6.
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with cost against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
RODELAS v ARANZA
No. L-58509, 7 December 1982
119 SCRA 16
Rodelas traces its antecedents to Gan v Yap, particularly in footnote no. 8 of the latter
decision. In an obiter incorporated through a footnote, the court noted in Gan that a lost
holographic will might be proved through a "photographic or photostatic copy" thereof, or
perhaps even through a "mimeographed or carbon copy". Accordingly, the court in Rodelas
reversed the order of the lower court dismissing the petition for probate (as well as the
motion for reconsideration) by reason of the proponent's inability to produce the original
copy of the alleged lost holographic will. It must be noted that Rodelas did not categorically
rule on the admissibility to probate of a secondary evidence of the missing holographic will.
It must be noted further that the dispositive portion of the decision ended at the point where
the denial of the motion for reconsideration was set aside. It would seem that the logical
result of such "setting aside" of the order would be the remanding of the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with the aforesaid decision.
One final note: the court observed that with a photocopy of the lost or missing holographic
will, the handwriting of the testator can be authenticated. This observation must be tested in
the light of established principles governing the authentication of questioned documents, for
it is sufficiently clear that an analysis of the handwriting of the testator based on a
photocopy of the lost or missing holographic will cannot go beyond a comparison of strokes
with an accepted standard. Circumstances such as speed of writing and the pressure of the
handwriting cannot be tested based on a photocopy of the questioned document.
What added value did Rodelas give to existing jurisprudence on the matter?
Relova, J.:
x
x
x
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can
be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code,
probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution
has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If
contested, at least three identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will
has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will. But a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic
will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator. In the case of Gan v Yap, 104 Phil 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise
it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court." Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then, the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's
motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979
dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
AZAOLA v SINGSON
No. L-14003, 5 August 1960
109 Phil 102
The case involves an interpretation of the three-witness rule required under the first
paragraph of Article 811. The ruling distinguishes between the execution of a notarial will on
the one hand, and the execution of a holographic will on the other. Based on the difference
in the formalities required, the court inferred that the first paragraph of Article 811 is merely
directory, and that to give it a mandatory tenor may result in legal absurdities.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the
determination of the quantity of evidence for the probate of a holographic will.
x
x
x
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and
his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will,
and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th of August and not on
November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature
are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone
witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one
witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811
does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse
party.
x
x
x
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was
not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil
Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since
no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being
required by law (Article 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses;
they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who
can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be
unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811
may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph
of Article 811 prescribes that -
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph,
and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
x
x
x
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the
will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for
ordinary testaments. But it cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered
mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at
least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their
validity. Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule requiring
production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to
be avoided.
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the
court deem it necessary," which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court
should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact
it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.
x
x
x
And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no
unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and
unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is
merely directory and is not mandatory.
Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called
upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in
our opinion, by giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence,
including expert witnesses, should the court deem them necessary.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered
remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to hold new trial in conformity with this
opinion. But evidence already on record shall not be retaken. No costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David,
JJ., concur.
CODOY v CALUGAY
G.R. No. 123486, 12 August 1999
312 SCRA 333
Codoy is an unusual case with an unusual decision. The bone of contention between the
parties was whether or not the oppositors to the probate of a will may yet present evidence
against the admission of the will, after they have unsuccessfully made a demurrer to
evidence. In short, the core issue is whether the oppositors should be allowed to present
controverting evidence after the demurrer was denied. As correctly ruled by the Supreme
Court, the oppositors should be permitted to present their evidence.
However, Codoy is a controversial decision as it held that the 3-witness rule in Article 811 of
the Civil Code is a mandatory requirement in the case of contested holographic wills.
Hence non-compliance therewith would be a fatal error. Azaola vs. Singson, a decision
penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that the requirement in Article 811 is merely directory.
Justice Reyes explained in detail the reason for such conclusion. Now, with Codoy reaching
a different conclusion, there is now a divisional ruling that is diametrically opposed with a
prior en banc ruling.
But was it absolutely necessary for Codoy to disturb Azaola? I do not think so. Codoy could
have been decided purely on the procedural issue that was raised. To support the
conclusion reached by the Court, it would have been sufficient to discuss the deficient
evidentiary basis for the admission of the holographic will to probate. It was totally
unnecessary to rule that compliance with the 3-witness requirement in Article 811 is
mandatory.
Pardo, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of applicant Evangeline Calugay and witness
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been
established and the handwriting and signature therein x x x are hers, enough to
probate said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the
holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed
presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on
demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has
shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf x x
x. Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered
allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seno vda. de
Ramonal.
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Sena vda. de Ramonal, filed
with the Regional Trial Court x x x a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Sena vda. de Ramonal, was
of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there
was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and the
will was written voluntarily.
The assessed valid of the decedents property, including all real and personal property was
about P400,000.00 at the time of her death.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to
the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. This gives an impression that a third hand of an interested party other than
the true hand of Matilde Sena vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed this will, and
was not forced, the dates and the signatures should appear at the bottom after the
dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the
holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners
instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming that
respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Sena vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence
having been well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the
document x x x on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seno vda. de
Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit.
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, and in support of their
appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita
Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of
their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special
proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced
and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the signature of the
deceased, Matilde Seno vda. de Ramonal. For the purpose of laying the basis for
comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produce and
identify the voters affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters affidavit was not produced
for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seno vda. de Ramonal was
her aunt, and that after the death of Matildes husband, the latter lived with her in her
parents home for eleven (11) years, from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of
close association with the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seno vda. de Ramonal) in
collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and the deceased
always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the
deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the
deceased to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde vda. de
Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and
entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the
dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro,
he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the
deceased in connection with the intestate proceedings of her late husband, as a result of
which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased Matilde Sena vda. de
Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the
application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the
deceased, since the deceased signed documents in her presence, when the latter was
applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the
deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time
she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Sena vda. de
Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:
Instruction
August 30, 1978
My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
(Sgd.) Matilde vda. de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikitan Street.
(Sgd.) Matilde vda. de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
My jewelry shall be divided among:
1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
(Sgd.) Matilde vda. de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R.
Calugay.
(Sgd.) Matilde vda. de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 square meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of
Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen musty continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no
longer around.
(Sgd.) Matilde vda. de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
6. Bury me where by husband Justo is ever buried.
(Sgd.) Matilde vda. de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
Gene and Manuel:
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully,
Mama
Matilde vda. de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision ruling that the appeal was
meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil 102, penned by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:
x x x even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we
are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate
denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of the
holographic will, none being required by law x x x, it becomes obvious that
the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualification is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding
and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not express) that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness
may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of
paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is
evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article 811 prescribes
that
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to.
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides
for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was
derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments x x x. But it can
not be ignore that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in
case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least
three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to
their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present (Art. 810), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Art, 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the
words if the court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law
deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the wills
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the
court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider
it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the
court may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of
the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as
much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate
denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the holographic will.
And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely
permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of
the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry,
for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of
the testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial
court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be
drawn from a partys failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the
court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the law witnesses.
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and
other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and
signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will
and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
Hence this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil 102, relied upon by
the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been
able to present credible evidence to prove that the date, text, and signature on the
holographic will were written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures on the
holographic will of Matilde Sena vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a
contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature
in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a
statute commonly connotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that
aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who
for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
So we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the
true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is
imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly
that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk
of court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of
Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly
that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to
identify the signature of the deceased in the voters affidavit, which was not even produced
as it was no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand testified that
x
x
x
What Mrs. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she
either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
Further, during the cross examination, the counsel for petitioner elicited the fact that the will
was not found in the personal belongings to the deceased but was in the possession of
Mrs. Binanay.
x
x
x
In her testimony it was also evident that Mrs. Binanay kept the fact about the will from
petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such action put in issue her
motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of
Matilde Seno vda. de Ramonal.
x
x
x
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testator. She testified that x x x.
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the
handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never
declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that x x x.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate
and disregarded the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will,
citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling that the requirement is merely directory and
not mandatory.
In the case of Ajero v Court of Appeals, we said that the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will
of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three
witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Mrs.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years
before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only
chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Mrs. Binanay when the lawyer
of petitioners asked Mrs. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature
of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even
the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature
in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the will convinces us that the strokes are different when compared
with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the
dispositions is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures
in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30,
1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are
continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing, unlike that
of the holographic will. We therefore cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in
support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde
Sena vda. de Ramonal.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
RIVERA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-75005-06, 15 February 1990
182 SCRA 322
Under Article 811 of the Civil Code, if the authenticity of the holographic will is contested,
three witnesses are required to identify the handwriting and signature of the testator. Failing
which, or if the court is not convinced, expert testimony may be resorted to. Rivera presents
a critical twist to the provision of law. Oppositor challenged the authenticity of the
holographic will and claimed that in fact the decedent died intestate. This would have
necessitated the application of the three-witness rule, where it not for the supervening
finding of the court that the oppositor is not related to and in fact a stranger with respect to
the decedent. Consequently, and despite his opposition, the three-witness rule is not
applicable.
Cruz, J.:
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera
died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the
deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's
estate. Docketed as S.P. No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who
denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his
father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as S.P. No. 1091,
this petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of
Venancio's intestate estate.
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later
appointed special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose
Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married
to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria
Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to
this estate because the decedent was not his father. The holographic wills were also
admitted to probate.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court. Its decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the
respondent court.
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
x
x
x
We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that
Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married
Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had
no relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more
prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious identity of named of the head of each,
there is no evidence linking the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera
was the head of both.
Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found
them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held that there was no necessity of presenting the three
witnesses of the wills required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had
not been questioned.
The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned
by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in S.P. No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died
intestate; and in S.P. No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented
by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic
wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it
may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code
providing as follows:
x
x
x
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the
son of the deceased Venancio Rivera, whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere
stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have
the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio
Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father
was sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
KALAW v RELOVA
No. L-40207, 28 September 1984
132 SCRA 237
Article 814 requires the authentication of any alteration in a holographic will. The failure to
authenticate such alterations results in the invalidity of the desired change. However,
where the testator canceled the name of the original heir, and substituted in lieu thereof
another name, without the requisite authentication, the institution of the new heir is
inoperative by reason of a failure to comply with the requirement of Article 814. Should the
nullity of the alteration result in the effectivity of the original disposition? The court in Kalaw
ruled in the negative, stating among other things, that the intention of the testatrix has
become indeterminable. Nevertheless, an examination of the provision of Article 830
indicates clearly that "cancellation" is a mode of revocation. Can the institution of the
original heir, therefore, be construed as having been expressly revoked by the cancellation
of her name by the testatrix? If so, and considering that the subsequent institution of the
second heir is inoperative, who inherits the estate of the deceased?
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent Gregorio K. Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir
of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic will executed on
December 24, 1968.
x
x
x
The holographic will, as first written, named Rosa K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix, as her
sole heir. Hence on November 10, 1971, petitioner Rosa K. Kalaw opposed probate
alleging, in substance, that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections and
insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required
by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
Rosa's position was that the holographic will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order dated September 13, 1973,
reading in part:
The document, Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation
for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the
insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same person.
Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw.
The only question is whether the will, Exhibit "C", should be admitted to probate
although the alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were not
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Article 814 of the Civil
Code. The petitioner contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert the
provision of Article 814 on the ground that they themselves agreed through their
counsel to submit the document to the NBI for examination. This is untenable. The
parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be
in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provisions of Article 814 of the Civil Code is
applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertion, alterations and/or additions in
Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K.
Kalaw, the court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
From that order, Gregorio moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/
or insertions were made by the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic will would
be contrary to her right to testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an
Order dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being
clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity of interpretation."
From that order dated September 3, 1973 denying probate, and the order dated November
2, 1973 denying reconsideration, Rosa filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari on the
sole legal question of whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations
and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature
of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator
in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, x x x the will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected
or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omision de la
salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de abril de 1895."
However, when as in this case, the holographic will is dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite full authentication by the full signature of the testator,
the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing
remains in the will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written
should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But the
change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the
manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations,
erasures or alterations in a holographic will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered
words themselves but not the essence and validity of the will itself. As it is, with the
erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention
cannot be determined with certitude. x x x.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of the Respondent
Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No cost.
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., and de la Fuente, JJ., concur. Teehankee (Chairman), J., concurs in a
separate opinion. Relova, J., took no part.
AJERO V COURT OF APPEALSPRIVATE
No. 106720, 15 September 1994
236 SCRA 488
Ajero upholds the proposition that Articles 813 and 814 do not form part of the requisites for
formal or extrinsic validity of a holographic will. Thus, a failure on the part of the testator to
observe the requirements of Articles 813 and 814 does not justify the disallowance of the
will. However, the relevant provisions may be disallowed. The court further stresses that
proof of compliance with the requirements of Articles 813 and 814 cannot ordinarily be dealt
with during probate proper, because at this stage, the court's area of inquiry should, in
general, be limited to the following issues: (1) whether the instrument submitted is indeed,
the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had testamentary capacity at
the time the will was executed; and (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing
were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
Puno, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
22840, dated March 30, 11992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial
court is hereby reversed and set aside, and the petition for probate is hereby
dismissed. No costs.
The earlier decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, branch 94, in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand, who died on November 2, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar
Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 11983, petitioners instituted Sp. proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound
and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every
respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body
nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to
probate. x x x
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and
814 of the New Civil Code, which reads as follows:
Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date
validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814. In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic
will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or
signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provided that wills shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
( a )
if not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) if the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time
of its execution;
(c) if it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
(d) if it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) if the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend
that the instrument should be his will, at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
( 1 )
if the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
( 2 )
if the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will,
at the time of its execution;
( 3 )
if it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
( 4 )
if it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other persons;
( 5 )
if the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
( 6 )
if the testator acted by mistake or did not intent that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition
to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will
was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and
814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of
said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of
the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as
provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity
of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova, 1132 SCRA
237, 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, x x x the
will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erase, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when
he said la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the
will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which
the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the
form and with the requisites required in Article 688.
Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to
the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him,
and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution. If it
should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify
them over his signature. Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own
language.
This separation and distinction add support to the interpretation that only the requirements
of Articles 810 of the New Civil Code - and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the
same Code - are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the
house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and
must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instance, courts are not
powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions
of the will. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will
that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led
oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as
correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which
she shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is reversed and set aside, except with
respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan
del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of
decedent Annie Sand, is hereby reinstated, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
VDA. DE PEREZ v TOLETE
G.R. No. 76714, 2 June 1994
232 SCRA 722
This case outlines the procedure for the reprobate of a will that was executed and probated
in accordance with foreign law.
Quiason, J.:
x
x
x
Petitioners add that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29,
1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effects in the Philippines if
made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated
outside the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with
the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court; and (5) the laws of the foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills. x x x Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all of the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them x x.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the questioned order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence for the joint probate of the wills
of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., (Chairman), on leave.
DE LA CERNA v REBACA-POTOT
No. L-20234, 23 December 1964
12 SCRA 576
Article 818 of the Code prohibits the execution of joint wills, whether they be for the
reciprocal benefit of the testators, or for the benefit of a third person. However, it must be
noted that if a probate court erroneously admitted a joint will to probate, the error thus
committed would be considered an error of law and not of jurisdiction. Therefore, such an
error must be corrected by appeal; failing which the erroneous decision would become
final.
The foregoing notwithstanding, please note that in the following case, the joint will, while
deemed operative with respect to the husband, was considered void as to the wife. The
issue of jurisdiction should be noted in particular.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals:
It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia
Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they
willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all
the improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we
have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union,
Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot," and that "while each of the
testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands
aforementioned," the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and
Tax No. 4677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon,
province of Cebu. Bernabe de la Cerna died on August 30, 1939, and the
aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due publication as required by law and
there being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939,
in Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el documento Exhibit A como
el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Cerna con derecho por
parte de su viuda superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora el propio tiempo
segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los frutos de los terranos descritos en dicho
documento; x x x. Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952,
another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned
was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the
same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R.
Potot, and her attorney, Manuel Potot, to appear for the hearing of said petition, the
case was dismissed on March 30, 1954. x x x.
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and
void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code; but on
appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the
decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on
the due execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
x
x
x
It is true the law (Art. 66, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code) prohibits the
making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of third persons. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned
by use, and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in the present case,
one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of
a court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give
effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case
of Macrohon v Saavedra, 51 Phil 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to
the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying, "assuming that the joint
will in question is valid.
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate entered in 1939 by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has
conclusive effect as to his last will and testament, despite the fact that even then the Civil
Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party. The error thus committed by the probate court was
an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however,
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for probate of a will is binding upon the
whole world (Manalo v Paredes, 47 Phil 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil 156); and
public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of
courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis
set litium. (Dy Cay v Crossfield, 38 Phil 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 322.)
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the
1939 decree admitting the will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be
validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with
the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On
this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account, also, to avoid future
misunderstanding, that the probate decree of 1939 could only affect the share of the
deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of
the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal
properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not
then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be
probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, insofar as the estate of the wife was concerned,
must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered
a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the
deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively
discussed in our opinion in Bilbao v Bilbao, 87 Phil 144, that explained the previous holding
in Macrohon v Saavedra, 51 Phil 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rabaca should pass upon her death to her
heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heirs, unless some other valid will in
her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
x
x
x
WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATIONS, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
GONZALES v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-37453, 25 May 1979
90 SCRA 187
Article 805 requires the notarial will to be attested by at least three credible witnesses.
Article 820 prescribes the qualifications of a witness, while Article 821 enumerates the
disqualifications. Thus, an issue arises as to whether or not a witness competent under
Articles 820 and 821 is necessarily credible as required by Article 805. Gonzales makes a
distinction between a competent witness and a credible witness. Furthermore, Gonzales
stresses that competence may be proved or inferred; whereas, credibility, which is a matter
to be determined by the court, is presumed unless evidence to the contrary is presented.
Guerrero, J.:
x
x
x
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel
Gabriel and designating therein petitioner the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and
without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal, her place of residence, on
June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not
controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina
Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her
husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latter's residence prior to and up to
the time of her death.
x
x
x
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of
Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to
be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified
amounts be given to her sister, Praxedes Gabriel vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago
Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner),
Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangelina, Rudyardo, Rosa, Andrea,
Marcial, Numancia, Verena, all surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda
Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na
aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na tulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as
universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal,
already acquired, or to be acquired, in her (testatrix's) name, after satisfying the expenses,
debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the
document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative;
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and
in the second alternative;
4. that the purported will was procured through undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of
some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the
court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:
1 .
That there is no iota of evidence to support the contention that the
purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other
person for her benefit;
2 .
That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time
of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased lacked
testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3 .
That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that
the purported will of the deceased was not executed and attested as
required by law;
4 .
That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for
probate, Exhibit "F", is not the purported will allegedly dictated by the
deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting
witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last will and
testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel, is hereby disallowed.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court,
hence the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was
executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that
the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15,
1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and
of each other as required by law, hence allowed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
and such motion was opposed by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter,
parties submitted their respective Memoranda, and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court,
former Special First Division, by Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration stating
that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that
the supposed last will and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in
accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions, that the
testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did
not sign the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges
on the appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and
documentary evidence of record. There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in
the decision of this Court sought to be set aside.
x
x
x
The petitioner, in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I .
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document,
Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by law when there is
absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible
witnesses.
x
x
x
Petitioner in her first assignment of error, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by
law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible
witnesses. She argues that the requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses
must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged
last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there
must be evidence on record that the witness has good standing in his community, or that he
is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner,
unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be
favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with
"competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code
and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further argued that
the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well-
known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation
with the Civil Code provision on wills with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code
provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth
the disqualifications from being a witness to a will. These articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more and
not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code.
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
( 1 )
Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
( 2 )
Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any
time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony
may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications
enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of
his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to
him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony, or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that
he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it
must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community,
his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because
such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the
opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the
Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where
the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character
witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a
petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines,
they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law
x x x.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they
merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said
execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited
by the petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not
applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses,
namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is
satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals,
which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner
has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been
shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or
cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the new Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic
will, must be x x x attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another. While the petitioner submits that Article 820
and 821 of the new Civil Code speaks of the competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second
Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses,
petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being
competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and
821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not
synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She
exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses
are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since
one was a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper.
It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya,
merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the
testatrix. But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble social or
financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness.
(Molo-Pekson and Perez-Nable v Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil 344; Testate Estate of
Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18, 1941, p. 788.)
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses
mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same
Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be a witness to
the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the
word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means "competent."
Thus in the case of Suntay v Suntay, 95 Phil 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting
that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked
before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost will may be clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. "Credible witnesses" mean competent
witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay.
In Molo-Pekson and Perez-Nable v Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil 344, the Supreme Court held
that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound
mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb, able to read
and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will." This same provision is reproduced in
our new Civil Code of 1950, under Article 820. The relation of employer and employee, or
being a relative of the beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will.
The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age,
mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to
say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this
point, a few of which we may cite:
A "credible witness" is one who is not disqualified to testify by mental incapacity,
crime or other cause. Historical Soc. of Dauphin County v Kelker, 74 A. 619, 226
{a. 16, 134 Am. St., Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a "credible witness" to a will means a
"competent witness." Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A,
837. (Ibid., p. 341).
Expression "credible witness" in relation to attestation of wills means "competent
witness;" that is, one competent under the law to testify to facts of execution of will.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 8283. Moos v First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex. Civ. App.
60 S.W. 2d 888, 889. (Ibid., p. 342).
The term "credible" used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested
by two credible witnesses means competent witnesses who, at the time of attesting
the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by
subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the
execution of the will and not of the time it is offered for probate. Smith v Goodell,
101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 Ill. 145. (Ibid.).
"Credible witnesses," as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent
witnesses - that is, such persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in
courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of
crimes, or other causes excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them
incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill
v Chicago Title & Trust Co., 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 Ill 42. (Ibid. p. 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is
determined by the statute, that is Articles 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility
depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of
the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court
held and ruled: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible
witness, so credible that the court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a
person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may
thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."
In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be
shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of
belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on
record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest
and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such
unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses
must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the
probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was
fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the
witnesses were "credible witnesses," that is, that they have a good standing in the
community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, de Castro and Herrera, JJ., concur.
GAGO v MAMUYAC
No. 26317, 29 January 1927
49 Phil 902

