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The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and examine common
constitutional reforms states have adopted when acceding to the European Union (EU, Union, or Community). A comparative analysis into the state practice of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia provides useful guidance into the accession process for candidates considering EU membership.
Originaltitel
Constitutional Reforms for European Union Accession
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and examine common
constitutional reforms states have adopted when acceding to the European Union (EU, Union, or Community). A comparative analysis into the state practice of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia provides useful guidance into the accession process for candidates considering EU membership.
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and examine common
constitutional reforms states have adopted when acceding to the European Union (EU, Union, or Community). A comparative analysis into the state practice of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia provides useful guidance into the accession process for candidates considering EU membership.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR ACCEDING TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE STATE PRACTICE
Executive Summary
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and examine common constitutional reforms states have adopted when acceding to the European Union (EU, Union, or Community). A comparative analysis into the state practice of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia provides useful guidance into the accession process for candidates considering EU membership.
To become a member of the European Union (EU or Union), a state is required to satisfy membership criteria, known as the Copenhagen Criteria. These criteria obligate states to achieve: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for, and protection of, minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. Moreover, the Madrid Summit in 1995 established an addition condition that states expand their administrative infrastructure to ensure effective implementation of the Criteria.
As a result of the requirements imposed by the Copenhagen Criteria, accession to the EU is generally a complex process that requires a candidate state to harmonize its legislation with the standards of the legal system of the EU, known as the acquis communautaire (acquis). While the European Commission generally looks at the overall legal and administrative infrastructure of the state in assessing its compliance with the acquis, such harmonization typically requires a number of institutional changes, including certain constitutional amendments. Common constitutional reforms include the delegation of some measure of sovereignty to the European Union, recognition of the primacy of EU law, as well as additional reforms aimed at aligning domestic state law with the overall objectives of the EU. These measures include the expansion of voting rights to non-citizens of the Member States, reinforcement of the independence of the judiciary, economic and monetary union with the rest of the Community, and the provision of extradition of a states citizens to other Member States.
In most instances, states adopted constitutional reforms only to the extent that existing constitutional provisions conflicted with Community law. For instance, many states had to change constitutional provisions prohibiting the Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012
extradition of their citizens in order to comply with the European Arrest Warrant framework, allowing for extradition of a states citizens to other Member States. Similarly, many states had to reform their constitutions due to provisions limiting property ownership over land for foreigners only to inheritance. Such provisions were amended to permit land ownership for foreigners in accordance with EU law. States also adopted constitutional amendments to provide for explicit mention of the states relationship with the European Union. For instance, some states adopted amendments to include language allowing the state government to delegate some of its sovereignty to international institutions, such as the European Union, based on a treaty or referendum adopted by the state.
In instances where the state did not have a conflicting constitutional provision, or a particular area of EU law was not mentioned in the states constitution, the European Commission would simply urge the acceding state to adopt lower-level measures or strategic national plans to achieve the same measure. For instance, many states that were deemed to have functional market economies in line with the Copenhagen Criteria were still encouraged to eliminate trade barriers or increase anti-corruption efforts, but not necessarily through constitutional reform. In addition, although some states constitutions continued to have seemingly contentious constitutional provisions, such states were nonetheless allowed to accede because the Commission concluded they had the administrative infrastructure necessary to sustain political and economic stability in accordance with the acquis.
Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement of Purpose 1
Introduction 1
The Copenhagen Criteria 2 Political Criteria 3 Economic Criteria 3 Acceptance of Community Acquis Communautaire 4
Common Constitutional Reforms for EU Accession 6 Delegation of Sovereignty to the European Union 6 Primacy of European Community Law 7 Economic and Monetary Union 10 Independence of the Judiciary 11 European Citizenship and Voting Rights 11 Extradition of Nationals 12
Comparative State Practice 13 Slovenia 13 Political Criteria 14 Economic Criteria 14 Adoption of the Acquis 15 Czech Republic 15 Political Criteria 16 Economic Criteria 17 Adoption of Acquis 17 Bulgaria 18 Political Criteria 18 Economic Criteria 20 Adoption of Acquis 21 Croatia 22 Political Criteria 22 Economic Criteria 23 Adoption of the Acquis 24 Serbia 25 Political Criteria 25 Economic Criteria 27 Adoption of the Acquis 27 Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012
Conclusion 27 Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 1 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS FOR ACCEDING TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARATIVE STATE PRACTICE
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this memorandum is to identify and examine common constitutional reforms states have adopted when acceding to the European Union (EU, Union, or Community). A comparative analysis into the state practice of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia provides useful guidance into the accession process for candidates considering EU membership.
Introduction
After the fall of the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s, the EU began to receive letters of application for membership from Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. 1 The European Council (Council) agreed upon the conditions and terms for enlargement of membership at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993. 2 The Council is comprised of the heads of government of the Member States along with the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, and is responsible for defining the political direction and priorities of the Union. 3
The Council decided that any of the CEE states could accede as soon as that state was able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. 4 These conditions, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, include the establishment of stable political institutions, a functioning market economy, and a willingness to accept the longer-term political and economic objectives of the EU. 5 The Copenhagen Criteria was affirmed in 1995 at the Madrid Summit, where a condition to develop and strengthen the administrative and structural institutions necessary to implement and harmonize domestic law with EU law was added. 6
1 Tanja Marktler, The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria, 2 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 243, 245 (2006). See also L. Massai, the EU Enlargement, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IN THE EU, p. 8 (2011). 2 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 12 (Jun. 21-22, 1993), available at http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/72921_en.pdf; see also Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Enlargement and Legitimacy of the European Union, 30 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 143 (2010). 3 European Council, the Institution (last visited Nov. 27, 2012), available at http://www.european- council.europa.eu/the-institution. 4 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 12 (Jun. 21-22, 1993). 5 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 12 (Jun. 21-22, 1993). 6 European Council in Madrid, Conclusions of the Presidency, sec. III(A) (Dec. 15-16, 1995), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 2 As a result of the Copenhagen Criteria, the accession process generally begins with a screening stage in which the European Commission (Commission) examines how well the state is prepared to meet its obligations for membership. 7
In contrast to the Council, the Commission represents the interests of the EU as a whole. 8 It is comprised of twenty-seven Commissioners (one from each Member State) and is responsible for proposing new legislation and making sure EU law is correctly applied by Member States. 9 The Commission decides whether it is open to direct negotiations or whether the candidate state is required to first meet a set of opening benchmarks before negotiations may begin. 10 The negotiations stage is comprised of structured meetings and dialogue between the candidate state and the EU Council to assess the political and economic conditions of the candidate state. 11
The negotiations stage also involves the adoption of established EU law, as well as the implementation of any necessary judicial, administrative, and economic reforms to comply with it. 12 Because a states constitution is generally the supreme law of the land, these reforms often have constitutional implications as well.
