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ISSN 1076 9005
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 9 (2002)
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DID NTIDEVA DESTROY THE BODHISATTVA PATH?
By
Jon Wetlesen
Department of Philosophy
University of Oslo
jon.wetlesen@filosofi.uio.no

ABSTRACT
The qnestion in the title has recentl, Ieen answered in the
affirmatie I, Panl Williams in his IooL on ltro|sm ond Bcol|ty:
Stod|cs |n thc Ph|losohy o[ thc Bodh|corycotro. Williams
assnmes that ntidea attempted to jnstif, the lodh|sottcos
nniersal altrnism on the Iasis of a rednctie conception of a
person. and that this entails a nnmIer of aIsnrd conseqnences
that are destrnctie of the lodh|sottco path. Williams concedes
that ntidea might hae aoided these conseqnences if he had
adopted a non-rednctie conception of the person as a
conentional trnth. Int Williams seems to assnme that this wonld
hae to Ie an indiidnalistic conception. and in that case it wonld
hae preented ntidea from reaching his desired conclnsion.

J argne that there ma, Ie a wa, ont of this dilemma if we
interpret ntidea's conception of the person in the direction of
an interpersonal holism. Jn this iew. others are perceied not
onl, as more or less similar to oneself. Int as parts of oneself. The
lodh|sottco path is nnderstood as a transformation from the small
to the Iig self within the frameworL of conentional trnth. and
eentnall, to non-self within the highest trnth. J Ieliee that this
approach taLes Ietter care of those few erses in chapter eight of
ntidea's IooL. on which Williams has Iased his interpretation.
and that it is snpported I, a nnmIer of other erses in this
contet. to which Williams has not paid mnch attention.
SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF OTHERS, AND
IF SO, WHY?
One of the central sonrces for the lodh|sottco ideal in Mohyno Lnddhism has Ieen the
Bodh|corycotro - Undcrtol|ng thc Woy to nolcn|ng,(1) I, the Jndian monL and
scholar ntidea. who is thonght to hae flonrished at the Nland Jniersit, aronnd
00 . J. One indication that this IooL has Ieen a sonrce of inspiration for the lodh|sottco
2
ideal is that the title of the IooL has traditionall, Ieen changed to the
Bodh|sottcocorycotro - Co|dc to thc Bodh|sottcos Woy o[ L|[c.(2) Loth ersions will Ie
aIIreiated as BC in the following. ntidea has Ieen read this wa, in TiIetan
Lnddhism. and still is. A nnmIer of the pnIlications of the present Dalai Lama. Tenzin
C,atzo. are deoted to this tet. not least to chapter si on patience. chapter eight on
meditation of the eqnalit, of oneself and others. and the echange of oneself and others.
and chapter nine on wisdom.(8) Han, of the other TiIetan lamas now liing in eile
follow np this line of interpretation.
Jecentl,. howeer. Panl Williams has pnIlished a IooL entitled ltro|sm ond
Bcol|ty: Stod|cs |n thc Ph|losohy o[ thc Bodh|corycotro.(1) Snrprisingl,. he argnes that
ntidea attempted to estaIlish a fonndation for the lodh|sottco path on the Iasis of a
rednctie conception of the person along the lines of the VaiIhsiLa AIhidharma School.
This entails a nnmIer of aIsnrd conseqnences that hae the net effect of nndermining the
lodh|sottco project.
The title of the conclnding section of the IooL is "How ntidea destro,ed the
Iodhisatta path." Williams Iases his conclnsion on a somewhat selectie reading of the
tet. He worLs mainl, on fie of ntidea's 912 erses. withont pa,ing mnch attention
to their contet. The main argnments for this conclnsion are gien in chapter fie. where
he discnsses BC 8: 101-108. Jnther snpport is gien in chapter two. where he discnsses
BC 8: 9-98.
Williams's interpretation appears to Ie oriented toward the following qnestion. which
he states on page 80:
Put more pointedly, why should we care if other people are suffering? What
does it matter to us? The point is raised by ntideva's opponent, and it might
be thought to be the very foundation question for a construction of an ethical
system.
J agree that this is a good qnestion to hae in focns when reading ntidea 's tet. Jt
ma, Ie. howeer. that the qnestion shonld Ie reformnlated in a somewhat more general
wa,: Shonld we Ie concerned aIont the welfare of others. and if so. wh,? This can Ie
specified in two aspects - concern for the snffering of others. and concern for the
happiness of others.
Jt ma, Ie that this qnestion shonld Ie snpplemented with the following one as well:
Shonld we hae respect for the freedom of others. and if so. wh,? This is also a central
qnestion for Lnddhists and others. especiall, in a mnlticnltnral societ,. Int J shall leae
that to one side at present.
The "others" here inclnde not onl, all hnman Ieings Int also all sentient Ieings. This
is a Lind of sentientism with regard to the qnestion of who or what is morall,
consideraIle. Jt stops short of Iiocentrism. howeer. which wonld inclnde all liing Ieings.
whether sentient or not. This wonld inclnde plants and microorganisms as well. The )ains
tooL this position. not the Lnddhists. althongh there was some nncertaint, with regard to
trees. dne to the assnmption that the, ma, Ie the aIode of sentient spirits.()
Snppose we answer the Iasic qnestion aIont welfare in the negatie: We need not Ie
concerned aIont the welfare of others: neither their snffering nor their happiness. ecept
in so far as it promotes onr own welfare. This wonld amonnt to an egoistic position not
nnLnown thronghont histor, or in the present.
8
Jgoism has a nnmIer of proIlems of its own. not onl, for others. Int for oneself as
well. These proIlems hae Ieen a major challenge to moral thinLing in man, traditions. J
Ieliee that in one wa, or another most ethical theories attempt to find solntions to these
proIlems. Ver, often. these solntions are songht in the direction of how to restrict egoism
or how to oercome it. Different solntions hae Ieen songht within the frameworL of
ethical theories Iased on dnt,. rights. jnstice. ntilit,. irtne. and so forth.
Jn Lnddhist thinLing. there seem to Ie two main approaches to this qnestion: one I,
means of elimination of the self. the other I, means of reintegration into a more holistic
nnderstanding of oneself in an interpersonal sense. The first of these approaches has Ieen
deeloped especiall, in the AIhidharma Schools of HIna,na Lnddhism. while the second
approach has Ieen deeloped in arions schools of Hah,na Lnddhism. Loth are Iased
on wisdom. impl,ing insight into the real natnre of the person (odgolo). and hence of the
ego.
The rednctie conception nnderstands the person as nothing Int the snm of its parts.
or rather. elements. The parts (dhormos) are snpposed to hae primar, realit, (drocyosot)
with an ontological Ieing of their own (scolhco) as indiisiIle momentar, energetic
atoms of eperience. So. this amonnts to a Lind of atomism. When we constrnct onr
conceptions of persons. liing Ieings and other things. the, hae onl, a secondar,
eistence (rojot|sot). These constrnctions can Ie anal,sed into componnds of parts.
the, are nothing in themseles. and the, are withont an, self (odgolo-no|rtmyo).
The non-rednctie conception nnderstands the person as something more than the
snm of its parts. This "something more." howeer. is nnderstood onl, as a conentional
trnth (somcrt|sotyo). and not as the highest trnth (oromrthosotyo). The highest trnth is
still that the person is not a snIstantial self (ontmon). it is onl, characterized I,
emptiness of own-Ieing (scolhcosunyot). Neertheless. it is ascriIed nnit, and identit,.
as a matter of conention and lingnistic nsage (cyocohro). when we nse singnlar terms
snch as names. prononns. indeicals and definite descriptions. Then we assnme that the,
hae the same reference when we ascriIe different properties to them. and locate them at
different positions in space and time. This presnpposes the assnmptions aIont nnit, and
identit,. These assnmptions are not eliminated throngh a rednctie anal,sis. This
conception has Ieen deeloped especiall, in Hadh,amaLa Lnddhism. for instance as
interpreted I, the CelnLpa School. Jt is a middle wa, aoiding the etremes of eternalism
and nihilism. Jt aoids eternalism Iecanse it does not assnme that the person is a
snIstantial Self (tmon) with an independent own-Ieing (scolhco) - in the wa, it is
done in other schools of Jndian philosoph,. snch as SnLh,a. VaiseiLa. and the Adaita
Vednta. And it aoids nihilism Iecanse it does not assnme that the person is a pnre
nothing that can Ie eliminated I, rednctie anal,sis. as assnmed I, the AIhidharma
Schools.
Horeoer. J Ieliee we can distingnish two arieties of a non-rednctie. holistic
conception of the person in Lnddhist thinLing: one indiidnalistic and the other
interpersonal. The distinctions J hae drawn here can Ie snmmarised in the following
diagram:


1

conentional
trnth
highest trnth


rednctie - atomistic

onceptions of
the person


indiidnalistic


non-rednctie.
holistic


inter-personal


The rednctie response to the challenge of egoism appears to hae Ieen epitomised in the
orhot ideal in HIna,na Lnddhism. while the non-rednctie response was epitomised in
the lodh|sottco ideal in Hah,na Lnddhism. On Williams's interpretation. ntidea
attempted to estaIlish the lodh|sottco ideal on a rednctie conception of the person. and
this did not worL.
THE NOTIONS OF ALTRUISM AND EGOISM
Lefore we hae a closer looL at Williams's argnment. let ns first attempt to fnrther clarif,
the notions of oltro|sm and cgo|sm. These terms hae a certain amIignit, Ioth in
eer,da, disconrse and in specialized stndies. This is also trne of Williams's nsage in his
IooL on altrnism. J Ieliee that J hae fonnd at least fonr different senses of oltro|sm in
his IooL. and J assnme that the term cgo|sm has a corresponding set of contrasting
meanings. We shonld Leep in mind that these different interpretations also hae
repercnssions for the initial qnestion mentioned aIoe. As a point of departnre we ma, nse
the formnlation that:
Altruism
0
: A given person a has an altruistic attitude.
When this is interpreted in the sense of altrnism1 it ma, mean the same as:
Altruism
1
: a is concerned about (or cares for) the welfare (pain or suffering,
and happiness) of others, and a is motivated to do something to prevent or
remove the pain and suffering of others and to promote their happiness.(6)
When the term "egoism" is interpreted in contrast to this. we hae:
Egoism
1
: a is not concerned about (or does not care for) the welfare (pain,
suffering or happiness) of others, or a is not motivated to do something to
prevent or remove the pain and suffering of others or to promote their
happiness.
Altrnism2 is more demanding Iecanse it presnpposes not onl, concern Int also
impartialit,:
Altruism
2
: a has an impartial concern for the welfare of all parties concerned,
without discriminating between the welfare of himself or herself and others.(7)
The notion of impartialit, can Ie nnderstood in accordance with the formal principle of
eqnalit,: ases that are releantl, similar shonld Ie treated in a similar manner:
differential treatment shonld not Ie gien nnless it can Ie jnstified I, releant differences.
Here it is assnmed that there are no releant reasons for a differential treatment. The
contrasting notion of egoism conld Ie formnlated in this wa,:

Egoism
2
: In so far as a cares for the welfare of other parties concerned, his or
her care is partial in favor of his or her own welfare more than the welfare of
others, and concern for others is dependent on its instrumental value for his or
her own interests.
