Copyright 2005, Offshore Technology Conference

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Abstract
Thunder Horses high pressure and temperature environment,
added to equipment size and enclosed volume, made pressure
testing potentially hazardous and failure consequences far-
reaching. The industry does have a fairly good safety record;
however, near misses are still prevalent. Though few and far
between, when incidents happen, they tend to be spectacular.
Evaluating ballistic potential of objects flying off the
equipment demonstrated how exposed we would be, given a
sudden catastrophic failure. This led to a major re-assessment
both in mitigation methods and test facilities.


Introduction
Pressure testing from a design engineers perspective is a
validation of his or her analyses work. The design meets
requirements and after assembly, a pressure test confirms that
everything was built properly. When looking at Safety, a
different set of criteria must be considered and many what if
questions must be answered to satisfy requirements. These
must seriously consider a 'train wreck scenario', for whatever
multitude of cumulative errors, and review the risk of
exposure to people and to assets. This paper focuses on
problems associated with high pressure products with an
emphasis on highlighting that design cannot end with product
manufacture, but must continue beyond, to the physical
testing.
The Thunder Horse project requirements of high
pressure and temperature with large bore piping made it
imperative to check the ballistic potential of pressure caps and
anything else that could possibly be unintentionally released,
in a failure situation. The ballistics analyses demonstrated a
number of interesting points. Firstly that existing facilities
may need to be upgraded, not only for Thunder Horse, but also
for less onerous work, for which we thought we were already
qualified. The distances that objects could reach was
surprising and in many cases would exceed the boundaries of
the building or outside test site. Testing would be impractical
unless mitigation methods could be employed to reduce these
projectile distances.
Obviously with high pressure, a large volume will
tend to increase ballistic potential and could be mitigated by
using volume reducers. This is true up to a point after which
the energy transfer to the 'projectile' remains constant. This
phenomenon is referred to as the small plug case, where the
plug is ejected before the system stored energy can be fully
converted to kinetic energy in the plug. The plug outlet
effectively acts to choke the flow from the vessel. The mass
of the projectile will also determine distance of flight; the
heavier it is, the more energy is required to move it. This
presents further methods of mitigation; by adding weight,
using a mass in the way of the object or using an independent
locking mechanism as an extra retention device. These would
be used in conjunction with an exclusion zone where all
personnel would be kept far enough back, to avoid any
missiles, should the unthinkable happen.
All of the above mitigation tools were strategically
employed based on the ballistic results. This was done
singularly or in combination as circumstance dictated. So
essentially the use of ballistic calculations, not only exposed
the potential dangers but also help to tailor-fit adequate
counter-measures.


Ballistic Definitions & Theory
Projectile Calculation.Ballistics analyses demonstrated a
number of interesting points. With high pressure and large
volumes there is an increased ballistic potential, and this
varies exponentially from water to gas, or mixtures of water
and gas. There are two issues that need to be addressed by the
different media used for testing: if gas is used as the
pressuring medium and a failure occurs then there will be both
a projectile release and a loud sound/shock wave. If a
compressed liquid at ambient temperature is being used,
sound/shock waves can largely be ignored, but there still will
be a projectile release. Reduction of the volume under
pressure could be mitigated by using volume reducers, or by
reducing the volume by selectively pressuring sections of the
assembly (where possible). This is true up to a point after
which the energy transfer to the 'projectile' remains constant.
The mass of the projectile will determine distance of flight;
the heavier it is the more energy is required to move it.
Smaller objects being projected by large volumes tend to be
expelled further. This then presents further opportunities to
utilize other methods of mitigation, which could be achieved
by adding weight, using an immovable mass or ballistic
retainer matting to block travel of the object, or by using an
independent locking mechanism to retain a pressure cap or

OTC-17691
Thunder Horse Ballistic Mitigation
Robert McInnes - FMCTI, Robert Scott Arnold - Proforma PSI LLC, David R Wieczorek - FMCTI, Bob Brooks - FMCTI
2 OTC-17691
plug. The simplest method of all is to create an exclusion
zone, around the test area, where all personnel would be kept
back far enough to avoid any projectiles or fragments, should
the unthinkable happen.
When calculating distances projectiles would be thrown, a
conservative approach is used:
This assumes 100% of potential energy is transferred as
kinetic energy when dealing with fluids.
It also assumes 35% of available energy is transferred as
kinetic energy when dealing with gases, and 65% of energy
goes into the shock wave or blast associated with the failure.