The Copenhagen Criteria
As mentioned above, the Copenhagen Criteria is the set of conditions required for EU membership. In particular, candidate states are required to achieve: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for, and protection of, minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. 13 States are also required to adapt their institutional structures to create proper conditions for harmonious integration into the EU. 14 This requirement ensures that acceding states not only adopt the legislative infrastructure, but are also prepared to properly apply and enforce the law. 15 By
7 European Commission, Steps Toward Joining (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps- towards-joining/index_en.htm. 8 European Commission, European Commission at Work (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_en.htm. 9 European Commission, European Commission at Work (2012). 10 European Commission, Steps Toward Joining (2012). 11 European Commission, Steps Toward Joining (2012). 12 European Commission, Steps Toward Joining (2012). 13 European Commission, Accession Criteria (last visited Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm. 14 European Council in Madrid, Conclusions of the Presidency, sec. III(A) (Dec. 15-16, 1995). 15 Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are They Helping or Hurting the European Union?, 14 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 390, 392-93 (2011). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 3 adding this requirement, the Council addressed its concern that candidate states would act to meet the requirements of accession, but fail to develop a mechanism for further success within the EU. 16
Political Criteria
The first set of conditions is primarily political, with the aim of harmonizing the applicant states domestic legal infrastructure with the principles of democracy and the rule of law. 17 The European Commission defines democracy in terms of free and fair elections, political pluralism (including recognition of the opposition), freedom of expression and freedom of religion, as well as independent judicial and constitutional authorities. 18 The Commission also understands rule of law to refer to an independent judiciary with suitably qualified judges, and an effective, trained, and disciplined police force. 19 Rule of law also includes mechanisms to address administrative decisions, access to courts and the right to a fair trial, and equality before the law. 20
The EU Council noted that [c]ompliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations whereas [e]conomic criteria and the ability to fulfill the obligations arising from membership have been and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way. 21 This means that the establishment of stable democratic institutions is inviolable, while fulfillment of the economic standards is flexible and may be assessed prospectively. 22
Economic Criteria
The second condition involves an assessment of whether the candidate state can show the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to
16 Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are They Helping or Hurting the European Union?, 14 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 390, 392-93 (2011). 17 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 12 (Jun. 21-22, 1993). 18 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 221 (2001). 19 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 221 (2001). 20 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 221 (2001). 21 European Council in Luxembourg, Presidency Conclusions, para. 25 (Dec. 1997), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm. 22 Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Enlargement and Legitimacy of the European Union, 30 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 150 (2010). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 4 cope with the competitive nature of a market economy within the Union. 23 For Central and Eastern European states, this generally involves opening up domestic economies to market competition, both within the Union and externally, as part of the EUs trade policy. 24 The Commission also looks at whether macroeconomic price stability has been achieved and the balance between demand and supply allows for the free interaction of market forces. 25 Rule of law and a functioning legal system are also assessed. 26 In particular, candidate states ought to have efficient judicial procedures that provide for the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property rights. 27
In assessing the candidate states competitiveness, the Commission is not only concerned with strains on the economic policies of the potential new member, but also with the global competitiveness of the EU as a whole. 28 The candidate states economic policies have to be in harmony with the Unions existing policies designed to boost employment and foster competition. 29 The Commission also examines the candidate states broad economic policy and the extent to which government regulation influences competition in the market, such as state assistance, subsidies, and antitrust laws. 30
Acceptance of Community Acquis Communautaire
The third Copenhagen criterion refers to the ability of the candidate state to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. 31 The acquis communautaire (acquis) is the body of EU rules, political principles, and judicial decisions that a candidate
23 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 220 (2001). 24 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 224 (2001). 25 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 224 (2001). 26 See European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, 40 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf. 27 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 224 (2001); see also European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, 41 (Oct. 12, 2011). 28 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 225 (2001). 29 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 224 (2001). 30 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 225 (2001). 31 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 224 (2001). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 5 state is required to accept. 32 It is divided into thirty-one different chapters, which form the bases for the accession negotiations between the Commission and the candidate state. 33 These chapters include: the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital; policies on agriculture, transportation, consumer protection, and energy; and foreign, security, and defense policy, among many others. 34 The acquis includes not only the adoption of binding legislation adopted under the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), but also requires that states harmonize domestic law and policy with the decisions of the European Court of Justice and other non-binding measures adopted under the Union treaties. 35 Unlike the other Copenhagen Criteria, acceptance of the acquis requires a forward-looking commitment by both the acceding state and the existing members of the Union. 36
The European Council reconfirmed the Copenhagen Criteria at the Madrid Summit in December 1995 and added the condition that candidate states expand administrative structures to effectively apply and enforce EU law. 37 This criterion aimed to ensure that new members would be able to maintain political stability and economic competitiveness through developed infrastructure and technical knowledge. 38 Implementation of legislation was not enough; acceding states needed to establish the internal mechanisms necessary for enforcement, including the development of management systems and the provision of training for civil servants, public officials, judges, and financial controllers. 39 For instance, during Polands accession process, the Commission found that, although the state had the legal framework necessary to combat organized crime, it still had to strengthen its Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice to provide the administrative infrastructure necessary to effectively enforce its laws. 40 This included training of
32 Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire, 3 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 249, 251-252 (2002); see also European Commission, Glossary: Acquis (July 9, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm. 33 European Commission, Glossary: Chapters of the Acquis (July 9, 2012). 34 European Commission, Glossary: Chapters of the Acquis (July 9, 2012). 35 Marise Cremona, Accession to the European Union: Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria, 25 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 224 (2001). 36 Antonija Petricusic and Ersin Erkan, Constitutional Challenges Ahead the EU Accession: Analysis of the Croatian and Turkish Constitutional Provisions that Require Harmonization with the Acquis Communautaire, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANISATION (USAK) 133 (2010), available at http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/JxS6ff7qsmR9xCUOsnfbtde1POQaB7.pdf. 37 Tanja Marktler, The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria, 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 243, 245 (2006). 38 Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are They Helping or Hurting the European Union?, 14 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 390, 392 (2011). 39 Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are They Helping or Hurting the European Union?, 14 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 390, 394 (2011). 40 Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are They Helping or Hurting the European Union?, 14 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 390, 395 (2011). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 6 scientific prosecutors, civil police, and forensic police in the treatment of fingerprints and criminal analysis. 41
Common Constitutional Reforms for EU Accession
Because candidate states are required to harmonize domestic legislation with EU law, the accession process often requires a number of legislative and institutional changes. 42 The European Council, existing Member States, and the applicant state sign accession agreements, which are draft documents that generally bind candidates to follow a structured plan of social, economic, and legal reforms. 43 Because state constitutions are generally the supreme authority for any state, candidates often have to reform their constitutions as part of the accession process. 44 For instance, states generally have to amend provisions regarding supremacy of the law, monetary policy, and voting rights, among others. 45
Delegation of Sovereignty to the European Union
Where international law or international institutions are not already mentioned in their constitutions, candidate states generally incorporate language that provides for the delegation of sovereignty. Some states amend their constitutions by explicitly delegating sovereignty to the European Union, while others simply refer to an international organization, association, or agreement. Both Poland and the Czech Republic refer only to international organizations rather than the EU itself. For instance, Article 90 of Polands Constitution provides that the Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters. 46 Similarly, Article 10 of the Czech Republics Constitution provides that promulgated international agreements, the ratification of which has been approved by the Parliament and
41 Paulina Rezler, The Copenhagen Criteria: Are They Helping or Hurting the European Union?, 14 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 390, 395 (2011). 42 Antonija Petricusic and Ersin Erkan, Constitutional Challenges Ahead the EU Accession: Analysis of the Croatian and Turkish Constitutional Provisions that Require Harmonization with the Acquis Communautaire, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANISATION (USAK) 133, 135 (2010). 43 Antonija Petricusic and Ersin Erkan, Constitutional Challenges Ahead the EU Accession: Analysis of the Croatian and Turkish Constitutional Provisions that Require Harmonization with the Acquis Communautaire, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANISATION (USAK) 133, 134 (2010). 44 Alfred E. Kellermann, Preparation of National Constitutions of Candidate Countries for Accession, FIFTH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE EUROPEAN INSITUTTUE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 2 (Mar. 4-5, 2002). 45 Antonija Petricusic and Ersin Erkan, Constitutional Challenges Ahead the EU Accession: Analysis of the Croatian and Turkish Constitutional Provisions that Require Harmonization with the Acquis Communautaire, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANISATION (USAK) 133, 135 (2010). 46 POLAND CONST., art. 90 (1997), available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 7 which are binding on the Czech Republic, shall constitute a part of the legal order; should an international agreement make provision contrary to a law, the international agreement shall be applied. 47
Alternatively, the Constitution of Slovakia explicitly transfers sovereignty to the European Communities and European Union. Specifically, Article 7(2) of Slovakias Constitution provides that the state may transfer the exercise of a part of its powers to the European Communities and the European Union. 48
Constitutional provisions such as these are necessary where state sovereignty and the authority to set social, economic, and political policies are reserved solely for the state government.
