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G.R. No. 108490 June 22, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO CANTURIA, ORLANDO DIIN, CARLOS
BARON, NORBERTO GABITO, ANTONIO SAN
JORGE, EDISON DIIN, EDISON SANCHEZ and
GLORIOSO LERIT, accused-appellants.

NARVASA, C.J.:

At just about midnight on September 10, 1985, the
spouses Romeo and Leonor Mendenes and their three
children were in deep slumber in their modest home in the
municipality of Irosin, Sorsogon. They were quite oblivious
of the fact that one of eight men, armed with bolos, had
succeeded in boring a hole through the lawanit window of
their bedroom making it possible for him to unlock the
same, and for him and his companions to make a
surreptitious entry into the house.
The first of the intruders to come into the house roused
the spouses from sleep and brandishing his weapon,
ordered the startled pair to lie face down on the floor. This
man, later identified as Carlos Baron, bound Romeo
Mendenes hand and foot. Another bolo-wielding man also
entered the house through the same window, opened the
main door, and let his companions in.
Thereupon the bandits, for that they were, ransacked the
Mendenes house and went through the family's personal
belongings. Baron remained beside Romeo whom, he
kicked whenever the latter tried to lift his head to see
what the armed trespassers were doing.
After a while, Renato Canturia, one of the robbers, moved
to the side of Mrs. Leonor Mendenes and began touching
intimate parts of the hapless woman's body. Evidently,
this disgusting activity soon led to full arousal of Canturia's
animal passion. He dragged Leonor out of the house to a
place some thirty meters away. There, by threat of his
jungle knife, two and a half (2 1/2) meters long, he forced
Leonor to take off her clothes. Ignoring her tearful pleas,
Canturia pawed her body and mashed her private parts
after which he had sexual intercourse with her, twice. All
throughout the unfortunate woman's ordeal, Canturia's
knife remained pointed at her throat. A third attempt to
rape Mrs. Mendenes was aborted when Canturia heard his
companions whistling for him. He ordered Leonor to put
her dress back on, pulled her back inside the house, and
tied her hands.
Before leaving the house, the armed men warned husband
and wife not to tell anyone what had happened lest the
worse fate of death befall them all. The Mendenes
children mercifully slept undisturbed all throughout their
parents' harrowing experience.
1

After the malefactors' departure, Leonor, whose feet had
not been fettered, went to where her husband still lay on
the floor. They struggled to free each from their bonds
and after a time were able to do so. Still filled with fear of
the robbers, they then fled with their children to the house
of Romeo's father. When daylight came, Romeo reported
the incident to the Irosin Police Station, and Leonor
underwent a physical examination in the Irosin District
Hospital. She was found positive for spermatozoa.
2

The information received from the Mendenes spouses
convinced the Irosin police officers that it was a group of
persons known as "Dose Pares" which was responsible for
the crime. In fact, they had already received reports of
several robberies allegedly perpetrated by this group in
the area. Accordingly, on September 19, 1985, police
officers proceeded to the houses of the suspects, namely:
Carlos Baron, Orlando Diin, Renato Canturia, Glorioso
Lerit, Antonio San Jorge, Norberto Gabito, Edison Diin,
and Edison Sanchez. In the course of their investigation,
they found some of the items stolen from the Mendeneses
in the house of Antonio San Jorge. The police then
brought the eight men to their headquarters. There they
were pointed to by Romeo and Leonor as the persons who
had robbed them. Leonor particularly identified Canturia
as the person who had raped her.
