1

MEANING IN LIFE: THEORY AND RESEARCH

1
The issue of lifes meaning has become prominent in modern times mainly
as a result of the rise of existentialist thinking and the fall of traditional religion.
In fact, writings on the meaninglessness of existence prior to the nineteenth cen -
tury are rare (locker, 1!"#$. Throughout human history the world was under -
stood to possess meaning and now, suddenly, the world has been depri%ed of its
intrinsic purposefulness and meaning. &or the first time it was declared that'(...
all existing things are born for no reason, continue through weakness and die by
accident... It is meaningless that we are born) it is meaningless that we die(
(*artre, 1!+,$. -xistentialists ha%e long argued that meaning and meaningless -
ness are basic components of the human condition that powerfully influence hu -
man thought, emotion and action. They ha%e emphasised that the problem of
meaning is an urgent .uestion in human existence. This is especially true since the
answers of traditional religion regarding the purpose and meaning of life ha%e
been less con%incing.
It seems that nowadays the .uestion of lifes meaning poses a threat to many
persons. /eople ha%e been found more willing to discuss intimate sexual matters
than issues of lifes meaning (&reedman, 1!"0$. 1er%ous laughter or satirising
(as the 2onty /ython group so excellently did in the mo%ie The Meaning of Life$
seem the only safe responses to these issues (aumeister, 1!!1$. 3orkaholism
is perhaps the most culturally accepted way for many people to escape from
emptiness and boredom. That is, until free time (4*unday neurosis$ confronts
1 /arts of this chapter appear in' 5ebats, 5.6., The measurement of personal meaning in' /.T.
3ong and /.*. &ry (-ds.$, Hand book of Perona! Meaning: Theor"# Reear$h and
A%%!i$a&ion' (submitted for publication$
7
Cha%&er (
them painfully with the fact that there is nothing they really )an& to do (8alom,
1!09$.
ecause of its centrality in human existence, the sub:ect of meaning has
played a role in many scientific disciplines e.g., philosophy, linguistics,
semiotics. ;ather than exhausti%ely co%er the extensi%e literature in these %ari -
ous domains, the present chapter pro%ides an o%er%iew of the leading theoretical
and empirical perspecti%es of this sub:ect from within clinical psychology. To
understand the general context of the present research it should be understood
that the meaning issue has generally been addressed at two le%els' <5oes life
ser%e any purpose=>) and, <3hat is the significance of my life=> The first .ues -
tion refers to the broad, philosophical sub:ect of the meaning of life, whereas the
second is about the worth of ones personal existence or meaning in life. *ince
the present research on the psychometric, clinical and phenomenological as -
pects of meaning is explicitly concerned with the latter issue, the phrase 4mean -
ing in life is consistently used throughout this text.
Theore&i$a! %er%e$&i*e on +eaning in !ife in $!ini$a! %"$ho!og"
Traditionally, the concept of meaning in life has not occupied a central po -
sition in mainstream psychology. ?s holds true for many constructs in the ex -
istential-humanistic tradition, e.g., <authenticity> and <self-actualisation>, the
meaning in life concept has long been considered too %ague and boundless for
the purposes of theoretical and empirical psychology. @onse.uently, only a few
theorists ha%e addressed the issue of the clinical and phenomenological aspects
of meaning in life. ?mong the limited number of theories which ha%e addressed
the issue of lifes meaning those of Aictor &rankl (1!,,) 1!"+$, ?braham 2as -
low (1!+0) 1!"1$, and Ir%in 8alom (1!09$ ha%e been most influential in clinical
psychology. ?s each of these was considered as a guiding theoretical framework
for the present research, these three approaches will be briefly summarised.
,i$&or Frank!- &heor". &rankl (1!,,) 1!"+$ has concei%ed of meaning in
life as a %ro$e of di$o*er" within a world that is intrinsically meaningful. Bis
theory postulates the following' meanings are not in%ented and can only be
found o.&ide &he %eron. The search for a personal idiosyncratic meaning is
a
primary human moti%e. &ulfilment of meaning always implies decision-making
and this is not understood to result in homeostasis, unlike need satisfaction.
2eaning can be attained through creati%e, experiential and attitudinal %alues.
@reati%e %alues inspire indi%iduals to produce, create and achie%e, usually
#
Meaning in !ife: Theor" and reear$h
through some form of work. -xperiential %alues include positi%e human expe -
riences such as lo%e and the appreciation of beauty. ?ttitudinal %alues bring per -
sons to choose their stance toward una%oidable negati%e conditions such as fac -
ing in:ustice with dignity.
