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Free-Riding in Australia
Peter Haynes, Peter Holland, Amanda Pyman and Julian Teicher
Economic and Industrial Democracy 2008 29: 7
DOI: 10.1177/0143831X07085138
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://eid.sagepub.com/content/29/1/7
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Free-Riding in Australia
Peter Haynes
University of Auckland
Peter Holland
Monash University
Amanda Pyman
University of Kent
Julian Teicher
Monash University
Keywords: bargaining agency fees, free-riding, trade union membership, union joining
Introduction
unions in their organizing efforts. It may also help public policymakers to evaluate the efcacy and equity of bargaining fee arrangements. We begin with a discussion of the meaning of free-riding by
drawing on prior research, and the relevant background in
Australia. The exposition then explains the method and sample
used for the survey, and reports results on the location and nature
of free-riding in Australia. The nal section discusses the implications for public policy and union strategy.
Prior Literature: Theoretical
10
11
12
Further research by Jermier et al. (1988) found that the effect of job
satisfaction was not signicant among blue-collar workers. Bryson
(2006), on the other hand, found higher needs (derived from scales
rating managers on various aspects of employment, trust in management, etc.) and higher perceptions of union effectiveness to be negatively associated with free-riding in large-scale workforce surveys in
Britain and New Zealand.
In our cross-sectional sample, we anticipated that we would nd a
variety of employee motivations for joining and not joining where
there was a union available to join, and that a number of these
would prevail over the demographic and worker characteristics
included in our analysis.
Free-Riding in Australia: History
13
14
15
The data used in this article are drawn from the AWRPS 2004. This
surveyed 1000 Australian workers' responses and attitudes to workplace participation and involvement, unions, management and
unionmanagement relations. It was based on the Worker Representation and Participation Survey developed by Freeman and
Rogers (1999) in the US, the British Workplace Representation
and Participation Survey (Diamond and Freeman, 2001) and the
New Zealand Worker Representation and Participation Survey
(Haynes et al., 2003). The questions were adapted to conform to
the institutional and demographic contexts in Australia.
Respondents were surveyed nationally using computer-assisted
telephone interviewing (CATI) techniques between October 2003
and March 2004. Potential respondents were selected from the residential telephone directory using random-digit dialling. The sample
was limited to Australian residents in paid employment of more than
10 hours per week who had left secondary school. The sample was
stratied by Australian state/territory to reect the geographical distribution of the population as reported in the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) Census of Population and Housing 2001. Of those
for whom eligibility could be established, 3335 refused to participate, resulting in a response rate of 23.1 percent.5
Of the respondents, 60 percent were female and the mean age
of the sample was 41.5 years (SD 11.41). The mean number of
hours worked per week was 36.5 (SD 12.19), with 67 percent of
respondents engaged in full-time work (dened as 35 hours or more
per week). The majority of respondents were non-manual workers
(81 percent) and were born in Australia (78 percent). Just under half
of the sample (46 percent) reported that they worked in organizations with 500 or more employees. The mean number of years
worked for their current employer was 8.46 (SD 8.02).
Our sample overestimates women and non-manual workers, particularly professionals, but is otherwise broadly representative of the
Australian population in terms of demographic characteristics.6
However, there is overrepresentation in some industries, with a
large concentration in the health and education sectors (34 percent
compared with 17 percent ABS Census data). Because of the skew
across industries, the data used for descriptive statistics (only) were
weighted by industry-based ABS Census data (2001), in order to
compensate for sample non-response bias.
Downloaded from eid.sagepub.com by Nicolas Diana on October 25, 2012
16
17
a union, 50.0 percent reported that they had not been (1.6 percent
did not know or did not answer), while 25.5 percent of non-members
in unionized workplaces stated that they were very or fairly likely to
join the union at their workplace if asked.
The AWRPS asked non-members in unionized workplaces how
strongly they agreed with six reasons that people don't join unions
(see Table 1). We found a high level of `calculating free-riding'
among such respondents, with 51.7 percent saying that there is `no
point in joining since I get all the benets anyway' as a reason for
not joining. Substantial proportions, 55.6 percent and 48.9 percent
respectively, nominated the level of membership fees or `the union
does not achieve anything I value' as reasons for not joining.7 For
the former, it would appear that the costs of membership are greater
than the benets, and the latter may also be clearly identied as
`passive beneciaries', in the sense that they do not receive, in
their perception at least, a net benet from being in a unionized
workplace. The same is arguably true of the smaller proportion of
non-members (22.1 percent) who reported that `people doing my
job don't join trade unions'.