Following this, the eight suspects were charged with
robbery with rape under an information reading as
follows:
That on or about the 10th day of September 1985, in the
Municipality of Irosin, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with intent to gain, by using force
and intimidation, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously entered (sic) the house of Mr. and Mrs. Romeo
Mendenes by unlevering (sic) and unlocking the back of
the window and once opened went inside the house by
passing thru the window an opening not intended for
entrance or egress, and poked at the occupants with a
bolo and tied their hands and feet and on the occasion
thereof one of the conspirators Renato Canturia focibly
take (sic) Leonor (wife of Romeo Mendenes) out of their
home for almost 30 meters away and forcibly had sexual
intercourse against the will and consent of said Leonor
and at the same time the co-conspirators of Renato
Canturia ransacked the personal belongings of Mr. and
Mrs. Mendenes and take, rob, steal and carry (sic) away
the following articles, to wit:
1. Three (30) dozen of plates;
2. One (1) clock citizen;
3. One (1) necklace;
4. Three (3) fighting cocks;
5. Thirteen pieces of 25 c/coins;
6. Two (2) pants.
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7. One (1) dozen bowl;
8. One (1) dozen fork;
9. Two (20) casserols;
10. Two (2) cauldrons;
11. Two (2) wedding rings;
12. Two (2) blankets;
13. One (1) flashlight plus several underwear and T-shirts
and articles
With a total value of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
of the aforesaid amount and to the personal damage of
Leonor Mendenes.
With the aggravating circumstances of night time, superior
strength and use of deadly weapon.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 280 and,
upon the defendants' plea of not guilty, was tried in the
Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Sorsogon, Branch 55, Judge
Senecio Ortile presiding.
The evidence of the prosecution tended to prove the facts
narrated in the opening paragraphs of this opinion . As
might be expected, the People's case was anchored
mainly on the testimony of Leonor Mendenes who
unequivocally pointed to all eight accused as the persons
who had offended against her family. She described to the
Court the specific participation of each of the accused in
the crime; she pointed to Baron as the one who had
roused them from sleep and hogtied her husband, Romeo;
she identified Glorioso Lerit and Edison Diin as the look-
outs; and she related how the robbers had methodically
divested her family of its possessions. She singled out
Canturia as the person who had brutally defiled her.
Six of the accused opted to testify for the defense: Edison
Diin and his father Orlando Diin, Glorioso Lerit, Antonio
San Jorge, Renato Canturia and Edison Sanchez. All put
up the defense of alibi all claimed that at the time of the
commission of the offense, they were at places other than
the Mendeneses' house. San Jorge claimed he was in the
mountains of Tabon-Tabon stripping abaca. The other five
testified that they were either in their respective houses,
sleeping, or drinking with friends.
After giving evidence in their defense, Sanchez and Lerit
escaped from the Sorsogon Provincial Prison and have
since remained at large.
The Regional Trial Court found all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, adjudging
the proofs of the prosecution to be entitled to full credit,
and rejecting the defense of alibi set up by the accused.
In its decision dated 27 June 1991, the Trial Court
sentenced each of the defendants to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P50,000,00 as civil indemnity to Leonor
Mendenes and the amount of P10,000.00 corresponding
to the value of the stolen goods without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. It also directed that
the accused be credited with the full benefit of their
preventive imprisonment if they should agree in writing to
abide by the disciplinary rules imposed on convicted
prisoners, failing in which they would be credited only with
four fifths (4/5) of the time of their preventive
confinement.
3

An appeal was taken in behalf of all the accused to this
Court. The Court's attention was soon called, however, to
the escape of Lerit and Sanchez from the Sorsogon
Provincial Prison. For this reason the Court dismissed their
appeal in a Resolution dated November 3, 1993, pursuant
to Section 8, Rule 124 of the rules of Court.
4
The Public
Attorney's Office, counsel for the fugitives, Lerit and
Sanchez, offered no objection to the dismissal of the
latter's appeal and promptly withdrew its appearance for
them.
5
The Trial Court's judgment as regards Lerit and
Sanchez thus became final and executory.
6

Hence, it is only with the appeal of the six remaining
accused that the Court will have to deal. These six
appellants fault the Trial Court for failing to give due
weight to the defense of alibi considering the "untenable
identification by private complainant," Leonor Mendenes.