?ccording to &rankl, meanings are not arbitrary human creations, but pos -
sess an ob:ecti%e reality of their own. There is only one meaning to each situ -
ation and this is its &r.e meaning. Indi%iduals are guided by their conscience to
intuiti%ely find this true meaning. ?lthough circumstances exert a powerful in -
fluence on the making and fulfilling of meaning, these are largely dependent on
persons attitude toward their circumstances. &rankls theory postulates that if
indi%iduals do not pursue meaning they may experience an existential %acuum
or meaninglessness. Cnder prolonged conditions this experience of meaning -
lessness can lead to a <noDgenic neurosis>, a condition typified by boredom and
apathy. En the contrary, when meaning is pursued indi%iduals experience self-
transcendence and profit from its concomitant sense of life satisfaction and ful -
filment.
Abraha+ Ma!o)- &heor"' 2aslow (1!+0) 1!"1$ in contrast to &rankl,
has thought of meaning as an intrinsic emergent %ro%er&" )i&hin &he %eron.
Bis
theory is composed of the following notions' Cntil the lower needs are satisfied,
%alues and meaning in life ha%e little impact on human moti%ation. Bowe%er,
when the lower needs are satisfied, %alues become moti%ational forces in indi -
%iduals dedicating themsel%es to some mission or cause. 2eaning in life is a
<meta-moti%e>, <a growth need> or <meta-need> that operates according to
different rules than a <deficit-need>. 2eta-moti%es re.uire fulfilment for
healthy functioning and produce illness when unfulfilled. Bowe%er, meta-needs
are different from deficit needs in se%eral ways. 2eta-needs do not refer to in -
ternal deficit because tensions they create are often pleasurable. In fact, the
gratification of meta-needs adds to their moti%ational power, their satisfaction
creates growth rather than merely a%erting illness. 2eta-needs can not be fully
satisfied. @orrespondingly, the total fulfilment of ones meaning or purpose in
life is not possible because meaning in life is found in ideals such as non-%io -
lence or beauty which cannot be perfected. Indi%iduals are free to choose mean -
ings, but they will be healthier if they choose meanings that help them to fulfil
their inner nature. The healthiest outcome occurs if chosen acti%ities match the
intrinsic %alues as closely as possible.
Thus, 2aslows theory holds that without the fulfilment of %alues, indi -
%iduals in higher stages, become ill'( The state of being without a system of %al -
,
Cha%&er (
ues is psychopathogenic, we are learning. The human being needs a framework
of %alues, a philosophy of life, a religion or religion surrogate to li%e by and un -
derstand by, in about the same sense that he needs sunlight, calcium or lo%e(
(1!+0, p.F9+$.
Ir*in Ya!o+- Theor"' 8alom (1!09$ has addressed the phenomenon of
meaning in life from an existentialistic stance. Bis approach starts with the basic
existential conflict that flows from the indi%iduals confrontation with four cen -
tral gi%ens of existence or ultimate concerns, i.e. death, freedom, isolation and
meaninglessness. /sychopathology is concei%ed as the result of defensi%e and
ineffecti%e modes of dealing with these ultimate concerns. En the other hand
meaning in life is considered an indi%iduals $rea&i*e re%one &o the worlds ab
-
solute +eaning!ene. Bumans essentially choose and create their own cir
-
cumstances. 2eaning does not exist outside of indi%iduals, who fully create it
of their own. There is not an ultimate design of, or purpose to the uni%erse. @on -
se.uently, personal meaning is needed to sur%i%e in a meaningless uni%erse.
2eaning can be achie%ed through %arious ways e.g., altruism, dedication to a
cause, creati%ity, or hedonism. Bowe%er, since most indi%iduals are aware of the
self-created nature of their personal meanings, a second action is re.uired, $o+/
+i&+en&.
Indi%iduals need to commit themsel%es wholeheartedly to their chosen
meanings and purposes if they wish to a%oid the anxiety of nihilism. ?nxiety of
meaninglessness is often enlarged by an awareness of the ine%itability of death.
If all is lost with death, then what meaning can life ha%e at all= ? sense of mean -
ingfulness of life is regarded essential to mental health' <The human being
seems to re.uire meaning. To li%e without meaning, goals, %alues or ideals
seems to pro%oke considerable distress. In se%ere form it may lead to the deci -
sion to end ones life... 3e apparently need absolutes, firm ideals to which we
can aspire and guidelines by which to steer our li%es((8alom 1!09, p.#FF$.