The proportion that expresses an ideological opposition to membership (`I don't believe in unions') is notably smaller (19.2 percent)
than those who believe membership to be a poor bargain. A larger
proportion of non-members (48.1 percent) agreed that `unions do
not cooperate enough for the good of the workplace' as a reason
for not joining unions. This is consistent with a strong preference
among AWRPS respondents for cooperative relations between
employers and unions (Teicher et al., 2007). Overall, a very high proportion of non-members nominated multiple reasons for not joining.
Taken together, these ndings suggest that many employees refrain
from union membership after balancing the costs and benets of
belonging, taking into account monetary costs, the costs of conict
and various types of benets delivered by the union. At most, we
may surmise, that half of those who are technically free-riding are
consciously avoiding paying for a benet because they are able to,
but many of these non-members may also perceive such benets to
be less than the costs of membership, or value them very little:
62.3 percent of those agreeing to some extent that there is no
point joining their union because they get all the benets anyway,
also agreed to some extent that the union did not achieve anything
that they valued.
821
231
131
131
921
521
5.1
2.4
9.0
8.0
2.5
8.0
3.12
0.91
7.61
5.12
6.8
3.41
0.71
4.7
7.9
6.51
3.3
6.91
eergA
)%(
ylgnortS
eergA
1.13
8.11
0.24
3.33
8.81
0.63
eergasiD ron
0.92
7.75
8.03
7.82
0.46
4.92
eergA rehtieN
)%(
)%(
)%(
eergasiD
)%(
ylgnortS
eergasiD
1 ELBAT
nioJ ot elbigilE ereW yehT noinU a nioJ ot ton snoisiceD 'seeyolpmE nailartsuA gnicneunI srotcaF
19
Location of Free-Riding
Table 2 shows the level of technical free-riding according to a range
of personal and positional characteristics. Technical free-riders are
disproportionately female, younger, Australian-born, less wellpaid, in part-time employment and have shorter tenure. Technical
free-riding is also found to vary by industry, being lowest in manufacturing, mining, utilities and construction, and higher for public
and private sector services. Free-riding varies by occupation, with
the highest levels among the intermediate and elementary clerical,
sales and service workers and the lowest levels in the labouring,
associate professional and trades categories. However, only the
differences for age, tenure, income and employment status are statistically signicant (p > :05).
TABLE 2
Technical Free-Riding by Selected Individual and Job Characteristics
(%)
Gender
Females
Males
42.9
34.5
Age
Up to 24 years
2534 years
3544 years
45 years and over
Weekly income
Up to AUS$299
$300$499
$500$699
$700$999
$1000 and over
Country of birth
Born in Australia
Born in main English-speaking countries
Born elsewhere
51.4
45.1
43.6
31.3
53.3
52.4
36.4
44.7
28.8
40.7
31.1
36.4
Signicance
.071
.020
.003
.426
20
TABLE 2 (continued)
(%)
Occupation
Educational achievement
Organizational tenure
1 year
25 years
610 years
1120 years
More than 20 years
Employment status
Full-time
Part-time
40.0
37.9
36.8
31.9
45.5
39.6
64.2
51.5
34.0
20.8
30.4
35.2
48.5
Supervisory responsibilities
Yes
No
Industry
36.4
37.7
32.4
33.9
40.0
56.4
40.6
43.1
27.3
65.4
52.5
37.5
34.1
40.8
40.2
Signicance
.214
.842
>.001>
.010
.003
.742
Source: AWRPS.
Notes: Excludes `don't know' responses. Signicance is the exact probability, twosided, for Pearson's chi-square. N varies between 447 and 450.
21
22
TABLE 3
Estimated Effects (Odds Ratios) of Independent Variables on Free-Riding
Independent Variable
Model 2
Model 1
Constant
Gender
Age
Highest formal education
(ref: completed secondary)
Post-secondary qualication
Income (ref: <AUS$300 p.w.)
$300499 p.w.
$500699 p.w.
$700999 p.w.
$1000+ p.w.