A will being essentially ambulatory, it may be revoked at any time by the testator at any time
prior to his death. Article 830 enumerates the modes of revocation. Gago holds that a
revocation of the will may be implied if the testator in his lifetime had ready access to the
same, and that after his death the will cannot be found. The presumption, while disputable,
may be reinforced by testimony regarding the circumstances of the alleged revocation of
the will. And if the presumption of revocation should apply, a duplicate copy of the said will
cannot be admitted to probate.
Please note that in Gan v Yap, the Court had the occasion to opine that a lost holographic
will might be proved through a photographic, photostatic, mimeographed or carbon copy
thereof. And in Rodelas v Aranza, the court reversed an order of the probate court which
dismissed the proceeding based solely on the fact that the original copy of the holographic
will could not be presented for examination.
Johnson, J.:
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel
Mamuyac, who died on the 2nd day of January 1922, in the Municipality of Agoo of the
Province of La Union. It appears from the records that on or about the 27th day of July
1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit "A"). In the
month of January 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the
same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause no. 1144, Province of La Union). After hearing all of the
parties, the petition for probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on
the 2d day of November 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of
April 1919, executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to
secure the probation of the said will of the 16th day of April 1919 (Exhibit 1). To said petition
Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon and Catalina Mamuyac presented
their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament
executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been canceled and revoked
during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac, and (c) that the said will was not the last will and
testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing
the respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground
that the same had been canceled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge Teodoro, after
examining the evidence adduced, found that the following facts had been satisfactorily
proved:
That Exhibit "A" is a mere carbon copy of its original which remained in the
possession of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his
death as per testimony of witnesses Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator
on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920, the original
of Exhibit "A" (will of 1919) actually canceled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who
assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land
where the house was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919), executing thereby
a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the testimony of Jose
Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased (Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919
was found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have
successfully established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920
another will. The same Narcisa Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living in
the house with him, when crossed-examined by attorney for the opponents,
testified that the original of Exhibit "A" could not be found. For the foregoing
consideration and for the reason that the original of Exhibit "A" has been canceled
by the deceased father Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of Exhibit
"A" for the applicant.
From that order the petitioner appealed.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the
evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by law;
that the same had been revoked and canceled in 1920 before his death; that the said will
was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that the will in question had been canceled
in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to
be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation
of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain
unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot
be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of
the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent
evidence, that the same was canceled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it
is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the
will was not destroyed by the testator with the intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been
canceled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in
accordance with the weight of evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will, the burden of
proof is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence.
Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show
that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the
purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all
evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by
the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will
was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and
requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to
appear that the original has been lost and was not canceled or destroyed by the testator.
(Borromeo v Casquijo, G.R. No. 26063)
After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will
presented for probate had been canceled by the testator in 1920. Therefore, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
TESTATE ESTATE OF ADRIANA MALOTO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-76464, 29 February 1988
158 SCRA 451
The burning of a will is one of the modes of revocation. Under Article 830, the act of
destroying the document must be done by the testator himself, and if done by a third
person, it must be executed pursuant to the testator's express direction and in his
presence. Maloto reversed the Court of Appeals which upheld the revocation of the will on
the basis of sufficient proof of animus recovandi on the part of the testator. While there are
various requisites for the validity of a revocation by means of an overt act (which requisites
were not discussed in Maloto), this case holds that if a third person executed the overt act
of destroying the will, the same must be upon the express direction of the testator and in his
presence. Both requisites must be duly proved, otherwise evidence intended to establish
the due execution and the contents of the destroyed will might be admissible. If the due
execution and the contents of the destroyed will is sufficiently established, the will may be
admitted to probate as a will which had been invalidly revoked.
Sarmiento, J.:
This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two other cases
directly related to the present one and involving the same parties had already been decided
by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, which was a petition for certiorari and mandamus
instituted by the petitioners herein, we dismissed the petition ruling that the more
appropriate remedy of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in
question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners commenced in the then Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding No. 2176, for the probate of the disputed will, which
was opposed by the private respondents presently, Panfilo and Felino, both surnamed
Maloto. The trial court dismissed the petition on April 30, 1970. Complaining against the
dismissal, again, the petitioners came to this Court on a petition for review by certiorari.
Acting on the said petition, we set aside the trial court's order and directed it to proceed to
hear the case on the merits. The trial court, after hearing, found the will to have already
been revoked by the testatrix, Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The petitioners
appealed the trial court's decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on June 7,
1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision
proved to be of no avail, hence, this petition.
For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a great help.
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio Maloto, and the private respondents
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last
will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the
parties - Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo and Felino - executed an agreement of extra judicial
settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into
four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extra judicial
settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.
That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but unfortunately, it had not.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of
Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled
"KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBULUT-AN (Testamento)", dated January 3, 1940, and purporting
to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the
testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet
drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the office of the
Clerk of Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and
Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue
of the agreement of extra judicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives
devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees
named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. When the trial court
denied their motion, the petitioners came to us by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court. As we stated earlier, we dismissed that
petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be
the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners.
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not
the document or papers allegedly burned by the house help of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto
vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and
found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence of
animus revocandi in the destruction if the will, had nevertheless, been sufficiently proven.
The appellate court based its findings on the facts that the document was not in the two
safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to
retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and her seeking the services of Atty.
Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we do not
view such facts, even considered collectively, as sufficient bases for the conclusion that
Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively revoked.
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution of
the will. The heart of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by
Adriana.
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, canceling or obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction. If burned, torn, canceled or obliterated by some
other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents
and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per
se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that
is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of
the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The
intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating or canceling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance
with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express
direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses,
Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the
place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers
proffered as the will were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the respondents as
oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who testified
in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in
the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and
Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocally positive that the document burned was
indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the
will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained
his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus
his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest that a
purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution
of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations x x x."
x
x
x
One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be inferred from the
fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had been
disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the properties remained at the time of death (of
the testatrix); and, furthermore, more valuable properties have been acquired after the
execution of the will on January 3, 1940. Suffice it to state here that as these additional
matters raised by the private respondents are extraneous to this special proceeding, they
could only be appropriately taken up after the will has been duly probated and a certificate
of its allowance issued.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the respondent
Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will
and testament. Costs against the private respondents.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., no part in the
deliberation.
RODRIGUEZ v RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 175720, 11 September 2007
642 SCRA 642
Rodriguez emphasizes the need for probate of a will, as mandated in Article 838 of the Civil
Code. Without probate, the will is ineffective and does not produce legal effect. In this
case, the Supreme Court recognized the testators right, during his lifetime, to sell the
property which he had previously adjudicated to his heirs in his will. In this regard, the
provision of Article 957 of the Civil Code is worth considering: The legacy or devise shall
be without effect: x x x (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or
devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. x x x. Article
957 is one of the 7 provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code which pertains to
implied revocation of a testamentary disposition.
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street, Guadalupe
Nuevo, Makati City, and covered by TCT No. 144865. On October 27, 1983, Juanito
executed a Huling Habilin at Testamento giving petitioner Crecenciana Tubo Rodriguez,
his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the deceased
husband of respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura
Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C.
However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in
favor of petitioner. Thus, TCT No. 144865 was cancelled and a new TCT No. 150431 was
issued in the name of the petitioner.
The case arose when petitioner filed on September 20, 2001 a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the respondents alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the
property; and that in 1984, she allowed respondents Evangeline, Buenaventura and Belen,
out of kindness and tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively.
However, without her knowledge and consent, respondents separately leased the units to
Montano Magpantay, Mel Navarro and Socorro Escota, who despite repeated demands,
failed and refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals thereof.
In their answer, respondents claimed ownership over the subject property by succession.
They alleged that while petitioner is the registered owner of the property, however, she is
not the lawful owner thereof because the June 14, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale was
simulated and void. x x x respondent maintain that petitioner exerted undue
influence over their father, who at the time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the
property for only Php20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in
the Huling Habilin at Testamento. Further, she had no cause of action against them for
being a party to the August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement wherein they recognized each
other as co-owners and partitioned the property in accordance with the provision of the last
will and testament.
x x x the MTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondents and held that the deed
of sale was simulated otherwise petitioner would not have entered into the Partition
Agreement, which legally conferred upone each heir exclusive ownership over their
respective shares x x x.
On appeal the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that petitioners certificate of
title is conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein; and that unless and
until said title has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, such title is existing
and valid. This is true also with respect to the deed of sale. The present action which
involves only the issue of physical or material possession, is not the proper action to
challenge it. Further, the MTC erred when it relied heavily on the Huling Habilin at
Testamento which was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed
therein. The Partition Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the Huling
Habilin at Testamento should not also be considered.
x
x
x
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It
held that the MTC correctly received evidence on ownership since the question of
possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Further, the
Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments not only to
the respondents but also to the petitioner; and pursuant thereto, the parties executed the
Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes of the testator.
x
x
x
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, petitioner filed the present
petition for review raising the following errors: x x x
Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys
the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an
ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court may
look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to determine the nature
of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue
would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not proper in the summary action for
unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Huling
Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments disregarding the
fact that the same is not probated yet and that the testator changed or revoked his will by
selling the property to petitioner prior to his death.
x x x
The petition has merit.
The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at their
respective decisions, albeit the RTC decision contradicts that of the MTC and Court of
Appeals: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito Rodriguez on October 27,
1983; 2) Deed of Sale of the property executed by Juanito Rodriguez and the petitioner on
June 14, 1984; 3) TCT No. 150431 in the name of petitioner; and 4) the August 23, 1998
Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents and the petitioner.
Based on the following documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance
of evidence in favor of the petitioners claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of
possession, as the Huling Habili at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal
effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must
be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of
the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. As the will was not probated,
the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect.
Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the
determination of the issue of possession.
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed inn favor of the petitioner,
Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his
heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue
that can be resolved only in Civil Case No. 02-1641, an action instituted by the respondent
for that purpose.
We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title over the property to
consider. We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land described therein; the validity of which shall not be subject to a
collateral attack, especially in an ejectment case which is summary in nature.
x x x
x x x Our ruling that petitioner has the better right of possession was arrived at
on the basis of evidence without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case,
where the issue as to who has title to the property in question is fully threshed out. x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91142 dated June 27, 2006 is reversed and set aside. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 0-3-517, reversing the
Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati, Branch 63 in Civil Case No.
75717 is reinstated.
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazareno, Nachura and Reyes, JJ, concur.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM v UMENGAN
G.R. No. 168156, 6 December 2006
510 SCRA 496
Lasam emphasizes the necessity of probate. Without which, a purported will cannot
be the source of any right and could not be relied upon to establish the right to possession.
Lasam further confirms the ambulatory nature of a will, such that at any time prior to
his death, the testator may change or revoke it.
Callejo Sr., J.:
x x x
The lot subject of the unlawful detainer case is situated in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan. It is the eastern half portion of Lot No. 5427 and Lot No. 990. The first lot, Lot No.
5427 containing an area of 1,037 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 196. The second lot, Lot No. 990 containing an area of 118 sq. m., is covered by
OCT No. 1032. These lots are registered in the names of the original owners, spouses
Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan.
In an instrument denominated as Deed of Confirmation and acknowledged before a
notary public on June 14, 1979, the heirs of the said spouses conveyed the ownership of
Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 in favor of their two children, Irene Cuntapay and Isabel Cuntapay.
In another instrument entitled Partition Agreement and acknowledged before a notary pubic
on December 28, 1979, it was agreed that the eastern half portion (subject lot) of Lots Nos.
990 and 5427 shall belong to the heirs of Isabel Cuntapay. On the other hand, the
remaining portion thereof (the west portion) shall belong to the heirs of Irene Cuntapay. The
subject lot (eastern half portion) has an area of 554 sq. m.
Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan
Original Owners of the Property
Lot Nos. 5427 and 990
West Side: 679 square meters
Heirs of Irene Cuntapay
East Side: 554 square meters
Heirs of Isabel Cuntapay
1
st
marriage to Domingo Turingan:
1. Abdon
2. Sado (deceased)
3. Rufo
4. Maria
2
nd
marriage to Mariano Lasam:
1. Trinidad
2. Rosendo
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan, namely:
Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo, and Maria. When Domingo Turingan passed away, Isabel
Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other children by him, namely: Trinidad
and Rosendo.
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel by her
second husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detaining against Vicenta
Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot. Vicenta Umengan is the daughter of
Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband).
In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the owners of
the subject lot, having inherited it from their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole
heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel Cuntapay. During his lifetime,
Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject lot
sometime in 1955. The latter and her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate
the subject lot upon demand. However, despite written notice and demand by the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot
and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam were
constrained to institute the action for ejectment.
In her Answer with counterclaim, Vicenta Umengan specifically denied the material
allegations in the complaint. She countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed away, the
subject lot was inherited by her six children by her first and second marriages through
intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly had a pro indiviso share of 1/6 of
the subject lot.
It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan,
purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject lots of his siblings Maria and Sado.
These conveyances were allegedly evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated March 3, 1975
appearing as Doc. No. 88, Page 36. Book No. XIV, series of 1975 of the notarial book of
Atty. Pedro Lagui.
Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan
and her husband as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1961, appearing as
Doc. No. 539, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book of Atty. Pedro
Lagui. Also on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to her
daughter Vicenta Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of Donation appearing as Doc. No.
538, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book of the same notary
public.
1
According to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her second
husband (Rosendo and Trinidad Lasam) own only 2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus
prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam
be ordered to pay her damages.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed
the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the newly
discovered last will and testament (entitled Testamento Abierto) purportedly executed by
Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son Rosendo Lasam, thus:
x x x my share 1/5 (one fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on the
North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South, by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P.
Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the property which is my
share stands a house of light materials where I presently reside; this 1/5
th
(one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and
also the aforementioned house of light materials x x x.
The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over
the subject lot on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan
hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances. Citing jurisprudence and
Article 1080 of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that intestacy
should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should prevail. It observed that the last will
and testament of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as required by law; nonetheless,
the institution of a probate proceeding was not barred by prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel Cuntapay to
Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan
no longer had any share thereon. Consequently, they could not convey to Vicenta
Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to possession of
the subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam as it found that
Vicenta Umengans possession thereof was by mere tolerance. x x x.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The RTC echoed
the reasoning of the MTCC that the testamentary disposition of the property of Isabel
Cuntapay should be respected, and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a better right to
possess the subject lot.
x x x
In the assailed Decision dated February 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC. The appellate court preliminarily upheld the jurisdiction of the
MTCC over the subject matter as it found that the allegations in the complaint made out a
case for unlawful detainer. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam x x x only sought for Vicenta
Umengan to vacate and surrender possession of the subject lot. The CA also rejected the
contention of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam that the issue of ownership of the subject lot had
already been settled in another case, Civil Case No. 4917, before RTC (Branch 3) of
Tuguegarao City. x x x.
However, the CA declared that the RTC, as well as the MTCC erred in ruling that,
by virtue of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cutapay, the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam have a better right to the subject lot over Vicenta Umengan. The CA explained that
the said last will and testament did not comply with the formal requirements of the law on
wills.
Specifically, the CA found that the pages of the purported last will and testament
were not numbered in accordance with law. Neither did it contain the requisite attestation
clause. Isabel Cuntapay as testator and the witnesses to the will did not affix their
respective signatures on the second page thereof. The said instrument was likewise not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The CA even
raised doubts as to its authenticity, noting that while Isabel Cuntapay died in 1947 and the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam claimed that they discovered the same only in 1997, a date May
19, 1956, appeared on the last page of the purported will. The CA opined that if this was the
date of execution, then the will was obviously spurious. On the other hand, if this was the
date of its discovery, then the CA expressed bafflement as to why the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam, through their mother, declared in the Partition Agreement dated December 28,
1979 that Isabel Cuntapay died intestate.
It was observed by the CA that as against these infirmities in the claim of the heirs
of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan presented a Deed of Sale and a Deed of Donation
to justify her possession of the subject lot. The CA noted that she has also possessed the
subject property since 1955. Such prior possession, the CA held, gave Vicenta Umengan
has the right to remain in the subject property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects her. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam do not have such a better right. The CA stressed
that the ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect the title to the subject lot
nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of
ownership. The parties are not precluded from filing the appropriate action to directly
contest the ownership of or the title to the subject lot.
x x x
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam (petitioners) now come to the Court alleging that the
CA committed reversible error in setting aside the decision of the RTC, which had affirmed
that of the MTCC, and dismissing their complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent
Vicenta Umengan.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it held, on one hand, that the MTCC had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint as the allegations therein make out a
case for unlawful detainer but, on the other hand, proceeded to discuss the validity of the
last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay.
Petitioners insist that respondent is holding the subject lot by mere tolerance and
that they, as heirs of Rosendo Lasam who was the rightful owner of the subject lot, have a
better right thereto. It was allegedly error for the CA to declare the last will and testament of
Isabel Cuntapay as null and void for its non-compliance with the formal requisites of the law
on wills. The said matter cannot be resolved in an unlawful detainer case, which only
involves the issue of material or physical possession of the disputed property. In any case,
they maintain that the said will complied with the formal requirements of the law.
x x x
According to petitioners, respondents predecessors-in-interest from whom she
derived her claim over the subject lot by donation and sale cold not have conveyed portions
thereof to her, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still covered by OCT Nos.
196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Cuntapay. Their respective
estates have not been settled up to now.
x x x
The CA correctly held that, as between the respective claims of petitioners and
respondent, the latter has a better right to possess the subject lot.
As earlier stated, petitioners rely on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay
that they had allegedly newly discovered. On the basis of this instrument, the MTCC and
RTC ruled that petitioners have a better right to the possession of the subject lot because,
following the law on succession, it should be respected and should prevail over intestate
succession.
However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the purported last will and
testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to establish petitioners right
to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said last will and
testament cold not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rule of Court. x x x
In Caiza v Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: [a] will is essentially ambulatory;
at any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being
quite explicit; No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Dr. Tolentino, an imminent authority on civil law, also explained that [b]efore any will
can have force or validity, it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before
some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument
offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published
as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a
proceeding to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for
probate is mandatory and is a matter of pubic policy.
Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously ruled that
petitioners have a better right to possess the subject lot on the basis of the purported last
will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has not been probated. Stated in
another manner, Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament, which has not been probated,
has no effect whatever and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners claim, respondent has
shown a better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by the deeds of
conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage.
x x x
Further, it is not quite correct for petitioners to contend that the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage could not have conveyed portions of the subject lot to
respondent, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still covered by OCT 196
and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. To recall, it was already agreed
by the heirs of the said spouses in a Partition Agreement dated December 28, 1979 that the
subject lot would belong to Isabel Cuntapay. The latter died leaving her six children by both
marriages as heirs. Considering that her purported last will and testament has, as yet, no
force and effect for not having been probated, her six children are deemed to be co-owners
of the subject lot having their respective pro indiviso shares. The conveyances made by the
children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage of their respective pro indiviso shares in
the subject lot to respondent are valid because the law recognizes the substantive rights of
heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and co-ownership among the heirs.
The Court had expounded the principle in this wise:
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can
sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under
administration, This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate
court.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same
is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions of co-ownership, further qualifies this
right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which maybe allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling,
alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.
As early as 1942, this court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose
of property under administration, In the case of Teves de Jakosalem v Rafols, et al.,
it was said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to
the result of the pending administration, is no wise, stands in the way of such
administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the old Civil Code, Article
440 and Article 399 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493,
respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted
civilest, Manresa: Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which
might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being this formed among
the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the conveyances made by the
children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage to respondent are valid insofar as their
pro-indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA justifiably held that these
conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of donation and deed of sale presented by
respondent, coupled with the fact that she has been in possession of the subject lot since
1955, establish that respondent has a better right to possess the same as against
petitioners whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament which,
to date, has not been probated; hence has no force and effect and under which no right can
be claimed by petitioners. x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated February 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated May 17, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 80032 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
GALLANOSA v ARCANGEL
No. L-29300, 21 June 1978
83 SCRA 676
Article 838 of the Code requires probate as a condition precedent for the effectivity of a will.
Probate is limited to a determination of two issues: one, the testamentary capacity of the
testator; and two, the due execution of the will. Testamentary capacity has two components:
first, the soundness of mind of the testator, and second, the requisite age. Due execution
refers to compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law. If the proponents of the
will are able to prove testamentary capacity and due execution, the probate judge will
forthwith issue an order admitting the will to probate. Once the probate order becomes
final, the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will becomes
incontestable. Res judicata will apply to any attempt to reopen and or revisit the issues of
testamentary capacity and due execution.
Gallanosa illustrates the inevitable result of an attempt to reopen probate proceedings long
after the probate order has become final. It is important to note that the present procedural
laws do not permit nor sanction the institution of an action for the "annulment" of a will.
Aquino, J.:
The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis, with
an estimated value of P50,000.00 and claims for damages exceeding one million pesos.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was
eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he was
survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. His other brothers, named Juan, Tito (Juancito),
Leoncio (Aloncio) and Apolonio and only sister Teodora, were all dead.
2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of hearing was duly
published. In that will, Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to
his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his
one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia,
the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of
Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to
Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties consisting of
three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege (sasacuyang ataman),
Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs, namely,
his surviving brother, Leon, and his nephews and nieces. After a hearing, wherein the
oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition, Judge Pablo S.
Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed
Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator executed his last
will "gozando de buena salud y facultades mentales y no obrando en virtud de amenaza,
fraude o influencia indebida."
4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo
Fortajada, submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels of land located in
various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle and several pieces of personal property which were
distributed in accordance with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed the obligations of the
estate amounting to P7,129.27 in the portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo Fortajada and
P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of partition was approved by Judge
Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs' possession of
their respective shares. The testator's legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate
and from the order of partition and distribution.
5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis and the heirs of Florentino's deceased brothers and
sister instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro
Gallanosa for the recovery of sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous possession of
those lands en concepto de dueo and that Gallanosa entered those lands in 1951 and
asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be declared the owners of the
lands and that they be restored to the possession thereof. They also claimed damages.
6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of action and on the
ground of bar by prior judgment in the probate proceeding. Judge Anatolio C. Maalac
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata in his order of August 14, 1952
wherein he said:
It also appears that the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-interest had
intervened in the testate proceedings in Civil Case No. 3171 of this court for the
purpose of contesting the probate of the will of (the) late Florentino Hitosis; and had
their opposition prospered and the will denied probate, the proceedings would have
been converted into one of intestacy and the settlement of the estate of the said
deceased would have been made in accordance with the provisions of law
governing legal or intestate succession x x x, in which case, the said plaintiffs, as
the nearest of kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Hitosis, would have succeeded to
the ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question forming part of
his estate.
However, the decision of the Court was adverse to them, when it dismissed their
opposition and ordered the probate of the will. From this decision (Annex K)
legalizing the said will, the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period fixed
by law, despite the fact that they were duly notified thereof, so that the said
decision had become final and it now constitute a bar to any action that the
plaintiffs may institute for the purpose of seeking a redetermination of their rights to
inherit the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.
In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case (Special Proceeding)
No. 3171, in which the herein plaintiffs, or their predecessors-in-interest had
intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of the
issue that the said plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal right to succeed to any
of the properties of the late Florentino Hitosis; consequently, their present claim to
the ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question is without any
legal merit or basis.
7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should have set the
matter at rest, but the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the probate of the will, and their heirs,
with a persistence befitting a more meritorious case, filed on September 21, 1967, or fifteen
years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 and twenty-eight years after the probate of
the will, another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo
Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the recovery of the
same sixty-one parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud and
deceit, caused the execution and simulation of the document purporting to be the last will
and testament of Florentino Hitosis. While in their 1952 complaint the same plaintiffs
alleged that they were in possession of the lands in question, in their 1967 complaint they
admitted that since 1939, or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the defendants (now
petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands.
9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants, now the
petitioners, was dismissed by respondent judge. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration. Respondent judge granted it and set aside the order of dismissal. He
denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of his order setting aside that dismissal
order.
The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that the lower court
has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate and the 1952 order of dismissal
in Civil Case No. 696 and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
private respondents' 1967 complaint.
The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private respondents have a cause
of action for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the recovery of sixty-
one parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its
order of dismissal x x x.
A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law and procedure is sufficient for an ordinary
lawyer to conclude upon a casual perusal of the 1967 complaint that it is baseless and
unwarranted.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will and testament duly probated in
1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands
adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will,
which action is a resuscitation of the complaint of the same parties that the same court
dismissed in 1952.
x
x
x
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a
will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.
x
x
x
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution and formal validity of the
will.
That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that
the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that
the will was genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be
questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of a
will.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issues as to the voluntariness of its execution
cannot be raised anymore.
In Austria v Ventanilla, 21 Phil 180, a "petition for the annulment of a will" was not
entertained after the decree of probate has become final.
x
x
x
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the testate
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been rendered in a
proceeding in rem, is under the above-quoted section 49(a), binding upon the whole world.
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with
respect to private respondents' complaint. The 1952 order of dismissal rendered by Judge
Maalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits.
It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the afore-quoted section 49(a).
The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of the
testamentary proceeding and the proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they
realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res judicata
and that there is no ground, nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders and
judgments in those two cases.
It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of public
policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object for
which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. (Dy Cay v Crossfield
and O'Brien, 38 Phil 521; Pe eq \O(n)alosa v Tuason, 22 Phil 303; de la Cerna v Potot,
supra.)
x
x
x
To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court naively adopting the theory of
plaintiffs' counsel, held that the action for the recovery of lands had not prescribed because
the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code, that "the action or defense for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe," applies to wills.
That ruling is glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills and testaments.
The trial court and plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case of Dingle v Guillermo, 48 O.G.
4410, allegedly decided by this Court, which cited the ruling in Tipton v Velasco, 6 Phil 67,
that mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to void contracts, a ruling elevated to the
category of a codal provision in article 1410. The Dingle case was decided by this Court of
Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains to verify the misrepresentation of plaintiffs'
counsel that the Dingle case was decided by this Court. An elementary knowledge of Civil
Law could have alerted the trial court to the egregious error of plaintiffs' counsel in arguing
that article 1410 applies to wills.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 and June 17, 1968 are reversed and set
aside and its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is affirmed. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Santos, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on
leave.
MANINANG v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-57848, 19 June 1982
114 SCRA 478
While as a rule the area of inquiry of a probate court is restricted to the twin issues of
testamentary capacity and due execution, practical considerations may necessitate an
inquiry into substantive validity. This is particularly true if none of the testamentary
dispositions could be given effect and therefore, an inquiry into extrinsic validity would be a
waste of time.
Nuguid v Nuguid is squarely in point. However, while much reliance on Nuguid was made
by the oppositor in Maninang, the same was not favored by the court since the nullity of the
testamentary dispositions in the questioned will did not appear to be indubitable. It seems
that the court sought a determination as to whether or not the oppositor was preterited or
disinherited under the terms of the questioned will. However, one finer point of law must be
considered. While preterition involves the omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line,
the supposedly preterited heir in the foregoing case is an adopted child. It would therefore
seem that the more crucial issue is the determination as to whether or not an adopted child
should be considered as a compulsory heir in the direct line of the testator. The issue is
significant because an adopted child may not have blood ties with the testator, and
therefore whether or not such adopted child is a relative in the direct line is disputable.
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
x
x
x
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age
81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder.
x
x
x
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay
and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my death
by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for
around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have
been kind to me. x x x I have found peace and happiness with them even during
the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being
troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as
Nonoy like me to appear. I know that is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I
do not consider Nonoy as may adopted son. He has made me do things against
my will. x x x
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a petition for probate of the will of the
decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304,
hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to
be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the
Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the
Intestate Case, for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before
Branch XI, presided by respondent judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that
the holographic will was null and void because, he, as the only compulsory heir, was
preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss,
respondent Bernardo cited the cases of Neri v Akutin (72 Phil 322); Nuguid v Nuguid (17
SCRA 449), and Ramos v Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2d, 878).
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule
that in a case for probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of
and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent.
On September 8, 1980, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case in this
wise:
x
x
x
On December 19, 1980, the lower court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the
same order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor
Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been
shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust."
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a Certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals
alleging that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the order of dismissal of the
Testate Case and denial of reconsideration.
On April 28, 1991, respondent court denied Certiorari and ruled that the trial judge's order of
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore,
appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that
even granting that the lower court committed errors in issuing the questioned orders, those
are errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by certiorari.
Thus, this petition before us.
We find that the court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate
Case. Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will
is probated and notices thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity of efficiency (sic) of the provisions,
these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.
The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated x x x.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine
if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid v Nuguid, reading:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet that issue.
Our ruling in Balanay v Hon, Martinez has a similar thrust:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic
validity of the wills in those cases was passed upon even before the probate because
"practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the
"meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the will; in fact, the parties in that case
"shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate." Not so in
the case before us now where the probate of the will is insisted on by petitioners and a
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that
calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's will, private respondent had
been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
x x x Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law." Disinheritance is always
"vol untary," preteri ti on, upon the other hand, i s presumed to be
"involuntary." (Citation omitted).
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
x x x The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the new Civil Code "shall annul the
institution of heirs." This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also
"annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue
has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed order of the trial court
that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited. We are of the
opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla v Narciso,
x x x it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied
legalization on dubious grounds, otherwise the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation x x x.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the orders of the Court of First
Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980 are nullified.
Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-
Branch XI, Rizal, therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No.
8569 for further proceedings.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur. Vasquez, J., no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur.
PASTOR, JR. v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-56340, 24 June 1983
122 SCRA 885
Pastor is a detailed account of the jurisdiction of a probate court, particularly in the matter of
liquidating the estate of a deceased person. The appropriate procedure must be noted in
the light of the unusual haste in which the probate judge sought to deliver a legacy to the
designated legatee. More importantly, the jurisdiction of a probate court to determine the
issue of ownership must be noted.
Plana, J.:
I. Facts:
This is a case of hereditary succession.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (Pastor, Sr.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966,
survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two
legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor, Jr.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (Sofia), and
an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (Quemada). x
x x
On November 13, 1970, Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an
alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I
(Probate Court), docketed as SP. No. 3128-R. The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.'s 42% share in
the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (Atlas) of some
mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
On November 21, 1970, the Probate Court, upon motion of Quemada and after an ex parte
hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr., whether or
not covered or affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as such on December
4, 1970 after filing a bond of P5,000.00.
On December 7, 1970, Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and
his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the
properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr.
and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their
own rights, and not by inheritance. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
On February 2, 1971, Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator.
On December 5, 1972, the Probate Court issued an order allowing the will to probate.
Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961-R, the order was affirmed in a
decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the
same to the Probate Court after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978.
For two years after remand of the case to the Probate Court, Quemada filed pleading after
pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said
legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings
remained unacted upon by the Probate Court.
x
x
x
On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Probate Court issued the now assailed Order of
Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by
Atlas and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. [There was
absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights or royalties thereon, nor
the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.]
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written
acknowledgment of Pastor, Jr. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in the
mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42% belonged to Pastor, Sr. and only 33%
belonged to Pastor, Jr. The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor
Group. The Probate Court thus directed Atlas to remit directly to Quemada the 42%
royalties due decedent's estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for
himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for payment of
the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of Pastor, Jr. and/or his
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada from
the time of Pastor, Sr.'s death, which amounted to over two million pesos.
The order being "immediately executory," Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of
Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same to Atlas on the
same day. Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the Probate Court
gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and
ordered the payment of Quemada's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will. In the meantime, the Probate Court ordered suspension of payment of all
royalties due Pastor, Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion for
reconsideration.
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, Pastor, Jr., this time
joined by his wife Ma. Elena Achaval de Pastor, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No.
SP-11373-R). They assailed the order dated August 20, 1980 and the writ of execution and
garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition was denied on November 18, 1980 x
x x.
On December 9, 1980, Pastor, Jr. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the appellate court to
another order of the Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their petition for
certiorari was pending decision in the appellate court), by which the oppositors' motion for
reconsideration of the Probate Court's order of August 20, 1980 was denied. [The
November 11 Order declared that the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of
ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated by
the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the suit for reconveyance
then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It clarified that only the 33%
share of Pastor, Jr. in the royalties (less than 7.5% share which he had assigned to
Quemada before Pastor, Sr. died) was to be garnished and that as regards Pastor, Sr.'s
42% share, what was ordered was just the transfer of its possession to the custody of the
Probate Court through the special administrator. Further, the Order granted Quemada 6%
interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless, the Court of
Appeals denied reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 1980 as well as the
orders of the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980 and December 17,
1980, filed by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by a Supplemental Petition with
Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
x
x
x
II. Issues:
Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of Execution and
Garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to
implement the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, to wit: x x x.
The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in probate, is not
questioned. But petitioners denounce the Probate Court for having acted beyond its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Orders. Their
argument runs this way: Before the provisions of the holographic will can be implemented,
the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the
holographic will must first be resolved with finality. Now, contrary to the position taken by
the Probate Court in 1980 - i.e., almost eight years after the probate of the will in 1972 - the
Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order could not
have resolved and actually did not decide Quemada's entitlement to the legacy. This being
so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate
Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis.
x
x
x
On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. x x x.
III. Discussion:
1. Issue of Ownership
(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule
75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title. (Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540)
(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive
part of the decision. (Philippine-American Insurance Co. v Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811)
However, in case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be scanned for
guidance in construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto v Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular v
Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles v Timario, 107 Phil 809)
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of Execution is the Probate Order
of December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed
mining properties. The said Probate Order enumerated the issues before the Probate
Court, thus:
x
x
x
Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate proceedings are: (a)
whether or not the holographic will (Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will
and testament upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5, 1966, in Cebu City,
Philippines; (b) whether or not the said will has been executed with all the
formalities required by law; and (c) did the late presentation of the holographic will
affect the validity of the same?
Issues in the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was the ex parte
appointment of petitioner as special administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there any
indispensable necessity for the estate of the decedent to be placed under
administration? (3) Whether or not petition (sic) qualified to be a special
administrator of the estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed in the
inventory (submitted by the special administrator but not approved by the Probate
Court) are to be excluded.
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:
Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves some of the
problems and issues presented in these proceedings, as follows:
(a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as it hereby
allows and approves the so-called holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr.,
executed on July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having
been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. Let, therefore, a certificate of its allowance be prepared by the Branch Clerk of
this Court to be signed by this Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the
Court, and thereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and
recorded by the clerk. Let attested copies of the will and of the certificate of
allowance thereof be sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
Corporation, Goodrich Building, Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu or of
Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording.
(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of
administration - for as a matter of fact, no regular executor and/or administrator has
been appointed up to this time - and the appointment of a special administrator
was, and still is, justified under the circumstances to take possession and charge of
the estate of the deceased in the Philippines (particularly in Cebu) until the
problems causing the delay are decided and the regular executor and/or
administrator appointed.
(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later on an
executor and/or administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court's
declaration that the oppositors are the forced heirs and the petitioner is merely
vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the extent of the bounty given to him
(under) the will insofar as the same will not prejudice the legitimes of the
oppositors, for the following reasons:
1 .
To submit a complete inventory of the estate of the decedent-testator
Alvaro Pastor, Sr.;
2 .
To administer and to continue to put to prolific utilization of the properties of
the decedent;
3 .
To keep and maintain the houses and other structures and fences
belonging to the estate, since the forced heirs are residing in Spain, and
prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good order after partition and
when directed by the Court, but only after the payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes.
(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and
possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before Branch
IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the intestate estate administration aspect
must proceed, unless, however, it is duly proven by the oppositors that debts of the
decedent have already been paid, that there had been an extra judicial partition or
summary one between the forced heirs, that the legacy to be given and delivered
to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator, that
the respective shares of the forced heirs have been fairly apportioned, distributed
and delivered to the two forced heirs of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., after deducting the
property willed to the petitioner, and the estate and inheritance taxes have been
paid to the Government thru the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special administrator
or administrator of the other properties of the estate of the decedent, which
properties are not directly or indirectly affected by the provisions of the holographic
will (such as bank deposits, land in Mactan, etc.), will be resolved in another order
as separate incident, considering that this order should have been properly issued
solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the
aforestated will.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties.
On the contrary, it is manifest that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the
question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a
special administrator. Thus, it allowed and approved the holographic will "with respect to its
extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect
must proceed "subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and
possession of real and personal properties x x x." (Parenthetically, although the
statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by
the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate
administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property
for testate but not for intestate purposes?) Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it
does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
administration aspect must proceed "unless x x x it is proven x x x that the legacy to
be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the
testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic
validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of
allowing Quemada to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by
the holographic will, "considering that this (probate) order should have been properly issued
solely as a resolution of the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated
will."
(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties
listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was
the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto
when they reviewed the Probate Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said
Order.
(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980,
the Probate Court in its order of November 11, 1980 explained that the basis for its
conclusion that the question of ownership had been formally resolved by the Probate Order
of 1972 are the findings in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he
was receiving royalties from Atlas; (2) he had resided in the Philippines since pre-war days
and was engaged in the mine prospecting business since 1937 particularly in the City of
Toledo; and (3) Pastor, Jr. was only acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a
Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously farfetched.
(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Order to conclude that the Probate
Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and
royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate
Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will
(a) When Pastor, Sr. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two
legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore, a need to liquidate the
conjugal partnership and set apart the share of Pastor, Sr.'s wife in the conjugal partnership
preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of Pastor, Sr. which will
include, among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of
his wife until her death. When the disputed Probate Order was issued x x x, there had
been no liquidation of the community properties of Pastor, Sr. and his wife.
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the
assets of the estate of Pastor, Sr. There was an inventory of his properties presumably
prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of
a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties
allegedly owned but not in the name of Pastor, Sr. was still being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the
decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
where the Probate Court ordered that -
x x x a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions of Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent
to file them in the office of the Branch Clerk of this Court.
(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for.
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced
heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained.
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the
legacy to Quemada - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the
entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other
respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years
after the Probate Order was issued - the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.
3. Propriety of Certiorari
Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of
the disputed Order of Execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not
jurisdiction, and properly correctable only by appeal, not certiorari.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuation of the
Probate Court to be overlooked or condoned.
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose
the estate of Pastor, Sr. in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (Ma.
Elena Achaval de Pastor) involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the
absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no
basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private
respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of
Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment of
Quemada's legacy, in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of
December 5, 1980, must fall for lack of basis.
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation
of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and
payment of all debts and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue
among the heirs and legatees.
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of Pastor, Sr. Payment therefore of
the legacy to Quemada would collide with the provision of the National Internal Revenue
Code requiring payment of estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive
share of the estate.
(d) The assailed Order of Execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly
under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees or heirs have
been in possession. - Where devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into
possession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been
settled and paid and have become liable to contribute for the payment of such
debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order
how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue
execution as circumstances require.
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A
legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom
execution is authorized to be issued.
x x x there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally
cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution
because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate
which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to
a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment
enforceable by execution.
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate
court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive
shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets
(Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Section 3,
Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in
probate proceedings may mean, under the rule of inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
(vda. de Valera v Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108)
(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order
the execution of a final order (which is not event meant to be executed) by reading into it
terms that are not there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari
may not be invoked to defeat the right of the prevailing party to the execution of a valid and
final judgment is inapplicable. For when an order of execution issued with grave abuse of
discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced (PVTA v Honorable
Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution which
varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in the
dispositive part of the latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the
remedy applied for.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-11373-R is
reversed. The Order of Execution issued by the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as
well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate
Order dated December 5, 1972, particularly the Order dated November 11, 1980 and
December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings, subject to the judgment to be rendered in Civil
Case No. 274-R.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
QUASHA ANCHETA PENA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE
v LCN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174873, 26 August 2008
563 SCRA 426
Further to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Pastor, J. v Court of Appeals, this case
explicitly permits the partial distribution of the estate of a deceased person prior to the
payment of the debts, under specific conditions.
Chico-Nazario, J.:
x
x
x
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance
distribution of the estate, thus:
Section 2., Advance distribution in special proceedings. Notwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the
court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just,
permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or
appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules.
The second paragraph pf Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised rules of Court allows the
distrition of the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided
that the distributes, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following:
(1) only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be
subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 90); and (2) the distributes must post a
bond, fixed by the court, conditions for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate
(second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC in awarding to
the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its
obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its
grant of the award in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had
not yet received their respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into
account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly
amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of
the estate, the RTC should have bee more prudent in approving the advance distribution of
the same.
Petitioners earlier invoked Dael v Intermediate Appellate Court, where the Court sustained
an Order granting partial distribution of an estate.
However, Dael is not even on all fours with the case at bar, given that the Court therein
found that:
Where, however, the estate has sufficient assets to ensure equitable distribution of
the inheritance in accordance with law and the final judgment in the proceedings
and it does not appear there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for
which provisions should have been made or a bond required, such partial
distribution may be allowed.
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations
of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there
is a pending claim by LCN against the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of
the entire estate.
Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial distribution of the decedents
estate pending final termination of the testate or intestate proceeding should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this rule is that courts
should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the
creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of their
shares in the inheritance.
X
x
x
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
JIMENEZ v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-75773, 17 April 1990
184 SCRA 367
The probate court, as a rule, cannot pass with finality on issues affecting ownership of
property. Jimenez holds that this limitation applies also to proceedings in intestacy where
an intestate court can only pass upon on issues of title on a provisional basis only. And
despite a ruling of the intestate court on the matter, the parties are not barred by res
judicata from instituting a separate and subsequent independent action to thresh out the
matter.
Fernan, C.J.
x
x
x
The facts are as follows:
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4)
children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the
marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he
begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto
and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on August 11, 1951 while
Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, x x x Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan x x x praying to be appointed administratrix of the properties of the deceased
spouses Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the
deceased spouses which included herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino
Jimenez by Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife.
In October 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo
Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto,
Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino
Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy, and
because they have already received their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of lands
in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
x x x petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy. x x x she filed an inventory of the estate of the
spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy wherein she included the five (5) parcels of
land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. As a consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr.
moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground that these had
already been adjudicated to Leonardo, Sr. Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their
deceased father Lino Jimenez. Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented
testimonial and documentary evidence in support of his motion while petitioner Virginia
Jimenez, other than cross-examining the witnesses of Leonardo, presented no evidence of
her own, oral or documentary.
On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of
land from the inventory on the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo
Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others of: (1) Tax Declaration showing that the subject
properties were acquired during the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion
Ungson; and (2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated,
that the subject properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children by a
previous marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles. The motion for
reconsideration of said order was denied on January 26, 1982.
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the annulment of the
order dated September 29, 1981 as well as the order of January 26, 1982. On November
18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because (1) Genoveva Caolboy,
petitioners' mother, had admitted that the subject parcels of land had been adjudicated to
the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the subject properties could not have been acquired
during the marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy because they were already titled
in the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to 1921, long before Lino's marriage to Genoveva in
1940; (3) the claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred by prescription because it was only in
1981 when they questioned the adjudication of the subject properties, more than ten (10)
years after Genoveva had admitted such adjudication in a public document in 1964; and (4)
petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty of laches. This decision became final and executory.
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984
before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil
Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land as
part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents
to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by prior judgment in
CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription and laches.
However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the action was not
barred by prior judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with
finality the question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate action,
and (2) the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or laches because
private respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject properties occurred only after the
death of the petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.
On February 13, 1985, the trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. On May 31, 1985, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution was
denied. As earlier intimated, the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners
before the appellate court was likewise denied due course and dismissed in a decision
dated May 29, 1986.
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower
court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to
bar petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land. In the negative, is the present action for reconveyance barred by
prescription and/or laches
We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is
appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions
of title provisionally. Since the probate court's findings are not conclusive, being prima facie,
a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land.
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property,
can only be settled in a separate action.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again
reiterated in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. v Court of Appeals,
Junquera v Borromeo, Borromeo v Canonoy, Recto v de la Rosa. It has also been held
that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement
no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically
in Sp. No. 5346, the action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez
and Genoveva Caolboy, while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in Sp. No. 5346 had jurisdiction, the same
was merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive
and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the other
hand, was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the
exercise of the court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or ordinary
proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a final determination of the issue of ownership
of the disputed properties. To repeat, since the determination of the question of title to the
subject properties in Sp. No. 5346 was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred from
instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby
REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.
OZAETA v CUARTERO
No. L-5597, 31 May 1956
99 Phil 1041
A will executed through undue and improper pressure of influence may be denied probate
by reason of the involuntariness of its execution by the testator. However, an allegation of
undue and improper pressure and influence must be substantiated by competent evidence
to prove that it was indeed exerted. Mere inferences resulting from circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will do not suffice to justify the denial of probate,
particularly where the execution of the will was attended by respectable members of the
bar. In addition, even if such undue pressure and influence were to be proved, the testator
would be deemed to have ratified the contents of the will if, having been given ample
opportunity to revoke the same, he did nothing until the time of this death. This is because
while undue pressure and influence vitiates consent, such vitiation ceases when the undue
pressure and influence ceased. Thus, if the testator did not exercise his option to revoke or
alter the provisions of the will which are not consistent with his wishes, a presumption
arises that he has silently ratified the same.
Reyes, A., J.:
x
x
x
Born in China of chinese parents, Palanca came to the Philippines in 1884 and resided
therein the rest of his life. He died a Filipino citizen. In 1894, he married Cesarea Victorina
Gano y Torres, with whom he begot three children named Marciana, Angel and Sebastian.
Cesarea died in 1907, and on the year thereafter, Palanca lived with Rosa Gonzales and
came to have eight children with her. While living with Rosa, Palanca also sustained
relations with another woman, Maria Cuartero, and by her came to have six children.
Realizing in his old age and failing health that life's end was fast approaching, Palanca
made up his mind to legalize his relations with Rosa Gonzales and give their children a
good name. And to put himself right with all the children, legitimate and illegitimate, he also
decided to make a will. And so it was that on April 12, 1945, in a marriage ceremony
performed by a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon, Mamerto Roxas,
Palanca took Rosa Gonzales as his wedded wife, and not long thereafter he engaged the
services of a prominent lawyer, Atty. Ramon Diokno, for the drafting of the will. x x x
x
x
x
The will named the later President Manuel Roxas as executor and it would appear that after
it was signed, the original was put in a sealed envelop and delivered to him. President
Roxas, in turn, entrusted the envelop to his daughter Ruby for safekeeping, and the latter
put it in her trunk. There it remained until 1950, when upon the advice of Atty. J. Chuidian,
whom she consulted on what to do after learning of Palanca's death, she got the envelop
out and opened it. Her father, President Roxas, having already died, Ruby sought advice
from her uncle, former Judge Mamerto Roxas, and the latter told her to deliver the will to
Justice Roman Ozaeta whom the will named executor in default of President Roxas. Acting
on this advice, Ruby gave the will to Mrs. Roman Ozaeta three days after Palanca's death.
Designated in the will as substitute executor, Roman Ozaeta, on September 20, 1959, filed
a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, asking for the probate of the ill, for the
issuance to him of letters of administration, and for his appointment as special administrator
pending probate. The petition was published together with the date set for its hearing and
thereafter, Maria Cuartero and her six children filed their opposition, alleging that the will
was not executed in accordance with law, that it was procured through fraud and undue
pressure and influence on the part of some of the beneficiaries or some other person for
their benefit, and that the decedent's signature thereon were procured thru fraud and
trickery, the same having been affixed by him without any intention of making the document
his will. Sebastian Palanca, Palanca's youngest son by his deceased first wife, also
opposed the petition, and in addition to the grounds alleged by Maria Cuartero and her
children, further averred that the provisions of the alleged will were unjust and contrary to
law and prayed that the petition be denied and that he himself be appointed administrator.
Rosa Gonzales and her children also appeared and joined the petition for probate.
After trial, the court rendered a decision allowing the will to probate and appointing the
petitioner Roman Ozaeta executor. From this decision only Sebastian, Marciana and Angel,
all children of the first marriage, have appealed, and the case being elevated to this Court
because the value of the estate exceeds P50,000.00.
x
x
x
As to the charge that the will was procured thru undue and improper pressure and influence
by those who stood to profit therefrom or by some other person for their benefit, we note
that no direct evidence has been presented to support it. Appellants, however, maintain that
direct evidence of undue influence is not essential; that a contest on the ground of fraud
and undue influence may be waged successfully on circumstantial evidence and that the
contestant is entitled to the benefit of all inferences which may be reasonably and
legitimately derived from established facts; and appellants then offer the theory that after
the petitioner had succeeded in convincing the decedent - whom they picture to be then a
"very old man suffering from several ailments besides cataract in both eyes" - to live with
him, he (petitioner), with the tolerance and cooperation of Rosa Gonzales and her children,
who were then living with the decedent in petitioner's house, instilled fear in his mind and
thereafter controlled all his acts in such a way that he could not but do what he was told
and had to sign whatever papers he was asked to sign. And that, according to appellants, is
how he came to sign the will in question. But this seems to us to be farfetched deduction
from the established facts that the decedent was at the time of the execution of the will
already old and somewhat sickly and living with Rosa Gonzales and their children in
petitioner's house. Though appellants would want to make the court believe that the
decedent was already blind at the time the will was alleged to have been executed and that
he could, therefore, not have read or signed it, we find that the imputation of blindness is
not substantiated. While appellant Angel Palanca and oppositors' witness Ariston Hermano,
Atty. Dinglasan's brother-in-law, both testified that the decedent had to request them to read
for him reports and contracts in 1945 because of his failing eyesight, neither of them could
assure the court that the deceased was in fact blind. On the contrary, Angel Palanca even
stated that his father, the deceased, was still signing checks in 1945, while Tan Guan Siu,
another witness for the appellants, declared that the deceased still had a good sight in July
1946 and could read papers by himself in 1949 when he was already living in his house on
Taft Avenue. It is not denied that the deceased had cataract in both eyes even before 1941.
But Dr. W. H. Waterous, a disinterested witness who was treating the deceased, testified
that the latter's affliction in the eyes impaired only his "distance vision" and he could still
read "in close-up" in June 1946 because his "near vision" was still good. Dr. Waterous also
stated that the deceased "could still see things around" and "went unaided to the dark room
in his clinic" when he went there for a check-up at that time. The decedent, though old and
suffering from diabetes would appear to be still in full possession of his mental faculties and
was not so helpless as appellants would picture him to be, and there is no showing before,
during and after the execution of the will, he was not a master of his will but had to take
orders from somebody. Moreover, the will was signed by him in the office of a distinguished
lawyer, who died a respected member of this Court, and without the presence of any of the
beneficiaries named therein or of the petitioner himself whom appellants apparently
suspect of having used pressure or influence in favor of the said beneficiaries. It is obvious
that the claim that the will was obtained thru undue influence and improper pressure has no
substantial factual basis but is more a matter of conjecture engendered by suspicion which
the weight of authority regards as insufficient to sustain a verdict defeating a will on that
ground. "It is not enough that there was an opportunity to exercise undue influence or a
possibility that it might have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was
actually exercised." (21 A.L.R. 821)
Appellants' theory is, furthermore, disproved by decedent's failure to revoke or otherwise
alter the questioned will as soon as he stepped out of petitioner's house and moved to his
own where he led a free man's life up to five years after the execution of the will in question.
This behavior of the decedent constitutes a silent ratification of the contents of the
impugned will and refutes the claim of undue influence and improper pressure, even
supposing that these circumstances were duly proved.
It is, therefore, our conclusion that the will involved in this case cannot be disallowed on the
ground that it was procured thru improper influence or pressure.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and
Endencia, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part.
COSO v FERNANDEZ DEZA
No. 16763, 22 December 1921
42 Phil 596
Coso discusses the nature of "undue influence" which vitiates the will of the testator.
Further to Ozaeta, Coso holds that mere influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will.
Influence must overpower and subjugate the mind of the testator so as to destroy his free
agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own. However, the
interesting twist of this old case is the fact that the beneficiary accused of exercising undue
influence on the testator is a mistress of the testator. Nevertheless, the Court allowed the
will, including the disposition in favor of the mistress. In the case of Nepomuceno v Court
of Appeals, supra, the Court invalidated a testamentary disposition in favor of a mistress. A
distinction between these two cases is therefore necessary.
Ostrand, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will
on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator
by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son
had by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of
nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged
to have suffered from a severe illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands,
became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit relations with
her for many years thereafter. After his return to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in
Manila in February 1918, and remained in close communication with him until his death in
February 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him and the only
question for our determination is whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate
the will.
The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc.
1144-1149.
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a
will; to have that effect that influence must be "undue." The rule as to what
constitute "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the
different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted
must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his
own.
x x x such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard
to the execution of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will,
or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor
of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions
which the testator would not otherwise have made x x x.
x x x and while the same amount of influence may become "undue" when
exercised by one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the
mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation
does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the
testator's free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the
sense above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this
burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained
strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered
and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears
to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a legitimate sense
of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of
gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No
imposition of fraud has been shown in the present case.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as "undue" if no
imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made. (Mackall v Mackall, 135 U.S. 167)
It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to
dispose of his property by will is limited to only a portion of his estate, and that under the
law in force in these Islands before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only
outside influences affecting the validity of a will were duress, deceit and fraud. The present
doctrine of undue influence originated in a legal system where the right of the testator to
dispose of his property by will was nearly unlimited. Manifestly, greater safeguards in
regard to execution of wills may be warranted when the right to so dispose of property is
unlimited than when it is restricted to the extent it is in this jurisdiction. There is, therefore,
certainly no reason for giving the doctrine of undue influence a wider scope here than it
enjoys in the United States.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico
Gimenez Zoboli is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the will be admitted to probate.
No costs will be allowed. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avance eq \O(n)a, Villamor, Johnson and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
PASCUAL v DE LA CRUZ
No. L-24819, 30 May 1969
28 SCRA 421
Undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will.
These twin grounds were invoked in this case. While the Court considered only the issue of
improper influence and pressure, and summarized the rulings thereon, it is equally
important to consider the effect of alleging undue influence and pressure simultaneously
with fraud.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., Acting C.J.:
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or
ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14
January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole
heir of the decedent.
Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late
Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities
required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of
disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the
signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
After hearing, during which the parties presented their respective evidences (sic), the
probate court rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will, and, as therein
provided, appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executor and administrator of the estate of
the late Catalina de la Cruz without bond. The oppositors appealed directly to this Court,
the properties involved being valued at more than P300,000.00, raising only the issue of the
due execution of the will.
x
x
x
Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground that the execution of the
will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted by proponent on the testatrix, and
affirm that it was error for the lower court to have rejected their claim. Said the court in this
regard:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a will was made in favor
of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through fraud and
undue pressure and influence, for we have numerous instances where strangers
are preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar,
Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la
Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own
son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared
for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that
Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her
will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is worthwhile to recall the basic
principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this Court:
that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make
him express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596);
Icasiano v Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico v del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965);
that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence and improper pressure
cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, as it is not enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised
(Ozaeta v Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of improper pressure and
undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised
(Ozaeta v Cuartero, ante; Teotico v del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is on
the person challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its
execution (Teotico v del Val, ante); that mere general or reasonable influence is not
sufficient to invalidate a will (Coso v Fernandez Deza, ante); nor is moderate and
reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the testator (Barretto v Reyes, L-5830-31,
31 January 1956); or omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence
(Bugnao v Ubag, 14 Phil 163; Pecson v Coronel, 45 Phil 416).
Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail
to establish actual undue influence and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the
proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his
testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it," which does not
amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the
evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the
testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be
painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that
proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of the
testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent
pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception
averred.
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one
of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the
rheumatism of the testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did
not resort to relative or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of
the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her,
thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recrimination that an aged person
would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can,
likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.
We conclude that the trial court committed no error in finding that appellants' evidence
established at most grounds for suspicion but fell short of establishing actual exercise of
improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her
own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her
sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing abnormal in her
instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
Appellants invoke a presumption of undue influence held to exist by American authorities
where the beneficiary participates in the drafting or execution of the will favoring him; but
since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although a nephew of the proponent, we do
not think the presumption applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney would
follow the instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in good standing may not be
convicted of unprofessional conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a statement, except
upon clear proof.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the decree of probate appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
contestants-appellants.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part. Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., both on official leave, did not
take part.
ORTEGA v VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005
478 SCRA 247
Ortega discusses two issues: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud in the making of the will; and
(ii) what constitutes a sound and disposing mind.
Panganiban, J.:
x
x
x
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA as follows:
x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time
in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came
home to stay in the Philippines and lived in the house and lot located at #9200
Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister
Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival
from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years
old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982.
But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984
of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting
of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 19893 but acknowledged only on August 9,
1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the
attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and
was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the
left hand margin. It provides in the body that:
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE
IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
I, Placido Valmonte, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag
Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro
Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind
and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and
testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the
auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance with the rites of said
Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided
by my executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my
family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C.
VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the follow-described
properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC GLRO),
situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT
No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca
Valmonte), having share and share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above described property,
made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence and my
wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila
also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro
Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte
and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-
owners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal
properties, including my savings account bank book in USA which
is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and
wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife,
Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix
of my last will and testament, and it is my will that said executrix be
exempt from filing a bond.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15
th

