NITTO ENTERPRISES, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI,

G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as
evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to
November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was
working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby
hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office
premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without
authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover
the medication of private respondent. On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and
Release in favor of petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. Three days after, or on
August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits. On October 9, 1991,
the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and
dismissing the money claim for lack of merit.
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was
valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement
when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow
worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in
employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training.
On July 26, 1993, the NLRC issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter the appealed
decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last
performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is
actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims
and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's
representative was present. On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, finding merit in [private
respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, The private respondent is being commanded to proceed
to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue,
Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties are located and effect the
reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the
respondent by payroll reinstatement.
He is also entitled to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the
dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN
TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
HELD: There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. Without
which, the dismissal becomes void. The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the
Labor Arbiter only three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such
resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or
"pahinante"). He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear
to him that anyway, he did not have a choice.
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's
alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of
both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
The court finds no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

MANILA TERMINAL CO. INC. v. CIR G.R. No. L-4148 July 16, 1952
FACTS: Manila Terminal Company, Inc. undertook the arrastre service in some of the piers in Manila's
Port Area at the request and under the control of the United States Army. The petitioner hired some
thirty men as watchmen on twelve-hour shifts at a compensation of P3 per day for the day shift and P6
per day for the night shift. The watchmen of the petitioner continued in the service with a number of
substitutions and additions, their salaries having been raised during the month of February to P4 per day
for the day shift and P6.25 per day for the nightshift. The private respondent sent a letter to Department
of Labor requesting that the matter of overtime pay be investigated. But nothing was done by the
Department of Labor.
Later on, the petitioner instituted the system of strict eight-hour shifts. The private respondent filed an
amended petition with the CIR praying, among others, that the petitioner be ordered to pay its
watchmen or police force overtime pay from the commencement of their employment.
By virtue of Customs Administrative Order No. 81 and Executive Order No. 228 of the President of the
Philippines, the entire police force of the petitioner was consolidated with the Manila Harbor Police of
the Customs Patrol Service, a Government agency under the exclusive control of the Commissioner of
Customs and the Secretary of Finance The Manila Terminal Relief and Mutual Aid Association will
hereafter be referred to as the Association.
Judge V. Jimenez Yanson of the CIR in his decision ordered the petitioner to pay to its police force but
regards to overtime service after the watchmen had been integrated into the Manila Harbor Police, the
has no jurisdiction because it affects the Bureau of Customs, an instrumentality of the Government
having no independent personality and which cannot be sued without the consent of the State.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Association also filed a motion for reconsideration
in so far its other demands were dismissed. Both resolutions were denied.
The public respondent decision was to pay the private respondents their overtime on regular days at the
regular rate and additional amount of 25 percent, overtime on Sundays and legal holidays at the regular
rate only, and watchmen are not entitled to night differential pay for past services. The petitioner has
filed a present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the CIR has no jurisdiction to render a money judgment involving obligation
in arrears?
2.) Whether or not the agreement under which its police force were paid certain specific wages for
twelve-hour shifts, included overtime compensation.
3.) Whether or not the nullity or invalidity of the employment contract precludes any recovery by the
Association.
4.) Whether or not the Commonwealth Act No. 4444 does not authorize recovery of back overtime pay.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision that the petitioner's watchmen is entitled to
extra compensation only from the dates they respectively entered the service of the petitioner,
hereafter to be duly determined by the Court of Industrial Relations.
1.) The Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to award a money judgment was already
overruled by this Court on the case of Detective & protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations and United Employees Welfare Association that under Commonwealth Act No. 103 the Court
is empowered to make the order for the purpose of settling disputes between the employer and
employee.
2.) Based on the case of Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations and United
Employees Welfare Association, the law gives them the right to extra compensation. And they could not
be held to have impliedly waived such extra compensation, since it cannot expressly be waived.
3.) The employee in rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the
latter has complied with the requirement of the law, and therefore has obtained the required
permission from the Department of Labor. This was based on the case of Gotamo Lumber Co. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, wherein both parties are in pari delicto. Moreover, the Eight-Hour Law, in
providing that "any agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee contrary
to the provisions of this Act shall be null avoid ab initio.
4.) Based on Fair Labor Standards Act of the United States which provides that "any employer who
violates the provisions of section 206 and section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime
compensation as the case may be," a provision not incorporated in Commonwealth Act No. 444, our
Eight-Hour Labor Law.
We cannot agree to the proposition, because sections 3 and 5 of Commonwealth Act 444 expressly
provides for the payment of extra compensation in cases where overtime services are required, with the
result that the employees or laborers are entitled to collect such extra compensation for past overtime
work. To hold otherwise would be to allow an employer to violate the law by simply, as in this case,
failing to provide for and pay overtime compensation.
AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC. vs. ANTONIO BAUTISTA G.R. No. 156367 May 16, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Antonio Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc.
(Autobus), as driver-conductor with travel routes Manila-Tuguegarao via Baguio, Baguio- Tuguegarao via
Manila and Manila-Tabuk via Baguio. Respondent was paid on commission basis, 7% of the total gross
income per travel, on a twice a month basis. While he was driving he accidentally bumped the rear
portion of Autobus No. 124. Respondent averred that the accident happened because he was compelled
by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for almost 24 hours, as he
had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela. Respondent further alleged that he was not allowed to
work until he fully paid the amount of P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost of repair
of the damaged buses and that despite respondents pleas for reconsideration, the same was ignored by
management. After a month, management sent him a letter of termination. Bautista instituted a
Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay against Autobus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista, who is paid on purely commission basis, is entitled to the grant of
service incentive leave pay.
HELD: Employees engaged on task or contract basis or purely commission basis are not automatically
exempted from the grant of service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the classification of field
personnel.
Field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs his
duties but also with the fact that the employees performance is unsupervised by the employer. They
are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer
and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined ith reasonable certainty. Thus, in
order to conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual
hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an
inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are constantly
supervised by the employer.
The respondent is not a field personnel but a regular employee who performs tasks usually necessary
and desirable to the usual trade of petitioners business. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to the grant
of service incentive leave. It is of judicial notice that along the routes that are plied by these bus
companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who board the bus and inspect the
passengers, xxxx. There is also the mandatory once a week car barn or shop day, where the bus is
regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical xxx. They too, must be at specific place at specified
time, as they generally observe prompt departure and arrival from their point of origin to their point of
destination. In each and every depot, there is always the Dispatcher whose function is precisely to see to
it that the bus and its crew leave the premises at specific times and arrive at the estimated proper time.
These, are present in the case at bar. The driver, the complainant herein, was therefore under constant
supervision while in the performance of this work. He cannot be considered a field personnel.

LABOR CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES V NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
FACTS: The 99 persons named as petitioners in this proceeding were rank-and-file employees of
respondent Empire Food Products, which hired them on various dates. Petitioners filed against private
respondents a complaint for payment of money claim[s] and for violation of labor standard[s] laws.
On January 23, 1991, petitioners filed a complaint docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01- 1964-91
against private respondents for:
After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers and presentation of testimonial
evidence, Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos absolved private respondents of the charges of unfair labor
practice, union busting, violation of the memorandum of agreement, underpayment of wages and
denied petitioners' prayer for actual, moral and exemplary damages. Labor Arbiter Santos, however,
directed the reinstatement of the individual complainants:
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are pakyao or per piece workers and therefore not entitled to
benefits as that of a regular employee.
HELD: As to the other benefits, namely, holiday pay, premium pay, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave which the labor arbiter failed to rule on but which petitioners prayed for in their complaint, we
hold that petitioners are so entitled to these benefits. Three (3) factors lead us to conclude that
petitioners, although piece-rate workers, were regular employees of private respondents. First, as to the
nature of petitioners' tasks, their job of repacking snack food was necessary or desirable in the usual
business of private respondents, who were engaged in the manufacture and selling of such food
products; second, petitioners worked for private respondents throughout the year, their employment
not having been dependent on a specific project or season; and third, the length of time that petitioners
worked for private respondents.
Thus, while petitioners' mode of compensation was on a "per piece basis," the status and nature of their
employment was that of regular employees. The Rules Implementing the Labor Code exclude certain
employees from receiving benefits such as nighttime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave and 13th
month pay, inter alia, "field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer, including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time
consumed in the performance thereof." Plainly, petitioners as piece-rate workers do not fall within this
group.
As mentioned earlier, not only did petitioners labor under the control of private respondents as their
employer, likewise did petitioners toil throughout the year with the fulfillment of their quota as
supposed basis for compensation. Further, in Section 8 (b), Rule IV, Book III which we quote hereunder,
piece workers are specifically mentioned as being entitled to holiday pay.
Sec. 8. Holiday pay of certain employees. (b) Where a covered employee is paid by results or output,
such as payment on piece work, his holiday pay shall not be less than his average daily earnings for the
last seven (7) actual working days preceding the regular holiday: Provided, however, that in no case shall
the holiday pay be less than the applicable statutory minimum wage rate.