Appellants contend that Leonor could not have sufficient
time and opportunity to see and subsequently remember
the faces of the robbers. They argue that by Leonor's own
admission, the crime took place in the middle of the night,
in a room where the lone source of illumination, a 25 watt
bulb, was immediately turned off by the first robber to
enter the house; that after this bulb was thus turned off,
the only source of illumination that remained was the
flashlight held by one of the robbers. They thus conclude
that in such a dark environment, Leonor's identification of
the accused as the robbers is incredible and erroneous.
The appellants also contend that neither could Leonor
have seen the face of the person who raped her because
it was pitch black in the place where the sexual violation
took place. According to them, this erosion or degradation
of the proof of identity should have given corresponding
enhancement and acceptability to the defense of alibi.
The arguments are untenable and cannot be accepted.
There is no question but that a robbery was perpetrated
by a band against the Mendenes spouses at their home,
and that in the course thereof, Leonor Mendenes was
raped. There is no serious dispute either (no rebuttal
having been essayed) about the fact that the police team
that went to investigate the suspects in their houses,
found some of the stolen items in the house of accused
San
Jorge.
7
The explanation proffered by San Jorge for his
possession of the stolen items that they were peddled
to his wife by co-accused Orlando Diin
8
strengthens
rather than weakens the case against him and his co-
accused. When a person has in his possession part of
recently stolen property, he is presumed to be the taker of
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all, in the absence of satisfactory explanation of his
possession.
9

The matter of the accuracy of the identification by Leonor
Mendenes of the offenders is a factual issue resolved by
the Trial Court which pursuant to established doctrine,
should be given weight on appeal unless there are
convincing indications that certain facts or circumstances
of weight and significance have been overlooked which, if
considered, would alter the result of the case. The Court
discerns no such convincing indications in the case at bar
and thus perceives no reason to overturn the trial court's
conclusion of the correctness of Leonor Mendenes's
positive identification of the appellants as the persons who
had robbed her family of their hard-earned property, and
of Canturia as the person who had ravished her during the
robbery. The records reveal that Leonor Mendenes
categorically pointed to the appellants as the persons who
broke into her house and carried away her family's
belongings, mostly, kitchen utensils. There was no
hesitation, equivocation or vacillation on her part when
she identified the accused as the people responsible for
the robbery. She repeated the identification in open court,
while understandably under deep emotion, crying very
hard, attempting to control the detestation she must have
felt for those who had so grievously wronged her and her
loved ones. She detailed with clarity the specific
participation of each of the accused in the robbery. And
when she came to Canturia, and identified him before the
Court as her rapist, she broke down and sought to hit him.
10
There was, to repeat, no tinge of doubt, hesitation, or
artificiality in her testimony. She acted as naturally and
normally as might be expected from a grievously wronged
woman recounting her plight.
When asked how she came to see the faces of the
accused in the dark confines of their bedroom, Leonor
positively declared that one of the robbers held a flashlight
while light reflected on their faces. At the time the robbers
entered the room, Leonor and her husband were told to
lie down. Romeo's hands were tied and every time he
tried to glance at the robbers, he was kicked by Baron.
Leonor was not similarly restricted in her movements. She
was not tied. She was also on the floor but she was able
to lift her face. She was thus able to see and recognize
the faces of the culprits. True, after a while she was
sexually harassed by Canturia but fending off lascivious
actuations did not deter or prevent her from recognizing
the faces of the other robbers and observe how her
family's belongings were being carted away by heartless
men. There is no cause to doubt the sincerity and the
certitude of her evidence.
Quite recently, this Court ruled that the light coming from
a flashlight is sufficient illumination by which to make a
reliable identification.
11
In this case, the illumination
coming from the flashlight of one of the robbers made it
possible for Leonor to see the bandits' faces. Moreover, as
this Court has previously observed, it is a most natural
reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to
observe the appearance of their assailants and the
manner in which the crime was committed. Leonor must
also have striven to engrave the faces and physical
features of the robbers in her memory, the better to help
in later bringing them to justice. It should moreover be
recalled that Canturia was already sexually molesting her
even at the onset of the robbery. He stayed physically
close to her inside the house. And they could not have
been closer, physically, than during the rapes. The Court
is satisfied that Leonor had the opportunity to make an
accurate identification of her rapist and of his companions,
and that there was no mistake in her subsequent
identification of them.