day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the
USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages and residence of the heirs of the
testator, or to give them proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and
formalities were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged
execution he being in advance state of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threat;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of
the petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that
the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina, alleging her want
of understanding and integrity.
At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary
public, Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the
instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie
Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane
Ortega testified.
According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents
house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to
get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There
were times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone.
And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was
made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who
were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just
serendipitously found it in his attach case after his death. It was only then that she
learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the
executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and
personal left by the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared
too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite his old age he
went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home, cooked
and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even
traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her
husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold
but which eventually resulted in his death.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the
three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to
prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told then to come back on June
15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary
public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses
returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before
the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained
to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke
and understood, He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was
signed by the testator and the witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should
have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually
on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of
June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary
public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public,
and testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and
Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him
to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving
his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983;
that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to
come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public,;
that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of
sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the
contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog
dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife,
Josefina, was not with them.
The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside
from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled
to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at
the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old
and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983
Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and
they took care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition
showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced,
reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and
attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was
then in an advanced state of senility.
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed
probate.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to
probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses
who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual
exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways did not make him a person of
unsound mind.
Hence this Petition.
x
x
x
In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.
This Courts Ruling
The Petitioner has no merit.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
x
x
x
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every
will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and
requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code
states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
x
x
x
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing
fraud in its execution and challenging the testators mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will,
but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary,
conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to
sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life
(to) almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who (was) thrice her age x x x
and who happened to be (a) Fil-American pensionado, thus casting doubt on the intention
of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human
reason, logic and common experience for an old man with a severe psychological
condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretence, by
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executed, or it may relate
to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led
to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of
the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other
than the self-serving allegations of petitioners, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution
of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole
beneficiary, and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken
the cudgels of taking care of (the testator) in his twilight years.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even
require that a (notarial) will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
More importantly, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more
credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one
another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a
notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will
as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained
by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.
x
x
x
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the
commission of fraud, There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to
receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony
favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required
by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines.
Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind
at the time of its execution.
Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence
of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making
his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
testator, one month or less, before making his will, was publicly known to be insane,
the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to
be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of;
(2) the proper objects of the testators bounty; and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding
that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them, and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole
beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v CA, which held thus:
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental
aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable
him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of this
property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
be unbroken or unimpaired or unsheltered by disease or otherwise. It has been held
that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall
actually be insane or of unsound mind.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
NEPOMUCENO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-62952, 9 October 1985
139 SCRA 206
While the general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity of the will, practical considerations may compel the probate court to pass upon
matters of intrinsic validity. In particular, where a testamentary provision is void on its face,
a probate court, in accordance with the ruling in Nuguid v Nuguid, pass upon such
provision for the purpose of declaring its nullity.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
x
x
x
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last will and testament x x
x.
In the said will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as
his sole heir and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife
and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner, herein Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in
Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs,
namely his legal wife Rufina Gomez, and his children Oscar and Carmelita, his entire
estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. x x x.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez, and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the will was procured by undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the will,
the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his
death on July 16, 1974, the will's admission to probate will be an idle exercise because on
the fact of the will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal denying probate of the will. The respondent court declared the will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in
relation to Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. x x x.
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess
of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last will and testament of the deceased Martin
Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be
passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings
because the only purpose of the probate of a will is to establish conclusively as against
everyone that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator
has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate
action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the
nullity of the testamentary provision in the will in favor of the person with whom the testator
was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last will and testament
itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the
testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private
respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated
in Nuguid v Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v Hon. Antonio
Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue
the legality of the devise.
We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will and declared the devise in
favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule is expressed thus:
x
x
x
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will.
In Nuguid v Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of
this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter (sic) proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
x
x
x
The only issue therefore is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. x x x.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the
proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of the will,
the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:
( 1 )
Those made between persons who are guilty of adultery of concubinage at the
time of the donation;
( 2 )
Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
( 3 )
Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants,
by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in no. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought
by the spouses of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before
the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez
was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also
declared that respondent Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In
Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952.
Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated
that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as
in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of
my aforementioned previous marriage."
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived
together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then
51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good
faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of ignorance or good faith. x x x.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The
very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, de la Fuente and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
ROBERTS v LEONIDAS
No. L-55509, 27 April 1984
129 SCRA 33
Probate of a will is mandatory in order that the said will may pass property. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that "it is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding." Accordingly, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the testate and intestate proceedings, and for the judge hearing the testate
case to continue hearing the consolidated cases.
In de Borja v vda de Borja, infra, the Supreme Court allowed and in fact enforced the
compromise agreement between a stepson and his stepmother, despite the fact that the
tenor of the compromise agreement is not consistent with the tenor of the will of the
testator. It is important to distinguish the variance between the ruling in de Borja and the
ruling in Roberts. Based on the dictum of the Supreme Court in these two cases, is it lawful
for the heirs to divide the estate in accordance with a freely negotiated compromise
agreement and in the process disregard the terms of the will? Or will such a compromise
agreement result in an "anomalous" situation deplored by the Supreme Court in Roberts?
Aquino, J.:
x
x
x
Antecedents - Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila x x x. He was survived
by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm, and their two children, named Edward Miller
Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts
(McFadden), his two children by a first marriage x x x.
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed
of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second
wife. The second will deposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first
marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this
country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm
Morris, or my daughter Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I
have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine
property.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar
Tate x x x in x x x Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California, and Mrs. Roberts
of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceedings.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January 1978. In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to
probate the two wills and the codicil. It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
dated April 14, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm,
Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm
Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts.
Two weeks later x x x Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete, as the first parties,
and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm, as the second
parties, without knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. x x x.
Intestate Proceeding No. 113024 - At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days
after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughters of the first marriage, Ethel, 49,
through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceedings no. 113024 for the settlement of his
estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara Law Office, filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency in Utah of a
proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special
administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine
estate. x x x.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new
lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg), withdrew the opposition
and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.
x
x
x
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers
Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M.
Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's
Philippine estate and one eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12 1/2%. No mention at
all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio
del Callar as their lawyer, who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of
partition. The court considered the motion moot and academic considering that it had
already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition.
After November 1979, or a period of more than five months, there was no movement or
activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980, Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's
lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned
among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer,
was notified of that motion.
x
x
x
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding no. 134559 - On September 8, 1980,
Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara Law Firm, in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in
Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already
probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and
the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and
Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the
same to Maxine.
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was
illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his
order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this
Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively, that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of annulment of
the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.
Ruling - We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed."
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition
and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings
sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be
served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No
Costs.
Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and de Castro, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr. and Abad
Santos, JJ., no part. Escolin, J., in the result.
DOROTHEO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108581, 8 December 1999
320 SCRA 12
Dorotheo distinguishes between the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of a will. It holds that the
admission of a will to probate does not necessarily mean the provisions of the will can be
given effect. The inquiry during probate of the will focuses only on formal or extrinsic
validity. Even as a probate order is issued, it is not a guaranty that the testamentary
dispositions are valid and would thus be given effect. In sum, extrinsic validity is one thing;
intrinsic validity is another.
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from
the following antecedents.
Private respondents
1
were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner,
2
who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will
and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion to Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void. The trail court granted the motion and issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will
and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the
only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose
respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on
intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not
married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within
the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals
on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final
and executory Order. Consequently, private respondent filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT)
covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the
TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of
new titles in their names. x x x.
An order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final
and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of
the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final
in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the
distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed
orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals x x x. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of
the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared
the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
x
x
x
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30,
1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment
made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set
aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy
of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on
probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
x
x
x
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;
and the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the
will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when
the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on
this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunal must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the
party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision
or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time be
fixed by law become final, otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut
finis sit litium the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put and end to
controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less
arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. The only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will,
as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the
only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son
of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to
the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum shopping. It should be remembered that forum
shopping also occurs when the same issued had already been resolved adversely by some
other court. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse
should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
x
x
x
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law on successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the
will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside
from the fact that transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be
done unless the will had failed to pass both extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is
extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it
is extrinsically valid, the test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is, whether the
provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court
had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof
were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not
belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed
of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate,
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
AUSTRIA v REYESPRIVATE
No. L-23079, 27 February 1970
31 SCRA 754
The statement of a false cause in the institution of heirs shall be disregarded, unless it is
proved that the testator would not have made such institution had he been properly
appraised of the truth. Aside from the fact that the false cause must be stated in the will, the
opponents of the will are likewise mandated to prove by substantial evidence that the
testator would not have made such a disposition had he known the true state of affairs.
Therefore, inferences and conjectures are not sufficient to invalidate a provision which is
challenged as one made on the basis of a false cause.
Please note that the false cause which led the testator to make a particular testamentary
disposition is treated in the same way as a mistake, which in contract law, vitiates consent.
Castro, J.:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for the probate, ante mortem, of her last will and
testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, Ruben Austria, Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews
and nieces of Basilia. The opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will
allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Me eq \O(n)ez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and
Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own
legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed probate, Basilia died. The
respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in
accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt
pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a
petition for intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of
Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by
the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers
to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the
court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959,
couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the
above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby
granted."
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the
several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of the
petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness
of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed to
obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-document examiner whose
views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et
al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary
for further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which
appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from
two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, x x x the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., moved the lower court
to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived,
however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Me eq \O(n)ez, who entered an appearance
separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed x x x a motion asking the lower
court by way of alternative relief to confine the petitioners intervention, should it be
permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides
subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an
order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the
deceased which were not disposed of in the will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an
opposition from the respondents. On October 25, 1963, the same court denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from
both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and
October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to
properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of
the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces
who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other
side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Me eq \O(n)ez,
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom are heirs in the will of the
deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal
adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will - immaculate in its extrinsic.
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the
respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent.
The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or
invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of
heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et
al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted
in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article 842 of the Civil Code which
reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part
of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code which regard to the legitime of said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and nieces are not
compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-
wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioner's interest is confined to properties, if any,
that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take
place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and nieces, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate
should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of
heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether
or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the
adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as
not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of
the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased
which recite:
III
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking
itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto,
Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz.
x
x
x
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking ari-ariang
maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
A. Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabaggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto,
Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti
ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en parte iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang
mana (legitima), ang kalahati (1/2) ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang
gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion
Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal na itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng
parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati (1/2) ng mga lagay na lupa at
palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong
ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati (1/2) ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa
Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumaong kapatid na si Fausto
Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the
late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of
her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., as the latter's legitime. The
petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she
would not have instituted the respondents at all - the basis of the institution being solely her
belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would
cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did
the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in
barring the petitioners nephews and nieces from registering their claim even to properties
adjudicated by the decedent in her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear on the face of
the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of
the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under
the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in
instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware
that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own
wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to
the legitime. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her
complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own
proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed
her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the
same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., solely because she believed that the law commanded
her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still
such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false
cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution
may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the
testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be
false. x x x

The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point, or at best
is vague and uncertain. The phrases "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana"
were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to
describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer
no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way
she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes.
Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the
respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of respondent Benita Cruz,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise
of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria.
Were we to exclude the respondent Perfecto Cruz et al. from the inheritance, then the
petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the estate by
intestacy - a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit
injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy."
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved in its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in
this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the
wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for
the purpose of giving it effect. A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it
becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of collateral
attack. x x x
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners' cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
REYES v BARRETTO-DATU
No. L-17818, 25 January 1967
19 SCRA 85
Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among other
things, Reyes holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must
be a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line received something from
the testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot be considered preterited.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San
Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land
Records of this Province, being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the
deceased Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors.
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they
acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285,
6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of
these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros
Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto
and his nephews and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San Roque,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerardo. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof,
she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as
guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court
of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the
delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud Barretto
took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original
certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the
distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon
her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she
instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and in the second, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the
later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso
Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was
not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This
ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of
Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased
Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this
action for the recovery of one-half portion thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only
of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud
Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano
Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
who was then a "minor."
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the
project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano
Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void
ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of
plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria
Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of
the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows:
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been
included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano
Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will
was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part.
And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she
was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the
properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of
the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that property acquired by fraud or
mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the
beginning of this opinion, the court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but
ordered them to return the properties received under the project of partition previously
mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied
defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and
defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been
misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one
such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not
null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children,
or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate
ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in the testament; for Bibiano Barretto
was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the
share (1/2) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that
reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or
total omission, of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri v Akutin, 72 Phil 322, invoked by
appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of
children of the testator's former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil
status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous,
since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual
concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while
untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There
can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil status
is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that would
correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely
a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept of reject, it is the court
alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto
and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia v Reyes, 63 Phil 629, 643; Act. 190, Section
750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree
of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or
not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by
opportune appeal; but once it has become final, its binding effect is like that of any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the
estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition
becomes irrelevant.
x
x
x
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake of inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even
then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion
within the elementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of.
x
x
x
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could
not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in
agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellee's rights and
entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano
Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim Boco
Barretto, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the
widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor
children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the second place, granting that
there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its
discovery, and the records shows that this period had lapsed long ago.
x
x
x
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court
of First Instance of Manila in 19939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being
contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's
action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of
limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith
and should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto
(nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the plaintiff's action for partition of the
fishpond described in the complaint should have been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila now under appeal is
reversed and set aside insofar as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties enumerated in said decision, and the same is
affirmed insofar as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records be
returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action of partition of the
fishpond (Lot 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof as prayed for in the
complaint. No cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
AZNAR v DUNCAN
No. L-24365, 30 June 1966
17 SCRA 590
The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in this case.
While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law, means that the
compulsory heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a
compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator in the will (without instituting him or her
as an heir), the said compulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.
One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testator was a citizen of the State
of California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration." (Article 16, Civil Code) In the foregoing
case, the estate of the testator was distributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into
account the fact that Article 854 was made to apply. This point needs clarification.
Makalintal, J.:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving
a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Davao x x x. In that same decision, the court declared that Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the
deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed in its decision of
February 14, 1958.
x
x
x
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the
project of partition submitted by the executor x x x wherein the properties of the estate
were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the
testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia,
who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the
proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy
Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons,
which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on the sole question
of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen
Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should
be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent
to 1/4 of the entire estate.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains among others, the following clauses which are
pertinent to the issue in this case:
3 .
I declare x x x that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4 .
I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
x
x
x
7 .
I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for said Maria
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) per month until
the principal as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted.
x
x
x
1 2 .
I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-loved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now
residing, as aforesaid, at no. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. all the income from the rest, remainder and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind
and character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at
my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime; Provided however, that should the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living
issue, then and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate,
and if so terminated, then I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest, remainder and
residue of my property with same force and effect as if I had originally so
given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided further, that should
the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue,
then and in that event x x x.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen
Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of
heir, pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed
by Article 906 of the Civil Code which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has
left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby the
testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy
nevertheless, although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively
disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which reads:
Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the
truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in
this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall
be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Articles 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled only
to the legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were intestate.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and Article 906 of
Article 815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:
Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse ignorancia o falta
de memoria en el testador; en el dejar algo al heredero forzoso, no. Este no se
encuentra privado totalmente de su legitima; ha recibido por cualquier titulo una
porcion de los bienes hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a completar la legitima,
pero que influeye poderosamente en el animo del legislador para decidirle a
adoptar una solucion bien diferente de la se eq \O(n)alada para el caso de
pretericion.
El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado bienes;
pero haciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de extra eq \O(n)os o
en favor de otros legitimarios por via de legado, donacion o mejora mayor cantidad
de la que la ley de consentia disponer. El heredero forzoso no puede perder su
legitima, pero tampoco puede pedir mas que la misma. De aqui su derecho a
reclamar solamente lo que le falta; al complemento de la porcion que forzosamente
la corresponde.
Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en testamento por titulo de
herencia, legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna cantidad o porcion
de bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la misma.Tal sentido, que es el mas
propio en el articulo 815, no pugna tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el
testamento se deja al heredero forzoso, la pretericion es incompleta; as mas
formularia que real. Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay
verdadera pretericion.
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right to ask for
completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:
La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la pretericion puede serlo,
pero se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste, en cuanto olvida o no
atiende el testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del derecho a la legitima del
heredero forzoso preterido, prescindiendo absoluta y totalmente de el y no
mencionandole en ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o no
instituyendole en parte alguna de la herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni por el de
legatar o aunque le mencionara o nombrada sin dejarle mas or menos bienes. Si le
dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su legitima, ya no
seria case de pretericion, sino de complemento de aquella. El primer supuesto o de
pretericion, se regula por el articulo 814, y produce accion de nulidad de la
institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de complemento de legitima por el 815 y
solo origina la accion ad suplementum, para completar la legitima.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not naming him
at all, or while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, not assigning to him some part of the properties. Manresa
continues:
Se necesita, pues: (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso; (b) Que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada recibida en el testamento:
x
x
x
B. Que la omision sea completa - Esta condicion se deduce del mismo Articulo 814
y resulta con evidencia el relacionar este articulo con el 815. El heredero forzoso a
quien el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su testamento, no se halla
propiamente omitido, pues se le nombra y se le reconoce participacion en los
bienes hereditarios. Podria discutirse en el Articulo 814 si era o no necesario que se
reconociese el derecho como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta
duda.Aquel se ocupa de privacion completa o total, tacita; este, de la privacion
parcial. Los efectos deben ser y son, como veremos, completamente distintos.
La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.
Privar totalmente de la legitima es negaria en absoluto al legitimario, despojarle de
ella por completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814. Privar parcialmente de la
legitima, es menguarla o reducirla, dejar al legitimario una porcion menor que la que
le corresponde. A este caso se refiere el articulo 815. En 813 sienta, pues, una
regla general, y las consecuencias del que bratamiento de esta regla se determina
en los articulos 814 y 815.
Again Sanchez Roman:
QUE LA OMISION SEA TOTAL - Aunque el articulo 814 no consigna de modo
expreso esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e institucion o
disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y absoluta, asi se deduce
de no hacer distincion o salvedad alguna empleandola en terminos generales;
perso sirve o confirmarlo de un modo indudable siguiente articulo 815, al decir que
el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, por cualquier titulo, menos de
la legitima que la corresponda, podria pedir el complemento de la misma, lo cual ya
no son el caso ni los efector de la pretericion, que anula la institucion, sino
simplemente los del suplemento necesario para cubrir su legitima.
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to
the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it
necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to
him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In order words, should he be
recognized or referred to in the will as heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of
the deceased Edward E. Christensen, Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir - indeed
her status as such is denied - but is given a legacy of P3,600.00.
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman Law, gave an affirmative answer to the
question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7ed 436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI,
Vol. 2.0 p. 937), that view was changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851,"
later on copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the citation given
above, comments as follows:
RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA - Se inspira el Codigo en
esta materia en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna
racional modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales al heredero forzoso,
a quien no se le dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de su legitima, la accion para
invalidar la institucion hecha en el testamento y reclamar y obtener aquella
mediante el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y aun cuando resultara favorecido
como donatario, por otro titulo que no fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de que se
le privaba no dandole este caracter, y solo cuando era istituido heredero en parte o
cantidad inferior a lo que le correspondiera por legitima, era cuando bastaba el
ejercicio de la accion ad suplementum para completarla, sin necesidad de anular
las otras instituciones de heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el
testamento.
El articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica necesidad
que le inspira, cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero forzoso, a
quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le corresponda, y se le
otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir el complemento de la misma sin necesidad de
que se anulen las disposiciones testamentarias, que se reduciran en lo que sean
inoficiosas, conforme al articulo 817, cuya interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su
apoyo la sancion de la jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion precisa que lo que se
hubiere dejado de menos de la legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya sido en el
testamento, o sea por disposicion del testador, segun lo revela el texto del articulo,
"el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, etc., esto es, por titulo de
legado o donacion mortis causa en el testamento y, no fuera de al."
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January 16,
1895, May 25, 1917 and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the
testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without
referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to
other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the
institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6 Manresa
pp. 438, 441)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the
testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will.
He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a
legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess
such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime
his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would
have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly
recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri et al. v Akutin, 74 Phil 185, is cited by appellees in support
of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it referred to a
will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left
nothing to them, or at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely
omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks
in the Christensen Plantation company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of
said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her
share as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is
entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently
accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of
Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will cannot
be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect
to her legitime.
One point deserves to be mentioned, although no reference to it has been made in the brief
for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to
Lucy Duncan in the event she would die without living issue. This substitution results in
effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income
from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event
she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the
testator named in the will. Without deciding this point, since it is not one of the issues raised
before us, we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of
substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864, Civil
Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project of
partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is
remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this
decision, that is, by giving to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more
than the portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the
hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges which shall not include those
imposed in the will of the decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs
against appellees in this instance.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
NUGUID v NUGUID
No. L-23445, 23 June 1966
17 SCRA 449
As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary
capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on
the face of the will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is
gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary disposition,
and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for practical considerations. While
Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified in declaring the entire
will void if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the
universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition
would be the same as the nullification of the will itself.
Sanchez, J.:
Rosario Nuguid x x x died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitime
or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid x x x some 11 years before her
demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father
and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her
will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in
the direct ascending line - were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is
void.
On August, 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity
and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and
dismissed the petition without cost.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited - to an examination of, and resolution
on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings - is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, meat of the case is the intrinsic
validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors in the court below and here on
appeal, traveled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below
that the will is a complete nullity. x x x
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise and bequeath all of
the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my
name this seventeenth day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
Sgd. (Illegible)
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. x x x
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814
of the Civil Code of Spain in 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus:
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid in
so far as they are not inofficious. x x x
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a
necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar el heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra
siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se
le deshereda expresamente, ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes resultando
privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento
omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte
corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso, b) que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void; x x x (Citation omitted.)
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of
divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate;
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. (Citation
omitted.)
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish; to do away with. (Citations omitted.)
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents,
now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both
of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such
preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando
caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento," referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of
the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir -
nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture
that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says
Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en
todo o en parte? No se a eq \O(n)ade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en
el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto perjudique a
la legitima del deseheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es
completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige
con preferencia al 817.
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institution de heredero por
pretericion de uno, various o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la
sucesion intestada, total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia
en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige
la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." x x.
Really, as we analyze the worn annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally
abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir - without
any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the
statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the Memoria Annual del Tribunal Supremo,
correspondiente a 1908, which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
x x x El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona
instituida en el sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso
pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho
sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo, por lo
tanto, procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un
testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en
todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no
hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta
consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene
declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la
voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que
constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como
legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto
razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus
terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentificaccion, pues no porque
parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para
convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimento lo que el legislador quiere establecer.
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annulment
notwithstanding, 'the devices and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious."
Legacies and devices merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in
a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will -
void because of preterition - would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As
to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified
institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814,
now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of heir "totalmente por la pretericion;
but added (in reference to legacies and bequests), per subsistiendo, x x todas aquellas
otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero x x. As Manresa puts it,
annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including la porcion
libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion.
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather
than one of preterition." From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not
apply to the case at bar." This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between
preterition and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law." In Manresa's own words, "La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion."
Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre
voluntaria;" preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria." Express as
disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will
itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply
omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is
clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from
those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall
annul the institution of heir." This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devices or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the
institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited," which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity
is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heir
in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o
dos tercios, el caso."
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri
case heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil
Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of
legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of
Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the
remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying
integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
special provision. With reference to Article 814, which is the only provision material
to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is
therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies and betterments.
And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and
separately treated in said article, but because they are in themselves different.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined.
Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. x x
x.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity." Article
854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however,
that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby
affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, concur.
BALANAY, JR. v MARTINEZ
No. L-39247, 27 June 1975
64 SCRA 454
Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court. Unless the nullity of the will is patent
on its face, the probate court should first pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will before
passing upon its substantive validity. Hence, the distinction between this case and Nuguid.
Upon the other hand, while the court correctly modified the husband's right to waive his
hereditary right with respect to the estate of the deceased spouse, and his right to waive his
half share in the conjugal estate, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the
Civil Code, the court was silent on the validity of the husband's conformity to the distribution
of the conjugal estate in accordance with the terms of the will of the wife. Obviously, the
court assumed the validity of the renunciation of the husband of his share in the conjugal
estate. Such waiver, however, may fall into one of two possible categories, i.e., inter vivos
or mortis causa. If it was a waiver effective inter vivos, then it would have amounted to a
donation to inter vivos to the wife. That would have been illegal under existing laws. On the
other hand, if it was a waiver mortis causa, then the formalities of a will should have been
observed, failing which, the waiver would be void. Furthermore, the waiver mortis causa
would have required the wife to survive the husband. In either case, the alleged waiver by
the husband of his half share in the conjugal estate resulted in a transmission of property to
the wife. And consequently, a characterization of such waiver along the parameters
mentioned above is necessary and inescapable. The fundamental question, therefore, that
demands an answer is whether or not a husband or wife could waive his or her share in the
conjugal estate in favor of the other by an act inter vivos. We exclude, however, a waiver
resulting from a successful petition for separation of property, and the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership (or for that matter, the absolute community of property) resulting from
the issuance of a decree of annulment or a decree of nullity.
It may be surmised that the validity of the waiver had to be assumed, properly or
improperly, otherwise the case will fall under the provision of Article 784 which categorically
states that the making of a will is strictly a personal act, and that the exercise of
testamentary discretion cannot be delegated by a person to another. In any case, Balanay
leaves many questions unanswered. Let alone the fact that the decision did not discuss
why the husband was not preterited within the meaning of Article 854.
Aquino, J.:
x
x
x
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by
their six legitimate children, namely, Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In
that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half" of nine
conjugal lots; (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited
from her father, and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied
out of the fruits of her properties.
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-
two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she
described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal
assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr.
should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his rely to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay,
Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and
affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed
an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary
Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and
renounced" his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same
instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her
death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973
"denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the
affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973, it appointed
its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.
x
x
x
In the meantime, another lawyer appeared in the case, David O. Monta eq \O(n)a, Sr.,
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate
of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding." In that motion, Monta eq \O(n)a claimed to be the lawyer not only of the
petitioner, but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and
Emilia B. Pabaonon.
x
x
x
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Monta eq \O(n)a assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted
the view of Attys. Monta eq \O(n)a and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of
February 28, 1974, it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and
set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. x x x
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated
April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974
on the ground that Atty. Monta eq \O(n)a had no authority to withdraw the petition for the
allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974
addressed to Atty. Monta eq \O(n)a and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo,
Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Monta eq \O(n)a's
services and informed him that his withdrawal of petition for the probate of the will was
without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their mother's
will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the
will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because
of Atty. Monta eq \O(n)a's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of
the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring the will void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the
lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had
been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue (Nuguid v Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v
Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v Udan, L-19996, April
30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
But the probate court erred in declaring in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was
void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity
to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his
one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator
would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others
invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme,
or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is
contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and
pro indiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code); Madrigal and Paterno v Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil
414). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should
be paid in cash is contrary to article 1980 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or
by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural,
industrial or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted
him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned, be paid in cash.
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children
(her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did
not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence,
she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate
may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate
should not be divided during her husband's legitime would at most be effective only for
twenty years from the date of her death, unless there are compelling reasons for
terminating the co-ownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the
conjugal partnership (Art. 179(1) and 1041, Civil Code), but insofar as said renunciation
partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate
(Art. 1050(1), Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for
his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid
and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair
the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will
and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of
his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in
paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of the will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will,
should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention." Under article 930 of the
Civil Code, "the legacy of devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed,
though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his by
whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition
the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she
could dispose of by will her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the
husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming
that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as
heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited
her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the
preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will, or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the
testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (Art. 960(2), Civil
Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his
hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the
formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil
Code; Guevara v Guevara, 74 Phil 479 and 98 Phil 249; Fernandez v Dimagiba, L-23638,
October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in
itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire should be given effect, independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby" (Resolution, vda. de Precilla v Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46
SCRA 538, 565).
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28 and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The
lower court is directed to conduct further proceeding in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
CAYETANO v LEONIDAS
No. L-54919, 30 May 1984
129 SCRA 522
Article 854 does not apply in the case of a foreign testator who omits in his or her will the
compulsory heirs in the direct line. In the case of a foreign testator, the conflict rule
enunciated in Article 16 of the Civil Code applies. Therefore, regardless of whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved, the provision of Article 854 of the Civil Code
cannot is never meant to apply to a foreign testator.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondents Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C.
Lopez, and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate
of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in
the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her
death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with
her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix's death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed and registered with the Registry of
Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator
who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as
executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore,
there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as
they would work injustice and injury to him.
x
x
x
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament if the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters
of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned upon the provisions of
Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile x x x petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which incidentally
has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face,
patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his
last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner
in the instant case which was granted by the court x x x.
x
x
x
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or
in excess of his jurisdiction when:
x
x
x
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession.
x
x
x
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule,
the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites and solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court had declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which
was reserved by law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
x
x
x
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039 Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campos' will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is
the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does
not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. This is squarely applied in the case of Bellis v Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein
we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
x
x
x
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and de la Fuente, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J. (Chairman),
no part.
ACAIN v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-72706, 27 October 1987
155 SCRA 100
Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not a surviving spouse could be
preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved
that an adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The
foregoing notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child (while
given the same rights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603)
could be preterited. It must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not
entitled to the right of representation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would seem,
however, that with the provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an
adopted child, the preterition of an adopted child finds greater support.
Paras, J.:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the
issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, x x x on the premise that Nemesio
Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and
his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a translation
in English submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. x x
x On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD. All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands, and
money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to
my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN, Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing
at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain
predeceases me, all the money, properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and
here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given by me to his children,
namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose,
all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo predeceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner x x x.
After the petition was set for hearing x x x the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A.
Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter's widow, Rosa
Diongson vda. de Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal
heir, and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. Said motion was
denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court
by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985.
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered
the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special
Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for
the review of respondent court's decision on December 18, 1985. x x x
x
x
x
Petitioner raises the following issues:
x
x
x
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it
is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line" and does not apply to private respondents who are not
compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
x
x
x
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been preterited.
x
x
x
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article
854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance for she is
not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by
petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of
the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en
virtual de legado, mejora o donacion" The only provisions which do not result in intestacy
are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will -
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear
terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No
legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased
has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of
annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except
that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
x
x
x
Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the
will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this state of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
The rule however is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. In Nuguid v Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the motion held
that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On
appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for
aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the
will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us
to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.
In Cayetano v Leonidas, supra, one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent judge allowed the
probate of the will. The court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner, the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should
meet the issue.
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds:
(1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal
heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. It was denied by
the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that the grounds for the
motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the
course of the trial on the merits of the case. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility.
It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. The trial court
have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v
Leonidas, supra; Nuguid v Nuguid, supra). The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.
x
x
x
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result on the basic proposition that preterition in this case was by mistake or
inadvertence.
To my mind, an important distinction has to be made as to whether the omission of a forced
heir in the Will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by
mistake or inadvertence, there is true preterition and total intestacy results. The reason for
this is the "inability to determine how the testator would have distributed his estate if none
of the heirs had been omitted or forgotten.
The requisites of preterition are:
1 .
The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);
2 .
The omission is by mistake or thru an oversight;
3 .
The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will.
On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a defective
disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case the institution is not
wholly void by only insofar as it prejudices the legitime of the persons disinherited. Stated
otherwise, the nullity is partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.
Preterition is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if the testator had
known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the execution of the will, he
would have instituted such heir. On the other hand, if the testator attempts to disinherit a
compulsory heir, the presumption of the law is that he wants such heir to receive as little
as possible from his estate.
In the case at bar, there seems to have been a mistake or inadvertence in the omission of
the adopted daughter, hence my concurrence in the result that total intestacy ensued.
SEANGIO v REYES
G.R. No. 140372-72, 27 November 2006
508 SCRA 177
Seangio resolves a number of legal questions. First, it confirms that where the sole
disposition of a purported will is the disinheritance of a compulsory heir, the disinheritance
is considered a property disposition. Therefore, the document is must be considered a will
because it conveys property. Second, the failure of the testator to institute an heir or to
even mention by name any of the compulsory heir, per se, does not constitute preterition.
Third, the Court gave an indication of what could constitute maltreatment which would give
an ascendant a ground to disinherit a descendant under Article 919.
Azcuna, J.:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents
1
filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioner Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and full command of her faculties; 2)
the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her
the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the
Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred
that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to
be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, x x x was
filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings
should take precedence over Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinoman
Ako si Segundo Seangio, Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St.
Ermita, Manila, at nagtataglay ng maliwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan
at hayagan inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang panganay kong anak na si
Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay nagging lapastangan sa akin at isang beses siya ay
nagsalita ng masama sa harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio
labis kong ikinasama ng loob at sasabe rin ni Alfredo s akin ako nasa ibabaw
ngayon ngunit darating ang araw na nasa ilalim sia at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis king ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit in Alfredo ng akin pangalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Banking Corporation na million pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito
ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng
China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga
customer ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinangasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si
Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilangin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan
kong inaalisan ng lahat at anomang mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay
hindi do siya anak at hindi sia makoha mana.
Nilagdaan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi.

(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
( s i g n e d )
(signed)