Horeoer. altrnism8 is een more demanding Iecanse it reqnires the snIordination of one's
own interests to those of others:
Altruism
3
: In all cases where a 's interests conflict with the interests of others,
a is disposed to give priority to the interests of others.(8)
The contrasting notion egoism8 has the opposite priorit,:
Egoism
3
: In all cases where a 's interests conflict with the interests of others, a
is disposed to give priority to his or her own interests before those of others.
Jn this interpretation. Ioth "altrnism" and "egoism" are nnderstood within the frameworL
of an indiidnalistic self-conception. There is. howeer. a fnrther interpretation altrnism1
within a wider frameworL. which J will call an interpersonal holism. Lroadl,. all non-
rednctie conceptions of a person ma, Ie regarded as holistic in the sense that the person
as a whole is more than the snm of its parts. Williams characterizes his indiidnalistic
conception as holistic.(9) The holism J hae in mind here. howeer. is not indiidnalistic.
Int interpersonal. Others are conceied as part of oneself at a deeper leel:
Altruism
4
: a has a concern for his or her own welfare, and a considers the
welfare of others as his or her own; hence that person has a concern for the
welfare of others.
Jt ma, Ie somewhat misleading to call this altrnism Iecanse in a wa, it transcends the
distinction Ietween ego and alter. Perhaps it shonld rather Ie called something else. for
instance generosit,.(10) Loth are integrated within a wider conception of the self. Jt ma,
Ie asLed in this connection whether the term cgo|sm conld Ie interpreted in contrast to
altrnism1? Jf we tried. it might tnrn ont as something liLe this:
Egoism
4
: a has a concern for his own welfare, but a does not consider the
welfare of others as his or her own.
J am relnctant. howeer. to consider this as a reasonaIle interpretation of cgo|sm Iecanse
a person of this t,pe ma, still Ie an altrnist in one of the three former senses. and then it
wonld Ie odd to call that person an egoist. J Ieliee. howeer. that Williams has
misgiings aIont this Lind of altrnism. Perhaps he does not regard it as a ps,chologicall,
feasiIle concept.(11) Neertheless. J Ieliee that it deseres to Ie eplored somewhat
fnrther. and in fact J Ieliee that ntidea nsed it.
WILLIAMS'S APPROACH TO BCA 8: 101-103
Williams Iases his rednctie interpretation of ntidea mainl, on BC 8: 101-108.
which he translates as follows:(12)
101: A continuant and a collective such as a [caste] row (pankti) or an army
are fictions (mrsa) / The one of whom there is pain (duhkha) does not exist.
Therefore of whom will there be the ownership of that? //
102: Pains without an owner are all indeed without distinction / Because of its
quality as pain indeed it is to be prevented. What limitation can be made there?
//
103: If one asks why pain is to be prevented (Tib: 'the pain of all is to be
prevented'), it is [accepted] (Skt: 'by all') without dispute / If it is to be
prevented, all also is thus. If not, oneself also is like [other] beings. //
6
Williams assnmes that ntidea is the proponent of all three of these erses. He reads
them as an argnment where the premises are laid ont in erse 101-102 and the conclnsion
is drawn in erse 108. He assnmes that ntidea is aiming at a formall, alid dednctie
argnment.
Williams reads the conclnsion in erse 108 as stating the lodh|sottcos ideal of
nniersal altrnism. or the "nniersal thesis." as he calls it. He reformnlates as follows:
J shall call the position that moralit, reqnires that if J am to remoe m, own pain J
mnst (moral imperatie) act to remoe the pains of others withont discrimination the
nniersal thesis. (p. 101)
J am not so snre that this shonld Ie called a "moral imperatie." Iecanse that sonnds
more liLe a deontological ethics. while J snppose that ntidea 's ethics shonld rather Ie
interpreted as an ethics of irtne. Neertheless. J agree that erse 108 seems to point to
some Lind of nniersalism.
Jn fact. we can distingnish two Linds of nniersalism in this erse. Jn the first place.
it reqnires some Lind of nniersal altrnism. Within the frameworL of a rednctie
conception of the person. one wonld tr, to formnlate this norm impersonall,. withont
reference to oneself or others. The following might Ie a possiIle formnlation: Jf one agrees
that snffering shonld Ie preented or remoed. this pertains to all snffering or none of it.
On the other hand. within the frameworL of a non-rednctie conception of the
person. one wonld tr, to formnlate this norm personall,. with reference to oneself and
others. for instance in this wa,: Jf one agrees that snffering shonld Ie preented or
remoed from sentient Ieings. this pertains to all sentient Ieings or none of them. withont
discrimination or differential treatment Ietween oneself and others.
Jt seems that Williams is inclined to read 108 in a rednctie wa,. Int J will argne that
a non-rednctie reading is more plansiIle and has a stronger snpport in the wider contet.
There is also a second Lind of nniersalism implied in erse 108. According to the
SansLrit ersion of the tet. the nniersal thesim is accepted I, all: that is to sa,.
ntidea assnmes that there is a nniersal agreement or consensns aIont it. J snppose
that this can Ie nnderstood as an indication that ntidea adheres to some Lind of
pragmatic theor, of normatie alidit, (that is. the Iinding character of moral norms).
Iased on acceptance. recognition. endorsement or consensns. This idea wonld fit er, well
with the notion of conentional trnth (somcrt|-sotyo). which we shonld proIaIl, not
interpret as a strong meta-ethical cognitiism Iased on trnth. or a moral realism Iased on
moral facts. Int rather as a weaL moral cognitiism Iased on pragmatic criteria of the
Lind mentioned.
Let ns moe on to the premises in erse 101-102. We can distingnish at least three
different interpretations of them: (1) A rednctie interpretation. which Williams criticizes
for its aIsnrd conseqnences. (2) a non-rednctie and indiidnalistic interpretation. which
Williams criticizes for Ieing insnfficient to jnstif, the desired conclnsion. and (8) a non-
rednctie and interpersonall, holistic interpretation. which Williams does not seem to
consider. and which ma, sae ntidea from the dilemma. with which Williams
confronts him.
(1) WILLIAMS'S REDUCTIVE INTERPRETATION OF BCA 8: 101-102
Jn erse 101. ntidea appears to draw an analog, Ietween the notion of a person or a
self on the one hand. and the notion of a collectie liLe an arm,: and of a continnant. liLe

a row or qnene. on the other. Jn the second line of the erse it is said that there eists no
one for whom there is pain or who owns pain. The notion of a person is characterized as a
fiction. analogons to the notion of a collectie and a continnant.
Jn a Lnddhist contet the notion of a person (odgolo) is anal,zed into fie gronps
(slondho) of Iodil, and mental phenomena (dhormo): the sense-organs. which pertain to
the Iod,. feelings. perceptions. dispositions. and conscionsness of these phenomena. These
elementar, phenomena hae an atomic strnctnre. mnch liLe the sense-data in Daid
Hnme's empiricism. Jach element is nnmericall, different from all other elements. and
each element lasts for onl, a moment and is nnmericall, different from the elements in the
preceding and sncceeding moments.
When a componnd thing liLe a person is constrncted ont of these elements. it appears
to hae a nnit, in the mnltiplicit, of parts. and to hae an identit, throngh time and
change. Jf we Ieliee that there is something liLe this. we ma, Ieliee that there is a
conentional person or a metaph,sical person. Verse 101 appears to den, Ioth of these
possiIilities Iecanse it affirms that the, inole fictions. mnch in the same wa, as Hnme's
sLeptical anal,sis of personal identit,.(18)
When we anal,ze the apparent nnit, and identit, of a person. we find nothing Int a
snm of parts. or rather. elementar, phenomena. The nnit, is rednced to a collectie and
the identit, to a continnant: Ioth are rednced to a snm of parts. A collectie liLe an arm,
is nothing Int a snm of soldiers. and a continnant liLe a qnene or a rosar, is nothing Int a
series of indiidnals (people or Ieads). Jn the same wa,. the person as a nnit, is nothing
Int a snm of elementar, phenomena eisting s,nchronicall,: the person as an identit, is
nothing Int a snm of elementar, phenomena eisting diachronicall,. each element Ieing
nnmericall, distinct from all the rest.
Jn Ioth cases. appearance does not match realit,. Jf we Ieliee it does. then that is
dne to onr Iasic ignorance or delnsion. which engenders nnwholesome effects snch as greed
and hatred. and these nnwholesome roots engender snffering and reIirth to new lies of
snffering. LiIeration from snffering presnpposes an insight into this root delnsion. and
that is the crncial wisdom. This is an insight into the nothingness of the assnmption aIont
a person. as nnderstood in the AIhidharma Schools. especiall, in the VaiIhiLa School.
This anal,sis is Ironght one step fnrther in erse 102. Jf the notion of a person or self
is a fiction. there can Ie no owner of pain or snffering. As a conseqnence. it mnst Ie
assnmed that these feelings can Ie had independentl, of a snIjectie contet. Williams
characterizes them as "free-floating feelings." Jn this anal,sis. feelings liLe snffering and
compassion. for instance. mnst Ie nnderstood independentl, of the snIjectie contets of
persons or other sentient Ieings who snpposedl, hocc these feelings. ompassion mnst Ie
assnmed to Ie motiated I, the perception of pain or snffering. withont an, reference to
whether it Ielongs to others or to oneself. When these personal references are IracLeted.
there is no Iasis for egocentric discrimination. All personal characteristics that might Ie
nsed to jnstif, a differential treatment of oneself and others are eliminated. and onl,
eqnalit, is left as a possiIilit,.
Jrom these premises in erse 101-102. then. the nniersal thesis in erse 108 can Ie
drawn as a conclnsion. Jn this wa, a nniersal altrnism of some sort can hopefnll, Ie
estaIlished.
8
WILLIAMS'S REFUTATION OF 101-102, WHEN INTERPRETED
REDUCTIVELY
J thinL this is the argnment that Williams ascriIes to ntidea. Williams's net moe is
to criticize this position and show that it entails a nnmIer of aIsnrd conseqnences. which
preents it from Ieing a worLaIle solntion. Let me Iriefl, snmmarize some of the main
aIsnrdities to which Williams draws attention.
Jt mnst Ie said that Williams is maLing a real toor dc [orcc in these parts of his IooL.
He draws a parallel Ietween the rednctie conceptions of the person in AIhidharma
Lnddhism and in Hnme's chapter "Of Personal Jdentit," in the Trcot|sc (189-110).
which has Ieen followed np in recent times I, DereL Parfit in Bcosons ond Pcrsons (1981)
and Snsan LlacLmore. among others.(11) Williams draws on the criticism against Parfit
I, S. ShoemaLer. ). Stone. ). ampIell. and C. Strawson.(1) He also draws on the
criticism of rednctionism in general I, a nnmIer of philosophers in modern Anglo-
American anal,tical philosoph,. liLe J. H. hisholm. C. Cillett. ). Cloer. J. L. Cregor,.