Thus, 8aloms theory postulates that attributing meaning and purpose to
external e%ents pro%ides a considerable amount of security and stability to hu -
man life. En the other hand, reaching the conclusion that the world does no&
possess meaning can be %ery disappointing and may result in an o%erwhelming sense
of responsibility and despair.
E*a!.a&ion' &rom the abo%e summaries it can be gathered that the three
leading theorists concur that meaning in life is a clinically rele%ant construct
which has both negati%e and positi%e mental health aspects. &rankl, 2aslow and
8alom ha%e all acknowledged that where an existential %acuum exists psycho -
+
Meaning in !ife: Theor" and reear$h
pathological symptoms of all kinds, e.g., alcoholism, depression, hyperinfla -
tion of sex, darede%ilry, rush in to fill it. Their conceptions of meaninglessness
also essentially correspond with 2addis (1!+"$ description of it as a state of
per%asi%e nihilism and %egetati%eness. 2addi has typified meaninglessness by
the following phenomena' En a $ogni&i*e le%el by a chronic inability to belie%e
in the usefulness or the %alue of any of lifes endea%ours, on an a0e$&i*e le%el
by a per%asi%e blandness and boredom, with episodic depressions, and on a be/
ha*io.ra! le%el by a lack of selecti%ity of actions, if acti%ity exists at all.
5espite their agreement on the clinical aspects of the meaning in life con -
cept the abo%e theorists ha%e offered discrepant construct definitions and theo -
retical differences. 3hile &rankl postulates the intrinsic meaningfulness of life
and describes meaning as a process of disco%ery, and 2aslow pro%ides a de%el -
opmental perspecti%e on meaning in life in which the process of self-actualisa -
tion and the creation of meanings are central, 8alom starts with the assumption
of the absolute meaninglessness of existence and emphasises commitment to
self-chosen %alues as the only way out of nihilism and despair. &rom these dif -
ferences it can be gathered that a persons attempts to achie%e a sense of mean -
ing in life hedonisticly would be disregarded in a &ranklian logotherapeutic ap -
proach gi%en that, for &rankl, only self-transcendent %alues are belie%ed to lead
to fulfilment in life. En the other hand, religious clients who belie%e in a per -
sonal, protecti%e God would ha%e a difficult time with a 8alom-like existential
therapist who holds that the belief in an ultimate rescuer is one of the basic de -
fences against facing lifes meaninglessness which has to be outgrown. 2as -
lows theory has also been criticised by &rankl (1!++$ because of the rigidity of
his designed %alues hierarchy. ased on his own experiences as a concentration
camp prisoner, &rankl has repeatedly stated that in contrast to animals humans
are .uite capable of %oluntarily surpassing the satisfaction of lower needs and
of transcending directly to the fulfilment of higher %alues, for instance out of
concern for their lo%ed ones. En the other hand, 2aslow (1!++$ has criticised
&rankls contention that self-transcendence is positi%e for anyone at any time.
2aslow has pointed out the 4danger of premature self-transcendence, as this
may lead to the failure to fulfil deficit-needs at the proper time, which may e%en -
tually hamper psychological growth.
? second theoretical discrepancy relates to the $rea&ed *er.
di$o*ered
nature of meaning in life. The postulated human faculty to freely create or in -
%ent personal meanings, which is a central component of existentialistic and hu -
manistic theories, has been discussed by se%eral theorists (e.g., aird, 1!0,$.
"
Cha%&er (
The de%elopment of meaning in life has been paralleled with language ac.uisi -
tion (;edekopp, 1!!9$. ?ccording to this argument language is socially ac -
.uired and each child who ac.uires linguistic abilities is di$o*ering the forms
and processes of his or her linguistic community. The child directs his or her ef -
forts toward disco%ering socially accepted language symbols and their referents
rather than creating personal symbols. &rom a de%elopmental perspecti%e on
meaning in life it can be similarly argued that meaning in life does not de%elop
in a %acuum, but that, like language, it originates from the interplay of social in -
teractions. locker (1!"#$ has con%incingly argued that in the early stages of
human de%elopment meaning should be understood as a feature of the world,
rather than a personal creation. In his %iew the first portion of life is spent di/
$o*ering meaning, in all its forms, rather than consciously $rea&ing
meaning.