Pressurizing Fluid.During pressure testing the most used
fluid is water, hydraulic oil or a gas such as nitrogen or
compressed air. In special circumstances other fluids might be
used, but results obtained using the above fluids and the
following formulae, will cover most other media. The
uppermost bound for fragment speed is found by applying the
total kinetic energy of the vessel as the total available energy.

Total Stored Potential Energy

(1)Ep = Ex + Es

Vessel Strain Energy

(2)
(
(

+ +
=
1
1 2 2 1 3
E 2
V P
Es
2
2 2
|
v | v ) ( ) (


Fluid Expansion Energy

(3)
( )
2
P V
2
Ex

=


Vessel Strain Energy Compared to Fluid Expansion
Energy.Vessel strain energy, as a percentage of fluid
expansion energy, is higher in thin-walled vessels:
Example: Subsea Flowloop
Vessel strain energy is ~7% of the fluid expansion energy
This is less than 5% of the fluid expansion energy for most
wellhead products tested.

Energy Release during Isentropic expansion of
Gas

(4).
W E E k p = =


(5).
(
(
(
(

|
.
|

\
|

=
|
|
|
.
|

\
|
k
k
Pinit
Pfinal
* Vinit * Pinit *
k
W
1
1
1
1


Loss of a Major Section of a Pressure Vessel.Total
stored potential energy is converted into the kinetic energy of
the projectile:

(6)..Ep = Ek
Where,

(7).
2
* *
2
1
V
g
m
Ek
c
=

Loss of Small Diameter Plugs

Limiting flow area at the hole in the vessel chokes the flow
out of the vessel:

(8)....Work Done =P*A*d


(9).



See sketch of the small plug arrangement, with Apllied Load
Distance d, in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Sketch of Plug Arrangement

Where, d = (2 x B) + C
m = mass of component
C = plug engagement

This is sometimes referred to as the SMALL PLUG CASE

Loss of a Flange/Closure.Initial Closure acceleration
away from the vessel is maintained until the fragment is clear
of the vessel by an amount equal to the diameter of the hole
left in the vessel. Refer to the Applied Load Distance, per
Figure 1. (See REFERENCES 1 & 2)


Projectile Motion
Relevant Physics.The Independence of the Vertical
and Horizontal directions means that a projectile motion
problem consists of two independent parts:
- Vertical motion at a constant downward acceleration,
which is equal to
(10)a = -g = -32.2 ft/s2 (9.80 m/s2).
C
2 x B
CB
d
p
c
2
E
g
V m
2
1
d A P s =
*
* * *
OTC OTC-17691-pp 3
- Horizontal motion at a constant horizontal speed, vx
= constant.

The object's vertical motion is the same as that of an
object undergoing only vertical free-fall.

Gravitational Free Fall
Generic Equation of Motion.

(11), (12)

The upward direction is taken as the positive direction. If the
origin is taken at ground level, then:
yo is the initial height of the object at time zero.
vy,o is the initial velocity of the object in the y-direction.
An object can be given an initial vertical velocity (either
positive or negative) and an initial height above the ground.

Information Implied.When an object is propelled into the air,
it is assumed that all other forces acting on the object except
gravity are negligible.

This means that:
We neglect any effects due to drag resistance on the object.
We neglect any effects due to the Earth's rotation.
We assume that the object does not rise high enough for the
acceleration of gravity to change.