S. Cnttenplan. D. W. Haml,n. J. ). Lowe. H. Pntnam. W. V. O. Qnine. ). J. Searle. P.
J. Strawson. D. Wiggins. and man, others.(16)
Qnite a few of Williams's criticisms hae a presnppositional strnctnre. Jf J ma, Ie
ecnsed for a rash snmmar, of Williams's argnment. J taLe it that he argnes that the
attempt to rednce the notion of a person to a collectie and a continnant is qnestion
Iegging. at least if the collectie is nnderstood as a snm of simnltaneons elementar,
phenomena. and the continnant is nnderstood as a snm of snccessie momentar,
phenomena that are cansall, related. Here the componnd notion of the person as a whole
is to Ie constrncted as a snm of these elements. Howeer. which elements are to Ie
inclnded or eclnded from the Iasis of this constrnction? How are elements selected so as
to fnnction as parts of the whole person. which is to Ie constrncted? And how are
elementar, phenomena to Ie ascriIed to the constrnction of one person rather than
another? The elements mnst Ie of thc r|ght sort, as Parfit calls it. Int what are the criteria
of releance for this selection? Williams argnes that this presnpposes a preconception of
the person as a whole on which it is parasitic. Here J wonld add that the notion of a
collectie proIaIl, presnpposes the conception of the nnit, of the whole. and the notion
of a continnant proIaIl, presnpposes the conception of the identit, of the whole throngh
time and change. Jn other words. the rednctie eplanation of the whole presnpposes the
whole. which shonld Ie eplained. and therefore the eplanation Iecomes circnlar and
qnestion Iegging.
Williams emplo,s a nnmIer of ariations of presnppositional argnments of this Lind.
He follows Kant's transcendental argnment that 1 th|nl mnst Ie capaIle of accompan,ing
all m, eperiences. and for this reason snIjectiit, is inherent in all mental eents. A
conseqnence of this is that if the snIject is eliminated throngh rednctie anal,sis. so is the
possiIilit, of eperience. mental eents. learning to nse a langnage. conceptnal thonght.
reasoning. decision-maLing. engaging in choices. agenc,. responsiIilit,. merit. demerit.
Larma. the frnits of Larma. pnnishment. reward. and fnrthermore. also the possiIilit, of
haing feelings. and hence pain and snffering. Withont this. there is no point in the
lodh|sottcos ow to help all snffering Ieings Iecome free from snffering and attain
happiness. Nor is there an, point in the lodh|sottcos decision or ow Iecanse he or she will
not Ie the same person maLing the decision and carr,ing it throngh. Jn short. the
rednctie conception of the person will destro, the lodh|sottcos path.
9
(2) A NON-REDUCTIVE AND INDIVIDUALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF
BCA 8: 101-103
How shall we assess Williams's interpretation of ntidea? Did ntidea reall,
adhere to a rednctie conception of the person or the self? Jrom a methodological point of
iew. J thinL there are two reqnirements that we shonld Leep in mind. Jirst. are there an,
plansiIle alternaties to Williams's reading of BC 8: 101-108? Secondl,. are there other
erses that snpport an alternatie interpretation rather than Williams's? J thinL Williams
has paid some attention to these reqnirements. Int perhaps not qnite as mnch as wonld Ie
desiraIle.
J Ieliee there are two main alternaties to Williams's interpretation. Loth of them
read erse 101 as a denial of a metaph,sical Self (tmon). Int not of a conentional person
(odgolo). This opens the possiIilit, of a non-rednctie nnderstanding of the person.
proided that this is nnderstood as a conentional trnth and not as the highest trnth.
Williams considers one of these interpretations. where the non-rednctie conception
of the person is nnderstood in an indiidnalistic manner. Williams concedes that this
interpretation might hae Ieen a theoretical possiIilit, for ntidea. ntidea is
commonl, regarded as a proponent of the Hadh,amaLa School of Hah,na. and some. if
not all. interpretations of this school hae fonnd room for snch a non-rednctie conception
of the person. This. at least. is trne of the TiIetan CelnLpa School. Jt is not inconceiaIle
that ntidea conld hae attempted to do the same himself.
Let me epand on this a little.(1) The first commentator on ntidea 's tet.
PrajLaramati (tenth centnr,). interpreted ntidea at this point from within the
frameworL of the VaiIhasiLa AIhidharma School. Jt seems. I, the wa,. that
PrajLaramati's interpretation has Ieen a major sonrce of inspiration for Williams's
rednctie interpretation as well. According to this school. the notion of a person or a self is
regarded as a whole (a collectie and a continnant). which is taLen to Ie nothing Int the
snm of its parts. or rather. of the elementar,. momentar, phenomena. which are its
constitnents. Lecanse the whole is nothing in itself. it can Ie rednced to its elementar,
constitnents. Therefore. it is rednndant and can Ie eliminated.
The CelnLpas. on the other hand. agreed with the AIhidharma philosophers that the
notion of a person is a conentional constrnction. Lnt the, did not conceie of it in a
rednctie manner. The, acLnowledged that the notion of a person presnpposes the
assnmption that there is a nnit, in the mnltiplicit, of parts. and that it has identit,
throngh time and change. The, also acLnowledged that it presnpposes snIjectiit,. These
assnmptions amonnt to something more than the snm of parts. and that is the reason for
the notion Ieing non-rednctie. Lnt still this is onl, a conentional trnth (somcrt|-sotyo).
This is Iased on lingnistic nsage (cyocohro) when we emplo, singnlar terms to refer to
others or onrseles I, means of names. prononns. indeicals. or definite descriptions.
These terms are nsed as snperenient terms. and are impnted to others or onrseles on the
Iasis of elementar, phenomena falling nnder the fie gronps of corporal or mental
phenomena. These phenomena are nsed as snIenient gronnds for the ascription of the
statns of a person. The attriIntion of person terms is not. howeer. assnmed to Ie the
highest trnth (oromrtho-sotyo) of the matter. The highest trnth is still that a person is
not a snIstantial self (odgolo-no|rtmyo). and is characterized I, emptiness of
independent own-Ieing (scolhco-sunyot).
10
Williams appears to hae two oIjections against this interpretation of erses 101-102.
Jn the first place. it does not seem to fit so well with the wording in 101 where it is said
that "the one of whom there is pain does not eist." or with the epression in erse 102
aIont "pains withont an owner." To some etent. these epressions seem to snpport a
rednctie interpretation of 101-102 as a denial of Ioth a conentional and a metaph,sical
person or self.
Lnt this argnment is not decisie. Williams admits that if ntidea had accepted a
conception of the person along these lines. he wonld hae aoided the aIsnrd conseqnences
of the rednctie conception. Lnt Williams holds that ntidea had a fnrther reason for
not doing that. Williams assnmes that if ntidea had accepted a non-rednctie
conception of the person. it wonld hae to Ie an indiidnalistic conception. And in that
case. he wonld hae to aIandon the hope of estaIlishing premises that conld gie a
dednctie jnstification for the desired conclnsion in erse 108. This conclnsion contains a
nniersal thesis. which reqnires a high degree of altrnism. A non-rednctie indiidnalism
cannot gnarantee for snch altrnism. Wheneer a person nnderstands himself or herself as
different from other persons. there is alwa,s the possiIilit, that he or she will gie priorit,
to his or her own interests Iefore those of others in cases where the, conflict. Lecanse this
is possiIle. altrnism does not follow with necessit,.
Williams amplifies this argnment with the following oIseration. Jt will not help if a
person accepts the thesis of no-self or emptiness of own-Ieing as a highest trnth. if this
person at the same time accepts an indiidnalistic conception of the person as a
conentional trnth. This comIination of premises does not entail altrnism. There is no
lacL of connter-eamples either. Han, people. who reject the assnmption of a snIstantial
self. neertheless tnrn ont to Ie more or less egoistic.
Jn iew of these argnments. Williams holds that ntidea faced the following
dilemma. Jf ntidea wanted to gie a dednctie jnstification of the nniersal altrnistic
conclnsion in erse 108. he had to accept a rednctie conception of the person. Lnt then he
also had to taLe the aIsnrd conseqnences into the Iargain. On the other hand. if
ntidea wished to aoid these aIsnrd conseqnences. he had to aIandon his hope of
giing a dednctie jnstification of the nniersal altrnistic conclnsion. Jn this sitnation.
ntidea chose the first horn of the dilemma. Jnfortnnatel,. he thereI, destro,ed the
lodh|sottco path.
Williams epresses his regrets for this. and he hopes that a Ietter solntion ma, Ie
fonnd. Lecanse Williams has not proposed an, snggestion aIont how this might Ie done. J
thinL it conld Ie worthwhile to inestigate the following h,pothesis.(18)
(3) A NON-REDUCTIVE AND INTERPERSONALLY HOLISTIC
INTERPRETATION OF BCA 8: 101-103
Let ns pass on to the second non-rednctie interpretation of the erses 101-102. Here it is
assnmed that when a lodh|sottco is nnderstood as a person. this need not Ie nnderstood
indiidnalisticall, within a dnalistic distinction Ietween oneself and others. Int it ma, Ie
nnderstood holisticall, in an interpersonal manner. Or. perhaps it wonld Ie Ietter to sa,
that in this interpretation the lodh|sottco path is nnderstood as a transformation of the
motiational strnctnre of a lodh|sottco from an indiidnalistic to an interpersonal self-
nnderstanding.
11
This might proide the premises needed for dedncing the desired nniersal altrnistic
conclnsion in erse 108. Let ns jnst rememIer what the initial qnestion was: Shonld we
care if other people are snffering? Or. more generall,: Shonld we Ie concerned aIont the
welfare of (all) other sentient Ieings. and if so. wh,? OIionsl,. ntidea answers this
qnestion in the affirmatie. and when his jnstification for it is gien within the frameworL
of a non-rednctie conception of the self. it ma, Ie spelled ont in terms of the following
two premises:
(1) I should be concerned about the welfare of myself, and endeavor to prevent
or remove my own pain and suffering, and to promote my own happiness.
This reading is fairl, close to the tet in erse 108. and it is in harmon, with some of the
other erses snch as 99. 110 and 11. As J remarLed earlier. this erse indicates that there
is wide agreement. This ma, Ie interpreted in terms of a pragmatic theor, of alidit,
according to which the Iinding force of norms hae their sonrce in endorsement or
agreement. Jn so far as it is not contested. there is no need to jnstif, it fnrther. This wonld
Ie in Leeping with a contetnal model of jnstification.
(2) The welfare of (all) other sentient beings is part of my own welfare.
This premise. of conrse. is not self-eplanator,. and the qnestion is whether it can Ie
interpreted in a meaningfnl and tenaIle wa, in iew of other erses in the contet. J shall
retnrn to that presentl,. Jrom these premises. we can conclnde:
(3) I should be concerned about the welfare of (all) sentient beings.
When ntidea's argnment for the nniersalistic altrnism of a lodh|sottco is
reconstrncted in this wa,. it seems to Ie all right from a logical point of iew. Jt is a plain
modos oncns. J snppose that this meets Williams's reqnirement. and that it is not
necessar, to assnme that ntidea has to Ie ecnsed for Iad logic in order to defend him
from Williams's charges. which seems to Ie the position taLen I, LarIra la,ton.(19) On
the other hand. J Ieliee that this reconstrnction Irings ont wh, the conclnsion cannot Ie
reached I, logic alone. Jt presnpposes that the second premise is estaIlished. and that
reqnires something more than an academic eercise in argnmentation. Jt reqnires
meditatie and moral practice. J agree with LarIra la,ton. who also refers to )ohn Pettit
at this point. that Williams has nnderrated this side of the matter qnite serionsl,.(20)
To some etent. this looLs liLe a casnistic argnment. Jt starts with one's own case as a
paradigmatic eample and etends it to others. Jsnall, casnistic argnments are Iased on
analogical etensions. Jf we accept and agree how to treat a paradigmatic case. and we
accept and agree that another case is releantl, similar to the first one. and if we.
fnrthermore. accept and agree that there are no snfficient connterailing differences
Ietween these cases. then this can Ie nsed as a reason for conclnding that the other case
shonld Ie treated in a similar manner. This Lind of argnment seems to presnppose an
indiidnalistic conception of the parties concerned. and to Ie Iased on the formal principle
of eqnalit,. The eqnalit, in qnestion here is Iased on similar properties of the indiidnals
concerned.