D y Y i e n g S e a n g i o

Ikalawang Saksi
(signed)
Ikatlong Saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and Sp. Proc. No.
99-93396 were consolidated.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the
will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo,
and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named or instituted as heir,
devisee or legatee, hence there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being
the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to
rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face
of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of the decedent; and 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or
heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order dismissing the petition for probate.
A perusal of the document termed as will by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned
thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the
New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is
concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct
line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition for to do otherwise would
amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v
Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made it clear: for .
Respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void . Would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort and expense,
plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.
x
x
x
Petitioners argue as follows:
x x x
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather its
title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will
on its face is not intrinsically void.
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since
there was no institution of an heir.
x x x
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was
dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the
document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In fact, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same
must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document,
the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
x x x
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided in Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is
an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of
the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed him in the
absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give
effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals,
or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the
document, even it captioned Kasulatan ng Pag-aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to
be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of
a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue of preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to an altercation between Segundo and his son Alfredo.
x x x
In view of the foregoing, the trial court therefore should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent takes precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP. Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No.
98090870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
RAMIREZ v RAMIREZPRIVATE
No. L-27952, 15 February 1982
111 SCRA 704
Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the opinion that a fideicommissary
substitution is in fact a disguised case of successive institutions. This is because both the
first and the second heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The beneficial
use and possession of the inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime at most,
and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The law requires that the first and second
heirs must be "one degree apart" from each other. This limitation became the object of two
divergent views. One view holds that the "one degree" apart rule refers to one transfer.
Ramirez settled the controversy by upholding the more restrictive view.
In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of
land does not permit an alien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such
a ruling apply to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a
compulsory heir?
Abad Santos, J.:
x
x
x
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix. In
due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) pro-indivisa de un
terreno, con sus mejoras y
edificaciones, situando en la Ecolta Manila
P 500,000
Una sexta parte (1/6) pro-indivisa de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en
Antipolo, Rizal
658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones de
l a
Central Azucarera de la
Carlota a P17.00 por accion
8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seiz (10,806) acciones de
la CentralLuzon Milling Co. disuelta y en
liquidacion, a P-.15 por accion
1,620.00
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Company
2,350.73
TOTAL 512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al banco de las Islas Filipinas,
garantizada con prenda de las
acciones de La Carlota
5,000.00
Valor Liquido P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A. En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambos menores de edad,
residentes en Manila. I.F., calle Wright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D.
Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciproca entre ambos.
El precendente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca
Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en
atencion a que dicha propiedad due crecion del querido padre del otorgante y por
ser aquellos continuadores del appelido Ramirez.
B. Y en usufructo a saber -
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni, No.
33, Siene, Francia, con sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da.
Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina, Avenida de los
Reyes 13,
b. Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da.
Wanda de Wrobleski, con sustitucion vulgar y fieicomisaria, a saber -
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan
Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina, Palma de Mallorca; y en cuanto a la
mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis
Building, Florida St., Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideicomisarias precedentemente ordinadas,
las usufructuarias nombradas con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier momento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin
intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property
of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow "en pleno
dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and
Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propiedad." Furthermore, one-third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor
of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions
for vulgar substitution in favor of Wande de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct
and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's
usufruct are invalid because the first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b)
that the provisions for fideicommisary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs
are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of
the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle, and the appellants, violates the
testator's express will to give the property to them. Nonetheless, the lower court approved
the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and
Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1 .
The Widow's legitime.
The appellants do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full
ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired the widow's legitime.
Indeed, under article 900 of the Civil Code, "If the only survivor is the widow or widower,
she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone
survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose
no burden, encumbrance, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par.
2, Civil Code)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably
so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the
testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo
erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her
legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the
testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and
tended to favor Wanda.
2 .
The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may
enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted" (Art. 857, Civil Code)
and that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or
compendious, reciprocal and fideicommissary. (Art. 858, Civil Code) According to
Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal
classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely
variations of these two." [III Civil Code, p. 185 (1973)]
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir
or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs die before him, or should not wish, or
should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph unless the testator has
otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first
heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a
second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect,
provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir
are living at the time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: "con sustitucion vulgar a favor
de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciproca entre
ambos." The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided.
The appellants question the "sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de D. Wanda de
Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle. However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the
widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the "sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria" in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two-thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator, But dying before
the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Article 859 of the Civil Code, supra.
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their
claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary
substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola, Maura and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The supreme court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one transmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez
Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code
has obviously followed this interpretation, by providing that the substitution shall not
go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the
first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of
the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from
the fiduciary.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes
as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the
testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits
the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and the naked owners."
3 .
Usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is
void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5 Save in case of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1.2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., de Castro, Ericta, and Escolin, JJ., concur. Aquino,
J. took no part.
VDA. DE MAPA v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-38972, 28 September 1987
154 SCRA 294
Mapa resolved a dispute between two sides of a family with respect to the interpretation of
a testamentary disposition obligating the surviving husband to deliver to the nephews and
nieces (both on the side of the deceased and on his side) the residue of the entire estate.
Claimants advance the theory that the obligation of the surviving husband constituted either
(a) an express trust, or (b) an institution subject to a fideicommissary substitution. It will be
noted that if the testamentary disposition were to be treated as a fideicommissary
substitution, the substitution would have been void since the second heirs are not related to
the first heir within the first degree by consanguinity, as required in Ramirez v Ramirez,
infra. If the substitution were to be declared void, the surviving husband would have
inherited the residue of the estate free and clear of any condition or encumbrance.
Consequently, upon his demise, the nephews and nieces coming from the side of the
deceased wife would be excluded from participating in the distribution of the properties. It is
worthwhile noting that the properties in question were largely from the estate of the
deceased wife.
If equity were to be taken into account, the decision of the Supreme Court would seem to
be correct. However, the decision fail to argue convincingly that the testatrix indeed
intended to constitute a trust.
Fernan, J.:
On January 16, 1965, petitioners Paz Garcia vda. de Mapa, et al., instituted Civil Case
59566 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the estate of the
late Ludovico Hidrosollo, then subject of Special Proceedings No. 52229 of the same court,
the properties left by the late Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo. They claimed that the
deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament dated June 2,
1951 and admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 46015, instituted Ludovico
Hidrosollo as universal heir to the residue of her estate with the obligation as trustee to hold
the same in trust for petitioners herein who are nephews and nieces of the deceased
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo and for respondents Luis, Teodoro, Victorina, Corazon and
Violeta, x x x Rosario and Magdalena, all surnamed Hidrosollo, who are nephews and
nieces of Ludovico Hidrosollo; that Ludovico, however, died without fulfilling the obligation
so that the estate of Concepcion formed part of the estate of Ludovico. They prayed in the
alternative that judgment be rendered either (a) declaring a trust to have been created in
their favor and their co-beneficiaries over the residue of the estate of Concepcion Mapa de
Hidrosollo and ordering therein defendants Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo, as administrators
of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo, to deliver to them 6/13 of the said properties; or (b)
declaring the institution of Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir with a provision for
fideicommissary substitution in their favor and their co-beneficiaries as null and void,
declaring the residue of the estate of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo to have been subject
to intestate succession, clearing them to be the sole heirs to said residue and ordering
therein defendants Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo to turn over to them the said properties.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the existence of a trust and alleged that Ludovico
Hidrosollo, being the surviving spouse of the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo,
became the latter's universal heir when she died without descendants or ascendants; that
as such universal heir, Ludovico stepped into the rights, title and claims of the deceased
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, so that the controverted properties became part of his
own estate subject to settlement in Special Proceedings No. 52229. They further claimed
that Civil Case No. 59566 was barred by the order of the same court sitting as a probate
court in Special Proceedings No. 52229 which denied petitioners' motion for intervention,
and that petitioners, in having instituted Civil Case No. 59566 has forfeited any benefits
under the will.
In disposing the same, the lower court ruled that a trust was created over the properties of
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo in favor of petitioners and respondents; that in resisting
petitioners' claim, however, respondents had forfeited their rights thereto; and that the
denial of petitioners' motion to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 52229 did not deprive
the petitioners of their right to institute a separate action to recover what pertains to them in
their own right. Thus, the lower court ordered respondents Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo or
whoever of the rest of therein defendants had disposition of the properties, to reconvey the
same in favor of petitioners, to render an accounting of the income of said properties and to
deliver to petitioners the net proceeds of such income.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but were denied the relief
sought. Their appeal to the Court of Appeals proved fruitful as the appellate court reversed
the decision of the lower court and ruled instead that no trust nor fideicommissary
substitution was created in Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo's will and that petitioners' claim
was barred by a final judgment, i.e., the order denying their motion to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 5229 from which no appeal was taken.
Hence this present recourse, petitioners maintaining that the will of Concepcion Mapa de
Hidrosollo created a trust in their favor, not a fideicommissary substitution, and that the
denial of their motion in Special Proceedings No. 52229 did not constitute a bar to Civil
Case No. 59566.
We find both contentions meritorious.
A careful perusal and scrutiny of the pertinent provisions of Concepcion Mapa de
Hidrosollo's will reveal that she intended to create a trust in favor of both petitioners and
private respondents. These provisions read:
x
x
x
Thus, under paragraph 8 of the will, Ludovico Hidrosollo was instituted as sole and
universal heir to the rest of the properties not covered by the legacies in the preceding
paragraphs. Under paragraph 9, however, said Ludovico Hidrosollo was charged (encargo)
with the obligation to deliver the rest of the estate in equal parts to the Mapa, Salazar and
Hidrosollo nephews and nieces, who, as beneficiaries, were directed to deliver annually to
one Salvador Genova, during his lifetime, 12 cavans of palay on the condition that the latter
assist Luis Hidrosollo in each harvest. Said beneficiaries were likewise required to allow
said Salvador Genova to maintain his house on a parcel of land situated at Ilaud,
Municipality of Dumarao, without payment of any compensation.
In paragraph 11 of the same will, the testatrix expressly provided that any obligations which
her husband might incur after her death, shall be charged against the share corresponding
to the Hidrosollo nephews and nieces, and in no case shall the participation of her own
nephews and nieces be charged with said obligations. She likewise expressed the wish
that all her properties should always remain in co-ownership among her beneficiaries, who
should abstain from selling or encumbering the same in any manner whatsoever (par 13)
and that the same be administered jointly by Ignacio Salazar and Luis Hidrosollo, or in case
of their inability, by a nephew or niece from each of the two groups (par 15).
Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the will, the testatrix's intent to create one
is nonetheless clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in her will. In designating her
husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the
properties to petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should
vest in him, and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as
"beneficiarios", she intended that the beneficial or equitable interest to these properties
should repose in them. To our mind, these designations, coupled with the other provisions
for co-ownership and joint administration of the properties, as well as the other conditions
imposed by the testatrix effectively created a trust in favor of the parties over the properties
adverted to in the will. "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust,
it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended."
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the surviving spouse of the testatrix,
Ludovico Hidrosollo was entitled to a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate. As
that portion is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition
or substitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposed upon the legitime by the testator.
The trust created by Concepcion Mapa de should therefore be, as it is hereby declared to
be effective only on the free portion of her estate, i.e., that portion not covered by Ludovico
Hidrosollo's legitime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40448-A is hereby
reversed. Private respondents Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo or their successors as
administrators of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo are hereby ordered to deliver to
petitioners their lawful shares in the trust constituted over the free portion of the estate of
Concepcion Mapa. Said Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo or their successors are further
ordered to render an accounting of the income of the properties pertaining to petitioners
and to deliver to the latter the net proceeds of such income. No pronouncement as to costs.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
CRISOLOGO v SINGSON
No. L-13876, 28 February 1962
4 SCRA 491
Crisologo stresses that the essence of a fideicommissary substitution is the imposition of an
obligation on the part of the first heir to preserve and to transmit the property to the second
heir upon the former's death or upon the happening of a particular event. The obligation to
preserve and transmit must be done in an expressed manner either by calling the
substitution fideicommissary, or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation to
preserve and deliver the inheritance to the second heir. In the absence of either, the
substitution would at best be considered simple or vulgar.
Two points raised in the decision should be noted. First, it inferred that if Consolacion were
instituted subject to a fideicommissary substitution, her rights would be limited to that of a
usufructuary. This is error, because the first heir in a fideicommissary substitution acquires
title to the property, subject merely to the resolutory term of the substitution. Second, while
the court ruled that the substitution is simple, it stated in the penultimate paragraph that the
substitution shall take place whether the death of Consolacion takes place before or after
the death of the testatrix. There seems to be something wrong with the statement.
Substitution was premised precisely upon the death of Consolacion, and for no other
cause. Therefore, if Consolacion survives the testatrix, as in fact she did survive, then the
substitution becomes academic. To allow the substitution even if Consolacion were to
survive the testatrix would be to give effect to a fideicommissary substitution, which the
same court overturned. The resulting conclusion would be in contradiction with the finding
that no fideicommissary substitution was intended by the testatrix.
Dizon, J.:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco
Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at Plaridel
Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax Declaration No. 10765-C. Their complaint
alleged that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion
Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of
Dona Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to and
approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Special Proceedings No. 453; that
plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendants refused to
accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.
Defendants' defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not
the owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was
not entitled to demand partition thereof.
After trial upon the issues thus posed, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
1 .
Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the defendants of
the house and lot described in the complaint to the extent of each of an
undivided 1/2 portion thereof;
2 .
Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement of partition of
the said property within 30 days from receipt of this judgment, unless it be
shown that the division thereof may render it unserviceable, in which case
the provisions of Art. 498 of the New Civil Code may be applied;
x
x
x
From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.
It is admitted that Dona Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the
owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she executed
her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 3605-R. At the time of
the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and
Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece
Consolacion, all surnamed Florentino.
Clause IX of her will reads as follows:
NOVENO - Ordeno que se de a mis nieta por parte de mis hermana mia y que al
mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y es la
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO;
(A) La mitad de mi casa de materiales fuertes con techo de hierro galvanizado,
incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de Vigan, Ilocos Sur, calle
Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del
apellido Kairuz. Pero, si falleciere antes o despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta
propiedad se dara por dos partes iguales entre mis tres hermanos, Evaristo,
Manuel y Dionisio, o a sus herederos forzosos en el case de que alguno de ellas
muriere antes. x x x."
The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for
what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. The issue is, we believe,
controlled by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the
effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the testatrix died on January 13,
1948. x x x."
In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator may not only
designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for substitutes in
the event that said heirs do not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or
legacies, or die ahead of him.
The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with the obligation, in
the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another person, totally or partially, upon the
occurrence of a particular event.
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a
substitution of the heir named in therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion
Florentino - whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix - the property
bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the
testatrix' three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone
of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known as
sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the
death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it
provided for sustitucion fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than
usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be
entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full
ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the
time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude
ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired by
another person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario.
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommisary substitution that an obligation be clearly
imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the
estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For
this reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall
have no effect unless it is made expressly (de una manera expresa) either by giving it such
name or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation (obligacion terminante) to
deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. x x x.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind,
nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall
only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership
thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides
that upon appellee's death - whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix - her
share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dona
Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution of Consolacion
Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of
the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes and de Leon, JJ., concur.
RODRIGUEZ v COURT OF APPEALSPRIVATE
No. L-287334, 28 March 1969
27 SCRA 546
A testamentary disposition prohibiting the alienation of the hereditary estate for a period
exceeding twenty years is void. However, the Court has ruled that the nullity refers not to
the prohibition to alienate, but to the prohibition in excess of the first twenty years.
Justice Fernando made a cryptic statement in the penultimate paragraph of the decision.
He opined that the intestate heirs may never even have the right to challenge the question
provision of the will which created the trust. Is he suggesting that the said intestate heirs
(first cousin of the testatrix) must survive the twenty year period in order to have the
personality, at that time, to challenge the trust? If so, is there a suggestion that the
successional right of the intestate heirs would ripen only if they survive the period? This
point is important for two reasons: (a) the first cousins are relatives of the testatrix within the
fifth degree, and beyond which relationship with the testatrix is no longer recognized by law;
(b) the said first cousins, assuming they do not survive the twenty-year period, cannot,
under the present law, be represented by their own respective descendants.
Fernando, J.:
A will is the testator speaking after death. The law listens and yields obedience, unless in
the preparation thereof or in the disposition made therein there is a failure to follow a legal
norm. In the present suit, there was none as to the formalities required, the will in question
having been probated on September 23, 1960. As to its intrinsic validity, there apparently
was none either as shown by the project of partition having been approved by the lower
court, again, without opposition.
As more specifically set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals of January 18, 1967,
the reconsideration of which after about a year, to be more precise, on January 8, 1968, led
to this petition for certiorari: "It appears from the record that Doa Margarita Rodriguez died
in the City of Manila on July 19, 1960, leaving a last will and testament under date of
September 30, 1951 and that said last will and testament was legalized by virtue of the
resolution or order of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of September 23,
1960, without the appellants' opposition in Special Proceeding No. 3845, hence the
extrinsic validity of the will was substantially not in question. On August 27, 1962, the
executor of the last will and testament of the late Doa Margarita Rodriguez presented a
project of partition and the same was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
again without opposition of the appellants. Hence, the intrinsic validity of the will could
never be again questioned and raised as issue in the trusteeship proceedings No. 51872 of
the same court.
One would expect, therefore, that the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals would write
finis to this litigation. Unfortunately, it was not so. It ought not to have been the case, for, as
admitted, the deceased, to quote from the language of the January 18, 1967 decision of the
Court of Appeals, "at the time of her death left no compulsory or forced heirs and,
consequently, (was) free to dispose of her properties even to strangers at will as provided in
her will." It was likewise noted therein that the testatrix created a trust which was objected
to by private respondents, who claimed to be first cousins of the deceased. Such an
objection was overruled by the lower court which granted letters of trusteeship to
petitioners, who were the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower court was
appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in the original decision of January
18, 1967, affirmed the action taken by the Court of First Instance.
A motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a resolution of January
8, 1968, which set aside its previous decision of January 18, 1967 and modified the
judgment appealed from insofar as the validity of the provision of clause 10 of the will
creating the trusteeship was concerned. The disputed clause reads thus:
[Clausula Decima o Pang Sampu]. Ipinaguutos ko na ang mga pag-aaring
nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay pangangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga ang
ipagbubukas ng "Fideicomiso" sa Juzgado sa pagkatapos na maayos ang
naiwanan kong pag-aari. Ang pangangasiwaang pag-aari ay ang mga sumusunod:
x x x. Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi sa Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang
"generator" at "automobile") hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa
pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang
pondo na gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi o ipagpapagawa ng panibago at alinsunod sa
kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon.
In the resolution setting aside the original decision of January 18, 1967, the Court of
Appeals held that the above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property mentioned,
constitutes a clear violation of Article 867 and Article 870 of the Civil Code. It was further
stated in the aforesaid resolution that the Court of Appeals did arrive "at the considered
view that the trust in question is a nullity for being in violation of the aforestated rules
(against perpetuities and the limitation regarding the inalienability of the hereditary estate)."
There being no institution of heirs as regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court
of Appeals held that "there should be intestate succession concerning the same, with the
nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the properties in accordance with the law
on intestacy. The case should, therefore, be remanded to the lower court." Hence this
petition for certiorari to review the aforesaid resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The validity of the above clause was not passed upon in the decision of January 18, 1967
of the Court of Appeals; rather, it was assumed. The view that then prevailed was that the
approval of the project of partition sufficed to dispose of that question. The challenged
resolution of January 8, 1968 betrayed a change of heart of the Court of Appeals. It
explained why:
The contention of [petitioner] that there had already been a project of partition
approved by the lower court [which] operates as a waiver on the part of the
[respondents] to raise the issue of the invalidity of the questioned provision of the
will which We have sustained in our decision, seems to be not well taken. We have
discovered from the records that the properties involved in this case have not been
disposed of as yet and are still within the reach of the probate court. The necessary
procedure, therefore, in accordance with the law as delineated in the above
discussion, should be observed. The order of the lower court granting the petition
for the formation of the trust in question should be annulled as being in violation of
the rules against perpetuities and the limitation on the prohibition for the alienation
of the property left by the deceased.
We will not deviate from the approach thus taken by the Court of Appeals in the challenged
resolution of January 8, 1968, but we differ in our conclusion. We find the clause, at least
insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned, in accordance with the Civil Code
provision. Accordingly, we find for petitioners and reverse the Court of Appeals.
The validity of the clause in question if interpreted to conform to the controlling legal norm
prescribed by the Civil Code cannot be assailed. If the January 18, 1967 decision of the
Court of Appeals were to be modified, it is only in the above sense. The reconsideration, as
was done in the challenged resolution, which would have the effect of partial intestacy, was
uncalled for.
It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the testatrix did make clear her
purpose not to mortgage or to sell forever more (kailan man) certain properties left by her.
There would seem then some justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged
resolution to deny force and effect to such a wish considering that "a perpetual prohibition
to alienate" is by the Civil Code forbidden. The more controlling provision, however, as
already made mention of is supplied by Article 870. Its terms are clear. "The dispositions of
the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are
void."
The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is
declared void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year
period. In the interim, such a provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot
be stricken down. Time and time again, we have said, and we now repeat, that when a
legal provision is clear and to the point, there is no room for interpretation. It must be
applied according to its literal terms.
Even with the purpose that the testatrix had in mind were not as unequivocal, still the same
conclusion emerged. There is no room for intestacy as would be the effect if the challenged
resolution of January 8, 1968 were not set aside. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the
law. Her will must be given effect. This is so even if there could be an element of
uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. In the language of a Civil
Code provision:
If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt,
that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.
Nor is this all. A later article of the Civil Code equally calls for observance. Thus:
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy.
The net result would be to reaffirm the conclusion reached that the challenged resolution of
January 8, 1968 is objectionable, in view of its lack of fidelity to the controlling legal norm.
In no other way can there be deference paid to what the testator had in mind. This Court so
emphatically expressed it in a decision rendered more than sixty years ago. Thus:
Respect for the will of the testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition,
constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law prescribed for the correct
interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words and provisions therein
written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and
real purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be respected
and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties in interest. Such is the
doctrine established by the supreme court of Spain, constantly maintained in a
great number of decisions, among which are those of March 24, 1863, April 28,
1882, and December 16, 1903.
Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed to prevail that we could even vary the language of the will for the
purpose of giving it effect. Thus:
Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and
surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of
expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give
effect to such intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict
wording and read a word or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily
attributed to it, and for such purpose may mould or change the language of the will,
such as restricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases.
A more recent reiteration of such an attitude is found in an opinion by former Chief Justice
Paras. Thus:
As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva Villapana in leaving
her properties to the person named in the will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-
appellees. Suffice it to state that the trial court itself found the will to have been executed
free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with Oliva having testamentary
capacity; and in such a situation it becomes our duty to give expression to her will.
What further fortifies the view taken by us is the admitted fact, as was expressed in the
January 18, 1967 decision of the Court of Appeals that at the time of her death the
deceased "left no compulsory heirs or forced heirs and, consequently, free to dispose of her
properties even to strangers x x x as provided in her will." That is what she did and
petitioners have no valid cause for complaint, at least not one cognizable in a court of
justice.
As we had occasion to state: "Though it might appear right that Amado Clemente should
receive something from the estate because he, together with Ariston Bustamante, has been
raised by the testatrix, and both are her relatives, nevertheless it would be venturesome for
us to advance our own idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a different
mode of disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix on the later will. As she had no
forcible heirs, she was absolutely free to give her estate to whomsoever she chose, subject
of course to the payment of her debts. It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the
interpretation of a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable decision
of the estate of a deceased person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to
carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the will. Once that intention has
been determined through a careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on
legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial cognizance to inquire into
the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequest. It might be said that it is hard to
understand how, in a temporary anger at Amando Clemente, the testatrix would entirely cut
him off from the inheritance. We should not, however, sit in judgment upon her motives and
sentiments, first because, as already stated, nothing in the law restrained her from
disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no
adequate means of ascertaining the inward processes of her conscience. She was the sole
judge of her own attitude toward those who expected her bounty."
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the provision in
question. It had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-year period
is still with us. What would transpire thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future,
beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, we cannot anticipate. Nor should
we. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause of action to a party when,
under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 18, 1968 of the Court of Appeals is set aside, thus
leaving in full force and effect its decision of January 18, 1967, which affirmed the lower
court order of May 11, 1964. With costs against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur. Capistrano, J., did not take part.
RABADILLA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725, 29 June 2000
334 SCRA 522
Rabadilla distinguished between a conditional institution and a modal institution, It also
discussed the various forms of substitution of heirs.
Justice Purisima concluded that in case of doubt, the institution must be deemed modal
and not conditional. Following his discussion, he noted that while a modal institution
obliges, it does not suspend the effectivity of the institution. On the other hand, a conditional
institution suspends the efficacy of the institution, although it does not impose any
obligation on the instituted heir.
One question that should probably be asked is: what happens to the mortgage in favor of
PNB and RPB upon the cancellation of the title of the property in the names of the heirs of
Dr. Rabadilla? If the mortgage is to be honored, the heirs of Aleja Belleza will receive the
property subject to the encumbrance. On the other hand, if the mortgage is to be cancelled,
PNB and RBP will be prejudiced.
Purisima, J.:
In a codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511,855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted x
x x contained the following provisions:
FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre covered by Transfer Certificate of title No.
RT-4002 (10942) x x x.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and
the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged
by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
x
x
x
FOURTH
(a) It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 x x
x Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
Twenty-five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heirs to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 x x
x shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar specified in the Fourth
Paragraph of this testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of
December of each year.
SIXTH
I command x x x that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I
have left and bequeathed, and his heirs shall later sell, lease, mortgage this Lot, the
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and
TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly
should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latters heirs, and shall
turn it over to my near descendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the
obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall
die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this
Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
sister.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in this name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint
x x x in Bacolod City against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The complaint alleged that the defendant heirs
violated the conditions of the Codicil in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic
Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrixs specific instruction to sell, lease or
mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendants-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred
(100) piculs of sugar x x x to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil,
despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6
th
paragraph of the Codicil which provided
that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee or
mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop
year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/
return Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No.
44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new
Certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
x
x
x
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-
law of herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of
defendant heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
That during the crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, to wit: x x x.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88 will be
complied with in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and
which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of
sugar during each crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid and delivered on a staggered cash
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to
wit: x x x.
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except
for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988-1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
c o m p l a i n t a n d d i s p o s i n g a s f o l l o w s :
x
x
x
On appeal by the plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellants right to
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-
appellees obligation under Aleja Bellezas codicil, as heirs of a modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-
appellees admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the
punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of
Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of non-
compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot
No. 1392 from the estate of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However,
plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Bellezas
estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to
Aleja Bellezas legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil,
to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No.
1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over
Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found its way
to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering
the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6
of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a
modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contents that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance
with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole
issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains
that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix
intended a mere simple substitution i.e., the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be
substituted by the testatrixs near descendants should the obligation to deliver the fruits to
herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and
without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be
given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as near
descendants without a definite identity or reference as to who are the near descendants
and therefore, under Articles 843 and 845 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be
deemed as not written,
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of
Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation.
The Court of Appeals found that the private respondents had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the
private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject
Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother
and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights
were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the
estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his right and title over said property, and they also assumed his (decedents)
obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent
over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the
latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institution is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was
to be substituted by the testatrixs near descendants should there be noncompliance with
the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
inherit, as in a simple substitution; or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommisary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitution, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrixs near descendants would substitute
him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over
to the testatrixs near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct.
In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property
and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the
instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the
negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important
element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking: the obligation clearly imposing upon
the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir.
Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from the testatrix
is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under
Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted
must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.
In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr, Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 862 of the New
Civil Code is the provision of law in point.
x
x
x
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law
of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the
testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property
left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A mode
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his right
to succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition
must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.
To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadillas inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrixs near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from
the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution
should be considered as modal and not conditional.
x
x
x
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to delivery One Hundred
(100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella (sic). Such obligation is imposed
on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
should they sell, lease, mortgage other otherwise negotiate the property involved. The
Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not
respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella (sic) shall seize the property and turn it over to the
testatrixs near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrixs near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed on his successor-in-interest, the
sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally
apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioners submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement,
the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever
obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to
have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the
fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject
property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner
in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 23, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Melo (Chairman), J., I concur as well in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Vitug, J., Plese see separate (concurring in result) opinion.
Panganiban, J., I join the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., No part.
Separate Opinion
Vitug, J.:
x
x
x
A mode is distinguished from a condition contemplated in the rules on succession in that
the latter dictates the efficacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory manner, of a
testamentary disposition while the former obligates the instituted heir to comply with the
mandate made by the testator but does not prevent the heir from at once claiming the
inheritance provided he gives a security to ensure compliance with the will of the testator
and the return of the thing received together with its fruits and interests, should (the heir)
disregard this obligation. The obligation imposed upon the heir or legatee is deemed not to
be a condition for his entry forthwith into the inheritance unless a contrary intention of the
testator is evident. In case of doubt, the institution is considered modal, rather than
conditional. Much of the variance in the legal effects of the two classes, however, is now
practically theoretical and merely conceptual. Under the old Civil Code an institucion sub
modo could be said more akin to an institution sub demostratione, or an expression of a
wish or suggestion of the testator that did not have any real obligatory force, that matter
being left to instead to the discretion of the heir; i.e., whether to abide by it or not. The
amendatory provisions of the new Civil Code now hardly differentiates between the
principal effect of the non-compliance with the mode and that of the occurrence of a
resolutory condition expressed in the will. In both instances, the property must be returned
to the estate of the decedent to then pass on under the rules of intestacy.
ACCORDINGLY, I also vote for the dismissal of the instant petition,

FRANCISCO v FRANCISCO-ALFONSO
G.R. No. 138774, 8 March 2001
354 SCRA 112
The legitime is a portion of the estate of the deceased person which is reserved by law for
the compulsory heirs. An attempt to deprive a compulsory heir of the legitime by way of a
simulated sale will not be tolerated. The simulated sale will be set aside.
In this case, the simulation of sale was proved by the fact that neither of the two buyers of
the property had sufficient financial resources to justify their acquisition of the property by
way of a cash purchase. And because the decedent had no property other than those
parcels of land which he allegedly sold to his illegitimate daughters, the simulation of said
sale resulted in the dissipation of his assets and the deprivation of the legitimate daughter
of her legitime.
The second reason proffered by the Supreme Court in sustaining the Court of Appeals is
erroneous. The Courts reasoning was: even if the sale was not simulated, the same
violated Aidas legitime. Therefore, the sale is void. The reasoning is flawed. If the sale was
bona fide in that consideration was indeed paid, then Aida would have no cause to
complain, because her father Gregorio, in his lifetime had every right to dispose the land for
valuable consideration. Aidas legitime will have to be determined at the time of death of
Gregorio, at which time, the land had already been validly sold.
The Courts argument seems to suggest that the simulated sale was Gregorios way of
depriving Aida of her rightful participation in the distribution of his estate. However, there is
nothing in the decision that would seem to prove that intent. Indeed, the decision states that
Gregorio confided to Aida that the titles to the property were in the possession of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. There is no indication that he admitted to having
fraudulently sold the property to the latter. The inference is that the titles were merely
entrusted to Regina and Zenaida. Consequently, I fail to appreciate the Courts suggestion
that the transfer of the property to Regina and Zenaida was Gregorios way to transfer the
property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter.
In any event, there is merit to the nullification of the sale based on the first theory that the
sale was simulated. I do not believe that the second reason preferred by the Court is
correct, nor did it support the conclusion.
Pardo, J.:
x
x
x
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfoso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses
Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are not both deceased.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his
common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When
Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the
certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 29, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her
half sisters. They informed her that Gregoria had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983.
After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to
Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida
Pascual.
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late
father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983,
was a forgery.
In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of
the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint. x x x
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable
thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment:
sustaining the validity of the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan (Exh.G) executed on 15
August 1983 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the defendants;
affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. I) issued to
defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. H) issued to defendant Zenaida
Pascual; and
dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants counterclaim for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of merit.
In time, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing that of the trial court x x x.
Hence this petition.
x
x
x
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and
Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the
property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating
a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW
(Ready to Wear) items in August of 1982 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000. She did not withdraw
money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the
property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross
earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00 and she earned P50.00 a night at
the club.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor selling nilugaw, earning a net
income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.
She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or
that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as
to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was
bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single
witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no consideration for the sale, the same was simulated and hence null and
void.
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions
insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983,
when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters
at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent
Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death,
Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
x
x
x
Gregorio did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the
only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in
her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only
legitimate child.
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived
of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur,
CASTRO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 50974-75, 31 May 1989
173 SCRA 656
An illegitimate child is a compulsory heir of his or her parent. Under the Civil Code, the
successional right of an illegitimate child is conditioned upon the fact of recognition,
whether voluntary or involuntary. The requirement of recognition has been abolished under
the Family Code. Thus, under the present law, an illegitimate child inherits regardless of
whether or not his or her parent recognized him or her as a child. The antecedent facts of
the present case occurred while the Civil Code was still in force. Accordingly, the legal
issues raised in the case should be governed by the provision of the said Code. However,
the Supreme Court applied the more liberal provisions of the Family Code on the basis of
the provision of Article 256 of the Family Code which allowed a retroactive application,
provided no vested or acquired rights are impaired.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
x
x
x
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brothers and sisters of the late
Eustaquio Castro while respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio.
Respondent Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.
The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the case as follows:
In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v Benita Castro,
the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging,
among other things, that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in
Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27, 1923.
In Civil Case No. 3763, plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for partition
of properties against Benita Castro Naval, alleging, among other things, that they
are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on
August 24, 1961 and that they are entitled to the partition of the properties of said
deceased.
The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro
Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is
the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of
action.
With leave of court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints whereby they
converted the original action for partition into an action for quieting of title.
Defendant's husband Cipriano Naval was forthwith impleaded as party-defendant.
In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for appointment as
receiver and for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 3762. The trial court,
however, denied said petition for appointment of received, but granted the petition
for writ of preliminary injunction and also adjudged Marcelina Bautista who is the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of
P100.00.
Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a receiver and
preliminary injunction as well as the motion for contempt were related to the merits
of the case, the parties stipulated that evidence therein be considered as evidence
in the trial on the merits.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved in this
case is as to whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged
natural child of Eustaquio Castro. In view of this stipulation, defendant Benita
Naval was allowed to introduce evidence to show that she was indeed the
acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro.
The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio Castro who was already dead were the
children of the deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago. Marcelina
Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3763, is the surviving spouse of the
deceased Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro died on August 23, 1961 and
Pricola Maregmen died on September 11, 1924.
It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio Castro and
Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919 in San Bartolome, Tarlac.
Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth gave the date indicated
in the civil registry that he was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the
Roman Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the baptismal certificate
appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen.
When Eustaquio Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate members
of the family in mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval. On
this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 admitted that
defendant Benita Castro Naval is the forced heir of Eustaquio Castro and a
compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro in Civil Case No. 3763.
The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita C.
Naval who was a resident of Mayantoc, Tarlac, was wedded to Felix de Maya of
Anoling, Camiling, Tarlac against her wishes on May 23, 1913. While the
celebration of the wedding in Anoling, Camiling, Tarlac was going on, the guests
soon found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party and went to the
house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio Malacampa, also in Anoling,
Camiling, Tarlac, and there she cried that she did not want to get married to Felix
de Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San Bartolome, Mayantoc,
Tarlac, where she united with her real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of
Benita Castro Naval.
Antonio Maregmen, the brother of Pricola Maregmen who was then in the wedding
party learned of the disappearance of his sister. He finally found her living with
Eustaquio Castro. A few days later, Eustaquio Castro accompanied by two persons
went to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac and informed them
that Pricola was already living with him as husband and wife. Pricola's parents
merely submitted to their daughter's wishes, so Eustaquio Castro and Pricola
Maregmen lived as husband and wife until the death of Pricola on September 11,
1924.
There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived with Pricola
Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry Pricola. As a result of
their cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born on March 27,
1919. After the death of her mother, when she was only five years old, she
continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until his death on August 22,
1961. Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval got married to Cipriano Naval, it was
Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in marriage. Even after Benita's marriage,
she was taken care of by her father.
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and
recognized natural child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the
partition of the properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the civil cases. As
stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is
the acknowledged natural and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the private respondent is an
acknowledged natural and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro in the following manner:
x x x. The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of Eustaquio Castro
appears in the records of birth and partition. Recognition shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing
(Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a voluntary recognition already established which did
not need any judicial pronouncement. In Javelona v Onteclaro, 74 Phil 393, the
Supreme Court clarified the distinction between voluntary recognition and
compulsory recognition. In the first place, a voluntary recognition is made in a
public document, whereas in the indubitable writing under Article 135 is a private
document. The father would ordinarily be more careful about what he said in a
public document than in a private writing, so that even an incidental mention of the
child as his in a public document deserves full faith and credit. In the second place,
in an action on Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the natural child merely asks for a
share in the inheritance by virtue of his having been acknowledged as such, and is
not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the acknowledgment, whereas
the action based on Article 135 is to compel the father or his heirs to recognize the
child. In the former case, acknowledgment has been formally and legally
accomplished because the public character of the document makes judicial
pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter case, recognition is yet to be
ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty and
higher authenticity of a public document is not self-executory. A final judgment in
favor of the status of a natural child according to Article 135 must therefore be
based on an express recognition so found and declared by the court after hearing.
At this juncture. it is to be noted that an action based on voluntary acknowledgment
may be brought after the death of the father, but not an action to compel
acknowledgment, as a general rule (Art. 137, Civil Code) which shows the liberality
of the law as to voluntary recognition, and its strictness towards compulsory
acknowledgment.
While it is true that Pricola Maregmen, Benita's mother was married to Naval (sic),
it is the rule, however, that in case the recognition is made by only one of the
parents, it will be presumed that the child is natural if the parents recognizing it had
the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of the conception (Art. 277, Civil
Code). The presumption arises from the act of recognition.
What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended complaint admitted that Benita
Castro was the compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro. They cannot now contradict
their own allegation.
The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but the petitioners contend that it
erred in applying these principles to the facts of this case.
The law which now governs paternity and filiation is Title VI of the Family Code of the
Philippines, Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No.
227, July 17, 1987. We have examined the earlier provisions, however, because the Family
Code provides in its Article 256 that:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to live with
him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola fled from her
own wedding party on May 23, 1914, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been
solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated although it could not be
consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved.
x
x
x
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be
recognized voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an
unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from her parents or to their
estate because her rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the
child's acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child
arose not because she was the true or real child of her parents, but because under the law,
she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
x
x
x
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code considering the facts and
equities of this case.
First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who
was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March
27, 1919 until her father's death on August 22, 1961, or for 42 years, Benita lived with her
father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private
respondents themselves admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a
forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special
relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate
family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the
inheritance of Benita.
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There
is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from
reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it
was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial
action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the elementary period to
do so.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. The
couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death.
Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for
Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code, but they add to
the equities of this case favoring the petitioner.
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provisions of the Family Code
which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested
rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation, there are only two classes of children -
legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinction among various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated.
Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children."
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate children provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
( 1 )
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
( 2 )
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
( 1 )
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
( 2 )
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority
or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in
defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during
her lifetime.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
TAYAG v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95229, 9 June 1992
209 SCRA 665
On facts nearly identical with those of Castro v Court of Appeals, supra, the Supreme Court
arrived at a diametrically opposed conclusion. It is therefore important to distinguish
between these two cases.
Regalado, J.:
x
x
x
In said Civil Case No. 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim
for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
x
x
x
2 .
Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan,
by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the
defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties
left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in
Angeles City on September 28, 1983;
3 .
Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several
years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had
illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof,
they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with
the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
4 .
Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born
in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had been sired, showered with
exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being
his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts of some of which are
hereunder reproduced;
x
x
x
5 .
The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled
to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
6 .
The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the
owner of real and personal property located in Baguio City, Angeles City
and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value in several
millions of pesos;
7 .
The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not yet been inventoried by the
defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs, including that of said
Chad, has not likewise been ascertained;
8 .
The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are
his children: namely, Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,
Felina Ocampo and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant
complaint is filed;
9 .
Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of
friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is
urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial
support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
1 0 .
Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to
grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for
inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo;
x
x
x
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to
render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child, Chad, in the estate of the
deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allegations in the complaint. x x x.
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses,
the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
This Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings
to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to hear their
respective sides.
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature
of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in
abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case is set for pre-trial
x x x."
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987,
petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals x x x which was granted x x x and enjoined respondent judge to
resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the
affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter
denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil
Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the
following manner:
x
x
x
From all the foregoing, the court finds that the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial
on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are
unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied.
x
x
x
Petitioner contends that the action for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in
behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause
of action. She submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial
action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke
his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that
since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for
Inheritance" then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforementioned claim, and
consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino v Paulino et al., wherein the petitioner, as
plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them
to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and
alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceeding for
the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the
defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She
accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share.
The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no
cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of
the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of
majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that
an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right
to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of
action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is
an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further,
that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisdiction.
As early as 1992, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz c Briz, et al., wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the
same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the
opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in
the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the
action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
differently from that generally applicable in other cases.
x
x
x
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has
prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition,
private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is
sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish
filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of
the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of
the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the
case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given
retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law
being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to
apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
( 1 )
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
x
x
x
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
This action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth
of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public
document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous
possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint
should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must
be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article
285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of
the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority
of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the
minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the
Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the
recent case of Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals, et al., where we held that the
fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it, and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such
right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provisions of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operations, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings
taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it
at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be
prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the
filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions
of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has
not yet prescribed.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed in toto.
S O O R D E R E D .
Narvasa, (C.J., Chairman), Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur. Nocon, J., on leave.
BARITUA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82233, 22 March 1990
183 SCRA 565
While legitimate parents are considered as compulsory heirs of their legitimate child, the
parents are secondary compulsory heirs and inherit only in default of legitimate children
and decendants of the deceased. Thus, the legitimate parents have no right to demand
indemnification for the death of their deceased child, and such right to indemnification
properly belongs to the latter's descendants and/or spouse.
Sarmiento, J.:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario
along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in
an accident with JB Bus No. 80 x x x. As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his
passenger died, and the tricycle was damaged. No criminal case arising from the accident
was ever instituted.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the
matter negotiated by the petitioner and the bus' insurer - Philippine First Insurance
Company, Inc. (PFICI for brevity) - Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena vda. de
Nacario, received P18,500. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on
March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and
forever discharging them from all actions, claims and demands arising from the accident
which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased
was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally
manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the
petitioners.
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on
November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario,
filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for
their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private
respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of
their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage to the
tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim.
The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their
obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that
the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of
P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle,
P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and
for moral damages.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and
successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the
plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants
(petitioners).
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial
court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena vda. de
Nacario did not discharge the liability of petitioners because the case was instituted by the
private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors
and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages being prayed
for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages
arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners
"failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the
ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden
of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony x x x." Anent the
funeral expenses, "the expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants
(the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). x x
x Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must
accrue in their favor."
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents P10,000.00 for the damage to the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral
services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but their
motion was denied. Hence this petition.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being payment. Article 1231
of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
x
x
x
There is no denying that the petitioner had paid their obligations arising from the incident
that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question is whether or not Alicia, the
surviving spouse and the one who received the petitioner's payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment
to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has
been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive
it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
successors in interest referred to in the law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1 .
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2 .
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;
3 .
The widow or widower;
4 .
Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5 .
Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs named in nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in nos. 1 and
2. Neither do they exclude one another.
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral
relatives.
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs will all
classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that
they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido;
they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone
child. This is so even if Alicia has been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is
not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned
to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for
his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate
of their deceased son. Those money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners, who, as
we have said, had been released by the agreement of extra-judicial settlement they
concluded with Alicia Baracena vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the
natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release of
Claim" in favor of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
VAN DORN v ROMILLO, JR.
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
139 SCRA 139
A foreign divorce validly obtained by a foreign national in a foreign court against his Filipino
spouse produces effects in the Philippines. Van Dorn suggests that the divorce decree
should likewise terminate the status of the foreign party as a "compulsory heir" of the
former Filipino spouse. It must be noted, however, that the dictum of the court in this
respect is merely an obiter inasmuch as heirship was not an issue in this case.
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines, while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hong Kong in 1972;
that after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-
P of the Regional Trial Court Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved in located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
x
x
x
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American court that they had no community property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds; and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declarations of a foreign court, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
x
x
x
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on the private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in his case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local laws and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. x x x.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he cannot
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 10, et seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his court.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., de la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
ROSALES v ROSALES
No. L-40789, 27 February 1987
148 SCRA 69
A daughter-in-law is not a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law. This is because of the
absence of blood relationship between the two.
Gancayco, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the records of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato T.
Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acedes and Antonio Rosales. Another
child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales,
and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acedes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
Acedes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972, declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate -
Fortunato T. Rosales, Husband, 1/4; Magna Rosales Acedes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son), 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution. First - is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second - are the Orders of the
trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as
against the said widow?
Our question to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir
can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for
in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same
law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them shall have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal shares.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children of their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation.
The provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles
978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with
the state as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If
the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law,
it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article
887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
( 1 )
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
( 2 )
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;
( 3 )
The widow or widower;
( 4 )
Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
( 5 )
Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos.
1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v Sales, to wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No.
3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. x x x.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Article 970 and 971 of
the Civil Code, viz -
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
Article 971 explicitly declared that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it
is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass
upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
PADURA v BALDOVINO
No. L-11960, 27 December 1958
104 Phil 1065
The division of the reservable property among the reservees is the subject matter of the
following decision. The court rejected the theory of reserva integral espoused by Spanish
commentators such as Scaevola, and categorically adopted the theory of delayed intestacy.
The reason for rejecting the first theory is clearly discussed below.
Gervacia Agustin Benita
Manuel Fortunato Candelaria
Dionisia Cristeta
Felisa Melania
Flora Anicia
Cornelio Pablo
Francisco
Juana
Severino
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel
Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing, he had two children named Fortunato Padura
and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated in
Special Proceedings No. 664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he
bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato, and his
surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate proceedings, Fortunato was
adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree No. 25960 issued in Land
Registration Case No. 86 G.L.R.O. No. 10818, object of this appeal.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not
having any issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by his mother, Benita
Garing. She applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but
subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, in accordance with the
applicable provision of law, under a decree of the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land
Registration Case No. G.L.R.O. No. 10818.
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate
children, the appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed
Baldovino. Six years later, Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate
children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana and Severino, all surnamed
Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants and
appellees took possession of the reservable properties. In a resolution, dated August 1,
1953 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings No. 4551, the
legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were
declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the
original reservees, Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura having predeceased the
reservista). The instant petition, dated October 22, 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino
seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to
them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right
of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition,
appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven reservees) be
deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal
share.
Based on the foregoing findings of facts, the lower court rendered judgment declaring all
the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcels of
land," subject matter of the suit.
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where
the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of the
origin, are nephews of the decedent (prepopsitus), but some are nephews of the half blood
and others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned
among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large
as that of the nephews of the half blood?
The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property under
Art. 891 of the new Civil Code, the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to
a share twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts. 1006, 1008 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines on intestate succession.
x
x
x
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is
correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista). x x x.
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of Castille. The
president of the Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez, explained the
motives for the formulation of the reserva troncal in the Civil Code of 1889 in his book El
Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las Legislaciones Forales in the following words: x
x x.
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the
specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time one, there is no further occasion
for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same
degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective shares of
each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatarios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of the more remote degree. And within the third
degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation
operates in favor of nephews.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject
to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The
right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth
and the succeeding degrees can never be considered reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right as reservatario, who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
Proximity or degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the
reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are
made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should
be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios)
to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since
Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance
that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is
strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
x
x
x
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility
to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva
viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889.
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista's lifetime, the
reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to
prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate the reversionary right; and
for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property
even while the reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so
long as there are reservatarios existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. Had the nephews of
whole and half blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would
undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why then should
the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was
delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante), the heirs and their
relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should
vary.
It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished
commentators of the civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Roman and Mucius
Scaevola. The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to
take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin; and not because of
their relationship. But the argument if logically pursued would lead to the conclusion that the
property should pass to any and all reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares,
regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola that later became
known as the theory of reserva integral. But, as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of
Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the reservable
property should be succeeded to by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to
the basic rules of intestacy. x x x.
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a minimum the
alterations introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and the
reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as
large as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Let the records be remanded to the court
below for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
EDROSO v SABLAN
No. 6878, 13 September 1913
25 Phil 295
A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just usufructuary in nature. The reservor,
having inherited the reservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof,
subject to a resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has a registrable title to the property, and
may institute land registration proceedings in the appropriate case.
It must be noted, however, that during the registration proceedings, the reservees should
intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is
properly inscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuant to a decree of
registration, may in the proper case extinguish the reserva.
Mariano Ma. Rita
Victoriano Marcelina
Pedro
Arellano, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required
by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Pangsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1
hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other of 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two
applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single
judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882.
In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who
at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902,
unmarried and without issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based
the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan - that is, two uncles of Pedro Sablan -
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her, the right reserved by law to the opponents
be recorded in the registration of each parcel."
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the applicant appealed through
a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two
uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error),
and denies that the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by
law to be reserved - a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan,
likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance
from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been
adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers.
These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration (gratuitous title), and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for
he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very
definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood
relationship.
x
x
x
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance from
another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence
the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature of property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proved that the two parcels of land in question have
been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable
consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to be reserved.
x
x
x
However that be, it is not superfluous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the
applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and
without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the
appellant's part. When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by
virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code: x x x.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these
lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case
presents no testamentary provision that demonstrates any transfer of property from the son
to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that
the transfer of the two parcels of land was ab intestato or by operation of law, and not by
will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. All the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all
he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have
perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
x
x
x
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be
reserved, because it is what, by operation of law, would fall to the mother from her son's
inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that
article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party
has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her
son.
x
x
x
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights
and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these
words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required
by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third
degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured,
have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the
things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in
commenting upon the articles of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the
owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in
articles 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the
Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that
article 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property
reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives within the third degree ought not to be more privileged in
the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article
975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a
condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be
alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to
continue, pending fulfillment of the condition. (Civil Code, VI, 270)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether
or not there exist at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendant from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If
such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the
ascendant. If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is
true, since the possessor of the property subject to conditions subsequent can
alienate and encumber it, the ascendant may alienate the property required by law
to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one
can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a
limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that
cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree.
After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives
may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will
acquire it and all the rest that has the same character in complete ownership, in fee
simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death
of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre Bienes Reservables, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right, has, beyond
any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth,
the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly, he has, under
an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to
dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because
he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and
recoverable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition
reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either actually, constructively or
formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of
fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person
who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of
whom they are relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in
said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of
the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in
the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be
reserved, his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on
appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and
scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen,
for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may
even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos
of the persons required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor
it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership,
except that the legal title is burdened with a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems
to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within
the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the property to be reserved must be
prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot
attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the applicant has made of the two parcels of land
in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is
equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil
Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved
are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the
usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner.
The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual and positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a
usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express with of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in
ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary,
he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the
whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to be reserved, merely because a condition
subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the
property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made
agree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be
recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the
vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art.
1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register the same after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition
subsequent annexed - that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the
vendor should exercise the right granted him by art. 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the
right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and
whatever more may have been agreed upon, that is, if he recovers the thing sold
by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding
this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may
register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged - that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the
vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows very well from
the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period,
a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent
expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purposes of the law would be defeated in not
applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein relative
to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more
powerful and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositio.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare
that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are
the subject matter of the application, recording in the registration the right required by article
811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan,
should they survive her; without special finding as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
SIENES v ESPARCIA
L-12957, 24 March 1961
1 SCRA 750
The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2) the
survival of the reservee at the time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to
the first as a resolutory condition, it would seem more likely that the same is a term. In any
event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the reservees may alienate the
reservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will be determined by the timeliness
or untimeliness of the death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to
herein from the concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article 1544 of the Civil
Code.
The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be clarified. It would seem fairly
clear that the reservor sold the reservable land in question, since at the time of the said
sale, she was the registered owner of the property and in fact in possession thereof. The
sale executed by the reservees may be viewed from a different perspective. Since the
reservor was still alive at the time of the said sale, it would seem that the reservees could
not have validly sold the same parcel of land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said
sale were to refer to the parcel of land, then the sale should properly be construed as a
conditional sale - the condition being the survival of the seller-reservees upon the death of
the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to construed this sale of the reservees
as a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hence the subject matter of the sale
would not be the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees thereto, which is
conditional.
Teresa Saturnino Andrea Sps. Sienes
Agaton Francisco
Fernando
Paulina
Sps. Esparcia Cipriana
Dizon, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the
sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan, Oriental Negros; x x x. In their answer
appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on
April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was
made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the
property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in
possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous
possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and
counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the
only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together
with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, a sole
surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in
possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
x x x declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the
plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the
reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving
the same lot is also void, and that they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the
reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death
of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. x x x.
From the above decision the Sienes spouses interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot
executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as
reservee, was entitled to inherit the land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had
four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife
Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records
of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death -the date of which does jot
clearly appear of record - were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367
to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368
(western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, original Certificate
of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it
in her name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died
on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his
sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00, she sold the
property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina
Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No.
10275 - which was in their possession - the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the
corresponding motion in the cadastral record no. 507. The same, however, was denied.
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving
half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on
January 1, 1951, executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter
secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141.
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question
was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father
Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was
inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation
to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that
Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana
Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952.
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserva creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the
survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came. This Court has held in connection with this matter that the
reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a
resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he
may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservista, the rights acquired by the transferee
being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the
reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,
only if the vendor die without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to similar
resolutory condition. The reserva instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real
right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition
being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one
of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died.
Thus, the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event,
became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in
a position to reverse the appealed decision, insofar as it orders the reversion of the
property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees - the Esparcia
spouses - did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision - as above modified - is affirmed, with costs, and
without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the
Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.
LACERNA v VDA. DE CORCINO
L-14603, 29 April 1961
1 SCRA 1227
The reserva applies only where the property sought to be reserved was acquired by
operation of law by an ascendant from a descendant who in turn, acquired it by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, brother or sister. Thus, where the disputed property was
acquired by a descendant from an ascendant, there is yet no reserva because there has
yet to be a second transmission of the property to another line by operation of law.
Catalino . . . . . Marcelo . . . . . Agatona . . . . . Bonifacia Valentin
Ricardo Faustino Juan Jacoba
Patrocinia Leonor (Half-sister of Juan)
Patria Ramona
Asuncion
Emiliana
Arsenio
Felipe
First Cousins of Juan
Concepcion, J.:
This action was instituted by Ricardo, Patrocinia, Patria, Faustino, Leonor, Ramona,
Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all surnamed Lacerna, for the recovery of three
parcels of unregistered lands, situated in the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, and more
specifically described in the complaint, upon the ground that said lands belonged to the
deceased Juan Marbebe, and that his cousins, plaintiff herein, are his sole heirs.
In her answer, defendant Agatona vda. de Corsino alleged, inter alia, that Juan Marbebe
might still be alive; that she held the disputed lands under a power of attorney executed by
Juan Marbebe; and that, if he has died, she is entitled to succeed him in the same manner
as plaintiffs herein, she being related to him in the same manner as plaintiffs are.
With the court's permission, Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in intervention alleging that
she is a half-sister of Juan Marbebe who died intestate, leaving neither ascendants nor
descendants, and that, as his half-sister, she is entitled, by succession, to the properties in
dispute.
After due trial, the court rendered judgment for the intervenor. Hence this appeal by the
plaintiffs.
The lower court found, and appellants do not question, that the lands described in the
complaint belonged originally to Bonifacia Lacerna. Upon her death in 1932, they passed,
by succession, to her only son, Juan Marbebe who was, subsequently, taken to Culion,
where he died intestate, single and without issue on February 21, 1943. The question for
determination is: who shall succeed him?
It appears that his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna, had a sister, Agatona Paurillo vda. de
Corcino, the defendant herein; that Catalino Lacerna died in 1950 and was survived by his
children, plaintiffs Ricardo, Patrocinia and Patria, all surnamed Lacerna; and that Marcelo
Lacerna, who died in 1953, was survived by his children, the other plaintiffs herein, namely,
Ramona, Faustino, Leonor, Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all surnamed Lacerna.
Upon the other hand, intervenor Jacoba Marbebe is a daughter, by first marriage, of
Valentin Marbebe, husband of Bonifacia Lacerna and father of Juan Marbebe, who,
accordingly, is a half-brother of said intervenor.
With this factual background, the issue is narrowed down to whether Jacoba Marbebe, as
half-sister of Juan Marbebe, on his father's side, is sole heir, as held by His Honor, the Trial
Judge, or whether plaintiffs herein, as first cousin of Juan Marbebe, on his mother side,
have a better right to succeed him, to the exclusion of Jacoba Marbebe, as plaintiffs-
appellants maintain.
The latter's pretense is based upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, establishing what is known as "reserva troncal", the properties in dispute
should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the line
from which said properties came, and that since the same were inherited by Juan Marbebe
from his mother, they should go to his nearest relatives within the third degree on the
maternal line, to which plaintiffs belong, not to intervenor, Jacoba Marbebe, despite the
greater proximity of her relationship to the deceased, for she belongs to the paternal line.
Jacoba Marbebe contends, however, and the lower court held, that brothers and sisters
exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that, as Juan
Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his
properties.
The main flaw in appellants' theory is that it assumes that said properties are subject to the
"reserva troncal", which is not a fact, for Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
provides: x x x
This article applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an
ascendant from a descendant, and this is not the case before us, for the lands in dispute
were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother, Bonifacia
Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not in point, and the transmission of the
aforementioned lands, by inheritance, was properly determined by His Honor, the Trial
Judge, in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles
1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister even if only a
half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters,
exclude all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the
line from which the property of the deceased came.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-
appellants. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
SOLIVIO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990
182 SCRA 119
The reservor can never be a descendant of the supposed prepositus. Thus, where
properties were inherited from a mother (origin) by a daughter (as prepositus), which
properties were later inherited by her son, the son holds the properties subject to no
reservation in favor of any relative, since this case is not contemplated by Article 891 which
establishes the reserva troncal. In addition, the reserva applies only if the prepositus dies
without issue.
Concordia . . . . . Esteban Sr. Salustia . . . . . . Celedonia
Esteban, Jr.
Medialdea, J.:
x
x
x
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first
post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives
are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,
Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of
his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife, but no conjugal property was acquired
during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In
due time, the titles to all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and
some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to
help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a
heart attack on February 26, 1977, without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with
Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate
in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the
purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the
plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or
Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, x x x.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to
the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel,
filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later she filed an amended petition
praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the
deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting,
the estate be adjudicated to her.
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done
for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister,
Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother side; and (3)
with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation
would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold
properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the "Salustia Solivio vda. de Javellana Foundation" x x x.
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was
denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on
January 7, 1980 Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26,
entitled "Concordia Javellana-Villanueva v Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207 in favor
of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
x
x
x
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On January 26,
1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal
issues:
x
x
x
3 .
whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor
of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from
whom he had inherited them; and
4 .
whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had
agreed to place the same in the "Salustia Solivio vda. de Javellana
Foundation," and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
x
x
x
III. On the question of reserva troncal -
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to
reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which
reads as follows:
x
x
x
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1 .
The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) - the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2 .
The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios) - relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (prepositus), and belonging to the line from which the
property came.
3 .
The prepositus - the descendant who receives by gratuitous title and
died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation
of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from
whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the
third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal is applied to properties inherited by
an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased Esteban Javellana, Jr. died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should
apply in the distribution of his estate are Article 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which
reads:
x
x
x
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent
within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the
subject estate "without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood," and is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share
alike of the estate.
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share -
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the
foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate
came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or
Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
x
x
x
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her
inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the
"Salustia Solivio vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but
deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it
is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement.
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia, who, significantly, did not
even testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were
supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law,
Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement
between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did
not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation.
x
x
x
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation,
Concordia is obliged to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Javellana is declared an heir of the
late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, conformably with the
agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the
deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio vda. de Javellana Foundation," of
which both the petitioner and private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be
entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the
Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The
petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and
accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings
therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
CHUA v CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V
L-29901, 31 August 1977
78 SCRA 414
The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the prepositus from the origin of the
reservable property was interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a certain
amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such payment
obligation was not imposed by the origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in
nature.
P a t r i c i a
J o s e