?dolescents become capable of .uestioning for the first time the ade.uacy of so -
cietal meanings which they ha%e absorbed in their personal li%es. -motional or
intellectual crises in middle and late adult life may precipitate the indi%iduals
need to break free of these culturally ac.uired meaning systems and may initiate
in them the search for and creation of more idiosyncratic and personal meanings
from within (e.g., 6auber, 1!!9) Bedlund, 1!0"$. This notion suggests that
&rankls and 2aslows conceptions of meaning in life which stress other-di -
rected, altruistic and self-transcendent %alues might better describe the de%el -
opment of meaning in middle and late adulthood, when lower needs ha%e been
fulfilled, than the earlier de%elopmental stages.
&rom the abo%e e%aluations it was concluded that the present research
would show more consistent results if it were to focus on the clinical and phe -
nomenological aspects of meaning in life in sub:ects belonging to one de*e!o%/
+en&a! !ife %hae, i.e. either young, middle or late adults. It was also acknow -
ledged that each of the three leading theories on meaning in life has its own
specific merit from both a theoretical and a clinical point of %iew, gi%en that
each presents a rele%ant and uni.ue aspect of this complex, multi-dimensional
phenomenon. Bowe%er, no reasonable decision could be made in fa%our of any
of these theories as a framework for the present research, because no in%estiga -
tions ha%e been conducted which establish the superiority of one of these theo -
ries. Therefore, it was concluded that a more sophisticated scientific framework
was needed to further the empirical in%estigation of the meaning in life con -
struct.
Ef the few remaining theoretical approaches to meaning in life which ha%e
not been discussed abo%e, the theoretical outlines of attista and ?lmond (1!"7$
0
Meaning in !ife: Theor" and reear$h
on meaning in life were considered most appropriate for the current research
context.
1a&&i&a and A!+ond- &heor"' attista and ?lmond (1!"7$
concluded
from a study of the existing theories on meaning in life that despite their pro -
found differences regarding the nature of meaning they essentially concur on
some important issues. Taking a meta-perspecti%e toward the %arious theories
on meaning in life attista and ?lmond disco%ered that there are four basic un -
derlying conceptions about meaning in life which are common to each theoreti -
cal approach. These can be described as follows' 3hen indi%iduals state that
their li%es are meaningful this implies that (a$ they are positi%ely $o++i&&ed to
some concept of the meaning of life) (b$ they ha%e a fra+e)ork or ha%e deri%ed
a set of life goals, purpose in life or life %iew from these) (c$ they see themsel%es
as ha%ing f.!2!!ed or as being in the process of fulfilling their framework or life
goals) (d$ they experience this fulfilment as a feeling of igni2$an$e.
attista and ?lmonds approach in%ol%es a re!a&i*i&i$ %er%e$&i*e
on
meaning in life. It holds that there is no <true> or <ultimate> meaning in life
which is identical for e%eryone and acknowledges that di%ergent ways of reach -
ing a sense of meaningfulness coexist. In contrast to other theories, this theo -
retical perspecti%e emphasises the critical role of indi%iduals %ro$e of be!ie*/
ing rather than the $on&en& of their beliefs. 5espite the fact that this approach had
recei%ed no subse.uent theoretical elaboration or empirical %alidation it was
adopted as the theoretical framework for the present research because of its ap -
pealing intellectual soundness. The following three reasons were conclusi%e' 1$
3hereas more philosophically oriented models ha%e postulated that
meaning in life de%elops on!" from the commitment to and fulfilment of
the in&rini$ meaning of life, i.e. God (religious models$, being (existential
models$, or +an (humanistic models$, the present relati%istic model states
that commitment to an" system of beliefs can ser%e as a life-framework
for the de%elopment of meaning in life.
F$ This approach a%oids abstract philosophical discussion o%er which system
of belief is 4superior or 4ultimately better and encourages the scientific
study of the %arious clinical and phenomenological aspects of meaning in
life.
7$ This scientific stance promotes tolerance toward the wide %ariety of belief
systems from which indi%iduals ha%e deri%ed a deep sense of meaning in
life. It acknowledges that there are many, di%ergent (e.g., theistic, atheistic,
!
Cha%&er (
humanistic$ ways of deri%ing meaning in life which do not appear to be
reducible to one ultimate, 4true or fundamental meaning system.