The Court cannot, however, see its way to upholding the
conviction of all the accused for robbery with rape. Of
seeming relevance, to be sure, are two (2) familiar
principles, i.e. (a) that in a conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all a conspiracy being amply demonstrated by the
proofs among the eight (8) accused in this case and (b)
that when "more than three armed malefactors take part
in the commission of robbery, it shall be deemed to have
been committed by a band," in which case, any member
of the band "who is present at the commission of a
robbery by . . . (said) band, shall be punished as principal
of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be
shown that he attempted to prevent the same."
12
This
notwithstanding, it is the Court's view that only Canturia
should be held responsible for the crime because he alone
perpetrated the detestable crime of rape. The others could
not be held liable therefor. For while the evidence does
convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also
as convincingly suggests that the agreement was to
commit robbery only; and there is no evidence that the
other members of the band of robbers were aware of
Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so
that they could have attempted to prevent the same. In
an early case, where on the occasion of a robbery in band,
one of the members of the band caught a woman while
trying to get away, and raped her in a place away from
her house in which the robbery was being committed, this
Court declined to hold the other members of the band
responsible for the rape, in the absence of positive proof
that they "were aware of, much less . . . (abetted)" said
rape.
13
Said other members of Canturia's band may and
should be held guilty of the crime of robbery by a band
under Article 294, No. 5, in relation to Article 296, of the
Revised Penal Code.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nocturnity
shall be appreciated against the appellants. The crime was
committed in the place of abode of the victims; and the
accused used the cover of the night to facilitate the
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commission of the crime. Abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by commission in band. The robbery having
been committed by a band with the attendance of these
aggravating circumstances, there being no countervailing
mitigating circumstances, the penalty provided by law for
the offense shall be imposed in its maximum period.
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
finding accused appellant Renato Canturia guilty of the
crime of robbery with rape, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the
accessory penalties of the law, is hereby AFFIRMED,
Appellants Carlos Baron, Orlando Diin, Edison Diin,
Norberto Gabito and Antonio San Jorge are sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum for the crime of
robbery. The award of damages by the lower court is also
hereby ammend.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN,
Respondents.
*

D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution
1
dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
05-54536 and the RTC Resolution
2
dated July 11, 2005
which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and
Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.
3
Out of this union,
two female children were born, Kyra Danielle
4
and Kristen
Denise.
5
On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
6
against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan
and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4),
(h)(5), and (i)
7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
8
otherwise
known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice
9

granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,
10
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition
11
to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing
that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution
12

dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that,
being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262
under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius."
13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration
14
contending that the doctrine of
necessary implication should be applied in the broader
interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration
15
arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between
the offender and the alleged victim was an essential
condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution
16
denying
petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A.
No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to
wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO
& JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT
OF 2004".
17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be
understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and,
accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8
of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262;
that Steven and respondents had community of design
and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing
her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that
respondents should be included as indispensable or
necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not
covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
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provides that the offender should be related to the victim
only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot
be done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or
necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not
only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the
non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against
women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for
the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act,
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in
which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,
18
the Court applied suppletorily
the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the
RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the
special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,
19
the Court applied
suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided
in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was
found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,"
considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,
20
the Court applied suppletorily
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A.
No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were
not defined therein, although the special law referred to
the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the
crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,
21
the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of
the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence
of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said
special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,
22
the Court applied
suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section
47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus,
general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A.
No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
x x x
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public
or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
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(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for
the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against
the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another,
any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
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(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal
construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law
24

and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In
the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction
as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women
and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim
"expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application
here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
"ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.
25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at
great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
on the merits and cannot be determined in the present
petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.
26
It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters
since this controversy is centered only on the
determination of whether respondents may be included in
a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence
of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the
merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of
conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To
do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of
the petition against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA
NIERRA, FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and
VICENTE ROJAS, accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA,
accused whose death sentence is under automatic
review.