Primacy of European Community Law
Although the TEU does not expressly regulate the issue of primacy between Community and domestic law when a conflict of law arises, Article 4 does impose a duty on Member States to adopt any appropriate measure, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 49 Moreover, Member States are required to facilitate the achievement of the Unions tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Unions objectives. 50 The European Court of Justice also declared that Member States are required to abide by the principle that Community law takes primacy over the states domestic laws. 51 As such, candidate states often reform their constitutions to incorporate Community law into their legal systems, either by accepting the full primacy of EU law or limiting acceptance on the condition that it does not conflict with the states constitution. 52 Alternatively, some states rely on their relevant constitutional courts to determine the primacy of European Community law.
The Czech Republic has accepted the full primacy of EU law in its Constitution. In 2002, during the Czech Republics accession process, the Constitution was amended to include two relevant provisions establishing the
47 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 10 (1992), available at http://www.hrad.cz/en/czech-republic/constitution-of-the- cr.shtml. 48 SLOVAKIA CONST., art. 7(2) (1992), available at http://www.concourt.sk/en/A_ustava/ustava_a.pdf. 49 Consolidated Version on the Treaty on European Union, art. 4(3) (2010), available at http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF. 50 Consolidated Version on the Treaty on European Union, art. 4(3) (2010). 51 See, e.g., Judgment of the Court of Justice, Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64 (15 July 1964). 52 Lucia Serena Rossi, How Fundamental Are Fundamental Principles? Primacy and Fundamental Rights After Lisbon, 27 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 65, (2008), available at http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/1/65.short. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 8 primacy of Community law. Article 1 was amended to include a paragraph requiring the Czech Republic to observe its obligations resulting from international law. 53 Moreover, Article 10 was rewritten to establish that [p]romulgated treaties, to the ratification of which Parliament has given its consent and by which the Czech Republic is bound, form a part of the legal order; if a treaty provides something other than that which a statute provides, the treaty shall apply. 54 The provision had originally provided for only international treaties concerning human rights to take precedence over domestic law. 55
Most states, however, reform their constitutions to provide for the primacy of Community law subject to compatibility with constitutional provisions. For instance, the Romanian Constitution assigns superiority to the EUs human rights treaties and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Article 20(2) provides, Where any inconsistencies exist between the covenants and treaties on the fundamental human rights Romania is a party to, and the national laws, the international regulations shall take precedence, unless the Constitution or national laws comprise more favourable provisions. 56 Further, Article 148(2) of the Romanian Constitution provides that the provisions of the constituent treaties of the European Union, as well as the other mandatory community regulations shall take precedence over the opposite provisions of the national laws, in compliance with the provisions of the accession act. 57
Other states did not adopt constitutional reforms and instead relied on the judgment of their relevant constitutional courts in interpreting existing constitutional provisions to determine the primacy of EU law. For instance, Article 34 of the Belgian Constitution provides that [t]he exercising of specific powers can be assigned by a treaty or by a law to institutions of public international law. 58 In interpreting this provision, the Conseil dEtat, whose responsibility is to assess the constitutionality of administrative acts, held in 1996
53 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 1(3) (1992). See also Eli!ka Wagnerov, The Czech Constitutional Court Doctrines on Community and Union Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW CDL-JU(2006)(024) p. 2 (2006). 54 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 10 (1992). 55 Eli!ka Wagnerov, The Czech Constitutional Court Doctrines on Community and Union Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW CDL-JU(2006)(024) p. 2 (2006). 56 ROMANIAN CONST., art. 20(2) (1991), available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371. 57 ROMANIAN CONST., art. 148(2) (1991). 58 BELGIAN CONST., art. 34 (2007), available at http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/constitution/grondwetEN.pdf.
Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 9 in Orfinger v. Belgian State that Community law prevails over constitutional law. 59
Moreover, the supremacy of Community law was affirmed by the Cour dArbitrage, whose role is to monitor the constitutionality of legislative acts. 60
Likewise, the Austrian Supreme Court in 2000 declared that an EU directive has supremacy over domestic law even if it violates constitutional provisions. 61
On the other hand, some states have placed EU law somewhere between existing constitutional provisions and federal statutes. 62 For instance, in May of 2005, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal annulled provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code implementing the European Arrest Warrant Framework by permitting the surrender of Polish citizens to another EU state. 63 The provisions violated Article 55 of the Polish Constitution, which absolutely prohibited the extradition of Polish citizens. 64 The Tribunal, however, delayed annulment of the provision for eighteen months, declaring that the government had to resolve the conflict by either amending the Constitution, withdrawing from the EU, or taking other action. 65 In the Accession Treaty case a few months later, the Tribunal affirmed the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme legal authority in Poland, even in cases of conflict with Community law. 66 The Tribunal added, however, that the interpretation of domestic law has to take into consideration the principle of sympathetic predisposition towards the process of European integration and the cooperation between states. 67 In September 2006, to resolve the conflict in the European Arrest Warrant case, the government passed a
59 Christian Franck, Herv Leclercq, Claire Vandevivere, Belgium: Europeanisation and Belgian Federalism, FIFTEEN INTO ONE?: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 69, 83 (2003), available at http://www.uni- koeln.de/wiso-fak/powi/wessels/DE/PUBLIKATIONEN/texte/TextMaurer/andreas/Belgium.pdf. 60 Christian Franck, Herv Leclercq, Claire Vandevivere, Belgium: Europeanisation and Belgian Federalism, FIFTEEN INTO ONE?: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 69, 83 (2003). 61 See Oberster Gerichtshof, Judgment of Mar. 9, 2000, 6 Ob 14/00b, Wirtschaftsrechtliche Bltter 2000, 286-288 (2000), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001DC0309:EN:HTML. 62 Lszl Blutman and Nra Chronowski, Hungarian Constitutional Court: Keeping Aloof from European Union Law, 5 INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 329, 334 (2011). 63 Judgment of 27th April 2005, P 1/05, Application of the European Arrest Warrant to Polish Citizens (Poland Constitutional Tribunal, April 27, 2005), available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/summaries_assets/documents/P_1_05_GB.pdf. 64 Judgment of 27th April 2005, P 1/05, Application of the European Arrest Warrant to Polish Citizens (Poland Constitutional Tribunal, April 27, 2005). 65 Judgment of 27th April 2005, P 1/05, Application of the European Arrest Warrant to Polish Citizens (Poland Constitutional Tribunal, April 27, 2005). 66 See Judgment of 11th May 2005, K 18/04, Polands Membership in the European Union (the Accession Treaty), p. 11 (Poland Constitutional Tribunal, May 11, 2005), available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf. See also Anneli Albi, Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States, 3 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW, 25 (2007), available at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/424/1/Supremacy_30OCT07DP.pdf. 67 Judgment of 11th May 2005, K 18/04, Polands Membership in the European Union (the Accession Treaty), p. 11 (Poland Constitutional Tribunal, May 11, 2005). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 10 constitutional amendment providing an exception to the prohibition to allow for extradition under the conditions of EU law. 68
Economic and Monetary Union
The European Central Bank (ECB) is the governing institution for Europes single currency, the euro, and determines EU-wide economic and monetary policies with the aim of maintaining the euros price stability and purchasing power. 69 As such, candidate states are required to harmonize domestic economic policy with EU policy. 70 Some states have formalized the delegation of economic policy to the ECB in their constitutions. For instance, Article 88 of the German Basic Law provides that the tasks and powers of the Federal Bank can be transferred to the ECB for the purpose of securing stability of prices. 71
As a result of the role of the ECB in harmonizing economic policy, conflicts arise when domestic laws provide for any type of political influence on domestic banks. 72 This means that constitutional provisions that allow for other state bodies to exert political influence on the bank may have to be amended to ensure independence of their banks. 73 For instance, the Croatian Constitution had to be amended because it granted the Croatian Parliament too much authority over the Central Bank. The Constitution was changed to provide that the Central Bank would report on its work to the Parliament, 74 instead of being responsible to the Croatian Parliament. 75 The amendment also set forth the authority of the Governor of the Croatian National Bank to manage and operate the Bank. 76 On the other hand, the Commission does not look at constitutional provisions alone. Slovenia did not have to amend its Constitution even though it provides that the governor of the Central bank is directly accountable to the National Assembly. 77