The Supreme Court in its decision HELD: DECLARING petitioners to have been illegally dismissed by
private respondents, thus entitled to full back wages and other privileges, and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement at the rate of one month's salary for every year of service with a fraction of six months of
service considered as one year.
University of Pangasinan Faculty Union vs. University of Pangasinan G.R. No. L-63122 Feburuary 20, 1984
FACTS: The petitioners members are full time professors, instructors, and teachers of the respondent
University. The teachers in the college level teach for a normal duration of ten (10) months in a school
year, divided into two (2) semesters of five months each, excluding the two-month summer vacation.
These teachers are paid their salaries on a regular monthly basis.
In November and December, 1981, the petitioners members were fully paid their regular monthly
salaries. However, from November 7 to December 5, during the semestral break, they were not paid
their emergency cost of living allowance(ECOLA). The University claims that the teachers are not entitled
thereto because the semestral break is not an integral part of the school year and there being no actual
services rendered by the teachers during said period, the principle of No work, no pay appllies.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner members are not entitled to ECOLA under No work, no pay principle.
HELD: The No work, no pay does not apply in the instant case. The petitioners members received
their regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the aforeqouted provision of the law that it
contemplates a no work situation where the employees voluntarily absent themselves.
Petitioners, in the case at bar certainly do not, ad voluntatem, absent themselves during semestral
breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this, they cannot be
faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the law. To a certain extent, the private
respondent can specify dates when no classes would be held..
Surely, it was no the intention of the framers of the law to allow employers to withhold employee
benefits by simple expedient of unilaterally imposing no work days and consequently avoiding
compliance with the mandate of the law for these days.
Thus, the legal principles of No work, no pay; No pay, no ECOLA must necessarily give way to the
purpose of the law to augment the income of the employees to enable them to cope with the harsh
living conditions brought about by inflation; and to protect employees and their wages against the
ravages brought by these conditions.

Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corp., vs Trajano G.R. No. 114698 July 3, 1995
FACTS: The case arose from a routine inspection conducted by a Labor Enforcement Officer on August 6,
1991 of the Wellington Flour Mills, an establishment owned and operated by petitioner Wellington
Investment and Manufacturing Corporation (hereafter, simply Wellington). The officer thereafter drew
up a report, a copy of which was "explained to and received by" Wellington's personnel manager, in
which he set forth his finding of "non-payment of regular holidays falling on a Sunday for monthly-paid
employees."
Wellington sought reconsideration of the Labor Inspector's report, by letter dated August 10, 1991.
However, respondents arguments failed to persuade the Regional Director who, in an Order issued on
July 28, 1992, ruled and accordingly directed Wellington to pay its employees compensation
corresponding to four (4) extra working days. Wellington timely filed a motion for reconsideration of this
Order of August 10, 1992. Its motion was treated as an appeal and was acted on by respondent
Undersecretary. By Order dated September 22, the latter affirmed the challenged order of the Regional
Director." Again, Wellington moved for reconsideration, and again was rebuffed.
Wellington then instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar in an attempt to nullify the orders
above mentioned. By Resolution dated July 4, 1994, this Court authorized the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the questioned orders.
ISSUE: Whether a monthly-paid employee, receiving a fixed monthly compensation, is entitled to an
additional pay aside from his usual holiday pay, whenever a regular holiday falls on a Sunday
HELD: Every worker should, according to the Labor Code, "be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten workers;" this, of
course, even if the worker does no work on these holidays. Particularly as regards employees "who are
uniformly paid by the month, "the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum
wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve." This monthly salary shall serve as compensation "for all
days in the month whether worked or not," and "irrespective of the number of working days therein." .
So, too, in the event of the declaration of any special holiday, or any fortuitous cause precluding work on
any particular day or days (such as transportation strikes, riots, or typhoons or other natural calamities),
the employee is entitled to the salary for the entire month and the employer has no right to deduct the
proportionate amount corresponding to the days when no work was done. The monthly compensation
is evidently intended precisely to avoid computations and adjustments resulting from the contingencies
just mentioned which are routinely made in the case of workers paid on daily basis.
In Wellington's case, no issue that to this extent, it complied with the minimum norm laid down by law.
Apparently the monthly salary was fixed by Wellington to provide for compensation for every working
day of the year including the holidays specified by law and excluding only Sundays. In fixing the salary,
Wellington used what it calls the "314 factor;" that is to say, it simply deducted 51 Sundays from the 365
days normally comprising a year and used the difference, 314, as basis for determining the monthly
salary. The monthly salary thus fixed actually covers payment for 314 days of the year, including regular
and special holidays, as well as days when no work is done by reason of fortuitous cause, as above
specified, or causes not attributable to the employees.