Jose W. Diokno for appellant Nierra.
Sedfrey A. Ordoez for accused Misa.
Alberto Cacnio for appellants Doblen and Rojas.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
Octavio R Ramirez and Trial Attorney Lolita C. Dumlao for
appellee.

PER CURIAM:
Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano
Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision
dated March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas of
the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General
Santos City Branch II, convicting them of murder,
sentencing each of them to death and ordering them to
pay solidarity an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to
the heirs of the victim Juliana Nierra (Criminal Case No.
2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge,
was also sentenced to death and ordered to pay a similar
indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969, pp. 36-8,
Record). His death sentence is under automatic review.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana
Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Pagano Nierra, 39, her brother-
inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of launch
transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago,
General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano
sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor
launches, Elsa I and II, while Paciano was the owner of
two launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of
Aniceto Nierra, Paciano's elder brother. To mollify Pagano,
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by diminishing the competition between their launches,
Aniceto sold Elsa II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano
were not on speaking terms.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality,
Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of liquidating his
competitor, Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a
cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house
in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a
convicted murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the
Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder
of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in June, 1969. He
resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja vs.
Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the
presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano,
agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand
pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the
killing he would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the
municipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty
kilometers away from General Santos City. The balance
would be paid in the same place on August 12, 1969.
That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When
Misa scheduled the assassination on July 8, 1969, Pagano
said that it was up to Misa since he was the one who
would kill Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of
Pagano Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a package
containing a caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa
contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that
he (Misa) had been hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas
to act as lookout on the night of July 8, 1969 when the
killing would be perpetrated.
On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette
store near the creek or canal about twenty-seven steps
from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed
near the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps
from the scene of the crime. Pagano was near the house
of Juanito Desinorio about twenty-seven steps from the
scene of the crime. The houses of the two Desinorios were
separated from the house of Juliana Nierra by an alley.
Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps
from the scene of the crime in close proximity to the back
of Juliana's house where. as he had previously observed
some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature.
The house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near
the beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General
Santos City.
Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary
Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to
void and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared
behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while
in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of
the pistol and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were
near the beach, witnessed the actual killing.
The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana
sustained a gunshot wound in the tongue. The bullet
passed through the buccal cavity down to the spinal
column where the slug was extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing
commotion, went down from the house and saw his
prostrate wife with blood oozing from her mouth and
nose. Her panty was pulled down, her dress was raised up
to her waist, and her genital organ was exposed. At the
hospital, the doctor pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in
front of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley
between the houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco
Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso Gas Station
crossed the creek or canal on the west, reached the Lagao
road, threw the gun into the dense talahib grass and rode
on a bus. He proceeded to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital.
Then, he changed his mind and returned to the beach
near the victim's house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing
through the alley between the house of the victim and the
Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of
the Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso
Gas Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which
intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia
resided. Their residence was about two hundred meters
away from the scene of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened
to be at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the
evening of July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated,
testified that she saw Pagano Nierra wearing an
underwear and striped T-short running from Saguing
Street to Barrio Tinago. About five minutes later, she saw
Pagano the boulevard and running towards Saguing
Street. He was wearing long pants. The witness made a
statement to the police about what she had seen.
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus
bound for Tupi and alighted near the municipal building.
Paciano Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four
hundred pesos. Misa returned to General Santos City,
gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and proceeded to the victim's
house where he mingled with the persons playing cards
and domino. He kept vigil there, staying there for four
nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the ,
buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a
commission of one peso per passenger. Policemen
arrested him and Rojas as for questioning but they were
later released. He left the city and brought his family to
Barrio Luan, Maitum South Cotabato. There, he was
arrested again, this time by Constabulary soldiers.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman
A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police department. He signed a
confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and
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implicating the other accused therein. The statement was
sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted
the killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A
sketch of the scene of the crime was prepared.