With these assumptions the body's acceleration is both
constant and downward regardless of its direction of motion or
its height above the ground. This means that object's
acceleration is downwards regardless of whether the object is
moving upwards or downwards;
a = -g = -32.2 ft/s
2
(9.80 m/s
2
)
Gravity only affects the object's vertical motion. Gravity
cannot change the object's horizontal speed, and the
component of the object's horizontal velocity remains constant
throughout its motion.

Generic Equation of Frictionless Projectiles.

Vertical Motion:

Constant
Downward
Acceleration
(13), (14), (15)

Horizontal Motion:

Constant
Horizontal
Speed

Total Space Motion:

(16), (17)..






Figure 2: Sketch of Object Trajectory

The components of the velocity vector are shown for an object
released into the air at a fixed angle.

Frames of Reference.Projectile motion problems
need a two dimensional coordinate system to describe the
projectile's motion. The y-direction is usually associated with
the vertical motion and location of the projectile, while the x-
direction is usually associated with the horizontal motion and
location of the projectile.
The generic equations for projectile motion assume
the origin is at ground level, up is positive, right is positive,
and that the clock starts the moment the projectile leaves the
ground.

Analyzing a Projectile Motion Problem.Break the
problem into two independent problems by resolving the
velocity vector into vertical and horizontal components
Solve the two problems independently.
Recombine the resulting components, if needed, to determine
the object's total space motion.

Drag Force in a Medium.The force exerted on a
4 OTC-17691
body moving in a medium like air or water depends in a
complex way upon the velocity of the body relative to the
medium, the viscosity and density of the medium, the shape of
the body, and the roughness of its surface.
The most common method of mathematically modeling the
drag force is the equation,

(17).


The direction of the drag force is always opposite the direction
of the body's velocity.
The drag coefficient CD is not constant. The CD
depends upon the velocity of the body, viscosity of the
medium, the shape of the body, and the roughness of the
body's surface.
The Reynolds number has been found to be a useful
dimensionless number that can characterize the drag
coefficient's dependence upon the velocity. The Reynolds
number is basically the ratio of the inertial force of the
medium over its viscous force.


(18)

For small values of the Reynolds number, called
laminar flow, since the flow is non-turbulent, the drag
coefficient is inversely proportional to the velocity. This
means that the drag force is only proportional to the body's
velocity.
(19).

When the flow is turbulent the Reynolds number is large, and
the drag coefficient CD is approximately constant. This is the
quadratic model of fluid resistance, in that the drag force is
dependent on the square of the velocity. See REFERENCE 3.
(20)

Note that the frictional force between two surfaces is an
example of a situation in which the drag force is constant and
does not depend upon the body's velocity or contact surface
area. See Table 1 for examples of typical drag coefficients.

Table 1: Typical Values of the Drag Coefficient

OBJECT C
D

Streamlined body 0.1
Sports Car 0.2 - 0.3
Sphere 0.47
Typical Car 0.5
Station Wagon 0.6
Cylinder 0.7-1.3
Racing Cyclist 0.9
Truck 0.8 - 1.0
Motorcyclist 1.8



Pressure Test Management
The following section reviews the practices in place at what
was considered a safety-focused organization, through the
improvements and upgrades, to the actual applications of
pressure test management. These were all as a result of our
experience and lessons learned on the Thunder Horse project.

Normal Industry Practice.Typically ballistic calculations
were not carried out and although higher pressure testing was
done for 15,000psi and above on a Research and Development
basis, the normal manufacturing mainly covered 5,000 and
10,000psi equipment. The industry has a fairly good record
on safety, however, failure events did happen and when they
did they were pretty spectacular. The energy capacity related
to gas testing was widely recognized and such testing was
consigned to be done in a water-filled test pit. The added
advantage was that leakage bubbles would be prominent. This
became so blas a function that people regularly would lean
over the safety railing looking for bubbles, without thought for
the consequences of failure. A common practice was to
hydrostatically test large assemblies in the shop area, and
although cordoned off, no fore-sight on the ballistic potential,
given catastrophic failure, was ever determined.