Consolacion

I g n a c i o
Juanito

Lorenzo

Manuel
Martin, J.:
x
x
x
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio,
he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua.
When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage, and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first
marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January
15, 1931 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of
Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in
favor of Lorenzo Frias Chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias Chua, his sons of the
first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980
(14483) dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indiviso
share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son
Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot
No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died
intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother
and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre," docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and Dominador and Remedios
Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage, filed the complaint a quo (subsequently segregated as a distinct suit and
docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias Chua but which passed to Consolacion de la
Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as reservable property for the reason that the lot
in question was subject to reserva troncal pursuant to Article 891 of the New Civil Code.
Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of Consolacion de la Torre and the heirs
of the latter traversed individually the complaint of petitioners.
On July 29, 1968, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioners. Hence this instant petition.
The pertinent provision on reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
x
x
x
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came. In the case before Us, all of the
foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-
indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre, by
operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate
had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisite of reserva troncal
- whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father, Jose
Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent court said:
It appears from Exh. "3" which is part of Exh. "D" that the property in question was
not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for
a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and costs and
other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable
that the lot in question is not subject to reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New
Civil Code, and such as the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent court's conclusion that the lot in question is
not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is as explained by
Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v Villanueva, 44 Phil 186, "the
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior
charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the
recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as
ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who
transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee
any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose
Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that
there is the Order (Exh. "D") of the probate court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which
states in express terms:
2. Se adjudicada por el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor
de edad, y de su hijo, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residentes de San
Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F., como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo,
estas propiedades:
14483
La parcela de terreno conocida por Lote No. 399 del Cadastro de La Carlota,
Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadrados y cubierto por el Certificado de
Titulo No. 11759, en partes eguales pro-indiviso; por con la obligacion de pagar a
las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3,971.20, sus intereses, costas y
demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil no. 5300 de este Juzgado.
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is
imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of this court in the
Testate Proceeding No. 4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the
property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case, Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standard Oil Co. of New
York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the
transmission of the property to him. As far as the deceased Jose Frias Chua is concerned
the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. This being the case, the lot in
question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.
x
x
x
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399
which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on
May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are
claiming as reservees of the property in question and their cause of action as reservees did
not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399,
they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners
of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399
issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the
names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion, and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz-Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO
No. 14856, 15 November 1919
40 Phil 480
Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the right of representation
accorded the reservee, the same may be exercised only by such person seeking to
represent if he himself is a relative within the third degree of the prepositus. Second,
Florentino rejected the theory that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of
strangers, then the reserva is not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable property
was devised or willed by the reservor to a relative of the prepositus coming from the same
line as the origin, the reservable nature of the property is not lost. From this principle arises
an inference that the reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservor upon his
demise. Third, there is an affirmation that the title of the reservor to the reservable property
is not in the nature of full dominion, by reason of the reservation provided by law. However,
there is serious doubt as to the validity of this proposition in the light of the more recent
pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is a mere usufructuary (as intimated in
Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions characterizing the title of the reservor to the
reservable property as absolute but possessed with a resolutory condition.
Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of this decision, committed an
error in the distribution of the reservable property.
A n t o n i a

A p o l o n i o I I

Severina

+ J o s e
Mercedes
R a m o n
Apolonio III
Miguel
Victorino
Antonio
Rosario
Juan

+ M a r i a
Encarnacion

+Isabel

+Espirita
Emilia
Jesus
Lourdes
Caridad
Dolores
Gabriel

+Pedro
Jose
Asunsion
Magdalena
Torres, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon
Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino and Antonio of the surname
Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for
Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem if Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and
Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the
minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during
the marriage he begot nine children called Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita,
Gabriel, Pedro and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a
widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina
Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III,
was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and
Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel,
Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino
who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
Caridad and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and
her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro
Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will
before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned
ten children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he
declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all
of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III,
this posthumous son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E and F in the
complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some
personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumous son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that
his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint;
that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting
as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir,
said daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina
Faz de Leon; that among the same is included the property, described in the complaint,
which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumous
Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes
Florentino, deceased, had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in
the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled
to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein, either by direct
participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to
deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable
motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its
value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands
mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four
pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen
thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty centavos, in addition to three
hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for the unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned
reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore, they pray it be declared
that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a
right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned
paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be
ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of
the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of one thousand pesos P1,000.00) together with costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of
action is based on the obligation of the widow, Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the
property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon who, in
turn, inherited the same from his father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that there being no
allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not
remarry after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by
the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following articles, but that
established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of the
aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those
extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow
Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property
which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the
defendant Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's
second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de
Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the posthumous son Apolonio
Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate
heir as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having been inherited
by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil
Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant
Mercedes, by operation of law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession of the
property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while
in the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable property - there being a
legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights,
property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not pass into
the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to
reserve the same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Fax
de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there
is a forced heiress entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de
Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of
respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow, Severina Faz de Leon was on
duty bound to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes, the defendant; that her
obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which
belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the
supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the
Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from
her right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate
mother, although the said defendant has a better right that the plaintiffs; and that there
would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as a
violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an
equal protection. Wherefore, they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs
against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants
from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new
trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs excepted thereto and filed the corresponding
bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
x
x
x
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary - as in
this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties - the appellate court will now
proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, x x x.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the
question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the property
enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and, if
so, whether in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz
de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited the said
property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio
Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve the same for the relatives, within the
third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
x
x
x
x x x Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only
daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost
its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants
Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by
operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumous son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his
brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father,
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the
Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the
third degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to
reserve and preserve the same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the
said ascendants-reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such
property came) acquired the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in
the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) - said property reverts to
said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendants-
reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios (persons from whom property is
reserved), and are relatives within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the
reservable property came.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of
the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relatives, called
reservatarios, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article
811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons
who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree relationship,
nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the
third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from
whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and
relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case, it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion,
Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio and Rosario are both
grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose
Florentino; that the same have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose
Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad and Dolores are the legitimate children of
the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and that the other
plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father Pedro
Florentino, one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact,
admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does not deal with
them.
There are then seven reservatarios who are entitled to the reservable property left at the
death of Apolonio III, the posthumous son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit,
his three children of his first marriage - Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three
children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children
respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All of the
plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumous son, Apolonio Florentino III, within
the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his
nephews as they are the children of this three half-brothers). As the first four are his
relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which
came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance
during his lifetime, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de
Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused
to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the
latter from the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the
instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother
Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her mother, Severina Faz de
Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes,
being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when
she inherited the property left at the death of her mother, together with that which came
from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code
was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the
same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or
expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased
Apolonio III never came to existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to
such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code
does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the
plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to
reduce and impair the forced legitime which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes
Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that
the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly
determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition or substitution of
any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse,
citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining
whether the property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumous son of Apolonio
Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable property when it was
received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in their complaint came, without any doubt
whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of
Apolonio III without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his
legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance
with the provision of Article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall
into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this
property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when
Severina Faz de Leon inherited the same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby
acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with
the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property
to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter,
Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant
who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his
own property nor become the legitime of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only
in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista), in which case
said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property
in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever
provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received from her son
Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios,
the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void,
inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver the same to the reservatarios, one of
whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by
operation of law all of the reservable property, received during the lifetime of Severina Faz
de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms part of the legitime pertaining to
Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive
property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant
Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the order of
legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the
third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino,
coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and
impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way
prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a
part only of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason which serves as
real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree,
to participate in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living,
claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive
why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be granted equal
participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes,
the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held,
of reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore had no further
obligation to reserve the same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased
Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the
reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the legitime of the
heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance,
does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from
her deceased son, nor did the same lose the character of reservable property, held before
the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took
possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it
is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no reason
founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other
brothers and nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept of
article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which, as
reservable property, pertain to them.
For the foregoing reasons, it follows that the reversal of the order of decision appealed from
we should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the
deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable
property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third
degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant
Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her
husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or
rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed from January 17,
1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Arellana, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avance eq \O(n)a, JJ., concur.
GONZALES v COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
L-34395, 19 May 1981
104 SCRA 481
Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and effects of reserva troncal.
Among other things, it stresses that the reservable property does not form part of the estate
of the reservor, if upon his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As
such, the reservor cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will, nor can
the reservor choose who or discriminate among the reservees should get the property. The
reservees inherit the reservable property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus.
Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling in Padura v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed
intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable property among the reservees. It
should be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in Florentino and quotes
substantially from the text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to note the
oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguish between full-blood brothers
from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost.
Benito Legarda Tuason
Consuelo
Rita
+Benito Legarda de la Paz
Filomena Roces
Beatriz
Rosario
Teresa
+Filomena
Benito
Carmen Legarda y Fernandez
Alejandro
Ramon Legarda y Hernandez
Jose
Filomena Legarda y Lobregat
J a i m e L e g a r d a y L o b r e g a t
Celso Legarda y Lobregat
Alejandro Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Teresa Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Antonia Legarda y Lobregat
Jose Legarda y Lobregat
Rosario Legarda y Lobregat
Benito Legarda y Lobregat
Eduardo Legarda y Lobregat
Trinidad Legarda
Aquino, J.:
x
x
x
Benito Legarda y de la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June
17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena, and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased
son Benito Legarda y de la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The
said properties consist of the following: x x x.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the
properties held pro-indiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of
her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
A mis hijos:
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos, hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los
bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la
Destileria "La Rosario" recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un lote de terreno que yo he donada
a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit.
La casa No. 181 San Rafael, la cedo a mi hijo Mandu, solo la casa; porque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Roces.
Sgd. FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July 1958 to February 1959, Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y de la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces vda. de Legarda. The
decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda v Gonzales, CA-G.R.
No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on
May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties
which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three
sisters and three brothers, and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons. (See Paz v
Madrigal, 100 Phil 1085)
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. In this appeal
under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower
court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend
that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her
daughter Filomena Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the
estate of her husband Benito Legarda y de la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales
waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription.
x
x
x
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed
facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal issue
to be resolved in this appeal.
x
x
x
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891
of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Roces vda. de Legarda could
dispose of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in
the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the
second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. It was
resolved in Florentino v Florentino, 40 Phil 480. Before discussing the applicability to this
case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to
make a brief discourse on the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria or semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on
the nature of reserva troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal,
was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which
uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the
confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly
leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserva troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas,
has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
x
x
x
In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from
an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant; and (3) the
said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line
from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a
posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmission
of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6
Castan Tobenas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1969, 6d., pp.198-199).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna
died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811.
(Lacerna v vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil 872)
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the
descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law, and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belong to the line (linea or tronco) from which the property came and
for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez v Rodriguez, 101 Phil 1098;
Chua v Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA
412). Fourth degree relatives are not included. (Jardin v Villamayor, 72 Phil 392)
The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente
por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extranas por el azar de los
enlaces y muertes prematuras" or "impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas extranas
a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella." (6 Castan
Tobenas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 6d., 1980, p. 203; Padura v Baldovino, 104 Phil 1065)
An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso v Sablan, 25 Phil 295. In that case,
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father, Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902,
single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from his the two parcels
of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees
were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the
prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the
fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they
survive, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a
parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Manalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Manalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. It was
held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto
Manalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot,
sisters of Maria and maternal aunts of Juliana Manalac, who belonged to the line from
which said one-half portion came. (Aglibot v Manalac, 114 Phil 964)
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino v Florentino, 40 Phil 480; Nieva
and Alcala v Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez v Balcita, 46 Phil
551; Lunsod v Ortega, 46 Phil 664; Dizon v Galang, 48 Phil 601; Riosa v Rocha, 48 Phil
737; Centeno v Centeno, 52 Phil 322; Velayo Bernardo v Siojo, 58 Phil 89; Director of
Lands v Aguas, 63 Phil 279; Fallorfina v Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus. (Cabardo v Villanueva, 44 Phil 186, 190)
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his
hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her
nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot
even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third
degree. (Florentino v Florentino, 40 Phil 480)
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote, subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the
prepositus. (Padura v Baldovino, 104 Phil 1065)
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing
in return such as donation and succession. (Cabardo v Villanueva, 44 Phil 186, 189-190,
citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7d., 1951, p. 360.)
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came. (Sienes v Esparcia, 111 Phil
349, 353)
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee.
The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the
death of the reservor, but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor. (Sienes v Esparcia, 111 Phil 349, 353; Edroso v Sablan, 25 Phil 295; Lunsod v
Ortega, 46 Phil 664; Florentino v Florentino, 40 Phil 480; Director of Lands v Aguas, 63 Phil
279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto de retro
sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,
meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod v Ortega, 46 Phil
664; Gueco v Lacson, 118 Phil 944; Nono v Nequia, 93 Phil 120.)
On the other hand, the reservees has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute
should the reservor predecease the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that
the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser. (Riosa v Rocha,
48 Phil 737; Edroso v Sablan, 25 Phil 295, 312-3; Gueco v Lacson, 118 Phil 944.)
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is
illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance. (Velayo Bernardo v Siojo, 58 Phil
89, 96.)
"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus),
said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed
no more than a life interest in the reservable property." (J.B.L. Reyes, in Cano v Director of
Lands, 105 Phil 1, 5.)
"Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that
might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the reservista is alive." (Ley
Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso v Sablan, 25 Phil 295.)
"This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of
the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing." (Arroyo v Gerona, 58 Phil 226, 237)
"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant prepositus,
of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservista." (Sanchez Roman, Vol VI., Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6d., pp. 274, 310 cited by J. B. L. Reyes in Padura v Baldovino,
L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil 1065.)
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cano v
Director of Lands, 105 Phil 1, 5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the
hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons.
As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo v
Villanueva, 44 Phil 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survive the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino v Florentino,
40 Phil 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant
(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants
as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for
the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the
same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to
the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus),
without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at
the same time the right of a reservatario (reservee).
In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina
Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties
from their father. Upon Apolonio III's death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. In her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as
heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and
the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino
for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina Faz de Leon
had inherited from Apolonio III, which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and
which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be
disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this
Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reservee, to one-seventh of
the properties. The other six-sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the
doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus,
regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable character. The
property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will,
choose the reservee to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased
ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve, is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal lines have
survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren. who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the
paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein."
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the
reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's
estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon
law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable
property.
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her
will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the
third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from
Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor. (Padura v Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104
Phil 1065.)
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the
non-existence of third degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda Family, "except third degree relatives who
pertain to both" the Legarda and Roces lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties
should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of
Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cano v Director of Lands, 105 Phil 1, 4.)
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. It is hereby adjudged
that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces vda. de Legarda from her daughter
Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties
which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed
Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdez and Benito F. Legarda,
who died in 1969 and 1973 respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and de Castro, JJ., concur. Justice Concepcion, Jr. is on
leave; Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.
DE PAPA v CAMACHO
No. L-28032, 24 September 1986
144 SCRA 281
Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of the prepositus, and (b) a
niece of the prepositus, the latter is preferred to the exclusion of the former in the
distribution of the reversionary estate. This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary
rules of intestate succession which govern the distribution of the reversionary estate.
Please note that brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces rank fourth in the order of intestate
succession to a legitimate person. Upon the other hand, the uncles and aunts (collectively
referred to as collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree) rank fifth in the order of
intestate succession to a legitimate person. Thus, following the order of preference, those
who rank fourth will exclude all those relatives who rank fifth. Again, this is a reaffirmation of
the theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura.
M a r c i a n a
Balbino . . . . . Romana

Francisca

Manuel

Nicolas
E u s t a c i o


Toribia
F a u s t i n o
Trinidad
Dalisay
Narvasa, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal,
was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation
of Facts and Partial Compromise:"
1 .
They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs
Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2 .
They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as a
common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship
of the parties is shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex "A" and made an
integral part of this stipulation.
3 .
They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which
parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165,
64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached
to this stipulation as Annexes "B", "B-1", and "B-2."
4 .
They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned
four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.
5 .
They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children and by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and
16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as
Annexes "C' and "C-1" were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,
but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of
land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6 .
They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue,
leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes "B", "B-1", "C" and "C-1."
7 .
They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and
interests in the parcels of land above-mentioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary
right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8 .
They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived by his
only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9 .
The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half
(1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from
her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
1 0 .
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva
troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the law on
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said
claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in
said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino
Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also
third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
1 1 .
The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal
issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of
the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the
one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his
son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso
share, or three-eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay
D. Tongko-Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
1 2 .
In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon
legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve
harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which
this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties.
On the basis thereof, the lower court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as
reservatarios, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
x x x Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court
holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the
seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise,
entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share
in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all
their claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation other than the legal interest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals,
the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of
the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an
accounting of all rents received by her on the properties involved in this action for
the purpose of determining the legal interest which should be paid to the plaintiffs
on their shares in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower
court, all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to
be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code which reads:
x x
x
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura v Baldovino where the reservatario
was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the prepositus in the line of origin, four of
whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were
entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling and ruled that the
nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of
the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
Said the Court:
x
x
x
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved
to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;
wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the rules of intestate succession. In this spirit, the jurisprudence of
this court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant
reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a
class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree. And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates
in favor of nephews.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject
to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The
right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for
the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth
and succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his rights as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x
x
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the
individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. x x x
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunts and
uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within
the same degree as the latter. x x x
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside, and
the complaint is dismissed with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur. Yap, J., took no part.
CARILLO v DE PAZ
No. L-22601, 28 October 1966
18 SCRA 467
Carillo establishes that the rights of a reservatario to the reservable property may be lost by
extinctive prescription. Thus a reservatario must institute action to recover the reservable
property either within ten or thirty years from the time the right to recover the same accrued.
In this case, it must be noted that the ten-year prescriptive period applied on the premise
that the possessor of the reservable property was a possessor in good faith and with a
colorable title to the same.
Bengzon, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a suit to
recover ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of
Tarlac.
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey
of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334 square
meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak
sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00 his 1/2 portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5,
1944, Severino Salak died. Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members
of her family died - massacred by the Japanese.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estate of Severino Salak and Petra
Garcia, and (2) Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family (parent
Simeon Salak and Isabel Carillo; and children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).
On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3,
which the court approved on November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia, Lot
No. 221, which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as
heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun,
Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to the present, Francisca Salak has
possessed all of Lot No. 221.
On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the court a quo
held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman vda.
de Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share), applying the survivorship
presumption, (Rule 123, Sec. 69 (ii), now Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court) thus:
(1) Simeon Salak died first - his properties went to the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo
and Ligaya (1/4 each); (2) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died next - Honoria's and
Consuelo's properties went to their mother Isabel; those of Ligaya went to her son, Ernesto
Bautista; (3) Isabel died next - her properties went to her son Adolfo; and (4) Adolfo died
last - his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina. Agustina thereby
succeeded to the properties that came by intestate succession from Honoria Salak and
Isabel Carillo, including 1/2 of Lot No. 221.
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman vda. de Carillo filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special
Proceedings No. 3 to recover 1/2 of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned has been
possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.
On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.
On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed that the properties inherited by
Agustina de Guzman vda. de Carillo were subject to reserva troncal.
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23 for the
execution of the judgment therein. Said petition was heard on November 10, 1959, after a
copy was served on the lawyer of Prima Carillo, the latter being a party thereto as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased mother Agustina. Acting on said petition, the
lower court issued its order of November 14, 1950, which reads in part:
x x x the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doa Agustina de Guzman
vda. de Carillo, declares all the interest of the said reservista Doa Agustina de
Guzman vda. de Carillo, as well as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share
adjudged to the reservista, definitely terminated, and that the reservee, the minor
Ernesto Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the said three-
fourths share declared reserved to him in the decision of the Court of Appeals of
June 8, 1950. x x x
On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The order of
dismissal reads in part:
By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of
Lot No. 221, inherited by Agustina de Guzman was never released from the
reserva, so as to convert the ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute
one. Upon her death on April 24, 1950, therefore, the property did not pass by
inheritance to her legal heirs, but rather reverted to the family trunk of the Isabel-
Adolfo line. Such being the case, the estate of Agustina de Guzman, the present
plaintiff in this case, has no cause of action against the defendants.
In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate Estate of the
late Simeon Salak and Isabel Carillo, which included Lot No. 221, has become res
judicata which cannot be disturbed in this case.
On April 22, 1963, Prima Carillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3
of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista.
x
x
x
On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of res
judicata, finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated November 14, 1950 in Special
Proceeding No. 23.
Plaintiffs Prima Carillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions of law.
x
x
x
Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article
811 of the old Civil Code, which states:
x
x
x
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it
then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for
recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription.
Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista, cambian por completo las
relaciones y condiciones juridicas de las personas y de las cosas, como ya se ha
indicado. La obligacion de reserver se convierte en la de entregar los bienes a
quien correspondan, obligacion que pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y
deben complir sus herederos. Y el derecho a la reserva se convierte en el derecho
al dominio pleno de esos bienes. Si a la muerte del reservista se comple la
condicion resolutoria de existir parientes dentro del tercer grado que pertenezcan a
la linea de donde los bienes proceden, a estos parientes pasa desde aquel
momento por ministerio de la ley el dominio absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por
consiguiente, el derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer libremente de
aquellos o de este, y transmitirlos a sus herederos, puesto que la ley no lo prohibe.
Y si no sobrevive al reservista ninguno de dichos parientes, queda extinguida la
obligacion de reservar, por no haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria
impuesta por la ley, y en su virtud vuelven los bienes al pleno dominio del
ascendiente, y pertenecen a su herencia conforme al art. 651. Y como nada ordena
la ley en sentido contrario, tenemos por indudable que no tiene el caracter de
personalisimo ninguno de esos derechos, que nacen con la extincion de la reserva,
pertenecen a la herencia y se transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no
los hubiere ejercitado por si mismo, salvo casos de renuncia, incapacidad o
prescripcion.
x
x
x
C) Extincion de la reserva. - Las mismas condiciones exigidas para el nacimiento
de la reserva son necesarias para su existencia. Al faltar una de ellas, la reserva
muere. Tres son, por tanto, las principales causes de extincion:
1.a Muerte del ascendiente. - Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo de los bienes,
en virtud de la naturaleza condicional de los derechos que crea el art. 811, es lo
cierto que la reserva, como tal, una vez necida, acompa eq \O(n)a al ascendiente
obligado a ella hasta su muerte. Muerto el ascendiente, cesa toda obligacion de
reservar; falta el sujeto pasivo de la reserva.
x
x
x
Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden sa eq \O(n)alarse otras que
expondremos a continuacion.
x
x
x
5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los bienes los herederos del
ascediente durante el tiempo y con las condiciones marcadas por la ley. (Manresa,
Comentarios Al Codigo Civil Espa eq \O(n)ol, Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289,
316-318)
Scaevola also states the view that prescripion can apply against the reservatarios to cut off
their right to the reservable property:
f) Prescripcion. - Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo aplicacion a los
parientes del tercer grado del descendiente, porque no habiendo reserva si no
acepta el ascendiente, no hay que hablar de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el.
Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es aplicable la doctrina, porque
pueden no ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muerte del descendiente o por otra
causa.
Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un derecho real sobre
bienes inmuebles, prescibira a los treinta a eq \O(n)os (art. 1.693)(1), contados
desde la aceptacion de la herencia por el ascendiente, momento determinante del
derecho al ejercicio de la reserva (art. 1.969); transcurridos, pues, treinta a eq
\O(n)os desde la aceptacion sin que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan
solicitado la constitucion de la reserva, se extenguira esta, y el ascendiente o sus
derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno dominio de los bienes reservables por su
naturaleza, pero que no fueron objeto de reserva. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil
Comentado, Vol. 14, 1944 Ed., p. 360)
Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of
Lot No. 221 - from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of
an owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals' decision
affirming the existence of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the
more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is
clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-
reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.
x
x
x
Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than ten
(10) years from April 24, 1950, has prescribed.
And having reached such conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question
of whether the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the ground of
prescription, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur. Barrera, J., is on leave.
SUMAYA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. Nos. 68843-44, 2 September 1991
201 SCRA 178
The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost to an innocent purchaser of the
reservable property. For the protection of the said reservees, it is important that the
reservable character of the property must be properly annotated at the back of the title
thereto. However, even absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third party
purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the reservable character of the property, then
the reversionary rights of the reservees shall be upheld.
Luisa
J o s e S r .
Consuelo
Raul
A m a d e o

Sumaya
S a n c h o
Donato
Luis
E r n e s t o
Villa Honoria Dev. Co.
+ J o s e , J r .
Luisa
Jose
Dolores Agro Industrial Coconut Coop.
Medialdea, J.:
x
x
x
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as
follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties
subject of this case: (1) a one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in
Dita, Lilio (Liliw), Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No.
SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and (2) a one-seventh
(1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in paragraphs 6
of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista,
who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real
properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties
in an affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del Finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided,
among others:
I .
Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he
tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo llamado Raul Balantakbo.
I I .
Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallecio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la
Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minoria de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.
I I I .
Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
I V .
Que soy la unica ascendiente sobreviviento de mi referido hijo Raul
Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera forzosa, legitima y universal.
V .
Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
V I .
Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles
situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
V I I .
Que dichas propiedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul
Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia
abuela Luisa Bautista.
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described
in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed
attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by
Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honoria Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963.
On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its
rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The
documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna
and the corresponding certificates of title were issued. The properties are presently in the
name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share
is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties
described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all it rights to the properties in
favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in
its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of title covering the above described properties do not
contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo,
brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed
Balantakbo, surviving children of the deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the
first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties
described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal
in their favor.
x
x
x
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, x x x.
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a
quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court which found
no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
x
x
x
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the
appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to
petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin
vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found
that there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title covering the
properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the prepositus, Raul Balantakbo, the
reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were
inherited by Raul from his father, Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No.
SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter
of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that the affidavit was, in its form,
declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable
character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant,
Consuelo, was a lone ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving
properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were
inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of title covering the properties in question show that
they were free from any liens (sic) and encumbrances (sic) at the time of the sale. The fact
remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the
source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in
accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A.
496) which reads:
Sec. 52. Constructive Notice Upon Registration - Every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to
all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
x
x
x
When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein x x
x.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise,
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. x x x.
In the case of Bass v de la Rama, 73 Phil 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of
a document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient
registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of
Levin v Bass, 91 Phil 420. As explained in Garcia v C.A. et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and
49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction:
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v Bass,
91 Phil 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary
registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice
of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in
the daybook is sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate
certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v Bass, in case of
voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of registered
land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law, the holder of a
certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed
of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same time he
surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land
sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not
within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it.
In this case, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has (sic) likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with
the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the
reservable character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This
matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of
Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as
follows:
That I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third
(1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated
December 10, 1945, and said portion in accordance with the partition above-
mentioned was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited
after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of any
nature or kind whatsoever x x x.
It was admitted though that as regard the properties litigated in Civil Case No. SC-957, no
such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the
reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long
time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors,
the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., are family corporations of the
Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case
were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal grandmother, and
that Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his (sic) son Raul.
x
x
x
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need
to register the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of the
reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case of
Director of Lands v Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil 279. The main issue
submitted for resolution therein was whether the reservation established by Article 811 (now
Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor
received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives within said
degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction, legitimate, natural
and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter
dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the
ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon
the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided in
Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this
special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them,
which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But if
this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in
accordance with the regular order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of
the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition
of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with
whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the
property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons
entitled to the reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the reservor,
which may make it ineffective x x x.
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil 601,
603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject to reserva
viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente
Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the
Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple,
which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado,
who acquired the said land in good faith, free of all encumbrances. An attempt was
made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he
remarked, "Why, did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from
the fact that it is not clear whether this conversation took place in 1913 or 1914,
that is, before or after the sale, it does not signify that he had any knowledge of the
reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited
the land from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had
inherited it from his mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record
shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether
or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the
reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no
prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed
spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character
of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from another
descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to
reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved
in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays
despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the
rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The
act of registration shall be operative act to convey or effect the land insofar as third persons
are concerned x x x."
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the
registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons shall
be prejudiced thereby. x x x
ACCORDINGLY the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
NIEVA AND ALCALA v ALCALA AND DEOCAMPO
No. 13386, 27 October 1920
41 Phil 915
Nieva ruled that reserva runs only in the legitimate family.
J u l i a n a