On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-
vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing
and confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra,
his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed
another confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn
to before the city judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969,
Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as co-
conspirators, were charged with murder aggravated by
reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity,
ignominy and abuse of superiority and, as to Misa,
recidivism, since he had been sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis in Cebu
City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co
accused, his confessions and testimony were offered by
the prosecution and were the main bases of the judgment
of conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.
As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their
individual cases will be separately reviewed.
Misa's case. His counsel de oficio contends that Misa
made an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly
failed to explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the
offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.
That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped
prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal
procedure. Not only that. He executed two extrajudicial
confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman He
testified at the preliminary investigation, and, after he was
sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star witness
during the trial of his co-accused. His testimony against
his co-accused, delineating their roles in the commission
of the killing, which he had perpetrated, fortified his plea
of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his
culpability and as to his understanding of the
consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs. Duaban,
L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de
oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside
and that the case be remanded to the lower court for new
trial To hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would again
be the star prosecution witness, would be a repetitious
and preposterous ceremony.
The case of the Nierra spouses. They denied any
complicity in the killing of Juliana Nierra. Their version is
that in the evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight o'clock
in the evening, Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his
house. Gaudencia Nierras was in her room, writing
something. Eduardo Nierra, the couple's son, was alone in
the sala while Encarnacion Sabihon a housemaid, was
somewhere in the house premises.
Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he
came out of the room, he met Nolasco Docallos who said
that Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra asked who
shot her. Docallos answered that he did not know.
Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's
motorcycle in going to the hospital. Paciano instructed his
son Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano could not go
out because two years before he had undergone a surgical
operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the
children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the
funeral parlor that Juliana was already dead.
At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day,
Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She talked with
Rodelio, the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her brother-in-
law and husband of the victim, did not answer when she
tried to talk with him.
Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his
wife and their Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and
Fernando Erro, the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus and
went to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger
of a vinta, a trip which the Nierra spouses had previously
agreed upon with Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten
o'clock. They were not able to buy bamboos. They ate
lunch at the Fernandez Restaurant.
The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there
at two o'clock in the afternoon. They went to the funeral
parlor. They were not able to talk with Aniceto Nierra. In
the evening of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the
repose of the soul of Juliana and she performed that task
on the second, third and fourth nights. She did not lead
the prayers on the succeeding nights because she was
advised that it was bad for her to do so. Their child
attended the novena Paciano could not attend the novena
because he had kidney trouble. They gave one hundred
pesos to Juliana's family as contribution to the funeral
expenses.
The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the
burial, Aniceto lost consciousness and collapsed Paciano
revived him by pressing his abdomen. After the coffin was
placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra
spouses gave to Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos
(Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible
witness because he was a recidivist and his testimony is
riddled with inconsistencies. That contention is devoid of
merit.
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic
point in his confessions and testimony was that he was
hired by the Nierra spouses, through Doblen to kill Juliana
for the price of three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for
the conviction of the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the
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assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his
testimony refer to minor details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with
their contractual commitment to pay Misa the balance of
two thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him
to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a
revelation speeled his own destruction.
The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy
among the accused is belied by the facts shown in the
record. Misa had no personal motive for killing Juliana
Nierra. He was induced to do so because of the monetary
consideration promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen
(Simoy), married to Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to
the Nierra spouses. Before Juliana's assassination,
Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill Nene Amador, her
former housemaid, who was allegedly Paciano's mistress.
That projected killing did not materialize.
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the
alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view of the rule that
"the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration"
(Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be
admitted as evidence against appellants Nierra, the
alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other
than such testimony and that there is no such
independent evidence. This argument is wrong. It is not
supported by action 27 of Rule 130
Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or
declarations but not to testimony given on the stand at
the trial where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant" (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531,
541).
Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in
finding that the motive for the killing was to stifle business
competition. This argument is refuted by the testimonies
of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that
Paciano Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law,
Juliana, the manager or "brains" of Aniceto's
transportation and coca-cola distribution businesses.