Facility and Process Upgrades.Initial ballistic results
highlighted the high energy potential of the 15,000psi
equipment. The results were so surprising that it led to a
series of upgrades within the facility. These included
procedural and process checks which prohibited testing
without a ballistics check sheet from engineering. During the
project these ballistics results become integral to pre-test
planning and HAZID studies. Guidelines were produced for
calculation work with ongoing enhancements to cover
sensitivities for entrapped air and dampening effects of water
in the test pit. The gas test pit was fully enclosed by a wall
with visual access through a reinforced window and blast
curtains (see Figure 3). The gauges and plumbing were
enclosed in high-impact Perspex and the use of inspection
cameras became common. Now based on ballistic results, a
taped off exclusion zone is defined and highlighted using a
cordon of flashing lights (see Figure 4). Additionally, a strict
preventive maintenance regime has been set up to encompass
all test equipment. As safety awareness of the pressure testing
intensified, it became obvious that we couldnt just stop on our
own doorstep. Our approved vendors were selected based on
audits which included safety and as our safety awareness
profile increased, so we increased the audit requirements.
This included the need for subcontractors to perform ballistic
OTC OTC-17691-pp 5
calculations and based on results, implement similar safety
related upgrades.



Figure 1: Upgraded Gas Pit





Figure 2: Safety Cordon (flashing lights)


Future Test Cell Upgrades.In the last two decades pressures
have increased from 5,000psi equipment till today we are
approaching 30K product lines. Typically test cells included
1/2 steel plate and cinder block walls filled with concrete and
in other areas 20 of un-reinforced concrete. This is no longer
enough to stop large projectiles while proof testing to
15,000psi.
The way forward is to use current High Strength
Concrete Designs developed at Sandia National Laboratories
in New Mexico, for Air Craft and Personnel Bunkers. A Third
Party Structural Engineering Analysis was used, leading to the
design of a test cell bunker system, that will be sufficient for
testing large forging composite block valve assemblies up to
20,000psi . The test cell criterion was to have the walls and
superstructure withstand the impact of a small high speed
projectiles, without complete penetration and large high speed
projectiles without collapse. Test Pressure for this design was
based on 30,000psi on both large and small projectiles.
In the Large Projectile event occurred there would be a
minimal cost to repair the test cell; due to a multiple
component design affecting only a small part of the complete
test cell. It was determined that a wall thickness would be
about 10 due the space constraints and that wide access into
the cell would be at least 6feet 10inches.
Using proven technology in strengthening concrete,
based on Sandia Labs studies, and working with a local
Concrete mixing plant it was possible to engineer a high
strength composite mix. This used Bekaert Steel Metal Fiber
(Trade name Dramix). For Aggregate; Davis Mountain Lime
Stone from Okalahoma was used. This was both rough and
hard, adding strength to the composite mix. Additionally, the
steel rebar sizes were increased by 25%, and all through
openings were narrowed by overlapping the rebar mats
producing a 1.5inch opening.
It was estimated that the finished compressive
strength of the high strength composite mix, after curing 29
days, would be 6,000psi. However, with the Davis rock and
the Dramix, the overall strength of the Mix could easily
double.