Because of accompanying lower-level legislation and infrastructure guaranteeing
68 World Intellectual Property Organization, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (last visited Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7539. See also POLISH CONST., art. 55 (1997). 69 European Central Bank, EU Enlargement and the Euro (last visited Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/history/enlargement/html/index.en.html. 70 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 96 (2008). 71 GERMAN BASIC LAW, art. 88 (1949), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/gm00000_.html. 72 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 96 (2008). 73 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 94-96 (2008). 74 CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990). 75 CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990) (2001 version). 76 CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990). 77 SLOVENE CONST., art. 152 (1991), Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 11 the independence of the Bank, the Commission determined that constitutional reform was not necessary. 78
Independence of the Judiciary
Similar to the European Councils concerns for the independence of financial institutions, some states have also had to reform their constitutions to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The acquis requires acceding states to ensure that their legal systems are based on the principle of separation of powers. 79
The executive or legislative branches cannot influence judges and judicial officials, and internal mechanisms have to exist to ensure impartiality in the decision- making process. 80 During Romanias accession process, the state adopted a series of constitutional amendments reforming the judiciary in response to the European Councils concerns about corruption in the region. 81 For instance, the principle of the separation and balance of powers between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches was incorporated into the Constitution. 82 Moreover, certain criminal procedural guarantees were added, including the right to be released from detention if no incriminating evidence exists and the prohibition of illegal searches and seizures. 83 Similarly, the Slovene Constitution had to be amended with regard to the nomination and probationary procedures for judges to provide for greater independence of the judiciary. 84
European Citizenship and Voting Rights
According to the Article 19(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, every citizen of the EU residing in a Member State of which he is not a citizen has the right to vote and stand as a candidate at local elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same
78 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 41 (2002). 79 Dimitry Kochenov, Why the Promotion of the Acquis Is not the Same as the Promotion of Democracy and What Can Be Dones in Order to Also Promote Democracy Instead of Just Promoting the Acquis, 2 HANSE LAW REVIEW, 171, 181 (2006). 80 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 94 (2008). 81 Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Croatia, EC Report: Bulgaria and Romania Need to Demonstrate Commitment to Rule of Law (Jul. 17, 2012), available at http://www.delhrv.ec.europa.eu/?lang=en&content=4266. 82 Law for the Revision of the Constitution of Romania, p. 1 (Romania, 1997), available at http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/reviz_constitutie_en.pdf. 83 Law for the Revision of the Constitution of Romania, p. 3 (Romania, 1997). 84 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 94 (2008). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 12 conditions as citizens of that Member State. 85 As such, many EU Member States have modified their respective constitutional provisions on the right to vote. 86 For instance, Article 28(1) of the German Basic Law provides that in county and municipal elections, persons who possess citizenship in any Member State of the European Community are also eligible to vote and to be elected in accord with European Community Law. 87 Likewise, Article 16(4) of Romanias Constitution was amended to grant citizens of the EU the right to elect and be elected to office. 88
Extradition of Nationals
Some Member States modified relevant constitutional provisions following the European Court of Justices 2002 decision requiring Member States to surrender persons to another Member State if the latter issues a European Arrest Warrant. 89 States amended existing constitutional provisions prohibiting the extradition of their citizens to provide an exception under the European Arrest Warrant Framework. Some states, such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania, amended their constitutions to comply with the decision prior to EU accession. For instance, Article 19(1) of the Romanian Constitution provides that Romanian citizens can be extradited based on the international agreement Romania is a party to. 90
Other states, such as Poland and Cyprus, only amended their constitutions after the provisions were challenged in their respective constitutional courts. 91 As mentioned earlier, the Polish government amended Article 55 of the Constitution, prohibiting the extradition of Polish citizens only after the Polish Constitutional Tribunal declared a revision in
85 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 94 (2008). 86 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 94 (2008). 87 GERMAN BASIC LAW, art. 28(1) (1949). 88 ROMANIAN CONST., art. 16(4) (1991). See also Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 92-93 (2008). 89 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 92-93 (2008). 90 ROMANIAN CONST., art. 19(1) (1991). 91 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 92-93 (2008). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 13 the Criminal Procedure Code unconstitutional. 92 Although Cyprus entered the EU in 2004, it did not amend its constitutional provisions prohibiting the extradition of Cypriot citizens until after the Supreme Court of Cyprus declared a domestic law implementing the European Arrest Warrant as unconstitutional in 2005. 93 In 2006, the government amended the provisions of Article 11 of the Cypriot Constitution to allow for the arrest or detention of citizens and foreigners in Cyprus in accordance with the EU law. 94
Comparative State Practice
Comparative analysis of the state practice of some of the European Unions most recent members provides useful guidance into the accession process for candidate states. An assessment of specific constitutional amendments and related provisions these states have had to undertake will illustrate the necessary legal and administrative reforms required of states in the accession process.
Slovenia
Accession negotiations with Slovenia were concluded on December 13, 2002 and the Treaty of Accession was signed on April 16, 2003. The Treaty of Accession was approved via referendum the following year, 95 and the date for accession was set for May 1, 2004. 96 The negotiations process lasted for five years, between 1998 and 2003, alongside nine other Central and Eastern European states. 97
92 Rafal Manko, the Polish Tribunal in the European Union, INTEGRATION OR ABPSORPTION? LEGAL DISCOURSE IN AN ENLARGED UNION, sec. 3.2.1 (Sept. 26-28, 2006), available at http://www.mzes.uni- mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/research%20groups/2/Hanover2006/Hannover_paper_Manko_DOC.pdf. 93 Council fo the European Union, Decisions of Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts Concerning the European Arrest Warrant, Doc. 14281/05, p. 2 (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/eurowarrant-webroot/documents/cms_eaw_id778_1_CouncilDoc.14281.05.pdf. 94 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Law of 2006, p. 3 (Republic of Cyprus, 2006), available at http://www.olc.gov.cy/olc/olc.nsf/all/EC240D2A9413ABBB4225793A00403484/$file/The%20Fifth%20Amendme nt%20of%20the%20Constitution%20Law%20of%202006.pdf?openelement. 95 Frank Hoffmeister, Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View From the Commission, 3 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 59, 73 (2008). 96 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Slovenias Preparations for Membership, (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_si_final_en.pdf. 97 Government Office for Development and European Affairs, Archive Slovenias Accession to the EU, GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA (2012), available at http://www.svrez.gov.si/en/areas_of_work/archive_slovenias_accession_to_the_eu/. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 14 Political Criteria The European Commission concluded in its 1997 Opinion on Slovenias application for EU membership that the state had met the political criteria. It provided that Slovenia is a democracy with stable institutions which guarantee the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and the protection of, minorities. 98 In its 2001 Regular Report (now called the annual Progress Reports), the Commission reaffirmed Slovenias political stability, adding that it had made good progress in judicial reform and public administration reform. 99 Moreover, the Commission observed that Slovenia had an independent judiciary, limited problems with corruption, and had made good progress in the protection of minorities and human rights. 100 As such, Slovenia was not required to make drastic changes to its Constitution to fulfill the political criteria for EU accession.