F r a n c i s c o
Manuela
S e g u n d a
A l f e o
Jose
Johnson, J.:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage, Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Juliana Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited
from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraph V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two
parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate
succession. Thereafter, Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela
Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 14, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the
defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that
the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate,
from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purpose of
recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, x x x invoking the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here
in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal
under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. x x x. Under the
decision of this court in that case, we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing
here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. x x x.
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an
illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by
article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property
came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation of law, by Francisco Deocampo
from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it in the same manner, from his
mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of
Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question
came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve the property for the benefit of
the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was,
then upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was
entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiffs action must fail.
There can be no question whatsoever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she was a legitimate daughter of
Juliana Nieva. x x x But in said article 811 the legislators used the generic term
ascendant, descendant, and relatives, without specifying whether or not they have to
be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives?
Counsel for appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the
affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court
or tribunal, However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted
their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise
under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are
unanimous in their opinion that the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to
legitimate relatives. Of such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of all of them, is
Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in
deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve
under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the
natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or
other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of ascendants
without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same
reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it
to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an
indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the
legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does
not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond
established by acknowledgment between the father or mother who acknowledges
and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an
indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general
rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as may be
easily seem, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of
ascendants and descendants, and in them reference is of course made to those
who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural
mother; it does not say any child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants,
brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or
natural parents (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935 to 938, 944
and 945, and 946 to 955.)
Articles 908 and 910 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be
maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They
evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs
in number 2 of article 897. And article 811, - and as we will see also article 812, -
continues to treat of the same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children
in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth section and is limited
to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3,
and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code is proof that it
refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon
considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811
applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of the legitimate
direct ascending line, the text of article 939 to 945, which treat of intestate
succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their
testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlines the exception which article 811 creates in the
right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is
due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriages,
out of a family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the
so-called reserva troncal, and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights
(troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of
the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968
et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or
subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra,
Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal
properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811
impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may
be raised just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it
altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but
to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be
strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants.
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established,
says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established.- This is one of the most
delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the
reservation is established in favor of the parents
1
who are within the third degree
and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession,
according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by
affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage,
and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of
one spouse to that of the other, which is, just what this article intents to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve is a legitimate
ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line
from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of
that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the
object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of
the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents
the right to succeed the natural child and vice versa, from which it must be deduced
that natural parents neither have the right to inherit from legitimate ones; the law in
the article cited establishes a barrier between the two families; properties of the
legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
Scaevola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same
conclusion as Manresa. La reservatario del articulo 811 es privelegio de la familia legitima.
(The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family). x x x.
Article 943 above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagrant violation of the express provisions of
the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without
any finding as to costs. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
MATEO v LAGUAPRIVATE
No. L-26270, 30 October 1969
29 SCRA 864
Mateo outlines the procedure for the liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, where
in particular, an allegation is made that certain dispositions inter vivos impaired the legitime
of a compulsory heir. It must be noted that collation is important only if the decedent left
compulsory heirs. Otherwise, collation would be irrelevant. Note, further, that the procedure
outlined in Mateo does not take into account the prior liquidation of the conjugal partnership
or absolute community, in case the deceased is survived by a spouse. The procedure for
liquidating the same are found in Articles 102 and 103 of the Family Code for the absolute
community of property, and Articles 129 and 130 of the same Code for the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Reyes, J.B.L.:
x
x
x
The established facts of this case are as follows:
Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan,
Pangasinan, referred to as Lot No. 998, with an area of 11,080 sq. m., more or less and
covered by O.C.T. No. 362; Lot No. 6541 with an area of 808 sq. m., more or less, covered
by O.C.T. No. 6618 and Lot No. 5106, with an area of 3,303 sq. m., covered by O.C.T. No.
8137. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument,
donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter's
marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter,
the couple took possession of the properties, but the Certificate of Title remained in the
donor's (sic) name.
In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter lived
with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots.
It seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to Bonifacia the owner's share of the
harvest from the land. In 1926, however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share, thus
prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan,
from where she obtained a judgment awarding to her possession of the two lots, plus
damages.
On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land
in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was
continuously given the owner's share of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether
stopped. It was only then that Bonifacia Mateo learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-
in-law, who had the sale in his favor registered only on 22 September 1955. As a
consequence, TCT Nos. 19152 and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan were
issued to Gervasio.
Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, assisted by her husband, Luis Alcantara, went
to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, seeking the annulment of the deed of sale in
favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession of the properties. On 3 January
1957, judgment was rendered in the case -
x x x declaring the sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of other defendants,
Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimiro, as null and void and non-existent; ordering
the Register of Deeds for the province of Pangasinan, to cancel Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 19152 and 19153; condemning the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the sum of P200.00; ordering the defendants
Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Lagua to vacate and deliver the possession over the
two parcels of land to the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs of suit.
The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter Anatalia Lagua, were
installed in possession of the land.
On 18 August 1957, the spouses Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimiro commenced in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, an action against Bonifacia Mateo and
her daughter for reimbursement of the improvements allegedly made by them on Lots 998
and 6541, plus damages. Dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court for being barred by
the judgment in Civil Case No. T-339, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. T-433. At about
the same time, another case was filed, this time by Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, for
annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned
(Civil Case No. T-442). It was their claim that in donating the two lots, which allegedly were
all that plaintiff Cipriano Lagua owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something
for his own support but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua.
Being intimately related, the two cases were heard jointly. On November 12, 1958, while
the cases were pending final resolution, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua died. On 23 December
1960, the court rendered a single decision dismissing Civil Case No. T-433 for lack of
cause of action, plaintiffs Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimiro having been declared
possessors in bad faith in Civil Case No. T-339 and therefore, not entitled to any
reimbursement of the expenses and improvements put up by them on the land. The other
suit, Civil Case No. T-443, was, likewise, dismissed on the ground of prescription, the
action to annul the donation having been brought only in 1958, or after the lapse of 41
years. Defendants' counterclaim were similarly dismissed although they were awarded
attorney's fees in the sum of P150.00.
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Said tribunal, on 18 March 1966,
affirmed the ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. T-443 denying plaintiffs' claim for
reimbursement of the improvements said to have been made on the land. In regard to the
annulment case (C.F.I. No. T-442), however, the Court of Appeals held that the donation to
Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a combined area of 11,888 square meters exceeded by
494.75 square meters his (Alejandro's) legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano
Lagua could have freely given by will, and, to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of
Cipriano's other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation was thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of
494.75 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots. The award of
attorney's fees to the defendants was also eliminated for lack of proper basis.
Bonifacia Mateo, et al., then resorted to this Court, assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it ordered them to reconvey a portion of the lots to herein respondent
Gervasio Lagua. It is petitioners' contention that (1) the validity of the donation propter
nuptias having been finally determined in Civil Case No. T-339, any question in derogation
of said validity is already barred; (2) that the action to annul the donation, filed in 1958, or
41 years after its execution, is abated by prescription; (3) that a donation propter nuptias is
revocable only for any of the grounds enumerated in Article 132 of the new Civil Code, and
inofficiousness is not one of them; and (4) that in determining the legitime of the Lagua
brothers in the hereditary estate of Cipriano Lagua, the Court of Appeals should have
applied the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889, and not Article 888 of the new Civil Code.
Petitioners' first two assignment of errors, it may be stated, are non-contentious issues that
have no bearing in the actual controversy in this case. All of them refer to the validity of the
donation - a matter which was definitively settled in Civil Case No. T-339 and which,
precisely, was declared by the Court of Appeals to be "beyond the realm of judicial inquiry."
In reality, the only question this case presents is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious, and in ordering
herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 square
meter portion of the donated lots.
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one exclusively
for annulment or revocation of the entire donation, but of merely that portion thereof
allegedly trenching on the legitime of respondent Gervasio Lagua; that the cause of action
to enforce Gervasio's legitime, having accrued only upon the death of his father on 12
November 1958, the dispute has to be governed by the pertinent provisions of the new Civil
Code; and that a donation propter nuptias may be reduced for being inofficious. Contrary to
the views of appellants (petitioners), donations propter nuptias are without onerous
consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its
causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the
donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.
It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under review, the Court of Appeals
acted on several unsupported assumptions; that the three (3) lots mentioned in the decision
(Nos. 998, 5106 and 6541) were the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of
the deceased Cipriano Lagua; that Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only
legal heirs; that the deceased left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for which the estate
would be answerable. In the computation of the heirs' legitime, the Court of Appeals also
considered only the area, not the value, of the properties.
The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article 908 the new Civil
Code specifically provides as follows:
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not
include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations
by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of
the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation
may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated
property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in
the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the
evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the
donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted
portion to the respondent.
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals, insofar
as Civil Case No. 442 of the court a quo is concerned, is hereby set aside and the trial
court's order of dismissal sustained, without prejudice to the parties litigating the issue of
inofficiousness in a proper proceeding, giving due notice to all persons interested in the
estate of the late Cipriano Lagua. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
NATCHER v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133000, 2 October 2001
366 SCRA 385
Natcher succinctly outlines the procedure for the calculation of the legitime of compulsory
heirs. Of equal interest is the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of general jurisdiction
over an issue which relates to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. Note that
the trial court, after ruling that the deed of sale executed by Graciano in favor of Patricia (his
wife) is void; that the deed of sale cannot gain validity by treating it as a donation to
Patricia, went further to state that the instrument may, however, be construed as a
document pertaining to the grant of advance legitime to Patricia. It is ironic that a document
that is void (either as a sale or as a donation) could be the source of a right.
On the issue of impairment of legitime, the outcome could be predictable if Graciano left no
other asset. Of Gracianos share in the subject property (5,326.85 sq. m,), he donated
4,849.38 sq. m. (or more than 90% thereof) to his children. He sold 80.90 sq. m. or (1.5%
thereof) to a third party, and purportedly sold to Patricia 447.60 sq. m. (or 8.4%). Each child
received by way of a donation from Graciano some 808 sq. m. while the Graciano
attempted to give Patricia 447 square meters. Based on the numbers, it is clear that if
anyone suffered an impairment of the legitme, it would be Patricia, the surviving spouse.
This therefore raises the question as to whether or not the children were properly advised
to seek the annulment of Patricias title to 447 sq. m. parcel of land.
Buena, J.:
x
x
x
Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six
children, namely; Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
extra judicial settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the Agreement,
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said
property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980
was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
Further on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of
Consolidation-Subdivision of real Property with Waiver of rights, where they subdivided
among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under
Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No. 36988. Subsequently, the land subject to TCT
No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area
of 80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a
land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During the
marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 104443 to his wife Patricia as a
result of which TCT No. 186059 was issued in the latters name. On 07 October 1985,
Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as
heirs.
In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, herein private responders alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner
Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT
No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June
1987 in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 197443 and the
issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
x
x
x
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26
January 1996 holding:
1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was
equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the
acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person x x x.
x x x Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an
advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the
validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. x x x
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the
expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate courts jurisdiction
for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
x
x
x
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is a civil action, whereas matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
x
x
x
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
then, all donation subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus
determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to
sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and thereby holds that under
the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other
related matters involving the settlement of Graciano del Rosarios estate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and de Leon, JJ., concur.
VDA. DE TUPAS v BR XLIII RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
No. L-65800, 3 October 1986
144 SCRA 622
Vda. de Tupas outlines the procedure for the determination of the hereditary estate of a
deceased person, particularly where impairment of the legitime is an issue. The case
outlines the step-by-step procedure for the determination of the legitime of the compulsory
heirs, as well as the determination of the freely disposable portion, which in turn will
determine the validity of donations inter vivos made by the deceased.
Narvasa, J.:
Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter vivos by a donor
now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the instance of the donor's widow.
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow,
Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a will dated May 18,
1976, which was permitted to probate on September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No.
13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his
will were lots nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital.
However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having
donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas'
widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her
legitime, therefore reducible x x by one-half or such proportions as x x (might be
deemed) justified x x and x x the resulting deduction x x restored and conveyed or
delivered to her. The complaint also prayed for attorney's fees and such other relief as
might be proper.
The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated, on which the
parties stipulated, said Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting her claim
on several grounds, viz:
x x x (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the
properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of
Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death
on August 20. 1978; (2) the donated properties were Epifanio's capital or separate
estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc., being a stranger and not a compulsory heir,
the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art.
1061, C.C.
The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is
that he cannot give by donation more that he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he
does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed
inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without
prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of
the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is,
its value is imputable to the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the
purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely
disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to
compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to
limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a long-
established rule in Liquez v Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., where this Court said:
x x
x Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far as
inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil Code if 1889, Art.
636, 645), computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that
"collationable gifts" under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor of
the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the
Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in
computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to herein appellant,
Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor's estate. Once again, only
the court of origin has the requisite data to determine whether the donation is
inofficious or not.
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of
the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent it from being brought to
collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly
applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or
separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does
not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was
within his power to give.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to
a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the
donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus
impairs the legitime of compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is inofficious or not,
recourse must be had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the determination of the
legitime, and by extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in Articles
908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step procedure
has been correctly outlined:
( 1 )
determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the
testator's death;
( 2 )
determination of the obligations, debts and charges which have to be paid
out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;
( 3 )
the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities,
giving rise to the hereditary estate;
( 4 )
the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were
made, of donations subject to collation; and
( 5 )
the determination of the amount of legitimes by getting from the total thus
found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective
compulsory heir.
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely
disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value
of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be
allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be
returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased
Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made as it requires appreciation of
data not before this Court and may necessitate the production of evidence in the court a
quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza
Lucerna vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated property in question,
as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio R.
Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial
Court for further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
RODRIGUEZ ET AL. v BORJA, ET AL.
No. L-21993, 21 June 1966
17 SCRA 418
Intestate succession is subsidiary or subordinate to testamentary succession. This is
because intestacy arises only in the absence of a valid and operative will. Thus, it is
inappropriate for an heir to institute proceedings in intestacy if he knows the existence of a
will, and neither will an intestate court acquire jurisdiction over the estate of a deceased
person, while proceedings in testacy is on-going in another court. Rodriguez, therefore, is
authority to the proposition that proceeding in testacy is preferred over proceedings in
intestacy. A contrary rule may result in an anomalous situation where a determination of
the intestate court would have to be set aside by reason of the admission of a will to
probate.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court
for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal
to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is
alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated
June 13, 1963 in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio
Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the above-
entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled "In the matter of the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez" which was filed ahead of the
instant case.
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the
City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan
delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr.
Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez,
through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the
alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the
same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez
was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that
Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on
March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 14, 1963. It was
stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he
was Parish Priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan from the year 1930
up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he
left real properties in Rizal, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 a.m. on March 17, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 a.m. on the
same day, the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate,
citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco vda. de Borja v Tan and
de Borja, G.R. No. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
Petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery
by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this
Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over
the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported
will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to
examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no
other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings." Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners,
came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, and
invoking our ruling in Ongsingco v Tan and de Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
Section 1. Where estate of deceased person settled. - If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on record.
We find this recourse untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March
4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Section 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. - When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for
proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof,
and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
x
x
x
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is deliver to OR a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit
therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where
the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate
back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days
later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
x
x
x
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that
their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the
decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to
divesting the latter court of precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of
priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of
the decedent's estate into a race between applicants, with the administration of the
properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or
subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
( 1 )
If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost is validity;
( 2 )
When the will does not institute an heir, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place
only with respect to property which the testator has not disposed;
( 3 )
If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
( 4 )
When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. v Martinez, 10 Phil 307, "only after final decision as to
the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of
pre-established action." The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of
the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate proceeding, said court did
not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be
discontinued.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.
Chief Justice Concepcion, and Justices Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J. P. Bengzon,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, concur.
MADARCOS V DE LA MERCED
G.R. No. 39975, 30 June 1989
174 SCRA 599
The Court had an opportunity to construe the meaning of the words "legal heirs." The
restrictive meaning thereof would refer to heirs called upon to inherit by intestacy. The more
liberal interpretation would, however, include any person called to succeed, either by virtue
of a will, or by intestacy.
The dispositive portion of this case must be carefully understood. Both Francisca Madarcos
and Telesforo Catain were intestate heirs or legal heirs of the original homesteaders. The
Court ruled that they were qualified redemptioners of the property sold. Why then did the
Court allow Francisca Madarcos to redeem the property, but at the same time affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint as regards the other petitioner, Telesforo Catain?
Fernan, C.J.
At issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the proper construction of the term "legal
heirs" as used in Section 119 of the Public Land Act which provides:
Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
The facts are as follows: Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the
niece and nephew respectively of the spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos.
Francisca is the daughter of the deceased brother (Joaquin) of Andrea Madarcos while
Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother (Gregorio) of Benito Catain.
The Catain spouses died without issue, and ab intestato. They left a tract of land with an
area of 50,985 square meters, more or less, situated in Salvacion, Roxas, Palawan,
covered by Homestead Patent No. 8193 and Bureau of Lands No. H-27580 and described
in Certificate of Title G-25 issued in the name of Benito Catain on September 28, 1925 by
the Register of Deeds of Palawan,
The only heirs of the deceased homesteaders were their nephews and nieces. In this duly
registered Affidavit of Adjudication, said heirs divided the above parcel of land into several
lots. One lot, known as Lot B, Psd-37486, with an area of 12, 746 square meters, was
awarded to petitioner Francisca Madarcos, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-202 issued in her name. The rest of the lots were adjudicated to the other nephews and
nieces of the deceased couple.
On May 19, 1972, Francisca Madarcos sold her share of the inheritance, Lot B, to
respondent Loreto Sta. Maria for a consideration of eq \O(P,=)4,800.00 by reason of which
the latter was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5656 by the Register of Deeds for
Palawan.
Subsequently, petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain demanded the
reconveyance of Lot B pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent vendee
Loreto Sta. Maria having refused, they instituted an action for repurchase with damages in
the Court of First Instance of Palawan.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioners had no
legal capacity to sue because they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Section 119 of
the Public Land Act. The trial court sustained respondent's motion and dismissed the action
in its order of August 20, 1974. That order is the subject of the present appeal.
The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover
any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of
law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether
succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily
compulsory heirs but they maybe so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
In this instant case, as the decedents had left no will, the law supplanted their intention.
Their estates were distributed by intestate succession.
x
x
x
Since the Catain spouses were childless and were survived only by their nephews and
nieces, the latter succeeded to the entire estate of the deceased.
Article 975 states that "when children of one or more brother or sister of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules of intestacy as
entitled to succeed to the entire estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of
compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be
considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the
homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heir" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive
construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind
the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is
not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance
with its purpose as in the case of Pascua v Talens where the Court, speaking through
Justice Bengzon, discoursed on the rationale behind Section 119.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the questioned dismissal order of the trial court dated August 30, 1974 in
Civil Case No. 945 entitled "Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain v Loreto Sta. Maria"
is MODIFIED. Respondent Loreto Sta. Maria is hereby ordered to execute a deed of resale
of Lot B, Psd-37486 in favor of petitioner Francisca Madarcos upon payment by the latter of
the redemption price. The dismissal of the complaint as to the other petitioner, Telesforo
Catain, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
DE LOS SANTOS v DE LA CRUZ
No. L-29192, 22 February 1971
37 SCRA 555
De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude the more
remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate
succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific
instance, is barred from exercising the right of representation.
Villamor, J.:
x
x
x
From the records of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965,
Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la
Cruz, alleging among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including
defendant, executed an extra-judicial partition agreement over certain portion of land with
an area of around 20,000 square meters; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicated
three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the
latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject
matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the
proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by
plaintiff, by the other co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant
refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the
aforementioned lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his
obligation under the extra-judicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extra-judicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that
the plaintiff was not even an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property,
and was included in the extra-judicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he
had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale
were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer
contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold
her share in the estate for P10,000.00 and that the extra-judicial partition agreement being
void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds
as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed;
that the extra-judicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to plaintiff; and, on
his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.
x
x
x
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of facts:
x
x
x
5 .
That the parties agree that defendant is the nephew of the deceased Pelagia de la
Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor in interest of the land
which was subject matter of the extra-judicial partition agreement;
6 .
That the parties agree that plaintiff is the grandniece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz;
7 .
That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16, 1962, as
evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit "2" for the defendant;
and
8 .
That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on September 22,
1935 as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a
party to the extra-judicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right
of the plaintiff to inherit from the deceased Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the
terms of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his obligations to
develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the Extra-Judicial
Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant should develop the
subdivision because said Lots 1,2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00 as attorney's
fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's counterclaim. The defendant
filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by the defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the
following questions:
1 .
The court a quo erred in not holding that the extra-judicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2 .
The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped from
questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the agreement enforced.
3 .
The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual
damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting the
relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the owner of
the estate, subject matter of the extra-judicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz,
who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said
decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother,
Marciana de la Cruz being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's
mother died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the
purpose of the extra-judicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate
among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is an heir of the
decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of
Pelagia, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line,
never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree exclude the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. x x
x.
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court in Linart y Pavia v Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil
176 (1905), said:
x x x [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer
relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of
representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and
sisters which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff,
had survived the deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree' to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece, is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the extra-
judicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is concerned?
They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the
extra-judicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was
to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself
states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in representation of her deceased
mother. The pertinent portion of the agreement is herein quoted, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, we x x x and Diego de los Santos, married to Anastacia de
la Cruz; Mariano de los Santos married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes de los Santos
married to Pascual Acu eq \O(n)a; Alejo de los Santos married to Leonila David;
and Sotera de los Santos married to Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our
mother, MARCIANA DE LA CRUZ, x x x do hereby by these presents, mutually,
voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the property
left by the deceased PELAGIA DE LA CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves
definite and independent portions of the estate in the following manner x x x.
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were
laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such an heir, the partition is void with
respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property effected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner
thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and
lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the
deceased, is null and void (de Torres v de Torres, et al., 28 Phil 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-
appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
2. The extra-judicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she
may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be
predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or
are against public policy (Baltazar v Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos.
16236-38, June 30, 1965 (14 SCRA 522)]) x x x.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any liability to and
in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby sentenced
to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she has received
under the extra-judicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been
disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instances against plaintiff-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
BAGUNU v PIEDAD
G.R. No. 140975, 8 December 2000
347 SCRA 571
Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative within the 3
rd
degree) excludes the
daughter of the first cousin of the decedent (a relative within the 5
th
degree), even if under
the order of intestate succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference.
Moreover, the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of representation in
order to elevate her status to a relative of a nearer degree because representation in the
collateral line is limited to children of brothers and sisters of the decedent.
Vitug, J.:
x
x
x
Augusto Peidad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a third degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is
the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
x
x
x
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right
of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions
of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning the division between the paternal and maternal lines.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of
law, raised to the same place and degree of relationship as that of a closer blood relative
of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he
represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person whose estate the person
represented would have succeeded.
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented
by the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the
ascending line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor
of children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their
uncles and aunts.
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but
never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Art. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate
shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives
shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were
living and could inherit.
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
The right of representation does not apply to other collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants,
fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of
the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of
the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in article
962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship
of the collateral relatives, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
Article 966. x x x
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is
made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is
two degree removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his
father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
(diagram omitted)
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad
excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate
of the decedent.
The provision of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate,
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree
of relationship in the collateral line.
Invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the
other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction
shall be observed by reason of relationship by the whole blood. In fine, a maternal aunt can
inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with
a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third degree relative,
excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship the latter, in
turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth degree relative.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No 116775, 22 January 1998
284 SCRA 511
A half-blood nephew is a collateral relative within the third degree. He excludes the children
of first cousins, even if the relationship of the decedent with the former is of the full blood.
The relative nearer in degree excludes those who are more remote, regardless of the full or
half blood relationship.
Mendoza, J.:
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were
Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan
Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent
Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and
daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and
Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and
Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justas father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.
Petitioners are thus grandchildren
1
, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of
J u s t a b y h e r c o u s i n P r i m i t i v a A r n a l d o U r i a r t e .
P e d r o
U r s u l a
J u a n . ( b r o t h e r ) D o m i n g o
Catalina
Agatonica
Justa

Gregorio
Primitiva
Benedicto


Jorencio
Josefina


Enecia
Gaudencio

Nicolas
Simplicio

Lupecino
Domingo

Felisa
Virgilio
Heirs of Pascacio:
Roselyn

Madrilyn
Lourdes
Felomina
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. The
children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio are, Josefina, Gaudencia,
Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo,
Primitivas bother, by Julieta Ilogon are, Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa.
These other petitioners are thus grandchildren
2
and relatives within the fifth degree of Justa
by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the
partitioning of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares,
had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed to be
the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He
complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justas tenant,
refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. He contended that
Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only 0.5 hectare land which
Justa inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their
answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa but the latters heirs entitled to
her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio
Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo,
Ambrocios nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. Domingo was to
receive two-thirds of the land and Juan one-third. The heirs claimed that the land had
always been in their possession and that in her lifetime, Justa never asserted exclusive
right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that
private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of
Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners contention. In its decision rendered on November 8,
1991, it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews,
Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectare, divided as follows: two-third or
3,654 square meters to Domingo and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The
area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectare because the adjacent lot of
about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo-Sering, daughter of Juan
Arnaldo, after the latters death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax
declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however, died intestate
and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle
Domingo Arnaldo to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation
of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the right to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (Art. 277, Civil Code).
Accordingly, the court ordered:
WHEREFORE. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the
intervenors [herein petitioner] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring
the defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late
Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax
Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa
Arnaldo Sering. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial courts findings, the
appellate court found that 0.5 hectare had been acquired by Justas parents, Juan Arnaldo
and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister
Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the
dispositive portion of its decision, the appellate court ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is
hereby entered
Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in
the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectares as the share of the plaintiff.
For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the
heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo.
x
x
x
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated,
Justa left a piece of land consisting of 2.7 hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectare), as the
Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and
Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of
her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justas property should be as follows as private
respondent contends:
A The first ! hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which
will accrue to petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will
accrue to private respondent.
B As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated was
consolidated with the ! hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan
Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of
Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three degrees from Just Arnaldo, whereas petitioners
who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed
from Justa Arnaldo.
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to
Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
x
x
x
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectare of the land in question belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectare of the half hectare land
as her fathers (Juan Arnaldos) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled
to the other 0.125 hectare. In addition, Justa inherited her mothers (Ursula Tubils) share
consisting of 0.25 hectare. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right,
Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7 hectare land. This 2.58 hectare
land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest surviving
relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, in every inheritance, the relative nearest
in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions
of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity or relation are provided by Articles
963-966 of the Civil Code. They provide:
x
x
x
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a
third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of
Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the
lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no
moment.
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo,
his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim
that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and this not qualified to
share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As
already stated, private respondent is the son of Justas halfsister Agatonica. He is
therefore Justas nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no
descendant, ascendant or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a
half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts
heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the determination of whether the
relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share
of the survivors.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
DE LA PUERTA v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 77867, 6 February 1990
181 SCRA 861
The right of representation does not extend to the adopted children of the person to be
represented. This is because the fictional tie that binds the adopter and the adopted does
not extend to the relatives of the adopter. Thus, the adopter may adopt an heir for himself,
but he cannot adopt one for his relatives.
Cruz, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la
Puerta, who claims successional rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties
to her three surviving children, namely Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la
Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed
executrix of the will.
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who
averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did
not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory
of her estate belonged to them exclusively.
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. Alfredo
subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor.
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a
petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. However,
the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case.
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate
proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the
acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita
presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit
counter-evidence.
On November 12, 1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied
from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and
was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence
presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the same."
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court, which is now
in turn being challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his
death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child
of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover,
Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was
already married at the time of her birth in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a
neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and wife
and had three children, including a girl named "Puti", presumably Carmelita. He said
though that he was not sure if the couple were legally married.
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife
but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled.
In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only
five or six houses away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the
relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known in the community.
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
x x x By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that she was
born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her father was
Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common
law husband and wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta
was married to, but was separated from, his legal wife, Genoveva de la Puerta;
that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last
will and testament, she was the only child who survived him together with his
spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not beget any child; that she was
treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time of her birth until his
father died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is
shown by the family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta and school
records wherein he signed the report cards as her parent; that during the hearing
of her adoption case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at
Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court that Carmelita
de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan; that it was Vicente de la Puerta
during his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and education; x x x.
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those circumstances
we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify reversal. x x x.
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim
support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?
According to article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente
de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious
child.
It is settled that -
In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator;
second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and
third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these
cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or
descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation.
x
x
x
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased
person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the
present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the
testatrix herein. x x x It is a fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix,
Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death.
And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison
et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. x x x In other words, the
herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of
the testatrix, but rather to the right to the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from
her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved nor could it be
invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It
would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died.
Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente,
assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
But here lies the crux for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from
inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the
barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quote clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relative of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v Court of Appeals, this Court declared:
x x x even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot
inherit, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged
putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged
father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v Intermediate Appellate
Court, thus:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate (sic) child.
They may have a natural tie by blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is hereby deprived; the
former, in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from
Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and
consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot
represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the
adopted. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because
the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the
adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they
cannot thus make one for their kindred.
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be considered in the
probate of Dominga Revuelta's will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, with costs against private respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
ABELLANA-BACAYO v FERRARIS-BORROMEO
No. L-19382, 31 August 1965
14 SCRA 986
As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only in the
descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but
only in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are
concerned. When such nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that
portion which their predeceased or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise
been entitled to inherit. By right of representation, these nephews and nieces shall be
deemed to be two degrees remote from the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the
exercise of the right of representation is that the nephews and nieces must concur with at
least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and nieces will inherit in their own right as
third degree relatives of the decedent.
It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree relatives,
nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are
likewise relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of
intestate succession which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order
of succession, whereas other collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the
deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise of the right of representation is subject to
the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families under Article 992.
In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through
Justice Corona ruled that (u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces), Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.
Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of
representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In
the collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with
uncles and/or aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
The facts of this care are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros,
Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the
filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for summary settlement of her estate, she has
not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively
dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate
of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated
to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendants, ascendants, or
spouse, but was survived only be collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia,
Catalina, Conchita and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephews, who were
the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who predeceased her
(the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek
to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit: an aunt and
the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with
the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by
the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent,
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three
degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by
brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with
article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of
the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of
representation could take place when the nieces and nephews of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their
own right.
We agree with appellant that as an aunt of the deceased, she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds
of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and
then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per
stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly
by Article 975:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
and aunts. But if they alone survive they shall inherit in equal portions.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujos exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.)
from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces
who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the
former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers and
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preferences among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force. Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces, children of the
former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by
a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers and
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of the deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preferences among them by
reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other
collaterals.
Appellant quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil
Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. This is true as
to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their proximity to the
decedent as established by Article 962 paragraph 1.
Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal
degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol. II, p.
439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly
states:
Other collaterals - The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers
or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond
this, we can safely say, there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of
collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer
considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude
the further. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no
right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preferences
among them on account of the whole blood relationship.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to the rule, is hereby affirmed. No
costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
MALANG v MOSON
G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000
338 SCRA 393
The rights to the succession of a Muslim who died during the effectivity of the Muslim Code
shall be governed by the said law. Prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code, the
succession to the estate of a Muslim is governed by the Civil Code.
The capacity of an heir to succeed is determined by the law in force at the time of the
conception or birth of the heir.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
x
x
x
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They
begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulysis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and
a d a u g h t e r n a m e d L a w a n b a i . x

x x. Hadji Abdula and Aida had two children when he married for the second time another
Muslim named Jubaida Kado x x x. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second
marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula
divorced her.
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless.
Thereafter Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz x x x
and soon they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). x x x Not long after, Haji
Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but
eventually divorced them.
x
x
x
In 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the
wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were
childless. x x x.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula
died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District
Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of
administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Adbula; that his other legal
heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that
he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdulas name married
to Neng P. Malang, and a pick-up jeepney.
On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition. After
such publication or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji
Mohammad for brevity) the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition.
He alleged among other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida
Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Maybay Malang,
surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji
Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as Teng Abdula, son; (f) Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula, son; (g) Fatima Malang, also known as
Kueng Malang, daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son; and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter.
Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother Hadji
Ismael Malindatu Malang, had help their father in his business, then they were more
competent to be administrators of his estate.
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima
Malang, Baybay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to the
petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad.
x
x
x
Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution
of the estate of Hadji Adbula and accordingly disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court orders the following:
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral
expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount of
P2,040.80;
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan,
Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed as follows:
a) Jubaida Kado Malang

2/64 of the estate
b) Nayo Omar Malang

2/64 of the estate
c) Mabai Aziz Malang

2/64 of the estate
d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia" Malang

2/64 of the estate
e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang
14/64 of the estate
f) Ismael Malindatu Malang
14/64 of the estate
g) Datulna Malang
14/64 of the estate
h) Labanbai Malang