Reear$h on Meaning in Life
It seems that during the second half of this century the issue of meaning in
life has gradually become unfashionable in philosophy. In contrast, this sub:ect
has been embraced more recently by se%eral social sciences as a serious sub:ect
for scientific in%estigation. Ene ma:or reason for this late admission of the
meaning in life issue to empirical in.uiry may be that meaning is, in fact, of an
ontologically different order than the obser%able data of regular empirical sci -
ence. It has been correctly noted that meaning is in the realm of <ideas> and not
in the realm of <things> or in the empirical world, if <empirical> means capable
of detection by the fi%e human senses or their extensions (3ilber, 1!07$.
&rom this epistemological notion one might conclude that meaning cannot
be known empirically. Bowe%er, while we acknowledge that meaning may ne%er
be fully grasped by nor reduced to the realm of the empirical, it is our opinion
that the empirical study of the meaning in life construct should be welcomed as
an important and inno%ati%e scientific contribution. It was reasoned that people
%ery much act and decide on the basis of %alues and meanings and that these de -
cisions and actions produce %ery real and empirically obser%able conse.uences
which merit scientific in%estigation.
Ear!" Reear$h. ? ma:or impetus to the empirical study of meaning in life
in clinical psychology has been the de%elopment of the /urpose in 6ife Test, see
below (/I6) @rumbaugh, 1!+0) @rumbaugh H 2aholick, 1!+#$. @rumbaugh
and 2aholick designed the /I6 from &rankls theoretical approach called !o/
go&hera%", i.e., the healing of patients through acti%ating their !ogo, their ca-
pacity for finding meaning in life. /ractically all earlier studies ha%e employed
the /I6 because this scale has long been the <only game in town> (8alom,
1!09$. -.uating 4meaning and 4purpose the /I6 assesses the degree to which
an indi%idual experiences a sense of meaning or purpose in life. The /I6 has
been used in many unpublished /h.5. dissertations and has been employed to
assess the effects of purpose in life in a %ariety of problem areas. *tudies ha%e
assessed significant relationships between /I6 scores and social attitudes (/er -
son H *heffield, 1!",$, %alues (@randall H ;asmussen, 1!",$, drug in%ol%e -
ment (/adelford, 1!"#) and depression (@rumbaugh, 1!+0$. Bowe%er, %alida -
tional studies ha%e shown that /I6 scores relate only moderately with
19
Meaning in !ife: Theor" and reear$h
therapists ratings of life purpose in patients (rI .70$ and with ministers ratings of
parishioners (rI .#"$ (raun H 5olmino, 1!"0$.
E%erall, patient populations were consistently found to ha%e a lower /I6
score than nonpatients' e.g., drugs addicts were found to ha%e particularly low
/I6 scores (/adelford, 1!"#$. /atients hospitalised for chronic alcoholism and
psychotic disorders were also found to ha%e lower /I6 scores than ha%e neurotic
outpatients (@rumbaugh, 1!+0$. ?lcoholics were reported as ha%ing particu -
larly low /I6 scores (@rumbaugh, 1!"1$. ? study of outpatients in a ritish
clinic demonstrated that the more highly neurotic and socially intro%erted pa -
tients had lower /I6 scores (*heffield H /earson, 1!"#$. &urthermore, the /I6
was found to not correlate highly with other personality scales, except for the
5epression scale of the 22/I (@rumbaugh, 1!+0$. ?lthough these early in%es -
tigations ha%e definitely contributed to the increasing interest of social scientists
in studying the meaning in life concept, results based on the /I6 must be inter -
preted with some care, gi%en that its %alidity properties ha%e been .uestioned
(see below$.
Re$en& Reear$h. Interestingly, the number of social scientists who ha%e
come to include in their research a measure for meaning in life or a related con -
struct is currently increasing. The inclusion of a measure for meaning in life
also results from the opinion of research sub:ects who, upon in%itation to com -
ment on the research assessments (concept mapping$, criticised the lack of a
measure for meaning in life (%an 1ieuwenhuiJen, *chene, oe%ink H 3olf,
1!!,$.