The argnment aIoe. howeer. transcends this Lind of indiidnalistic eqnalit, and
moes into some Lind of interpersonal conception of the person. Or. perhaps it
presnpposes that the notion of a person mnst Ie stratified in two or more la,ers. one at the
snrface. which is indiidnalistic. and another at a deeper leel. which is more
interpersonal.
12
Jn this reading. it is most liLel, that ntidea himself wonld hae welcomed
Williamss criticism of erse 101-102. ecept for its Ieing directed against ntidea
instead of his opponent. Jn so far as these erses are interpreted within a rednctie
conception of the person. the, hae a nnmIer of aIsnrd conseqnences. Jn pointing ont
these conseqnences. Williams is engaging in an eemplar, eercise in the Lind of
dialectical argnmentation that is the hallmarL of the PrasagiLa Hadh,amaLa to which
ntidea himself Ielonged - refnting the opponent I, means of rcdoct|o od olsordom
argnments.
Horeoer. ntidea wonld agree with Williams that these aIsnrd conseqnences
conld Ie aoided I, assnming a non-rednctie conception of the person as a conentional
trnth. ntidea wonld not agree. howeer. that a non-rednctie conception mnst
necessaril, Ie indiidnalistic. Jen if this is the most common conception. it can Ie
transformed into an interpersonal holistic conception. Jn so far as that is done. one oItains
the Lind of altrnism that is reqnired as a premise for the nniersal thesis in the conclnsion
in erse 108. To do so is a central oIjectie for a lodh|sottco.
Lefore we looL at other erses that ma, snpplement this reading of ntidea within
the frameworL of a non-rednctie interpersonal conception of the person. let ns first
consider Iriefl, how Williams interprets and criticizes BC 8: 9-98.
REDUCTIVE AND NON-REDUCTIVE READINGS OF BCA 8: 97-98
Williams translates these erses as follows:(21)
97: Supposing one says that the suffering which happens to that [other] person
does no harm to me, therefore (s)he should not be protected against [it] / Then
since future suffering (Skt.: 'the suffering of future bodies') also is doing no
harm [to you now] why is that to be protected against? //
98: If you consider that 'I will experience that,' such conception is false /
Indeed other the one who died; other also is the one who is born. /
Let ns first asL. "Who are the antagonists here?" J thinL it is safe to sa, that there are two
parties: one part, holding a rednctie conception of the person. the other holding a non-
rednctie conception. Williams assnmes that ntidea is a protagonist of the former
conception. while J assnme he is a protagonist of the latter. That certainl, maLes a
difference here. J shall set forth m, own reading and attempt to characterize Williams's
interpretation as J go along.
As a h,pothesis J snppose that ntidea as his initial moe in the discnssion
formnlates the first sentence in 9 with the opponent. who is a follower of the VaiIhiLa
AIhidharma. Jt sa,s. "Snpposing one sa,s that the snffering which happens to that
[other] person does no harm to mc, therefore (s)he shonld not Ie protected against [it]."
This seems to impl, the following sentence:
(1) If and only if a suffering happens to me should I be concerned about it, and
attempt protect myself against it so as to prevent it or remove it.;
Jrom this. it wonld seem to follow.
(2) If a suffering does not happen to me, I need not be concerned about it.;
The point of this is to draw some aIsnrd implications from the rednctionist's denial that
the person as a whole is more than the snm of constitnent parts or elements. Jf one denies
that the person has an internal nnit, in the mnltiplicit, of parts. and also denies that he
or she has identit, throngh time and change. seeral odd conseqnences will follow with
18
regard to planning for one's own fntnre. Jt seems that ntidea. in erse 98. ascriIes to
the rednctionist the iew that fntnre snfferings Ielong to another person than the present
person. Williams points ont two ersions of this. a narrower and a wider - where the
narrower is connected with fntnre Iodies. and the wider with fntnre snfferings withont
referring to an, particnlar Iod,. According to the narrower iew. m, fntnre snfferings
ma, Ie related to fntnre Iodies in which J am reIorn. These Iodies are clearl, nnmericall,
different from m, present Iod,. According to the wider iew. m, fntnre snfferings need
not Ie specificall, related to an, Iod, at all. Lecanse all the elementar, phenomena that
constitnte a person are new in each moment. there is strictl, speaLing no gronnd for
sa,ing that the fntnre snfferings are mine at all. Onl, present snfferings Ielong to me now:
fntnre snfferings Ielong to someone else. and a new one in each moment.
Jn iew of this. it ma, Ie asLed whether J shonld taLe measnres in the present to
aoid snffering in the fntnre. Lecanse fntnre snfferings do not happen to me now. and
hence do not happen to me. it wonld seem to follow that J need not Ie concerned aIont
them. On the other hand. it appears to Ie a fact that most people do plan for the fntnre
and taLe measnres in a more or less prndent wa, in order to aoid fntnre snffering. Jf we
accept that this is jnst what we shonld do. we will hae a good reason for rejecting the
rednctie conception. So. this argnment amonnts to an attempt at a rcdoct|o od olsordom
of the rednctie iew.
The Iattle is not won ,et. howeer. According to Williams's interpretation. the
rednctionist has fnrther resonrces. He ma, retort that the non-rednctionist has not
nnderstood how radical his iew is. Lecanse he considers the notion of a person to Ie a
fiction and an illnsion. he does not need to rel, on the distinction Ietween oneself and
others at all. All he needs is the occnrrence of snffering. That alone will motiate
compassion. and hence altrnism. withont regard to the persons concerned. There will Ie no
releant difference Ietween one's own snffering and that of others. and hence no gronnd
for a differential treatment. The feelings of pain. snffering. compassion. and so forth will
Ie "free-floating." and artificial Iorders Ietween others and m,self will not limit their
scope.
Jf we snppose that a lodh|sottco is motiated in this wa, to preent or remoe all
pain and snffering. simpl, Iecanse it is pain or snffering. we will hae the premise needed
in order to eplain his nniersal altrnism. We ma, snppose that this motiation is
Iasicall, there in eer,Iod,. Int in most people and other sentient Ieings it is oIscnred
I, hindrances snch as the three nnwholesome roots (delnsion. greed. and hatred). Jn the
lodh|sottco. howeer. it will shine forth again in proportion as he or she remoes these
hindrances. And that is all the normatie jnstification a lodh|sottco will need.
Jt seems that Williams has two Linds of argnments against this defense. Jn the first
place. he argnes against this eplanation on the Iasis of the transcendental or
presnppositional argnments of the t,pe we hae alread, considered. Jf eperience and
feeling necessaril, presnppose someone who eperiences and feels. then there can Ie no
free-floating eperiences or feelings in the aIsence of a personal contet. Jn that case.
there can Ie no Iasis een for an egoistic motiation. let alone a nniersal altrnistic
motiation.
Secondl,. Williams argnes against this normatie jnstification I, pointing ont that it
is Iegging the qnestion. Jen if we grant. for the saLe of the argnment. that a
compassionate lodh|sottco will Ie motiated to preent or remoe all pain and snffering.
withont regard for personal contet. then we will presnppose the er, thesis that we were
11
snpposed to eplain or jnstif,. And that is qnestion Iegging. which is to sa, that it is not
reall, an eplanation or jnstification at all.(22)
As J said. Williams assnmes that this is a refntation of ntidea 's position. while J
snppose that it is a refntation of ntidea 's opponent. and that ntidea himself wonld
hae endorsed Williams's argnments. J Ieliee that ntidea wonld hae nnderstood
erse 9-98 as a non-rednctie argnment that ma, perhaps Ie reconstrncted along the
following lines:
(3) I can envisage future sufferings that will happen to me because I can
identify with these future states and incorporate them into my conception of
myself as a unity with identity through time.;
This nnit, and identit, of the person. it shonld Ie rememIered. can here Ie nnderstood as
a conentional trnth. onentional trnths are conditioned I, lingnistic and other nsages.
snch as the nse of singnlar and general terms to isolate and identif, indiidnals referred to.
which is a precondition for identif,ing with them. Hence. this conld onl, Ie nnderstood as
a non-rednctie conentional conception of oneself.
(4) More generally, I can envisage my own future states of welfare, both with
regard to suffering and happiness because I can identify with these future states
and incorporate them into my conception of myself as a unity with identity
through time.;
(5) Therefore, I should be concerned about my own future states of welfare.;
(6) There is no relevant difference between my own future welfare and the
present or future welfare of others because I can identify with both, and thus
incorporate these states of welfare into my conception of myself.;
This is an assertion that wonld need fnrther clarification and jnstification. which we ma,
looL for on a Iroader Iasis in ntidea 's tet.
(7) Therefore, I should be as concerned about the welfare of others as for my
own.;
The scope of this concern ma, Ie particnlaristic if it etends to some others. snch as
certain other hnman Ieings or certain sentient Ieings. or it ma, Ie nniersalistic if it
etends to all others. And. it ma, Ie Iroadened throngh certain Linds of meditation
practice. J shall retnrn to this.
One adantage of this interpretation is that it wonld proide an answer to the initial
qnestion: Shonld J care aIont the snffering or welfare of others. and if so. wh,? Yes. J
shonld. at least if J accept that J shonld care for the snffering and welfare of m,self. and if
J nnderstand m,self at a deeper leel as nnited with others. This latter |[, howeer. is a
large one. Has ntidea an,thing more to sa, aIont it?
OTHER VERSES SUPPORTING A NON-REDUCTIVE INTERPRETATION
OF NTIDEVA
When we taLe into consideration a Iroader contet than Williams has done. we find a
nnmIer of erses where ntidea appears to proponnd a non-rednctie conception of the
person in a conentional sense. Horeoer. ntidea does not seem to share Williams's
assnmption that a non-rednctie conception of the person mnst Ie indiidnalistic. Jen if
most people do entertain an indiidnalistic conception of themseles. and therefore ma,
Ie more or less egoistic. the whole point of Iecoming a lodh|sottco is to transform this
motiational strnctnre in the direction of what J called altrnism1 aIoe. and Iecome as
1
concerned for the welfare of others as one is for one's own. A means for doing this is to
change one's conception of oneself into an interpersonal conception.
J Ieliee this is the main point in the greater part of ntidea's tet in so far as it is
focnsed on the notion of an awaLening mind (lodh|c|tto). This notion is interpreted
differentl, within a gradnal and an instantaneons nnderstanding of the path to
awaLening. Jn ntidea 's tet it is mainl, nnderstood in the gradnal wa,. The first three
chapters of BC ma, Ie interpreted as an eplanation of how an awaLening mind can Ie
aronsed. the net three chapters eplain the methods I, which one maintains an
awaLening mind and preents it from deteriorating. and the three chapters after these
eplain how to increase lodh|c|tto when it has Ieen engendered.(28)
ntidea 's tet contains a wealth of eercises and techniqnes of meditation that
ma, Ie helpfnl in this connection. Of particnlar interest are his meditations in chapter si
on forIearance. and in chapter eight on the eqnalit, of self and others in 8: 90-119. and on
the echange of oneself with others in 8: 120-18. And of conrse. the meditations on
wisdom in chapter nine hae a fnrther Iearing on all of this. especiall, with regard to the
transition to selfless moties and actions.