Project-related Lessons & Improvements (Customers
Perspective).As the envelope of technology and water depth
continues to be pushed, so does the need to engineer larger
equipment that operates at greater pressures. Therefore, testing
of this equipment will continue to pose a greater safety threat
to personnel conducting pressure tests.
Looking at past incidents occurring within this industry,
reveals a certain amount of complacency when it comes to
hydrostatic testing and hazards associated with it. This
complacency stems from the belief that water is
incompressible and therefore its stored energy is somehow
less significant than gas testing. This is why in many cases
you will see the operator standing in close proximity to
equipment being tested with water. As an industry we have to
rapidly change this culture by utilizing science and
calculations in order to quantify the hazards to personnel.
The leaders in the upstream oil and gas business have gone to
great lengths and expense to change the safety culture within
their organizations and the contractors that work for them.
However, when it comes to pressure testing equipment, they
have fallen short. By conducting ballistics calculations a better
understanding can be gained on how much energy is generated
when liquid mediums are compressed. From these calculations
one can determine stand-off distances that will take personnel
out of harms way. However, in some cases when these
distances are so great, shielding may have to be incorporated.
Ballistic calculations help to determine what type and
thickness is required to contain projectiles that have failed.
From the knowledge gained from ballistics, one understands
that in certain cases merely reducing volume will drastically
reduce the amount of energy stored within a system, therefore
reducing the distance a projectile will travel.
Of course ballistics have been utilized by militaries
for centuries to design more efficient weapons as well as aid in
the design of shielding to protect its personnel. In industry
these calculations are an invaluable tool, which allows testing
to be conducted while minimizing the impact to personnel in
the event a failure occurs. There are companies that have
already adopted the use of these calculations as company
policy. In an industry where companies are leading the way in
safety and technology, this is yet another tool that
demonstrates best in class performance.
To better serve the communication of safety related issues,
cross-communication of lessons learned and ballistics
6 OTC-17691
methodology has been encouraged between partners in the
project and often with other projects. Acceptance of the
Safety Moment philosophy as a way of working, rather than
simply lip-service has developed into the modulus operandi
of the associated project companies.

Manifold Testing Experience.The large bore manifolds (@
500,000lbs) presented the biggest challenge for ballistic
mitigation, due to their large volumes and bores and a
pressures to 15,108psi. The pressure caps were all situated
vertically, and a maximum offset angle of 3 was considered
as being worst possible case. This enabled the horizontal
component displacement to be plotted for the projectile.
Volume reduction was the first mitigation challenge. This
could be accommodated by stringing together a series of high
density plastic reducers inside the main piping headers (see
Figure 5). This helped reduce volumes between 40 and 50%
only but had the disadvantage of adding time for handling,
installation and retrieval to the test duration. There was also
the associated risk of jamming or reducer breakage within the
piping. In the Test Header, ballistic distance was unaffected,
indicating the small plug case had been achieved. In the
branch hubs, volume reducers could not be used because of
piping configuration and because removal after testing would
disturb a metal seal and render the test invalid. The branch
hub pressure cap, being the smallest mass, became the pacing
item with respect to potential distance that could be traveled.
To reduce this to within a practical range, the branch hub
volume was minimized by closing the hub isolation valves.



Figure 5: Volume Reducers

Further efforts to reduce the ballistic distance
considered adding mass suspended over the caps. While being
effective, it was impractical from the viewpoint of changing
pressure lines and moving between hubs. A neater solution
was to add a cage around the pressure cap and hub. This
served as an independent locking mechanism (ILM) to that of
the cap and effectively reduced the risk of sudden failure (see
Figure 6). The problem here was that making the assumption
of zero failure, gave no indication of ballistic distance and
therefore no guidance for setting an exclusion zone. However,
if we assumed that both the cap and the ILM failed, we could
take advantage of half the ILM weight added to the cap. This
had the advantage of severely reducing risk of failure and
allowed a workable exclusion zone to be determined.


Figure 6: ILM Capturing Pressure Cap

The same criteria could be used for the header piping
and the larger pressure caps. Consequently the use of the
ILMs were sufficient on their own, to allow an acceptable
exclusion zone. This ensured for this particular application,
the use of volume reducers was discarded. See Figure 7 for
manifold ILM application.
In assessing other aspects of the testing, the small
bore plumbing, and the issue of shrapnel or fragments of pipe
were considered. It was concluded that the manifold structural
fabrication served as an adequate shield, to potential
projectiles coming from the inside. At the plumbing
connection/termination points, which were at the corners,
concrete ballistic blocks were strategically placed.