Slovenia, however, did amend several provisions of its Constitution to enable its integration into the Community. In 2003, Slovenia added Article 3a, which allowed the state to transfer the exercise of part of its sovereign rights to international organizations which are based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the principles of the rule of law. 101
Slovenia also amended Article 68 of the Constitution to extend the right to property ownership over land to foreigners under conditions provided by law or a treaty ratified by the National Assembly. 102 The original provision had only granted this right to foreigners through inheritance. 103 Moreover, Article 47 was amended to implement the European Arrest Warrant and allow for the extradition of Slovene citizens to other Member States in accordance with EU law. 104
Economic Criteria In its 2002 Report, the European Commission praised Slovenia for its substantial reforms to transform the economy and achieve macroeconomic stability. 105 Since 1997, Slovenia had adopted a number of economic policies and legislation that provide for the free movement of capital and services, strengthen the independence of the Central Bank, and sustain economic growth. 106 As a result
98 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 18 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/sl_en.pdf. 99 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 18 (2002). 100 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 22-23, 26 (2002). See also European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Slovenias Preparations for Membership, 12 (2003). 101 SLOVENE CONST., art. 3a (1991), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/si00000_.html. 102 SLOVENE CONST., art. 68 (1991). 103 Verfassungsvergleich, Slovenia Index (2010), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/si__indx.html. 104 SLOVENE CONST., art. 47 (1991). 105 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 41 (2002). 106 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 30-33 (2002). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 15 of this progress, the Commission concluded that Slovenia had a functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with the EUs competitive pressure and market forces. 107 Slovenia was commended for decreasing its unemployment rate and increasing the size of the GDP to the EU average. 108 Although Slovenia was urged to make some constitutional reforms to meet the political criteria, no constitutional reforms to meet the economic criteria were necessary. Constitutional provisions relating to the Central Bank, supported by implementing legislation and infrastructure, were determined sufficient in establishing the Central Banks independence. 109
Adoption of the Acquis Slovenia was similarly praised as making good progress on the implementation of the acquis, as well as developing institutions necessary for its enforcement, though there was some room for improvement in certain areas of the acquis. 110 For instance, while Slovenias legislative framework was aligned with the objectives of the acquis, administrative capacity and technical assistance were needed. 111 As mentioned above, Slovenia did adopt some constitutional amendments regarding the delegation of sovereignty, property rights, and extradition in order to harmonize its laws with the acquis. Such amendments, as well as additional lower-level legislative and administrative reforms, led the Commission to conclude by 2003 that Slovenia was sufficiently on track to meet its obligations under the acquis. 112
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic signed the Treaty of Accession on April 16, 2003 and became a member of the European Union on May 1, 2004. 113 Negotiations began in March 1998 and concluded in December 2002, alongside Slovenia and other Central European states. 114 Because the Czech Republics Constitution was a markedly national constitution, greatly emphasizing its sovereignty and
107 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 41 (2002). 108 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 43 (2002). 109 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 41 (2002). 110 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 43 (2002). 111 European Commission, Regular Report on Slovenias Progress Towards Accession, 117 (2002). 112 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Slovenias Preparations for Membership, 30 (2003). 113 Embassy of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic and European Union (last visited Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.mzv.cz/dublin/en/about_the_czech_republic/czech_republic_and_european_union/index.html. 114 Embassy of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic and European Union (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 16 independence, the state had to amend the Constitution to allow for the transfer of powers through the Constitutional Act No. 395/2001 Sb on June 1, 2001. 115
Political Criteria The 2001 Amendments changed the language of Article 1 of the Constitution to include a provision committing the Czech government to observe its obligations resulting from international law. 116 Moreover, Article 10a was added in its entirety, allowing for [c]ertain powers of the Czech Republic authorities [to] be transferred by treaty to an international organization or institution. 117 Article 10b was also added, obligating the government to inform the Parliament on issues connected to its obligations under international treaties, including the TEU. 118 These provisions provide for the delegation of sovereignty to the EU in full commitment to upholding Community goals of legal, economic, and political harmony.
In addition, the provisions in the Constitution establishing the jurisdiction and role of the Constitutional Court were amended to clarify the Courts authority with regards to Community law. 119 Article 87(2) provides, Prior to the ratification of a treaty under Article 10a or Article 49, the Constitutional Court shall further have jurisdiction to decide concerning the treatys conformity with the constitutional order. A treaty may not be ratified prior to the Constitutional Court giving judgment. 120 While these provisions do not establish that EU law prevails, the Court is required to interpret constitutional law taking into account the principles arising from Community law. 121 Where the Court decides that a treaty is not in conformity with the Constitution, the treaty may not be ratified. 122
115 Eli!ka Wagnerov, The Czech Constitutional Court Doctrines on Community and Union Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, p. 2 (2006), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL- JU(2006)024-e.pdf; see also Report of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, the Relations Between the Constitutional Courts and the other National Courts, Including the Interference in the Area of the Action of the European Courts, CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: XIITH CONGRESS p. 4 (Aug. 27, 2012), available at http://www.confcoconsteu.org/reports/rep-xii/Tsjechie-EN.pdf. 116 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 1 (1992). 117 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 10a (1992). 118 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 10b (1992). 119 Eli!ka Wagnerov, The Czech Constitutional Court Doctrines on Community and Union Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW CDL-JU(2006)(024) p. 2 (2006). 120 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 87(2) (1992). 121 Eli!ka Wagnerov, The Czech Constitutional Court Doctrines on Community and Union Law, EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW CDL-JU(2006)(024) p. 5 (2006) (citing to the Sugar Quotas case Pl. US 50/04). 122 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 89 (1992). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 17 Unlike Slovenia, the Czech Republic did not have to adopt any constitutional amendments referring to extradition of Czech citizens, nor change any provisions relating to property and voting rights for foreigners. Extradition is not mentioned in the Czech Republics Constitution. Moreover, constitutional provisions regarding voting and property rights for foreigners did not violate the acquis or hinder the free movement of persons and property. 123
Economic Criteria The Czech Republic did not adopt constitutional reforms to meet the economic criteria, but rather adopted lower-level reforms on banking laws and fiscal policies. In its 2002 Report, the European Commission concluded that the Czech Republic was a functioning market economy and [t]he continuation of its current reform path should enable the Czech Republic to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 124 The Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic will appoint members of the Banking Council, 125 and that the Czech National Bank is responsible for maintaining price stability and the Banks powers are governed by statute. 126 The Commission did not mention constitutional amendments to these provisions in its Progress Reports. 127 Rather, the Commission commended the Czech Republic for maintaining economic policies in line with the EU since 1997. 128 In 2002, the Banking Act was amended to further strengthen the independence of the Czech National Bank. 129
Adoption of Acquis In its 2003 Report, the Commission commended the Czech Republic for essentially meeting the requirements for membership with regards to several chapters of the acquis, including sections on the free movement of goods and services, banking, social policies, and the coordination of structural policies, among others. 130 In other areas, including the free movement of persons,