Occupation (ref: professionals and
managers)
Intermediate clerical, sales and service
Unskilled occupations
Tenure (ref: <2 years)
24 years
59 years
10 years
Supervisory responsibilities
Hours of work
Industry (ref: manufacturing)
Private services
Public services
Organizational size (log)
Needs index
Political ideology
Mgmt attitude to unions (ref: in favour
of unions)
Neutral
Opposed
Don't know
Technical
Calculating
Passive
Free-Riders
Free-Riders
Beneciaries
2.546
0.652
0.983
0.804
0.960
0.553
0.997
0.893
0.421
1.834
1.120
0.508
0.961
0.597
2.167
2.060
4.255
2.583
0.646
0.181
0.315
0.211
0.818
0.445
0.719
0.428
1.067
0.525
0.828
0.424
0.256*
0.360**
0.999
1.096
0.682
0.201*
0.413
0.942
0.625
0.232*
0.243*
0.329**
1.043
0.551
0.878
1.149*
0.904
0.956
0.220
0.703
1.169
0.828
0.950
1.291
1.188
1.131
0.952
0.972
1.640
1.181
2.018
2.752
1.637
6.545*
1.310
0.983
1.077
N
Nagelkerke R2
2 log likelihood
23
24
25
26
27
Haynes et al.: Free-Riding in Australia
25.1
17.01
dradnatS
noitaiveD
95.
27.3
07.
67.24
24.
03.
bnaeM
gnidoC/noitpircseD
'?od ot tahw seeyolpme rehto llet ro seeyolpme rehto fo krow eht eganam
ro esivrepus uoy od ,boj )niam( ruoy fo trap laicfo na sA` :deksa erew stnednopseR
.sraey +01 4 ;sraey 95 3 ;sraey 42 2 ;sraey 2 < 1 dedoC
'?reyolpme emas eht rof dekrow uoy evah sraey ynam woH` :deksa erew stnednopseR
.sreruobal ,selas yratnemele )3( ;tropsnart dna
noitcudorp etaidemretni ,ecivres dna lacirelc etaidemretni ,ecivres dna lacirelc decnavda
,snosrepsedart ,slanoisseforp etaicossa )2( ;slanoisseforp ,srotartsinimda dna sreganam )1(
.noitacilauq yradnoces-tsop )1(
;etacitrec 21 raey ,yradnoces emos ro on )0( :deveihca noitacude fo level tsehgih dessessA
.sraey 2781 :egnaR
.elam 1 ;elamef 0
.'yawyna steneb eht lla teg I ecnis
gninioj tniop on si erehT` ot 'eerga ylgnorts` ro 'eerga` rewsna ton did 1 ;rebmem 0
.'yawyna steneb eht lla teg I
ecnis gninioj tniop on si erehT` ot 'eerga ylgnorts` ro 'eerga` derewsna 1 ;rebmem 0
.rebmem-non 1 ;rebmem 0
XIDNEPPA
seitilibisnopser
yrosivrepuS
erunet boJ
noitapuccO
noitacudE
egA
redneG
yraiceneb evissaP
gnidir-eerf gnitaluclaC
pihsrebmem noinU
elbairaV
39.2
82.1
noitaiveD
dradnatS
52.2
07.3
bnaeM
gnidoC/noitpircseD
'.wonk t'nod )4( ?snoinu ot desoppo ro )3( ;snoinu tuoba lartuen )2(
;snoinu fo ruovaf ni )1( . . . era sreganam ruoy yas uoy dluoW` :deksa erew stnednopseR
tuoba gnidnatsrednu era ereh sreganam` :'ecalpkrow tneserp ]rieht[ ta gnikrow` tuoba
stnemetats eht htiw deergasid stnednopser emit hcae dedda osla saw tniop A .'sesaercni
yap riaf gnivig` ro 'elbayojne dna gnitseretni krow gnikam` ,'seeyolpme htiw ytirohtua
dna rewop erahs ot ssengnilliw` ,'seeyolpme rof nrecnoc` ,'segnahc desoporp htiw
etad ot pu enoyreve gnipeek` ,'ssenisub eht fo egdelwonk dna gnidnatsrednu` ,'seeyolpme
lla rof seitinutroppo lauqe gnitomorp` rof edarg F ro D a tnemeganam dedrawa
tnednopser a emit hcae dengissa saw tniop enO .)6002( nosyrB yb dnalaeZ weN dna
KU eht ni ruoivaheb gnidir-eerf htiw etaicossa ot dnuof dna depoleved elacs yrammuS
elbairaV
rotces yrtsudnI
ezis lanoitazinagrO
ytilatnemurtsni
noinu deviecreP
snoinu ot edutitta
tnemeganam deviecreP
xedni sdeeN
)deunitnoc( XIDNEPPA
29
Haynes et al.: Free-Riding in Australia
30.1
58.71
01.2
ygoloedi lacitiloP
ytilatnemurtsni
noinu deviecreP
.1 gnirocs noitroporp eht swohs nmuloc siht ni erug eht ,selbairav suomotohcid roF b