7/64 of the estate
i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang

7/64 of the estate
Total
64/64
3) That the amount of P250,000 given to Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of
advance be charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the
excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition
for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt of this order.
On October 4, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order. The
oppositors subjected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
However, on January 19, 1995 she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal
on the strength of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083.
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions. The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether
on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein
contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court as
provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. She contends that the Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a)
ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three existing marriages
with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Maybay Ganap Malang and therefore
the properties acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b)
holding that said properties are not conjugal because under Islamic law, the regime of
relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary
in the marriage settlement or any other contract.
As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the
New Civil Code, under which all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provision on
conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim
Law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under
P.D. 1083.
x
x
x
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the
three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity
of the New Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced
four wives namely Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai all divorces of which took place
before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993,
after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four wives (Hubaida, Nayo,
Maybay, and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one with
Maybay. It is also clear that the following laws were in force, at some point or other, during
the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950,
Republic Act No. 394 (R.A. 394) authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from
June 18, 1949 to June13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and
the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is
simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition.
To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness
of the evidence before us could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well
as cast profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the
parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order to
supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas words, missing links, that would be
the basis for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve the instant case.
In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our part to set out guidelines in
the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition concerning the
property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim
Code was interposed in relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.
Settlement of estate of Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code
may easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus
convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely presented and
verify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case.
As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, the Court does not often come by a case
as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the
watershed of collateral issues that this case presents.
The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in
question form: x x x (5) What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim
who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? x x x.
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae
Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for reference of respondent court, and for
the direction of the bench and bar.
x
x
x
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession
And Dissolution of Property Regimes
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which
should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the
respective shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who
entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the
time of the performance of the marriage rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the
time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived for born during the period
covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the
determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus,
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one
hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) by the impotence of the husband;
(2) by the fact that the husband and wife living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;
(3) by the serious illness of the husband.
Article 256. The child is presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the
Muslim code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18,
1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the
Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established.- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the
evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the
conception of the child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children.-
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within
two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical
impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of
the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. Should the marriage be dissolved and
the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born
within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to
have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the
latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife
believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days
from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his
heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to
prevent a simulation of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions,
the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the
said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include:
(a) the husband, the wife;
(b) the father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) the daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;
(d) the full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is
entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she
shall inherit one-fourth of the estate. The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out
in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in Article 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of
Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE and the instant petition is
REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the
case based on the guidelines set out in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and de Leon, JJ., concur.
SAYSON v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, 23 January 1992
205 SCRA 321
The right of representation accorded to legitimate grandchildren is reiterated in this case,
although there were legal issues raised with respect to such legitimacy. The unavailability of
the right of representation to the adopted children was likewise confirmed. The conflicting
theory of the petitioners in this case should be noted.
Cruz, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondent and their capacity to inherit from
their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioner deny them that right, asserting it for
themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who has married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine
years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030, in Branch 13
of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedent's
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional
Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted that Delia and Edmundo were
the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of herein private respondents on the basis of practically
the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986, that Delia and
Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. Consequently, the three children
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, Judge Jose S. Sanez dismissed Civil Case No.
1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as
established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its
own decision dated February 28, 1989, the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby affirmed. In Civil Case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the
appealed decision is modified in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified
from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners
and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private
respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of
adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from
adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who
cannot adopt "(1) those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Editha Abila, who manifested in
a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul
the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath, try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967.
Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
x
x
x
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is formidable
piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the
Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Editha Abila was
understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila
denying her earlier statement in the petition for guardianship of Doribel is of course
hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even
without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v Court of
Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely
evidentiary character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose x x x.
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex, age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above,
she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which
shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the
right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other
private respondent being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
Narvasa (C.J.), Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
DEL PRADO v SANTOS
No. L-20946, 23 September 1966
18 SCRA 68
An illegitimate child succeeds his or her illegitimate father to the exclusion of the legitimate
brothers and sisters of the latter. The legitimacy of the collateral relatives within the second
degree does not create a preference over the illegitimate status of the descendant. Note
that under the Family Code, recognition of the filiation of the illegitimate child has been
abolished.
Makalintal, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Eugenio C. del Prado filed a complaint to annul a
deed executed by Aurea S. Santos, married to Deogracias Demetria, adjudicating to the
minor Jesus Santos del Prado, her son allegedly by plaintiff's deceased brother Anastacio
C. del Prado, a parcel of land left by the latter. Plaintiff alleged that he was thus deprived of
his rightful share in the estate of his brother. Annulment of the transfer certificate of title
issued to the minor by virtue of said deed of adjudication was also prayed for.
In defendant's answer, she averred that her son Jesus Santos del Prado, being an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased, was entitled to the property left by the latter;
and on the ground that the action had been maliciously filed, she interposed a counterclaim
for damages.
On July 3, 1959 the parties entered into the following stipulation of facts:
Come now the parties in the above entitled case, assisted by their respective
counsels, and to the Honorable Court respectfully state that, for purposes of this
action only, and without in any way constituting an admission for any other purpose
and with the understanding that the same may not be used against them in any
other proceeding, as provided in Rule 23, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the
parties admit that the following facts are true and may be considered by the Court
as proved without need of introduction of any evidence thereon:
1 .
Anastacio C. del Prado died intestate in the City of Manila on August 11,
1958; at the time of his death, Anastacio C. del Prado was single;
2 .
Plaintiff Eugenio C. del Prado is a legitimate brother of the late Anastacio
C. del Prado;
3 .
Defendant Aurea S. Santos was legally married to Deogracias Demetria in
1945, but has been in fact separated from him;
4 .
The deceased Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos
cohabited with each other without the benefit of matrimony; as a result of
that cohabitation, the late Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant Aurea S.
Santos had one son - the minor Jesus S. del Prado - who was born on
December 19, 1957, and whom Anastacio C. del Prado admitted to be his
son in the latter's birth certificate;
5 .
After the death of Anastacio C. del Prado, his estate x x x was
adjudicated to the minor Jesus del Prado. x x x.
The following facts raises one principal issue of law, namely: "who has a better right to the
aforesaid parcel of land left by the late Anastacio C. del Prado, plaintiff or minor Jesus S.
del Prado?" x x x.
Upon the foregoing stipulation, the parties submitted the case without further evidence.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to this Court, the question involved being purely legal.
The lower court ruled - and this ruling is assigned as error - that since the deceased
Anastacio C. del Prado "left no legitimate descendants or ascendants the minor Jesus S.
del Prado shall succeed to the entire estate left by his supposed father to the exclusion of
the plaintiff who is only a collateral relative."
Appellant contends: Even if said minor is the illegitimate son of the deceased, the latter
never recognized him as such, no showing having been made that it was at the instance or
with the consent of the deceased that said minor was entered as his son in the civil registry
or that the birth certificate where the recognition appears authentic.
Appellant's position is untenable. The facts stipulated by him and by appellee are clear:
"The deceased Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos cohabited with each
other without the benefit of matrimony; as a result of that cohabitation, the late Anastacio C.
del Prado and defendant Aureao S. Santos had one son - the minor Jesus S. del Prado -
who was born on December 19, 1957, and whom Anastacio C. del Prado admitted to be his
son in the latter's birth certificate."
Since Anastacio C. del Prado died in 1958 the new Civil Code applies (Article 263).
Illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to successional rights (Art. 287). Where,
as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without legitimate descendants or ascendants,
then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of
appellant who is only a collateral relative.
The decision appealed is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur. Regala, J., took no part.
CACHO v UDAN
No. L-19996, 30 April 1965
13 SCRA 693
The Court reaffirms the exclusion of legitimate brothers and sisters of the decedent by the
latter's illegitimate child. Note, however, that the Court disallowed the intervention of the
brothers in the probate proceedings, since regardless of the outcome of the probate, the
brothers cannot inherit from the deceased. Implicitly, the lower court also disqualified the
said brothers from claiming any right against the illegitimate son of the deceased by reason
of Article 992, when the said court instructed the fiscal to study the propriety of instituting
escheat proceedings.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
From the records it can be gleaned that on 13 December 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single,
and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son,
Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
Wencesla Cacho filed a petition to probate said will in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales on 14 January 1960. On 15 February 1960, Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother
of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate x x x. On 9 June 1960 Francisco G.
Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to the probate of this will. On 15 September
1960 oppositor Rustico G. Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his
opposition dated 13 February 1960, due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the
named heir in the will and said opposition was ordered withdrawn. After one witness, the
Notary Public who made and notarized the will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco
G. Udan died on June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines.
After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate
brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the ground
that the will was not attested and executed as required by law; that the testatrix was
incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. On 20
January 1962 proponent-appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions
filed by the oppositors, and on 20 February 1962, the Honorable Court of First Instance of
Zambales issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions for lack of interest in the
estate and directing the Fiscal to study the advisability of filing escheat proceedings. On 26
and 30 March 1962, both oppositors filed their Motions for Reconsideration, through the
respective counsels, and these motions were both denied by the lower court on 25 April
1962. On 7 May 1962, oppositors filed their joint Notice of Appeal.
The first issue tendered by appellants is whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico
Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. We
find that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death
Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her
brothers. This is clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the
Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatrix:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate
children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only
in the absence of descendants, ascendants and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and
sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do not concur, but
are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the
oppositors and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is
termed "son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must be
necessarily illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article 277).
The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no
standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated, John and
Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied,
both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole
intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation
of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own
heirs at law, not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason
that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while Francisco Udan did survive his mother,
and acquired the rights to the succession from the moment of her death (Art. 777, Civil
Code), still he did not acquire the inheritance until he accepted it. This argument fails to
take into account that the Code presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not
repudiated in due time (Civil Code, Art, 1057, par.2), and that repudiation, to be valid, must
appear in a public or authentic instrument, or petition to the court. There is no document or
instrument or pleading in the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco
Udan. The latter's own opposition to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible
with the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary co-heir, and to claim the
entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.
Finally, it is urged that as probate is only concerned with the due execution of a testament,
any ruling on the successional rights of oppositors-appellants is at present premature.
Inquiry into the hereditary rights of the appellants is not premature, if the purpose is to
determine whether their opposition should be excluded in order to simplify and accelerate
the proceedings. If, as already shown, appellants cannot gain any hereditary interest in the
estate whether the will is probated or not, their intervention would merely result in
unnecessary complication.
It may not be amiss to note, however, that the hearings on the probate must still proceed to
ascertain the rights of the proponent Cacho as testamentary heir.
WHEREFORE, the order under appeal is affirmed, without prejudice to further proceedings
in the case, conformably to this opinion. Costs against appellants John G. Udan and
Rustico G. Udan.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Barrera, J., took no part.
CUARTICO v CUARTICOPRIVATE
No. 11190-R, 16 November 1955
52 O.G. 1489
Cuartico explains the reason for the barrier in Article 992.
Hernandez, J.:
x
x
x
The records discloses that on June 12, 1941, petitioner Tranquilino Cuartico was named
administrator of the Intestate Estate of said deceased. On December 13, 1949, after all
money claims against the estate had been settled, the administrator and his co-petitioners
moved that they be declared the exclusive heirs of the deceased. On May 2, 1952, the
oppositors filed a similar motion praying that they, along with the petitioners, be declared
heirs of the deceased. After trial, the court below, as aforestated, declared the petitioners
and oppositors legal heirs of Patricia Clavecilla whereupon the petitioners, unsatisfied with
the ruling, interposed the present appeal.
The main question that instantly presented itself is who is entitled to succeed ab intestato to
the inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla.
It appears indisputably clear between the parties that Patricia Clavecilla died single and ab
intestato on October 4, 1940 in Manjuyod, Negros Oriental and that she left an inheritance
of six parcels of land and houses. The petitioners-appellants named Tranquilino, Cipriano,
Luis, Demetrio and Pancrasio all surnamed Cuartico are the legitimate children of Macario
Cuartico and Maria Clavecilla, now both deceased. The oppositors-appellees along with the
appellants' father Macario Cuartico, are the children of Eleno Cuartico and Susano
Germodo, both deceased.
The evidence for the appellants tends to show that their mother Maria Clavecilla together
with Patricia and Romana Clavecilla were children by different women of a Chinese named
Juan Clavecilla; that Maria's mother is Sinforosa Romano who, after Maria's birth, married
one Benigno Martinez; that Patricia's mother is Susana Germodo who upon Patricia's birth,
married Eleno Cuartico from which wedlock were born the appellees Feliciana, Gregorio,
Paula, Macario the appellant's father, and Macario now deceased but represented by a
daughter named Generosa; and that Ramona's mother is a woman named Bonifacia with
an unknown surname. Romana died at an early age, single and without issue. Maria's
death occurred in 1925 while Patricia as above indicated died on October 4, 1940.
The appellants claiming to be natural nephews of Patricia Clavecilla aver, moreover, that
their mother Maria Clavecilla is a natural sister of Patricia Clavecilla and that both women
were recognized natural daughters of Juan Clavecilla, mainly on the strength of a private
instrument supposedly executed by the latter on June 26, 1896.
Upon the other hand, the appellees contend that Juan Clavecilla was legally married to
Bonifacia Cardente on July 13, 1969 as evidenced by the parochial church records of
Malabuyoc, Cebu; that from said marriage, Romana Clavecilla was born; and that Bonifacia
Cardente died on March 6, 1900 followed shortly by Juan Clavecilla who died in 1903. The
appellees further maintain that Patricia Clavecilla and Maria Clavecilla, assuming that the
latter was a child of Juan Clavecilla, were both adulterous children and could not have been
validly recognized by Juan Clavecilla who, during their conception and birth, was legally
and validly married to Bonifacia Cardente.
In the trial below, the appellees tried to prove that Maria Clavecilla was neither a natural nor
an adulterous daughter of Juan Clavecilla but was merely a maid of the latter; that Maria's
real name was Maria Romana; and that she was born of the wedlock between Sinforosa
Romano and Benigno Martinez. Appellees admit that Maria Clavecilla was legally married
to their brother, Macario Cuartico; that from said marriage, the herein appellants were born
and that consequently, appellants are entitled to inherit from Patricia Clavecilla namely in
representation of appellants' father, Macario, as ostensibly held by the trial court.
No dispute exists that the appellees are the children of Eleno Cuartico and Susana
Germodo. Susana Germodo being the natural mother of Patricia Clavecilla, it results
therefore, that the appellees are natural half-brothers, half-sisters and half-niece
respectively of Patricia Clavecilla.
x
x
x
We begin with an inquiry into the alleged rights of the appellees to be declared heirs of and
to succeed Patricia Clavecilla. During the trial, petitioners adduced in evidence a certificate
issued by the parish of Alegria, Cebu attesting to the marriage between Eleno or Lino
Cuartico and Susana Germodo, parents of the herein oppositors. Said marriage
purportedly took place in Alegria, Cebu on June 1, 1880. Remarkably, the oppositors
proffered no objection to the admission of said exhibit which explicitly shows that the
oppositors' parents were legally married and inferentially that said oppositors were
legitimate children. It is plainly evident, therefore, that the oppositors who are illegitimate
children of Susana Germodo and Lino Cuartico are seeking to inherit ab intestato from their
half-sister, Patricia Clavecilla. This pretension is certainly not countenanced under Article
943 of the Old Civil Code which provision is substantially reproduced as Article 992 in the
New Civil Code. Article 943 reads:
Art. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such
children or relatives so inherit from the natural child.
The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is obviously the
intervening antagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural family and
those of the legitimate family. In the words of Manresa:
Entre el hijo natural y los parientes legitimos del padre o madre que los reconcio,
niega el Codigo toda relacion succesoria. No puedan decirse parientes y no tienen
derecho a heredar. Existe desde luego un vinculo de sangre; pero esta vinculo no lo
reconoce hechos y en la presunta voluntad de los interesados; el hijo natural es,
mirado con desprecio por la familia legitima; la familia legitima es, en cambio,
odiada por el hijo natural; este considera la situacion privilegiada de aquella y los
recursos de que por ella se ve privado; aquella en cambio, solo ve en el hijo natural
el producto del vicio, la prueba viva de un barron para la familia. Toda relacion esta
rota ordinariamente en la vida; la ley no hace mas que reconocer verdad, evitando
nuevos motivos de resentimiento.
Los hojos y los parientes legitimos del padre o madre que reconocio un hijo natural,
son todos los parientes en linea recta descendente o ascendente, o en linea
colateral. La familia legitima queda separada por completo de la natural; ni los
individuos de ista heredan a los de Aquila, ni los individuos de aquella pueden
heredar a los de ista. (p. 127, Commentarios al Codigo Civil.)
This legal provision and its rational have found reiteration in several rulings of our Supreme
Court, (Llorente v Rodriguez, 10 Phil 585; Centeno v Centeno, 52 Phil 322; Director of
Lands v Aguas, 63 Phil 279; Grey v Fabie, 40 Off. Gaz. 1st Supplement, No. 3, 196).
The appellants, on the other hand, pretend to succeed Patricia Clavecilla by reason of their
alleged status of natural nephews of the latter. The appellees attempt to refute appellants'
claims by alleging that Maria Clavecilla was merely a maid and not a child of Juan
Clavecilla and could not have been, therefore, a relative of Patricia Clavecilla who was
admittedly a daughter of Juan Clavecilla. Moreover, appellees claim, that assuming that
Maria was a child of Juan Clavecilla along with Patricia Clavecilla, neither Maria nor Patricia
could have been recognized as natural daughters by Juan Clavecilla who was, at the time
of their (Maria's and Patricia's) birth legally and validly married with Bonifacia Cardente.
x
x
x
In view of all the foregoing, and finding that neither the appellants nor the appellees are
entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla, it behooves us
to call upon the State to succeed.
Wherefore, the appealed order should be, as it is hereby, revoked and the court a quo is
hereby instructed, when this decision becomes final, to furnish the provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental a copy of this decision for such action as may be proper pursuant to Rule
92 of the Rules of Court. No special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, David and Martinez, JJ., concur.
CORPUS v CORPUS
No. L-22469, 23 October 1978
85 SCRA 567
Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child is excluded from the inheritance of
an illegitimate relative.
Aquino, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His
will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in
Corpus v Yangco, 73 Phil 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half
brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Osorio, (3)
Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother,
Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus. Juanita died in October 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow
of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five
children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforementioned Pablo Corpus and
Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945
was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of
partition was opposed x x x.
The probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. x
x x.
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the
estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in
this Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants
entered into compromise agreements. x x x. As the resolutions dismissing the appeals
became final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24,
1947 wherein he acknowledged that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) "as settlement in full of my share in the compromise
agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case."
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and
physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and
noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the
controversy over the Yangco estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the supposed share in Yangco's intestate
estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco's will imposing perpetual
prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that
the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed
according to the rules of intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action x x x. It held that the
intrinsic validity of the Yangco's will was passed upon it its order dated December 26, 1946
in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which x x x certified the appeal to this
Court x x x.
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that
Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized, and (3) that
plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.
x
x
x
The appeal may be resolved by determining whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of
appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action
to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation. The trial court found
that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le abrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco,
hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco." The basis of the
trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child wand
not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated
June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural
children. His exact words are:
Primera, declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro,
Pas, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis herederos forzosos.
x
x
x
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as
Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on
appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the
presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over
the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael
Yangco made in a second marital venture with Victoria Obin, implying that he had a first
marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the
probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's will, is incontestable. The said will is part of a public or
official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to
be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumed "that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,"
"that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board,
is legitimate," and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature
and the ordinary habits of life." (Sec. 5(z), (bb) and (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court.)
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since
Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold
that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of
Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil Code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen
derecho a suceder ab intestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que lo
haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado." Article 943 "prohibits all
successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives." (6
Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands v Aguas, 63 Phil 279,
287. See 16 Scaevola, Codigo Civil, 4d, 455-6.) x x x.
Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas
Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate.
The rule in Article 943 is now found in Article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child."
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law
does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.
Under Articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or
mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of
natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural
brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and
sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in Article 992, formerly Article 942, it was held that the legitimate relatives
of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho v Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman v Sevilla, 47 Phil 991.)
Where the testatrix, Rosario Fabie, was the legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie, the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Fabie, her father's brother, were held
not to be her legal heirs (Grey v Fabie, 88 Phil 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandfather (Llorente v Rodriguez, 10 Phil 585;
Centeno v Centeno, 52 Phil 322; Allarde v Abaya, 57 Phil 909). The natural daughter
cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural
mother (Anuran v Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil 29).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
LEONARDO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-51263, 28 February 1983
120 SCRA 890
The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purpose of determining his qualification
to inherit from a deceased person. In Leonardo, the Court found after looking into the birth
certificate of the petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred by Article 992 to
claim a share in the inheritance of his great grandmother.
De Castro, J.:
x
x
x
From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 21, 1942 was
survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero
Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late
Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and
accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one
of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate
of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to
have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned
between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income
derived from said properties from the time defendant took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailes asserted exclusive ownership
over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot
succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are not his by virtue of a valid and legal deed
of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were
allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paraaque, Inc. sometime in September
1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private
respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit. From said judgment,
private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated, reversed
the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint. Reconsideration
having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was filed on the following
assignment of errors:
x
x
x
II.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT
ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE
GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO
I N H E R I T B Y R E P R E S E N T A T I O N .
x
x
x
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo,
the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges
that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero,
who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can
consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate
showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Soccoro Timbol, his alleged
mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital
evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link
connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this
piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of
the plaintiff but a certain "Alfredo Leonardo" who was born on September 13, 1938
to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did
not submit any durable evidence showing that the "Alfredo Leonardo" mentioned in
the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and
space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove
his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be
an heir in the inheritance in question.
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the
absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or
that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he
was born outside of wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September
13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married; and what is more,
his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., on
leave. Abad Santos, J., I concur with the observation that I would have dismissed the
petition by minute resolution for lack of merit.
DIAZ v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-66574, 17 June 1987
150 SCRA 645
This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will be noted, the legitimate
collateral relative of the intestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. There
was no showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there
was animosity. It must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any
other descendants other than the illegitimate children who were excluded from her
inheritance.
Paras, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance
of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late
Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding
letters of administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: (1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother, Juliana, were the only legitimate children of the spouses
Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; (2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their
union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; (3) that Simona
Pamuti vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero;
(4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and
Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero; (5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; (6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and has six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 declared
Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
( a )
Sp. Proc. No. B-4 - is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of
the Intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
( b )
Sp. Proc. No. B-5 - is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
( c )
Sp. Proc. No. B-7 - is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an
Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero;
( d )
Sp. Proc. No. B-21 - is the Petition for the Settlement of the Intestate Estate
of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion for Intervention in Sp. Proc. Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed
to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the
Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her Opposition and Motion
to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero, as
well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa, guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of
March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by
Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from
further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero
and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated
November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in
CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on
December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which
reads -
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and
law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining
the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of
Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere
in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti
vda. de Santero.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was
denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the
present Petition for Review with the following:
x
x
x
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows - who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero - her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero and
the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero, by right of representation
of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings
that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that
said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (old Civil Code) and
recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that
rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly
grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero)
in the estate of their grandmother (Simona Pamuti).
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo
Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code x x x.
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the new Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. x x x.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of
the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the new Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil
Code is changed by Article 990 of the new Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the
reflections of the illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes which also finds full support from
other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that
an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all
cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution
would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, Journal of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, First Quarter, 1976, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-41.)
It is therefore clear from Art. 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
late Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in
holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Cortes, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part;
principal counsel for petitioners is related to me.
DIAZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 66574, 21 February 1990
182 SCRA 427
This resolution settled the motion for reconsideration filed by the illegitimate children on the
decision immediately preceding. An argument is raised that the word "relatives" used in
Article 992 cannot possibly refer to the grandmother of the illegitimate children, but only to
the other collateral relatives. The argument stresses the injustice resulting from the fact that
while the illegitimate children of an illegitimate child can exercise the right of representation,
the same right is denied the illegitimate children of a legitimate child.
Paras, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. v
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective pleadings,
the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of the
petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on
November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the
new Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to
discuss as amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B. L. Reyes,
former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo
Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
x
x
x
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti vda. de
Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether
petitioners, as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero, could inherit from Simona Pamuti vda.
de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child
of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil
Code of Spain) by Article 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines)
constitute a substantial and not a merely formal change, which grants illegitimate children
certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the new Civil Code has given
illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them
under the old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they
are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code
(No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are
only some of the many rights granted by the new Civil Code to illegitimate children. But that
is all. A careful evaluation of the new Civil Code provisions, especially Article 902, 982, 989
and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent
their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal
that such right to this time does not exist.
Let us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal shares.
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right
and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the preceding articles to illegitimate
children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall
inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparents.
Articles 902, 989 and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are
very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be
argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendants of a legitimate child is
entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the
legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children x x x are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to
the end that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae's Opinion
by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12.)
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above-quoted are based on
Article 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the new Civil Code
and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this
Court in the cases of Llorente v Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil 585; Centeno v Centeno, 52 Phil
322; and Oyao v Oyao, 94 Phil 204, cited by former Justice Minister Ricardo Puno, Justice
Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to
succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate
child himself), is already abrogated by the amendments made by the new Civil Code and
this cannot be made to apply to the instant case.
Once more, We declined to agree with petitioners. We are fully aware of certain substantial
changes in our law of succession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the
provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article
992, which was a reproduction of Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been
suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the
present controversy. While the new Civil Code may have granted successional rights to
illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the
right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a
legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then
his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the
person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him
because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of
representation by reason of the barrier imposed in Article 992. In this wise, the
commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code,
are still very much applicable to the new Civil Code because the amendment, although
substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural
parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with
the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable
to the instant case.
x
x
x
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the new Civil Code that the phrase "illegitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero as
the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of.
The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti
Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners
herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, it not defined by it. In
accordance, therefore, with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be
understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one; Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia
defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya
sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea
por proceder de una misma rais o tronco, como los colaterales."
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides,
he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the new Civil
Code.
Thus, the word 'relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense - which, as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates, which goes back
very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our
legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on
exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not
abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it
has done away with the sub classification of illegitimates into natural and
"spurious"). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those
rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law. (Amicus Curiae's
Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12.)
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least
amended to clarify the term "relatives," there is no other alternative but to apply the law
literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti vda. de Santero,
to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion of Reconsideration is DENIED and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Gri eq
\O(n)o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., please see dissenting opinion.
Padilla, J., No part; related to petitioners' lead counsel.
Bidin, J., No part, I participated in the appealed decision.
Sarmiento, J., No part. I was a lawyer of some parties in a case still pending in the Court
involving the same legal issue.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.: Dissenting Opinion
It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before
the Court. But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and
in the usually tidy and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern
a change effected by our own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier
inflexibly separated the legitimate from the illegitimate families have been relaxed a little.
The opprobrium case on illegitimate children and the disadvantages they suffer in law are
no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no longer as rigid as it used to be. The
efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our civil law conform "with the
customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with modern trends in
legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from the strict
and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel
bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results
brought about by amendments in the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their
own grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry
their mother. There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother go
to a collateral relative - her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group
of grandnieces and grandnephews will inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh
and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
disregards the order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the
right of representation in Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate of illegitimate as
provided by Articles 902, 993 and 995.
I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as
illegitimate children and legitimate uncles, aunts or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their
legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that
the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason why we
should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation
should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the
Code which provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the
circumstances given in the preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right
was reserved to the illegitimate child's legitimate offspring.
I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their
grandparents Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while
supporting the majority view of this Court states:
In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an
illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not have under the old
Civil Code. But in retaining without change provisions of the old Code in Article
992, it created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the
illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate
descendant of a legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child
should succeed by operation of law only to persons with the same status of
illegitimacy has thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 330.)
The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does
not impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for
reinterpretation because the Code has been amended. The meaning of "relatives" must
follow the changes in various provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.
My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right
and just. Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her
grandchildren - legitimate or illegitimate - more than the second cousins of said
grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the
indiscretions of her son but why should the law include the innocent grandchildren as
objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to members of a
separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.
I therefore vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
MANUEL v FERRER
G.R. No. 117246, 21 August 1995
247 SCRA 476
If an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of
his father or mother, the latter are barred in the same manner from inheriting from the
illegitimate child.
Notice, however, that in this case Court took special note that the beneficiary of the estate
of the illegitimate child (who executed a affidavit of self-adjudication as sole heir) is not
even an heir of the deceased illegitimate child. While the beneficiary was raised by the
deceased as his own daughter, she was not formally adopted. It would therefore seem that
the State was short-changed because in the absence of any qualified intestate heir, the
State succeeds the decedent pursuant to Article 1011.
Vitug, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manial and Beatriz Guiling, initiated
this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra marital affair with one
Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed
before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on,
respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manual, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration
of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land x x x covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT-P-19902 and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41134 were later bought by Juan and registered in his name.
The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the
spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised
her as their own daughter.
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale
con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his
land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manual died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two
years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594,
OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the
registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the
three titles x x x in the name of Juan Manuel were cancelled and new titles x x x were
issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed
in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim
over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225)
that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale con Pacto de
Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for
summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15
th
August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint
holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of the illegitimate brother Juan Manuel,
were not the real parties in interest to institute the suit. x x x.
Petitioners motion of reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
x
x
x
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juans intestate estate (while
the other half would pertain to Juans surviving spouse) under the provision of the last
paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded
by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
Respondent, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article e992
of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children of his father or mother, nor such children or relative inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family. The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line
between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on the other,
although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary disposition.
This barrier between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is
explained by a noted civilist. His thesis:
x x x. Consequently, when the law speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and
sisters as well as to the children whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers
and sisters.
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this iron curtain, firstly, in the early case of
Grey v Favie, and then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v Intermediate Appellate Court
and de la Puerta v Court of Appeals. x x x
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases.
Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the
latter had no right to the formers inheritance, that the legitimate collateral relatives of the
mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child, that a natural child cannot represent his
natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent, that the natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of
her natural father, and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
illegitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated
by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must
always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.
x
x
x
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an
intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal
(judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory or a legal heir.
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCTs issued to her favor,
as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was
properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real parties in interest in the
case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch
37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees and litigation expenses in favor of private respondents, which portion is
hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano (Chairman). Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
VDA. DE CRISOLOGO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-44051, 27 June 1985
137 SCRA 233
Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
The petitioners filed an action against private respondents for ownership, annulment of
sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and
damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four
deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by
Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which
was however, denied for not being indubitable at that stage of the proceedings. The private
respondent, therefore, filed his answer.
After termination of the pre-trial proceedings and during the trial on the merits, the parish
priest of the Roman Catholic Church, Rev. Father Roque N. Fidol, testified on the witness
stand. He was duly cross-examined by Atty. Aguirre, counsel for the petitioners.
The private respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on the following grounds:
1. That Leoguarda (alias Lutgarda) was the illegitimate daughter of the late Julia
Capiao consequently plaintiffs are complete strangers to her (Leoguarda) and they
(plaintiffs) are not the real parties in interest and have no cause of action, much
less personality to maintain the present proceedings; and
x
x
x
After the petitioners filed an opposition to the motion and the respondent had filed his reply,
the respondent judge rendered a summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.
The judgment was based on the following findings:
The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in
quintessence or in substance the following: "That Julia Capiao, who maintained
extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or
forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao, who was married to Raymundo
Zipagan, both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964 respectively,
without any children and/or immediate forced heirs (paragraph 5 of the amended
complaint); that Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao, having died on November 11, 1970
at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will intestate succession took place and the
herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda]
Capiao), were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally
entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extra-judicial
partition, Annex "B", (paragraph 15, amended complaint).
The motion to dismiss, particularly the motion is reiteration of defendant's previous
motion for summary judgment, contains as Page 2-A diagram of the family tree of
the plaintiffs and the defendant, showing that their common ancestor was Pablo
Capiao. x x x As shown by the family tree or diagram, Julia Capiao, deceased,
who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, had one issue,
the deceased Leogarda and/or Lutgarda Capiao, married to Raymundo Zipagan,
both having died without any children and/or immediate forced heirs. x x x.
The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda (Leoguarda) is
undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad,
retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao. Article 992 of the
Civil Code, cited by the movant, the defendant, provides:
x
x
x
Going back to the diagram, putting in black and white the family tree of the parties
graphically showing their relationship with the late Lutgarda Capiao, the source of
the properties in question, and their relationship with one another, the question that
arises x x x is the following:
The relatives of Julia Capiao, namely: the plaintiffs in this case,
can they inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the original owner of the
properties in question?
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit
from an illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable
provision of Article 992 of the new Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit
from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant
case.
x
x
x
The legal questions raised to us are: x x x (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals in
dismissing the petition acted in accordance with law or with the applicable decision of the
Supreme Court and whether or not it departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings
as set down by this Court.
x
x
x
On certain occasions, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal outside the period
prescribed by law in the interest of justice. Emphatic in the decisions cited by the petitioner
are strong considerations of substantial justice. The present case does not warrant such
liberality because the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It
is clear from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question
because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia
Capiao, they cannot inherit from her illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao
predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao. As explained by Manresa, whom the private
respondent cited:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called
relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the
law does not recognize it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts
and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in
turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish
upon the family. Every relations is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Alampay, JJ., concur. de la Fuente, J.,
no part.
SUNTAY III v COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183953, 16 June 2010
621 SCRA 142
While the barrier in Art. 992 remains in force, Justice Nachura sets the tone in what could
lead to a reconsideration of the ruling in Diaz v Intermediate Appellete Court, supra. Be
mindful, however, that the excerpt cited above is at best an obiter since the principal issue
raised in this case relates to the preference in the appointment of an administrator.
Nachura, J.:
x x x
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the
Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the
decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to
respondents petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law
concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the
eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
which in the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed
that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Civil Code in
its own Article 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and
998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his
own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents
the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-avis
illegitimate children.
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded . . . on the presumed will of the deceased. . . Love,
it is said, first descends, then ascends, and finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law
first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always
preferring those closer in degree to those of more remote degrees, on the
assumption that the deceased world have done so had he manifested his last
will . . . Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by
ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property
be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare
of humanity.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between
her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband Federico, who in fact
legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate
child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist
animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from
making a final decision of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in
the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer
the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Carpio (Chairman), Peralta, Abad and Perez, JJ., concur.
VERDAD v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109972, 29 April 1996
256 SCRA 593
When a surviving spouse inherits, she acquires all the rights and privileges of
ownership pertaining to the property thus acquired. Hence, where a surviving spouse
becomes a co-owner of property through succession to her deceased spouse, the former is
entitled to the right of redemption in the circumstances described in Article 1620 of the Civil
Code. Verdad confirms this fact when a widow was granted the right to redeem a property
in which she was a co-owner, that her brothers and sisters-in-law sold to a third party
without giving her prior written notice.
Vitug, J.:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248 square meter residential
lot x x x. Private respondent, Socorro Cordero vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right
of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega,
her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos
and the second, following the latters death, with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own
death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her
daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the
second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales and Aurora
Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after
Macarias death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his
widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon Jr., sold to petitioner
Zosima Verdad (their interest) on the disputed lot supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In
a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that the
lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended
merely to save on tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City
Treasurers Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong
Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the property. She
tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the amount for
being much less than the lots current value of P80,000.00. No settlement having been
reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private respondent on 16 October 1987, initiated
against petitioner an action for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed down
its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents right to redeem the property had
already lapsed.
An appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed by private respondents. The
appellate court, in its decision of 22 April 1993, reversed the court a quo; thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one is accordingly entered declaring plaintiff-
appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. 1088,
NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620 NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos Sr. in
Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS
from finality hereof, unless written notice of the sale and its terms are received in the
interim, under the same terms and conditions appearing under Exhibit J and after
returning the purchase price of P23,000.00 within the foregoing period. NO COST.
In her recourse to this Court, petitioner assigned the following errors: That
x x x
Still, the thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private
respondent, Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely the spouse of
David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in the intestate estate of
Macaria.
We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that
matter, a mere relative by affinity) is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law, however,
Socorros right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macarias
estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a
share in his mothers inheritance.
David Rosales incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria died on
08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales,
who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died,
his own estate which included the undivided interest over the property inherited from
Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on
succession.
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
x x x
ART, 1001, Should brothers and sisters or their children survive the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters, of their children to the other half.
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales,
thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a
right of redemption arise in favor of private respondents; thus:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated upon the same terms
and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by
purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondent.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the
co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code
x x x
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent
Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she
discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan city, or when the case
was initiated on 16 October 1987 before the trial court.
x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
SANTILLON v MIRANDA
No. L-19281, 30 June 1965
14 SCRA 563
Santillon resolved the dispute regarding the intestate shares of a surviving spouse
concurring with one legitimate child. In addition to the arguments clearly stated in the text
of the decision, it may be stressed at this point that commentators who insist on a 3/4 - 1/4
sharing in favor of the legitimate child adhere to the theory of preference. In short, there the
order of intestate succession listed the legitimate children as having first priority in the
intestate estate of the deceased parent, and the spouse as fourth, then the law must be
interpreted as having given a preference to the legitimate child or children with respect to
the hereditary estate, after the legitime of all other compulsory heirs shall have been paid.
Obviously, Santillon rejected the theory of preference and adopted the theory of
concurrence. Accordingly, heirs who do not mutually exclude each other shall ratably share
the inheritance. Since preference is not inferred from the order of intestate succession, then
the free disposal (after payment of legitime to the compulsory heirs) must be distributed in a
manner that would result in the least disproportion between or among the respective shares
of the concurring intestate heirs.
Two other theories in relation to the disposition of the free disposal might be mentioned.
Under the theory of equality, the free disposal is divided equally among the concurring
intestate heirs, regardless of the order of intestate succession. Another theory advanced by
other commentators is that the free disposal must be proportionately distributed among the
concurring intestate heirs based on their respective legitime.
Bengzon, C.J.:
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses
Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties
enumerated in the petitioner were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda
claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two
documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated
in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was
not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was
necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified
for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed
administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project
of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking
Article 892 of the new Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal
properties as the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows:
1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her
conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the new Civil Code to another 1/2 of the
remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta
claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961 issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit one-half (1/2) share and the
remaining one-half (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. x x x.
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law
are involved. x x x And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How
shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the
spouse and one legitimate child?
x
x
x
The Second Issue: - petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the
new Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. x x x.
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites
Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says that the article is unjust and inequitable to the
extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate
succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control,
regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving
a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural
word "children" includes the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the new Civil Code falls under that chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being
the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his
father's estate. Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of law
with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with
each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to
when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate
succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our new Civil Code seem to support Claro's intention; at least, his
objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm that half and half idea of the Pangasinan
court.
This, is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the new Civil Code's chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this
article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in
equal parts. Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One Child Surviving - If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse,
since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half
goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants,"
the rule in statutory construction that the plural can include the singular is
applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art.
996 speaks of "children," therefore, it does not apply when there is only one "child;"
consequently Art. 892 (and not Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial
construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate
succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get one-half in
intestate.
A. Children. - It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the
singular. So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied): "If the widow or widower
and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child."
Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included
in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include
"child" in the following articles:
Art. 887 - The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants x x x.
Art. 888 - The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half
of the hereditary estate x x x.
Art. 896 - Illegitimate children who may survive x x x are entitled to one-fourth of
the hereditary estate x x x. [See also Art. 901.]
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent
when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets
one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate
child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in
Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996 - Such position, more clearly states, is this: In testate succession,
where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or
widower one-fourth. But in intestate, if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and
the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower
"gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half - if the testator so wishes. So, the law
virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only
child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstances that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained
two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower
survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
widower survives with only one child (exception). Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second
situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule
applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain - and this we are not called
upon to discuss - but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo, J., no part. Barrera, J., is on leave.
PARISH PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC v RIGOR
No. l-22036, 30 April 1979
89 SCRA 496
Capacity to succeed is determined from the moment of the death of the testator or the
decedent. To be capacitated, an heir, legatee or devisee must be living at the time
succession opens, except in case of representation whenever appropriate. A testamentary
disposition giving a devise to the nearest male relative who would pursue an ecclesiastical
career is meant to refer to such relatives living (or at least conceived) at the time of the
testator's death. A contrary interpretation may be upheld only if there is a clear intention to
the contrary. Nevertheless, the enforceability of such a testamentary disposition is
necessarily limited to twenty years from the time succession opens, in order that the
disposition be consistent with the rule prohibiting perpetuities.
Aquino, J.:
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this
Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court
declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor v Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 23419-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August
9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will
were the testator's nearest relatives x x x.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to
facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado cuatro (4) parcelas de terreno palayeros, situados en el
municipio de Guimba de la provincia de Nueva Ecija, cuyo num. de Certificado de
Transferencia de Titulo son: Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de
superficie; Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie; Titulo Num.
6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251
m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier parente mio varon mas cercano que
estudie la carrera eclesiastica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote;
las condiciones de estrate legado son:
x
x
x
To implement the following bequest, the administratrix in 1940 submitted a project of
partition containing the following item:
x
x
x
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the
meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest, to his nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as
the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria has no right
to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate
proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or in February 19, 1954,
the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administratrix, Florencia
Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the
possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court
granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957, the parish
priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957, praying
that the bequest be declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled
to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male
relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood." That petition was opposed by
the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court through Judge Bernabe de Aquino,
declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs
in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge de Aquino granted the second motion for reconsideration in his order of December
10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan
in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was
directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father
Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the
holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it
beyond that period would violate 'the rule against perpetuities." It ruled that since no legatee
claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass
to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the
new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that
the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary
provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
x
x
x
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the
plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention
was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil 333).
x
x
x
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made," but excluding the testator's oral declaration as to
his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following restatement of
the provisions of his will:
1 .
That he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives
who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest;
2 .
That the devisee could not sell the ricelands;
3 .
That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could
continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death
but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood;
4 .
That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate
every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father
Rigor and his parents;
5 .
That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy
and the administration of the ricelands would pass to the incumbent parish
priest of Victoria and his successors;
6 .
That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee, as
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the
responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors;
and
7 .
That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce
five percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to
twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each
year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the
name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, x x x.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands
only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the
testator was studying for the priesthood, and two, in case of the testator's nephew became
a priest and he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado," or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had a
nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has
brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal
heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his
nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest
male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time
of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit,
the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe
them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would
render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his
estate. That could not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or second-
degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the
testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son
of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative of possibly a grandnephew. But since
he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category
of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his
nearest male relative would be his nephew of grandnephews (the son of his nephew or
niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative."
x
x
x
x x x Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was
living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights
to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the
will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie
la carrera eclesiastica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born
after his death, he could have so specified in his will. He must have known that such a
broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his
bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado?" The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his
nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade
school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of
Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the
moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and
administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would
be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time of Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of the appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and
January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "no nearest male relative of the
late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood."
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged
in the will, was likewise inoperative.
x
x
x
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when
the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had
not yet entered the seminary, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated.
Those two contingencies did not arise and could not have arisen, in this case because no
nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever become a
priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil
Code, nor article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in
which the right of accretion exists" x x x.
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, nor article 960(2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that
belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands,
the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the
testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
x
x
x
We find no merit in the appeal. The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against
the petitioner.
Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur. Abad Santos, J., did not take part.
CID v BURNAMAN
No. L-24424, 31 July 1968
24 SCRA 435
The capacity of an heir to inherit is to be determined at the time succession opens. Cid
refers to the provision of the Civil Code of 1889 which disqualifies an illegitimate child who
has not been acknowledged by his or her putative parents from inheriting. The status of an
acknowledged natural child must be established as of the death of the deceased parent in
order to entitled such illegitimate child to certain successional rights. Without such
acknowledgement as of such time, no successional rights shall accrue to said child.
Please note, however, that the requisite acknowledgment has been repealed by the Family
Code. This case, therefore, and the pertinent provisions of law referred to herein, shall not
longer apply to deaths occurring after the effectivity of the Family Code.
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
x
x
x
The following facts were found by the Court of Appeals:
The aforesaid lot was originally decreed in undivided halves, one in favor of Gregoria
Bonoan (1/2) and the other half in favor of the five petitioners Julians (Dionisia, Amador,
Escolastica, Domingo and Teodoro), as owners in equal shares of said realty.
Gregoria had in her possession Original Certificate of Title No. 7130, covering the land in
question. When she died on 19 November 1938, the Certificate passed to the hands of her
son, Cenon Bonoan @ Cenon Hernando. The land tax assessment was also in the name
of Gregoria, but when she died, it was placed in the names of Cenon Hernando (Cenon
Bonoan) and Engracia Hernando, her children. Engracia was the mother of the petitioners
Julians.
On 4 May 1950, Cenon executed a sworn affidavit adjudicating unto himself the entire half
interest of his mother, Gregoria Bonoan, in Cadastral Lot No. 9008 as "her only legal heir
the affiant named herein who is her only child," and the sworn statement was entered,
recorded on the same day, and annotated on the back of the certificate of title, subject to a
2-year reservation in favor of possible claimants, in conformity with Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. x x x.
Six (6) years later, on 7 April 1956, Cenon ceded by way of absolute sale - "all his rights,
participation and interest over his entire share of one fourth unto Nancy Warwick
Burnaman" for the price of P1,500.00, but the deed was not recorded.
Eight months afterwards, on 5 December 1956, Cenon Bonoan, or Hernando, subscribed
another deed of sale wherein, for a price of P2,500.00, he conveyed unto the same
vendee, Nancy W. Burnaman, not one-fourth but an undivided half (1/2) interest of Lot
9008, stating in the deed of sale that he was "the absolute owner and actual possessor of
the said undivided half interest in the above described parcel of land." This deed of sale
was recorded on 17 December 1956. A new Certificate of Title No. T-4215 was issued, with
Nancy as owner of an undivided half and with the Julians as holders of the other half.
Original Certificate of Title No. 7139 was canceled. x x x.
Petitioners Julians filed, on 18 July 1957, a complaint against Nancy Burnaman, her
husband, Elis J. Burnaman, and Cenon Hernando, seeking the avoidance of the sale by
the latter insofar as concerned a one-fourth (1/4) undivided interest in the lot, on the basis
that the original half owner, Gregoria Bonoan, died leaving two children, Cenon and
Engracia, the latter being the mother of plaintiffs Julians; that upon Engracia's death, her
children, the Julians, became entitled to half of Gregoria's half interest (i.e., 1/4 of the
whole) in addition to their recorded half share; x x x. They prayed to be declared owners
of an undivided three-fourths (3/4) of Lot No. 9008, and to be awarded damages and other
relief.
The defendant Burnaman's denied the allegations of the complaint; pleaded good faith in
their purchase from Cenon Hernando and counterclaimed for damages; while Cenon
answered admitting that Engracia B. Hernando was his sister, but denied that she had any
right or participation in the land in question; and pleaded that the lot was purchased with his
earnings as a soldier in the Philippine Scouts, and that his mother, Gregoria, and his sister,
Engracia, had recognized his rights to the undivided half of Lot No. 9008 of the Laoag
Cadastre.
After trial, the court of first instance found for the plaintiffs Julians; declared them owners of
the undivided 3/4 of the lot; annulled pro tanto the adjudication in favor of Cenon, and his
sale in favor of the Burnaman spouses; ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
title No. 4215; and ordered defendants to pay damages at P5.00 per month from 5
December 1956.
Upon appeal by the defendants, the Court of Appeals found, in its turn, that Engracia
(mother of the Julians) was an illegitimate child of Gregoria Bonoan, and was never
recognized, voluntarily or compulsory, by her mother, that her certificate of baptism on 16
April 1879, even if considered a public document at the time it was issued, was
incompetent evidence of her acknowledgment; that not having acknowledged, expressly or
tacitly, she could not inherit from Gregoria, unlike Cenon who was acknowledged,
according to Dionisia Julian Cid's testimony; that Cenon's admission that Engracia was his
sister did not make the former an acknowledged natural child of his mother. x x x. Hence
this appeal.
The first attack leveled at the appealed decision by petitioners-appellants, is that, their
action being 'an ordinary civil action on the ground of fraud," it was improper for the
appellate court to "make a declaration of heirship which is within the exclusive competence
and jurisdiction of the court in special proceedings," citing Litam v Espiritu, 100 Phil 365.
Appellants suffer from a misconception of the true purpose of the inquiry by the Court of
Appeals into the filiation and status of their mother, Engracia Bonoan (or Hernando).
Plaintiffs, as claimants of an additional undivided fourth (1/4) of Lot 9008, are duty bound to
rely on the strength of their title thereto, and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
(Civil Code, Article 434; Misamis Lumber Co. v Director of Lands, 57 Phil 881) Since the
plaintiffs Julians based their title upon hereditary succession from the original recorded
owner, Gregoria Bonoan, through their mother, Engracia Bonoan, it was perfectly proper for
the appellate court to inquire whether Engracia was, or could be, an heir of Gregoria. To be
such heir, it is not enough that Engracia was Gregoria's daughter; for not every child is
entitled to inherit. To succeed, a child must be, under the rules of the Civil Code of 1889 (in
force when Gregoria died in 1938), either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else
an acknowledged natural child, for illegitimates not natural are disqualified to inherit (Civil
Code 1889, Articles 807, 939). As appellants' own Exhibits "G" and "H" showed that both
Cenon and Engracia were children of Gregoria but with father unknown, their legitimacy or
legitimation was out of the question. Hence, it became imperative to ascertain whether
Engracia was properly acknowledged, assuming that her parents could marry each other
when she was conceived, because if Engracia was not recognized, she could not inherit
from her mother, Gregoria, and consequently, could not transmit to her own issue any
successional rights to Gregoria's estate.
The court of first instance held that Engracia was deemed acknowledged by a public
instrument, because her baptismal certificate in the parish records was a public document
before General Order No. 68 and Act 190; but the Court of Appeals correctly held that this
certificate did not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the latter must be
executed by the child's father or mother, and the parish priest can not acknowledge in their
stead (Canales v Arrogante, 91 Phil 6). This action of the appellate court was not a
declaration of heirship but a testing of the chain of title of herein petitioners-appellants,
plaintiffs in first instance. There being no other evidence of her acknowledgment, Engracia
and her children were properly refused a share in her mother's property.
It is true that Cenon Hernando (or Bonoan) admitted in his answer that Engracia was his
sister, but this certainly is not an admission that she was also acknowledged by their
common mother. For acknowledgment is not a consequence of filiation.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against appellants
Julians.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
DIMAYUGA v COURT OF APPEALS
L-48433, 30 April 1984
129 SCRA 111
Article 1043 provides that no person may accept or repudiate an inheritance unless his is
certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the
inheritance. A compulsory heir who is deprived of a portion of his legitime through a
donation inter vivos executed by his father, or through a partition inter vivos made by his
father, is not deemed to have repudiated the inheritance to the extent of the shortfall of his
legitime, even if in the meantime he had executed an affidavit confirming and accepting his
share of the distributed property.
Aquino, J.:
x
x
x
The spouses Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda Gayapanao, who were married in 1915,
acquired a Torrens title for that homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940,
survived by her son Manuel, and her husband, Genaro.
During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named Emerenciana Panganiban by whom
be begot five children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaida, Remedios and Socorro. A sixth
child, Nelia Dimayuga, was born in 1944 after Segunda's death. Emerenciana cultivated a
homestead adjoining the thirteen-hectare homestead in question. So it was not surprising
that she became the paramour of Genaro.
Genaro, 56, married Emerenciana, 37, on February 26, 1947. That marriage legitimated
Nelia, who had been a duly acknowledged natural child, but it did not improve the status of
her brother and four sisters who were adulterous or spurious children.
On September 16, 1948, or about month before Genaro's death a "partition of real
property" was executed in English. It was duly notarized. It was signed by Genaro, Manuel,
Filomeno and Pacita, and thumb marked by Emerenciana, in representation of her minor
children, Adelaida, Remedios, Socorro and Nelia, though Emerenciana had not been
appointed judicial guardian of their property,
The document states the ages of the children as Pacita, 22, Filomeno, 19, Adelaida, 17,
Remedios, 15, Socorro, 13 and Nelia, 4. But their birth certificates now show that they
were all minors. Filomeno and Pacita were twins born on December 25, 1929; Remedios
and Adelaida were also twins born on January 2, 1932; Socorro was born in 1938 and
Nelia, as already noted, in 1944.
In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the
homestead as his sole property and not conjugal, which it actually was (Pisalbon v Bejec,
74 Phil 288; Tabunan v Margimen, 101 Phil 288). Manuel was given as share five and one-
half hectares of the homestead (southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's separate
homestead). The six illegitimate children were given seven and seven-tenths hectares
(northern portion also adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The partition was not
registered.
The partition as amended in 1951 by means of an affidavit in Tagalog signed by the same
parties except Genaro who died intestate on October 8, 1948. An additional one hectare
was given to Manuel making his total share six and five-tenths hectares. The 1948 partition
prejudiced him because "ang ginawang paghahati ni Genaro Dimayuga ay hindi tumpak
sapagkat naapi si Manuel Dimayuga."
Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel having been advised that the entire
homestead was inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral
ascendancy, executed an affidavit of adjudication which he registered. He obtained a
Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare homestead.
About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the annulment of
Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's seven
children, including Manuel. The parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts. The plaintiffs
offered the partition and the amendatory affidavit as their documentary evidence. On the
other hand, Manuel's documentary evidence consisted of his title, the marriage contract of
his parents and of Genaro and Emerenciana and the birth certificates of the illegitimate
children.
There was no oral evidence. The parties submitted 'the case on pure question of law." The
trial court annulled Manuel's title, decreed that about one-half of the homestead should be
divided equally among the six illegitimate children and ordered Manuel to pay them P2,500
as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Manuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which adjudicated to him three-fourths of the
homestead and the other one-fourth to Nelia. The six illegitimate children appealed to this
Court. x x x.
The petitioners or the six illegitimate children admit that the Appellate Court correctly
applied the law by adjudicating three-fourth of the homestead to Manuel and one-fourth to
Nelia. However, they contend that their possession of about one-half of the homestead
since the 1948 partition made them owners by prescription and that Manuel is estopped to
deny that fact because he adjudicated the homestead to himself only twenty-two years
later.
That contention is devoid of merit. It may be morally plausible but it is not legally
defensible. No portion of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by
prescription. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
x
x
x
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code proves that if the testator should make a partition of his
property b an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of forced heirs. Article 1056 was construed to mean that a person
who makes an inter vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the partition is
void (Legasto v Verzosa, 54 Phil 766; Fajardo v Fajardo, 54 Phil 842; Romero v Villamor,
102 Phl 641). With more reason the partition be void is there was no will.
The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner of
the entire homestead. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husbands usufructuary
legitime, was inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his mother who was married to
Genaro for twenty-five years. Genaro could dispose by an act inter vivos only one-half of
the homestead. In that one-half portion, Manuel and Nelia, as Genaros legal and forced
heirs, had a two-thirds legitime.
In donating the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived
Manuel of his legitime in his estate, or in effect, made him renounce his future inheritance.
The 1951 affidavit cannot be construed as a repudiation of his inheritance in his fathers
estate because the document does not have that tenor. For this reason, Manuel is not
estopped to ignore that partition. The rule in Alforque v Velos, 65 Phil 272, cited by the
petitioners, does not apply to Manuel. The facts in the Alforque care are radically different
form the facts of the instant homestead case.
The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was legitimated) have no rights
whatsoever to the said homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or spurious
children.
x
x
x
As such, they are not entitled to successional rights but only to support (Art. 139, old Civil
Code; Reyes v Zuzuarregui, 102 Phil 346); Olivete v Mata, 100 Phil 563; Javelosa v
Monteclaro, 74 Phil 393; Lagrimas v Lagrimas, 95 Phil 113; Ramirez v Gmus, 42 Phil 855).
WHEREFORE, the trial courts judgment is reversed and set aside. Three-fourths of the
said homestead is hereby adjudicated to Manuel Dimayuga and one-fourth to Nelia
Dimayuga. The register of deeds should cancel Manuels title and issue the corresponding
titles in accordance with this decision. No costs.
S O O R D E R E D .
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ/. Concur.
De Castro, J., no part.
GUY v COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 163707, 15 September 2006
502 SCRA 151
Guy holds that a waiver of hereditary share, in order to be effective, must make an explicit
reference to the hereditary rights that are being waived. A waiver must pertain to a known
or established right. Where there is a waiver of the hereditary rights of illegitimate children,
it is essential that their hereditary rights must be established prior to the waiver. Hence, if
proof of illegitimate filiation has not been commenced, a waiver of hereditary rights would
be premature.
The Court made reference to the rule on repudiation of an inheritance. Specifically the
Court cited Article 1044 which requires the judicial approval of a repudiation of hereditary
rights of a minor or an incapacitated person. It is not altogether clear what Justice Santiago
referred to Article 1044. The fact that the mother acknowledged receipt of P300,000.00 on
behalf of her minor children and an educational plan for their education (which is the basis
of the waiver of claim) is indicative that there was indeed an acceptance of the inheritance.
It would seem that Justice Santiago viewed the payment made to the mother, on behalf of
the minor children, was the monetary consideration for the waiver of hereditary rights. The
question, however, is whether a waiver of hereditary rights is functionally equivalent to
repudiation.
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
x
x
x
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial court of Makati City Branch 138. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a.
Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who dies intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued
at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his
surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator
for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of
the estate. x x x.
In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted
that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing
letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further
alleged that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
x
x
x
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his
co-heirs alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim
stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and
all liabilities.
The Regional Trial court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by
Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her
minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of rights occurred. x x x.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed
Decision dated January 22, 2004 x x x.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
x
x
x
The petition lacks merit.
x
x
x
As regards Remedios Release and Waiver of claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a
person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver
of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way
of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and
kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Considering that the
document did not specifically mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of
Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Under Article 1044 of the Civil
Code, provides:
Art. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to
their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property,
or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030.
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which
must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of claim in the instant case is void and will not
bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Further, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional
rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of
the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his
co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence petitioners invocation of waiver on
the part of private respondents must fail.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 70742 affirming the denial of petitioners motion to
dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
LEVISTE V COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. L-29184, 30 January 1989
160 SCRA 581
Article 1052 in part provides that if an heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his
creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the
heir. This right pertains to creditors, and excludes an attorney who may have a claim
against his client-heir based on a contingent fee arrangement.
Grio-Aquino, J.:
The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee
basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his clients refusal to
appeal the decision of the trial court.
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written
agreement with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario, to appear as her counsel in a
petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a
piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila was bequeathed to del Rosario. It
was agreed that petitioners contingent fee would be thirty-five percent (35%) of the
property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will.
In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as del
Rosarios counsel:
X
x
x
On August 20, 1956, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she
was terminating his services as her counsel due to conflicting interest. x x x.
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect his Rights to Fees
for Professional Services.
In an order dated November 12, 1965, the trial court denied his motion on the ground that
he had not filed a claim for attorneys fees or recorded his attorneys lien.
On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a Formal Statement for Claims for Attorneys Fees
and Recording of Attorneys Lien. Which was noted in the courts order of December 20,
1965.
Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued
to receive copies of the courts orders, as well as the pleadings of the other parties in the
case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for decision without the
respondents evidence.
On November 23, 1966, del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed
a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Probate alleging that del Rosario waiver her rights to the
devise in her favor and agreed that the de Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her
petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.
In an order of April 13, 1967, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for
being contrary to public policy.
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal
requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will
and the testatrixs signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva.
The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record of appeal. The private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a
party in interest.
The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he had a direct and
material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed, He also asked that he be
substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario.
On March 26, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal an denied petitioners motion for
substitution.
The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. No. 41248)
praying that the trial court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his
motion for substitution.
On May 28, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form
and substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision
in Special Proceeding No. 58325.
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari to this
Court, assigning the following errors against the Court of Appeals resolution:
1 .
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner appears not to be the proper party to
appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
x
x
x
Under the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of
services with del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors,
the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to
the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the person to whom, in accordance with
the rules established in this Code, it may belong.
he has a right to accept for his client del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in
her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorneys fees.
The argument is devoid if merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case.
That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of
Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the
successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by
the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a
legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of
the decedents will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latters estate. There is
nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name.
This Court has ruled in the case of Recto v Harden, 100 Phil 1427, that the contract (for
contingent attorneys fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any
right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Hardens) aforesaid share in the
conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said
fees.
x
x
x
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceedings in the lower court. He had no direct
interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as
former counsel of a prospective heir. In Paras v Narciso, 35 Phil 244, We had occasion to
rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not intervene in its probate. Thus:
x
x
x
the reason for the rule excluding from contesting the will is not that thereby the court
may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the
intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would
entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras v Narciso, 35 Phil 244, 246.)
Similarly, in Morente v Formalino, 40 O.G. 21
st
Supp. 1, We held:
We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an
attorneys lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his
client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
DE ROMA V COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-46903, 23 July 1987
152 SCRA 205
Collation seeks to preserve the legitime of the compulsory heirs, and at the same time, to
equalize the shares of the heirs in the hereditary estate. As a general rule, all gratuitous
conveyances made by the decedent during his lifetime are collationable. By way of an
exception, the donor may provide that a particular donation shall not be collationable. In the
exceptional case, it is necessary that the prohibition to collate is expressed. Otherwise, no
inference can be deduced that the intention of the donor was to excuse collation.
Cruz, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda
de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondents as guardian of
Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the
estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.
There is no dispute regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon is
whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent vigorously argues that
it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062,
claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and
the donation was not inofficious.
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
fro the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should
have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless
the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trail court, x x x which held that
the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited
collation. Moreover, the donation which did not impair the legitime of the two, was imputed
to the free portion of Candelarias estate.
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court x x x holding
that the deed of donation contained no expressed prohibition to collate as an exception to
Article 1062. Accordingly, it order collation and equally divided the net estate of the
decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.
The pertinent portion s of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin
ang aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaeda, may
kasapatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat
din dito sa Lungsod ng San Pablo, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-
loob kong ibininibay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabaggit na BUHAY DE ROMA,
sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng
kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang magmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito
at kanya nang maaaring ilipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa
kanyang pangalan, datapwat samantalang ako ay nabubuhay ay ako rin ang
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesio sa mga sasabing lupa.
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari na sapat
pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitima ng
mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay
bahagi ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao
na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion.
We agree with the respondent court that there is noting in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli merely described the
donation as irrevocable and should not be construed as an express prohibition against
collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the sue of such terms as legitime and free portion in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume that he understood
the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the
precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donors intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of
Article 1962. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties
donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedents estate merits little
consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed
donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to
collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Narvasa, Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
VIZCONDE v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118449, 1 February 1998
286 SCRA 217
This is a very important case as it discussed at length the concept of collation. Because of
the complicity of the matter, I reserved my observations by including footnotes to the more
significant statements in the body of the decision. Based on my personal observations
regarding this decision, I would say that I can only agree with it to the extent that the Court
ruled that the Paraaque property is not collationable.
Francisco, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz.,
Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses
Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are
Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an
incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow Zenaida
and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110
sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No.
(T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced
by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734. In
view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. On
March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad
Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P3,405,612.00). In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a
parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter
Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The
remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was
deposited in a bank.
The following year, an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her two
daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly
known as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI
revealed that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and
herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and
Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner
entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde With Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents.
1
The
extrajudicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two
daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank
deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the
funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer,
amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00). The settlement gave fifty percent (50%)
of the total amount of bank deposits if Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except
Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token
amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property
and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heirs, in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate proceedings x x x, listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida)
and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels
estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile,
and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein respondent Ramon filed an opposition dated
March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely
three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita
was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million
Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for the courts
intervention to determine the legality and validity of the inter vivos distribution made by
deceased Rafael to his children, Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his
own petition x x x In the Matter of the Guardianship of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G.
Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner
is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter of Estrellita.
2
In a consolidated Order dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the
guardian of Salud and Ricardo, while Teresita in turn, was appointed Special Administratrix
of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs.
Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate. Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as
Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without the courts knowledge
and permission.
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days
x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition
insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has
been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon. In response,
petitioner filed a manifestation, dated January 19, 19194, stressing that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the
proceedings. The RTC noted said manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994.
Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to
include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property,
as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property,
be collated. Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same
in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
x
x
x
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed.
On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. It provides:
x
x
x
The center point of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were
then financially capable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable
consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas.
Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas
in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses
were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And. Lauro Vizconde
left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and
returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita
and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to
buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have
been engaged in business ventures such as taxi business, canteen concessions
and garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted
to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property
from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her
father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased
out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael
Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In
its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals denied the petition
stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela
property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased x x x. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Finding prima facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995 gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent Court
of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to
Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code speaks of collation. It states:
x
x
x
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants and other forced heirs who intervene in
the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property
which they receive from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will
of the testator.
3
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other
compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent.
4
The purpose is to attain equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or
predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give
him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors
will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.
Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable
donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value
of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real
alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or
any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court,
as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafaels compulsory heirs.
Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point.
x
x
x
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third party or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be
dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to
intervene as he has no personality in the said proceeding which petitioner correctly argued
in his manifestation.
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of
a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such
determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action
to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject
property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and
the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration, are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be
ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
x
x
x
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceeding is still in its initiatory stage.
We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafaels heirs has been
impaired to warrant collation.
5
We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v Jurado, 59 Phil 11,
13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the
provisions of article 1035 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiff to allege
and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or
in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In
the absence of that effect, the collation should is untenable for lack of ground or
basis therefore.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case, the probate court
nonetheless made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque property. We
note that what was transferred to Estrelitta, by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela
property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the
sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof.
Indeed, collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate
court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to
Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property was conveyed for and in
consideration of P900,000.00 by Premier Home, Inc. to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has
no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the
Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs.
6
Thus, the probate courts order of
collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with
Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels
estate.
7
As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper, for, to repeat,
collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his
compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property.
Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heir in the Paraaque property.
8
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela
property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael.
In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the
Valenzuela property.
9
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated,
collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been
returned to the estate of Rafael.
10
Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the
matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
ARELLANO V PASCUAL
G.R. No. 189776, 15 December 2010
638 SCRA 826
Collation is relevant only when there are surviving compulsory heirs who are entitled to the
legitime. Thus, if the decedent is surviving only by his siblings, the donations made by the
decedent in his lifetime are not collationable. No portion of the estate is reserved to
compulsory heirs by way of legitime.
The purpose of collation is two-fold: the first is to ensure equality among the compulsory
heirs as far as practicable; and second, to protect the legitime by ensuring that donations
made by the decedent during his lifetime do not exceed the free disposal.
Carpio-Morales, J.:
Angel N. Pascual, Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his suiblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P.
Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.
Pascual.
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration, x x x filed by respondents x x x before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located
in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to
petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an
advance legitime of petitioner.
x
x
x
Provisinally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court
found the Deed of Donation valid in the light of the presumption of validity of notarized
documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the
New Civil Code which reads:
x
x
x
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus, it
disposed:
x
x
x
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that:
The property donated to appellant Amelia Pascual Arellano is part of the estate of
Angel Pascual, Jr.
The property donated to Appellant is subject to collation under Article 1061 of the
New Civil Code.
Appelles who are merely collateral relatives of deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as
his compulsory heirs entitled to legitimes.
In not partitioning the estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. equally among his legal or
intestate heirs.
By decision of July 20, 1009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal partly
meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of
division. We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia
is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and
we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not
strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the
net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it
imcluded the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court,
herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stock owned by the
decedent which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator.
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTYLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of includion of properties of the
Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, jr., as well as the partition and distribution of
the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in
accordance with the disquisitions herein.
Petitioners partial Motion for Reconsideration having been denited by the appellate court
by Resolution of octobet 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed,
ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
that the property donated by Angel N. pascual, jr. to petitioner Amelia Pascual
Arrellano is part of his estate at the time of his death;
that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation under Article 1061 of
the New Civil Code;
that respondents are compulsory heirs of their deceased brother Angel N. Pascual,
jr. and are entitled to legitimes;
in not partitioning the estate of Angel N. pascual, jr. equally among petitioner and
respondents, as his legal or intestate heirs.
Petitioner thus raised the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate shold have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the
hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed
of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.
The purpose of collation are to secure equality aming the compulsory heirs in so far
as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survivied by his siblings, who are his collateral
relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any letitime that part of the testators property
which he cannot dispose of because the law reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs ay be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and
exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in
the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are
secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who
succeed together with the primary or secondary compyulsory heirs; the illegitimate
children and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left ant compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he
was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral
relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as
donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being
no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provision of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering
the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the
d e c e a s e d A n g e l N . P a s c u a l , J r . i s S E T A S I D E .
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for
the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide
whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Bersamin, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
MANG-OY V COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-27422, 12 September 1986
144 SCRA 33
Article 1080 permits a person to make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will. Such partition shall be respected provided the legitime of the compulsory heirs is not
prejudiced. The Court held that this partition is not in the nature of a donation nor of a will. It
is of a special character which does not even require the execution of a prior will. The
partition is revocable at any time during the lifetime of the causante, and does not operate
to convey ownership of the properties involved until the death of the latter.
Cruz, J.:
The hero if this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all began he was
still a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he begot three children who
are the private respondents in this case. Upon her death, he took to himself a second wife,
by whom he had no issue but who had two children she had adopted according to the
practice of the Igorots then. It is their children who, with some others, are the petitioners in
this case.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a last will and
testament the dispositive portion of which declared:
Lastly, I appoint my son Bando Tumpao whom I named, that after departing from
this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have
the power to see and dispose all what I have started, he shall not change what I
have already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in my will, I will affix my
right hand thumb mark at the end of my written name because I do not know how to
read and write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Will this 2:00
Oclock in the afternoon this 4
th
day of September 1937, before those who are
present and have heard what I have stated, Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, 4
th