123 See CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 89 (1992). Compare CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., arts. 18-19 (1993) (1993 version), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ez00000_.html. 124 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on the Czech Republics Preparations for Membership, p. 3 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_cz_final_en.pdf. 125 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 62 (1992). 126 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 87(2) (1992). 127 European Commission, Enlargement (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and- progress-report/index_en.htm. 128 European Commission, Regular Report on Czech Republics Progress Towards Accession, p. 39 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/cz_en.pdf. 129 European Commission, Regular Report on Czech Republics Progress Towards Accession, p. 39 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/cz_en.pdf. 130 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on the Czech Republics Preparations for Membership, p. 53 (2002). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 18 agricultural policies, and transportation mechanisms, the Czech Republic needed immediate improvements. 131 The government responded by passing legislation and adopting strategies to address these problem areas, but did not pursue constitutional reform. As mentioned earlier, the government did include an additional provision in the Constitution expressing the Czech Republics commitment to abide by its international obligations, 132 which would include the acquis as provided under the Accession Treaty.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria submitted its application for EU membership in December 1995, but the European Commission did not present its first report until November 1998. 133 In February 2000, following the Helsinki European Councils decision, accession negotiations were formally opened. 134 Accession negotiations lasted until December 2004, and the Accession Treaty was signed on April 25, 2005. 135
Bulgaria was set to join the EU on January 1, 2007. 136 Unlike the previous enlargement, the Accession Treaty with Bulgaria (and Romania, who also joined the EU in 2007), included a provision that allowed for the postponement of accession by one year if the EU saw a serious risk that the state would be unable to implement the required reforms. 137 Moreover, the Treaty reserved the right of the EU to intervene in economic and political policies for up to three years after Bulgarias accession. 138 Unlike Slovenia and the Czech Republic, Bulgaria was required to institute a number of constitutional reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria and, by 2006, still had remaining issues with regards to the accountability and efficiency of the judicial system and law enforcement bodies. 139
Political Criteria Following the conclusion of Accession Negotiations, Bulgaria adopted a number of amendments shortly before the signing of the Accession Treaty on April
131 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on the Czech Republics Preparations for Membership, p. 54 (2002). 132 CZECH REPUBLIC CONST., art. 87(2) (1992). 133 European Commission, EU-Bulgaria Relations (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/bulgaria/eu_bulgaria_relations_en.htm. 134 European Commission, EU-Bulgaria Relations (2007). 135 European Commission, EU-Bulgaria Relations (2007). 136 European Commission, EU-Bulgaria Relations (2007). 137 Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, art. 39 (2005), available at http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_157/l_15720050621en00290045.pdf 138 Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, art. 37 (2005). 139 European Commission, Commission Decisions p. 2 (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/bulgaria/bg_accompanying_measures_1206_en.pdf. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 19 13, 2005. In February 2005, Bulgaria amended constitutional provisions relating to the states participation in the EU, extradition of Bulgarian citizens, and the political and property rights for European citizens. 140 The amendments also clarified the authority of the National Assembly to ratify international treaties, and the responsibility of the Council of Ministers in ensuring Bulgaria met its obligations under the EU. 141 Article 25 prohibiting extradition was also amended to provide an exception for the European Arrest Warrant. 142
Although these constitutional amendments were designed to address some of the primary concerns expressed by the Commission during the negotiations, many of Bulgarias existing provisions remain inconsistent with EU law and the acquis. For instance, although Bulgaria amended Article 4(3) to provide for the delegation of sovereignty once the state became a member, the language of the provision remains problematic. There is no mention of delegation of sovereignty to the EU or international organizations; rather, Article 4(3) only mentions that Bulgaria will participate in the building and development of the European Union. 143
Bulgaria has since amended its Constitution two more times, but has not changed the language of this particular provision. Moreover, Articles 5(4) and 85(3) limit the supremacy of ratified treaties and international law only to state statutes and not the Constitution. 144
Between the signing of the Treaty and accession to membership on January 1, 2007, the Commission closely monitored Bulgarias progress in implementing the necessary reforms to comply with the acquis. 145 The Unions primary concerns centered on the independence of the judiciary, combating corruption and money laundering, and suppressing organized crime. 146 To address these concerns before its entry into the EU, Bulgaria adopted another series of constitutional amendments in 2006. 147 Article 70 was amended to clarify and provide for immunity for
140 BULGARIAN CONST., art. 22 (1991), available at http://www.parliament.bg/en/const. 141 See BULGARIAN CONST., art. 22 (1991); compare 1991 BULGARIAN CONST., art. 22 (1991), available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/BUL%201991%20Constitution%20of%20Bulgaria%20(English).pdf. 142 BULGARIAN CONST., art. 4(3) (1991). 143 BULGARIAN CONST., art. 25 (1991). 144 See BULGARIAN CONST., art. 5(4) and 85(3) (1991), 145 European Commission, Report on Bugarias Progress in Accompnaying Measures Following Accession, (Jun. 27, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/abc/pre_accession/key_documents/index_en.htm. 146 European Commission, Report on Bugarias Progress in Accompanying Measures Following Accession (Jun. 27, 2007). 147 European Commission, Report on Bugarias Progress in Accompanying Measures Following Accession (Jun. 27, 2007). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 20 Members of the National Assembly. Moreover, an office of the Ombudsman was established to defend the rights and freedoms of citizens. 148
Additional reforms to the judicial sector included clarifying the role and independence of the Prosecution Office and diminishing the authority of the Minister of Justice in appointing, disciplining, and removing judges. 149 The independence of the Judiciary was further strengthened in 2007 (after Bulgarias official entry into membership) when Bulgaria adopted two more amendments to address the Commissions concerns. Article 130 was amended to eliminate any ambiguities in the independence and accountability of the Supreme Judicial Council and further exclude the Ministry of Justice from influencing the Judiciary. Article 132 was also amended to establish the independent judicial inspectorate to monitor the integrity of the judiciary and follow-up on complaints. 150
In addition to these constitutional amendments, the Commission urged the government to adopt implementing legislation and develop the administrative structures necessary to execute and apply the reforms. Regulations to evaluate the professionalism and ethics of magistrates were adopted, and the penal code reformed to strengthen accountability mechanisms. 151 Additionally, anti- corruption measures needed to be reinforced, with procedural training provided for police investigators and ethics training provided for prosecutors and magistrates. 152
Toward this end, the Commission established the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism in 2006 to monitor and set benchmarks for improving the judicial sector. 153 The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism continues to monitor the progress of Bulgaria in reforming its judiciary, still voicing concerns for continued reforms in the penal code, the provision of protection mechanisms for victims and witnesses, and improved anti-corruption measures for high-level officials. 154
Economic Criteria The European Commissions 2006 Report confirmed that Bulgaria had a functioning market economy and had made significant progress in its fiscal and
148 BULGARIAN CONST., art. 91(a) (1991). 149 European Commission, Report on Bugarias Progress in Accompanying Measures Following Accession (Jun. 27, 2007). 150 European Commission, Report on Bulgarias Progress on Accompanying Measures Following Accession, sec. 3.1 (Jun. 27, 2007); see also BULGARIAN CONST., Ch. 6 (1991). 151 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, p. 14 (2006). 152 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, p. 15 (2006). 153 European Commission, Commission Decisions, p. 2 (2006). See also European Commission, Report on Bulgarias Progress in Accompanying Measures Following Accession, (Jun. 27, 2007). 154 European Commission, Report on Bulgarias Progress on Accompanying Measures Following Accession, p. 11- 15 (Jun. 27, 2007). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 21 wage policies, as well as in the privatization and liberalization of trade. 155
However, certain issues still needed to be addressed, including containing Bulgarias high external deficit, easing the regulatory framework for businesses and the labor market, and improving the functioning of the judicial system. 156
Bulgaria has halted its euro membership plans 157 and has not adopted constitutional provisions in relation to the economic conditions of the Copenhagen Criteria. 158
The existing constitutional provisions provide only that the National Assembly has authority to elect and remove the Governor of the National Bank. 159 Absent other conflicting provisions, it is unclear whether the Commission will require constitutional reform to ensure the independence of the Bank.