E%er the last two decades the construct of meaning in life has also recei%ed
attention from scientists of different disciplines in this country. These scientists
ha%e more descripti%ely than empirically in%estigated the significance of the
phenomenon of meaning in life in %arious contexts, e.g., psychogerontology
(e.g., 1ies, 2unnichs, *te%ens H uyssen, 1!07) 5ittmann-Kohli, 1!!#$, psy -
chotherapy (5ebats, 1!!9$, religion (%an der 6ans, 1!!9$, person-centred the -
ory (%an Kalmthout, 1!!#$, and %aluation theory (Bermans, 1!00$.
a' Sene of Coheren$e' eyond the domain of clinical psychology a rela -
ti%ely new theoretical approach has been inspiring researchers to embark on the
empirical study of a concept which is related to meaning in life, i.e., *ense of
@oherence (*E@, ?ntono%sky, 1!07$. The *ense of @oherence is a construct
which refers to a disposition to look at life and its problems in a manner which
makes coping easier by %iewing the world as meaningful, comprehensible and
11
Cha%&er (
manageable. ?ntono%sky has departed from much of the traditional stress litera -
ture and has started to in%estigate why some of the concentration camp sur%i%ors
were doing well despite their extremely traumatic experiences in the past. Be
has aimed at capturing how people cope in the face of stress, rather than dwell -
ing on the negati%e impact of stressors. Thus, the *E@ takes a 4salutogenic or
health oriented rather than a 4pathogenic or disease oriented approach to cop -
ing.
This model has been mainly in%estigated in the field of medical sociology,
which examines health and disease as they pertain to socio-cultural factors
(e.g., ;yland H Greenfeld, 1!!1$. 5ue to its recent nature, research examining
the impact of sense of coherence on health outcomes is limited. *E@ scores
ha%e been correlated positi%ely with self-reported health (?ntono%sky, 1!07$.
In one study which used sense of coherence a as predictor of response to brief
pain-management programme, only the meaningfulness factor significantly
predicted reported pain at the six-month follow-up (/etrie H ?Jariah, 1!!9$.
?nother study (/etrie H rook, 1!!F$ established the ability of pre-test *E@
scores to predict suicidal ideation and reattempting suicide at the six-month fol -
low-up.
b' Men&a! Hea!&h O.&$o+e. -mploying psychometrically impro%ed %er
-
sions of the /I6, a number of well-designed studies ha%e explored the relation
of meaning in life to mental health outcomes. 1ewcomb and Barlow (1!0+$
found that percei%ed loss of control and meaninglessness in life mediated the re -
lation between uncontrollable stress and substance use. Barlow, 1ewcomb and
entler (1!0+$ found meaninglessness to mediate between depression and
selfderogation, as well as subse.uent drug use for women and suicidal ideation for
men. ?long similar lines, @oleman, Kaplan and 5owning (1!0+$ reported that
drug addicts are less likely than non-addicts to ha%e a well-defined meaning in life.
Ganellen H laney (1!0#$ concluded that alienation from self, a construct closely
related to meaning, moderated the effects of life stress on depression. Lika H
@hamberlain (1!0"$ found meaning in life to be a strong and consistent predictor of
psychological well-being. ?nd, finally, 3aisberg and /orter (1!!#$ assessed the
ability of purpose in life to predict the outcome of psychotherapy of alcoholics
three months following treatment.
&urthermore, research showed that indi%iduals who were able to find
meaning in experiences, such as terminal illness (e.g., Bamera H *hontJ,
1!"0$, cancer (Taylor, 6ichtman, H 3ood, 1!0#$, ?I5* (*chwartJberg, 1!!7$,
the loss of a child (@hodoff, &riedman, H Bamburg, 1!+#$, or being %ictim of
1F
Meaning in !ife: Theor" and reear$h
incest (*il%er, oon, H *tones, 1!07$, coped better after the e%ent than those
who were unable to find meaning. In addition, a number of studies in%estigated
the interacti%e effects between trauma and process of ascribing meaning to life
with a wide %ariety of populations, including sur%i%ors of holocaust, combat,
natural disaster and untimely berea%ement (e.g., Manoff-ulman, 1!!F) 6ifton,
1!09) 3ortman H *il%er, 1!0!$. ? central issue in this research is the demon -
strated need for sur%i%ors to establish some meaning or purpose in the pro -
foundly disrupting e%ents they ha%e experienced.
The +ea.re+en& of +eaning in !ife
? ma:or problem in conducting empirical research on meaning in life has
been that psychometrically sound instruments are rare. In fact, only three theo -
retically deri%ed scales ha%e been de%eloped to measure the rele%ant construct'
the /urpose in 6ife test (@rumbaugh, 1!+0) @rumbaugh H 2aholick, 1!+#) the
*ense of @oherence *cale (?ntono%sky, 1!07$) and the 6ife ;egard Index (at -
tista and ?lmond, 1!"7$.
The P.r%oe in Life 3PIL4 test has long been the only a%ailable instrument.