Figure 7: Manifold with ILMs installed

PLET Testing Experience.The Pipe-line End Termination
(PLET) consisted of a mud-mat with horizontal piping ending
in a bend with a vertical hub. A pressure cap would be fitted
on the hub and a welded cap would seal the pipe end. Using
the same methodology as the manifolds, volume reduction was
first reviewed. In the case of the welded caps, the
configuration meant that volume reduction would have no
affect for all sizes. However it did have an effect for all sizes
pressure caps, except the Test line PLET, where the small
plug case was again confirmed. Similar to the manifold
scenario; volume reducer installation, retrieval and risk of
jamming were looked at. Additionally, the manufacturing
process of welding and inspection of a tail-pipe onto the end
of the PLET pipe would be complicated by the use of
reducers. In the end, a decision was made to use the ILMs
OTC OTC-17691-pp 7
without volume reducers, on the PLETs. Based on the
successful manifold experience, confidence was raised
sufficiently to take account of 75% of the ILM weight in the
ballistics calculations. The horizontal end of the pipe was
protected by placing a large concrete ballast block in front of
it. The overall test layout allowed several PLETs to be tested
simultaneously and the concrete blocks were pre-placed to
minimize test disruption.


Ballistics Results
The results for the Manifold Ballistics are tabulated in Table 2.
This shows the results of distance traveled against mitigation
efforts. The pressure caps are orientaed vertically.
The results for the PLET calculations are shown in
Table 3. These show the both the vertical pressure caps and
the horizontal welded test caps.


Conclusions
The normal method of testing based on previous experience is
no longer adequate. Ballistic analysis is now an essential tool
for all pressure testing activities and must be factored into the
overall design of components. This must become a
fundamental in the process as testing represents the highest
risk to personnel. To improve the overall safety philosophy,
this methodology must be encouraged throughout the supply
chain.
Design of equipment should review testing implications to
maximize mitigation and minimize effects of possible
projectiles. This may involve structural modifications for
shielding or access. Mitigation methods need to be tailored to
suit each particular application and can only be properly
assessed following ballistic calculation.
A continuing process of improvement and vigilance is now not
only a preferred option but a necessary one, based on the
realization of actual ballistic potentials and consequences of
failure. This includes the development of ballistics analysis to
further refine the sensitivity regarding test mediums (water
and gas), air in test water and damping effects of water in the
test pit. Consequentially facility requirements may require
upgrading, to accommodate present as well as, upcoming
developments.
Safety culture in an already safety-conscious environment has
been raised further. This includes looking at the significance
of the human factor in terms of what can possibly go wrong
due to errors, lack of training or experience levels.
At the end of the day four large manifolds and multiple PLETs
were successfully pressure tested outside with exclusion
zones. Testing was completed on schedule with no incidents.


Nomenclature
A =Cross-sectional Area perpendicular to the flow. ft2
a =acceleration
B =bore of plug hole
C =plug engagement
CD =Drag Coefficient. SI: Dimensionless (See Table 1)
d =applied load distance
E =Youngs Modulus of Vessel Material
Ek =kinetic energy immediately after launch
Ep =Total Stored Potential energy
Ex =Fluid Expansion Energy
Es =Vessel Strain Energy
FD =Drag Force lbf
K =Cp / Cv, ratio of Specific Heats
L =Characteristic length of the body along the direction
of flow. ft
m = mass of component
P = Final Pressure
Pinit = initial pressure
Pfinal = final pressure
Re = Reynolds Number (dimensionless)
V = Internal Volume of the Vessel
v = velocity of body relative to the medium ft/s
Vinit = initial volume of system
W = work done during expansion
= Ratio of outside to inside diameter of the vessel
= Compressibility of Water
= Poissons Ratio
= Density of the medium. lb/ft3


References
(1) Saville G., Richardson S.M. & Skillerne de
Bristowe B.J . Pressure Test Safety UK Health
& Safety Executive, 1999 CRR 168/1998 HSE
Books, Sudbury, Suffolk. Prepared by the
Department of Chemical Engineering
Technology, Imperial College, London and BJS
Research, Reading. Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) is responsible for the regulation
of almost all the risks to health and safety arising
fromwork activity in the United Kingdom (Great
Britain).
(2) FMC Design Guidelines G03.04 and G03.05
(3) Projectile Motion with Air Resistance,
Department of Physics, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN.

