In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch,
Elsa II, while it was under construction. Aniceto had to sell
that launch because of Paciano's threat that somebody
would be hurt if its operation was continued. Pagano told
Rodelio that the latter's mother, Juliana, who was
pockmarked was bad and dominated her husband Aniceto.
On two occasions, Paciano even challenged his brother to
a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court
convicted them on the basis of the hearsay testimonies of
Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya. This argument is
misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored
principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the
tool used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's
death. Misa's evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.
The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved
that Misa, Rojas and Doblen were implicated in the killing
of Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of Sanchez, linking
Misa to the killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in
the solution of the case. After the connection of Misa with
the crime was established, the police arrested him and
obtained his confessions which implicated appellants
Nierra as the investigators.
The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that
the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the affidavit
of appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was obtained
through an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not
clear as to that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement
was taken on August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified
at the pre investigation. The record of his testimony
before the fiscal was signed by him. He was assisted by
counsel at that pre investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No
promise of immunity was shown to have been made by
the fiscal to Rojas.
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and
is cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial
and decisive evidence consists of Misa's testimony and
confessions.
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui
acted acted the preliminary investigation as counsel of
appellant Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the
offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he
acted as counsel de oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He
also appeared for Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as
having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as
already noted, were convicted on the basis of Misa's
confessions and testimony. The appellants have not
successfully overthrown or rebutted Misa's evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool
of Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a
friend on Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no
hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the
shooting, Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra did not go
to the funeral parlor to view the remains of Juliana.
After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder,
there was a confrontation between the said spouses and
Aniceto Nierra in the house of their brother, Alonso, in the
presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The following
dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:
Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of
your wife?
Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to
you that you were standing by the post and Paciano
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(Gaudencia) was also standing in a another post when he
(Misa) killed my wife. From now on I have no brother by
the name of Pacing.
Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.
Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when
they were confined in the city jail (translation):
My companion Pacing (Paciano):
I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will
do my best that you will be free. Before the trial of (in)
court, I would like that you give me the sum of P600 even
if you give the cash advance of P 500 before Sunday. OK
and you give the same thru the hole.
Your companion,
(Sgd.) Gaspar Misa
Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately.
(Exit 1)
The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were
co- conspirators. The Nierras were co-principals by
inducement. By acting as lookouts during the perpetration
of the killing, they became co-principals by cooperation as
well.
Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. Doblen's alibi was that on
the night of the killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan,
South Cotabato. He returned to General Santos City at ten
o'clock in the morning of the following day. He denied that
he accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on
July 4, 1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package
containing the murder weapon.
Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in
his pumpboat at Lion's Beach, General Santos City.
However, that could not have precluded him from having
acted as lookout on that same beach.
These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that
Misa's confessions and testimony have no probative value
because there was no other evidence proving the alleged
conspiracy. As already stated, that rule does not apply to
testimony given on the witness stand where the
defendants have the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant (People vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).
It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator
because he was not present when Misa and the Nierra
spouses discussed the liquidation of Juliana Nierra and
that when Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he
(Doblen) did not know that it contained the murder
weapon. As to Rojas, it is contended that he was not
present at the said conference between Misa and the
Nierra spouses.
These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of
Doblen and Rojas indubitably show that they had
community of design with the Nierra spouses and Misa in
the assassination of Juliana Nierra.
Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends
that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas
(Exh. J) because it was obtained under an alleged promise
of immunity.
It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain
anything connecting him to the murder. In that affidavit,
he denied that he had any participation in the commission
of the crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the
admission in evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice
him at all.
The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as
murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by
premeditation and price or reward. As to the Nierras,
relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.
Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority.
The manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added
shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused
by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs.
Abaigar 2 Phil. 417).
In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance
offset his plea of guilty. That did not preclude the
imposition of the death penalty upon him.
Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death
penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in accordance-
with law. However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the
death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be
commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the
Nierra spouses and delivering the murder weapon to Misa.
He was not present at the scene of the crime. On the
other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty
pesos for his work.