.sisylana evitpircsed eht ni desu esoht morf reffid erofereht selbairav
eseht rof scitsitats evitpircsed eht dna sisylana noisserger eht morf dedulcxe erew deksa fi noinu a nioj ot ecnereferp a gnitats stnednopseR a :setoN
.dethgiew SPRWA :ecruoS
77.3
.'ecnereffid on
ekam dluow` gnitacidni )3( evitanretla lartuen eht htiw ,)retteb tol a 5 ,esrow tol a 1(
elacs tniop-ev a no erew srewsnA '?ecnereffid on ekam ti dluow ro ,noinu on saw ereht fi
ffo esrow ro retteb eb dluow yllanosrep uoy taht kniht uoy oD` :deksa erew stnednopseR
.547. si elacs eht fo
tneicfeoc ytilibailer ahpla hcabnorC ehT .denialpxe ecnairav latot eht fo tnecrep 2.05 rof
gnitnuocca 5.2 fo eulavnegiE na htiw rotcaf elgnis a otno daol ot dnuof erew smeti ev lla
,sisylana stnenopmoc lapicnirp gnisU .sweiv gniw-tfel erom gnitacidni serocs rewol htiw
,52 ot 8 morf si serocs elbissop fo egnar ehT .eergasid ylgnorts 5 ,eerga ylgnorts 1
:elacs tniop-ev a no erew srewsnA '?roop eht ot hcir eht morf htlaew etubirtsider
dluohs tnemnrevoG )5( ;htlaew s'noitan eht fo erahs riaf a teg t'nod elpoep gnikrow
yranidrO )4( ;roop eht rof rehtona dna hcir eht rof wal eno si erehT )3( ;seeyolpme
fo esnepxe eht ta srenwo steneb ssenisub giB )2( ;seeyolpme fo retteb eht teg ot seirt
syawla tnemeganaM )1( stnemetats gniwollof eht htiw eergasid ro eerga uoy od ylgnorts
woH` :ot srewsna eht morf devired ecitsuj evitubirtsid ot sedutitta fo elacs yrammuS
.178. si elacs eht fo tneicfeoc ytilibailer ahpla hcabnorC ehT .denialpxe ecnairav latot
eht fo tnecrep 8.93 rof gnitnuocca 2.5 fo eulavnegiE na htiw rotcaf elgnis a otno daol
ot dnuof erew smeti 31 lla ,sisylana stnenopmoc lapicnirp gnisU .'efil krow ro boj ym no
snoisiced ynapmoc ni evah I ecneuni eht htiw desitas ma I` dna ,'seeyolpme rehto dna
em ot sesimorp rieht peek ot reyolpme ym tsurt I` ,'doog era tnemeganam dna seeyolpme
neewteb snoitaler ,lareneg ni` ,'ecalpkrow siht ni eruces si boj ym` ,'slliks rieht poleved
ot degaruocne era ereh gnikrow elpoep` ,'seitilibisnopser ylimaf teem ot gnivah seeyolpme
30
The authors thank, without implicating, Brian Cooper and Alan Lee for assistance
with the data set and statistical analysis, and David Peetz, Alex Bryson and the
EID referees for comments on an earlier draft.
1. The term `open shop' implies the absence of any compulsion towards union
membership. `Closed shop' is used in the present discussion to refer to both preand post-entry closed shops.
2. For example: Metal Trades' Employers' Association v. Amalgamated Engineering
Union 1935 54 CLR 387 (see O'Neill and Shepherd, 2003).
3. Australian Bureau of Statistics (1983, 1990); adjusted to exclude agricultural,
forestry, shing and hunting workers to enhance comparability with award coverage
estimates.
4. Australian Bureau of Statistics (1985, 1991).
5. Hearing or language problems prevented a further 221 calls from proceeding to
the point where eligibility could be established.
6. Census gures indicate 45 percent of employed Australians are female and
70 percent work in non-manual occupations.
7. Cregan (2005) also found that a cohort of uncommitted workers believed that
the costs of being a member were too great.
8. The ndings were not altered when those who indicated a preference to join the
union if asked were included. These models are available from the rst author on
request.
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