J agree that there is a leewa, for different interpretations of ntidea 's tet. Jn
chapter eight. for instance. it is possiIle to interpret man, of the erses either within the
frameworL of a rednctie conception of the person. or within a non-rednctie and
indiidnalistic frameworL. or within a non-rednctie and interpersonal frameworL. Jn the
following. J shall mainl, concentrate on the third of these possiIilities. J Ieliee that this
Lind of holism is eplored especiall, in 8: 91. 99. 100. and 111. and that it gains fnrther
snpported from 8: 111. 112. 11. 186. 18. and 18. We ma, start with erse 90. Here and
in the following. J shall mostl, nse the translation of Wallace and Wallace. Int J will also
consnlt the fie other translations J hae at hand:
90: One should first earnestly meditate on the equality of oneself and others in
this way: "All equally experience suffering and happiness, and I must protect
them as I do myself."
The point of erse 90 is to meditate on the eqnalit, of oneself and others. This eqnalit, is
spelled ont in descriptie terms as two properties that are attriInted to oneself and others:
eer,one eperiences snffering. and eer,one eperiences happiness. We ma, perhaps add
that eer,one desires to aoid snffering and to gain happiness. This is nsed as a gronnd for
a normatie prescription: therefore. J mnst protect others as J protect m,self.
Jt is interesting to notice here that this Iasic similarit, is characterized Ioth in a
negatie and a positie aspect: snffering (dohlho) and happiness (solho). Snffering. of
conrse. is the oIject of compassion (loron). motiating the compassionate person to hae
a concern for others who snffer. and help to preent their snffering or remoe it. Horeoer.
happiness is the oIject of loing-Lindness (mo|trI). motiating the gentle person to
promote the happiness others. Jn this wa, ntidea starts from a Iroader Iasis than
Williams's formnlation of the Iasic proIlem. Williams mentions onl, the negatie concern
for the snffering for others. while ntidea mentions also the positie concern for the
happiness of others. Jt is interesting to see how mnch the Dalai Lama maLes ont of this
comIined goal (aoiding snffering and oItaining happiness) in his pnIlic speeches. He
taLes it as a Iasis for a common moralit, in a mnlticnltnral world. This ma, Ie a frnitfnl
idea. At least it is worth proIing.(21)
16
Verse 90 is one of those erses that lends itself to an interpretation within all three of
the conceptions of the person that J mentioned. Jf it is interpreted within a rednctie
frameworL. the Iasic similarit, Ietween persons or other sentient Ieings is that the, are
illnsions. What reall, eist are onl, elementar, phenomena. snch as acts of pain or
pleasnre. or of compassion or loing-Lindness. J shall not go fnrther into this possiIilit,
Iecanse we hae alread, discnssed Williams's criticism of it.
Jf erse 90 is interpreted within a non-rednctie and indiidnalistic frameworL. pains
and pleasnres are regarded as properties Ielonging to indiidnal persons. J thinL Williams
has a good point here when he donIts that an indiidnalistic conception of the person will
snffice to motiate a nniersalistic or egalitarian ethics. As we said earlier. althongh it is
possiIle for an indiidnalist to hae snch a nniersalistic motiation. there is no necessit,
that he or she mnst hae it. And. if we assnme that all persons are similar in Ieing
concerned primaril, aIont their own welfare. then this alone will not gnarantee that
people will care for the welfare of others.
At least some more premises mnst Ie added that eplain wh, people with this Lind of
indiidnalistic interest shonld Ie motiated to agree on common moral or legal norms.
aIide I, them. or een feel oIligated I, them. This has Ieen one of the standard proIlems
in mnch western philosoph, since the time of HoIIes. if not Iefore. A ariet, of contract
theories hae Ieen proposed to sole it. some on a conseqnentialist Iasis. others on a
deontological Iasis. Jf indiidnalism had Ieen the onl, Lind of non-rednctie conception
the person aailaIle to ntidea. one conld reasonaIl, epect that he too wonld hae
proIed into some Lind of contract theor,. Lnt there is no trace of that in his writings. J
taLe this as a confirmation of the assnmption that he was rather eploring other Linds of
non-rednctie conceptions.
One snch possiIilit, is the non-rednctie and interpersonal conception of the person.
Jt is interesting that this seems to Ie the wa, ntidea deelops his thonght in the er,
net erse. which is translated as follows I, Wallace and Wallace:
91: Just as the body, which has many parts owing to its division into arms and
so forth, should be protected as a whole, so should this entire world, which is
differentiated and yet has the nature of the same suffering and happiness.
Jletcher's translation differs a little from this. Jnstead of characterizing the Iod, as a
whole with the limIs as its parts. he characterizes the Iod, as one with man, limIs. Jn
either case. the Iod, is to Ie protected as a whole or as a nnit,. The term rotcct in this
contet mnst Ie interpreted in a sense wide enongh to inclnde not onl, a concern to
preent or remoe snffering. Int also to promote happiness. This concern is Ioth self- and
other-regarding.
Jn a non-rednctie and indiidnalistic interpretation. one part,'s concern for others is
Iased on the perception of a releant similarit, Ietween one's own interests and that of
others. comIined with the lacL of a snfficient connterailing difference. Int in a non-
rednctie and interpersonal interpretation. one part,'s concern for others is Iased on the
perception of oneself and others as parts of a more comprehensie whole that is assnmed
to hae an organic nnit,. Jn so far as a person identifies with this whole. it Iecomes the
deeper self of the person. Here others are iewed not onl, as more or less similar to oneself.
Int as parts of oneself.
An oIions oIjection against an interpersonall, holistic conception of the self is that
the feelings of one person are not identical with those of another. The, ma, Ie more or
less similar. Int the, are not the same. Jen if the, are qnalitatiel, identical. the, are
1
nnmericall, distinct. So it does not seem to maLe sense to talL aIont the feelings of
another person as Ieing m, own. Jach person has his or her own feelings. Jollowing
Williams. we conld go on to sa, that feelings presnppose a personal contet. Jf this is
taLen to Ie the end of the matter. we hae an indiidnalistic conception of the person.(2)
Adherents of an interpersonal conception of the self wish to sa, that the feelings of
another person ma, Ie not onl, similar to one's own. Int the, ma, Ie one's own. an this
Ie reconciled with the common sense iew that there is a nnmerical distinction Ietween
the feelings of different persons? One possiIle solntion might Ie to distingnish two aspects
in the attriIntion of feelings to others or oneself. Jn the first place. we ma, refer to acts of
feeling. These acts can Ie indiidnalized in snch a wa, that the acts of one person are
different from those of another. and een the acts of one and the same person are different
at snccessie moments. Secondl,. we ma, refer to the person to whom these acts of feeling
are attriInted. Jf we snppose that the identit, of this person is formed throngh a process
of identification. and that it is possiIle for one person to identif, with another. then it
seems to maLe sense to sa, that the feelings of the other can Ie one's own. in spite of the
fact that the acts of feeling are nnmericall, different.(26) The feelings of the other can
Ielong to one's conception of oneself at a deeper leel of self-nnderstanding. proided that
the other is incorporated as part of this conception.
When this deeper notion of oneself as a whole is ascriIed internal nnit,. it will impl,
indiisiIilit,. Horeoer. this implies that the different parts will Ie nnderstood as haing
internal rather than eternal relations to each other. There will Ie an implicate order
Ietween them. This ma, Ie what ntidea has in mind in erse 91 where he seems to
hint at the possiIilit, that the different parts of the Iod, will hae a mntnal concern for
each other's welfare Iecanse the snffering or happiness of each part is the snffering or
happiness of all the other parts on acconnt of their internal nnit,. Here he mentions the
arms. and in erse 99 he also mentions the feet. This seems to impl, that the arms. for
instance. will hae a concern for the welfare of the feet in so far as the, are nnderstood as
parts of the same person.
Jn erse 91 ntidea does not confine this organismic analog, to relations Ietween
parts within an organism: he hints at the possiIilit, of etending it to relations Ietween
organisms. in so far as the, are iewed as parts of a more comprehensie organism. J taLe
it that this ma, inclnde one's relations to other persons and other sentient Ieings in
general. One might epect. perhaps. that it can Ie etended as far as one's identifications
go. thns transforming one's self-conception from a smaller to a Iigger self.
Jn the following erses. ntidea appears to go fnrther into the oIjection J
mentioned aIont the nnmerical distinctness of feelings Ielonging to different persons. Jt
mnst Ie admitted that the tet is amIignons. and that the translators arrie at rather
different renderings of these erses. J shall not attempt to go into the details of these
diergences. Int sticL to a certain selection of translations. The translation of Wallace and
Wallace is as follows:
92: Although my suffering does not cause pain in other bodies, nevertheless
that suffering is mine and is difficult to bear because of my attachment to
myself.
Alternatiel,. the, render it I, "that snffering of mine is nnIearaIle Iecanse J cling to it
as mine." rosI, and SLilton translate with "J shonld neertheless find their snffering
intoleraIle Iecanse of the affection J hae for m,self."
18
Jt appears that ntidea in this erse assnmes that a pain Iecomes a snffering and is
nnIearaIle to a person onl, if he identifies it as his own. This amonnts to an assnmption
that snffering reqnires a personal contet and presnpposes a non-rednctie conception of
the self. Jf this is a correct interpretation of ntidea. it is a good connter-instance
against Williams's accnsation that ntidea proponnds a rednctie theor, of the self
with "free floating" feelings and withont a snIjectie dimension. On the contrar,. it seems
that ntidea proponnds the er, Lind of theor, Williams endorses himself.
Horeoer. this erse seems to raise an oIjection against an interpersonal conception
of the self Iecanse it implies that the feelings of one person do not directl, affect another
person. Depending on the translation. it ma, well Ie that ntidea attempts to meet this
oIjection in the net erse. Three of the translations J worL with point in this direction.
Sharma. for instance. has this translation:
93: Similarly, even if other's pain is not borne by myself but that pain too
becomes unbearable for me when others are conceived as my own self.
Latchelor nses the epression "I, conceiing of (others as) 'J' their snffering Iecomes
mine: Therefore it too shonld Ie hard to Iear." and Jletcher sa,s. "Lecanse J taLe them
for m, own their snffering is liLewise hard to Iear."
J read this erse as stating that althongh the pains and snfferings of another person
are nnmericall, distinct from m, own feelings. in so far as J conceie m,self at a
snperficial leel. it is neertheless possiIle for me to regard the other's snffering as m, own
at a deeper leel of self-nnderstanding.
Jt mnst Ie admitted. howeer. that the three other translations do not snpport this
reading. rosI, and SLilton. Hatics. and Wallace and Wallace translate it as sa,ing that J
cannot eperience another's snffering. and that it is hard for him to Iear his snffering
Iecanse of the affection he has for himself or Iecanse he clings to it as his own.
Williams has a Irief reference to the erses 91-96. which J qnote here in the
translation of Wallace and Wallace:
94: I should eliminate the suffering of others because it is suffering, just like
my own suffering. I should take care of others because they are sentient beings,
just as I am a sentient being.
95: When happiness is equally dear to others and myself, then what is so
special about me that I strive after happiness for myself alone?
96: When fear and suffering are equally abhorrent to others and myself, then
what is so special about me that I protect myself but not others?