There is no provision of law requiring any employer to make such adjustments in the monthly salary rate
set by him to take account of legal holidays falling on Sundays in a given year, or, contrary to the legal
provisions bearing on the point, otherwise to reckon a year at more than 365 days. As earlier
mentioned, what the law requires of employers opting to pay by the month is to assure that "the
monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days
divided by twelve," and to pay that salary "for all days in the month whether worked or not," and
"irrespective of the number of working days therein." That salary is due and payable regardless of the
declaration of any special holiday in the entire country or a particular place therein, or any fortuitous
cause precluding work on any particular day or days (such as transportation strikes, riots, or typhoons or
other natural calamities), or cause not imputable to the worker. And as also earlier pointed out, the
legal provisions governing monthly compensation are evidently intended precisely to avoid re-
computations and alterations in salary on account of the contingencies just mentioned, which, by the
way, are routinely made between employer and employees when the wages are paid on daily basis.
Decision: In promulgating the orders complained of the public respondents have attempted to legislate,
or interpret legal provisions in such a manner as to create obligations where none are intended. They
have acted without authority, or at the very least, with grave abuse of their discretion. Their acts must
be nullified and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the orders complained of, namely: that of the respondent Undersecretary dated
September 22, 1993, and that of the Regional Director dated July 30, 1992, are NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE, and the proceeding against petitioner DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeal January 30, 2002 375 SCRA 311 GR. No. 146775
FACTS: It was October 17, 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment, Illiigan district office,
conducted a routine inspection in San Miguel Corporation in Illigan city. DOLE discovered that there was
an underpayment by SMC of regular Muslim holiday pay to its employees. SMC contested the findings
and DOLE conducted summary hearings. SMC failed to submit proof that it was paying regular Muslim
holiday pay to its employees. DOLE issued a compliance order to consider Muslim holidays as regular
holidays and to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim employees a holiday pay within 30 days from the
receipt of the order. SMC appealed to the DOLE main office in Manila, but its appeal was dismissed for
lack of merit. SMC, then, went to the Court of Appeals for a relief via a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not there is a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as regards to the
payment of benefits for Muslim holidays.
HELD: Muslim holidays are legally observed within the area of jurisdiction of the ARMM. It is only upon
presidential proclamations that Muslim holidays may be officially observed outside the ARMM and
generally extends to Muslims to enable them to observe the said holidays. There must be no distinction
between Muslims and non-Muslims as regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays; wages and
other emoluments are laid down by law and not based on faith or religion.

MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. Nos. 83380-81
November 15, 1989
FACTS: Individual complainants have been working for petitioner Makati Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors,
seamstress, sewers, basters (manlililip) and "plantsadoras". They are paid on a piece-rate basis except
Maria Angeles and Leonila Serafina who are paid on a monthly basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they
are given a daily allowance of three (P 3.00) pesos provided they report for work before 9:30 a.m.
everyday. Private respondents are required to work from or before 9:30 a.m. up to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.
from Monday to Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays.
The Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino, a labor organization of the respondent workers, filed a
complaint for (a) underpayment of the basic wage; (b) underpayment of living allowance; (c) non-
payment of overtime work; (d) non-payment of holiday pay; (e) non-payment of service incentive pay;
(f) 13th month pay; and (g) benefits provided for under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of complainants. The NLRC affirmed the arbiters decision.
Petitioner urged that the NLRC erred in concluding that an employer-employee relationship existed
between petitioner and the workers.
ISSUE: Whether employees paid on piece-rate basis are entitled to service incentive pay.
RULING: The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important requisite of control is present. As
gleaned from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the
haberdashery or its proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker,
sewer or "plantsadora" to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt as
specified by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects the manner and
quality of cutting, sewing and ironing.
Petitioner has reserved the right to control its employees not only as to the result but also the means
and methods by which the same are to be accomplished. That private respondents are regular
employees is further proven by the fact that they have to report for work regularly from 9:30 a.m. to
6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and are paid an additional allowance of P 3.00 daily if they report for work before 9:30
a.m. and which is forfeited when they arrive at or after 9:30 a.m.
The workers did not exercise independence in their own methods, but on the contrary were subject to
the control of petitioners from the beginning of their tasks to their completion. Unlike independent
contractors who generally rely on their own resources, the equipment, tools, accessories, and
paraphernalia used by private respondents are supplied and owned by petitioners. Private respondents
are totally dependent on petitioners in all these aspects. The piece-rate workers in the case at bar are
employees which fall under exceptions set forth in the implementing rules and therefore not entitled to
service incentive leave and holiday pay.