September 1937.
The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the
time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation of
this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an agreement providing as
follows:
x
x
x
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died.
The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience
to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last will and affirmed by the other
above-quoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty-three years
later, that brought this matter to this court.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extra judicial partition in which they
divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of
the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. By virtue of this partition, Old
Man Tumpaos title was canceled and another one issued in favor the three respondents.
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for
reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court, which, however, was reversed
by the Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the will executed by Old Man
Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated. The agreement of partition
among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter
vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It
was likewise held that the land in dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpaos first
marriage although it was registered during his second marriage and so the petitioners were
liable in rentals for the lots occupied by them, as well as attorneys fees.
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling, made both by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that the will, not having been probated as required by law, was
inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in
accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved or allowed in court.
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Art. 1056 of the Civil
Code of 1889, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man
Tumpao in 1937. The article reads as follows:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of forced heirs.
On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela v Albela, also
cited by the Court of Appeals, which Justice J.B.L. Reyes, as the ponente.
In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition dividing two
parcels of land between his daughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their
conformity by signing the instrument. They took possession of their respective shares upon
his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected Eduarda from the lot alleging title by
purchase from a third party and denying the existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for
recovery and was upheld by the trial court on the basis of the deed of partition.
x
x
x
In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the above
document, but argue against its validity, on the ground summarized in their brief, as
follows:
Therefore, the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela,
rest on a document which defies classification. If it is a deed of
partition, it is null and void because it is not embodied in a public
document; if it is a simple donation of realty, it is also null and void
because it is not in a public document and there is no acceptance;
if it is a donation mortis causa, certainly it is null and void because
it doe not follow the rules governing testamentary succession; and
if ever it is to be classified as a will, more so, it is still null and void
because it does not conform to the requirements of Section 618,
Act 190 as amended by Act 2645.
None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently
fail to realize that Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes
a testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them
among his heirs, and that this partition is not necessarily either a
donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character,
sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during
his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his
death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due
to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors
and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. x x x.
That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation
inter vivos is a consequence of its special nature. x x x.
It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition, Exhibit A, should be in
writing. It does not have to be in a public instrument except to affect
third persons, being valid between the parties who signed it in its
present form.
If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would be in
the absence of a previous testament preceding it (Legato v
Verzosa, 54 Phil 766). And even this may not be indispensable in
the present case for the testators partition did not depart from the
shares allotted to his heirs by law of intestacy. Nor is a prior will
necessary under Article 1080 of the new Civil Code, which
replaced the word testator in Article 1056 of the Code of 1889
which the broader term person.
There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albelas deed of partition and Old
Man Tumpaos last will and testament. Both are sustainable under Article 1056 of the Civil
Code, which was in force at the time they were executed. Even as Agustin Albelas partition
was signed by the two daughters themselves, so was Old Man Tumpaos will affirmed by
the beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized
the terms of such will. While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and
1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their
conformity to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his last will and testament.
x
x
x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial
court sustained, with costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
CHAVEZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G. R. No. L-68282, 8 November 1990
191 SCRA 211
While Mang-oy holds that a partition inter vivos executed in accordance with Article 1080 is
revocable by a person at any time during his or her lifetime, and that such partition will not
result in a transfer of ownership to his heirs during his lifetime, Chavez holds that an
exception may be taken if the partition has in fact been implemented and that one (or
some) of the heirs, with the consent of the person making it, conveys or sells his or her pro-
indiviso share to another co-heir. Estoppel bars a selling heir from disavowing the sale and
from proceeding contrary thereto.
The Court, in passing, mentioned that the several sales among the co-heirs did not
constitute contracts involving future inheritance. This is because each of the sales among
the co-heirs was with the expressed consent and authorization fro the parent who executed
the partition. This was construed as a sale of the parent herself.
Finally, it must be noted that in the case of a partition inter vivos under Article 1080, the law
does not specify a particular form. The court opined that such a partition may be made
orally or in writing.
Grio-Aquino, J.:
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuela Buenavista
(defendant in Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who
had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and
Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiff, and the last three, with their mother, were the
defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.
On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela
Buenavista, executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land
in question to her sister Conception Chavez for P450.00.
Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother,
also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the price
of P450.00. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her
undivided 1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion for P600.00. Having acquired the
shares of Presentation, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of
a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question which Antonio and Rosario as owners of
the remaining 2/6 shares.
In all the documents, the following stipulation appears;
Na ang nasabing lupa na sa amin ng aming ina, ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista,
kung kaya ito ay hahatiin naming anim (6) na mga magkakapatid, bagamat hindi pa
naming maisagawa ang paghahati o particion; ako bilang isa sa anim na
magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing
lupa, gayon pa man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana namin ay
samantalang nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang makakandili at makikinabang
sa nasabing pag-aari.
meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children,
in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, barrio
Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or
less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however,
reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her
lifetime.
Despite the transfer or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten
years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a Bilihang Patuluyan ng
Lupa of the entire property in favor of her daughter Raquel Chavez, and her husband
Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario, and Concepcion filed Civil Case
No. 1934 against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold
the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 with right to repurchase. Ferrer
was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving
the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the
costs. The court did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, The dispositive portion of
its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and render another
one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez
and the sale in favor of defendant Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio and further
that the documents are evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and
between Manuela Buenavista and her children, subject to her right of usufruct
during her lifetime, without pronouncement as to damages and costs.
On April 5, 1984, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others:
x
x
x
3. That the late Manuela Buenavista vda. De Chavez, one of the defendants-
appellees, was found to have executed during her lifetime a LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT x x x and there is now a pending petition for probate of said last will
and testament before the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Cmarines Norte;
x
x
x
6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavistas execution of
the document referred to as Exhibit A, B, C and D are valid, nevertheless its validity
cased from the time that she executed the Last Will and Testament x x x because
the execution of the Last Will invalidates the former act of the said Manuela
Buenavista;
7. That the Last Will and Testament x x x which is now pending probate I the
Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally affect the property
hence there is a ground for this motion for reconsideration and/or to suspend the
decision pending final outcome of the probate of the last will and testament of the
late Manuela Buenavista.
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition
inter vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and
Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the supposed Last Will and
Testament was executed on December 11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the
complaint for annulment on October 6, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was already
senile and not of disposing mind; that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her
own hand the several Deeds of Sale, the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her
thumb mark only; that Manuela Buenavista had no more property to dispose of by will on
December 11, 1969, when she supposedly executed her Last Will and Testament.
On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
x
x
x
Article 1080 of the new Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by
an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future
inheritance, the partition by a parent, as provided in Article 1080, is a case expressly
authorized by law. Art. 1080 of the new Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in
making a partition of his estate: either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes
a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with
the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form
of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained
on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common
as to parts of the land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty
was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity
will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose
of concluding the rights of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
(Hernandez v Andal, et al., 78 Phil 196, 203.)
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez, in favor of Concepcion
Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela
Buenavista and her children as she not only have her authority thereto but also signed the
sales. The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance,
but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who
signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.
x
x
x
As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from
denying and repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts. It is a
general principle of law that no one may be permitted to disavow and go back upon
his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin v Mitsumine, 34 Phil 858.)
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation
that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to
bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper
disposition according to the tenor of the partition. x x x They cannot attack the
partition collaterally x x x. (Ralla v Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing
Torres v Encarnacion and de Borja, 89 Phil 678.)
As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and
inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista vda. De Chavez to revoke the sales she herself
authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son, only to execute a
simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she
made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the
doctrine that no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of
another.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. CV-64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for review is dismissed for
lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
ALONZO V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
No. L-72873, 28 May 1987
150 SCRA 261
Article 1088 of the Code gives to co-heirs the right to redeem, within 30 days from written
notice of the sale, the hereditary property sold by a co-heir to a stranger. The Court has
interpreted this provision (as well as the counterpart provision in Article 1623) that the
notice must be in writing and sent by the seller to all prospective redemptioners. The Court
took exception in this case in view of the peculiar circumstances and waived the written
notice requirement.
Cruz, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we
are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we
administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer
is that we do neither because we are a court of both law and of justice. We apply the law
with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. The case is
an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro-indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share to the
herein petitioner for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year later, on April
22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated Con Pacto de Retro Sale, for the sum of P440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their
con Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was
an American citizen. On May 27, 1977 however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.
The trial court x x x also dismissed the complaint, now on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and
1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales
by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The
other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604
square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners. Eustaquia herself, who had
sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed
redemption. Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and
neighbors whose children went to school together.
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the areas occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was
impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon
of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners son, which was done without
objection on her part or of an of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of
the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor,
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court x x x declared that the notice required by
the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.
Citing the same case of de Cornejo v Court of Appeals applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the
need for written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus accordingly to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the
co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy
the requirement for written notice. So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner)
is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, he declared, the thirty days for
redemption start running.
In the earlier decision in Butte v Uy, the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist,
emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees,
conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by
the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
As it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a
particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive, the Court
held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the
30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that hard cases
make bad laws as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was
really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit: that in view of such
deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not began to run, much less expired in
1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
but is purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never the intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. Courts are apt to err by striking too closely to the words of a law, so we are
warned by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them. While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret
the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason
for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter than killeth, but to the spirit that
vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will.
The spirit rather than the letter of a statute determines its constructions, hence a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is
within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is no within the statute. Stated differently, a thing
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within
the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to endure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to being, to obviate any problem of
alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by
Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of
course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such
notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in
writing, would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long
before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents pretence
that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually
informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we are not here to declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in
1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale
and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the
period for its exercise had already expired.
x
x
x
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and built thereon a
house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a
mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemingly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim
the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of
the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above cited cases. In fact, and this should be
clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the de Cornejo and Butte doctrines.
What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due. That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus, when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes. JJ., concur. Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
BAUTISTA v BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 160556. 3 August 2007
529 SCRA 187
Bautista holds that an action to set aside a void extra judicial partition is imprescriptible.
However, the Courts statement that an invalid partition transmits no right is rather
disturbing. Notice that it is the death of the decedent that transmits ownership of the
hereditary estate to the heirs not the partition that is executed between or among them. In
Go Ong v Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the sale of ! of the property which pertains to
the conjugal share of the wife, setting aside only the sale insofar as the ! portion of the
property that is subject of settlement proceedings. In the instant case, Angelica and Alegria
already acquired ownership of their respective shares of the property upon the demise of
Teodora. Shouldnt the Court uphold the sale to Pacita, and Pacitas sale to Pedro, at least
insofar as the shares of Angelica and Alegria are concerned?
Carpio-Morales, J.:
During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80-square meter parcel of land
(the property) in Poblacion, San Carlos city, Pangasinan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 12951. She died intestate on January 19, 1970, leaving behind her spouse
Isidro Bautista (Isidro) and five children namely: Teofilo Bautista (Teofilo), Alegria Bautista
(Alegria), Angelica Bautista (Angelica), Pacita Bautista (Pacita), and Gil Bautista (Gil).
On April 21, 1981, Isidro and four of his five children Pacita, Gil,. Alegria, and Angelica
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the property in which Isidro waived his share
in favor of his said four children. Teofilo was excluded from the partition.
Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, acquired ! of the
property, sold the same, by Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981, to their sibling
Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc (Pedro).
Pacita and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations and TCT No. 18777 in their names over
209.85 square meters of the property including the shares they purchased from Angelica
and Alegria.
Pacita, with Pedros conformity, later conveyed via Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 13,
1993 ! of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedros nephew.
On January 24, 1994, herein petitioner Teofilo, represented by his attorney-in-fact
Francisco Muoz, filed a Complaint against his siblings Alegria and Angelica, along with
Pedro (the common law husband of his already deceased sister Pacita), Pricilla Bautista
(wife of his already deceased brother Gil), Pricillas children Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, and
Gelacio and Cesar Tamondong before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City,
for annulment of documents, partition, recovery of ownership, possession and damages.
In his complaint, petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of
the property and that the deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar Tamondong
was fictitious as it was impossible for her to have executed the same in Manila, she being
already seriously ill at the time.
In their answer, the defendants herein respondents sisters Alegria and Angelica, who
were jointed therein by their co-defendants-respondents Pricilla, Gilbert, Jim, Glenda,
Guen, Gelacio, and Gracia, claimed that it was Pacita who caused the execution of the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and because they trusted Pacita, they signed the document
without scrutinizing it; and that they learned about the contents of the partition only upon
Teofilos filing of the complaint.
By way of a cross claim against Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the answering defendants-
respondents claimed that a few weeks after the partition, Pacita approached Angelica and
Alegria to borrow their share in the property on her representation that it would be used as
security for a business loan; and that agreeing to accommodate Pacita, Angelica and
Alegria signed a document which Pacita prepared which turned out to be a deed of
absolute sale in Pacitas favor.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, Pedro and Cesar Tamondong claimed that they were
buyers in good faith. In any event, they contended that prescription had set in and that the
complaint was a mere rehash of a previous complaint for falsification of public document
which had been dismissed by the prosecutors office.
By Decision of June 24, 1999, Branch 57 of the RTC of San Carlos City rendered judgment
in favor of Teofilo, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring as null and void and of no force and effect the following documents:
a) Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 21, 1981;
b) Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981;
c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18777;
d) Tax Declaration Nos. 59941, 45999 and 46006;
e) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 13, 1993.
Ordering the partition of the land in question among the compulsory heirs of the late
Spouses Isidro Bautista and Teodora Rosario;
Ordering defendants Cesar Tamondong and Pedro Tandoc to vacate the premises.
On appeal by Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February
21, 2003, reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed Teofilos complaint
on the ground of prescription. Teofilo filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that prescription has set in, reasoned:
Unquestionably, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is invalid insofar as it affects the
legitimate share pertaining to the defendant-appellee in the property in question.
There can be no question that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was fraudulently
obtained. Hence an action to set is aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted.
Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within
four years from the discovery of the fraud. Significantly, it cannot be denied, either,
that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known
actually or constructively.
In the present case, defendant-appellee is deemed to have been constructively
notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in
the certificate of title over the subject land on December 21, 1981. From the time of
its registration, defendant-appellee has four (4) years or until 21 December 1985,
within which to file his objection or to demand the appropriate settlement of the
estate. Unfortunately, defendant-appellee failed to institute the present civil action
within said period, having filed the same only on 17 January 1994, or more than
twelve (12) years from the registration of the deed of extrajudicial partition. Hence,
defendant-appellees right to question the deed of extrajudicial partition has
prescribed.
x
x
x
As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the court of Appeals applied the
prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property
under a constructive trust.
The extrajudicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid, however. So, Segura v
Segura instructs:
x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the
rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years x x x.
The deed of extrajudicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it
annulled does not prescribe.
Since the deed of extrajudicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilos co-
heirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ! of the property
to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of ! of the property to Cesar
Tamondong is invalid, hence conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of
nemo dat quod non habet.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the court a quo is SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, is
REINSTATED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tiga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur,
NON v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 137287, 15 February 2000
325 SCRA 652
The omission of a compulsory heir in the distribution of the partible estate, in the absence
of fraud or bad faith, will not result in the rescission of the partition. In Article 1104, the law
uses the phrase preterition of any of the compulsory heirs. Preterition as used in this
article should be distinguished from preterition under Article 854.
Vitug, J.:
x
x
x
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several
pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma,
Quezon City, x x x. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian Viado died
three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo Viado,
Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado married to Jose Non, and Delia
Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind
as his own sole heirs herein respondents his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cerri
Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners (Rebecca with her husband Jose, and Delia) and respondents (Alicia and her
daughters Cherri and Fe) shared since 1977 a common residence at the Isarog property.
Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado
and respondent Alicia Viado after the former asked that the property be equally divided
between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith,
claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate
the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership
over the property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch
93).
Respondents predicate their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half
conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor
of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments
were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments,
contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian
Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case,
averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of
extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retarded sister, Delia Viado, in
the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latters preterition that should warrant its
annulment. Finally petitioners asseverated that the assailed instruments, although executed
on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the
three parties thereto, namely Julian viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already
died.
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia
Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification by
ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner
Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled correctly.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog
property in question, was transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children
Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance which vested
from the moment of the death of the decedent remained in a co-ownership regime among
the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto,
respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which
consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the
document on the grounds heretofore expressed.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of
the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate
court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence
submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving
testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in
procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial
settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed
vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held
incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the
property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed
the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite
difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood
the tenor of the assailed document,
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after date of their execution did
not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud.
The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive
notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained
completely valid and binding.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, allegedly to be a retardate, from the deed of
extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
however, in the absence of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the
preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate
court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to
make the proper valuation of the Isarog Property and ascertainment of the amount due
petitioner Delia Viado.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision dated 29 May 1996 in CA-
G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or
carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.
1
NOTE: Based on Vicentas allegations, she owns and aggregate 4/6 share of the subject
property by virtue of the following transactions:
1. March 3, 1975 Purchase by Abdon of combined 2/6 shares of Maria and Sato, which Vicenta
acquired from her father through intestate succession;
2. June 14. 1961 Donation by Abdon of his 1/6 share of the property to Vicenta; and
3. June 14, 1961 Purchase by Vicenta of the 1/6 share of Rufo
1
Nilda D. Quintana for herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of Vicente Dorotheo and Jose Dorotheo.
2
Lourdes L. Dorotheo
1
Alfredo D. Seangio, Alberto D. Seangio, Elisa D. Seangio-Santos, Victor Seangio, Alfonso D.
Seangio, Shirley D. Seangio-Lim, Betty D. Seangio-Obas, and James D. Seangio
1
NOTE: There seems to be an error of translation here. The Spanish word used is parientes
which means relatives.
1
NOTE: This seems to be an error. The Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte (namely, Roselyn, Madrilyn,
Lourdes and Felomina) are grandnephews and grandnieces of Justa by her first cousin, and
therefore relatives within the sixth degree in the collateral line. Justa on the one hand, and
Primitiva and Gregorio on the other hand, are first cousins because their respective fathers, Juan
and Domingo are brothers. Therefore, the heirs and direct descendants of Pascasio cannot be
considered as grandchildren (relatives in the direct descending line) of Justa Arnaldo-Sering. It is
equally erroneous to state that the heirs of Pascasio are relatives of Justa within the fifth degree.
They are in fact relatives within the 6
th
degree.
2
NOTE: For the reason that Gregorio is a first cousin of Justa, the children of Gregorio
(Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa) are nephews and nieces (not grandchildren) of
Justa by a first cousin. They are relatives of Justa within the 5
th
civil degree.
1
NOTE: The extra-judicial partition between Lauro and her parents-in-law is irregular and clearly
disregarded the sequence of death. Upon the death of Estrellita, her compulsory heirs were
Carmela and Jennifer, legitimate daughters, and Lauro, surviving spouse. Therefore the parents
of Estrellita, Rafael and Salud, were excluded by Carmela and Jennifer. Accordingly, Rafael and
Salud were not legally entitled to inherit from Estrellita.
2
NOTE: This is a ridiculous statement. It is well settled in law that children-in-law are not heirs to
the estate of their parents-in-law, whether in their own right or by right of representation.
3
NOTE: This statement is not accurate. It is not the property that is brought into the common
mass, but the only value thereof. Otherwise an erroneous inference may arise: i.e., that collation
refers to the property itself and thus requires the restoration of the property to the mass of the
estate of the deceased person. Collation relates solely to the value of the property donated and
solely for accounting purposes it does not require the physical return of the property donated;
for, if the donation was valid, title to the property donated passed to the ownership and dominion
of the donee.
4
NOTE: In respect of compulsory succession, the objective of collation is to equalize the shares
of compulsory heirs so that those who receive an advance of their hereditary shares are made to
account for such advances when the estate of the donor is divided among them at the time
succession opens. In respect of voluntary heirs inheriting with compulsory heirs, the objective of
collation is to ensure that what the donor gave gratuitously in his lifetime does not exceed the free
portion of the estate. Therefore, the duty to collate is not limited to compulsory heirs. Voluntary
heirs are also charged with this obligation. Otherwise, the legitime could be impaired through the
simple expedient of making donations to strangers.
5
NOTE: It is not accurate to state that collation shall take place only after a determination that
the legitime of any compulsory heir has been impaired. The fact is that collation is resorted to
precisely to determine whether or not the legitime was impaired by a prior donation inter vivos,
either because donations were made to compulsory heirs or donations were made to strangers.
After collation, if it is determined that the collationable donation to strangers is within the free
disposal, the same shall be honored and the value of such donation shall be disregarded for the
purpose of distributing the estate to the rightful beneficiaries. In the case of Ubarde v Jurado cited
in the decision, the refusal of the Supreme Court to compel the collation of all prior donations to
compulsory heirs was premised on the fact that upon the death of the decedent, there were
substantial properties yet to be divided by the compulsory heirs, and that there was no showing
that the prior donations made to some of the compulsory heirs indeed impaired the legitime of the
other compulsory heirs. Clearly, the rationale of Ubarde rests on the lack of proof that the prior
donations impaired the legitime. Nonetheless, I subscribe to the idea that collation should have
been ordered by the court since it is only after the collation of the value of prior donations can it
be ascertained whether or not the legitime of the compulsory heirs was impaired. In any event,
the collation that is relevant in Ubarde is not that collation referred to in Article 1061, but rather
the collation referred to in Article 1070 because the potentially collationable donations were
indeed donations propter nuptias. In Article 1070, wedding gifts are collationable only to the
extent that they (collectively) exceed 10% of the free disposal.
6
NOTE: Collation does not refer to the property that was the subject matter of a donation inter
vivos made by the decedent in his lifetime. Collation refers only to the value thereof. Hence it is
correctly stated that the Paraaque property is not a collationable property since, it did not come
from the decedent Rafael. One thing should be very clear: while there is such a thing as a
collationable donation, there is no such thing as a collationable property. This is the inevitable
conclusion from the fact that collation is a mere accounting process that requires the inclusion of
the value of all prior donations in calculating the hereditary estate. However, I take exception to
the resulting inference that the value of the Valenzuela property is not covered by collation. If it is
established that Rafael transferred the same to Estrellita without any valuable consideration,
despite the execution of the purported deed of sale, then the conveyance to Estrellita should be
considered as a collationable donation. However, I take note that the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected the allegation that the transfer to Estrellita was not supported by valuable consideration,
primarily due to the insufficiency of evidence that Estrellita did not have the sufficient financial
resources to purchase the same property from her father. In Sanchez v Court of Appeals (279
SCRA 687), the Court rejected the allegation of fraud in the execution of a questioned deed of
sale as being bereft of substance, it being alleged that the sale is simulated and therefore the
property conveyed thereunder should be treated as acquired by donation and therefore
collationable. In rejecting this contention, the Court cited the following; and (i) the presumption of
validity of a duly notarized deed of sale which can only be overcome by competent evidence; (ii)
that fraud is never presumed and must be proved. The presumption of validity cannot be
overcome by mere conjectures or speculations.
7
NOTE: I take exception to the statement that the Lauro is exempt from the obligation to collate
because such obligation is directed at Estrellita. In Article 776 of the Civil Code, the inheritance
includes properties, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Accordingly, when Lauro inherited from Estrellita upon the latters death, Lauro likewise inherited
Estrellitas obligation to collate the value of the collationable donation. Estrellita predeceased her
father Rafael and therefore did not inherit from Rafael. But, for the purpose of liquidating Rafaels
estate, Estrellita must account for the value of the Valenzuela property which had been
transferred to her as a stranger. That is, if the Valenzuela property was in fact conveyed to
Estrellita by Rafael without valuable consideration. In which case, the heir of Estrellita (Lauro in
this case) would be charged to collate the value thereof for the purpose of ensuring that the value
of the Valenzuela property did not exceed the value of the free disposal and therefore did not
impair the legitime of Rafaels surviving spouse and 4 legitimate children. For indeed, a voluntary
heir (Estrellita, in this case) who received a donation from a deceased person (Rafael) is duty-
bound to collate the value of the donation for the purpose of ensuring that such value did not
exceed the free disposal.
8
NOTE: I wonder whether or not the waiver of all claims, rights, ownership and participation
that was signed by Rafael and Salud in favor of Lauro as part of the extra judicial settlement of
the estate of Estrellita operates to bar the collation that is now demanded from Lauro. Bear in
mind that even if Rafael were to waive collation, a compulsory heir may yet demand that all
gratuitous conveyances made by the decedent in his lifetime be collated, if there is a showing that
these conveyances in fact impaired the legitime. In short, the waiver of collation cannot bar an
honest claim of a compulsory heir that the prior gratuitous conveyances made by the decedent
impaired his legitime. Collation is for the benefit of the compulsory heirs not the testator or the
decedent. Therefore, only a compulsory heir can waive the benefit of collation. Indeed, if a donor
should stipulate in the deed of donation that the same is non-collationable, the effect of such
waiver is simply to charge the value of the donation to the free disposal.
9
NOTE: This resulted from the extra judicial partition entered into between Lauro on the one
hand, and Rafael and Salud on the other. Notice that this partition was totally inappropriate
because Rafael and Salud are not compulsory heirs of Estrellita because Estrellita was survived
by Carmela and Jennifer, her legitimate daughters.
10
NOTE: I do not agree with this statement. When Rafael and Salud received some cash from
the estate of Estrellita, it was not a return of the value of the Valenzuela property, which in the first
place, was not even contemplated. They received the money under a erroneous notion that they
were compulsory heirs of Estrellita. Lauros obligation to collate (which incidentally should have
been required in this case) was not obliterated by the fact that Estrellita predeceased her parents
and that her parents inherited from her.


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