Jn his comment. Williams states that "ntidea had alread, nrged that snffering is to Ie
remoed simpl, Iecanse it is snffering. . . . He appears to want to sa, that it maLes no
rational difference. and therefore for ntidea no moral difference. who actnall,
eperiences the snffering."(2) J agree that it is possiIle to interpret these erses in a
rednctie manner. Lnt it seems to me that the, might eqnall, well Ie interpreted in a
non-rednctie manner. either indiidnalisticall, on the Iasis of eqnalit,. or as a Lind of
interpersonal holism. On an indiidnalistic interpretation. the point might Ie that in a
pnIlic contet the difference Ietween m, own happiness or snffering and that of others is
I, itself not releant as a gronnd for a differential treatment. Here the consideration
pertains to persons. not their effects onl, as the rednctiist wonld hae it. Jn an, case.
Williams appears to Ieg the qnestion when he taLes it for granted that the first
interpretation is the onl, plansiIle possiIilit, here.
19
J moe on to erse 99. which is translated in this wa, I, rosI, and SLilton:
99: If you think that it is for the person who has the pain to guard against it, a
pain in the foot is not of the hand, so why is the one protected by the other?
The other translations do not snIstantiall, deiate from this. J read it as an oIjection
against an interpersonal conception of the self. and a response. The oIjection is raised
from an indiidnalistic point of iew. Jf each person has a concern for his own welfare.
gnarding against his own snffering. and caring for his own happiness. wh, shonld one
person hae a concern for the welfare of another? The response is gien in the form of an
analogical argnment in faor of an interpersonal conception of the self. Wh, shonld the
hand gnard against the pain in the foot? Lecanse the, are memIers of the same person.
And wh, shonld one person hae concern for the snffering of another person? Lecanse
the, are memIers of the same interpersonal holistic self at a deeper leel. J do not claim
that this is the onl, reasonaIle interpretation. Lnt J thinL it is possiIle and een
plansiIle.
Verse 111 points in the same direction. Here is Jletcher's translation:
114: Hands and other limbs are thought of as the members of a body.
Shall we not consider others likewise Limbs and members of a living whole?
The other translations are not so different from this. Latchelor renders the part/whole
relation as "limIs of Life." rosI, and SLilton translate it as "part of the nnierse." Hatics
has it as "memIers of the nnierse." Sharma as "limIs of the same world." and Wallace
and Wallace as "memIers of the world." Here the notion of an organism is etended I,
analog, from the indiidnal to the whole of life or the whole of the nnierse. J assnme that
this can Ie interpreted in terms of an interpersonal self.
Jn this connection. it wonld Ie interesting to Lnow how a person can etend self-
conception from an indiidnalistic to an interpersonal orientation? Some of ntidea's
erses gie a hint of what he might thinL aIont this. Here. as elsewhere. J Ieliee that
ntidea argnes casnisticall, from paradigmatic cases and I, analogical etension to
other cases. The paradigmatic cases are mentioned in erse 111. 11. and 18. and the
analogical etensions are mentioned in erse 112. 11. 186. 18. and 18. Let ns hae a
looL at some of this. J qnote from the translation of Wallace and Wallace:
111: Due to habituation, there is a sense that "I" exists in the drops of blood
and semen that belong to others, even though the being in question does not
exist.
Here the paradigmatic eample is the notion of 1, in so far as it has its origin and
deelopment in a process of haIitnation. The term "haIitnation" has Ieen nsed in the
translations of rosI, and SLilton and I, Jletcher as well. while Hatics nses "haIit" and
Latchelor translates with "throngh (constant) familiarit,."
Verse 18 comes close to epressing the same idea. Wallace and Wallace translate this
as follows:
158: Therefore, just as you formed a sense of self-identity with regard to the
drops of blood and semen of others, contemplate others in the same way.
As an alternatie reading. the, hae: "Therefore. jnst as ,on hae identified with the J in
the drops of Ilood and semen of others. so accnstom ,onrself to others." This seems to Ie
to Ie a er, apt terminolog,. One forms one's self-identit, throngh a process of
identification. Latchelor renders this formation in terms of acqnaintance: rosI, and
SLilton nse the epression "formed the notion 'J' regarding others' drops of sperm and
20
Ilood." Jletcher nses "cling to it as thongh it were ,onrself." Hatics nses "as ,on located
the Jgo-maLer (ohomlro) in drops of sperm and of Ilood." and Sharma nses "jnst as ,on
own these other drops of Ilood and sperm. ,onr Iod, or ,onrself."
The idea seems to Ie that the notions of 1, mc, myscl[, scl[, scl[-|dcnt|ty, and the liLe
are deeloped or constrncted throngh a process of identification. At the ontset the oIject
of identification is one's Iod, (see also erse 11). which can Ie traced IacL to the gametes
of one's parents. At ntidea 's time these were perceied as the semen of the father and
the Ilood of the mother - in an, case corporal phenomena that were not one's own to
Iegin with. Int stemming from the Iodies of other persons. Throngh a process of
identification. these phenomena come to Ie owned I, oneself. One endorses them.
thinLing. "This is mine. J am this. this is m, self."(28)
The analogical etension of this idea is as follows: Jf J conld form m, self-identit,
throngh a process of identification with this Iod,. wh, shonld J not Ie aIle to do the same
with the Iodies of other people? This is Ironght ont in fnrther erses snch as 112. Here is
the translation of Wallace and Wallace:
112: Why do I not also consider another's body as myself in the same way,
since the otherness of my own body is not difficult to determine?
According to this erse. there is an analog, Ietween identif,ing with one's own Iod, and
with the Iodies of others. Jn Ioth cases. the Iodies are something other to Iegin with.
One's own Iod, deries from the Ilood and semen of one's parents. and een after the, are
merged. the emerging organism is othcr nntil one gets acqnainted with it. nsed to it. and
identifies with it. Jn this wa,. identification is a matter of nsage and haIitnation. This
ma, Ie connected with conentional trnth (somcrt|-sotyo) Iased on nsage (cyocohro). Jf
this can Ie done in relation to one Iod,. wh, not also in relation to more Iodies? This idea
is followed np in erse 11. which is rendered I, Wallace and Wallace as follows:
115: Just as the notion of a self with regard to one's own body, which has no
personal existence, is due to habituation, will the identity of one's self with
others not arise out of habituation in the same way?
Horeoer. in erse 186 this line of thonght is followed np with regard to practical concern
for others. J snppose that we ma, amplif, the notion of identification with others with the
traditional Lnddhist notions of the natnral aIilit, of empath, and s,mpath, (onolom)
and its reinforcement I, means of tranqnilit, meditation on the fonr immeasnraIles.
among them compassion. Throngh s,mpath, and compassion with the snffering of others.
one epands one's conception of one's own self so as to inclnde others. and then one has a
motie to commit oneself to preent or remoe the snffering of others as one's own. Here.
once again. is the rendering of Wallace and Wallace:
136: Therefore, in order to alleviate my own suffering and to alleviate the
suffering of others, I give myself up to others and I accept others as my own
self.
Jnrthermore. this concern for others can Ie etended Ie,ond an, particnlar Iorder and
Iecome increasingl, nniersal. One opens np toward the class of hnman Ieings and the
class of sentient Ieings tending in the direction of inclnding all. J snppose erse 18 can Ie
read in this wa,. once more in the translation of Wallace and Wallace:
137: O mind, make this resolve: "I am bound to others." From now on you
must not be concerned with anything but the welfare of all sentient beings.
21
This seems to snpport m, earlier remarL that Lnddhist ethics has a sentientist conception
of the scope of moral statns. rather than a Iiocentric. Within an ethics of irtne. liLe the
one considered here. moral statns ma, Ie ascriIed to all and onl, those Ieings toward
which we taLe an attitnde of direct moral concern.(29) As a h,pothesis J snppose that this
is eqnialent with the class of Ieings with whom we identif, and inclnde into onr
conception of onrseles at a deeper leel.
SYMPATHY AND THE GOLDEN RULE AS A BASIS FOR BUDDHIST
ETHICS
There are different wa,s of reconstrncting the Iasis of Lnddhist ethics. Some snppose it
shonld Ie nnderstood as a teleological ethics of a conseqnentialist t,pe. The theor, of
Larma. for instance. ma, lend itself to an indiidnalist or egoistic theor, of ntilit,. On the
other hand. there are man, Lnddhist tets that ma, Ie interpreted as a conseqnentialist
ethics of nniersalistic theor, of ntilit, comparaIle to classical ntilitarianism.(80) This
pertains also to ntidea 's tet. for instance. to BC 8: 96. 102. 101-10. This. howeer.
does not eclnde the possiIilit, of interpreting the same tets within the frameworL of a
teleological ethics of the holistic t,pe. comparaIle to Aristotle's ethics of irtne. Damien
Keown has argned that this is the most snitaIle wa, of nnderstanding Lnddhist ethics.
and J Ieliee he is right.(81) There are een some who hae attempted to interpret
Lnddhist ethics along the lines of a deontological ethics of a Kantian t,pe.(82) J do not
thinL that this is er, plansiIle. howeer.
Jt seems to me that the most liLel, fonndation of Lnddhist ethics is simpl, onr
capaIilit, of haing empath, and s,mpath, (onolom) with others. comIined with the
Colden Jnle - which enjoins ns to do (or omit to do) to others what we wish that others
do (or omit to do) to ns.
The aIilit, to empathise or s,mpathise with others ma, Ie assnmed to Ie part of onr
natnral endowment. Jt ma, Ie more or less well deeloped in different persons. depending
on man, Linds of factors. Jt ma, degenerate throngh lacL of nse. Int it ma, also Ie
reinforced throngh cnltiation. for instance throngh different Linds of Lnddhist
meditation. Heditation of the fonr snIlime attitndes (among them loing-Lindness.
compassion. and s,mpathetic jo,) are a case in point.
As for the so-called Colden Jnle. this refers to a famil, of more or less similar
formnlations that are fonnd in man,. if not most. cnltnral traditions. Some of the oldest
Lnddhist tets contain an interesting ersion. One eample is the Dhommoodo 129-182.
Thomas lear, translates erse 129 in this wa,:
Everyone trembles at the whip, everyone is afraid of death. Considering others
as yourself [attnam upamam], do not kill or promote killing.(33)
A related eample is the Sotto |to 0. which J translate as follows:
They are as I am. Considering others as myself (attnam upamam), I should
neither kill nor cause others to kill.
Jsnall, the Colden Jnle is formnlated as a norm of reciprocit, Ietween two or more
parties. This fits well together with an indiidnalistic conception of the person along the
lines discnssed aIoe in connection with BC 8: 90. On this interpretation. the Colden
Jnle can Ie nnderstood as an application of the formal principle of eqnalit,. Jeleantl,
similar cases shonld Ie treated in a similar manner: a differential treatment reqnires a
releant difference. The crncial qnestion here will Ie. "How can we decide which factnal
similarities or differences are releant as gronnds for a similar or differential treatment?"
22
Jrom a pragmatic point of iew. some Lind of recognition might do the joI. for instance
one's own endorsement in a thonght eperiment where one taLes the role of the other in
Iilateral cases. or some Lind of consensns where one taLes the roles of all parties concerned
in mnltilateral cases. J shall not go fnrther into these possiIilities here Iecanse J do not
thinL that this is what ntidea had in mind. Jt wonld Iring ns far into the field of man,
schools of contemporar, moral theor,.
J Ieliee that ntidea deeloped his interpretation of s,mpath, and the Colden
Jnle within the frameworL of an interpersonal holistic conception of the person along the
lines discnssed aIoe in connection with BC 8: 91. 99. and 111. Perhaps this ma, Ie
formnlated as follows: We shonld do (or omit to do) towards others what we wish to do (or
omit to do) towards onrseles.