The /I6 is a F9-item "-point attitude scale. -ight items deal explicitly with life
meaning (purpose, mission$) six items deal with life satisfaction (life is boring,
routine, exciting, or painful$) three items deal with freedom) one item with fear
of death) one item with contemplation of suicide) and one with worthwileness
of ones life. 5espite its wide usage, established satisfactory estimates of reli -
ability in terms of split-half reliability of 9.!9 (@rumbaugh, 1!+0) ;eker,
1!""$, and test-retest coefficient of 9.07 (2eier H -dwards, 1!"#$, its %alidity
has been repeatedly and seriously .uestioned by se%eral researchers (e.g.,
raun H 5olmino, 1!"0) 5ufton H /erlman, 1!0+) 5yck, 1!0") Garfield,
1!"7$. These criticisms relate to the blending of distinct concepts (e.g., mean -
ing in life, fear of death, freedom$, to being loaded on social desirability (a cor -
relation of .," with the 2arlow @rowne *ocial 5esirability *cale$, and to being
highly %alue-laden (e.g., the /rotestant work ethic underlies most of the F9
items$. ecause of these .uestionable psychometric properties it was concluded not
to adopt the /I6 as a criterion measure in the present research.
The Sene of Coheren$e S$a!e 3SOC4 is a relati%ely new instrument
that
has been de%eloped by ?ntono%sky (1!07) 1!0,$. This scale is a F!-item self-
report .uestionnaire, with each item being rated on a "-point 6ikert scale. The
*E@ is more general than the /I6 and is composed of three sub-scales. The
17
Cha%&er (
$o+%rehenibi!i&" sub-scale assesses the extent to which the world is percei%ed
as ordered, predictable and explicable (e.g.,( Bow often do you ha%e the feeling you
are in an unfamiliar situation and dont know what to do=($. The
+anageabi!i&" sub-scale assesses the degree to which life e%ents can be coped
with and challenges met (e.g., < Bow often do you ha%e feelings that youre not sure
you can keep under control=>$. The +eaningf.!ne sub-scale measures the
degree to which life is %iewed as important and e%ents %iewed as challenges worthy
of commitment (e.g., <Bow often do you ha%e the feeling there is little meaning in
the things you do in you daily life=>$.
To date, only a few studies ha%e e%aluated the psychometric properties of
the *E@. ?ntono%sky (1!07$ has reported -coefficients for the full-scale rang -
ing from 9.0F to 9.!1, with a test-retest reliability estimate of 9.+7. Bowe%er,
the three postulated components were not empirically discriminated. @hamber -
lain and Lika (1!00$ concluded from a principal components analysis of the
*E@ items, that the conceptual structure of the scale was not supported by the
results. It was also noted that ?ntono%sky himself (1!0"$, despite his theoretical
discrimination of three separate dimensions, has recommended abandoning the
use of the three separate subscales, and employing the global *E@ score in -
stead. Bowe%er, gi%en that only the subscale of meaningfulness was rele%ant in the
current research context, the *E@ was eliminated as an operationaliJation of the
meaning in life construct for the present research.
The Life Regard Inde5 3LRI4 was de%eloped by attista and ?lmond in
1!"7 in response to the criticism of the /I6 as a %alue-independent operation -
aliJation for the construct of positi%e life regard, which they used synonymously
with the construct of meaning in life. The 6;I is composed of F0 items which
are rated on a fi%e-point 6ikert scale. The scale consists of two subscales' a
Fra+e)ork scale and a F.!2!+en& scale. The &ramework scale was designed to
assess the degree to which indi%iduals can en%ision their li%es within some
meaningful perspecti%e or ha%e deri%ed a set of life-goals or philosophy of life
from these. The &ulfilment scale measures the degree to which people see them -
sel%es as ha%ing fulfilled or as being in the process of fulfilling their framework or
life-goals. -ach scale has 1# items, half phrased positi%ely (e.g., <I ha%e a %ery
clear idea of what Id like to do with my life>$ and half negati%ely (e.g., <I dont
really %alue what Im doing>$.
8alom concluded in 1!09 that the 6;I was more conceptually sophisti -
cated than the /I6 and he regretted that the 6;I had recei%ed no subse.uent use
1#
Meaning in !ife: Theor" and reear$h
nor psychometric e%aluation. 5espite the fact that this situation had not changed
at the time of the start of the present research in 1!0", the 6;I was selected as
an instrumental operationaliJation for the meaning in life construct in the pre -
sent research. Ene ob%ious reason was that the 6;I fitted perfectly well with the
relati%istic approach of attista and ?lmond which was adopted as general theo -
retical framework for the current research.
