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This document discusses the potential impacts of restricting European Union investment in new Russian securities issuances in response to Russian actions in Ukraine. It finds that:
1) Russian investors would face sharply higher costs of issuing new securities, even if alternative financing could eventually be found in third markets.
2) In the short term, substitution would not be easy as third-country investors would be unwilling or would demand higher yields to participate in new issuances by targeted Russian entities.
3) This would push affected Russian companies to seek state financing, further straining the government's budget.
This document discusses the potential impacts of restricting European Union investment in new Russian securities issuances in response to Russian actions in Ukraine. It finds that:
1) Russian investors would face sharply higher costs of issuing new securities, even if alternative financing could eventually be found in third markets.
2) In the short term, substitution would not be easy as third-country investors would be unwilling or would demand higher yields to participate in new issuances by targeted Russian entities.
3) This would push affected Russian companies to seek state financing, further straining the government's budget.
This document discusses the potential impacts of restricting European Union investment in new Russian securities issuances in response to Russian actions in Ukraine. It finds that:
1) Russian investors would face sharply higher costs of issuing new securities, even if alternative financing could eventually be found in third markets.
2) In the short term, substitution would not be easy as third-country investors would be unwilling or would demand higher yields to participate in new issuances by targeted Russian entities.
3) This would push affected Russian companies to seek state financing, further straining the government's budget.
lmpact on Russian investors would consist in sharply increased costs of
issuance, even if eventually alternative financing sources in third markets
could be found. Substitution would not be easy in the short term. Even if not cautht by EU sanctions, third-country investors will likely be unwilling to participate in new issuances by targeted entities or demand significantly higher yields. This would push companies to seek State financing as a stop-gap, further straining the govemment's budgeL Within the EU, direct negative impac6 would be limited (opportunity cost of new investment and related services) and concentrated in .jurisdictions with high levels of financial intermediation or attractive venues for issuance. The indirect impact wouldle distributed across the EU as potential investors and holders of Russian securities are spread out. Whilst the measure will cover only new issues of (selected) Russian securities, it may affect indirectly the securities previously issued by targeted entities, and already traded and held by EU investors. Adverse effects could materialise in loss of revenue for operators,-Sepressed value of existing securitles, loss of market positions, and as an unlikely worst-case scenario risks of defauh on outstanding obligations from targeted institutions. The Russian authorities, as maiority owners of the targeted institutions, would have litde interest in seeing their finaflcial institutions default on their obligations. At an initial stage restrictions would not extend to sovereign bonds, as Russia is a significant investor in issuance by several EU MS. Equity and debt financing irom private se6or operators yould also not be affected. Syndicated loans would also not be covered in tIrc piohibition, given the posslble adverse effects of possible asymmetsical retaliations on the EU subsidiarles in Russia, but it is technically possible to add them in subsequent rounds. The efficiency of the measure strongly depends on coordinatbn with the US. EU and US investors constitute the major portion of market participants investing or assisting the investment in these financial instruments and their venues are the major hubs for issuance. Other jurisdlctionsluch as Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong or Tokyo would only provide significant substitution capacity over time, but they could not fully compensate for the loss of EU and US investors. As a possible next step the restriction could be tied to other sanctions in the package, prohibiting subscription of bonds and equities from companies operating in the sectors subject to sanctions (e.9. defence companies as done by the US on 15 July). ,r- 4 I