To m, mind. there are seeral adantages with this line of interpretation. Jor one
thing. it appears to fit well with a irtne ethics of the holistic teleological t,pe. This seems
to Ie comparatiel, independent of assnmptions aIont reIirth. which for man, people is a
qnestion-Iegging assnmption and therefore nnsnitaIle as a fonndation for ethics. Thirdl,.
it aoids a conseqnentialist ethics Iased on ntilit, fnnctions. either egoistic or collectie as
in ntilitarianism. Jonrth. it also aoids a deontological ethics.
The Colden Jnle appears to Ie a snitaIle principle for the jnstification of other norms
and actions. Jt is interesting to see how it ma, fnnction in the contet of hristian ethics.
The formnlation in Hatt :12 adds a comment that sa,s that the Colden Jnle is the law
and the prophets. As Jichard Hare has pointed ont. this can reasonaIl, Ie interpreted in
the direction of taLing the Colden Jnle of the New Testament as the fonnding principle
(or r|mo [oc|c gnideline) for the Ten ommandments of the Old Testament. or at least
those commandments that hae a moral Iearing.(81) Jn this wa,. the Colden Jnle
fnnctions as a principle for reasoning aIont more specific norms of action. This fnnction it
ma, er, well hae in Lnddhist ethics as well.
COMPASSION AND LOVING-KINDNESS
Jn connection with BC 8: 11 and 186 aIoe. J made the point that the scope of
moral statns in Lnddhist ethics ma, etend as far as one's identifications. and that this
goes as far as we conceie onrseles at a deeper leel. J wonld liLe to amplif, this idea and
connect it with the two main t,pes of Lnddhist meditation - tranqnillit, meditation
{somotho-lhcon) and insight meditation (c|osyon-lhcon) - which ma, Ie
instrnmental in the constrnction of onr conception of onrseles.
Jirst a few oIserations aIont tranqnillit, meditation. J shall not go into the details.
Int onl, mention that one important ariet, of this Lind of meditation aims at deeloping
onr interpersonal attitndes. This is the meditation on loing-Lindness (mo|trI). compassion
(loron). s,mpathetic jo, (mod|t) and eqnanimit, (ocl). This is commonl, called
meditation on the fonr snIlime aIodes (lrohmo-c|hro). or on the fonr immeasnraIles
(oromno).
There are a nnmIer of interesting parallels with hristian ethics of loe at this point.
for instance as set forth in the Sermon on the Honnt (Hatthew : 88-18). The precepts in
Ioth cases point in the direction of retnrning hatred with loe. and iolence with non-
iolence. The Lnddhists. howeer. hae done mnch more to deelop a meditatie practice.
which ma, enaIle people to deelop their attitndes in this direction. ntidea 's BC is a
case in point. especiall, his chapter si on patience. and his chapter eight. which we hae
Ieen considering.
28
J Ieliee that Aronsen has got it right when he emphasizes the distinction Ietween
s,mpath, and loe in Lnddhism.(8) S,mpath, is a natnral capaIilit, and fnnctions as a
direct Iasis for moral practice. while loe (inclnding loing-Lindness. compassion and the
other immeasnraIles) are oIjects of tranqnillit, meditation. The, do not fnnction directl,
as a fonndation for moralit,. Int the, ma, hae an indirect fnnction when the, are nsed
to reinforce the natnral capaIilit, for s,mpath,.
Jn some Lnddhist traditions. especiall, in Hah,na Lnddhism. a distinction is
drawn Ietween ordinar, loing-Lindness (mo|trI) and compassion (loron) on the one
hand. and great loing-Lindness (moh-mo|trI) and compassion (moh-loron) on the
other. The, appear to differ in Ioth strength and scope. The former t,pe seems to Ie more
particnlaristic. Ieing Iased on the transformation of the small to the Iig self within the
frameworL of conentional trnth. while the latter t,pe seems to Ie more nniersalistic.
Ieing Iased on the awaLening to the non-self or the emptiness of the conentional self
within the frameworL of the highest trnth. This insight or wisdom (roj) implies a
critical stance to all pnrportedl, releant differences Ietween oneself and others. nsed as
gronnds for the jnstification of a differential treatment. thns impl,ing a loing-Lindness
and compassion that is withont conditions and withont limits. There are interesting
parallels here to the hristian notion of diine loe (ogoc).
Jt seems that the former t,pe has its sonrce in particnlar cases where one has a
positie attitnde towards friends whom one liLes and loes. Jrom these paradigmatic
cases. one etends the positie attitndes I, analogical etension to nentral persons. and
lastl, to enemies towards whom one Iears resentment or hatred. Jn this wa,. these
meditations proceed I, a casnistic procednre. This approach Ielongs to the gradnal path
to liIeration from snffering. Jt is a step-I,-step procednre. and it is particnlaristic in scope
in the sense that one ma, practice this etension of attitndes toward a more or less
encompassing class of persons or sentient Ieings.
As a parallel to these two Linds of loing-Lindness and compassion. there is also a
distinction Ietween two Linds of lodh|c|tto - one within the frameworL of conentional
trnth. the other within the frameworL of the highest trnth.(86)
These meditatie techniqnes for the transformation one's conentional self from an
indiidnalistic orientation to a more interpersonal and holistic orientation hae Ieen
fnrther deeloped in Lnddhist Tantric traditions. Some of these techniqnes are gronnded
in elaIorate isnalizations. for instance of the Iodies of the Lnddha. of the lineage of
lodh|sottcos and gnrns. cnlminating in one's own root gnrn. One isnalizes how these
merge into one encompassing Lnddha-natnre. and how oneself merges into this. J taLe it
that all of this points in the direction of a non-rednctie. interpersonall, holistic
conception of the person as a conentional trnth. and een if ntidea did not moe so
far in this direction. J see no incompatiIilit, Ietween his position and these trends.
With regard to meditation on the three Iodies of the Lnddha. J assnme. as a
h,pothesis. that it is possiIle to interpret the dhormolyo as a s,mIol for the nnit, of the
holistic self. the somlhogolyo as a s,mIol for its wholeness. and the n|rmnolyo as a
s,mIol for the parts of the whole. nnderstood as indiidnal historical persons. Lnddhist
meditation on these dimensions of the holistic self ma, hae an integrating fnnction.
parallel to hristian meditation on the hristian s,mIolism of the Jather as the inner
nnit, of all there is. the Son or hrist as the logos of the whole of all things. and the
historical )esns as part of the whole. and as one historical indiidnal hnman person among
21
others.(8) This does not qnite correspond to the Trinit,. howeer. Iecanse it does not
Iring in the Hol, Spirit. nnderstood as the mntnal loe Ietween the Jather and the Son.
Lnt as J remarLed aIoe. in the Lnddhist conception there is an internal relation Ietween
wisdom and loe. and this is qnite as close as in the hristian conception of the Trinit,.
Jn Ioth the Lnddhist and the hristian cases. it seems that this integratie
s,mIolism ma, gie a motie for a nniersal altrnistic orientation. Jf a person perceies
his or her deeper self as inclnding all persons. and this whole is perceied as a nnit,. this
will impl, a concern for the welfare of all persons as for himself or herself. The second
commandment of loe in the )ewish and hristian traditions ma, Ie nnderstood as an
epression of this: one shonld loe one's neighIor as oneself. That wonld taLe care of the
moral intention. J snppose the same thing can Ie said for the Lnddhist tradition. ecept
that here one wonld etend the scope of one's concern to all sentient Ieings. while in the
)ain tradition one wonld etend it to all liing Ieings. With regard to moral action. one
shonld do to others as one wonld do to oneself. The scope of this Ieneficent action wonld
Ie analogons to the scope of the Ieneolent motiation.
This ma, also eplain the lodh|sottcos nniersal altrnism or concern. Jf all Ieings are
integrated in his conception of himself. he or she will not hae completed the promise to
help all snffering Ieings Iefore this is accomplished for the er, last of them. And this. of
conrse. has its parallel in hristianit, - compare )esns' sa,ing that what we do to the
least of onr Irothers. we do to him (Hatthew 2: 10). This follows from the assnmption of
nnit,. which implies indiisiIilit,.
WISDOM
This is not the end of the matter. howeer. Le,ond this. there is the possiIilit, of
deeloping the highest trnth (oromrthosotyo) aIont the person and other phenomena. Jn
Lnddhist meditation there are a large nnmIer of themes for this Lind of insight
meditation. and among them the theme that the person is not a snIstantial self
(ontmon). Int is characterized I, emptiness of own-Ieing (scolhco-sunyot). These are
the themes for ntidea's chapter nine on wisdom (roj).
This has a Iearing on the Lnddhist and hristian s,mIolisms that J referred to
aIoe. with regard to nnit,. wholeness. and part. Jn a Lnddhist setting. the, will Ie
interpreted as conentional trnths and the, will Ie assessed in iew of their pragmatic
fnnction for the integration of the holistic person. These meditatie fnnctions are
sometimes emphasized in a hristian setting too. especiall, in the contemplatie
traditions. Qnite often. howeer. these s,mIols hae fossilized into metaph,sical dogmas.
especiall, in the hands of academic theologians. Jt ma, well Ie that the Lnddhist
meditations on snch s,mIolisms conld Ie a sonrce of inspiration in a hristian contet as
well.
Jn the light of these insights. it is possiIle to deelop the highest lodh|c|tto.(88) Jrom
a moral point of iew. J snppose that one of the fnnctions is this Lind of insight meditation
ma, Ie to remoe the hindrances for a nniersal etension of one's conception of oneself as
a conentional person. Jf one's identifications with certain particnlar gronps of persons or
sentient Ieings degenerate into fiations. the, ma, estaIlish Iarriers in relation to other
persons or sentient Ieings who are Ie,ond the pale. Jt ma, Ie. for instance. that one
identifies oneself with and attaches oneself to certain properties on the assnmption that
the, proide a releant gronnd for discrimination Ietween those who hae these
properties and those who do not. Lnt if one comes to see these properties as non-
2
snIstantial and empt, of own-Ieing. one will adopt a more detached attitnde to them.
thereI, remoing the gronnds of discrimination. As a resnlt. one will Ie more willing to
inclnde those Ieings who were discriminated against on these gronnds. Jn this wa,. insight
meditation ma, fnnction as a Lind of critiqne of ideolog,.
Jt might Ie said. perhaps. that those parts of the lodh|sottco path that we hae Ieen
discnssing in the preceding are concerned aIont the transformation of the self from a small
self to a Iig self. This pertains to conentional trnth. The highest trnth is concerned with
the fnrther transformation into no-self or selflessness.
Jmptiness is not so empt, as one might epect. This has Ieen a rich field of
cnltiation. Jn TiIetan Lnddhism. a distinction has Ieen drawn Ietween two Linds of
emptiness that is especiall, pertinent in this connection: emptiness of own-Ieing (in
TiIetan called rongtong) and emptiness of other (shcntong). The former is ascriIed to all
things that can Ie an oIject of onr conscionsness. while the latter is ascriIed to the
snIjectie conscionsness itself. This notion has Ieen mnch discnssed oer the centnries in
Dzogchen and other schools of TiIetan Lnddhism.
There is hardl, an, donIt that ntidea snIscriIed to the rongtong interpretation of
emptiness. Jt is more donItfnl. howeer. whether he might also hae room for a shcntong
conception.(89) Lnt this is another discnssion than the one we hae looLed at aIoe.