Adoption of Acquis In its 2006 Report, the Commission noted that significant progress has been made with regard to the free movement of persons, the free movement of services, including banking and securities, and agriculture and fisheries policies. 160
However, progress is needed in other areas, including preparing for applying the Schengen acquis, which are rules and regulations arising from the Schengen Agreement, 161 and meeting the EUs goals for monetary union. 162 In particular, the Commission noted the vulnerability of Bulgarias borders with regard to trafficking in human beings and goods, as well as its position as a transit state for the smuggling of drugs. 163
155 European Commission, Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, p. 22 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/sept/report_bg_ro_2006_en.pdf. 156 European Commission, Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, p. 22-23 (Sept. 26, 2006). 157 Benjamin Fox, Bulgaria Shelves Euro Membership Plans, EUROOBSERVER (Sept. 4, 2012), available at http://euobserver.com/economic/117415. 158 See BULGARIAN CONST. (1991). 159 BULGARIAN CONST., art. 84(a) (1991). 160 European Commission, Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, p. 22 (Sept. 26, 2006). 161 Council of the European Union, the Schengen Acquis, p. 3 (1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/sept/report_bg_ro_2006_en.pdf. 162 European Commission, Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, p. 31 (Sept. 26, 2006). 163 European Commission, Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, p. 31 (Sept. 26, 2006). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 22 Croatia
Croatia applied for EU membership in 2003 and was in negotiations from 2005 until 2011. 164 Croatia closed accession negotiations with the EU on June 30, 2011, 165 and on December 9, 2011, Croatia signed an Accession Treaty to become the European Unions twenty-eighth member. 166 The EU expects the ratification process by the parliaments of the EU Member States to conclude by the end of June 2013. 167 Thus, Croatias entry into the EU is set for July 1, 2013. 168
Political Criteria Throughout Croatias accession process, the Commission was primarily concerned with strengthening the judiciary, combating corruption, and protecting human rights. 169 To address these concerns, on June 16, 2010, the Croatian government adopted a number of constitutional amendments in preparation for accession to the EU. 170 Some revisions were to take effect immediately, while others referring to the European Union and EU citizens would only take effect upon Croatias accession to the Community in 2013. 171 Revisions relating to the protection of minorities and the independence of the judiciary were promulgated immediately. The government expanded the introduction to the Constitution describing Croatia as a state of autochthonous national minorities to include twelve additional ethnic groups as recognized minorities, including Bosniaks and Roma. 172 Alongside this change, Croatia also passed the Constitutional Act Amending the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act, which expanded representation of minorities in the Croatian Parliament, and provided greater protection for the Serbian minority by recognizing the Serbian National Council. 173
164 European Commission, Croatia (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country- information/croatia/index_en.htm. 165 European Commission, EU Closes Accession Negotiations with Croatia (Jun. 30, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/824&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiL anguage=en. 166 European Commission, Croatia (2012). See also European Commission, EU Closes Accession Negotiations with Croatia (Jun. 30, 2011). 167 European Commission, EU Closes Accession Negotiations with Croatia (Jun. 30, 2011). 168 European Commission, EU Closes Accession Negotiations with Croatia (Jun. 30, 2011). 169 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, 9 (2011). 170 See CROATIAN CONST., ch. 8 (1990), available at http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2405. 171 CROATIAN CONST., art. 152 (1990). 172 See CROATIAN CONST., ch. I (1990). 173 See Constitutional Act Amending the Constitutional National Minority Rights Act (Croatia, 2010), available at http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2448. See also Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (Croatia, 2002), available at http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Constitutional-Law- on-the-Rights-NM.pdf. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 23 Croatia also implemented a judicial reform package that included a number of constitutional amendments pertaining to the independence of the judiciary. For instance, the amendments removed the probationary 5-year initial term period for judges and the Deputy Prosecutors General. 174 Instead, the language was changed to provide for life tenure at the outset of their appointment. 175 The revised language also affirmed the independence of the National Judiciary Council and its authority to autonomously decide on the appointment, dismissal, and disciplinary accountability of judges, removing any requirement to first consult the Parliament before taking such action. 176 Similarly, the revised Constitution removed any provision granting the Parliament authority to appoint the Public Prosecutors Council, the independent body responsible for keeping the Public Prosecutors accountable. 177 The 2010 amendments also inserted Article 54 into the Constitution, establishing a State Audit Office as the supreme audit institution in the state. 178
Other provisions relating to EU integration were also added to the Constitution, including the rights of EU citizens, the rights of Croatian citizens in the EU, the primacy of EU law, and the extradition procedures, to take effect only upon Croatias accession on July 1, 2013. 179 Article 9(2) was included to provide for an exception to the rule forbidding the extradition of Croatian citizens in accordance with the acquis. Additionally, an entire chapter on the EU was added. 180 The chapter sets forth the legal grounds for Croatias membership into the EU, the states participation in EU institutions, the role of Community law in domestic jurisprudence, and the rights of Croat citizens as citizens of the EU. 181
These rights include freedom of movement in Croatia, and active and passive voting rights in any European parliamentary elections or local elections of Member States in accordance with that Member States law. 182
Economic Criteria In its 2011 Progress Report for Croatia, the European Commission declared that Croatia had maintained a functioning market economy. 183 Despite rising
174 See CROATIAN CONST., art. 123, 125 (1990). See also CROATIAN CONST. (1990) (2001 version), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b551c.pdf. 175 See CROATIAN CONST., art. 123, 125 (1990). See also CROATIAN CONST. (1990) (2001 version). 176 See CROATIAN CONST., art. 124 (1990). See also CROATIAN CONST., art. 123 (1990) (2001 version). 177 See CROATIAN CONST., art. 125 (1990). See also CROATIAN CONST., art 124 (1990) (2001 version). 178 CROATIAN CONST., art. 54 (1990). 179 CROATIAN CONST., art. 152 (1990). 180 CROATIAN CONST., ch. VIII (1990). 181 CROATIAN CONST., art. 133(4),144-146 (1990). 182 CROATIAN CONST., art. 146 (1990). 183 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, 23 (2011). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 24 unemployment and the increase in the external debt, prudent measures by monetary authorities contained the fiscal deficit to support market institutions. 184
Moreover, the Commission found that Croatia had an open economy and trade policies in line with EU policy. 185 As mentioned earlier, Croatia established the authority and independence of the State Audit Office to ensure good governance over all political and financial matters within the government. 186 Moreover, Croatia made substantial progress in aligning its monetary policy with the acquis by amending the Constitution to ensure the full independence of the Central Bank. 187 The original constitutional provision provided that the Bank would be responsible to the Croatian Parliament. 188 This provision was revised to provide that the Bank would only report on its work to the Croatian Parliament. 189
Moreover, the revised provision established the authority of the Governor of the Croatian National Bank to manage and operate the Bank. 190 The government also later adopted lower-level measures incorporating the Croatian National Bank into the European System of Central Banks to participate in the operation of all European Central Bank institutions. 191
Adoption of the Acquis As a result of its progress within the political and economic criteria, Croatia was commended for its alignment of political and economic policy with the acquis. 192 In particular, the Commission noted Croatias recent passage of legislation relating to migration, immigration, and asylum policies as consistent with the Communitys union objectives. 193 Moreover, alignment with the acquis is mentioned throughout the amended Constitution, particularly with regard to the provisions relating to EU integration. 194 With regard to the other acquis chapters, such as the free movement of capital and people, economic and monetary policy,