? second reason for the selection of the 6;I as a criterion measure was that
the few a%ailable psychometric properties of the 6;I were found to be satisfac -
tory. attista and ?lmond (1!"7$ reported a test-retest reliability for the 6;I of
9.!#, and found that social desirability accounted for only #N of the 6;I
scores %ariance. /reliminary e%idence of discriminant construct %alidity for the
6;I was established as 6;I-scores discriminated low from high meaning sub -
:ects in predicted ways' low meaning as compared to high meaning sub:ects had
%isited psychiatrists more often in the past and for longer periods of time, they had
significantly lower le%els of self-esteem and saw themsel%es fulfilling their ultimate
life goals to a lesser degree (cf. attista H ?lmond, 1!"7$.
,a!.e and Meaning in !ife
&rom the pre%iously discussed theories on meaning in life it can be gath -
ered that *a!.e play a crucial role in the process of finding meaning in life.
3hile &rankl (1!"+$ emphasised the process of self-transcendence and the role
of creati%e, experiential and attitudinal %alues in de%eloping a sense of meaning -
ful life, and 2aslow (1!"1$ focused on self-actualisation and the different roles
of deficiency and growth %alues, 8alom (1!09$ stressed engagement and the %al -
ues of creati%ity and commitment. 5espite their theoretical disagreements these
theorists concurred that indi%iduals strongly need the guidance of certain %alues
in their search for purpose and meaning in life, regardless of whether these %al -
ues are consciously held or not yet conceptualised. 3ithout %alues the .uest for
meaning would lack direction.
ecause of the centrality of the %alue concept in the de%elopment of mean -
ing in life an in%estigation of its effects was included in the present research. 3e
adopted ;okeachs (1!"7$ definition of the %alue concept since it is clear, well
established and comprehensi%ely operationalised in the Rokea$h ,a!.e
S.r*e"
3R,S, ;okeach, 1!"7$. ;okeach defined the %alue concept as < an enduring be -
lief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or so -
cially preferable > to another (p.,.$. ;okeach distinguished &er+ina! and in&r./
1,
Cha%&er (
+en&a! %alues. Terminal %alues refer to goals or end states of existence and in -
%ol%e %alues of a %erona! nature e.g., 4self-respect and 4pleasure or a o$ia!
nature e.g., 4a world at peace and 4e.uality. Instrumental %alues refer to
modes of conduct and concern issues of $o+%e&en$e e.g., 4capable and 4inde -
pendent or +ora!i&" e.g., 4responsible and 4helpful.
;egarding the effects of %alues two areas of interest were selected. &irst,
the %alidity of attista and ?lmonds (1!"7$ relati%istic theoretical perspecti%e
on meaning in life was tested. This perspecti%e postulates that the de%elopment
of positi%e life regard is essentially %alue-independent, i.e. that meaning in life
can be attained in many different ways and that ultimately no %alues are superior
nor inferior to others in producing these effects. *econdly, since it has been
demonstrated that persons, including therapists, ha%e certain %alues e%en when
they intend to be %alue free (e.g., ergin, 1!09) 3eiskopf-Moelson, 1!09$ we
wanted to e%aluate the effects of clients and therapists %alues on the process
and outcome of psychotherapy. The roles of two rele%ant phenomena which are
reported in literature were in%estigated' clientOtherapist *a!.e/dii+i!ari&", i.e.
a tension between clients and therapists %alues at the start of treatment, and
*a!.e/$on*ergen$e, the increasing similarity between clients and therapists
%alues during the course of treatment.
Con$!.ion
ased upon the abo%e theoretical and empirical considerations, the present
research was undertaken to further in%estigate the clinical and phenomenologi -
cal aspects of the construct of meaning in life. It was decided to adopt attista
and ?lmonds approach to meaning in life as a guiding theoretical framework,
to select the 6ife ;egard Index (6;I$ as a criterion measure for assessing the
construct of meaning in life and to in%estigate the multiple aspects of %alues and
the meaning in life construct in sub:ects of one de%elopmental life phase, i.e.
young adults. The first aim of the present research, then, was to in%estigate the
psychometric properties of the two central instruments in this research, the 6;I
and ;A*. In the next chapter the se%eral studies which ha%e been conducted will
be introduced.
1+