8 OTC-17691

Table 2: Manifold Ballistic Data




































































Manifold
Component
MITIGATION CONDITIONS Test
Pressure
psig
Cap
Weight
lbs.
Volume in3
X-Axis
Travel ft.
Y-Axis
Travel ft.
50% ILM
Weight
Volume
Reducer
Pigging Loop
12 W.I.
Header

No No N/A 12,500 1,324 92,900 398 82
Yes No N/A 12,500 3,074 92,900 177 36
No No N/A 12,500 1,422 92,900 1666 348
Yes No N/A 12,500 3,172 92,900 753 156
No Yes N/A 12,500 1,422 58,162 688 143
8 Test
Header
No No No 15,108 1,372 34,206 653 135
Yes No No 15,108 3,072 34,206 293 60
No Yes No 15,108 1,372 24,230 653 135
No No Yes 15,108 3,072 41,534 653 135
No Yes Yes 15,108 3,072 41,534 293 60
12 Production
Header #1
No No
No

12,563 1,422 92,043 1675 350
Yes No No 12,563 3,172 92,043 756 157
No Yes No 12,563 1,422 45,354 544 112
No No Yes 12,563 1,422 119,485 1675 350
Yes No Yes 12,563 3,172 119,485 756 157
12 Production
Header #2
No No No 12,563 1,372 86343 1735 362
Yes No No 12,563 3,122 86,343 768 159
No Yes No 12,563 1,372 47,672 591 122
No No Yes 12,563 1,372 106,460 1735 362
Yes No Yes 12,563 3,122 106,460 768 159
5 Valve
Cluster
No No N/A 15,108 155 13,451 3357 702
Yes No N/A 15,108 1,905 13,451 282 58
12 Pigging
Loop
N/A No Pig Loop Test 12,563 13,659 40,234 59 11
N/A No Manifold +AIR 12,563 13,659 119,485 183 37
8 Pigging
Loop
N/A No Pig Loop Test 15,108 10,489 14,650 33 5
N/A No Manifold +AIR 15,108 10,489 106,460 281 57
Pig Loop Test
Stand
N/A No Stand Test 12,563 5,869 40,234 126 25
Valve Cluster
& Test Header
FULL VOLUME - Ductile/Brittle Failure
@weld 1% to 20% fragment
15,108 N/A 7,010 4459 931
W.I. &
Production
Headers
FULL VOLUME - Ductile/Brittle Failure
@weld 1% to 20% fragment
12,563 N/A 47,672 3698 774
Table 3: PLET Ballistics Data
PLET
Component

MITIGATION CONDITIONS Test
Pressure
psig
Cap
Weight
lbs.
Volume in3
X-Axis
Travel ft.
Y-Axis
Travel ft.
75% ILM
Weight
Volume
Reducer
Hub or Pipe
12 Pressure
Cap

No No Hub
12563 1422 109967 1429 298
No Yes Hub
12563 1422 43730 525 108
Yes No Hub
12563 4047 109967 497 96
12 Test Cap
No No Pipe
12563 257 109967 N/A 213
No Yes Pipe
12563 257 43730 N/A 213
10 Pressure
Cap
No No No 12500
1738 78267 711 147
No Yes No 12500
1738 28165 279 57
Yes No No
12500 4363 78267 384 75
10 Test Cap

No No Pipe
12500 200 78267 N/A 187
No Yes Pipe
12500 200 28165 N/A 187
8 Pressure Cap

No No Hub
15108 1701 41388 413 85
No Yes Hub
15108 1701 21010 413 85
Yes No Hub
15108 4326 41388 413 85
Test Cap
No No Pipe
15108 146 41338 N/A 347
No Yes Pipe
15108 146 21010 N/A 233