184 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, 23 (2011). 185 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, 24 (2011). 186 CROATIAN CONST., art. 54 (1990). See also European Commission, Croatia 2010 Progress Report, 64 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/hr_rapport_2010_en.pdf. 187 European Commission, Croatia 2010 Progress Report, 41 (2010). 188 CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990) (2001 version). 189 CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990). 190 CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990). 191 Croatian National Bank, the Republic of Croatia and the EU (2012), available at http://www.hnb.hr/medjunarodna_suradnja/emedjunarodna_suradnja.htm. 192 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 10 (Apr. 24, 2012). 193 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 12 (Apr. 24, 2012). 194 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 12 (Apr. 24, 2012). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 25 and foreign security, alignment with EU law is almost complete. 195 Though some outstanding issues remain, Croatia appears on track for EU membership having reached a considerable degree of alignment with the acquis. 196
Serbia
In 2003, the EU identified Serbia as a potential candidate for EU membership during the Thessaloniki European Council summit. In 2008, the European Council adopted a European Partnership for Serbia, setting out priorities for the state's membership application. 197 In 2009, Serbia formally applied for membership to the EU. 198 Recently, in March 2012, the EU granted Serbia EU candidate status. 199
Political Criteria Serbia adopted a new Constitution in 2006 in an effort to distance itself from the 1990 Constitution that had been associated with the presidency of Slobodan Milosevic. 200 Although similarly drafted as its predecessor, the 2006 Constitution passed via referendum as a means to preserve the province of Kosovo and Metohija permanently within the sovereign state of Serbia. At the time, the United Nations was discussing the future of Kosovo, and Serbia moved quickly to name the province of Kosovo and Metohija an integral part of the territory of Serbia, [with] the status of substantial autonomy within he sovereign state of Serbia. 201
Other changes to the Constitution included the elimination of social property and reference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since Montenegro had declared independence in early 2006. 202
195 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 12 (Apr. 24, 2012). 196 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 12 (Apr. 24, 2012). 197 European Commission, Serbia (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country- information/serbia/index_en.htm. 198 European Commission, Serbia (2011). 199 European Commission, Serbia (2011). 200 RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty, Timeline: the Political Career of Slobodan Milosevic (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1066641.html. 201 SERBIA CONST., Preamble (2006), available at http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php?change_lang=en. 202 Nicholas Wood, Montenegrins Elect to End Union with Serbia, NEW YORK TIMES (May 22, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/world/europe/22cnd-monte.html. Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 26 As a fairly new constitution, and one that had received comments from the Venice Commission prior to its adoption, 203 the European Commission commended the Constitution as largely in line with European standards. 204
Implementing the Constitution, however, remains a key priority and Serbia has been slow in adopting the necessary laws and mechanisms required by the Constitution. 205 For instance, Article 110 of the Constitution provides that [t]he Law on the National Parliament shall be enacted, 206 but the Serbian Parliament only enacted the relevant law in February 2010. 207 The law established parliamentary budgetary autonomy through a separate budget as opposed to the previous practice of government-decided allocations. 208 Moreover, Article 185 of the Constitution provides for the adoption of the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, 209 which will regulate the competencies of the province. However, the Serbian Parliament has yet to adopt such a law. 210
Despite its high level of compliance with European standards, some constitutional provisions remain problematic; in particular, the level of control by political parties over parliamentary mandates and the Parliaments role in the appointment and dismissal of the judiciary. 211 Article 102 provides that a deputy shall be free to irrevocably put his/her term of office at disposal to the political party that elected him or her. 212 Such authority grants political parties tremendous influence over parliamentary mandates. In addition, the National Assembly has constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss five justices of the Constitutional Court, 213 appoint the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation and lower court judges, 214 as well as appoint the Civic Defender 215 and Republic Public Prosecutor. 216 If the Commission finds that these provisions compromise the independence of the judiciary, Serbia may have to adopt constitutional amendments or lower-level legislation to resolve these areas of conflict.
203 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia (Mar. 17-18, 2007), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)004-e.pdf. 204 European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, 6 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/sr_rapport_2012_en.pdf. 205 European Commission, Serbia 2010 Progress Report, 6 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/sr_rapport_2010_en.pdf. 206 SERBIAN CONST., art. 110 (2006). 207 European Commission, Serbia 2010 Progress Report, 6 (2010). 208 European Commission, Serbia 2010 Progress Report, 6 (2010). 209 SERBIAN CONST., art. 185 (2006). 210 European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, 17 (2012). 211 European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, 6 (2012). 212 SERBIAN CONST., art. 102 (2006). 213 SERBIAN CONST., art. 172 (2006). 214 SERBIAN CONST., art. 144 (2006). 215 SERBIAN CONST., art. 138 (2006). 216 SERBIAN CONST., art. 158 (2006). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 27
Economic Criteria The European Commissions 2012 Progress Report did not mention any necessary constitutional reforms with regard to Serbia meeting the EUs economic criteria. 217 Although Article 95 of the Constitution establishes the National Bank of Serbia as an independent bank, 218 its accompanying provisions subject the Bank to potential political influence. The Bank is subject to supervision by the National Assembly and managed by the Governor elected by the National Assembly. 219 These provisions closely mirror the problematic provisions in the Croatian Constitution regarding the Croatian Central Bank, which the Commission determined granted excessive parliamentary authority and, therefore, undermined the independence of the Bank. 220 On the other hand, constitutional reform may be unnecessary as the Constitution provides for the enactment of the Law on the National Bank of Serbia. 221 Like Slovenia, Serbia may only need to reform lower- level legislation to make sure the Bank is free from political influence.
Adoption of the Acquis As mentioned above, the Commission commended the Serbian Constitution as in line with European standards. Serbia, however, still needs to develop and strengthen administrative institutions and policies to meet its obligations under the acquis. For instance, in the area of consumer protection and health, the Commission urged the government to strengthen efforts implementing the existing legislative framework and to foster institutional cooperation between consumer protection organizations and public health programs. 222 Similarly, in the area of education and culture, while Serbia was commended for reforming the education system to be more socially inclusive of ethnic minorities, implementation of such reforms has been slow. 223
Conclusion
The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) provides that any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) [of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law] may apply to
217 SERBIAN CONST., art. 95 (2006). 218 SERBIAN CONST., art. 95 (2006). 219 SERBIAN CONST., art. 95 (2006). 220 See CROATIAN CONST., art. 53 (1990); see also CROATIAN CONST., art 53 (1990) (2001 version). 221 SERBIAN CONST., art. 95 (2006). 222 European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, 60 (2012). 223 European Commission, Serbia 2012 Progress Report, 56 (2012). Const. Reforms for EU Accession, November 2012 28 become a member of the Union. 224 The Copenhagen Criteria provides uniform standards by which states may become members. Meeting these criteria typically requires a number of institutional changes, including constitutional reform. The EU reviews the applications of candidate states on a case-by-case basis, assessing both the constitutional and administrative framework to support the state in meeting its Community obligations. Candidate states generally adopt constitutional amendments that allow the state to delegate sovereignty to the European Union, give primacy to European Community Law, extend voting rights to non-citizens, and reaffirm the independence of the judiciary.
224 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union arts. 6(1), 49 (2003).
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