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen
and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they
should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly
speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished
as co-principals. However, since their participation was not
absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the
murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder
form of liability may be applied to them (People vs.
Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases).
In some exceptional situations, having community of
design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor
from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively
speaking, of a minor character (See People vs. Ubia, 97
Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs.
Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed
with respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.
(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is
communited to reclusion perpetua. The civil liability
imposed upon her by the trial court is affirmed.
(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are
convicted as accomplices. They are each sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor
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medium as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and to pay solidarily with
the principals an indemnity of six thousand pesos (as their
quota) to the heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each
subsidiarily liable to the extent of six thousand pesos for
the principals' civil liability. Costs against the accused.

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO
PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA
were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case
No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as
follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the
Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping and assisting one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior
strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured
gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani
Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of
said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the
defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the
crime was deliberately augmented by causing another
wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a
decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of
murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and
Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated
mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced
to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the
law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted
from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed
the present appeal and assigned the following errors
committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE
STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A
COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME
EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO
THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION
WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY
THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the
accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands
for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the
evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in
the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different
kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo
Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic
book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy.
As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they
started making fun of him. They made the deceased
dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased,
the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from
under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its
contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not
to do so while the latter was already in the process of
pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with
water the burning body of the deceased. Some people
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around also poured sand on the burning body and others
wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police
officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the
Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident.
Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the
dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed
to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for
treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought
Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the
Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer
Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion
and the two accused, after which Gabion was released.
The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds
relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of
the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the
incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements
to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his
statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on
the deceased believing that the contents thereof was
water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on
fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in
his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda
but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of
note is the fact that both statements did not impute any
participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of
the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants
repudiated their written statements alleging that they
were extracted by force. They claimed that the police
maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime.
They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame
on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the
accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the
decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not
utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the
decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that
"even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which
remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving
and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p.
247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution
suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the
incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were
other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was
presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case.
They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these
persons raises the presumption that their testimonies
would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who
witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there
appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written
statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico
Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the
deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to
by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution
witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their
testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-
presentation does not give rise to the presumption that
evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs.
Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<re||an1w> Besides, the matter
as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to
decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the
eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter
requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the
prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability
but also because his testimony that he was reading a
comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human
behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother
of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the
truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased
likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that
she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case
was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that
Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other
accused Samson testified that they had no previous
misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no
reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to
the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the
deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible,
the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-
examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline
on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics;
and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire
that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct
examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination
that you were reading comics when you saw Pugay
poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by
Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while
you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw
what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with
gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with
Pugay, is that correct?
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A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was
trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you
had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told
him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know
from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass,
do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will
pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour
gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his
ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then
later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay
tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know
he was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent
him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I
thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a
stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the
time you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely
pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline
he was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the
body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question,
Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped
reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of
the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of
gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it
was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the
gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion
warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw
Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that
there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose
and intention between the two accused-appellants
immediately before the commission of the crime. There
was no animosity between the deceased and the accused
Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the
incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused
Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the
deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of
Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against the deceased is individual and not collective, and
each of them is liable only for the act committed by him
(U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog,
et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal
responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can
from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it
before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased,
this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The
stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have
escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly,
he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from any act that
may be committed by his companions who at the time
were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs.
Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as
follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such
results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one
would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those
of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is
an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect
to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief
contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper
considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire
knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is
characterized by treachery as the victim was left
completely helpless to defend and protect himself against
such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the
accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased
before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their
fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the
culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew
very well that the liquid poured on the body of the
deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he
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would not have committed the act of setting the latter on
fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it
call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he
merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His
act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would
cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on
his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If
his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place
in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor.
Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record
establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused
Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence
of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The
eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and
Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased
burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<re||an1w>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer
is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for
P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his
hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for
death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the
aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages
and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the
court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the
modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.