Jither of these alternaties is compatiIle with a non-rednctie conception of the
conentional self. and een if ntidea wonld hae rejected a shcntong conception of
emptiness. this does not impl, that he accepted a rednctie conception of the conentional
self.
We ma, add that when the meditation on emptiness is practiced in the direction of
the shcntong conception. we are facing an alternatie to the gradnal wa, to liIeration.
notaIl, the sndden wa, that has Ieen ampl, eplored in the TiIetan Dzogchen tradition
(in part also in the Hahmndr tradition). as well as in the hinese h'an, the Korean
Son, the )apanese Zen, the Vietnamese Thien traditions. Lnt J do not thinL that this
approach wonld Ie so congenial to ntidea. His IooL has. first of all. Ieen a sonrce of
inspiration for the gradnal path - what the TiIetans call lom r|m.
CONCLUSION
Did ntidea destro, the lodh|sottco path? Jf Williams is correct in his rednctie
interpretation of ntidea 's jnstification of this path. he ma, hae destro,ed it. Lnt J
Ieliee there are good reasons to donIt that Williams is correct. J do not thinL that
Williams has paid snfficient heed to alternatie interpretations of the few erses on which
he Iases his conclnsion. nor do J thinL that he has paid snfficient heed to other erses that
seem to faor a non-rednctie interpretation. notaIl, of an interpersonal holistic Lind. J
therefore Ieliee that the traditional reception of ntidea can Ie maintained. according
to which he was a central contriIntor to the lodh|sottco path. not onl, to its theoretical
fonndations. Int also to its practical implications. J feel confident that his tet still holds
the promise of man, frnitfnl deelopments in the new enironment of the modern world.
ENDNOTES
(1) There are three translations from the SansLrit tet cnrrentl, aailaIle in Jnglish: rosI,
and SLilton 199. Hatics 191. and Sharma 1990. rosI, and SLilton nse Shantidea's
title on their front page. Thc Bodh|coryocotoro. Int on p. . the, translate the title as
Undcrtol|ng thc Woy to 1nl|ghtcnmcnt. Jetnrn to tet.
26
(2) Another three translations from the TiIetan tet are also cnrrentl, aailaIle in Jnglish:
Latchelor 199. Jletcher 199. and Wallace and Wallace 199. Jetnrn to tet.
(8) Tenzin C,atso 1991 is a commentar, of the whole tet of Shantidea. Tenzin C,atso 199
is a commentar, to chapter si of Shantidea's IooL. Tenzin C,atso 1991. chapter eleen.
"The Seen-Point anse and Jffect Hethod." and chapter twele. "Jqnalizing and
Jchanging Oneself with Others" are mainl, a commentar, on chapter eight of
Shantidea. Tenzin C,atso 1988. is a commentar, on chapter nine. Two commentaries on
chapter nine. translated on the recommendation of the Dalai Lama. are contained in
Khenchen Knnzang Pelden and Hin,aL Knnzang Snam 1998. The first of these is
written from the perspectie of the Dzogchen tradition. the second from the perspectie of
the CelnLpa School.
Jn Tenzin C,atso 1991. p. 16 the Dalai Lama remarLs: "The instrnction for training
one's mind in the method of eqnalizing and echanging with others is Iest fonnd in
Lodhisattacar,aatara. This tet - particnlarl, the sith chapter. the chapter on
patience - is in fact liLe a Ling among all the tets dealing with the thonght
transformation practices. When ,on are aIle to perceie enemies as Lind to ,on. ,on will
hae oercome a great stnmIling IlocL Iecanse the enem, is the greatest stnmIling IlocL
for the cnltiation of the thonght cherishing the welfare of others. Jrom this iewpoint.
the er, factor that normall, seres as an oIstacle and stnmIling IlocL for others in their
spiritnal progress is transformed into a faoraIle condition and actnall, Iecomes an
impetns for practice. This mindset is indeed effectie and powerfnl. The instrnction for the
cnltiation of this mind of eqnalit,. eplained in the eighth chapter of
Bodh|sottcocoryocotoro, the chapter on concentration. is to Ie practiced in particnlar."
This jndgment is also reaffirmed in Tenzin C,atso 1992. p. 101. where he writes: "Jn
order to hae pnre ethics. it is necessar, to cnltiate patience. The practice of patience is
etremel, important Iecanse it is the main InlwarL for training in the eqnalizing and
switching of self and others. Jt is most helpfnl to practice together the techniqnes that
Shantidea sets forth in the chapters on patience and on concentration in his Co|dc to
thc Bodh|sottcos Woy o[ L|[c, in which he eplains the eqnalizing and switching of self and
others. The practice of patience estaIlishes the fonndation. the Iasis. for eqnalizing and
switching self and others. Jt is hardest to generate a sense of affection and respect for
enemies." Jetnrn to tet.
(1) p Williams 1998a. Jetnrn to tet.
() At this point Professor Jli Jranco has referred me to DharmaLIrti's Short Trcot|sc o[ Log|c
n|th o Commcntory ly Dhormottoro, translated I, J. T. SterIatsL,. 1962. p. 18.
According to DharmaLIrti's nnderstanding of the Lnddhist position. there can Ie no
difference Ietween sentientism and Iiocentrism Iecanse life presnpposes sentience.
Strange as it ma, seem. it follows from this that trees cannot Ie said to hae life. This.
howeer. is not accepted I, all Lnddhist schools. Jetnrn to tet.
(6) p H, formnlation is a generalized ersion of the one nsed I, Williams 1998a. pp. 80. 18.
which concentrates on concern for the pain of others. Jetnrn to tet.
() p Williams 1998a. pp. 1. 111. 161 f. 1 f. Jetnrn to tet.
(8) p Williams 1998a. p. 161 f. Jn this contet. Williams eplicitl, formnlates what J call the
concept of egoism8 - giing priorit, of one's own interests Iefore those of others. As a
contraposition. he seems to impl, the concept of altrnism8 - giing priorit, to the
2
interests of others Iefore one's own. This is a qnite common concept in the literatnre. for
instance in SoIer and Wilson 1998. p. 6. Jetnrn to tet.
(9) p Williams 1998a. p. 121. Jetnrn to tet.
(10) p Williams 1998a. p. 1 f. Williams holds that a gennine altrnism reqnires recognition of
the other as a nniqne indiidnal different from oneself. This ties altrnism to indiidnalism.
J thinL. howeer. that in fact some people nse the term oltro|sm in the sense of altrnism1.
so J am willing to retain it. Jetnrn to tet.
(11) p Williams 1998a. p. 1 f. Jetnrn to tet.
(12) Williams 1998a. p. 10 f. Jetnrn to tet.
(18) Hnme 189-110. LooL 1. Part 1. Section 6: "Of Personal Jdentit,." Jetnrn to tet.
(11) p Parfit 1981. LlacLmore 1991. Jetnrn to tet.
(1) p ShoemaLer 198. Stone 1988. ampIell 1991. Strawson 1991. Jetnrn to tet.
(16) He does not. howeer. go into analogons criticisms in modern phenomenological
philosoph,. snch as for instance the contriIntion I, Cnrwitsch 1961. Jetnrn to tet.
(1) Here J follow Williams 1998a. p. 111 f and especiall, note 2. p. 28 f. Jetnrn to tet.
(18) p Williams 1998a. pp. 1. 16. Jetnrn to tet.
(19) la,ton 2001. pp. 92-91. Jetnrn to tet.
(20) la,ton 2001. p. 92: Pettit 1999. Jetnrn to tet.
(21) p Williams 1998a. pp. 80. 89. Jetnrn to tet.
(22) p Williams 1998a. pp. 1. 111. Jetnrn to tet.
(28) The notion of an awaLening mind (Iodhicitta) is eplained in LA 1:10. 1-19. 8:22-21.
1:11-12. 11-18. Jn 8:1 it is diided into (a) the mind resoled on awaLening
(lodh|ron|dh|c|tto) and (I) the mind proceeding towards awaLening (lodh|rosthno). The
latter comprises the si perfections or irtnes of a Iodhisatta: generosit, (dno). moralit,
(sIlo). forIearance (lsnt|). igonr (cIryo). meditatie aIsorption (dhyno). and wisdom
(roj). p Thrangn Jinpoche 1999. p. 1. Jetnrn to tet.
(21) p Tenzin C,atso 1999. p. 1 ff. Se also the comments on this donIle motiation in
HopLins 2000. pp. 1. 22. 80. 82. 81. 10. 82. 89. 91. 100. 10. 11. J wonld liLe to add that
there are other and more profonnd wa,s of conceiing of eqnalit, within Lnddhist
philosoph,. snch as in the TathgatagrIha tradition where all sentient Ieings are
assnmed to Ie eqnal on the Iasis of their inherent Lnddha natnre. which is interpreted in
the sense of emptiness of the shentong ariet, - emptiness of other. See. for instance.
Yin-shnn 1998. p. 818. Lnt this does not seem to Ie the line taLen I, ntidea. Jetnrn
to tet.
(2) p Williams 1998a. p. 116 ff. Jetnrn to tet.
(26) The relation Ietween acts of feeling and one's conception of oneself here seems to Ie
parallel to the relation Ietween noetic acts and a noematic s,stem in the phenomenolog,
of Jdmnnd Hnsserl. Jetnrn to tet.
(2) p Williams 1998a. p. 80. Jetnrn to tet.
(28) This corresponds to the formnla in the oldest Lnddhist tets. snch as what is traditionall,
taLen to Ie the second sermon of the Lnddha. the AnattalaLLhalasntta in Sam,ntta-
niL,a. NNJJ. 9. Jetnrn to tet.
28
(29) Jn a deontological ethics. the same point can Ie made with regard to Ieings toward whom
we hae direct moral dnties. J hae elaIorated this in m, paper Wetlesen 1999. Jetnrn to
tet.
(80) p Keown 2001. hapter : "Lnddhism and Jtilitarianism." Jetnrn to tet.
(81) p Keown 2001. hapter 8: "Lnddhism and Aristotle." Jetnrn to tet.
(82) p Olson 1998. Jetnrn to tet.
(88) p lear, 1991. Jetnrn to tet.
(81) p Hare 19a and 19I. Jetnrn to tet.
(8) p Aronsen 1980. pp. 8. 11-1. 22. Jetnrn to tet.
(86) p C,atso 1998. treats "onentional Lodhicitta" on pp. 18-16. Jetnrn to tet.
(8) p oomaraswam, 196. p. 289. who draws a parallel Ietween the Lnddhist tr|lyo :
scolhc|lo-lyo, somlhogo-lyo and n|rmn|lo-lyo on the one hand and the hristian
Trinit,: the Jather. the fignre of hrist in glor,. and the isiIle. historical )esns on the
other. See also the critical reserations in Nagao 1991. pp. 112-111. Jetnrn to tet.
(88) p C,atso 1998. treats "Jltimate Lodhicitta" on pp. 1-6. Jetnrn to tet.
(89) p Williams 1988I. especiall, his ecellent discnssion in note 1 on pp. 191-206. which is
also reprodnced in ;oornol o[ Boddh|st 1th|cs, Volnme 6. 1999. in his "Jesponse to )ohn
Pettit" who in the same olnme has a reiew of Williams 1998a. Horeoer. cp the
commentaries on chapter nine of ntidea 's tet in Khenchen Knnzang Pelden and
Hin,aL Knnzang Snam 1998. Jetnrn to tet.
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